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What is political?

Amitai Etzioni

l1lere is no widely agreed upon definition of what is political. A definition that seems

fruitful is to hold that political processes concern bridging power differences with s0-

ciety with those within the state,bridges that carry inputs both from society to the state

(e.g., the results of elections) and from the state o society (e.g., Presidentialspeeches;

legislation). l1le political realm also includes intrastate -but not intra-societal -proc-

essesconcerning the application, reallocation, and legitimation of power. Hence, if one

adopts the suggested definition, one can speak about 'politics' within a voluntary as-

sociation or on a private college board only by the way of vague analogues,because

such talk confounds society and the state to the detriment of sound analysis and nor-

mative judgement. Indeed, one of the main merits of the suggested defmition is that it

calls attention to an often overlooked cardina1distinction between he stateand society.

Note also that only once society and state are systematicallyseparated can one analyze

the relationship between the two realms. I proceed next to examine key attributes of

the political realm, including its limits.

A. The political is not the social

Ever since Aristotle advanced the thesis that human beings are by nature political an-

imals, there has been a tendency to fold the social into the political. The meaning of

Aristotle's dictum has been subject to a considerable body of scholarship, but there is

a wide consensus hat whether it is narrowly or broadly understood, it does mean that

people are social in natUre, that they cooperate and have shared meanings and pur-

poses, and not that the essence of their being is state related or mitigated (Aristotle

1984,488a pp, 7-14).1

Moreover, when considering a small polis, one could readily collapse state and s0-

ciety and cause relatively limited damage o political and social analysis.However, such

a reduction of two essential concepts to one is much more troublesome when one

deals with much larger and more complex societies. Nevertheless, here is a common

tendency to confound state and society by folding into the 'political' numerous proc-

essesand actionsand institUtions hat are inherently social. This is evident, for instance,

when citizenship (a legal status that defines one's legal obligations to the state and

one's legal rights the state is expected to protect and honor) is equated with member-

ship (a social statUs he defines one's membership in one or more communities or as-

sociations, the moral responsibilities one has toward other members of one's

community and the common good, and the moral claims that others have of him). Pay-

.I am indebted o JasonMarsh or detailed comments n a previousdraft and editorial work on the

currentone.

1) For an overviewof someof the competing heorieson Aristotle's hesis,seeLarry Arnhart,John M.

Cooper1993.

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ing taxes, serving in the anned forces (when there is a draft), and -in some countries

-voting are the obligations of citizens. The constitution or basic laws enumerate rights

citizens have vis-a.-vis he state. n conti"ast, onating to charity, volunteering, caring for

one's friends and family (above and beyond one's legal obligations), collaborating with

neighbors, being tolerant of people of different background and habits (above and be-

yond what the law prescribes),pursuing social justice,volunteering to work to protect

the environment -these are all matters that concern membership, not citizenship.

The temptation to blur the line between the political and the social is particularly

high when one studies nationalism,a phenomenon in which the state acquires some of

the attributes of communities. And, atavism s not merely a regrettable social pheno-

mena on but also a conceptual mpairment. Citizens in countries in which the civil s0-

ciety is thin, has low visibility, or is merely conceptually unacknowledged, one of often

hears a tell tale line .1 paid my taxes; now it is up to the government to take careof.. ."

whatever needs attention.

The distinction between citizenship and membership s especially important if one

recognizes that the relationship between the state and society is somewhat akin to that

between the state and the individual. The more the state akes over functions once dis-

charged by communities, voluntary associations,and families, the weaker society will

become. In conti"ast, he more the state generatesopportunities for social actors o in-

itiate and sustain their own action, the more viable the society will become. But, if, for

instance, the government starts sending professional grief counselors, licenced and

trained by the state, o the homes of people who have lost a loved one, this is likely to

weaken friendship ties, those of neighbors, of religious groups and of extended fami-

lies. In conti"ast,public policies that recognize both the need for the state to attend to

numerous social as well as personal needs (especially those of the more vulnerable

members of society or to vulnerable phases n the lives of all citizens) but also the need

not to undermine social actors, are those that build on rather than ignore and under-

mine the difference between the political and the social. To put it differently, one rea-

son to cherish the distinction between the social and the political is to ensure that the

social will not become the political.

B. The good society vs. the 'good' state

Socialconservativesmaintain that it is the role of the state (the core and focus of the

political realm) to promote not merely citizenship but also the good person, not only

skills needed to participate in the polity but also social virtues -those that make the

society a good one. George Will, for instance,argues that people are self-indulgent by

nature: left to their own devices, hey will abuse their liberties, becoming profligate and

indolent. The state needs to restrain hem. Other conservativesassert hat in the name

of 'national greatness',people need a 'strong national government' that will be a 'shap-

er' of citizens and help them cope with the weaker angles of their nature (Brooks/

Kristall997). Religious social conservativeshave long been willing to rely on the state

to foster behavior they consider virtuous. They favor banning abortion and pornogra-

phy, making divorce more difficult, and outlawing homosexual activities.

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Additionally, both religious and secular social conservativeshave strongly advocated

longer, more arduous prison terms for more individuals and more kinds of crime, es-

pecially favoring life sentences without the possibility of parole and death sentences.

Harsh penalties are often applied to people of whose consumption and business the

state disapproves (a large proportion of those in jail in the United Statesare there for

non-violent, drug-related offenses) rather than for endangering public safety or failing

to discharge their duties ~ citizens. These are not good-citizen issuesbut good-person

issues.

The term 'the good state' appropriately summarizes he social conservative position

because he state here is not viewed as an institution that threatens o debase people or

undermine liberty, and hence must be constantly contained, he liberal position, but as

an institution that can be entrusted with making people good. That s, although social

conservativesdo not suggest hat the state is inherently good, but they do hold that it

-and hence the political -can do good by fostering virtue.

Addressing the same socio-historical conditions that led to the rise of the contempo-

rary social conservative position, responsive (or new) communitarianshave advocate a

fundamentally different approach (Etzioni 2001). It rejects state regulation of most mor-

al behavior, under most circumstances. Communitarians advocate state restraint be-

cause hey believe that the society should be the main agentresponsible for promoting

moral behavior, relying on education, persuasion and leadership rather than the law.

Granted, developing and sustaining a good society does require reaching into what

is considered the private realm, shaping behavior that does not directly relate to the

state or to the state-mediated elationships with one's fellow citizens. A good society,

for instance, osters trust among its members not solely or even primarily to enhance

their trust in the government but to cultivate a better society,one in which certain types

of conduct are preferred over others by the community, rather than leaving it to each

individual to judge what is good behavior.

Similarly, a good society fosters substantive values other than trust such as steward-

ship toward the environment, charity for those who are vulnerable, marriage over sin-

glehood, having children, and showing special consideration o the young and elderly.

These are all specific goods with regard to which the society, hrough its various social

mechanisms,prefers one basic form of conduct over all others, and all concern the pri-

vate realm.

All this, however, does not mean that all or even most private mattersneed to be sub-

ject to societal scrutiny and normative suasion. One major way the communitarian po-

sition differs from the totalitarian, authoritarian, theocratic,and social conservative ones

is that although the good society reaches into the private realm, it seeks to cultivate

only a limited set of core virtues rather than have an expansive or holistic normative

agenda. For example, American society favors being religious over being atheist but is

rather 'neutral' with regard to which religion a person should follow. There are no pre-

scribed dress codes (e.g., no Spartan Mao shirts), correct number of children to have,

places one is expected to live, and so forth. In short, a key defining characteristic of the

good society s that, in contrast o the liberal state, t formulates shared formulations of

the good, but the scope of the good is much smaller than that advanced by govern-

ment-centered societies, either of the secular (Soviet style) or religious kind (Iran, Tal-

iban), or social conservatives. To put it differently, the relationship between the

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What ispolitical?

deliberations as a rule do not lead to cultural or civil wars. On the contrary, the absenceof

a broad array of shared values -for instance, between Jewish and Arabic citizens of

Israel -is one key reason that such groups find it particularly difficult to resolve con-

flicts ~t arise for other reasons.Moreover, the law, never morally neutral, is at its best

when it reflects widely shared moral values rather than impose the values of one group(the

majority included) on the general populous.

Valuepromotion: the moral voicevs. coercion

Another major difference between the good society and the 'good' state, other that

the scope of values enforced, is found in the ways values are fostered. A major instru-

ment of the good society s the mor-a.l oice, which urges people to behave in pro-social

ways. Although some tend to stress he importance of the inner voice, and hence good

parenting and moral or character education (see Lickona 1992), esponsive commlini-

tarians recognize the basic fact that without continual external reinforcement, the con-

sdence tends to deteriorate. The validations by fellow human beings, especially of

those to whom a person is attached through familial or communal bonds, carry a con-

siderable weight because of a profound human need to win and sustain he approval

of others (see Wrong 1994).

One may wonder whether compliance with the moral voice is compatible with free

choice, whether one's right to be let alone includes a right to be free not only from state

controls but also social pressures.This issue is highlighted by the conflicting interpre-

tations of an often-cited line by John StuartMill. In On Liberty, Mill writes, "The object

of this Essay s to assertone very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the

dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether

the means used be physical force in the form of legal penalties, or the mor-a.l oercion

of public opinion" (Mill 1975,p. 71). Some have interpreted this statement o mean that

the moral voice is as coercive as the government. Similarly, Alexis de Tocqueville,

wrote that "The multitude require no laws to coerce those who do not think like them-

selves: public disapprobation is enough; a sense of their loneliness and impotence

overtakes them and drives them to despair" (Tocqueville 1991,p. 261). If one takes

these ines aswritten, the difference between reinforcement by the community and that

by the state becomes a distinction without a difference.

One should note, though, that Mill has also to be understood to suggest hat while

public opinion written large is coerdve, local communal pressuresare not. And de Toc-

queville is, of course, known for having highlighted the importance of communal

associations n holding the state at bay. Indeed, as I see it, it is essential o recogniZe

that there is a profound difference between the moral voice of the community and co-

erdon, and that the moral voice is the best antid'ote to an oppressive state.

Above all, the moral voice is much more compatible with free choice than state co-

erdon. The internal moral voice is as much a part of the person's self as he other parts

of the self that are from his or her choices. The external moral voice, that of the com-

munity, leaves final judgments to the acting person -an element that is notably absent

when coercion is applied. Society may persuade, cajole, censure,and educate, but al-

ways leaves the final decision to the actor. The state may also persuade, cajole, and

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E. Deliberationsvs. moral dialogues

At the heart of the political -whether there is a quest for new public policies, regu-

lations, or laws -are deliberations through which people or factions that have diver-

gent interests are s~id to arrive at shared resolutions. Deliberations are often depicted

as if an aggregate of individuals assembleand discuss dispassionately he facts of the

situation, their logical implications, the available policy alternatives, and choose the

most empirically valid and logical one.2Miriam Galstonwrites: "Most contemporary le-

gal theorists addressing republican concerns advocate some fonn of deliberative de-

mocracy. The heart of their recommendations or making political life more delibera-tive

is the establishmentof certain procedures in the decision making processdesignedto

enhance, f not ensure,a rational or reasoned basis or legislative, udicial, and otherdetenninatio

(Galston 1994,p. 355).Jack Knight and JamesJohnSon state, We view

deliberation as an idealized processconsisting of fair procedures within which political

actors engage in reasoned argument for the purpose of resolving political conflict"

(Knight/Johnson 1994,p. 285).3

Deliberation and democratic polity are often closely associated.A civil society s said

to be one that deals with its problems in a deliberative manner. KuklinSki and his as-sociates

sum up this view:

In a democratic society, reasonable decisions are preferable to unreasonableones; considered

thought eads to the former, emotions o the latter... citiZensare o approach he subjectof politics withtemperate

considerationand objective analysis, hat is, to use their heads when making judgments

aboutpublic affairs (Kuklinski et aI. 1991).4

Somewhat ike those economistswho build models of perfect competition and than

draw conclusions from them about the real world, some political theoristsbuild modelsof

the way politics ought to be -and tend to disregard that this is not the way it is ac-

tually practiced, even i1 he bestdemocracies.Actually resolutions n the political realmare

much driven by moral dialogues, although these occur largely in the social one.

Moral dialogues are processes n which the values of the participants are engagedand

shared moral fonnulations may be worked out. They are substantiveand not mere-

ly or firstly procedural. When they successfullymature, hey lead to a change of valuesamong

some of the participants, an essential precondition for reaching newly sharedunderstandin

about social policies based a truly shared consensus ather on merely

2) For a particularly cogent discussionof the role of reason n deliberationsof ends and not just

means,see Selznick 1992, p. 524-6.

Dennis Wrong illustrates he tendency oward reason n stating, Many sociologists onfme them-

selves, mplidtly at least, o the cognitive rather than the motivational or emotional aspectsof in-

teraction,often making tadt assumptions bout he latter or simply aking them for granted Berger

and Luckmannexplicitly call their vivid accountof how actorsconstructan objectivesocialworld

that then confrontsand constrains hem a contribution o the 'societyof knowledge'. (1994,p. 60).

Although Wrong speaksdirectly of sociology, he affillity for the rational applies to many disci-

pliries.

3) Furthermore,Knight and Johnsonstresshe importanceof reason, Deliberation nvolves easoned

argument.Proposalsmust be defendedor criticizedwith reasons. ..The crucialpoint is that :r>arties

to deliberation ely only on what Habermas alls he force of be better rgument,other forms of in-

fluence are explidtly excluded so that nterlocutorsare free to remainunconvincedso ong as they

withhold agreementwith reasons.' Knight/Johnson,1994, talics omitted,p. 286;1).

4) Seealso,Wilson, JamesQ. 1990, . 559; Kuklinski,JamesH. e.taI. 1993, . 227; Barber, Benjamin

R 1996,pp. 275,276; Fishkin,JamesS. 1991.

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overlapping ones. Among the moral dialogues that had such effectsare those about the

environment, civil rights and women rights, and sexual harassment.None led to a full-

fledged, detailed, new shared understanding, but all have moved the societies nvolved

in important ways to change their values and consensus which then was reflected in

various political acts and new legislation.

One may tend to think that moral dialogues occur in families or small communities

but wonder how a society could possibly come together to affirm a new, renewed, or

some other set of values. I suggest hat they occur on the societal evels as well.

Whole societies,even if their population counts n the hundreds of millions, do en-

gage in moral dialogues that lead to changes n widely sharedvalues. The process oc-

curs by linking millions of local conversations between couples, n neighborhood bars

or pubs, in coffee or tea houses,next to water coolers at work) into ~iety-wide net-

works and shared public focal points. The networking takes place during regional and

national meetings of many thousands of voluntary associations n which local repre-

sentatives dialogue; in state, regional, and national conventions; and increasingly via

electronic links (such as groups that meet on the Internet). Public focal points occur

around call-in shows, debates on network television, and nationally circulated news-

papers and magazines. Severalvoluntary associations, re explicitly dedicated to nour-

ishing both local and society-wide (some even cross national) moral dialogues.

Moral dialogues are often extensive,disorderly (in the sense hat there is no clear pat-

tern to them), have an unclear beginning, and no clear or decisive conclusion. Never-

theless, hey lead to significant changes n core values. One brief illustration follows.

Until 1970, he environment was not considered a sharedcore value in Western so-

cieties (nor in many others). This does not mean that there were not some studies, ar-

ticles, and individuals who saw gl;'eat alue in it. But society as a whole paid little

systematic heed, and the environment was not listed among America's core values.5

As is often the case,a book -Silent Spring,by RachelCarson,which was very widely

read and discussed triggered a nationwide megalogue.A massive oil spill and the en-

suing protests in SantaBarbara, California and the Three-Mile Island incident further

impressed the subject on the national normative agenda. Thousands of people gath-

ered in New York City to listen to pro-environment speechesand to pick up garbage

along Fifth Avenue. Two hundred thousand people gathered on Washington, DC's Mall

in 1970 to demonstrate concern for the environment on "Earth Day" (Mowery/Red-

mond 1993). As a result, concern for the environment became a shared core value.

(There continues to be disagreementsabout the level of commitment to this causeand

the best ways to proceed, but not about the basic value. A conservative president, Ri-

chard Nixon, founded the Environmental Protection Agency, and during his Presidency

many environmentalist policies, such as recycling, were introduced. The extent to

which this value sharing was breached in the mid-l990s is not yet clear, but it held for

25 years and is now found in many other societies.)

5) .[It would probably not be difficult to reach agreement, ven amongpersons of diversevalue ori-

entation, hat the following values areconspicuouspartsof Americanculture.' The list follows: mo-

nogamous maniage, freedom, acquisitiveness,democracy, education, monotheistic religion,

freedom and science.RobinM. Williams, r. 1952,p. 389.

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Does this mean that if a community becomes aware of a serious flaw, say segrega-

tion, it can never act by mainly relying on the law without first laying moral foundations

(assuming that none or rather weak ones are in place)? f the evil that needs to be over-

come is great enough, combating it may outweigh the undesirable side-effects and

render tolerable the resulting low compliance rate and high costs of enforcement. But

these exceptions do not invalidate the rule: enacting laws bereft of moral underpinning

tends to be both an un-communitarlan and ineffectual exercise.Although a good soci-

ety can tolerate a few such bare aws, it cannot make them its mainstayof social order.

The political must be preceded and undergirded by the social.

In conclusion, it is essential o avoid collapsing or confusing the political and the s0-

cial realm. Although formation and reformation of power relationsare at the core of the

political, most of its decisions have a moral dimension. Hence the cardinal importance

of moral dialogues that help form these decisions and the difference between laws

backed not simply by majority vote but also by profoundly shared moral understand-

ing, the outcome of moral dialogues that have matured.

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