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Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rjih20 Journal of Intelligence History ISSN: 1616-1262 (Print) 2169-5601 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rjih20 A visual examination of the battle of Prokhorovka Ben Wheatley To cite this article: Ben Wheatley (2019): A visual examination of the battle of Prokhorovka, Journal of Intelligence History, DOI: 10.1080/16161262.2019.1606545 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2019.1606545 Published online: 13 May 2019. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 2535 View Crossmark data

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Page 1: A visual examination of the battle of Prokhorovkabodenplatte-45.narod.ru/A_visual_examination_of_the...‘The Death Ride of the Panzers? Recent Historiography on the Battle of Kursk’,inJournal

Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found athttps://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rjih20

Journal of Intelligence History

ISSN: 1616-1262 (Print) 2169-5601 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rjih20

A visual examination of the battle of Prokhorovka

Ben Wheatley

To cite this article: Ben Wheatley (2019): A visual examination of the battle of Prokhorovka,Journal of Intelligence History, DOI: 10.1080/16161262.2019.1606545

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2019.1606545

Published online: 13 May 2019.

Submit your article to this journal

Article views: 2535

View Crossmark data

Page 2: A visual examination of the battle of Prokhorovkabodenplatte-45.narod.ru/A_visual_examination_of_the...‘The Death Ride of the Panzers? Recent Historiography on the Battle of Kursk’,inJournal

A visual examination of the battle of ProkhorovkaBen Wheatley

School of History, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK

ABSTRACTThe battle of Prokhorovka was steeped in Soviet legend (and myth)for many decades. This remained the case until post-Soviet eraresearch revealed the reality of a Soviet armoured disaster. Buildingon this knowledge this article explores Luftwaffe reconnaissancephotographs taken in the days and weeks immediately followingthe battle of Prokhorovka. The photographs provide visual confirma-tion across the battlefield of the demise of the 5th Guards Tank Army’s18th and 29th Tank Corps’. The battle’s most famous locations arevisualized (many for the first time) in wartime photographs; theseinclude the notorious anti-tank ditch, Hill 252.2, Oktiabrskiy statefarm, Storozhevoye Woods and the site of Tiger tank duels on andclose to Hill 241.6.

ARTICLE HISTORYReceived 05 April 2019Accepted 09 April 2019

KEYWORDSProkhorovka; kursk;operation citadel; easternfront; nazi germany; sovietunion; second world war;luftwaffe

Introduction

It is important to preface this article by stating my sincere admiration for the Soviet tankcrews and their supporting units’ heroism. The sheer scale of the disaster that unfolded on12 July 1943 for the 5th Guards Tank Army should not in any way diminish from theimmense sacrifice the Red Army troops made for their Motherland. This article is based onphotographic evidence of the battlefield south-west of Prokhorovka, and as such thephotographs paint a truly horrific picture of destruction. The impact of seeing so manydestroyed tanks and the knowledge that each Soviet tank contained four soldiers is deeplysobering. The author felt it only right to mark this sacrifice.

The photographs in this article were taken by Luftwaffe reconnaissance planes in the daysimmediately following the battle of Prokhorovka; as such they are historically significant. Thechief protagonists of the battle of Prokhorovka, the Soviet 5th Guards Tank Army and theGerman SS PanzergrenadierDivision ‘Leibstandarte SSAdolfHitler’, fought over a battlefrontof no more than 3 km between the river Psel and the Storozhevoye Woods. Therefore, thelocation of one of the most famous battles of the Second World War was able to bephotographed by the Luftwaffe in a single shot. Specifically and importantly photographsare available from 14 and 16 July when the battlefield was still in German hands (the Germanschose to withdraw from the area on 17 July). The battlefield remained largely unaltered from12 July. As a result, these photographs depict the Soviet armoured disaster (the entire 5th

Guards Tank Army lost around 235 fighting vehicles written off) with absolute clarity.1 There

CONTACT Ben Wheatley [email protected] School of History, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK1Frieser, Karl-Heinz, The Battle of the Kursk Salient in The Research Institute for Military History, Potsdam, Germany,Germany and the Second World War Volume VIII – The Eastern Front 1943–1944 (Oxford: Clarendon Press 2017), 130.

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are also important photographs from 7 August, which although 3 weeks later, further high-light the scale of the Soviet disaster. Comparisons made between the July photographs GX-2696-SK-23, GX-2696-SK-24, GX-2696-SK-52, GX-3734-SK-61 and the August photographsGX-3942-SK-69, GX-3942-SD-124 are highly revealing.2 Destroyed tanks visible in both Julyand August indicate that they were in all probability lost on 12 July. We know this as in themain attack sectors from 13 July, the Soviets went onto the defensive as a result of theextremely heavy losses they sustained the previous day.3 Equally the Germans, havingrecaptured their forward positions on 12 July, were content to await developments on theirflanks before resuming the advance.4 These factors are of real importance.As a result, the frontlines of 16 July were virtually identical to those of 12 July which protected the authenticity ofthe Prokhorovka battlefield in photographGX-3734-SK-61 (the photographwhich depicts themajority of the battlefield) whichwas taken on 16 July. German tank losses wereminuscule bycomparison, with just five battle tanks ultimately beingwritten off (including four Pz IVs closeto Hill 252.2). All other damaged tanks were located in secure firing positions (i.e. behind theline of the anti-tank ditch) and were recovered before 16 July and later repaired.5 In terms ofarmouredwarfare the Leibstandartemostly used superiormodern 75mm long barrelled, highvelocity, long rangeweapons such as the Pak 40 L46 anti-tank gun, Pz IVL48 (someL43) tank,StuG L48 assault gun and Marder III (or equivalent) L46 tank destroyer, while 4 Tiger tankswith 88 mm L56 main guns and thick armour proved devastating. The Soviets’ main battletank the T-34 76 mm was greatly outclassed in hitting power by all these weapons.6 TheGermans fought much of the battle of Prokhorovka at arm’s length firing from stronglyfortified defensive positions. These positions actually formed part of the Soviets own 3rd

(army) line of defence–part of thewiderKursk defensive system.7Therefore the vast numbersof destroyed tanks (forward of the infamous anti-tank ditch and the adjacent Stalinsk statefarm) visible in photograph GX-3734-SK-61 of 16 July are almost without exception Soviet.8

The reality is that there were only seven German tanks (all Pz IVs), assault guns or tank

For an account of the research that led to this study see the author’s article ‘In Pursuit of Prokhorovka’, in Defence inDepth (2019) https://defenceindepth.co/

2The photographs used in this article are located at the US National Archives and Records Administration, College Park,MD and can be found in the Series RG 373: German Flown Aerial Photography, 1939–1945. See specificallyphotographs relating to the battlefield of Prokhorovka: for 14 July (tactical reconnaissance by a Bf 110 from NAG6 2.(H)33) see; GX-2696-SK-23, GX-2696-SK-24 and GX-2696-SK-52. For 16 July (strategic reconnaissance by a Ju 88from 2.(F)11) see; GX-3734-SK-61 (incorrectly dated as 15 July by NARA). For 7 August (strategic reconnaissance by aJu 88 from 2.(F)100) see; GX-3942-SK-69, GX-3942-SD-124.

3Frieser, Karl-Heinz, The Battle of the Kursk Salient in The Research Institute for Military History, Potsdam, Germany,Germany and the Second World War Volume VIII – The Eastern Front 1943–1944, 130.

4The Leibstandarte made a limited attack on 13 July in an attempt to find a weak spot in the soviet defences.The attack was aborted as soon as the panzers were met by anti-tank fire. In any event the advance wasaway and forward of the original battlefield of 12 July, i.e. from the anti-tank ditch, Hill 252.2 and theOktiabrskiy state farm as a result the battlefield around these sites was largely preserved until the Germanswithdrew on 17 July – which of course is visually significant in terms of the content of GX-3734-SK-61 whichis dated 16 July. Frieser, Karl-Heinz, The Battle of the Kursk Salient in The Research Institute for MilitaryHistory, Potsdam, Germany, Germany and the Second World War Volume VIII – The Eastern Front 1943–1944,130 & 136n. For the direction of this German attack see Glantz, David & House, Jonathan, The Battle of Kursk(London: Ian Allan 1999), 214–15.

5Frieser, Karl-Heinz, The Battle of the Kursk Salient in The Research Institute for Military History, Potsdam, Germany,Germany and the Second World War Volume VIII – The Eastern Front 1943–1944, 129. See also Töppel, Roman, ‘Kursk –Mythen und Wirklichkeit einer Schlacht’, in Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 57 (2009), 376–77.

6Frieser, Karl-Heinz, The Battle of the Kursk Salient in The Research Institute for Military History, Potsdam, Germany,Germany and the Second World War Volume VIII – The Eastern Front 1943–194, 162.

7Ibid., 177.8NARA RG 373: German Flown Aerial Photography, 1939–1945. GX-3734-SK-61 (16 July 1943).

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destroyers deployed forward of this line on 12 July.9 It is impossible to do justice to the originalphotographs by highlighting segments of them. However, for the purpose of this article it wasthe only viable option. I would strongly recommend anyone interested in the battle to viewthese photographs at the NARA or to seek their professional reproduction.10 The reader isadvised to regularly refer to Figures 1–3 when viewing the battlefield photographs for thepurposes of battlefield orientation.11

Over the years the historiography of the battle of Prokhorovka has evolved from one ofSoviet myth (stemming from General Rotmistrov’s need to justify to Stalin the 5th GuardsTank Army’s heavy losses; Rotmistrov claimed the Germans lost 400 tanks, including70 Tiger tanks) to today’s reality of scholarly accuracy.12 The work of Niklas Zetterling andAnders Frankson, Valeriy Zamulin, Roman Töppel and Karl-Heinz Frieser has been instru-

Figure 1. The tank battle at Prokhorovka on 12 July, Source: Map II.IV.6., Frieser, Karl-Heinz Germanyand the Second World War Volume VIII – The Eastern Front 1943–1944 (Oxford: Clarendon Press 2017).Reproduced with permission of the Licensor through PLSclear.

9Frieser, Karl-Heinz, The Battle of the Kursk Salient in The Research Institute for Military History, Potsdam, Germany,Germany and the Second World War Volume VIII – The Eastern Front 1943–1944, 124.

10I can highly recommend the work of cartographic researcher Susan Strange. Email: [email protected], Karl-Heinz, The Battle of the Kursk Salient in The Research Institute for Military History, Potsdam, Germany,Germany and the Second World War Volume VIII – The Eastern Front 1943–1944, 182.

12For an excellent summary of the evolving historiography of the battle of Kursk see Lak, Martijn. ‘The Death Ride of thePanzers? Recent Historiography on the Battle of Kursk’, in Journal of Military History, 82:3 (2018) 909–19. See alsoFrieser, Karl-Heinz, The Battle of the Kursk Salient in The Research Institute for Military History, Potsdam, Germany,Germany and the Second World War Volume VIII – The Eastern Front 1943–1944, 132.

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Figure 3. A contemporary perspective of the battlefield; Source Google Maps.

Figure 2. GX-3734-SK-61 16 July – Battlefield of 29th Tank Corps.

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mental in moving historiography across the world towards the true reality of the eventsduring the battle of Prokhorovka.13 Frieser’s contribution to the semi-official study by theGerman Research Institute for Military History in Potsdam is superbly accurate and yetconcise. It is this description of the battle (one can hardly say interpretation due to its highlevel of accuracy) which provides this article with its context and battlefield commentary inrelation in particular to the fighting in the 29th Tank Corps sector. The author wishes to thankOUP for agreeing to the use of this text and the excellent battlefield map contained in thisarticle.

To the author, it seems impossible that any worthwhile publication or exhibition relatingto the battle of Prokhorovka could not include the remarkable Luftwaffe photographscontained within this article. To further aid the reader I have included contemporaryphotographs of the battlefield obtained via Google which are highly useful in establishingthe topography of the battlefield. For example, one cannot get a true understanding of theavailable fields of fire from the Luftwaffe photographs. Therefore, GoogleMaps and GoogleStreet View have proved to be vital tools in the formulation of this article.

Citadel in the south – the prelude to Prokhorovka

It is no exaggeration to say that by the summer of 1943 Germany’s overall strategicsituation on the Eastern Front was hopeless. Following the tremendous losses sustainedduring the first 2 years of the war on the Eastern Front, and faced with an enemy witha seemingly endless supply of troops and tanks, the German Army’s only realistic course ofaction for 1943 was one of strategic defence.14 Indeed, on 18 February 1943 Hitler statedthat he was ‘unable to undertake any large-scale operations this year’ but ‘only smallforays’, Operation Citadel (as the German offensive against the Kursk salient wouldultimately be known) was therefore conceived by General Kurt Zeitzler, Chief of theArmy General Staff, within this overall defensive context.15 On 13 March 1943, Hitlerissued Operations Order No. 5 for a pincer attack on the 120 km deep and 200 km wideKursk Salient. Army Group Centre’s 9th Army was to form the northern arm of the pincer,while the southern arm was to be formed of Army Group South’s 4th Panzer Army andArmy Detachment Kempf.16 It was assumed the offensive would commence in the 2ndhalf of April with the operation expected to last no more than 18 days.17 Citadel had twokey objectives, firstly the operation was to straighten the front. By cutting off the protrud-ing Kursk salient, a more favourable defensive line would be achieved, enabling troops tobe withdrawn from the Eastern Front for the anticipated two-front war with the western

13Zetterling, Niklas & Frankson, Anders, Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis (London: Frank Cass, 2000), Zamulin, Valeriy,Demolishing the Myth: The Tank Battle at Prokhorovka, Kursk, July 1943: An Operational Narrative (Solihull: Helion2011), Töppel, Roman, Kursk 1943: The Greatest Battle of the Second World War (Solihull: Helion 2018) & Frieser, Karl-Heinz, The Battle of the Kursk Salient in The Research Institute for Military History, Potsdam, Germany, Germany andthe Second World War Volume VIII – The Eastern Front 1943–1944.

14Kroener, Bernhard, Management of Human Resources, Deployment of the Population, and Manning the Armed Forces inthe Second Half of the War (1942–1944) in The Research Institute for Military History, Potsdam, Germany, Germany andthe Second World War Volume V/II, (Oxford: Clarendon Press 2003), 1018–20. See also Frieser, Karl-Heinz, The Battle ofthe Kursk Salient in The Research Institute for Military History, Potsdam, Germany, Germany and the Second World WarVolume VIII – The Eastern Front 1943–1944, 168–69.

15Wegner, Bernd, From Stalingrad to Kursk in The Research Institute for Military History, Potsdam, Germany, Germanyand the Second World War Volume VIII – The Eastern Front 1943–1944, 62.

16Ibid., 69–72.17Forczyk, Robert, Kursk 1943: The Southern Front (Oxford: Osprey 2017), 30.

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powers. The second objective was to weaken the massive Soviet forces concentrated in theKursk area before they could launch an avalanche-like summer offensive in a concertedaction with the western powers. Unlike in 1941 and 1942, no German plans existed fora strategic offensive to follow. Operation Citadel constituted only a preventive attack withlimited aims within an overall defensive strategy.18 Following numerous delays to itslaunch (chiefly caused by slow panzer production and the concerns of Colonel-GeneralWalter Model, commander of 9th Army, over the weakness of his forces and the prospectof a counter-offensive in his rear) Operation Citadel was finally launched on 5 July 1943.19

For their part, the Soviets had decided on a strategic defence to absorb the coming Germanoffensive at Kursk to be followed by strong counter-offensives against the fatally weakenedGerman forces.20 To help ensure the success of these counter-offensives a large strategicreserve had been formed (Steppe Front with 449,133 troops & 1,632 tanks and assaultguns). For Citadel, in the north 9th Army (223,000 troops & 988 tanks and assault guns)was opposed by Central Front (510,983 troops & 1,607 tanks and assault guns), while toModel’s rear Bryansk Front (335,068 troops & 1,525 tanks and assault guns) and WestFront (226,043 troops & 1,737 tanks and assault guns) stood ominously poised to strikeagainst 2nd Panzer Army (107,000 troops & 234 tanks and assault guns) in the Orel salient.In the south Army Group South’s 4th Panzer Army and Army Detachment Kempf(combined strength: 215,271 troops & 1,377 tanks and assault guns) were opposed byVoronezh Front (466,236 troops & 1,699 tanks and assault guns). The German 2nd Army(80,000 troops & 100 assault guns) which saw no significant fighting in July, held thewestern edge of the Kursk salient.21

By 9 July (5th day of Operation Citadel) units of Army Group South, under thecommand of Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, had already reached the river Psel thelast natural obstacle before Kursk.22 The original idea was for XXXXVIII Panzer Korps(deployed on the left wing) to carry the main thrust of the attack, this plan had to beabandoned as the Korps had struggled to break through in depth. The II SS PanzerKorps made faster progress (breaking through the Soviets 2nd defensive system on the2nd day of the offensive), this shifted the main thrust of the offensive north-east in thedirection of Prokhorovka. The III Panzer Korps fared even worse and was for sometime stuck close to its start lines- this exposed the right flank of the II SS Panzer Korps,there was a shortage of infantry to man such a unplanned overextension of front.23

The Soviet leadership were deeply concerned by the rapid progress of the II SSPanzer Korps. Nikolai Vatutin, commander of Voronezh Front, had deployed almost allhis operational reserves including 1st Tank Army (which had been deployed defen-sively) on 6 July. The Soviet High Command (Stavka) was forced to call open theStrategic Reserve which had been earmarked for the Soviet strategic summer offensiveto follow a defensive victory. 2nd and 10th Tank Corps and 5th Guards Tank Army were

18Frieser, Karl-Heinz, The Battle of the Kursk Salient in The Research Institute for Military History, Potsdam, Germany,Germany and the Second World War Volume VIII – The Eastern Front 1943–1944, 168–69.

19Wegner, Bernd, From Stalingrad to Kursk in The Research Institute for Military History, Potsdam, Germany, Germanyand the Second World War Volume VIII – The Eastern Front 1943–1944, 76.

20Glantz, David, Soviet Military Intelligence in War (Oxon: Frank Cass 1990), 185–99.21Frieser, Karl-Heinz, The Battle of the Kursk Salient in The Research Institute for Military History, Potsdam, Germany,Germany and the Second World War Volume VIII – The Eastern Front 1943–1944, 100.

22Ibid, 117.23Ibid., 113–14.

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put to march on 8 July, other major formations of Steppe Front were called upon suchas 5th Guards Army, 27th and 53rd Armies, and finally 4th Guards Army.24

Despite Vatutin’s defensive deployment, Soviet armour had suffered catastrophiclosses. The tank units of 6th & 7th Army were largely destroyed in the first two days ofthe offensive. By 10 July 1st Tank Army had shrunk from an original 646 to 100 tanksand assault guns. Up to and including 13 July, Voronezh Front (together with reservesbrought in) lost a total of 1,223 tanks and assault guns. A large proportion of thoselosses were incurred in the first few days of the battle. By contrast, up to and including10 July the attacking units of Army Group South lost only 116 tanks and assault guns,although they had to fight their way through enemy positions under the most adverseconditions.25

12 July 1943 – the opposing forces

The Stavka envisaged 12 July as the decisive day in the battle of Kursk. To the north ofthe Kursk salient, Bryansk Front and large parts of West Front launched an offensiveagainst the thinned-out 2nd Panzer Army. When the front collapsed, Walter Model’s 9th

Army would have to halt its advance on Kursk. A destructive strike on the attackingformations of Army Group South was also planned for the same day. The strongestweapon was the 5th Guards Tank Army under the commanded of Pavel Rotmistrov,whose total of 909 tanks and 43 assault guns were intended to smash the battle-worn IISS Panzer Korps at Prokhorovka.26

On 12 July the whole of II SS Panzer Korps had at its disposal a total of 211operational battle tanks, 72 assault guns and 43 tank destroyers. However, since SSPanzergrenadier Division Totenkopf was attacking northwards on that date on the farside of the river Psel, there remained only SS Panzergrenadier Divisions Leibstandarteand Das Reich, with a total of 117 battle tanks, 51 assault guns, and 32 tank destroyers,that is, 200 fighting vehicles in all, which could be deployed against 5th Guards TankArmy.27

On the morning of 12 July, Rotmistrov possessed 838 operational fighting vehicles,and a further 96 tanks were brought in. Of his five corps, he kept 5th GuardsMechanized Corps in reserve and deployed around 100 of its tanks to secure his leftflank against the III Panzer Korps approaching from the South. Thus, 672 Soviet

24Ibid., 115.25This paragraph is used with permission of OUP. Reproduced with permission of the Licensor through PLSclear. Frieser,Karl-Heinz, The Battle of the Kursk Salient in The Research Institute for Military History, Potsdam, Germany, Germanyand the Second World War Volume VIII – The Eastern Front 1943–1944 (Oxford: Clarendon Press 2017), 117.

26The XXXXVIII Panzer Korps and the II SS Panzer Korps were to be attacked from four directions: From the west by 1stTank Army, including 5th Guards Tank Corps and the newly arrived 10th Tank Corps, reinforced by infantry andartillery units; From the north-west by units of 6th Guards Army; From the north-east by 5th Guards Army, newlybrought in from Steppe Front. From the east by 5th Guards Tank Army, also brought in from Steppe Front, reinforcedby 2nd Tank Corps and 2nd Guards Tank Corps, plus a number of attached units. Further to the south-east 7th GuardsArmy had the task of breaking through the front on III Panzer Korps right flank and advancing its rear towardsRazumnoye (in the direction of Belgorod). Ibid, 119–20.

27This and the subsequent paragraph are used with permission of OUP. Reproduced with permission of the Licensorthrough PLSclear. Frieser, Karl-Heinz, The Battle of the Kursk Salient in The Research Institute for Military History,Potsdam, Germany, Germany and the Second World War Volume VIII – The Eastern Front 1943–1944 (Oxford: ClarendonPress 2017), 121–22. See: Zetterling, Niklas & Frankson, Anders, Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis, 106 & 187. See alsoTöppel, Roman, ‘Kursk – Mythen und Wirklichkeit einer Schlacht’, in Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 57 (2009), 375.

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fighting vehicles were effectively engaged that day in action against the 200 tanks,assault guns and tank destroyers of divisions Leibstandarte and Das Reich.Rotmistrov’s operational plan involved thrusts in two directions, the first of which isthe focus of this article:

● The main thrust was directed from the north-east frontally against SSPanzergrenadier Division Leibstandarte through the Prokhorovka corridorbetween the railway embankment and the river Psel. The riverbank was boggyand there were several ribbon villages along it, leaving a strip about only 3 km widein which to manoeuvre. In this section of the main thrust, 18th Tank Corps with190 battle tanks (96 T-34, 63 T-70 and 31 Churchill Tanks) was to attack on theright along the river Psel, and 29th Tank Corps with 192 battle tanks (122 T-34 and70 T-70) and 20 assault guns (Su 122 & SU 76) on the left along the railwayembankment. This meant that, in the very first phase of the battle, more than 400fighting vehicles advanced on the Leibstandarte Division, which had only 56 battletanks (5 Pz III, 47 Pz IV and 4 Pz VI – Tiger Tanks), 24 StuG assault guns, and 20Marder tank destroyers at its disposal.

● Another thrust was to be directed simultaneously from the east at the Germanflank, against the SS Panzergrenadier Division Das Reich, which was deployed onthe right alongside Leibstandarte. Here the attack was to be carried out by 2nd

Guards Tank Corps, supported by 2nd Tank Corps. Altogether 200 Soviet tanksstood ready, against which the German division could deploy 61 battle tanks (42Pz III, 18 Pz IV and 1 Pz VI), 27 StuG assault guns, and 12 Marder tank destroyers.

Account must also be taken of Voronezh Front formations, especially 69th Army, whichwere fighting in this sector anyway. In addition, units of 5th Guards Army, which wasalso part of the strategic reserve, were deployed in the zone of action of 5th Guards TankArmy, for example 9th Guards Paratroop Division. German intelligence was expectinga counter-attack, but by no means one of such dimensions.

The Leibstandarte’s tank and anti-tank capability

In July 1943 the Leibstandarte was the most powerful division Germany possessed. Thedivision was lavishly equipped, and, ominously for the Soviets, the division hada tremendous tank and anti-tank capability which we shall now explore.

The Leibstandarte was the first German division to be authorized to possess a panzerregiment with four medium companies in both of its organic panzer battalions. On1 May 1943, the Leibstandarte began to reorganize for Operation Citadel. As a result,the division’s armoured strength was greatly increased. Although the panzer regiment’sstrength had been temporarily reduced by its I battalion returning to Germany to be re-equipped with Pz Vs (Panthers), the division’s armoured strength was still formidable.The Leibstandarte’s II panzer battalion had become the first German panzer unit to befully equipped with Panzer IVs all armed with the long barrelled 75 mm high velocitymain gun.28

28Jentz, Thomas, (ed.) Panzer Truppen II (Atglen: Schiffer 1996), 52.

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Heinz Guderian, the newly installed General Inspector of Panzer Troops, had aspira-tions of equipping every panzer division in a similar fashion to the Leibstandarte (at least interms of battalion panzer strength) with four panzer battalions consisting of panzers, andassault guns or tank destroyers. Guderian hoped to reinstate the organic panzer brigadewithin each panzer division, something which had not been uniformly seen since 1940.Ideally, Guderian hoped the panzer brigades would consist of four or three tank battalions,but he recognized that due to sluggish tank production, two tank battalions, a StuGbattalion and a Panzer Jager battalion was a more realistic target. As a minimumGuderian desired a panzer regiment with two battalions for his panzer divisions, oneoutfitted with modern variants of the Panzer IV and the other with the new Panthertank.29 By the end of 1943, it was hoped that every panzer division would possess at leasta tank battalion of 79 long barrelled Pz IVs (the figure had been reduced from the original96). However, other than a few exceptions most of the army panzer divisions began thesummer of 1943 with a single mixed battalion of Pz III and Pz IVs. Even then many unitsstruggled to fill one battalion with enough tanks.30 For Citadel no division (including theLeibstandarte) yet possessed a panzer regiment with two battalions outfitted with 160-200modern medium tanks. Therefore, Leibstandarte began Citadel with a panzer regimentcontaining a single panzer battalion consisting of four medium companies. On 5 July thepanzer battalion could call upon 7 Pz IIs, 13 Pz IIIs, 83modern long barrelled Pz IVs and anattached heavy tank company fielding 13 Tiger tanks. It also possessed an assault gunbattalion consisting of three batteries with a total of 35 StuGs and an anti-tank battalionwith three companies fielding 21 Marder tank destroyers (8 more Marders arrived follow-ing the start of the offensive). The Leibstandarte launched Citadel with 172 tanks, assaultguns and tank destroyers in its inventory, crucially 152 of these fighting vehicles mountedlong barrelled high velocity weapons of 75 mm calibre (Pz IV variants F2, G, H, StuGassault guns and Marder III – or equivalent tank destroyers) or better (Tiger tankspossessed the excellent L56 88 mm main gun) which were capable of knocking out allSoviet tanks at long range.31 Nevertheless, it is important to reemphasize that on 12 Julyonly 95 of these fighting vehicles were operational. However, given their technical super-iority over the enemy’s tanks, this was a powerful force.32

Although designated a panzergrenadier division the Leibstandarte drew on elements ofthe table of organisations for panzer divisions, panzergrenadier divisions and even infantrydivisions. For example, the Leibstandarte (alongside the army’s Grossdeutschland and theother classic SS divisions Das Reich and Totenkopf) possessed six motorized panzergrena-dier battalions (three per panzergrenadier regiment) as would be expected ina panzergrenadier division. However, one of its six battalions (III battalion 2nd SSPanzergrenadier Regiment for the Leibstandarte) travelled in armoured personnel carriersrather than trucks. This would normally only be the preserve of panzer divisions. This gave

29Guderian, Heinz, Panzer Leader (Penguin: London 2009), 295–98.30Jentz, Thomas, (ed.) Panzer Truppen II, 52–53.31Zetterling, Niklas & Frankson, Anders, Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis, p.46. See also Frieser, Karl-Heinz, The Battle ofthe Kursk Salient in The Research Institute for Military History, Potsdam, Germany, Germany and the Second World WarVolume VIII – The Eastern Front 1943–1944, 160, and Niehorster, Leo, German World War II Organization Series, Volume5/III (Milton Keynes: The Military Press 2005), 47.

32Frieser, Karl-Heinz, The Battle of the Kursk Salient in The Research Institute for Military History, Potsdam, Germany,Germany and the Second World War Volume VIII – The Eastern Front 1943–1944, 122. See also: Zetterling, Niklas &Frankson, Anders, Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis, 187 and Töppel, Roman, ‘Kursk – Mythen und Wirklichkeit einerSchlacht’, in Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 57 (2009), 375.

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the panzers vital infantry support as they advanced, while affording the troops protectionagainst small arms and shrapnel. The Soviets possessed no equivalent throughout the war.A lack of infantry support was one of the key reasons that Soviet armoured spearheads wereregularly decimated. By contrast, a conventional panzer division would only possess fourpanzergrenadier battalions in its two panzergrenadier regiments (typically a panzer divisionhad a ration strength of around 15,000 men). In actual fact, the Leibstandarte was evensubstantially stronger than the army’s Grossdeutschland Division and its sister SS divisionsDas Reich and Totenkopf. The Leibstandarte possessed more powerfully equipped specia-list organic units and although still awaiting its Panther battalion (as were all panzerdivisions) it was the strongest German division in terms of manpower. On 10 July thedivision had a ration strength of 24,240 men. In comparison, on the same date (10 July) theration strength of the army’s Grossdeutschland Division stood at 21,475. The rationstrength of the other ‘classic’ SS division was as follows: Das Reich 20,110 (4 July combatstrength: 7,350) and Totenkopf 20,830. By way of further comparison, the 3rd PanzerDivision’s ration strength on 10 July was 14,126 (4 July combat strength: 5,170) while the11th Panzer Division’s ration strength was 16,520. During Citadel all these units fought aspart of Manstein’s Army Group South.33

In terms of the Leibstandarte’s anti-tank capability the 1st & 2nd SS PanzergrenadierRegiments each had a designated towed (heavy) anti-tank company equipped with six75 mm Pak 40 anti-tank guns (which had a similar long barrelled high-velocity gun tothe modern variants of the Pz IVs which equipped the vast majority of Leibstandarte’spanzer battalion). In addition, six more Pak 40s could be found within Leibstandarte’sreconnaissance battalion, which could boast its own heavy anti-tank company. Togetherthese three companies added 18 heavy 75 mm Pak 40 anti-tank guns to the alreadyformidable defensive capability of the Leibstandarte Division.34

In regards to medium anti-tank guns, the Leibstandarte divisional headquarterspossessed an armoured heavy company which contained a platoon equipped with three(medium) 50 mm Pak 38 anti-tank guns. This gun (the same weapon mounted on thedivision’s 13 Pz IIIs) could only penetrate the frontal armour of the T-34 at very closerange and only then when using AP40 ammunition (which contained a cementedtungsten-carbide core); such shells were expensive to produce and in short supply. AtProkhorovka, however, flanking targets were not in short supply and therefore, standardarmour piercing shells were often effective against T-34s. Each of the divisions six panzergrenadier battalions were also equipped with a further platoon of three Pak 38s, while thedivision’s two Nebelwerfer batteries would each have a single Pak 38 for close protection.Overall then the division was authorized to possess 23 medium anti-tank guns.35 Incomparison Das Reich was authorized to possess 30 medium anti-tank guns and 27 heavyanti-tank guns, the latter number being higher than the Leibstandarte’s equivalent inorder to compensate for Das Reich’s smaller complement of Marder tank destroyers.Totenkopf was authorized 33 medium anti-tank guns and 21 heavy anti-tank guns.36

The Leibstandarte could also call upon twelve 88 mm 36 or 41 Flak guns which could be(and often were) deployed in an anti-tank role to devastating effect. Amodified version of the

33Zetterling, Niklas & Frankson, Anders, Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis, 236–237, and see also 225 & 38.34Niehorster, Leo, German World War II Organization Series, Volume 5/III, 31.35Ibid., 46–47.36Ibid., 32–33.

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Flak 36 formed the main gun of the Tiger tank. The Leibstandarte also possessed strongdivisional indirect fire support. The division boasted a full allocation of self-propelled artilleryconsisting of twelve 105 mm Wespe (light) howitzers and six 150 mm Hummel (heavy)howitzers. Together these weapons formed one of the three battalions that constituted thedivision’s artillery regiment. In terms of divisional artillery, the Leibstandarte was alsoauthorized to possess a further twelve 105 mm towed light field howitzers and twelve150 mm heavy field howitzers. Taken together the division had 18 heavy howitzers and 24light howitzers either self-propelled or towed. In addition, the regiment had a battery of four105 mm guns.37 The division could also call on support from the SS Panzer Korps HQconsisting of two artillery battalions, two 150 mm Nebelwerfer rocket regiments and one150 mm Nebelwerfer battalion (uniquely the Leibstandarte also possessed two organic150 mm Nebelwerfer batteries, equipped with a total of 12 Nebelwerfers).38

Perhaps crucially then the 5th Guards Tank Army would also face highly concen-trated anti-tank fire from at least 53 towed anti-tank and Flak guns which were all verycapable of destroying its armour, 30 of which from long range. This coupled with factthat the Leibstandarte was largely entrenched in strong defensive fortifications andcould count on effective artillery and Luftwaffe support made the 5th Guards TankArmy’s task of effecting a breakthrough in depth an extremely arduous one.

The battle of Prokhorovka, 12 July 1943

On 11 July SS Panzergrenadier Division Leibstandarte overcame an anti-tank ditch whichwas to play an important role the following day. Beyond it stretched Hill 252.2, ‘like anenormous wave’. After managing to capture the heights and the Oktiabrskiy state farm onthe far side against the resistance of 9th Guards Paratroop Division, Leibstandarte was only2.5 km from Prokhorovka. At the same time, however, it had manoeuvred itself into a veryexposed position with open flanks. Only a loose connection remained to its right-handneighbour SS Panzergrenadier Division Das Reich. An even more dangerous situation haddeveloped on the left wing, which was hanging in the air. Since SS Panzergrenadier DivisionTotenkopf had attacked northwards rather than eastwards, the two thrust wedges haddrafted apart, leaving a gap which Leibstandarte’s Reconnaissance Battalion could onlymonitor but by nomeans secure. At that moment an enemy push along the river Pselwouldinevitably have disastrous consequences. For that reason Leibstandarte was instructed tohalt its advance for the time being. II SS Panzer Korps ordered the attack by DivisionTotenkopf on the dominating Hill 226.6 in the Psel bridgehead to be pressed forward thenext day with ‘all the artillery available’ to the korps. Only when this upland north of thePsel had been taken in its entirety should the other two divisions resume their attack.39

Meanwhile, the Leibstandarte units had been torn apart. On the right wing, south of therailway embankment, stood 1st SS Panzergrenadier Regiment, and on the left, far forward in

37Ibid., 31.38Zetterling, Niklas & Frankson, Anders, Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis, 30, and see also Niehorster, Leo, German WorldWar II Organization Series, Volume 5/III, 31.

39This and the two subsequent paragraphs are used with permission of OUP. Reproduced with permission of theLicensor through PLSclear. Frieser, Karl-Heinz, The Battle of the Kursk Salient in The Research Institute for MilitaryHistory, Potsdam, Germany, Germany and the Second World War Volume VIII – The Eastern Front 1943–1944 (Oxford:Clarendon Press 2017), 123–24. Regarding the timing of the Soviet attack see: Töppel, Roman, Kursk 1943: TheGreatest Battle of the Second World War, E-book locations: 3077 and 3082.

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the wake of Hill 252.2, 2nd SS Panzergrenadier Regiment. The division’s panzer regiment,on the other hand, was recovering from its exertions in a dip behind Hill 252.2. In reality,the regiment consisted of only one battalion of three companies of Pz IVs (it began theoffensive with four companies and 79 operational Panzer IVs), to which a heavy panzercompany with four operational Tigers had been attached. As stated the panzer regiment’sother battalion was back in German undergoing conversion to Panthers. Therefore, on12 July between the railway embankment and the river Psel 5th Guards Tank Army wouldonly face a single panzer battalion.

Rotmistrov launched the attack around 09.00 (10.00 Moscow time), many ofLeibstandarte’s exhausted tank crews were still fast asleep. The foremost German unit atthat moment was 2nd SS Panzergrenadier Regiment’s III Battalion. The previous day itsinfantry had taken Hill 252.2 and occupied the captured trenches. On the morning of12 July, the following scene took place on that hill: ‘We were all fast asleep when they weresuddenly all over us with aircraft and endless mass of tanks with infantry riding on them. Itwas hell. They were around us, over us, among us. We fought man to man.’

Thefirst German tank officer to see the Soviet tank avalanchewasOberstrumführer Rudolfvon Ribbentrop. Looking up at Hill 252.2 that morning he saw violet signal flares, meaning‘tank alarm’. The signalswere ‘seen all along the crest of the slope’ and also appeared ‘farther tothe right at the railway embankment’. While the other two panzer companies remainedbehind the anti-tank ditch, he set off up the hill with his company’s seven Panzer IVs.

On reaching the crest of the slope we saw another low rise about 200 meters away on theother side of a small valley, on which our infantry positions were obviously located. . . Thesmall valley extended to our left, and as we drove down the forward slope we spotted thefirst T-34’s which were apparently attempting to outflank us from the left. We halted onthe slope and opened fire, hitting several of the enemy. A number of Russian tanks wereleft burning. For a good gunner 800 meters was the ideal range.

Ribbentrop then saw a huge column of tanks approaching:

As we waited to see if further enemy tanks were going to appear, I looked around. . . about150 to 200 metres in front of us there emerged from a slight dip in the terrain 15, 20, 30, 40Russian T-34s, and then too many to count. The wall of tanks rolled towards us. Tank bytank, wave upon wave, an unimaginable mass of armour approaching at top speed.

The seven German tanks stood no chance against such overwhelming odds. Four werehit immediately, but the other three got away.40

The attacking formation which appeared so suddenly was themass of 29th Tank Corps, ledbyMaj.-Gen. Kirichenko, consisting of 212 fighting vehicles.41 The attack at this location wascarried out by 31st and 32nd Tank Brigades and 53rd Motorized Rife Brigade, supported bya self-propelled gun regiment and 26th Guards Paratroop Regiment. Once the tanks hadpassed the crest of Hill 252.2, they raced down the incline towards the two German panzer

40Glantz, David & House, Jonathan, The Battle of Kursk, 182–85, see also Frieser, Karl-Heinz, The Battle of the Kursk Salientin The Research Institute for Military History, Potsdam, Germany, Germany and the Second World War Volume VIII – TheEastern Front 1943–194, 124.

41This and the subsequent paragraph are used with permission of OUP. Reproduced with permission of the Licensorthrough PLSclear. Frieser, Karl-Heinz, The Battle of the Kursk Salient in The Research Institute for Military History,Potsdam, Germany, Germany and the Second World War Volume VIII – The Eastern Front 1943–1944 (Oxford: ClarendonPress 2017), 125–26. See also; Zamulin, Valeriy. ‘Soviet Troop Losses in the Battle of Prokhorovka, 10–16 July 1943’,Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 32:1 (2019), 118–19.

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companies, which opened fire on them from the declivity. Mistaking the Germans tanks forTigers, they wanted to eliminate their range superiority as quickly as possible. According toa German eyewitness report, ‘to anyone seeing the whole thing, it looked like the Russianswere carrying out a Kamikaze attack’ If the Soviet tanks broke through in depth, it could onlyresult in the collapse of the German front. Then, in a fewminutes, the whole picture changed,and the seemingly inevitable victory turned into a catastrophe for the attackers. All because ofan incredible Soviet oversight. They had forgotten about their own anti-tank ditch! This4.5 m- deep obstacle, which we have already mentioned had been dug by Soviet infantry andstretched across the declivity of Hill 252.2 at right angles to the German–now the Soviet–direction of attack. The German defenders watched in amazement as ‘more and more T-34scame over the crest, raced down the slope, and overturned in the anti-tank ditch behindwhich we were positioned’. Ribbentrop had got away by moving along together with theSoviet fighting vehicles in a thick cloud of dust:

Now the T-34s recognized the ditch and tried to veer left to the road, in order to get acrossthe ditch via the bridge, which had been repaired. What happened then is indescribable[. . .] As they converged on the bridge, the Russians were exposed on the flanks and madeeasier targets. Burning T-34s ran into and over each other. An inferno of, fire smoke,burning tanks, dead and wounded!

On the other side of the ditch, there were only two German Panzer companies, whowould normally have stood no chance of stopping the avalanche of steel. Now it wassimply ‘target practice at moving targets’. Finally, the four Tigers came rushing up andwere deployed on the division’s left wing.

By noon 2nd SS Panzergrenadier Regiment had recaptured Hill 252.2 and the Oktiabrskiystate farm. The front slope of the hill looked like a tank graveyard, covered with the still-burning wrecks of some 100 Soviet tanks and a few infantry fighting vehicles from IIIBattalion 2nd SS Panzergrenadier Regiment. On 12 July, according to the logistics files, SSPanzergrenadier Division Leibstandarte seized 190 Soviet tanks abandoned in the areas whichit had temporarily lost and then recovered. Most of themwere found on the front slope of thehill. Yet the figure reported seemed so incredible that SS Obergruppenführer Paul Hausser,the commanding general of II SS Panzer Korps, drove to the front in person to see for himself.According to the most recent Russian information, on 12 July 29th Tank Corps alone lost 102of 212 tanks and assault guns as write-offs (60 T-34s, 31 T-70s, 8 SU-122s, 3 SU-76s).Casualties totalled 1,991, including 1,033 dead and missing.

The photographs which encompass the fighting in the 29th Tank Corps area of operationsare as follows: The 16 July photograph GX-3734-SK-61 and the 7 August photographs GX-3942-SK-69 andGX-3942-SD-124most strongly relate to thefighting on the line of advance of32nd and 31st Tank Brigades in the central area of the battlefield.42 The 32nd and 31st TankBrigades advanced with the railway embankment on their left flank and the Oktiabrskiy StateFarm (and the surrounding area) on their right flank (See Figures 4–7). This route traversedHill 252.2 and ultimately the notorious anti-tank ditch at its foot. As the Germans recapturedtheir forward positions by the end of the day, the front lines of 16 July were virtually identicalto that of 12 July. Therefore, photograph GX-3734-SK-61 is truly remarkable; it is the solephotograph available that clearly shows themass destruction of the 29th Tank Corps. The vast

42NARA RG 373: German Flown Aerial Photography, 1939–1945. For 16 July see; GX-3734-SK-61 (incorrectly dated as15 July by NARA). For 7 August see; GX-3942-SK-69, GX-3942-SD-124.

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numbers of destroyed Soviet tanks and equipment visible in the anti-tank ditch and the fieldsimmediately in front of the obstacle is astonishing. It is possible to see a mangled mass ofSoviet tanks in the left-hand half of the anti-tank ditch (nearest the main road) and manyindividually destroyed tanks in the right-hand half of the anti-tank ditch (See Figures 8–22).43

As the crest of Hill 252.2 and the Oktiabrskiy state farm were back in German hands by theend of 12 July, we know that any disabled German tanks in this area were able to be recoveredfrom the battlefield with exception of two Pz IVs which could not be recovered due to enemyfire. We also know that all the destroyed tanks that can be seen on the field of battle in these

Figure 4. GX-3734-SK-61 16 July – The battlefield beyond Hill 252.2.

43NARA RG 373: German Flown Aerial Photography, 1939–1945. 16 July GX-3734-SK-61 (incorrectly dated as 15 July by NARA).

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photographs in the area between theOktiabrskiy state farm and the anti-tank ditchwill almostcertainly be Soviet.44

Four of the five permanent German tank losses of 12 July were located forward ofthe German front line (i.e. on or beyond the crest of Hill 252.2). The tanks inquestions were Pz IVs belonging to Ribbentrop’s 6th company, II Battalion, SSPanzer Regiment 1.45 Given the detailed information available to us it is entirelypossible for us to locate the lost German tanks amongst the mass of Soviet tanklosses on the battlefield photographs.46 From German testimony we know four ofthe seven operational Pz IVs of 6th company, SS Panzer Regiment 1 were disablednear to, on, or just over the summit of Hill 252.2 after being faced with the masstanks of 31st and 32nd Tank Brigades. Two of the Pz IVs went up in flames straight

Figure 5. GX-3734-SK-61 16 July – The 2nd field from anti-tank ditch includes the crest of Hill 252.2.

44Frieser, Karl-Heinz, The Battle of the Kursk Salient in The Research Institute for Military History, Potsdam, Germany,Germany and the Second World War Volume VIII – The Eastern Front 1943–1944, 129n. Ribbentrop and Walter Schule(Ribbentrop’s driver) offer slightly conflicting testimony of the fate of the four disabled Panzers, the interpretation ofwhich is open to question. See Månsson, Martin, Prokhorovka – Verdens største panserslag in Ostfronten (2017) https://bokasin.no/prokhorovka-verdens-storste-panserslag/(accessed 7 April 2019); See also Töppel, Roman, ‘Kursk – Mythenund Wirklichkeit einer Schlacht’, in Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 57 (2009), 376–77.

45Ibid.46NARA RG 373: German Flown Aerial Photography, 1939–1945. Compare 16 July; GX-3734-SK-61 (incorrectly dated as15 July by NARA) with 7 August; GX-3942-SK-69, GX-3942-SD-124.

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away and were immediately written off.47 As the summit of Hill 252.2 was again inGerman hands by the end of 12 July it can be assumed that the other two damagedbut unrecoverable Pz IVs must be forward of the hill’s summit.48 Ribbentrop statedhis tanks advanced beyond the summit of Hill 252.2 and onto the slope of a smallvalley, they then opened fire on tanks advancing to their left about 800 m away, itwas on this small slope that his tanks were ambushed frontally. Looking at thephotographs of Hill 252.2 beyond German lines, I believe it is possible to locate atleast one of these panzers (See Figures 23–26). The Pz IV in question is sited onundulating ground in the middle of the near diagonal road running on the railway –Oktiabrskiy state farm axis (this road is now defunct). The slightly different size andshape of the tank (compared to the mass of Soviet wrecks visible elsewhere), thedirection it faces (towards the Soviet lines), the direction and length of its gun

Figure 6. GX-3942-SD-124 7 August – The 2nd field from anti-tank ditch includes the crest of Hill252.2.

47Frieser, Karl-Heinz, The Battle of the Kursk Salient in The Research Institute for Military History, Potsdam, Germany,Germany and the Second World War Volume VIII – The Eastern Front 1943–1944, 124. See Månsson, Martin,Prokhorovka – Verdens største panserslag in Ostfronten (2017) https://bokasin.no/prokhorovka-verdens-storste-panserslag/(accessed 7 April 2019); See also Töppel, Roman, ‘Kursk – Mythen und Wirklichkeit einer Schlacht’, inVierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 57 (2009), 376–77.

48Frieser, Karl-Heinz, The Battle of the Kursk Salient in The Research Institute for Military History, Potsdam, Germany,Germany and the Second World War Volume VIII – The Eastern Front 1943–1944, 130. See also; Töppel, Roman, ‘Kursk –Mythen und Wirklichkeit einer Schlacht’, in Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 57 (2009), 376–77.

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barrel (aimed left towards the Soviet tanks that Ribbentrop’s company first engagedprior to being swamped by Soviet tanks frontally), all indicate this tank is one of thefour lost Pz IVs. Extended close examination of the photographs would probablyalso reveal the location of the other lost Pz IVs.49

Figure 7. Looking up to the crest of Hill 252.2; Source Google Street View.

Figure 8. Looking down the slope to the anti-tank ditch from the parallel road (the gap through thetrees, centre, gives an excellent impression of the view in 1943, i.e., without trees); Source GoogleStreet View.

49NARA RG 373: German Flown Aerial Photography, 1939–1945. Compare 16 July; GX-3734-SK-61 (incorrectly dated as15 July by NARA) with 7 August; GX-3942-SK-69, GX-3942-SD-124.

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The photographs are remarkable in that they allow a further evolution of the historio-graphy of the battle of Prokhorovka. In the space of two decades historiography of thebattle has evolved from one of mutual mass destruction and German operational failure, tomass Soviet destruction.50 Now we are in a position to pinpoint individual German tanklosses on the battlefield (1 Pz IV with near certainty – with others as possible). It is evenpossible to differentiate between operational and disabled German tanks. In the 16 Julyphotograph, an operational Tiger is visible in a forward defensive position close to thesummit of Hill 252.2. The Tiger it is sited just behind the more horizontal road running onthe railway –Oktiabrskiy state farm axis (this road today is also defunct), being a Tiger it isthe largest tank visible, the number of operational Tigers belonging to the Leibstandarte’sheavy panzer company having increased to nine by 16 July.51

Figure 9. GX-3734-SK-61 16 July – The 1st field in front of the anti-tank ditch.

50Overy Richard, Why the Allies Won (Pimlico: London 1995), 95–96. For an excellent summary of the evolvinghistoriography of the battle of Kursk see Lak, Martijn. ‘The Death Ride of the Panzers? Recent Historiography onthe Battle of Kursk’, in Journal of Military History, 82:3 (2018) 909–19. See also Frieser, Karl-Heinz, The Battle of theKursk Salient in The Research Institute for Military History, Potsdam, Germany, Germany and the Second World WarVolume VIII – The Eastern Front 1943–1944, 132.

51NARA RG 373: German Flown Aerial Photography, 1939–1945. Compare 16 July; GX-3734-SK-61 (incorrectly dated as15 July by NARA) with 7 August; GX-3942-SK-69, GX-3942-SD-124. See also; Zetterling, Niklas & Frankson, Anders,Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis, 187. see also; Schneider, Wolfgang, Tigers in Combat II (Winnipeg: J.J. Fedorowicz1998), 106.

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The photographs from7August are highly significant. Looking at GX-3942-SD-124 one cansee that the heavy rains experienced since the battle has filledmany trencheswithwater. This, inparticular, is very useful in highlighting their location around Hill 252.2, – unsurprisingly theoperational Tiger haswithdrawn and is therefore no longer visible (the company’s only eventual

Figure 10. GX-3942-SD-124 7 August – The 1st field in front of the anti-tank ditch.

Figure 11. DT-TM5-11587 22 June – The anti-tank ditch 3 weeks before the battle.

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loss during Citadel occurred on 12 July in another sector, see below).52 The destruction in andaround the trenches closest to Hill 252.2 remain largely untouched – the closer focus of the

Figure 12. GX-3734-SK-61 16 July – The anti-tank ditch.

Figure 13. The anti-tank ditch today; Source Google Maps.

52NARA RG 373: German Flown Aerial Photography, 1939–1945. Compare 16 July; GX-3734-SK-61 (incorrectly dated as15 July by NARA) with 7 August; GX-3942-SD-124.

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photograph is useful in identifying German halftracks belonging to the III battalion 2nd SSPanzergrenadier Regiment which were destroyed in the first moments of the attack.53 Looking

Figure 14. GX-3734-SK-61 16 July – The left half of the anti-tank ditch.

Figure 15. GX-3942-SD-124 7 August – The left half of the anti-tank ditch.

53For example it is quite straightforward to pinpoint the location of a destroyed German SPW close to Hill 252.2’s summit whichis depicted in a photograph taken on 21 July 1943 that appears in; Zamulin, Valeriy, Demolishing the Myth: The Tank Battle atProkhorovka, Kursk, July 1943: An Operational Narrative (Solihull: Helion 2011). It is possible to locate this halftrack by using thebeginning of the railway embankment in the background and the Storozhevoye Woods beyond as points of reference. Mostemerging pictures of the battlefield should be able to be treated in the same way.

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further afield, it seems there may have been early Soviet attempts to remove some – but by nomeans all– tankwrecks from the battlefield particularly in thefield closest to the anti-tankditch.By closely comparing the photographs of 16 July and 7 August we can see the location of thedestroyed tanks in the anti-tank ditch in the latter, though by nomeans as clearly as on 16 July.The track in front of anti-ditch is less worn on 7 August which only goes to highlight (given its

Figure 16. Contemporary view of the approach to the anti-tank ditch from the adjacent road; SourceGoogle Street View.

Figure 17. Contemporary view of the anti-tank ditch from the adjacent road; Source Google Street View.

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Figure 18. The anti-tank ditch today is packed with trees; Source Google Maps.

Figure 19. GX-3734-SK-61 16 July – The right half of the anti-tank ditch.

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clear marking on 16 July) how many tanks on 12 July must have traversed the route whilstlooking for a crossing.54

Figure 20. GX-3942-SD-124 7 August – The right half of the anti-tank ditch.

Figure 21. German field of fire from behind the anti-tank ditch; Source Google Street View.

54NARA RG 373: German Flown Aerial Photography, 1939–1945. Compare 16 July; GX-3734-SK-61 (incorrectly dated as15 July by NARA) with 7 August; GX-3942-SD-124.

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At the same time as Hill 252.2 was being defended against frontal attack, thesituation was becoming critical on Leibstandarte’s left flank. There Maj.-Gen.Bacharev’s 18th Tank Corps attacked along the Psel with 170th, 181st and 110th

Armoured Brigades (the latter held in reserve), supported by 32nd Motorized RifleBrigade and several unattached units such as 36th Guards Tank Regiment, whichwas equipped with British ‘Churchill’ tanks. This sudden thrust occurred at themost unfavourable moment for the Germans, and in the most unfavourable place,

Figure 22. Depth and width of the anti-ditch; Source Google Maps.

Figure 23. GX-3734-SK-61–16 July – Location of a frontally knocked out Pz IV (left of photograph) – justbeyond Hill 252.2’s crest (sited in the middle of the minor road – turret aiming at targets to its left) – Anoperational Tiger tank is visible (see also Figure 4. large tank – sited behind a road to the rear of the PzIV).

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that is, right in the gap between SS Panzergrenadier Divisions Leibstandarte andTotenkopf to which we have already referred. The Soviet 18th Tank Corps pene-trated deep into the gap with almost no opposition. In the left-hand section of 2nd

Panzer Grenadier Regiment’s zone of action, tactical coordination dissolved intochaos. There was no longer any stable front. On both sides, the leadership lostcontrol, and the combat disintegrated into a multitude of individual clashes inwhich it was difficult to see ‘which side was attacking and which side wasdefending’.55 The Leibstandarte’s heavy panzer company’s four Tigers were sentto prevent the 170th and 181st Tank Brigades from breaking into the rear of theLeibstandarte Division. After a 3-h battle, this was successfully achieved. TheGermans lost none of their Tigers on 12 July. However, one of the four Tigerswas left heavily damaged by shell shot. It could not be hauled away thefollowing day because of strong enemy fire, and later had to be written off. Thepush by 18th Tank Corps failed with considerable losses, including (according toSoviet reports) 55 of 190 tanks ultimately being written off (32 T-34s, 12 T-70s, 11

Figure 24. GX-3942-SD-124 7 August – View of the knocked out Pz IV (sited in the middle of theminor road) – The operational Tiger tank has withdrawn.

55This paragraph is used with permission of OUP. Reproduced with permission of the Licensor through PLSclear. Frieser,Karl-Heinz, The Battle of the Kursk Salient in The Research Institute for Military History, Potsdam, Germany, Germanyand the Second World War Volume VIII – The Eastern Front 1943–1944 (Oxford: Clarendon Press 2017), 126.

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Churchill Tanks). After all the attacks had been repelled, the corps was withdrawnin the early afternoon and thereafter essentially deployed only defensively.56

Photographs relating to the 18th Tank Corps offensive are as equally compelling asthose relating to the 29th Tank Corps. The major tank dual between the four Tiger tanks(recently placed under the command of Michael Wittmann) and Soviet armour that

Figure 25. GX-3942-SD-124 7 August – Close up image of the knocked out Pz IV – L48 barrel can beseen facing enemy to its left.

56Frieser, Karl-Heinz, The Battle of the Kursk Salient in The Research Institute for Military History, Potsdam, Germany,Germany and the Second World War Volume VIII – The Eastern Front 1943–1944, pp.126–27 and 127n. See also;Zamulin, Valeriy. ‘Soviet Troop Losses in the Battle of Prokhorovka, 10–16 July 1943’, Journal of Slavic Military Studies,32:1 (2019), 118–19.

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occurred following the mass breakthrough of 170th Tank Brigade into theLeibstandarte’s weakly defended left flank (west of the anti-tank ditch) is covered inthe following photographs; GX-3734-SK-61 (16 July) and GX-3942-SK-69 (7 August),but also partially in photographs; GX-2696-SK-23, GX-2696-SK-24, GX-2696-SK-52(14 July); while the results of the Tiger tanks subsequent action in the late morning/early afternoon against the 181st Tank Brigade which was advancing uphill from theriver Psel towards the Tigers original firing positions (on the summit of Hill 241.6) is

Figure 26. Site of the knocked out Pz IV on undulating ground beyond Hill 252.2’s crest: Source GoogleStreet View.

Figure 27. Site of 170th Tank Brigade’s breakthrough; Source Google Maps.

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Figure 28. GX-3734-SK-61 16 July – Location of 170th Tank Brigade’s breakthrough (Soviet tanks inwedge formation).

Figure 29. GX-3734-SK-61 16 July – 170th & 181st Tank Brigades advance, showing the wedge group& advance from the gully (on the right of image).

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clearly visible in photographs GX-2696-SK-23, GX-2696-SK-24 and GX-2696-SK-52(14 July).57

The 170th Tank Brigade attacked in the first echelon and succeeded in penetrating theGerman line en masse – according to Soviet reports with 50 tanks (see Figures 27–32).58

We can see the evidence of this breakthrough south-west of the anti-tank ditch inphotographs GX-3734-SK-61 (16 July) and GX-3942-SK-69 (7 August).59 The 181st TankBrigade also launched attacks early on 12 July with the same initial objective as the 170th

Tank Brigade of reaching the Komsomolets state farm in the Leibstandarte’s rear.60 TheTigers engaged the units of the 170th Brigade first. Given the fluid nature of the battlefieldin this sector, a number of T-34 did not engage the German tanks and pushed on towardsthe Leibstandarte’s artillery regiment’s firing positions close to the Komsomolets statefarm.61 These Soviet tanks were ultimately tracked down and destroyed either by theartillerymen themselves firing across open sights or by elements of SS Panzer Regiment 1.62

Figure 30. Tiger tanks view of 170th Tank Brigade’s advance in wedge formation; Source GoogleStreet View.

57NARA Series RG 373: German Flown Aerial Photography, 1939–1945. See specifically photographs relating to thebattlefield of Prokhorovka: for 14 July see; GX-2696-SK-23, GX-2696-SK-24 and GX-2696-SK-52. For 16 July see; GX-3734-SK-61 (incorrectly dated as 15 July by NARA). For 7 August see; GX-3942-SK-69.

58Zamulin, Valeriy, Demolishing the Myth: The Tank Battle at Prokhorovka, Kursk, July 1943: An Operational Narrative,E-book locations: 7804 & 7951.

59NARA Series RG 373: German Flown Aerial Photography, 1939–1945. GX-3734-SK-61 (incorrectly dated as 15 July byNARA). For 7 August see; GX-3942-SK-69.

60Zamulin, Valeriy, Demolishing the Myth: The Tank Battle at Prokhorovka, Kursk, July 1943: An Operational Narrative,E-book location: 7804.

61Forczyk, Robert, Kursk 1943: The Southern Front, 85. See also; Zamulin, Valeriy, Demolishing the Myth: The Tank Battle atProkhorovka, Kursk, July 1943: An Operational Narrative, E-book location: 14,637, See Map of the battlefield. (I believesome elements of this map to be incorrect, for example in reference to 25th Tank Brigade, however, the 170th TankBrigade’s route is correct).

62Forczyk, Robert, Kursk 1943: The Southern Front, 78. See also; Zamulin, Valeriy, Demolishing the Myth: The Tank Battle atProkhorovka, Kursk, July 1943: An Operational Narrative, E-book location: 7891.

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The four Tigers were faced with a mass of Soviet tanks approaching from at leasttwo lines of advance. As Glantz described ‘on the 1 SS Panzer Regiment’s left flanknorth of Oktiabrskiy state farm (sic), its 13th (Tiger ed.) Company ran into a forceof 60 Soviet tanks, which it engaged at ranges 600 to 1000 m. As the ranges rapidlyclosed, another Russian force of like strength descended on the 13th Company.A swirling, deadly, 3-h battle ensued, during which the Soviet tanks suffered appal-ling losses.’63 Testimony of this conflict is provided by Georg Lötzsch, who was oneof the four Tiger tank commanders that day: ‘In the morning, the company was onthe left wing of the II Panzer Battalion when about 50 enemy tanks, from the coverof copses and hedges, came storming towards us in a broad wedge formation’.64 Asthe extracts taken from GX-3734-SK-61 (16 July) and GX-3942-SK-69 (7 August)show, Lötzsch’s testimony matches the events portrayed in the photographs fromthis location. We can see destroyed tanks from the 170th Tank Brigade which after,making a frontal advance largely unopposed, have begun to deploy in a wedgeformation upon seeing the Tiger tanks – it is possible to follow the formers tracks inthe field. We can establish these tanks are Soviet via a number of methods. Firstlythe wrecks appear in both the 16 July photograph and 7 August photograph. Givenour knowledge of the small losses incurred by the Leibstandarte throughout itsdeployment in the Prokhorovka area (see below section on German armouredlosses) the large number of knocked tanks out in a single location must be Soviet.We can also see the wrecks of many other tanks which have advanced out of theeastern gullies into the area. These tanks (as described by Glantz) formed part ofthe second group of soviet tanks which descended on the Tigers. The Tigerspositioned on the high ground of Hill 241.6 had an excellent field of fire along

Figure 31. View of the gully from Tiger tanks perspective; Source Google Street View.

63Glantz, David & House, Jonathan, The Battle of Kursk, 185.64Frieser, Karl-Heinz, The Battle of the Kursk Salient in The Research Institute for Military History, Potsdam, Germany,Germany and the Second World War Volume VIII – The Eastern Front 1943–1944, 127.

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the soviet tankers chosen lines of advance.65 The four Tigers took full advantage oftheir vastly superior armour (a T-34 with its 76 mm main gun could not penetratea Tiger frontally even from point-blank range) and the lethal penetrating power ofits main gun, which could penetrate the frontal armour of a T-34 from ranges ofover 2000 m.66 The battlefield photographs testify to this success.

Early in the afternoon, a further thrust by the 181st Tank Corps directly uphilltowards the summit of Hill 241.6 from the direction of the Psel and the ribbon villageof Andreyevka encouraged the Tigers to move forward to the declivity of the hill inorder to engage this new threat.67 The Tigers then fought the Soviet tanks from variouspositions on the declivity. We can make this assumption with confidence as to engagethe Soviet tanks the Tigers tanks would have to have moved from their original firing

Figure 32. GX-3942-SK-69 7 August – Comparison image of the ‘wedge group’.

65NARA Series RG 373: German Flown Aerial Photography, 1939–1945. GX-3734-SK-61 (incorrectly dated as 15 July byNARA). For 7 August see; GX-3942-SK-69.

66Frieser, Karl-Heinz, The Battle of the Kursk Salient in The Research Institute for Military History, Potsdam, Germany,Germany and the Second World War Volume VIII – The Eastern Front 1943–1944, 160.

67Zamulin, Valeriy, Demolishing the Myth: The Tank Battle at Prokhorovka, Kursk, July 1943: An Operational Narrative,E-book locations: 8035, 8041 and 8055 and See also Forczyk, Robert, Kursk 1943: The Southern Front, 78.

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positions in order to bring the Soviet tanks into their line of fire. The topography of thebattlefield forced the 13th Company forward (see Figures 33 and 34).

It was during this engagement that the company lost its only Tiger duringOperation Citadel. The lost Tiger, having been immobilized by shell shot, would

Figure 33. 18th Tank Corps battlefield; Source Google Maps.

Figure 34. The topography of the battlefield looking towards Andreyevka; Source Google StreetView.

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ultimately be deemed unrecoverable due to enemy fire.68 As with the unrecover-able Pz IVs beyond the crest of Hill 252.2, we can establish that the Tiger waslost forward of Hill 241.6 as to be under consistent enemy fire the tank must havebeen fairly far forward of the Leibstandarte’s front lines.69 Given that this is theonly location on 12 July that the Tigers fought close to enemy lines and yet farenough removed from the majority of the panzer regiment (i.e. its recovery unit)then the Tiger must have been lost on the declivity of this hill. In all probability,the Tiger was lost in the middle ground of the following photographs (in range ofSoviet tank fire from Andreyevka at the base of the hill).70 Had the Tiger beenimmobilized in the earlier fighting with the first echelon of the 170th TankBrigade at the summit of Hill 241.6 then the damaged Tiger would have beenrecovered by the Germans. Clearly then the Tiger was lost during the laterengagement with the 181st Tank Brigade.

We are once again fortunate to have this section of the Prokhorovka battlefield entirelycovered by Luftwaffe photographs (see Figures 35–39). Soviet wrecks and sheltering orabandoned Soviet tanks are particularly concentrated on the western edge of the battlefieldclose to the ribbon village of Andreyevka. In this area, there seems to be at least two

Figure 35. GX-2696-SK-52 14 July – Battlefield of 181st Tank Brigade vs Tiger company.

68Frieser, Karl-Heinz, The Battle of the Kursk Salient in The Research Institute for Military History, Potsdam, Germany,Germany and the Second World War Volume VIII – The Eastern Front 1943–1944, 127n.

69Ibid., 182.70NARA Series RG 373: German Flown Aerial Photography, 1939–1945. See specifically photographs relating to thebattlefield of Prokhorovka: for 14 July images see; GX-2696-SK-23, GX-2696-SK-24 and GX-2696-SK-52.

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columns of Soviet tanks on the periphery of the battlefield. It is clear from the photographsGX-2696-SK-23, GX-2696-SK-24 and GX-2696-SK-52 (which were taken on 14 July) thatthe four Tiger tanks halted a much larger opposing force in the 181st Tank Brigade.71

There are a number of clues as to the lost Tiger’s location on the battlefield. The forwardfacing direction of the knocked out Soviet tanks indicates the direction from which theywere being fired at (presenting their thickest frontal armour towards the enemy). As theTiger tank was not immediately destroyed but rather disabled, the photographs of 14 Julymay not yet contain a ‘burned’ tank (if indeed it ever was). From both Russian andGerman testimony, it does seem the Soviet tanks got in close proximity to the firingposition of the Tigers; therefore the cluster of tanks in the centre of this area of thebattlefield may well include the Tiger in question.72 Overall one wonders if the loss of theTiger is evidence of the cavalier tactics used by the heavy company’s commander MichaelWittmann. Tactics that would ultimately cost Wittmann him his life the following year inNormandy when on 8 August 1944 (as commander of 2nd Company 101st SS Heavy Tank

Figure 36. GX-2696-SK-52 14 July – Detail of destruction caused by the four Tiger tanks.

71NARA Series RG 373: German Flown Aerial Photography, 1939–1945. See specifically photographs relating to thebattlefield of Prokhorovka: for 14 July images see; GX-2696-SK-23, GX-2696-SK-24 and GX-2696-SK-52.

72Frieser, Karl-Heinz, The Battle of the Kursk Salient in The Research Institute for Military History, Potsdam, Germany,Germany and the Second World War Volume VIII – The Eastern Front 1943–1944, 127 & 127n.

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Figure 37. 181st Tank Brigade’s view looking up to the Tigers firing positions; Source Google StreetView.

Figure 38. GX-2696-SK-23 14 July – Potential site of destroyed or abandoned Soviet tankcolumn.

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Battalion) his no longer invulnerable Tiger was destroyed whilst charging across openterrain.73

The Soviet attacks in the right-hand section of the front to the south-east of theProkhorovka-Belgorod railway embankment were even less successful. 1st SSPanzergrenadier Regiment held Leibstandarte’s right-wing near the Stalinsk state farm,where it had to manage largely without support from battle tanks and was initially onlyreinforced with a few Marder tank destroyers. The attacking forces consisted of 25th TankBrigade of 29th Tank Corps, supported by 1446th Self-Propelled Gun Artillery Regiment and28th Guards Paratroop Regiment, as well as parts of 169th Tank Brigade of 2nd Tank Corps.74

The battlefield of the 29th Tank Corps’ 25th Tank Brigade is depicted in photo-graphs GX-3734-SK-61 (16 July), GX-3942-SK-69, GX-3942-SD-124 (7 August).75

Figure 39. GX-2696-SK-52 14 July – Column of possibly destroyed or abandoned Soviet tanks.

73Zaloga, Steven, Armoured Champion: The Top Tanks of World War II (Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books 2015), 3–4 &221.

74The contents of this paragraph is used with permission of OUP. Reproduced with permission of the Licensor throughPLSclear. Frieser, Karl-Heinz, The Battle of the Kursk Salient in The Research Institute for Military History, Potsdam,Germany, Germany and the Second World War Volume VIII – The Eastern Front 1943–1944 (Oxford: Clarendon Press2017), 127.

75RG 373: German Flown Aerial Photography, 1939–1945. See specifically photographs relating to this area of thebattlefield: For 16 July see; GX-3734-SK-61 (incorrectly dated as 15 July by NARA). For 7 August see; GX-3942-SK-69,GX-3942-SD-124.

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The 25th Tank Brigade advanced along the line of Prokhorovka-Iamki towards theStalinsk state farm in the direction of the gap between Storozhevoye Woods andthe railway embankment. The photographs capture the drama that unfolded when theadvancing 25th Tank Brigade was ambushed and savaged by flanking fire from fiveMarder tank destroyers located in the confines of the Stalinsk state farm and with-ering frontal fire from 75 mm Pak 40 anti-tank guns from 1st SS PanzergrenadierRegiment’s anti-tank company which was located on the edge of the StorozhevoyeWoods (see Figures 40–42).76 Finally, the rapidly depleting 25th Tank Brigade wouldhave to face a proportion of the Leibstandarte’s assault gun battalion which hadhitherto been held in reserve.77

Figure 40. GX-3734-SK-61 16 July – The battlefield of the 25th Tank Brigade.

76Glantz, David & House, Jonathan, The Battle of Kursk, 185–87. See also Niehorster, Leo, German World War IIOrganization Series, Volume 5/III, 31.

77Töppel, Roman, Kursk 1943: The Greatest Battle of the Second World War, E-book locations: 3115, 3121 and 3126.

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Figure 41. Route taken by 25th Tank Brigade towards the Stalinsk state farm (seen on left) andwoods (ahead).

Figure 42. GX-3942-SD-124 7 August – The battlefield of the 25th Tank Brigade.

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Clearly, the 25th Tank Brigade’s demise is visible by the trail of explosions on theirroute of advance from Prokhorovka & Iamki towards the Stalinsk state farm,Storozhevoye Woods and the gap between the woods and the railway embankment.78

It is also possible to identify tanks of 1st Battalion, 32nd Tank Brigade which havingcrossed over the railway line from Hill 252.2 then closely followed the railway embank-ment, ultimately reaching the Komsomolets state farm.79 A detailed study of thephotographs with specialist equipment would allow the location of many of thedestroyed Soviet tanks to be identified.

The right flank of II SS Panzer Korps, which curved back far to the south, wasdefended by SS Panzergrenadier Division Das Reich. In that sector, the attackingforces were 2nd Guards Tank Corps and 2nd Tank Crops. Their attacks, in thedirection Yasnaya Polyana and Kalinin, were repelled after heavy fighting, afterwhich the German units went on the counter-attack and captured Storozhevoyeon the left wing.80 The most significant territorial gains on 12 July were achieved bySS Panzergrenadier Division Totenkopf. All of Totenkopf fighting vehicles were inthe bridgehead on the far side of the Psel and attacked in a northerly direction. Theonly significant fighting unit of the division to remain south of the river andtherefore in the Prokhorovka corridor was the division’s 6th SS PanzergrenadierRegiment which was securing the engineer’s bridge over the Psel. North of the PselTotenkopf attacked 5th Guards Army, as well as 31st Tank Corps and parts of 6th

Guards Army. After beating off heavy Soviet attacks in the morning, it succeeded inpushing forward as far as the Prokhorovka-Kartashevka road (the northernmostthrust of Operation Citadel), 5th Guards Tank Army units were now threatened inthe rear as well as on the flanks.

Although the operations of the Das Reich and Totenkopf divisions are outsidethe scope of this article, elements of these divisions operations on 12 July areclearly visible on the periphery of a number of photographs used in itsformation.81

An assessment of German armoured write-offs

As a direct consequence of the fighting on 12 July the Leibstandarte division lostjust five tanks. No German tanks were reported as ‘write-off’s on the 12 July.However, five tanks that were left immobilized on the battlefield could not subse-quently be recovered because of enemy fire; so the write-off figures had to beadjusted later. Four of the five tanks in question were Pz IVs belonging toRibbentrop’s 6th Company, 1st SS Panzer Regiment, the other was the Tiger

78Compare GX-3734-SK-61 with GX-3942-SK-69 & GX-3942-SD-124.79Frieser, Karl-Heinz, The Battle of the Kursk Salient in The Research Institute for Military History, Potsdam, Germany,Germany and the Second World War Volume VIII – The Eastern Front 1943–1944, 182.

80This and the subsequent paragraph is used with permission of OUP. Reproduced with permission of the Licensorthrough PLSclear. Frieser, Karl-Heinz, The Battle of the Kursk Salient in The Research Institute for Military History,Potsdam, Germany, Germany and the Second World War Volume VIII – The Eastern Front 1943–1944 (Oxford: ClarendonPress 2017), 127–28.

81For example images GX-2696-SK-23, GX-2696-SK-24 and GX-2696-SK-52 clearly show the route of advance of SSPanzer Regiment 3 on 12 July. While images GX-3734-SK-61 &; GX-3942-SK-69 provide evidence of Das Reich’soperations on the division’s left flank.

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belonging to the panzer regiment’s heavy panzer company. No StuG assault guns orMarder tank destroyers were reported as being lost on 12 July.82

Between 5 and 9 July the II SS Panzer Korps lost 20 tanks and assault guns. Inaddition, we know that between 10 and 16 July (the period the II SS Panzer Korpswas on active operations in the Prokhorovka area) the Panzer Korps lost anadditional 13 tanks and assault guns, this latter figure includes the five tanksultimately lost by the Leibstandarte on 12 July.83 As stated in the introduction tothis article, both sides went onto the defensive following 12 July and this remainedthe case until the Germans withdrew on 17 July.84 In the subsequent days followingthe battle of Prokhorovka, we can say with near certainty that no further Germantanks losses occurred in the area that constituted the field of battle on 12 July. TheLeibstandarte did make a limited attack on 13 July in an attempt to find a weak spotin the Soviet defences. However, the attack was aborted as soon as the panzers weremet by anti-tank fire. In any event, the advance was away and forward of theoriginal battlefield of 12 July, i.e. away from the anti-tank ditch, Hill 252.2 andthe Oktiabrskiy state farm. As a result, the battlefield around these sites was largelypreserved until the Germans withdrew on 17 July – this is of course visually andhistorically significant in terms of the content of GX-3734-SK-61 which is dated16 July.85 Given this, it is highly probable that the Leibstandarte lost no furthertanks in this sector (18th and 29th Tank Corps’ attack sectors on 12 July) up to itswithdrawal on 17 July. It must be remembered that by the evening of 12 July theGermans had regained secure control of almost all the territory in which their tanksfought. As a result, the majority of the small number of damaged tanks could,therefore, be towed away. During the subsequent withdrawal of the II SS PanzerKorps (17–23 July) the Panzer Korps only lost one additional Panzer III and twoassault guns as write-offs – therefore no further Pz IVs or Tigers were lost by the IISS Panzer Korps in this phase; however, it is unclear which SS division sustainedthese final three losses.86

During the II SS Panzer Korps involvement in Citadel and the subsequentperiod of withdrawal (5–23 July), the Korps lost in total: 31 tanks, 5 assaultguns and 2 tank destroyers for a total of 38. Throughout its involvement inCitadel (5–16 July), the Leibstandarte lost just 12 tanks and assault guns, specifi-cally: 1 Pz III, 9 Pz IV, 1 Tiger & 1 StuG. While as the whole II SS Panzer Korpslost only 2 Marder tank destroyers, between 5 and 23 July, at worst theLeibstandarte’s Marder losses were no greater than this small number. For its

82Frieser, Karl-Heinz, The Battle of the Kursk Salient in The Research Institute for Military History, Potsdam, Germany,Germany and the Second World War Volume VIII – The Eastern Front 1943–1944 (Oxford: Clarendon Press 2017), 129.See also; Töppel, Roman, ‘Kursk – Mythen und Wirklichkeit einer Schlacht’, in Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 57(2009), 376–77.

83Cross-reference information from the following pages in Frieser, Karl-Heinz, The Battle of the Kursk Salient in TheResearch Institute for Military History, Potsdam, Germany, Germany and the Second World War Volume VIII – TheEastern Front 1943–1944, 136 & 151.

84Ibid., 130 & 136n.85Frieser, Karl-Heinz, The Battle of the Kursk Salient in The Research Institute for Military History, Potsdam, Germany,Germany and the Second World War Volume VIII – The Eastern Front 1943–1944, 130 & 136n. For the direction of thisGerman attack see Glantz, David & House, Jonathan, The Battle of Kursk, 214–15.

86Cross-reference information from the following pages in Zetterling, Niklas & Frankson, Anders, Kursk 1943: A StatisticalAnalysis, 124–25 & Frieser, Karl-Heinz, The Battle of the Kursk Salient in The Research Institute for Military History,Potsdam, Germany, Germany and the Second World War Volume VIII – The Eastern Front 1943–1944, 151.

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part in Citadel Das Reich lost over the same period (5 −16 July) nine tanks andassault guns, specifically 1 Pz III, 6 Pz IV, 1 Tiger and 1 StuG. Totenkopf lost 12: 2Pz III, 8 Pz IV, 1 Tiger and 1 StuG.87

An assessment of German armoured operational strength following thebattle of Prokhorovka

The number of damaged German tanks was also slight. On 11 July the Leibstandarteand Das Reich reported 200 operational tanks, assault guns, and tank destroyers, whileon 13 July, that is, after the battle of Prokhorovka, the figure was down by just 10 to190.88 However, Leibstandarte was down to 31 operational Pz IVs by the evening of13 July as compared with 47 on the evening of 11 July.89

The Leibstandarte’s fully equipped assault gun battalion began the campaign with 35operational StuGs which were formed into three batteries.90 On 12 July the assault gunbattalion began the day in reserve with 24 operational StuGs and therefore did not initiallyenter the battle, the battalion was still recuperating from its exertions of the previous day. On11 July it had spearheaded (along with the Tigers) the Leibstandarte’s push into theProkhorovka region.91 By the evening of 13 July, the assault gun battalion operationalstrength had fallen to 20. It is interesting to compare these figures with the number ofoperational Pz IVs on the evening of 11 July. As already stated the II battalion possessed 47operational Pz IVs (having begun the offensive with 79 operational Pz IVs and 4 Pz IVsunder repair). However, on 13 July a day after the battle of Prokhorovka the II battalion wasdown to 31 operational Pz IVs, suggesting that the battalion suffered at least 12 damagedtanks on 12 July plus the four write-offs close to Hill 252.2. Of course, it must be borne inmind that the repair facilities would have returned some tanks to the II battalion during thisperiod – so the number of damaged tanks in this period that were actually put out of actionmay have been a little higher. The largest single daily uplift in Pz IV operational strengthbetween consecutive days was 10, which would indicate at most 22 Pz IV being put out ofaction damaged (but later repaired) on 12 July. The Tiger 1 of the heavy panzer company wasthe only other tank lost by the Panzer Regiment either damaged or written off on 12 July (thecompany having started Citadel with 13 Tigers).92

As we have seen the Leibstandarte’s tank destroyer battalion also did not reportany losses for 12 July. At the start of the campaign, the Leibstandarte had 21Marders operational. As stated on 12 July it possessed 20 operational Marders,while we have also seen that just two Marders were reported as being written-offby the entire II SS Panzer Korps between 5 and 23 July (the Panzer Korps beganCitadel with 44 operational Marders). Unfortunately, however, no regular dailyrecord for the Marders operational status has been found. Nevertheless, the

87Ibid.88Frieser, Karl-Heinz, The Battle of the Kursk Salient in The Research Institute for Military History, Potsdam, Germany,Germany and the Second World War Volume VIII – The Eastern Front 1943–1944, 129. and See also Töppel, Roman,‘Kursk – Mythen und Wirklichkeit einer Schlacht’, in Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 375.

89Zetterling, Niklas & Frankson, Anders, Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis, 187.90Ibid., 46.91Töppel, Roman, Kursk 1943: The Greatest Battle of the Second World War, E-book locations: 3115, 3121 and 3126. Seealso; Forczyk, Robert, Kursk 1943: The Southern Front, 70–72. and Töppel, Roman, ‘Kursk – Mythen und Wirklichkeiteiner Schlacht’, in Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 375.

92Zetterling, Niklas & Frankson, Anders, Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis, 187, and see also 46.

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minimum number of Marders the Leibstandarte could have possessed at the end ofOperation Citadel was 27 (8 Marders arriving from Germany following the start ofthe offensive).93

Subsequently, with the defensive posture of both the Soviets and Germans in theLeibstandarte’s sector following 12 July, the repair services were able to greatly increasethe number of operational Panzers. By 16 July 42 Pz IVs, 9 Tigers and 30 StuGs wereoperational again, while on 18 July following the division’s withdrawal from the front 55 PzIVs, 9 Tigers and 28 StuGs were operational.94 During the course of fighting theLeibstandarte received no new tanks or assault guns from Germany prior to its withdrawalfrom the front.95 Looking specifically at the Pz IVs, we know the Leibstandarte lost 9 Pz IVsbetween 5 and 23 July and that these losses all occurred prior to 17 July, with four stemmingfrom 12 July. Given this knowledge, we know that on 18 July 19 Pz IVs must have still beenunder repair. Similarly, only 1 Tiger was lost by the Leibstandarte (Das Reich and Totenkopfalso lost 1 Tiger each) between 5 and 23 July; as discussed this also stemmed from 12 July.By 18 July, given that we know 9 Tigers were operational, a further 3 Tigers, therefore, musthave been under maintenance.96 The Leibstandarte did receive an additional 5 Tigers afterits withdrawal from the front; however, these and all the other tanks in the II PanzerBattalion were split between Das Reich and Totenkopf when the Leibstandarte left for Italylater in July.97 It is possible the Leibstandarte may have lost the two StuG’s recorded by theII SS Panzer Korps during the withdrawal phase between 17 and 23 July; if so, on 18 July 4StuGs would have been under repair.,98 As can be seen the Leibstandarte was rapidly able toincrease its offensive strength in the days following the battle of Prokhorovka. To achievethis feat the II SS Panzer Korps repair troops had a crucial advantage over many of thearmy’s panzer divisions. It was not short of spare parts and recovery vehicles.99

Other German losses: selected gun, vehicle and personnel losses

It is also interesting to note that the II SS Panzer Korps reported losing a relatively highnumber of Pak 40 towed anti-tank guns (16) between 5 and 23 July. Given that theLeibstandarte had 18 of these powerful weapons and that its three towed anti-tankcompanies faced the majority of the 5th Guards Tank Army’s attacking armour on12 July, then it can be assumed a proportion of these weapons would have been lost bythe Leibstandarte that day.100 After all, the firing positions of some of the division’santi-tank guns were overrun at the Oktiabrskiy state farm, while the Leibstandartereconnaissance battalion’s heavy anti-tank company lines were also breached by the

93Zetterling, Niklas & Frankson, Anders, Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis, 46, 124. See also Niehorster, Leo, German WorldWar II Organization Series, Volume 5/III, 47.

94Zetterling, Niklas & Frankson, Anders, Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis, 187.95Ibid., 181–83.96Cross-reference information from the following pages in Zetterling, Niklas & Frankson, Anders, Kursk 1943: A StatisticalAnalysis, 124–25 & Frieser, Karl-Heinz, The Battle of the Kursk Salient in The Research Institute for Military History,Potsdam, Germany, Germany and the Second World War Volume VIII – The Eastern Front 1943–1944, 151.

97Zetterling, Niklas & Frankson, Anders, Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis, 182.98Cross-reference information from the following pages in Zetterling, Niklas & Frankson, Anders, Kursk 1943: A StatisticalAnalysis, 124–25 & Frieser, Karl-Heinz, The Battle of the Kursk Salient in The Research Institute for Military History,Potsdam, Germany, Germany and the Second World War Volume VIII – The Eastern Front 1943–1944, 151.

99Forczyk, Robert, Kursk 1943: The Southern Front, 18–19.100Zetterling, Niklas & Frankson, Anders, Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis, 124–25.

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170th and 181st Tank Brigades. Fierce fighting also raged around the gunners of 1st SSPanzergrenadier Regiment’s heavy anti-tank company when faced by the 25th TankBrigade near to the Stalinsk state farm and the Storozhevoye Woods. The Germantroops firing across the anti-tank ditch would also have received heavy fire from thefloundering Soviet tanks.101 As Zetterling and Frankson state the loss of 16 Pak 40 anti-tank guns is ‘testimony to the German practice of pushing anti-tank guns as far forwardas possible’. This loss is even more noteworthy when one considers that the whole 2nd

Panzer Army only lost 26 Pak 40s throughout July 1943 despite facing the mammothSoviet offensive against the Orel salient (Operation Kutuzov). Even when it is acknowl-edged proportionally the units of Army Group Centre received on average less Pak 40sper unit than those within Army Group South, this is still a remarkable comparison. Inaddition, the II SS Panzer Korps lost 2 105 mm field howitzers which almost certainlybelonged to the Leibstandarte, the losses occurring when Soviet tanks broke into theartillery regiment’s firing positions on 12 July. Furthermore, 8% of the II SS PanzerKorps establishment of armoured personnel carriers were lost between 5 and 23 July.The losses sustained by III battalion 2nd SS Panzergrenadier Regiment on Hill 252.2would surely have contributed enormously to this total.102

In terms of personnel losses, on 12 July the Leibstandarte lost 39 KIA, 235 WIA and5 MIA, while Das Reich lost 41 KIA, 190 WIA and 12 MIA. Together 522 (279 forLeibstandarte and 243 for Das Reich) men were lost.103

Soviet losses

The Soviet losses are slightly harder to detail precisely but all reliable accounts of thebattle indicate that well in excess of 200 Soviet tanks were written-off. Frieser usingRussian archival material reaches the figure of around 235 vehicles as write-offs for12 July.104 The Russian historian Valeriy Zamulin comes to the conclusion, that at least207 of Rotmistrov’s fighting vehicles were ‘burned’ on that day. As the Germans hadsucceeded in pushing back the Soviet attacking forces to their starting positions, thebattlefield was in the Germans hands. On the evening of 12 July, damaged Soviet tankswere totally destroyed by special squads. It was only on 17 July, when the II SS PanzerKorps was withdrawn from the front, that the approaching Soviet troops were able tosee the extent of the debacle that had taken place. Thus, the first reliable report of lossesalso bears that date. It is a statement of fighting vehicles lost from 12 to 16 July, signedby the chief of staff of 5th Guards Tank Army, according to which the army had writtenoff 222 T-34s. 89 T-70s, 12 Churchill Tanks and 11 assault guns for a total of 334 tanksand assault guns. However, almost all those losses must have occurred on 12 July, sinceimmediately afterwards the hard-hit 5th Guards Tank Army was largely withdrawn and,

101Frieser, Karl-Heinz, The Battle of the Kursk Salient in The Research Institute for Military History, Potsdam, Germany,Germany and the Second World War Volume VIII – The Eastern Front 1943–1944, 182.

102Zetterling, Niklas & Frankson, Anders, Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis, 124–25.103Ibid., 207.104This and the subsequent paragraph is used with permission of OUP. Reproduced with permission of the Licensorthrough PLSclear. Frieser, Karl-Heinz, The Battle of the Kursk Salient in The Research Institute for Military History,Potsdam, Germany, Germany and the Second World War Volume VIII – The Eastern Front 1943–1944 (Oxford: ClarendonPress 2017) 130–31. See also Zetterling, Niklas & Frankson, Anders, Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis, 108–09 and;Zamulin, Valeriy. ‘Soviet Troop Losses in the Battle of Prokhorovka, 10–16 July 1943’, Journal of Slavic Military Studies,32:1 (2019), 118–21.

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as is also evident from the German reports, took hardly any further part in the fighting.An exception was 5th Guards Mechanized Corps, which was deployed on 12 July, butonly as a reserve. In any case it suffered only 73 write-offs, so that 261 were incurred bythe remaining four corps (including for 29th Tank Corps: 60 T-34s, 31 T-70s, 8 SU-122s, 3 SU-76 and for 18th Tank Corps: 32 T-34s, 12 T-70s, 11 Churchill Tanks). Inaddition, there were 308 fighting vehicles ‘in need of repair’ which could not be repairedimmediately. The Military History Institute in Moscow has made the following laconicstatement: ‘Despite its [. . .] numerical superiority, 5th Guards Tank Army did notmanage to give the battle a decisive turn. Towards evening, after losing 500 tanks andassault guns, its units went over to the defensive’. Despite its grievous losses, as a resultof its large initial strength, completed repairs and replacements received by 17 July, 5th

Guards Tank Army could still field 419 operational tanks and 25 operational assaultguns.

A key reason for the debacle occurred on 11 July. The Soviets had been shocked atthe pace of the German advance and the proposed marshalling areas for the Sovietoffensive fell into German hands. The Stavka representative Marshall AleksandrMikhailovich Vasilevsky overreacted and ordered the offensive to be launched assoon as possible. As a result, 5th Guards Tank Army found itself forced to attackwithout sufficient intelligence and reconnaissance. Not even the huge anti-tank ditchon the other side of Hill 252.2 was taken into account. The attack was carried outhastily, in a hectic rush. Instead of the properly prepared attack that had been planned,an unnecessary immediate attack was launched in which it was impossible to coordinatethe action of the various forces. A report by 29th Tank Corps stated: ‘The attack beganwithout artillery fire [. . .] and with no aerial support.’105

On 12 July the Soviets suffered 3.563 casualties, of whom over 1,500 were dead ormissing (not including 5th Guards Mechanized Corps). The causality figures for 5th

Guards Tank Army as at 16 July (including late reports) are more complete. Totalcausalities were 7,107, and the figure of 3,597 for dead and missing was higher than thatfor the wounded.106

Aftermath of Prokhorovka – a operational ‘lost victory’ in a strategicallyhopeless situation

At Prokhorovka on 12 July the SS’ armoured losses were extremely light, whereasconversely, Soviet armoured losses had been extremely heavy. This pattern of losseswould be a reoccurring theme of the armoured warfare that took place in the Kursk/Orel area during the summer of 1943. During Citadel (5–16 July) 9th Army, 4th PanzerArmy, and Army Detachment Kempf together lost just 252 tanks and assault gunswritten-off (77 for 9th Army & 175 for Army Group South), while Soviet losses areestimated to be between 1,614 and 1,956 tanks and assault guns written off (526 ofwhich were incurred by Central Front opposing 9th Army between 5 and 15 July).107

Heinz Guderian’s prior concerns, and later reflections, regarding a waste of his (partly)

105Frieser, Karl-Heinz, The Battle of the Kursk Salient in The Research Institute for Military History, Potsdam, Germany,Germany and the Second World War Volume VIII – The Eastern Front 1943–1944, 133.

106Ibid., 131.107Ibid., 151–52.

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rebuilt Panzer arm in a pointless offensive at Kursk (Citadel), have therefore beenproved to be unfounded.108 On the contrary, given the level of Soviet armoured lossesvis-à-vis the Germans that summer in the Kursk/Orel area (between 5 July and23 August the Soviets lost 6,064 tanks and assault guns in this area, while theGermans lost around 760 tanks and assault guns), the evidence indicates that followingthe battle of Prokhorovka, Army Group South would have been well served seeking outfurther clashes with the Soviet armoured reserves.109

Despite the developments of 12 July at Prokhorovka, on 13 July Field Marshals vonKluge and von Manstein were summoned to Führer headquarters in East Prussia andinformed by Hitler that due to the critical situation in Italy (the Western Allies havinglanded in Scilly on 10 July) he wanted to immediately terminate Citadel and send the IISS Panzer Korps to Italy. Hitler hoped the SS soldiers would have an importantrecruiting effect on the wavering Fascist elements in the Italian armed forces andpublic. Kluge was only too relieved to end Citadel given that the previous day theSoviets had begun its massive summer offensive against the Orel salient (OperationKutuzov), clearly the Soviet offensive was also a major factor in Hitler’s decision toterminate Citadel. Manstein on the other hand protested vigorously and proposed analternative to Citadel – Operation Roland. Manstein sought to take advantage of thehuge Soviet armoured losses in his area of command. He proposed repositioning the IISS Panzer Korps and shifting the Schwerpunkt further to the west away fromProkhorovka towards Oboyan. He proposed to encircle all the Soviet troops positionedin the south-western section of the Kursk salient potentially destroying parts of the 38th

and 40th Armies, and old adversaries in the 1st Tank Army and 6th Guards Army.Furthermore, Steppe Front was sending 27th, 53rd, and parts of 47th Army into the areain preparation for the forthcoming summer offensive against Kharkov; however, theseformations could not have been deployed immediately. Manstein stated that with theuse of the uncommitted Army Group reserve (XXIV Panzer Korps by now comprisingSS Panzergrenadier Division Wiking, 17th and 23rd Panzer Divisions, which altogetherpossessed 181 tanks and 13 mobile infantry battalions) and III Panzer Korps as flankprotection against the east, the westward advance of Operation Roland would bepossible. Manstein felt a great victory had been achieved against a proportion of theSoviet armoured reserves and this should be taken advantage of. He accepted thatterritorial losses in the Donbas area would be the almost inevitable result of OperationRoland (indeed he planned for this in regard to the original Citadel plan), but to himthe overall aim of inflicting further losses on the Soviets was by far the more importantconsideration.110

Manstein’s assessment that the II SS Panzer Korps was capable of further offensiveoperations was undoubtedly a correct one.111 By 18 July the operational armouredstrength of the composite divisions of II SS Panzer Korps stood as follows:

108Guderian, Heinz, Panzer Leader, 308–09 & 312.109Frieser, Karl-Heinz, The Battle of the Kursk Salient in The Research Institute for Military History, Potsdam, Germany,Germany and the Second World War Volume VIII – The Eastern Front 1943–1944, 199.

110Frieser, Karl-Heinz, The Battle of the Kursk Salient in The Research Institute for Military History, Potsdam, Germany,Germany and the Second World War Volume VIII – The Eastern Front 1943–1944, 138–43. See also Zetterling, Niklas &Frankson, Anders, Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis, 137–39.

111Zetterling, Niklas & Frankson, Anders, Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis, 221.

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● The Leibstandarte: 7 Pz IIIs, 55 Pz IVs, 9 Tigers and 28 StuGs, for a total of 99operational tanks and assault guns.

● Das Reich: 36 Pz IIIs, 24 Pz IVs, 9 Tigers and 28 StuGs, for a total of 97 operationaltanks and assault guns.

● Totenkopf: 30 Pz IIIs, 25 Pz IVs, 7 Tigers and 20 StuGs, for a total of 82operational tanks and assault guns.

Therefore, the II SS Panzer Korps operational armoured strength comprised 73 Pz IIIs,104 Pz IVs, 25 Tigers and 76 StuGs; in total 278 tanks and assault guns were available forthe launch of Operation Roland on 18 July or thereafter. Importantly 201 (four ofTotenkopf's Pz IVs were L24 short barrelled) of this total were modern fighting vehiclesarmed with long-barrelled 75 mm or 88 mm guns, while the II SS Panzer Korps couldalso call on an undetermined number of operational Marder tank destroyers. These totalscompare well with the II SS Panzer Korps operational armoured strength throughoutCitadel when the offensive was in full swing. For example, the II SS Panzer Korps had 257tanks and assault guns operational on 8 July, while on 11 July the II SS Panzer Korpscould count on 294 operational tanks and assault guns. Clearly then on 18 July, the II SSPanzer Korps was still very much capable of further offensive action.112

Given the superiority of the Germans armour & tactics in the summer of 1943, had theNazi leadership held its nerve then Operation Roland would probably have beensuccessful.113 There is no reason to suppose the trend of armoured combat already describedwould not have continued. Crucially with theGermans remaining on the offensive, continuedcontrol of the battlefield would have allowed the Germans to retrieve and repair the majorityof their damaged tanks and assault guns. It must be stated that by the summer of 1943, therewas no prospect of the Germans redressing the overall strategic situation on the EasternFront; the vastness of Soviet manpower and material reserves prohibited that.114 However,Operation Roland offered a real opportunity to further reduce the Red Army’s capacity tostrike (at least temporarily) in the summer offensive to follow against Kharkov.

As a result ofModel’s reserved use of armour duringOperation Citadel, von Kluge’s ArmyGroup Centre would have been capable (granted with difficulty) of managing its expertdefence and evacuation of the Orel salient, without having to impede on the strength orground operations of Army Group South. Army Group Centre could call on (and did) 8Panzer Divisions (6 from 9th Army alone) fromwithin its own pool of armour during July fora strength of 464 battle tanks and 161 assault guns and tank destroyers.115 TheGrossdeutschland Panzergrenadier Division did eventually transfer from Army GroupSouth but by the time it deployed in late July the situation around Orel, although still veryserious, was no longer critical.116 Soviet armoured losses during Operation Kutuzov (theSoviets having deployed the 2nd, 3rd and 4th TankArmies) were once again astronomical, with

112Ibid., 187–88.113See ‘Technological and Tactical Balance-Sheet: The Qualitative Turnaround in Favour of German Armour’ in Frieser,Karl-Heinz, The Battle of the Kursk Salient in The Research Institute for Military History, Potsdam, Germany, Germanyand the Second World War Volume VIII – The Eastern Front 1943–1944, 157–68.

114Ibid., 84.115Zetterling, Niklas & Frankson, Anders, Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis, 121. See also Frieser, Karl-Heinz, The Battle ofthe Kursk Salient in The Research Institute for Military History, Potsdam, Germany, Germany and the Second World WarVolume VIII – The Eastern Front 1943–1944, 175–76.

116Glantz, David & House, Jonathan, The Battle of Kursk, 238–40.

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2,586 tanks and assault guns being written off during the battle which lasted from 12 July to18 August. German armoured losses for Army Group Centre in July were only 343 tanks,assault guns and tank destroyers (including 77 lost by 9th Army during Citadel). The numbersfell in August during the planned withdrawal to the Hagen Line (1–16 August).117

Between 13 and 17 July (the period following the battle of Prokhorovka) Voronezh Frontremained, as a result of its losses, passive in most sectors. For the Germans Operation Rolandrepresented the last opportunity in the summer of 1943 to launch a significant offensiveoperation. This opportunity was short lived and missed. Hitler forbade Manstein from usingArmy Groups South’s reserve and instead on 17 July ordered the withdrawal of II SS PanzerKorps from the front (in the event only the II SS Panzer Korps Staff and LeibstandarteDivision were ultimately transferred to Italy). This effectively ended any further Germanoffensive intentions.118 On the Eastern Front in July and August, the Soviets lost anastonishing 9,294 tanks and assault guns.119 Had Operation Roland been pursued thisstaggering figure would have been substantially added to.

Following 12 July the 5th Guards Tank Army was reconstituted in time for OperationRumyantsev (the Soviet offensive against Kharkov) which was launched on 3 August.During this offensive, the 5th Guard Tank Army and the 1st Tank Army once againsuffered catastrophic losses. In 20 days 5th Guard Tank Army tank strength fell from543 to only 50, while 1st Tank Army and attached units lost 1,042 vehicles (the tankarmy having been continuously resupplied with new tanks during the battle). Kharkovwas captured by the Soviets at great cost on 23 August, the Soviets having lost 1,864tanks and assault guns during the offensive.120

With the Germans now firmly on the defensive, and with no prospect of a managedwithdrawal (as had occurred in the Orel salient) damaged tanks became far more difficult toretrieve as the battlefield was inevitably left in Soviet hands. Accordingly, German armouredlosses mounted and the army’s repair facilities became overwhelmed. Given the almostconstant fighting from 3 August onwards the number of operational panzers plummeted,which in turn severely hampered German defensive operations. With the fall of Kharkova German withdrawal to the Dnieper became inevitable, this had duly occurred by the end ofSeptember.121 By the time the retreat to the Dnieper had been completed just 605 of 1,953available panzers were operational on the Eastern Front.122

Conclusion

In conclusion, given our knowledge of the relative losses incurred by both sides and thelocations of the tanks on the battlefield, it is clear that the photographic evidencecontained in this article support Frieser’s description of the battle – i.e. that the Sovietssuffered a major defeat and incurred vast numbers of written off tanks in the process. Thelocation of the mass destruction of the 29th Tank Corps armour is clear to see with 32nd &31st Tank Brigades demise in (or near to) the anti-tank ditch and 25th Tank Brigade’s

117Frieser, Karl-Heinz, The Battle of the Kursk Salient in The Research Institute for Military History, Potsdam, Germany,Germany and the Second World War Volume VIII – The Eastern Front 1943–1944, 186–87.

118Ibid., 141–42.119Ibid., 199.120Ibid., 197–98.121Zetterling, Niklas & Frankson, Anders, Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis, 135.122Jentz, Thomas, (ed.) Panzer Truppen II, 110.

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defeat between the railway embankment, Stalinsk state farm and the Storozhevoye Woodsalso being clearly visible in the photographs provided. Regarding the halting of 18th TankCorps – we can see from the photographs available to us that the Soviet attempt tooutflank the Leibstandarte was also met with a major defeat. The demise of the 170th &181st Tank Brigades is clearly highlighted behind the left flank of the anti-tank ditch andthe 2nd SS Panzergrenadier Regiment’s position. The defeat of 181st Tank Brigade’ssubsequent effort to advance up from the ribbon village of Andreyevka is also depicted.The fact that only four Tiger tanks repelled both of these armoured advances is testamentto the tanks’ prowess at that stage of the war.

This article has therefore verified the demise of the majority of the attackingcomponents of the 5th Guards Tank Army during the battle of Prokhorovka on12 July 1943. As has been shown above, the level of detailed information now availableto us means it is entirely possible that individual lost German tanks can be located onthe battlefield photographs amongst the mass of Soviet tank losses. It is remarkable thatthe historiography of the battle has evolved so radically over the last 20–30 years froman era when it was believed the Germans had suffered a major war-defining defeat withthe loss of as many as 400 tanks (including 70 Tigers), to one that recognizes (withrespect) that a Soviet catastrophe took place and that this catastrophe can be visuallyverified. If the myth of Prokhorovka is still given any credence around the world thenthe photographs contained in this article will surely bring this myth to an end.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor

Ben Wheatley is an Honorary Research Fellow in the School of History at the University of EastAnglia and a former Teaching Fellow with the Defence Studies Department, King’s CollegeLondon. Dr Wheatley is the author of British Intelligence and Hitler’s Empire in the Soviet Union,1941-1945 (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2017).

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