abbas vs. obama amitai etzioni - middle east forummar 27, 2009 · spring 2011 volume 18, number 2...

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SPRING 2011 VOLUME 18, NUMBER 2

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• Reviews by Cohen, Hollander,Meir-Levi, Nisan, Phelps,Plaut, and Solomon

The AfghanistanConflict

John EibnerTurkey’s Top Catholic Bishop Slain

Steven RosenAbbas vs. Obama

David Schenker Damascus on Trial

Ben-Dror Yemini NGOs vs. Israel

Alexander JoffeEgypt’s Museums Plundered

Ali AlfonehAhmadinejad’s Patronage System

Hilal KhashanLebanon’s Islamist Stronghold

Amitai Etzioni An Exit Strategy

David KatzWinning the War

Harsh PantIndia’s Dilemmas

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SPRING 2011 VOLUME 18, NUMBER 2

THE AFGHANISTAN CONFLICT

03 Amitai Etzioni, Mission Creep and Its DiscontentsWashington must abandon unrealistic nation-building and democratization goals

17 David Katz, Reforming the Village WarSeparating the Pashtun tribes from the Taliban is key to victory

31 Harsh V. Pant, India’s Changing RoleWashington should pay closer attention to India’s concerns

41 John Eibner, Turkey’s Christians under Siege A bishop’s murder is emblematic of Turkey’s endemic Christophobia

53 Steven J. Rosen, Abbas vs. Obama A U.N. declaration of Palestinian statehood could put Washington on the spot

59 David Schenker, Damascus on Trial A U.S. court judgment imposes a high price on Assad’s recklessness

67 Ben-Dror Yemini, NGOs vs. Israel The Knesset probes foreign funding of the delegitimization campaign

DATELINE

73 Alexander H. Joffe, Egypt’s Antiquities Caught in the Revolution The country’s relics have always been a tool to shape Egyptian identity

79 Ali Alfoneh, All Ahmadinejad’s Men Can the Iranian president’s patronage system thwart the supreme leader?

85 Hilal Khashan, Lebanon’s Islamist Stronghold The city’s hopelessly fragmented Salafi movement is primarily non-combative

REVIEWS

91 Brief Reviews Israel’s Arab media ... The Goldstone report ... India’s Israel policy ... Lebanese identity

2 / MIDDLE EAST QUARTERLY SPRING 2011

Board of Editors

Editorial AssistantWilliam Aquilino

EditorEfraim Karsh

Senior EditorsPatrick ClawsonDenis MacEoinMichael Rubin

Managing EditorJudy Goodrobb

Publisher and Review EditorDaniel Pipes

Deputy PublisherRaymond Ibrahim

Assistant EditorHillel Zaremba

Fouad AjamiJohns Hopkins University

David CookRice University

Martin KramerThe Shalem Center

Timur KuranDuke University

Habib C. MalikFoundation for Human and Humanitarian Rightsin Lebanon

James PhillipsThe Heritage Foundation

Steven PlautUniversity of Haifa

Dennis RossWashington, D.C.

Barry RubinGlobal Research in International Affairs Center

James R. RussellHarvard University

Franck SalamehBoston College

Philip Carl SalzmanMcGill University

Saliba SarsarMonmouth University

Robert B. SatloffThe Washington Institute for Near East Policy

Sabri SayarøSabancø University

Kemal SilayIndiana University

Lee SmithWashington, D.C.

Steven L. SpiegelUniversity of California, Los Angeles

Kenneth W. SteinEmory University

/ 3Etzioni: Afghan War Strategy

The Afghanistan ConflictMission Creepand Its Discontents

Amitai Etzioni is a university professor and pro-fessor of international relations at George Wash-ington University, director of the Institute forCommunitarian Policy Studies, and the authorof Security First: For a Muscular, Moral For-eign Policy (Yale University Press, 2008).

by Amitai Etzioni

Washington’s persistent difficulties in Afghanistan are due to the Obamaadministration’s mission creep. Within a matter of months, U.S. operationsexpanded from counterterrorism measures designed “to disrupt, dismantle,

and defeat al-Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan and to prevent their return to eithercountry in the future”1 to a counterinsurgency strategy viewing nation-building and de-mocratization as prerequisites to military success—a highly unrealistic goal in a countrythat is as poor, illiterate, corrupt, and conflicted as Afghanistan.

The mission creep and confusion in Afghanistan has greatly hindered U.S. efforts tofind a way to complete its campaign and to disengage. As the target keeps changing andenlarging, public support for the intervention both in the United States and in othernations is declining while the human and economic costs of the war are mounting. Areturn to the original goal and to some version of the “Biden approach”—advocatingreliance on drones, Special Forces, and the CIA to ensure that Afghanistan will notagain become a haven for terrorists after the U.S. departure—may provide an answer.

COUNTERTERRORISM TO COUNTERINSURGENCY

Having made the Afghan war the edifice ofhis struggle against violent extremism, PresidentObama has been struggling to shape a coherentstrategy. His first strategic review of the situa-tion in Afghanistan, completed in March 2009,was basically framed as a counterterrorism

mission to be carried out by military forces andthe CIA. However, over the following year, thepresident endorsed Gen. David Petraeus’schange of strategy from counterterrorism tocounterinsurgency, which holds that in order toaccomplish the security goal of eliminating ter-rorists and their havens, a considerable measureof nation-building must take place.

In discussions of counterinsurgency, theterm “nation-building” is typically avoided, butthe precept that to win the United States mustbuild an “effective and legitimate government”and that counterinsurgency means not just de-stroying the enemy but also holding the territo-

1 Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President on a New Strat-egy for Afghanistan and Pakistan,” Mar. 27, 2009.


ries and building the new polity, in effect amountsto nation-building. Moreover, the scope of na-tion-building has been steadily extended. Thus,Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has stated that“we share an interest in helping build an Af-ghanistan that is stable and secure; that can pro-vide prosperity and progress and peace for itscitizens.”2 Obama added the following day thathe had “reaffirmed the commitment of the UnitedStates to an Afghanistan that is stable, strong,

and prosperous.” He re-iterated the 2009 goal to“disrupt, dismantle, anddefeat al-Qaeda and itsextremist allies in Af-ghanistan and Pakistan,and to prevent its capac-ity to threaten Americaand our allies in the fu-ture.” But he also under-scored the need for “a ci-vilian effort to promote

good governance and development … In addi-tion… [to] open the door to Taliban who cut theirties to al-Qaeda, abandon violence, and acceptthe Afghan constitution, including respect for hu-man rights.”3

As the Hamid Karzai government started tonegotiate with various factions of the Talibanabout the conditions under which they mightsupport the government, or join it, or lay downtheir weapons after the departure of U.S. andNATO forces, the nation-building goal was ex-tended. It grew from an “effective and legitimategovernment” in the eyes of the Afghans to en-suring that democracy and human rights, espe-cially women’s rights, as stated in the Afghanconstitution (fashioned under U.S. influence andin line with the values Americans hold dear) arerespected and that Shari‘a or Islamic law doesnot become the law of the land.

Late in 2010, as it became clearer that na-

tion-building was progressing rather poorly, mis-sion creep turned into mission confusion. Atseveral points, the U.S. government opposednegotiations with the Taliban. At others, it en-dorsed and facilitated these talks.4 A more mod-erate goal was mentioned much more frequently:Weaken the Taliban to the point that they be-come truly interested in a peaceful settlement orin avoiding a civil war among the various ethnicgroups after U.S. troops leave.

Most recently, a geopolitical goal has beenadded—namely to ensure that after the U.S. with-drawal, the Afghan government will not tilt to-ward Pakistan or come under its influence—es-pecially not that of the Inter-Services Intelligence(ISI)—because such a tilt could trouble India,which in turn might lead to a regional war or toIndia distancing itself from the United States,just as Washington is counting on New Delhi tocountervail China.

The discussion proceeds by spelling outthe reason why nation-building, a key elementof counterinsurgency, is not working in Afghani-stan, the need to draw much more on structuresand leaders already in place rather than buildingnew ones if Washington is to disengage suc-cessfully, and it closes by outlining what mightbe done and what lessons might be learned fromthis war, one of the longest in which the UnitedStates has ever engaged.

THE LIMITS OF NATION-BUILDING

Champions of nation-building, which oftenentails pouring large amounts of money on thenations to be reconstructed, ignore the bitter les-sons of foreign aid in general. An extensive 2006report on the billions of dollars invested by theWorld Bank since the mid-1990s in economic de-velopment shows that despite the bank’s bestefforts, the “achievement of sustained increasesin per capita income, essential for poverty reduc-tion, continues to elude a considerable number of

2 Hillary Clinton, “Remarks at Reception in Honor of AfghanPresident Hamid Karzai,” May 11, 2010.3 Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Obama and PresidentKarzai of Afghanistan in Joint Press Availability,” May 12,2010. 4 The Guardian (London), July 19, 2010.

Police, judges,jailors, customsofficers, and civilservants inAfghanistanregularlyaccept bribes.

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countries.”5 Out of twenty-five aid-recipient countriescovered by the report, morethan half (14) had the sameor worsening rates of percapita income from the mid-1990s to the early 2000s.Moreover, the nations thatreceived most of the aid, es-pecially in Africa, devel-oped least while the nationsthat received very little aidgrew very fast (notablyChina, Singapore, SouthKorea, and Taiwan).6 Othernations found foreign aid a“poisoned gift” because itpromoted dependency onforeigners, undermined in-digenous endeavors, anddisproportionately ben-efited those gifted at pro-posal writing and courtingfoundation and foreign aidrepresentatives, rather thanlocal entrepreneurs andbusinessmen.

In addition, the World Bank and other stu-dents of development have learned that largeparts of the funds provided are wasted becauseof widespread and high-level corruption. In TheWhite Man’s Burden,7 American economist Wil-liam Easterly systematically debunked the ideathat increased aid expenditures in and of them-selves can alleviate poverty or modernize failedor failing states and pointed to the key roles thatbad government and corruption play in thesedebacles. Steve Knack of the World Bankshowed that huge aid revenues may even spurfurther bureaucratization and worsen corrup-tion.8 Others found that mismanagement, sheer

incompetence, and weak government were al-most as debilitating.

Afghanistan was ranked by TransparencyInternational as the third most corrupt nation inthe world in 2010.9 Its government lost much ofwhatever legitimacy it had following fraudulentelections. It does not govern large parts of thecountry. It surely qualifies as a failing state—eight years after reconstruction began with fewsigns of improvement. A 2008 study by TheEconomist found that several of the main rea-sons that Afghanistan’s development is pro-ceeding so poorly are the widespread corrup-tion, cronyism and tribalism, lack of account-ability, and gross mismanagement. The Econo-mist recommended that the West pressure Presi-dent Karzai to introduce reforms.10 But how

Etzioni: Afghan War Strategy

Photo by Michael Sparks, CJTF-101

Having made the Afghan war the edifice of his battle against violentextremism, President Obama, here with U.S. troops in Afghanistan,December 3, 2010, has been struggling to shape a coherent strategy.His frequent juggling of goals and his lack of clarity on what theyare has reduced public support for the war and hindered U.S.efforts to disengage.

5 “Annual Review of Development Effectiveness 2006: GettingResults,” World Bank Independent Evaluation Group, Wash-ington, D.C., 2006.6 Ibid.7 New York: Penguin, 2006.8 Stephen Knack, “Aid Dependence and the Quality of Gover-nance: Cross-Country Empirical Tests,” Southern EconomicJournal, 2 (2001): 310-29.

9 “2010 Corruption Perceptions Index,” Transparency Interna-tional, Berlin, accessed Jan. 12, 2011.10 “A War of Money as Well as Bullets,” The Economist, May24, 2008.


should Karzai proceed? Should he call in all theministers and ask them to cease taking bribesand stop allocating public funds to their favor-ites? Fire them and replace them—with whom?And if he did, what about their staffs? Many ofthe police, judges, jailors, customs officers, andcivil servants in Afghanistan regularly acceptbribes and grant strong preference to membersof their family, clan, and tribal group.11 Most arepoorly trained and have no professional tradi-tions to fall back on. How is a president, evenone backed by foreign powers, to change thesedeeply ingrained habits and culture?

One may argue that such reforms occurredin other countries, including in the West. Indeed,social scientists could do a great service to de-veloping nations if they conducted a thoroughstudy of how those nations succeeded in curb-ing corruption and gross mismanagement.12 Thestudy would probably show that the process tookdecades, if not generations, and that it entailed amajor change in social forces (such as the rise ofa sizable middle class) and major alterations in theeducation system—among other major societalchanges. Such changes cannot be rushed and

must be largely endemic.Many conditions

that are unlikely to be re-produced elsewhere ledto successful reconstruc-tion in Germany and Ja-pan after World War II.First, both nations hadsurrendered after defeatin a war and fully submit-ted to occupation. Sec-

ond, many facilitating factors were much moreestablished than they are in countries in whichsocial engineering is now being attempted. Therewas no danger that Japan or Germany wouldbreak up due to a civil war among ethnic groupsas is the case in Afghanistan and Iraq. No efforthad to be expended on building national unity.On the contrary, strong national unity was a

major reason change could be introduced withrelative ease. Other favorable factors includedcompetent government personnel and a lowlevel of corruption. Political scientist RobertPackenham cites as core factors the presenceof “technical and financial expertise, relativelyhighly institutionalized political parties, skillfuland visionary politicians, well-educated popu-lations, [and] strong national identifications.”13

And, crucially, there was a strong culture of self-restraint present in both Japan and Germanythat favored hard work and high levels of sav-ing, essential for building up local assets andkeeping costs down.

Conditions in the donor countries were dif-ferent as well. In 1948, the first year of the MarshallPlan, aid to the sixteen European countries in-volved 13 percent of the U.S. budget. In compari-son, the United States currently spends less than1 percent of its budget on foreign aid, and not allof it is dedicated to economic development.14

Other nations are giving relatively more, but thetotal funds dedicated to foreign aid are still muchsmaller than those committed to reconstructionat the end of World War II. In short, the currenttasks are much more onerous, and the resourcesavailable are meager in comparison.

Sociologist Max Weber established the im-portance of culture or values when he demon-strated that Protestants were more imbued thanCatholics with the values that lead to hard workand high levels of saving, essential for the riseof modern capitalist economies.15 For decades,developments in Catholic countries (such asthose in southern Europe and Latin America)lagged behind the Protestant Anglo-Saxon na-tions and those in northeast Europe. These dif-ferences declined only when Catholics becamemore like Protestants.

Culture is also a major factor that explains

11 CNN, Dec. 2, 2010.12 See, for example, Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption andGovernment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

13 Robert A. Packenham, Liberal America and the ThirdWorld (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), pp. 34-5.14 Curt Tarnoff and Larry Nowels, “Foreign Aid: An Intro-ductory Overview of U.S. Programs and Policy,” Congres-sional Research Service, Washington, D.C., Apr. 15, 2004.15 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capi-talism, 2 ed. (Abingdon, N.Y.: Routledge Classics, 2001).

Counterinsurgencyefforts are veryunlikely tosucceed in theforeseeablefuture.

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the striking differences between various ratesof development, especially between the South-east Asian “tigers” (which received little aid) andAfrican and Arab states that received a greatdeal. It is not that these latter states cannot bedeveloped because of some genetically innatecharacteristics of the people living there, but be-cause their cultures stress other values, espe-cially traditional religious values and communaland tribal bonds. These cultures can change,but, as the record shows, only slowly, and thechanges involved cannot be foisted upon themby outsiders.

When all is said and done, one must expectthat development of countries such as Afghani-stan will be very slow and highly taxing on allinvolved, which is exactly what has happenedthere. Corruption continues to be endemic at alllevels of the Afghan government. Efforts to sup-

press the growth of opiates and the illegal drugtrade have failed. Warlords continue to play amajor role in large parts of the country. The gov-ernment is not considered legitimate, followingfraudulent elections. The majority of citizens feelthat the judiciary is bought, law and order islacking, and a considerable number are yearn-ing for the days when the Taliban were in charge.Indeed, the Taliban influence is growing in partsof the country, including in the north, where itwas weak in earlier years.16

All this indicates that counterinsurgencyefforts are very unlikely to succeed in the fore-seeable future. This is quite openly acknowl-edged by General Petraeus, who called for pa-


Rather than use the massive international aid to rebuild Afghanistan, President HamidKarzai established a political system rife with corruption, cronyism, lack ofaccountability, and gross mismanagement. In 2010, Afghanistan was ranked byTransparency International as the third most corrupt nation in the world.

16 The Washington Post, Dec. 6, 2010.

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tience in a 2007 BBC interview because “the av-erage counterinsurgency is somewhere arounda nine or a 10 year endeavor,” and the Britishcounterinsurgency in Northern Ireland took “de-cades.”17 But Americans and the citizens of otherinvolved nations are very unlikely to supportsuch a long-run project at such high cost, whichis estimated to already have cost the U.S. gov-ernment $336 billion by the end of 2010, and withthe addition of $119 billion requested for 2011,will cost $455 billion by the end of 2011.18 Inshort, the nation-building goals are too ambi-tious and must be abandoned.

WORKING WITH LOCAL FORCES

The nation-building project has been a top-down one. Washington and its allies sought to

rely on the national government headed byPresident Karzai and on a constitution thatcentralizes more power in the national gov-ernment than any democratic society andin a society in which local, ethnic bondsand commitments are far stronger than inany democratic society. The national gov-ernment appoints provincial and districtgovernors and city mayors. Although dis-trict councils are supposed to be elected,elections have not yet taken place. At thesame time, the Afghan sense of nation-hood is weak, and the primary loyalty ofmost Afghans is to their ethnic group—the Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks,Turkmen, etc. Moreover, the national armyhas a disproportionately high number ofofficers from non-Pashtun groups, espe-cially the Tajiks,19 while the Taliban’s clos-est affinity is with the Pashtun and furtherdivides society along ethnic lines. Attemptsto reduce the tension between the politicalstructure and the societal one have run into

difficulties because of the close alliance betweenthe coalition forces and the national government.To disengage, much more attention will have tobe paid to local powers and local institutionsand leaders that are in place.

Alexander Thier, the director for Afghani-stan and Pakistan at the U.S. Institute of Peace,and Jarat Chopra, a former professor at BrownUniversity, write that in Afghanistan, “family andtribal affiliations outweigh all others” and thattribal elders “are not willing to place a unitedAfghanistan over advancement of their particu-lar tribe.”20

The Taliban were defeated in Afghanistanin 2001 with very few U.S. casualties; only twelveU.S. service members were killed. This has ob-scured the fact that the war was won by a U.S.-supported coalition of ethnic groups, mainly

Vice president Joe Biden’s counterterroristapproach—advocating reliance on drones,Special Forces, and the CIA to preventAfghanistan’s transformation into a haven forterrorists after the U.S. departure—may provethe best exit strategy. He is pictured here on aJanuary 2011 visit to Afghanistan.

17 BBC News, July 9, 2007.18 Amy Belasco, “The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and OtherGlobal War on Terror Operations since 9/11,” CongressionalResearch Service, Washington, D.C., Sept. 2, 2010.

19 Antonio Giustozzi, “Afghanistan’s National Army: TheAmbiguous Prospects of Afghanization,” Terrorism Monitor,Jamestown Foundation, Washington, D.C., May 1, 2008.20 Alexander Thier and Jarat Chopra, “Considerations forPolitical and Institutional Reconstruction in Afghanistan,” U.N.Public Administration Network, New York, Jan. 2002.

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Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara, known as the North-ern Alliance.

U.S. officials tend to favor national forcesalthough even in the United States, much policework is locally and not nationally controlled.Even the U.S. National Guard can be called uponly by the governors of the various states, andeach unit primarily serves its own state. Yet inIraq, after U.S.-led coalition forces removed theSaddam regime, Washington and its allies triedto create a national force by insisting that Sunni,Shiite, and Kurdish units either disarm or be in-tegrated into a national force. Moreover, initiallythe Bush administration positioned Shiite forcesin Sunni areas and Sunni forces in Shiite areas inthe hope that they would cease to view them-selves as tribal forces and start acting like “Ira-qis.” The result was often increased bloodshed.

A similar development took place in Af-ghanistan. In the aftermath of the defeat of theTaliban in 2001, the new Afghan governmentsought to disarm the tribal forces that hadousted the Taliban—what the government re-ferred to as the AMF (Afghan Militia Forces)—in favor of fashioning a new national army. As aresult of this disarmament, demobilization andreintegration, about 63,000 militiamen were dis-armed by 2005. However, there are still a greatnumber of unofficial ethnic forces and other pri-vate armies. Estimates of their size run between65,000 and 180,000. Recently several attemptshave been made to work with local forces. NATOforces have contracted with private securitycompanies to secure dangerous stretches of high-way while the Local Police Force Program wasestablished in July 2010 as part of a larger “villagestability platform” to supplement the AfghanNational Army and provide regional security.21

In Wardak province, the Afghan Public Protec-tion Program has helped to establish security inwhat was a Taliban stronghold.22 To further dis-engage, Washington and its allies will have to

shift more weight and resources to these localforces and rely less on the Karzai government.

An essential feature of a stable political sys-tem, and one able to adjust as changes occur, isthe availability of institutions that can be usedto settle differences without resorting to vio-lence. Westerners tend to assume that these po-litical institutions will be democratic and that vari-ous particularistic interests will be representedby elected officials. In this way, ballots will re-place bullets. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S.government and its allies invested considerableeffort in introducing free and fair elections, inpart to serve the purpose of absorbing ethnicand regional conflicts into political institutions.

Given, however, that the format of the intro-duced political institutions was greatly influ-enced by U.S. guidelines, they often do not re-flect the preferences of the majority of the Af-ghan people. For instance, Washington insistedthat the Afghan constitution be drafted and ap-proved by consensusbefore the election of theNational Assembly andnational officials, and itpromoted Karzai as thenational leader. None ofthese moves helped lendlegitimacy to political in-stitutions that were im-ported and alien to beginwith.

In Afghanistan, asin other countries in similar states of societaldevelopment, native people have their own in-stitutions and their own ways of selecting lead-ers and resolving conflicts. These include tribalcouncils, community elders, and religious au-thorities. That is, the people often rely on natu-ral leaders—those who rose to power due totheir charisma, persuasive powers, lineage orreligious status, but who were not elected in theWestern way. Initially, it is best to try to workwith them, rather than expect that they could bereplaced by elected officials in short order. Thesame holds for various councils and inter-tribalbodies.

Seth Jones of the RAND Corporation ar-gues that a strategy that seeks to build a strong


It is best towork with nativeleaders ratherthan expect thatthey could bereplaced byelected officials.

21 The New York Times, June 5, 2010; Seth G. Jones andArturo Munoz, Afghanistan’s Local War: Building Local De-fense Forces (Santa Monica: National Defense Research Insti-tute, RAND Corporation, 2010), p. 57.22 Time, Oct. 27, 2010.


central government and to hold territory withforeign forces is unlikely to work in Afghani-stan.23 He reports that the national presidentialelections in 2004 and parliamentary elections in2005 did little to diminish the power of regionalwarlords and tribal militias. Even efforts that weremade to relocate such leaders and wrest themfrom their regional power bases were unsuccess-ful. Instead of attempting—and failing—to breakthese solid ties, strategists should draw uponthem to promote security in Afghanistan. Jones

points out that a success-ful bottom-up strategymust strengthen the lo-cal tribal and religiousleaders who understandtheir communities best,so that they may providesecurity and services.Indeed, he writes that“the most effective bot-tom-up strategy in Af-

ghanistan is likely to be one that already tapsinto existing local institutions … Local tribal andreligious leaders best understand their commu-nity needs.”24

To illustrate the influence of local naturalleaders, one only needs to look at Ismail Khan.After the defeat of the Taliban, Khan, a warlordin Herat, became governor of the area. Despitehis ability to maintain security, Khan’s supportof Iran and his refusal to send the tax revenueshe collected to the central government in Kabul,coupled with a wish to strengthen Karzai, ledWashington to urge his removal. Khan was re-moved from his local post in 2004, a move thatresulted in violent protests,25 sectarian violence,increased crime, and the Taliban making inroadsinto Herat. Similarly, Governor Gul Agha Shirzaiof the Nangarhar province was removed from a

previous gubernatorial position because of hisautocratic, warlord style but is now viewed asnecessary to stabilize the province. Atta Mu-hammad Noor, the governor of Balkh province,has been credited with bringing security to hisprovince and eradicating the poppy trade there.26

This is not to suggest that all these tribal chiefscan or should be made into local partners. Eachmust be examined in his own right. However,one can work with many to improve their records.The more Washington and its allies work withlocal leaders, including religious ones, the soonerit will be able to disengage.

There remains a danger that if the U.S. forcesdisengage, having increasingly drawn on localforces to provide security and stability in theirarea of the country, a civil war might break outamong various groups, especially among thePashtun and other ethnic groups, or among vari-ous warlords. The best way to minimize this riskis not to presume that one can fashion an effec-tive national government to which various localpower centers will yield but to work out inter-local coalitions, treaties, and agreements.

THE GEOPOLITICAL MISSION CREEP

Recently, an argument surfaced that theUnited States cannot withdraw from Afghani-stan until that country is well-stabilized becausesuch a withdrawal would cause Pakistan—es-pecially the ISI—to greatly extend its supportfor violent Islamist groups in Afghanistan anduse it as a base for terrorist attacks against In-dia. This could result in a new battleground forIndo-Pakistani rivalry, bring other powers into aconfrontation, and even risk a nuclear war.27

Although Pakistan is a U.S. ally in fightingthe Taliban in Afghanistan, various observersbelieve Islamabad is playing both sides.Pakistan’s historical alliances with the Afghan

Pakistan’shistoricalalliances withthe AfghanTaliban extendfrom the 1990s.

23 See, also, Andrew M. Roe, “What Waziristan Means forAfghanistan,” Middle East Quarterly, Winter 2011, pp. 37-46.24 Seth G. Jones, “U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan,” RANDCorporation, Santa Monica, testimony before the House For-eign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Middle East andSouth Asia, Washington, D.C., Apr. 2, 2009.25 The Washington Post, Feb. 21, 2006.

26 Environment News Service (Washington, D.C. and Se-attle), June 6, 2007.27 The Economic Times (Mumbai), Nov. 10, 2010.

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Taliban and the Islamist Haqqaninetwork extend from the 1990s whenthe country supported the rise ofthe Taliban government. Moreover,the ISI, which appears anti-Ameri-can and pro-Taliban, is following adifferent course than the Pakistanimilitary. Journalist Helene Cooperobserves in The New York Times,

What Pakistan wants most in Af-ghanistan is an assurance that Indiacannot use it to threaten Pakistan.For that, a radical Islamic movementlike the Taliban, with strong ties tokin in Pakistan, fits the bill.28

Cooper also believes that Paki-stan wants to keep the Taliban in its“good graces” should U.S. forceswithdraw and leave the Taliban toreassert control over the country.Likewise, Shuja Nawaz of the Atlan-tic Council asserts that Pakistan’ssupport of extremists is “leveragein the sense that it allows [the Paki-stanis] to have a government inKabul that is neutral, if not pro-Pakistan. That’swhy they’ve always hedged on the AfghanTaliban.”29

There is an ethnic dimension to the Indo-Pakistani rivalry in Afghanistan, as well. Paki-stan wants an Afghan government that providesgreater representation for the Pashtun and ismore closely allied with Pakistan. The currentAfghan government contains more Tajik, Uzbek,and Hazara members that were aligned with theIndia-backed Northern Alliance, and thus Paki-stan perceives the current Afghan governmentas being too close to India.

Additional evidence to support the claimthat Pakistan is at least somewhat favorable tothe Taliban and would be more so should U.S.forces withdraw, can be seen in the accusations

that Islamabad is undermining the current peacetalks between the Afghan government and theTaliban. According to The New York Times,Pakistan’s apparent stance against the peaceprocess is due to the fact that the Karzai gov-ernment is reported to be leaving out thoseTaliban members regarded as being controlledby the ISI.30 Those Taliban leaders not associ-ated with Pakistan who do show willingness tonegotiate have been suppressed by Pakistan;for example, Pakistani agents arrested high-levelTaliban official Mullah Baradur. The New YorkTimes also reports, “Afghans who have tried totake part in, or even facilitate, past negotiationshave been killed by their Taliban comrades,sometimes with the assistance of Pakistan’s in-telligence agency.”31

A number of observers have suggested that


Under Gen. David Petraeus (middle, with U.S.ambassador to Afghanistan Karl Eikenberry, right),U.S. operations expanded from counterterrorismmeasures designed to “disrupt, dismantle, and defeatal-Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan and to preventtheir return to either country” to a counterinsurgencystrategy viewing nation-building and democratizationas essential to military success.

28 Helene Cooper, “Allies in War, but the Goals Clash,” TheNew York Times, Oct. 9, 2010.29 Time, Dec. 2, 2009.

30 The New York Times, Oct. 19, 2010.31 Ibid.


a U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan would pre-cipitate the return of the Taliban with ties to Pa-kistan that would enable increased terrorismagainst India. As Steve Coll observed in a NewYorker blog, “The probable knock-on effect of asecond Taliban revolution in Afghanistan wouldbe to increase the likelihood of irregular Islamistattacks from Pakistan against Indian targets—not only the traditional target set in Indian-heldKashmir, but in New Delhi, Mumbai, and othercities, as has occurred periodically during the

last decade.”32 Likewise,Robert Kaplan writes ina report for the Center ofNew American Securitythat Afghanistan is a“principal invasion routeinto India for terrorists”and “an Afghanistanthat falls under Talibansway … would be, in ef-

fect, a greater Pakistan, giving Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate [ISI] the abilityto create a clandestine empire composed of thelikes of Jallaluddin Haqqani, GulbuddinHekmatyar and Lashkar-e-Taiba.”33 The lattergroup carried out the 2009 Mumbai terror attacksagainst India.

Aside from terrorism, some observers pointto potentially even more devastating conse-quences of increased India-Pakistan rivalry, fol-lowing a U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan andthe likely return of the Taliban that it could facili-tate. Associated Press reports that the “fight [inAfghanistan] pits nuclear-armed rivals India andPakistan against one another in a battle for in-fluence that will almost certainly gain traction asthe clock ticks down toward America’s militarywithdrawal.”34 Coll contends that the tensioncaused by terrorism against India, emanatingfrom Pakistan, “would present, repetitively, the

problem of managing the role of nuclear weap-ons in a prospective fourth Indo-Pakistaniwar.”35

Finally, some observers hold that a U.S.withdrawal would be seen as an abandonmentof India, causing it to move closer to other pow-ers. Associated Press reports that

India warns that it would form a coalitionwith Iran—an alliance that would infuriateWashington—if the Taliban appear poised toreturn to power. The “self-interested coali-tion” could include Russia and several Cen-tral Asian states that would also fear a Talibanreturn.36

Kaplan suggests that a U.S. withdrawal fromAfghanistan would be tantamount to desertingIndia, causing it to move closer to China:

The quickest way to undermine U.S.-India re-lations is for the United States to withdrawprecipitously from Afghanistan ... [It] wouldsignal to Indian policy elites that the UnitedStates is surely a declining power on whichthey cannot depend. Détente with China mightthen seem to be in India’s interest.37

During off-the-record briefings in Wash-ington, conducted under Chatham House rules,which allow the use of the information but notthe identification of the source or organizationat which the briefing took place, U.S. State De-partment officials indicated that indeed the de-partment saw the need to keep India on theU.S. side for many reasons but especially to“balance” China, a major consideration in de-termining the role Washington should play inAfghanistan.

AN ASSESSMENT

The frequent re-juggling of the goals of amission and lack of clarity on what they are is

Overstaying inAfghanistan toplease India isa lose-losesituation.

32 Steve Coll, “What If We Fail in Afghanistan?” The NewYorker, Nov. 16, 2009.33 Robert D. Kaplan, “South Asia’s Geography of Conflict,”Center for a New American Security, Washington, D.C., Aug.2010.34 Associated Press, Apr. 25, 2010.

35 Coll, “What If We Fail in Afghanistan?”36 Associated Press, Apr. 25, 2010.37 Kaplan, “South Asia’s Geography of Conflict.”


detrimental to any campaign. The main difficul-ties the U.S. administration faces in Afghani-stan are due to mission creep generated by na-tion-building—in both the somewhat-limitedcounterinsurgency version and the expandedhuman rights and democracy version—often ahighly unrealistic goal, in particular in a coun-try that is as poor, illiterate, corrupt, and con-flicted as Afghanistan.

The military mission, as originally definedby President Obama, was achieved in Afghani-stan but not in Pakistan. However, there is noreason to hold that continued fighting in Af-ghanistan, by drawing on large conventionalforces and a similar number of private contrac-tors, will change the situation in Pakistan. At-tempts to move the government to confront thePakistani Taliban and eradicate the havens forAfghan terrorists in that country have largelyfailed. So have most efforts to pressure, cajole,or incentivize Islamabad to change the balancebetween the largely anti-U.S. ISI and the otherparts of the military—and between the militaryand the civilian authorities in favor of the latter.Pakistan continues to have a rather unstableregime, to harbor terrorists, to be unable to putdown an insurgency, to hold nuclear arms, andto be headed by a civilian government that isunpopular.

The most promising avenue for signifi-cant change in Pakistan lies in helping it andIndia to settle their major differences, whichwould free the Pakistani military from its east-ward obsession and enable it to fight terrorismand insurgency, improve the economy, anddowngrade the importance of nuclear arms.This is a very challenging mission, which mightwell be impossible to carry out. However, theprospects of such a settlement have little todo with what is happening on the ground inAfghanistan.

With regard to the geopolitical goal, NewDelhi has many interests that Washingtoncan serve—or neglect—from continuedoutsourcing to deals concerning fuel for nuclearreactors and technical knowhow, from weaponagreements to sharing intelligence about terror-ists. For example, U.S. intelligence agencies arereported to have had knowledge about those

who attacked Mumbai before they struck.38

Hence, given the high costs of staying thecourse in Afghanistan and the likelihood that itwill fail, Washington will be better served if itdisengages even if this leads to some displea-sure in India.

Moreover, it further suggests the importantrole Washington can have by fostering a settle-ment of the Kashmir is-sue and other sources ofconflict between Indiaand Pakistan—a win-winsituation compared tooverstaying in Afghani-stan to please India—alose-lose condition. Itremains for another dayto ask whether the wholenotion of nations such asIndia “balancing” na-tions such as China is not a highly anachronis-tic one, harkening back to the days when na-tions had no ideological commitments andshifted sides to maintain a balance of power.

CAN WASHINGTON AFFORD WAR?

In recent years, a consensus is emergingamong students of international relations that U.S.power is declining and that its foreign policy willhave to adapt to its increasing weakness. Thisthesis has numerous facets and implications, onlyone of which is here explored—namely, the argu-ment that because of the stressed condition ofthe U.S. economy, interventions of the kind seenin Iraq and Afghanistan will no longer be pos-sible, at least in political ways.

Michael Mandelbaum of Johns HopkinsUniversity contends:

the limits that constrain the government in itsexternal initiatives will be drawn less on thebasis of what the world requires and more by

Nation-buildingcannot be carriedout long-distanceby foreign powersin nations in anearly state ofdevelopment.

38 The Washington Post, Oct. 16, 2010.


considering what the United States can—andcannot—afford. In an era in which fewer re-sources will be available for everything, it iscertain that fewer will be available for foreignpolicy. When working Americans are payingmore than in the past to support their fellowcitizens who have retired, and retirees are re-ceiving fewer benefits from the governmentthan they were promised, neither group willbe eager to offer generous support to over-seas ventures.39

Defense Secretary Robert Gates has said:

I think the Congressand the presidentwould look long andhard at another militaryoperation that wouldcost us $100 billion ayear … If there’s a realthreat out there, thepresident and Con-gress will spend what-ever it takes to protectthe nation. But in situ-

ations where there are real choices, I thinkthis would be a factor.40

New York Times columnist Thomas Fried-man writes:

If we become weak and enfeebled by eco-nomic decline and debt, as we slowly are,America may not be able to play its historicstabilizing role in the world.41

This viewpoint is based on the failed andcostly attempt to engage in nation-building butdoes not apply to military interventions. Thus,the U.S. intervention in 1991 that rolled Saddamout of Kuwait exacted a heavy cost from Iraq forviolating another nation’s sovereignty andshored up U.S. credibility in the world, but it

was achieved swiftly with few casualties and ata low cost of $61 billion,42 almost 90 percent ofwhich was borne by U.S. allies. The same is trueof 1989’s Operation Just Cause in Panama. The2003 invasion of Iraq and the removal ofSaddam’s regime were carried out swiftly withfew casualties and low costs. Only $56 billionhad been appropriated for Iraq operations bythe time President Bush declared “Mission Ac-complished” on May 1, 2003, and 172 U.S. ser-vicemen had died.43 Most of the casualties andcosts were inflicted during the nation-buildingphase that followed. Since May 2003, more than4,500 Americans have died and hundreds ofthousands of Iraqis, and the direct financial costhas totaled $650 billion.44 The overthrow of theTaliban in 2001 was carried out swiftly with mini-mal U.S. casualties and low costs. Most of thecasualties and costs that followed took placeduring the nation-building phase—only $21 bil-lion was spent in 2001 and 2002 while the costssince then have amounted to more than $300billion.45 Only twelve U.S. soldiers died in Af-ghanistan in 2001, but almost 1,300 more havedied since then.46

Thus, it is wrong to conclude that the UnitedStates will be unable to afford military interven-tions to support its foreign policy goals, for in-stance, compelling Iran to give up its nuclearsites—although they are likely to be substan-tially higher than the interventions just cited—as long as no nation-building follows. This isnot to suggest that the United States should goto war because wars are cheap. On the contrary,a nation should engage in a “just war” if andonly if there is a clear and present danger, if all

39 Michael Mandelbaum, The Frugal Superpower: America’sGlobal Leadership in a Cash-Strapped Era (United States:Public Affairs, 2010), p. 33.40 The Telegraph (London), May 9, 2010.41 Thomas L. Friedman, “This I Believe,” The New YorkTimes, Dec. 1, 2009.

42 Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, final report to the U.S.Congress by the U.S. Department of Defense, Washington,D.C., Apr. 1992, appendix P.43 “The Cost of Military Operations in Iraq: An Update,”analysis by the House Budget Committee’s Democratic staff,Washington, D.C., Sept. 23, 2003.44 “The Budget and Economic Outlook: An Update,” Con-gressional Budget Office, Washington, D.C., Aug. 2010.45 Belasco, “The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other GlobalWar on Terror Operations Since 9/11.”46 “Faces of the Fallen,” The Washington Post, accessed Jan.12, 2010.

The United Statesmust limit itsgoals to keynational interestsand globalsecurity.


other means to resolving the conflict have beenexhausted, and only to protect innocents. How-ever, when the United States must engage inwar, economic considerations will not prevent itfrom proceeding.

Some argue that Washington has a moralobligation to “reconstruct” countries it in-vades.47 Opinions can differ on what the UnitedStates owes a country it helped liberate or thatused to harbor terrorists. However, in any case,given that nation-building cannot be carried outlong-distance by foreign powers in nations inan early state of development (in contrast topost-World War II Germany and Japan), the moralissue is moot. At the same time, there is no rea-son to stop non-lethal interventions througheducational, cultural, and public diplomacymeans, from Fulbright scholarships to foreignaid. It is also worth noting that diplomacy is dirtcheap. The U.S. State Department budget fa-mously has fewer foreign service officers thanthe Pentagon has military band musicians.48

Granted, a return to military interventions andcounterterrorism without counterinsurgency ef-

forts would mean that once the United Statestopples a regime that endangers it or others, thepeople of the nation will have to duke it out todetermine which kind of regime will be estab-lished without coerced U.S. tutelage. Hence, forinstance, if the people of Afghanistan find thatthe Shari‘a law that the Taliban is promoting istoo harsh from their viewpoint, they will have tofight the Taliban. On the other hand, if they fa-vor a strict Shari‘a regime, the swift justice theTaliban metes out, its harsh way of dealing withpedophilia and drug dealers—combined withinjustice to women—then Washington shouldlet them embrace that regime while exhortingthem to work for reforms, the way it does in manynations in the Middle East and elsewhere.

In any event, the American decline is to aconsiderable extent a reflection of an inability tolive up to the excessively ambitious goals Ameri-cans set for themselves. It matters little whetherthis goal-setting is due to an idealistic Americancommitment to human rights and democracy, tofalling prey to public relations, to a lack of real-ism, or to sheer arrogance and hubris. If theUnited States limits its goals to key national in-terests and global security—it can readily af-ford to use its power for good purposes.49

47 Noah Feldman, What We Owe Iraq: War and the Ethics ofNation Building (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004),p. 80; Bill Wineke, “Whatever Happened to Freedom Fries,”Wisconsin State Journal, June 12, 2005; Gerard F. Powers,“The Dilemma in Iraq,” America, Mar. 6, 2006, pp. 19-26.48 National Public Radio, Sept. 29, 2010.

49 For more discussion, see Amitai Etzioni, Security First(New Haven: Yale, 2007); idem, “The Promise of the Prolifera-tion Security Initiative,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2009.

Queen Rania’s Islamist FacebookQueen Rania al-Abdallah of Jordan is the recipient of numerous international prizes. She is also the author ofThe Sandwich Swap, a children’s book promoting tolerance and acceptance of the other.

However, a look at Queen Rania’s Facebook account reveals some disturbing content. A thread titled “IsHolocaust a Reality or a Myth” features a lengthy discussion about the veracity of the Holocaust, as well asposts denying Israel’s right to exist and presenting the 9/11 attacks as a Western conspiracy. Another threadopens with a post suggesting that peace with the Jews will only be possible after Israel ceases to exist.

It is noteworthy that neither one of these threads, nor any of the posts within them, have been censoredor removed.

Middle East Media Research Institute, Jan. 25, 2011


The Jewish Review of Books is a quarterly magazine of criticism, culture, and ideas.

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Visit us atwww.jewishreviewofbooks.com to subscribe at our special introductory rates.

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Professor of Political Science The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

/ 17Katz: Pashtun Society

The Afghanistan ConflictReforming the Village Warby David Katz

In the strategic debate over Afghanistan, two opposing schools of thought haveemerged. The first asserts that a durable victory requires a functioning, legitimate, and representative nation-state; the second contends that U.S. national security

concerns can be satisfied without committing to a wholesale restructuring of the country.The predominate school advocates surging ground troops and deeper national commit-ment; its counterpart seeks solution through long-distance punitive strikes using cruisemissiles, unmanned predator drones, or raids by special operations forces.

Limiting the strategic response to whether America is either spending billions ofdollars and suffering thousands of dead to restructure whole countries or is a distantsword bearer antiseptically raining down death and destruction is, however, a falsechoice. Washington’s challenge is to field a decisive and cost-effective global strategyimplemented by successful tactics to bring a durable victory.

To be sure, Afghanistan is a seemingly intractable problem. Throughout history,dozens of foreign armies have marched into the country—from the ancient Greeks andPersians, to the Mongol hordes, to British, Russian, and Soviet occupiers. None ofthem remained, and the legacy of their battles and campaigns has not been empire butan indigenous Pashtun tribal structure and culture, refined and honed over millennia forfierce resistance against invaders.

The Pashtuns are permanent in the region. The Americans are not. The Afghans willwait out this latest incursion as they did those by every foreign invader since Alexanderthe Great. Unless Washington adopts a new and imaginative strategy that will separatethe Taliban from the Pashtun tribes, the U.S. footprint in Afghanistan is bound to disap-pear with no lasting legacy.

David Katz is a West Point graduate, former GreenBeret captain, and Silicon Valley entrepreneur.He formed DaraCom to facilitate the strategicuse of twenty-first century technologies to com-municate effectively with unconnected or non-technical individuals and communities through-out the world.

SHIFTING STRATEGIES

In his address to the nation on October 7,2001, announcing the beginning of combat op-erations in Afghanistan—or Operation Endur-ing Freedom (OEF) as it would come to beknown—President George W. Bush defined thenascent campaign as

carefully targeted actions … designed to dis-rupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base


of operations and to attack the military capa-bility of the Taliban regime … Every nationhas a choice to make … In this conflict, thereis no neutral ground. If any government spon-sors the outlaws and killers of innocents, theyhave become outlaws and murderers them-selves. And they will take that lonely path attheir own peril.1

This goal was reaf-firmed in “The NationalSecurity Strategy of theUnited States,” the Bushadministration’s strategydocument, published inSeptember 2002, whichsought to “disrupt anddestroy terrorist organi-zations by … denyingfurther sponsorship,support, and sanctuaryto terrorists by convinc-

ing or compelling states to accept their sover-eign responsibilities.”2

Nine years later, Operation Enduring Free-dom has progressed through three distinct stra-tegic phases:

Phase one. Beginning as a counterinsur-gency campaign, OEF quickly developed intoan offensive war of maneuver where massedNorthern Alliance militias advanced to engagethe Taliban in open battle. OEF phase one waswaged unconventionally—utilizing the Taliban’slocal rivals and supported by the CIA, ArmyGreen Berets, and U.S. air power. It toppled theTaliban regime in a rapid and cost-effective man-ner that was over to all intents and purposes byDecember 20, 2001, when the U.N. Security Coun-cil established the British-led International Se-curity and Assistance Force (ISAF) “to assistthe Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenanceof security in Kabul and its surrounding areas.”3

Phase two. Characterized by a logisticalbuildup and strategic defense waged througha conventional war of attrition, the secondphase began with Operation Anaconda inMarch 2002 when more than 1,000 U.S. soldiersconducted fierce firefights in the Tora Bora re-gion, inflicting hundreds of casualties on theTaliban, their Pashtun tribal backers, and theiral-Qaeda allies.4

For all its achievements, Operation Ana-conda was not decisive. It did not, in any strate-gic sense, destroy the enemy’s forces, seize theirterrain or populations, or break their will to fight.Quite the contrary in fact, it marked the begin-ning of the strategic defense as U.S. forces failedto pursue the enemy over the Pakistan border,thus enabling the creation of sanctuaries in thatcountry’s Northwest Frontier Provinces and theFederally Administered Tribal Areas from whichthe Taliban would carry out sporadic and dif-fuse guerilla operations.

Imposing a conventional framework onwhat had been a chaotic unconventional cam-paign, the new strategy involved the construc-tion and expansion of ISAF bases around thecountry as the force grew from its initial 600-strong size to the current 131,700.5 Numeroustactical operations were launched. The Afghannational government, army, police and borderforces were created. Twenty-six provisional re-construction teams were dispatched to theprovinces.6 Civil and public works were com-missioned and funded by the internationalcommunity.

The shift from a tribal-based counterinsur-gency to a conventional Western diplomatic andmilitary framework was an abrupt and radicalchange for Afghanistan, not least since the mod-est strategic goal of denying al-Qaeda a base of

The U.S.-backedKarzaigovernment isseen as a foreignimplant similar toSoviet-backedgovernments.

1 The Washington Post, Oct. 7, 2001.2 “The National Security Strategy, September 2002,” TheWhite House, chap. III, p. 2.3 “Security Council Authorizes International Security Force forAfghanistan,” resolution 1386, United Nations, New York, Dec.20, 2001.

4 “Tora Bora Revisited: How We Failed to Get Bin Laden andWhy It Matters Today,” report to U.S. Senate, Committee onForeign Relations, 111th Congress, Washington, D.C., Nov.30, 2009.5 “Key Facts and Figures,” International Security and Assis-tance Force, North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO), accessedDec. 14, 2010.6 “ISAF Regional Command Structure,” International Secu-rity Assistance Force, NATO, Oct. 22, 2009.

/ 19

operations gave way to compellingthe Afghan government to enforceits authority over the country’s tribalentities—something that had histori-cally resulted in insurrection. Smallwonder, therefore, that the latest im-position of modern state structureson this tribal society generated areaction that served to unify and mo-tivate current and possibly futuregenerations of Pashtuns againstU.S. forces, their allies, and the Af-ghan government. For most Af-ghans, the U.S.-backed Hamid Karzaigovernment has been as much a for-eign implant as the Soviet-backedcommunist governments; its militaryoperations in the provinces are al-most as foreign an exercise as West-ern interventions.

The ISAF’s tactical successesnotwithstanding, the Taliban contin-ued to attack and did so in increas-ing numbers. The conventional warof attrition focused on kinetic opera-tions against enemy forces in Afghanistan tothe exclusion of Pakistani sanctuaries, militantmadrasas (Islamic schools), and Pashtun tribaland religious imperatives. Moreover, it mis-matched U.S. tactical advantages of speed, com-munication, and firepower against Pashtun stra-tegic advantages of permanence, religious andtribal will, moral purpose, local knowledge, lan-guage, and culture.

The ISAF could inflict cumulative casual-ties numbering in the tens of thousands on theTaliban without deterring them, their Pashtuntribal backers, or their al-Qaeda allies. The rea-son for this is simple arithmetic. The total fertil-ity rate—the average number of children bornto a woman over her reproductive lifetime—inthe Taliban’s sanctuary of Pakistan’s NorthwestFrontier Provinces is 5.17; in Afghanistan, it is

6.6.8 If these rates bracket the actual rates oneither side of the border, the provinces’ popula-tion of eighteen million doubles every eleven tofourteen years, providing some eight to ninemillion additional males for jihad. This regenera-tive capacity trumps any casualty rate the ISAFcan inflict on the Taliban in Afghanistan. TheTaliban needs to protract the conflict in order torealize its strategic advantage provided by birthrate. The ISAF’s strategy not only provided thattime but also surrendered the strategic offen-sive to the enemy, which could decide at its lei-sure if and when to engage.

Ultimately, the second strategy failed be-cause it lacked a way to convert tactical gainsinto strategic victory. The ISAF’s tactical-stra-tegic disconnect manifested itself in emergentbad habits; timid generalship allowed force pro-tection where avoidance of casualties is a pre-dominate strategic objective. It fixated on per-

Katz: Pashtun Society

Pashtun village society operates within strong indig-enous traditions. Foremost among them are the qawm,a densely layered weave of local, social-solidarity net-works, and the manteqa, a culturally uniform, shared-geographic space, usually based around clusters ofsmall villages.

7 “The Pakistan Reproductive Health and Family PlanningSurvey (PRHFPS),” National Institute of Population Studies(NIPS), Islamabad, 2001, p. 48.

8 “Afghanistan Statistics,” UNICEF, New York, 2008, ac-cessed Feb. 7, 2011.

Photo

will

not d

isplay

.


sonalities, not war goals. Remote, periodic cull-ing of the Taliban’s leadership through Predatordrone strikes and commando raids achieved “sil-ver bullet” status for a command substitutingtactical body and bean counting for strategicgains.

Phase Three. This phase commenced withthe insertion of 4,000 Marines into the HelmandRiver valley on June 30, 2009, as part of a newclear and hold strategy that de-emphasized pro-tecting military forces in favor of deploying themacross Afghanistan.9 As Gen. David Petraeusexplained to the Senate Armed Forces Commit-tee on April 1, 2009,

In order to address the situation in Afghani-stan, we will implement a comprehensivecounterinsurgency approach that works todefeat existing insurgent groups, develops the

institutions required to address theroot causes of the conflict, main-tains relentless pressure on terror-ist organizations affiliated with theinsurgency, dismantles illegal drugnetworks, and prevents the emer-gence of safe havens for thosetransnational extremist groups …A properly sized, trained, andequipped Afghanistan National Se-curity Force is a prerequisite forany eventual drawdown of interna-tional forces from Afghanistan …In addition, we will bolster the ca-pabilities and the legitimacy of theother elements of the Afghan gov-ernment—an effort in which, inmuch of Afghanistan, we will bebuilding, not rebuilding.10

While maintaining mostframeworks of the second phase,this strategy avoided the pitfallof a conventional war of attritionby employing a comprehensivecounterinsurgency approach. Thestrategic goal of compelling Af-ghanistan to exercise sovereign

control over its territory remained preeminent,and open-ended direct tactical engagement re-mained the means. Petraeus specifically men-tioned an endpoint where ISAF’s security re-sponsibilities would be transferred to the Af-ghans and its forces drawn down. The ques-tion is whether a foreign war can evolve, or de-volve, into a purely Afghan war.

WINNING AFGHANISTAN

The United States and its allies have beenbattling the Taliban for nearly a decade, to noconclusive effect. While having a wide spec-trum of responses and capabilities, they haverelied almost exclusively upon direct tactical en-gagement, ignoring for the most part soft power,

Accounting for some 42 percent of Afghanistan’s 29-million-strong population and concentrated in theeast and the south of the country, the Pashtuns havedominated Afghan policies since the country’s foundingin the mid-eighteenth century. Above, darkest shadingrepresents Pashtun regions.

9 The Washington Post, July 3, 2009. 10 Gen. David H. Petraeus, statement before the Senate ArmedServices Committee, Washington, D.C., Apr. 1, 2009.

/ 21

whether religious, economic, social competition,or co-optation. Yet armed force is only one meansto defeat an adversary. In order to execute a suc-cessful war in Afghanistan or elsewhere, theWest must broaden its approach, initiate newmethods and remove failed ones.

The minimum goal must be to preclude theestablishment of armed Salafi Islam in failed na-tion-state sanctuaries or defeat it locally whereit threatens U.S. or Western national interests.Ultimately, this will require the removal ofIslamism’s hold on targeted tribal societies al-though this cannot be directly achieved throughexternal intervention but rather through a deci-sive engagement between indigenous constitu-encies. As such, Western nationals, whetherarmed or nongovernmental organizations, are notpart of the permanent solution.

Specifically, the key to victory lies in thereformulation of Afghanistan’s Pashtun villagesociety to the extent that it not only rejectsSalafi Islam as its sole or preeminent organiz-ing and motivating principle but also invigo-rates competitive forces—political, cultural, re-ligious, economic, and ideological—capable ofsuperseding and/or replacing the Salafi inter-pretation of Islam in those societies. Such natu-ral competitors must create in-place, multigen-erational societies, whose opposition to radi-cal Islam is self-maintaining, self-replacing, andself-organizing. Their emergence requires thatthe West alter the predominance, range of con-trol, and the depth and balance among thesenatural forces, elevating certain constituenciesand diminishing others, without forgetting fora moment that these are native constituenciesand are not proxy forces dependent upon for-eign support and intervention.

The advantage of societal reformulation isthat it uses existing constituencies, operatingwithin natural parameters and constraints, whichprecludes the cost of introducing, preparing, andeducating societies on foreign concepts; de-creases the probability of rejection; and also re-duces the probability that natural competitorsare co-opted and used against U.S. and alliedforces. Also, the use of existing constituenciesdecreases the need to deploy Western forces indirect tactical engagements. Lastly, evolution-

ary and consistent reformulation, rather thanabrupt radical transformation, avoids supplyingreactionary elements in society with a rallyingfocus.

DECENTRALIZATION AND ITS MERITS

Reformulation of a targeted society takesplace within that society’s natural operating pa-rameters and constraints. In the case of south-ern Afghanistan, local Pashtun village societyoperates within the Hanafi school of Sunni Mus-lim jurisprudence and Pashtunwali indigenoustraditions of the region expressed through narkh,a Pashto word meaning informal or traditionallaws and rules.11 Qawm (Dari) is a densely lay-ered weave of constantly renegotiated, local, andsocial solidarity networks. Manteqa (Pashto) isa self-identified, culturally uniform, shared-geographic space, usually based around clus-ters of small villages.12

Together, they articulatethe depth, range of con-trol, predominance, andbalance among naturaland traditional Afghanconstituencies.

The straightforwardintegration of local vil-lage society to the cen-tral state will be no mean feat. The qawm net-works have historically been inaccessible, if nothostile, to the imposition of external, hierarchi-cal control, all the more so to a central govern-ment seeking to impose a Western-type staterun by English speaking, transnational elites andbacked by foreign troops. Current village-basedcounterinsurgency programs such as the Village


Victory lies in thereformulation ofPashtun villagesociety to rejectSalafi Islam.

11 Shahmahmood Miakhel, Understanding Afghanistan: TheImportance of Tribal Culture and Structure in Security andGovernance (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2009),p. 2.12 Raphy Favre, “Interface between State and Society in Af-ghanistan,” Aizon, Addis Abeba, Feb. 2005, pp. 5-8.


Stability Program, Afghan Public ProtectionProgram, Community Defense Initiative, andLocal Defense Initiative that operate throughshuras or jurgas (local or tribal consultativecouncils) will either be co-opted by a large rep-ertoire of local interests or rejected because, attheir core, they are antithetical to qawm andmanteqa interests.13

Short of a funda-mental restructuring ofthe Afghan state, there-fore, the solution is toconstruct an intermedi-ate edifice or interfacebetween the antitheticalaspects of the Afghanstate and village society.This structure should beable to directly accessqawm networks, migratethem to the central state

over time, fight the sectarian war, and stabilizethe village system. This requires that the pre-dominance, range of control, depth and balanceamong the networked constituencies that makeup village society is altered, elevating some anddiminishing others. This intermediate structuremust be evolutionary, rather than revolutionary,so as to preclude a reactionary backlash. Itshould, moreover, isolate and atomize those linksSalafists use to access the village society’s so-cial structure.

Admittedly, the situation in Afghanistanis chaotic. The central government does notpossess an established, widely trusted, or ac-cepted capacity for institutional governanceand is challenged by numerous warlords andheavily armed tribes dotting the Afghan andPakistani landscape. Co-opting and makingthem enemies of Salafi Islam and allies of thenational government will be difficult, but thereare historical precedents for long-term success.The most directly applicable is the “internal im-perialism” of Amir Abdurrahman (1880-1901),

aptly named the “Iron Amir,” who consolidatedpreviously independent tribes under centralgovernment authority. Likewise, Zahir Shah’slong and peaceful reign (1933-73) was largelydue to its co-optation of and cooperation withvillage society: He successfully maintained bal-ance among tribes, religious leaders, and thecentral government by limiting its presence androle in the countryside and by skillful use of softpower.14

By way of repeating Abdurrahman’s con-solidation while emphasizing Zahir’s co-optation, a prominent man from each manteqashould be selected as baradur ikhan (or he-roic local leader in Pashto) and endowed withpermanent, indivisible, and inheritable federalassets, obligations, and powers. These are in-tended to align the baradur ikhan, his family,extended relations, and constituents with thecentral government, and they then become aconduit between it and the qawm in eachmanteqa, facilitating the incorporation of vil-lage society over time to the state. By elevat-ing select qawm members, providing themwith federal assets (fiefs), and requiring al-legiance and owed service (homage), the pre-dominance, range of control, depth, and bal-ance among the networked constituenciesthat make up village society are altered,interlinking the village with the decentralizedsubstructure, and by extension—with thestate’s central superstructure. Additionally,the manteqa’s fixed physical location attachesthe baradur ikhan, his family, and clan to adefined geographic area they must defend ifthey want to retain the centrally-awarded ben-efits. If properly managed, the federal inves-titure of an individual from the manteqa andthe qawm can generate a cascade of personalobligations and owed service—ultimately tothe central government—from the baradurikhan downward to his retainers in themanteqa, and horizontally through mutualsupport obligations to other baradur ikhansacross manteqas.

The competitionbetweenthe Afghangovernment andthe Taliban maybe about whowill providepublic order.

13 The New York Times, Mar. 11, 2010. 14 Miakhel, Understanding Afghanistan, p. 21.

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Decentralization also im-poses an obligation on the cen-tral government, which mustassist and support its represen-tative, his family, retainers, andconsti tuents, not intr igueagainst them, or reduce themto servitude. While it mayspecify terms and conditionsfor operat ing the f ief , thegovernment’s goal is to gener-ate a string of long-term, per-sonal obligations from promi-nent individuals and families inthose areas it needs to consoli-date. Prior conditions on thebaradur ikhan for holding andoperating the fief cannot beoverly constraining to ensurethat federal assets are pro-tected and operated profitably.

INSTITUTIONAL STRATEGY

Newly-appointed baradur ikhans in thevarious manteqas will play a central role in cre-ating links between village society and the cen-tral government. It is to them that local con-stituents would pledge personal allegiance inexchange for profiting from centrally createdassets and federal alignment. The baradurikhan must deliver homage, military service ofa specified number of retainers in battle or gar-rison, or service support, such as digging for-tifications, carting supplies, providing arms orvehicles, etc. Additionally, the baradur ikhanmust provide hospitality and food for federalrepresentatives and attend meetings at the na-tional level when summoned.

A long-tenured baradur ikhan can providedirect, consistent, and stable civil-military rep-resentation to the manteqa. Long tenure makesit possible to fulfill cross-generational personalobligations between the central government, itssubjects, and the qawm network. Without theability to redress grievance or interface with theoriginal, local individual guarantor or his family,neither the subject nor the qawm will risk a mean-

ingful relationship with the central authorities.Long tenure provides consistency and stabilitywhich minimizes random shocks to the qawmand manteqa, allowing for better planning andhigher societal growth with lower societal risk.Ultimately, a long tenure facilitates the evolu-tion of baradur ikhans’ individual performanceinto the standard for the office, laying the foun-dations of institutional governance.

The baradur ikhan’s duties as direct civil-military representative to the manteqa includeterritorial defense, both separately and in coor-dination with, but not subordinate to, the localconsultative body (jurga or shura), administra-tion of governmental goods and services, andfacilitation of the government-qawm relation-ship.15 As such, the baradur ikhan would recruitand maintain a professional constabulary fromlocal families. He would also incorporate thosefamilies, as appropriate, to his centrally-providedfiefs requiring formal homage obligations (i.e.,


15 Seth Jones, “Community Defense in Afghanistan,” JointForces Quarterly, 2nd Quarter, 2010, p. 11.

Refined and honed over millennia for fierce resistanceagainst invaders, Afghanistan’s Pashtun tribal society mustbe separated from the Taliban and its Salafist allies andaligned to the central government as a prerequisite forwinning the war.

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armed support) from them to him. While thereare many specific approaches, the baradur ikhanshould report to the provincial governor as well

as the interior ministry,be independent fromdistrict Afghan NationalArmy and Afghan Na-tional Police elementsand operate on his ownrecognizance underguidance from the pro-vincial governor.

The baradur ikhan’sduties are not to imposecentral law onto the

manteqa or into the qawm but primarily to con-duct stability operations and maintain the peace.His long tenure and qawm interconnections en-sure the firm subordination of tactical priorities,martial ideals, and warlike instincts to politicalgoals and minimizes the misuse of force in pur-suit of purely tactical goals or for the psychicrewards of purposeless victories.16 As a local,albeit elevated by the central government, hewould operate with deep understanding andacknowledgement of local traditions.

Given the inherent power of the baradurikhan, additional governmental checks and bal-ances, as well as constraining regional offices,should be implemented. On stability operations,the baradur ikhan reports to the provincial gov-ernor and could be removed by him with theconcurrence of the Interior Ministry and thedefense department. On constituency-relatedissues (fief, homage, allegiance), the baradurikhan answers to a federal justice of the peace.Unless and until hostile areas are pacified, sta-bilized, and consolidated under central con-trol, there is no advantage to antagonizing theqawm by introducing national police or anyvariant of this profoundly alien concept.17 Thisis why the baradur ikhan is different and dis-

tinct from any national police force.Beyond defeating Taliban paramilitaries and

bandits, successful stability operations provideconsistent, stable public order. The essentialcompetition between the Afghan governmentand the Taliban may, in fact, be about who willprovide public order and to what end. Given thepresumption of sovereignty and the self-polic-ing nature of the qawm, enforcing public orderin Afghanistan requires the ability to maneuveramong a large array of local interests. A viableapproach is to facilitate the acculturation of na-tional needs through village society’s socialframework into the qawm, manteqa, and shura.The baradur ikhan and his retainers, a local, per-manent, federal force whose self-interest and per-sonal survival is inextricably linked to govern-mental success, can operate inside the qawm toredirect and/or co-opt its mechanisms for en-forcing public order to federal ends.

The baradur ikhan’s responsibility for re-gional stability offers significant military andstrategic advantages, mainly by freeing the Af-ghan army from territorial duties. This allows thearmy to remain a mobile strike force, employingthe psychological weight of its presence and itsmobility to pacify unruly districts with economyof force measures and to avoid the heavy forceprotection requirements of a garrisoned force.

Economically, the baradur ikhan with hisintimate knowledge of both the qawm and thecentral government serves as an intermediarybetween the two. He not only satisfies theqawm’s demand for government goods and ser-vices delivered at the right place, quantity, qual-ity, and price but also stimulates demand throughpromotion, time, place, safe storage, and trans-port.18 In other words, a central government de-livering a generic selection of non-priced goodsand services on an ad hoc basis to a qawm willsee those goods and services co-opted by localinterests for local purposes. By contrast, thebaradur ikhan matches the assortment of gov-

16 Edward Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), p. 2.17 Thomas Blau and Daryl Liskey, “Analytics and Action inAfghanistan,” Prism 1, Sept. 2010, pp. 42-5.

18 Philip Kotler, Marketing Management: Analysis, Planning,Implementation and Control (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: PrenticeHall, 1988), pp. 529-32.

Salafism is amodern movementthat lacks historicweight comparedto traditionalIslam.

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ernmental goods and services to the market, seesthat they are properly transported to where themarket can gain access to them, or stored untilthey are ready for use, and exchanged for money,goods, or services. As an intermediary channel,the baradur ikhan also regularizes the transac-tion by standardizing the ordering, as well asvaluing and paying for goods or services be-tween the central government and the qawm. Asthe trade-relations mix is fulfilled by completedtransactions between the government and theqawm, trust is created between the local and na-tional institutions.

Cross-border sanctuaries present a chal-lenge to any state. In theory, states either re-spect sovereign borders or declare war in orderto violate them. On the ground, weak or failedstates may be unable to control their borders,pursue national strategy asymmetrically throughdeniable proxy forces, or find it expedient to al-low restive minorities to become a neighbor’sproblem.

To fight the Taliban and its allies in theirPakistan sanctuaries, the Afghan governmentcould make use of ghazis—semiautonomouswarlords operating as a vanguard for the centralgovernment—who would focus on expansioninto contested areas and sanctuaries outside theoperative Afghan state. These ghazis couldconduct limited campaigns in hostile or con-tested Pashtun territories with a view to confed-erating independent manteqas and tribes andconsolidating hostile manteqas under their au-thority and de-facto Afghan central control.19

The ghazis must be co-opted, controlled,and counterbalanced in order to preclude com-petition with the state. U.S. funding, logisticaland combat support, as well as air power andspecial forces support are all available counter-balances. Shifting support among competingghazis could reinforce dependency on U.S. andallied forces. Upon successful societal reformu-lation of confederated or consolidated popula-

tions, the ghazis will have to be incorporatedinto the Afghan state institutions through “actsof union” granting equal rights to those popu-lations through locally arbitrated rather thancentrally appointed representation.

FIGHTING ARMED SALAFISM

The war in Afghanistan is both nativist andsectarian. Any viable strategy must engage anddefeat the Taliban in both. As an alien implant ina predominantly Hanifi Sunni society, armedSalafism in Afghanistan has exploitable weak-nesses. For one thing, its doctrinarian oppres-siveness creates an enormous resource drainand places Salafism in opposition to many pre-existing local constituencies and natural soci-etal forces. For another, despite its atavisticyearning for the restora-tion of an idealized past,Salafism is a modernmovement that lacks his-toric weight compared totraditional Islam. TheTaliban, in particular, arepoorly tutored in Islamicand Afghan history andhave rudimentary famil-iarity with the Qur’an andthe Shari‘a (Islamic law), not to mention politicaland theoretical developments in the Muslimworld during the twentieth century.20 This in turnleaves them exposed to numerous counter-strat-egies. It is possible, for example, to exploitSalafism’s doctrinal characteristics and tenden-cies to wedge it away from and render it foreignto Afghan society, then use that foreignness toinvoke an immune response from natural com-ponents of that society. It may also be possibleto enhance and intensify existing schisms be-tween doctrinal purist Salafists and their morepragmatic and less theological jihadist counter-


19 See a similar idea in Robert Bartlett, England under theNorman and Angevin Kings: 1075- 1225 (Oxford: ClarendonPress, 2000), p. 73. 20 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban (New Haven: Yale University Press,

2000), p. 93.

The Russiansbegan usingSufism as acounterbalanceto Salafism inChechnya.


parts until the local movement collapses—an ap-proach that was successfully employed inChechnya and Algeria where the Armed IslamicGroup’s methods were so violent as to be ques-tioned by some Salafi clerics.21

While both counter-strategies are feasible,the “foreignness” approach is most accessibleand universal. Initially, Salafi sects must be de-nied a local foothold by the development anddeployment of wedge issues that separate themfrom traditional, local village society. These canrange across numerous sectarian, ethnic, andnational divides as the Pakistani military at-tempted to wedge the Ahmadzai Wazir andMeshud Taliban factions apart in Waziristan.22

Ultimately, the theocratic case against Salafi Is-lam can be made and formalized in religious rul-ings (fatwas) issued by respected Pashtun ulema,something that should not be too difficult giventhe Taliban’s low level of religious knowledge.

Once the divide is drawn between Salafismand local, traditional Islam, the historical weightand resources of local religion must be mobi-lized for challenging Salafism for grassroots con-trol of the mosque, imam, and ulema. Imams canbe recruited to report on parishioners who chal-

lenge traditional doc-trine. Parishioners canseize the religious en-dowments of radicalizedmosques or the mosquesthemselves. Establish-ing an affiliated, ruralHanafi Islamic madrasa(school) system, provid-ing a local center of grav-ity for community-based

social services, job training and placement,youth recruitment and education, all within pre-existing qawm and manteqa structures providesanother avenue for challenging Salafism. As with

radical Islamic schools, these madrasas shouldbe free of charge and driven by missionary zeal.As such, they should be able to attract vettedand trained ulema and clerics as well as thebrightest and most ambitious students sinceofficial recognition of their diplomas would pro-vide a safe and lucrative avenue to governmentemployment and social services.23

Such a system can provide a means for re-inforcing and defending local religion’s positionwithin the village social network while drivingSalafism outside it. It employs the same methodused to install Salafism in the Pashtun areas ofPakistan’s Northwest Frontier Province andBaluchistan during the 1980s but to oppositeeffect.24 For example, emphasizing the differ-ences between Pashtunwali and Salafi interpre-tations of the Shari‘a can create internal contra-dictions for Salafi Pashtuns, forcing them tochoose between being good Pashtuns and goodSalafis. Likewise, the employment of local ulemaand mullahs provides them with a material in-centive to spread the message within villagesociety. At a minimum, it co-opts local religiousresources and prevents their co-optation by oth-ers. Affiliation among local madrasas aids infor-mation flow and facilitates rapid response.Coupled with provincial associations for re-gional ulema and mullahs for additional educa-tion, specific services, and mutual defense, thesystem creates a religious critical mass compet-ing directly with Salafi Islam—all without directgovernment presence.

The outcome is a coherent distributionchannel for a competitive Pashtun Hanafi reli-gious model where the individual adherent canbe both a good Pashtun and a good Muslim asopposed to the Salafi model that rejects tradi-tional Pashtun social structure.25 A competing

21 Quintan Wiktorowicz, “The New Global Threat:Transnational Salafis and Jihad,” Middle East Policy, Dec. 2001,pp. 25, 30.22 Mona Kanwal Sheikh, “Disaggregating the PakistaniTaliban,” Danish Institute for International Studies Brief,Copenhagen, Sept. 2009, p. 5.

Grassrootspatriotism couldfuel rejectionof foreignconcepts suchas Wahhabism.

23 Olivier Roy, “Islamic Radicalism in Afghanistan and Paki-stan,” U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Emer-gency and Security Service, Jan. 2002, p. 11; S.J. Malik,“Dynamics among Traditional Religious Scholars and TheirInstitutions in Contemporary South Asia,” The Muslim World,July-Oct. 1997.24 Rashid, Taliban, p. 89.25 Ibid., p. 92.

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madrasa system can also attack acritical vulnerability of armed Salafimovements by aggressively vyingwith them for new recruits. Thiscould, in turn, limit the Taliban’s abil-ity to replace its combat losses,shrink its available pool of man-power, and drive up its labor costs.The confluence of these factors maycascade through to Taliban combatoperations, reducing tempo, de-creasing range, changing tactics andfocus. If successful, a competingmadrasa system should providetheological shock troops matchingthe Taliban’s religious zeal and ex-ceeding them in religious education.The end result would be an equaland opposite self-organized, armed,extra-tribal, sectarian force funda-mentally opposed to the Taliban.

There are other minority sectsin Afghanistan and Central Asia thatcan buttress the sectarian waragainst armed Salafism, notably the Sufi move-ment, which in many ways embodies the antith-esis to Salafism. Its incorporation of local be-liefs and variations of practice falls into the sin-ful category of Bid’a, or religious innovation af-ter Islam’s first generations; its veneration ofsaints, visitation of tombs, celebration of theProphet Muhammad’s birthday, all violatetawhid—the uniqueness and unity of God—byrevering anything other than God.26

Sufism’s propensity to regionalize, accul-turate, and seek economic uplift imbues it withthe ability to create combined religious-ethnic-economic wedge issues. As such, it can offer anadvantageous religious model for Pashtuns ver-sus Salafism and be successful in competing fornew adherents. Establishing Sufi centers orcloisters with schools in border regions intro-

duces a strategic, sectarian challenge to theSalafis. Sufism in Chechnya operates in a mili-tary-style cell structure.27 This could easily beimported to Afghanistan. In hostile locations,Sufism operates underground schools, and thecombination of military organization and ten-dency to secrecy may allow for strategic pen-etration of Salafi areas.28 Indeed, the Russiansbegan using Sufism as a counterbalance toSalafism in 1996 under Chechen president AslanMaskhadov, and the idea of promoting Sufismas a counterbalance to Salafism is gaining cur-rency in some U.S. defense-related think tanks,such as the Rand Corporation and the HeritageInstitute.29

Given their inclination to oppose foreignoccupation, Sufis fought alongside Salafis and


Burqa-clad Afghan women show identification cardsas they wait to cast their votes at a school converted toa polling center in Kandahar, August 20, 2009. To winthe fight against Salafism, the historical weight andresources of local religion must be mobilized forgrassroots control of the mosque, imam, and ulema.

26 Mary Brill Olcott, “Sufism in Central Asia: A Force forModeration or a Cause of Politicization?” Carnegie Endowmentfor International Peace, Russian and Eurasian Program, Wash-ington, D.C., May 2002, p. 1; Wiktorowicz, “The New GlobalThreat,” p. 20.

27 Mairbek Vatchagaev, “The Role of Sufism in the ChechenResistance,” North Caucasus Analysis, Jamestown Founda-tion, Washington, D.C., Dec. 31, 1969.28 Olcott, “Sufism in Central Asia,” p. 16; Reuters, June 26,2009.29 Reuters, June 26, 2009.

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Baathists against U.S. forces in Fallujah in 2004,and this factor may limit their strategic employ-ment.30 However, Sufi expansions into Salafi ar-eas will undoubtedly induce Salafi attacks,which could in turn provide the impetus forarmed Sufi response. Moreover, the use of Af-ghan non-Salafi sects, like the Sufis, directlychallenges Salafi claims to sacred legitimacy, frag-ments their attempts to organize village society,and plunges those areas under Salafi control intodestructive, internecine, sectarian war.

Finally, the newly-appointed ghazis couldbe induced to support the Hanafi system andSufi monasteries so as to introduce religiouscompetition at the local level in harmony with,but not a direct component of, the decentralizedsystem. On a wider level, local patriotism canreinforce the sectarian wedge. A Pashtun cul-tural renaissance will compete with radical Islamas a societal motivator and organizer. A Pashtuncultural renaissance, distributed as an ethnic-tribal component of a federally-funded, religious-educational system, could support the estab-lishment of specifically created local groups.In addition to providing cultural identification,these groups could become natural competi-tors, promoting and distributing indigenousdogma with positive or punitive scope on is-

sues, including Pashtuntribal history, politics,and genealogy. Theirgrassroots patriotismcould fuel rejection offoreign concepts such asWahhabism and the in-dividuals and groupscarrying it.

Pashtun patriotismcould be a means to iso-

late and drive out foreign, non-Pashtun radicalsand their religious concepts. It could directlyattack the linkage between non-traditional, non-local Islamic jurisprudence and militarism. Track-

ing, targeting, and locating foreign militantswould be consistent with such groups andhighly useful to U.S. intelligence. Promoting lowintensity conflict between the proponents ofPashtun patriotism and foreign-derived Islamicmilitarism could shut down the pipeline of for-eign recruits coming to centralized training fa-cilities. This would force Islamic radicals to ex-pend resources replicating training bases in eachlocale where they seek to operate.

ECONOMIC STRATEGY

Religious and ideological motivators pro-vide the will. Political and cultural organizationsprovide the force. Economic programs providethe staying power. The goal of a national logis-tics system is to compete for tribal affiliation,based upon standard of living. National logis-tics programs conducted at the district level mustbe delivered as a package of goods and ser-vices only to clans willing to affiliate or ally withthe national, provincial, and district govern-ments or their representatives, such as thebaradur ikhan. Goods or services must not bedelivered to clans of suspect loyalty or to thoseunwilling to make a substantial, up-front com-mitment. This would be counterproductive andcould, in fact, serve to aid and abet nationalself-destruction. The tribes who ally will winand expand; those who oppose will lose andcontract. U.S. allied forces would be the arbi-ters of the difference. The advantage of a basic,franchised package of goods and services isefficient delivery, comprehensive program con-trol, coherence of government support at thedistrict level, and ease of replication.

Forces such as demographic, industrial,agricultural, distribution, and communicationsmake the strategic offensive possible but are of-ten overlooked in war planning because they donot generally require soldiers. Replacing U.S.soldiers with local nationals and tribal-basedlogistic programs can be a tremendous force mul-tiplier. The national logistic program must gen-erate measurable, positive results for allied clans,qawm, and manteqa. Demographic programssuch as public health, field medical, and mid-

30 Rafid Fadhil Ali, “Sufi Insurgent Groups in Iraq,” Terror-ism Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, Washington, D.C., Jan.25, 2008.

Replacing U.S.soldiers with localnationals andtribal-basedprograms can bea force multiplier.

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wifery-based prenatal and childbirth programswould need to enhance the birthrate, decreaseinfant mortality, and increase life expectancy forallied clans. The cumulative result is to engineera higher growth rate for clans opposing radicalIslam, rather than for those supporting it. Thenet effect, and strategic goal, is to create a mul-tigenerational, in-place tribal army, and an alliedpopulation that would grow faster and live longerthan radical Islam’s supporters.

Industrial economic programs may includethe creation of specialized guilds to establish,train, and support a myriad of manufacturing,mining, and engineering activities. For example,a federal fief delivered to a government alliedmanteqa could be a man-powered, machine shopfor metal and wood parts manufacture, completewith a district manufacturing contract. The pro-vincial governor and interior ministry would de-termine which allied family receives it in ex-change for becoming a baradur ikhan. The re-gional manufacturing guild council would thenbe responsible for setting it up, training guildmembers, and getting the manteqa into opera-tions. Specialized guilds have the advantage ofbeing self-organizing, self-motivating, and self-maintaining. They could be used to seed andsupport industrial activity in allied families andacross the nation. This would develop, if notcreate, local economies. Guild-generated indus-trial specialization would create local econo-mies with greater efficiency, diversification, andresilience. Industrial finance programs could in-clude micro-finance for village-based busi-nesses, guild-based businesses, and women-and minority-based businesses. The net effectand strategic goal is to create more prosperoussocieties, capable of supporting larger, denserpopulations, full-time law enforcement, and civildefense capabilities.

Agricultural programs may include seedbanks, production, distribution, and sales co-operatives as well as district and provincial levelconsulting. These programs would be measuredby the comparative increase in calories per dayprovided to allied or affiliated families and tribesversus those supporting radical Islam. The neteffect and strategic goal would be to createlarger, higher density, better fed populations

with a lower incidence of illness due to dietarydeficiency.

Distribution programs make use of trans-portation, roads, bridges, fuel, fleet management,etc. The ability to movematerial, military, and al-lied populations may be-come the most importantlever of pacification inAfghanistan. Targetedpopulation growth couldbe the ultimate arbiter ofsovereignty, displacingthose who oppose thegovernment with thosewho support it. The con-trol and reformulation ofPashtun societies, twocomponents of victory,are in many ways prepped by military, political,and religious initiatives and fueled by economicprograms riding national distribution grids intothe societal battle-space. The geographic coher-ence of economic programs is facilitated by thephysical distribution grid.

Perceptual coherence is facilitated by theintroduction of a new communications grid dis-tributing intellectual property. Creating and dis-tributing a low cost, suitably engineered smartphone for disseminating information, intelli-gence, and knowledge to locals in hostile re-gions via one-to-one conversations, party-linediscussions, and one-to-many broadcasts prepsthe intellectual battlefield for further governmentinitiatives. This grid also serves as a platformfor collecting visual, audible, text, and other in-formation from locals in hostile regions allowingthe coordinating authorities to sequence andcalibrate future actions.

CONCLUSIONS

Distributive, economic, religious, and mili-tary initiatives are the means of achieving vic-tory in Afghanistan if expressed through natu-rally occurring enemies of armed Salafism. Thestrategic intent is to destroy Salafist military ca-pacity, seize control of Pashtun populations un-

An alliedPashtun tribalsociety andparamilitary isthe most efficientmeans ofconducting anoffensive againstradical Islam.



der Salafism’s grasp, and reformulate those so-cieties so that they ally with the governmentand reject radical Islam. A multigenerational, al-lied, in-place, Pashtun tribal society and para-military is the most efficient means of conduct-ing a comprehensive, strategic offensive thatmatches radical Islam’s advantages of perma-nence, religious and tribal will, local knowledge,language and culture. The allied Pashtuns’ livesmust be measurably superior to radical Islam’sPashtun supporters and opposed to them as amatter of politics, culture, religion, and ideology.

The rise of armed Salafi Islam has been agenerational phenomenon. Washington can suc-ceed by moving off the strategic defensive andlaunching a comprehensive, coherent, and gen-erational strategic offensive against Salafi Islamin Afghanistan and Pakistan’s Pashtun majorityprovinces. The requirements of U.S. strategy areto engage and destroy core enemy forces deci-sively, seize populations, and break the enemy’s

willpower. U.S. strategy must, therefore, be com-prehensive to allow for the use of any tool toachieve victory, across the spectrum from soci-etal competition to armed force, and must alsobe coherent, harnessing all individual outcomesfrom agricultural and ideological competition tomilitary conflict.

The U.S. strategic offensive against armedSalafi Islam must match its advantages of ter-rain, tribal and cultural knowledge, language,birth rate, and permanence. In order to be practi-cal and efficient across multiple generations, itshould be self-organizing, self-maintaining, andself-replicating. Victory in Afghanistan will mani-fest in the creation of a multigenerational, in-place, Pashtun village society with a paramili-tary and population whose lives and work aremeasurably superior to Salafi Islam’s Pashtunsupporters and that opposes them as a matter ofpolitics, culture, religion, and ideology.

Not a Prayer at Finnish Fitness CenterEspoo, Finland—According to Ombudsman for Minorities Eva Biaudet, a ban on prayerissued by Lady Fitness Entresse in Espoo [Finland] was not discriminatory. Biaudet’sstance on the matter is based on her discussions with the owner of the fitness center and therepresentatives of the Muslim community in Espoo.

In August, Lady Fitness Entresse, located in the Entresse shopping complex in theEspoon Keskus district of the city, posted a notice on the wall of the locker room asking itsclients to refrain from praying and eating in its premises. The sign read, “The locker room isa religion and politics-free zone where everyone can spend their free time in a neutralmanner.”

In her statement, Minority Ombudsman Biaudet noted for example that the request torefrain from praying was drawn up in a matter-of-fact way, and it did not call specialattention to any particular religion.

The representatives of the Muslim community in Espoo Center agreed to the viewexpressed by the owner of the fitness center, to the effect that the facility was not consideredto be a suitable place for prayer. Biaudet feels that a prayer space organized in the shoppingmall library would be more appropriate and could serve all religious groups among regularusers of the library.

Helsingin Sanomat, Dec. 21, 2010

/ 31Pant: India’s Afghan Policy

The Afghanistan ConflictIndia’s Changing Roleby Harsh V. Pant

As the Afghan war enters its final and most decisive phase, India’s strategic po-sition in the country has turned a full circle. Having maintained a close relationship with the post-Taliban government for years, New Delhi suffered a humili-

ating setback last January when its warning against the folly of making a distinction“between good Taliban and bad Taliban” was summarily ignored by the AfghanistanConference in London.1

At a stroke, Pakistan squeezed its nemesis from the evolving security architectureby persuading the West that the time had come to incorporate the “moderate” faction ofthe Taliban into Afghanistan’s future state structure and to give Islamabad a key role inmediating this process.2 Meanwhile, despite its best attempts to keep a low profile,India and its nationals have been increasingly targeted by extremist forces in Afghani-stan. The Indian embassy in Kabul was struck twice over the past two years, and guesthouses frequented by Indians were attacked with nine Indian nationals killed.3

Viewing these strikes as a blatant attempt to drive it out of Afghanistan, somethingNew Delhi has explicitly ruled out despite the recent setbacks, the Indian governmenthas embarked on a major rethink of its Afghanistan-Pakistan policy; and while this pro-cess has yet to be completed, it might eventually culminate in a new regional alignment—between India, Iran, and Russia—that will only complicate Washington’s exit strategyfrom Afghanistan.

Harsh V. Pant is a lecturer in the defense stud-ies department at King’s College London and anassociate at the King’s India Institute.

INDIA’S AFGHAN POLICY

India’s approach toward Afghanistan haslargely been a function of the desire to preventPakistan from dominating that country, some-thing Islamabad views as a vital counterweightto India’s preponderance in South Asia.4 Thetwo countries have been stuck in a classic secu-rity dilemma in so far as their Afghan policies areconcerned, in that any measure by either side to

increase its security is liable to trigger a reactionthus causing a deterioration in the overall re-gional balance.

India’s relations with Afghanistan have im-proved steadily since the fall of the Taliban for anumber of reasons. To begin, unlike relations

1 Times of India (New Delhi), Jan. 29, 2010; Gen. StanleyMcChrystal, interview, The Financial Times (London), Jan. 19,2010.2 The New York Times, Jan. 28, 2010.3 Times of India, Feb. 26, 2010.4 Marvin G. Weinbaum, “Pakistan and Afghanistan: The Stra-tegic Relationship,” Asian Survey, June 1991, pp. 498-9; RifaatHussain, “Pakistan’s Relations with Afghanistan: Continuityand Change,” Strategic Studies, Winter 2002, pp. 43-75.


between Afghanistan and Pakistan, this bilateralrelationship is not hampered by the existence of acontiguous and contested border. For another,India’s support for the Northern Alliance againstthe Pakistan-backed Taliban in the 1990s strength-

ened its position in Kabulafter 2001 as many Alli-ance members have cometo hold key governmen-tal or provincial posts.New Delhi has also doneits best to restore the bal-ance in its engagementwith a range of differentethnic groups and politi-cal affiliations in Afghani-stan and has used its vo-cal support for President

Hamid Karzai, an ethnic Pashtun educated in In-dia, to demonstrate its keenness to revive its closeties with the Pashtuns, on the one hand, and tosupport the Afghan government and thecountry’s economic and political restructuring onthe other.5

Broadly speaking, New Delhi has pursueda “soft power” strategy toward Afghanistan,sticking to civilian rather than military matters.In consonance with the priorities laid down bythe Karzai government, Indian assistance hasfocused on building human capital and physicalinfrastructure, improving security, and helpingthe agricultural and other important sectors ofthe country’s economy. The Indian governmentis building roads, providing medical facilities,and helping with educational programs in an ef-fort to develop and enhance long-term Afghancapabilities.

New Delhi has pledged some US$1.3 bil-lion on various projects, emerging as the sixthlargest bilateral donor to Afghanistan. Impor-tant infrastructural projects undertaken by Indi-ans include the construction of electricity trans-mission lines, the Salma Dam power project in

the Herat province, construction of the Afghanparliament building, helping in the expansion ofthe Afghan national television network, and sev-eral smaller projects in agriculture, rural devel-opment, education, health, energy, and voca-tional training. The 218-kilometer Zaranj-Delaramhighway, enabling Afghanistan to have accessto the sea via Iran and providing a shorter routefor Indian goods to Afghanistan, was completedby India’s Border Roads Organization in 2008despite stiff resistance from the Taliban. A 300-strong paramilitary force provided by India en-sured the safety of the Indian workers and al-lowed the project to beat construction and mon-etary deadlines.6

As a consequence, New Delhi has come toenjoy considerable influence in Afghanistan.Ordinary Afghans have welcomed Indian in-volvement in development projects in their coun-try; Indian films and television programs are ex-tremely popular among the local Afghan popu-lace, and India remains the favorite destinationfor Afghans with its embassy and four othermissions issuing around 350 visas daily. TheIndian government has a fundamental interestin ensuring that Afghanistan emerges as a stableand economically integrated state in the region.Though the Afghan economy has recovered sig-nificantly since the fall of the Taliban with realgross domestic product growth rate exceeding 7percent in 2008 and exceeding 22 percent in 2009,it remains highly dependent on foreign aid andtrade with neighboring countries.7 The only wayin which the flailing Karzai government can re-tain and enhance its legitimacy is by bringingthe Afghan economy back on track. For this, itlargely depends on other states, and New Delhiis playing an important role by laying the foun-dations for sustainable economic developmentin the country. A preferential Afghan-Indiantrade agreement gives substantial duty con-cessions to certain categories of Afghan dryfruits when entering India with Afghanistan

5 Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pend-ing the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institu-tions (Bonn agreement), United Nations, Bonn, Ger., Dec. 5,2001.

New Delhi haspursued “softpower” inAfghanistan,sticking tocivilian ratherthan militarymatters.

6 The Indian Express (New Delhi), Jan. 23, 2009.7 “Afghanistan,” The World Factbook, Central IntelligenceAgency, McLean, Va., Dec. 28, 2010.

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allowing reciprocal conces-sions to Indian products suchas sugar, tea, and pharmaceu-ticals. Kabul wants Indianbusinesses to take advantageof the low tax regime to helpdevelop a manufacturing hubin areas such as cement, oiland gas, electricity, and in ser-vices including hotels, bank-ing, and communications.

The Indian governmentalso piloted the move to makeAfghanistan a member of theSouth Asian Association of Re-gional Cooperation (SAARC)in the hope that this move willexpedite the country’s eco-nomic development by facilitat-ing transit and free flow ofgoods across borders in the re-gion. Moreover, Afghanistan’s SAARC member-ship could also enable South Asia to reach outto Central and West Asia more meaningfully. Ithas been estimated that given Afghanistan’s lowtrade linkages with other states in the region, itsparticipation in the South Asian Free Trade Areawould result in trade gains of $2 billion to theregion with as much as $606 million accruing toAfghanistan.8

THE LIMITS OF SOFT POWER

These gains notwithstanding, there is agrowing consensus in New Delhi that the softpower approach has yielded no real strategicgains and that, despite being the only countrythat has been relatively successful in winningAfghan hearts and minds, India has been in-creasingly sidelined by the West.

From the very beginning, the foremost ob-jective of India’s policy has been to preempt thereturn of Pakistan’s embedment in Afghanistan’s

strategic and political firmament. Ironically, it isIndia’s successes in Afghanistan that havedriven Pakistan’s security establishment intopanic mode with a perception gaining groundthat India was taking over Afghanistan. TheObama administration’s desire for a rapid disen-gagement from Afghanistan has given the nec-essary opening to the Pakistanis to regain theirlost influence in Kabul.9 In order to keepIslamabad in good humor, Washington insistedon New Delhi limiting its role in Afghanistan,having apparently bought the argument that asubstantial Indian presence in the country threat-ened Pakistan and made it difficult for it to coop-erate fully with the international community inthe fight against al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Infact, India had a very limited presence in Af-ghanistan in the 1990s, and it was then that thePakistanis had a free hand in nurturing theTaliban.

The Indian government’s traditional stancethat while it is happy to help the Afghan gov-ernment in its reconstruction efforts, it will notbe directly engaged in security operations is be-

Pant: India’s Afghan Policy

8 The Hindu Business Line (Chennai, Madras), Mar. 29, 2007. 9 The New York Times, Dec. 1, 2009.

Indian foreign minister S.M. Krishna (right, here withSecretary of State Clinton, New Delhi, July 20, 2009) failed toconvince Western leaders of the folly of making a distinctionbetween “good Taliban and bad Taliban.”

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coming harder to sustain. A debate has there-fore ensued as to whether the Indians shouldstart backing their humanitarian endeavors inAfghanistan with a stronger military presence.If Afghanistan is the most important frontier incombating anti-Indian terrorism, then how longcan New Delhi sustain its present policy trajec-tory whereby its civilians are being killed in pur-suit of developmental objectives?

The Indians have much to consider. Thereturn of the Taliban to Afghanistan would posea major threat to India’s security. In the end, thebrunt of escalating terrorism will be borne byIndia, which has already been described as “thesponge that protects” the West.10 Indian strate-gists have warned that a hurried U.S. withdrawal,with the Taliban still posing a threat to Afghani-stan, will have grave implications for India, notleast the emergence of Pakistan, its rival, as abigger regional player. As Henry Kissinger hasnoted, “In many respects, India will be the most

affected country if jihadist Islamism gainsimpetus in Afghanistan.”11

True, India’s role in Afghanistanshould not be viewed through the eyes ofWestern observers who have dubbed itprovocative, or through the eyes of the Pa-kistanis, who have long resented their ownwaning influence. Rather, New Delhi’s in-volvement should be considered throughthe eyes of the Afghan people who, argu-ably, are benefitting from the use of itsneighbor’s soft power, whatever its ultimatemotivations.

President Karzai, meanwhile, is grudg-ingly accepting Islamabad’s larger role inhis country. The July 2011 deadline wasintended to force Karzai to address urgentproblems such as corruption and ineffec-tive governance. But it may have had theopposite effect, convincing the Afghanpresident that in the not too distant futurehe would be left on his own. Though Wash-ington is at pains to underline that July 2011“will be the beginning of a conditions-

based process,”12 there are few who believe thatthe Obama administration has the stomach for aprolonged stay despite the recent NATO deci-sion to hand over security to the Afghans by2014. Declaring that the war in Afghanistan is“on track” toward achieving its military and po-litical goals but that progress is coming “slowlyand at a very high price” for Americans who arefighting there, the most recent review of the Af-ghanistan war effort suggests that significantprogress has been made but that the gains inthe country remain fragile. The review concludesthat U.S. forces can begin withdrawing in July2011, despite finding uneven signs of progressin the year since President Obama announcedthe deployment of an additional 30,000 troops.13

Karzai in particular seems convinced thatthe United States will not be able to stay thecourse as evidenced by his attempts to craft a

As President Karzai began hedging his betsahead of the impending U.S. departure, he wasreported to have held a meeting with SirajuddinHaqqani (pictured), Taliban ally and head of aprominent Pakistan-propped terror network, inthe presence of Pakistan’s army chief of staff andthe intelligence chief.

10 Indian Express, Jan. 29, 2009.

11 Ibid., Sept. 13, 2010.12 The New York Times, June 19, 2010.13 The Washington Post, Dec. 16, 2010.

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more autonomous foreign policy. The Afghanpresident lost no time in sacking the two closestU.S. allies in his cabinet—the interior ministerHanif Atmar14 and the chief of intelligenceAmrullah Saleh.15 These were the men Wash-ington had insisted that Karzai include in hiscabinet after his 2009 reelection, and they stub-bornly resisted his attempts to negotiate withthe Taliban and to develop closer ties withIslamabad, which Karzai considered an impor-tant player in ending the war whether throughnegotiations with the Taliban or on the battle-field. The decision to send a contingent of offic-ers for training in Pakistan is of great symbolicvalue and is the result of talks between the Af-ghan government and Pakistan’s security agen-cies that began in May 2010.16 It has even beenreported that Karzai had a face-to-face meetingwith Sirajuddin Haqqani, head of a prominentPakistan-propped terror network, in the presenceof Pakistan’s army chief of staff and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) chief.17 The Taliban’sgrowing power and self confidence are also evi-dent in their dismissal of proposed negotiationswith Washington, an indication of the convictionthat they are winning the war and that public opin-ion in the West is turning against the war.

Pakistan’s security establishment relishesthe double game it is playing in Afghanistan.Pakistani support for the Taliban continues tobe sanctioned at the highest levels of govern-ment, with the ISI even represented on theQuetta Shura—the Taliban’s war council—soas to retain influence over the movement’s lead-ership. Taliban fighters continue to be trainedin Pakistani camps while the ISI not only pro-vides financial, military, and logistical supportto the insurgency but also retains strong stra-tegic and operational control over the Talibancampaign in Afghanistan.18 Likewise, despiteits counterinsurgency offensives in North andSouth Waziristan, the Pakistani military contin-

ues to view the Taliban as a strategic asset. Theconclusion of the Afghanistan-Pakistan Tradeand Transit agreement is a major shot in the armfor Islamabad since it explicitly affirms that Indiawill not be allowed to export goods to Afghani-stan through the Wagah border.19

In one of the largest single disclosures ofsuch information in U.S.history, WikiLeaks, a self-described whistleblowerorganization, releasedmore than 91,000 classi-fied documents in July2010, largely consistingof low-level field re-ports.20 These docu-ments merely confirmedthe long-held belief thatPakistan’s intelligence agency is guiding theAfghan insurgency even as it continues to re-ceive more than US$1 billion a year from Wash-ington to combat the extremists. The ISI hasbeen helping Afghan insurgents plan and carryout attacks on U.S. forces and their Afghan gov-ernment allies in Afghanistan, and its efforts torun the networks of suicide bombers as well asits help in organizing Taliban offensives at cru-cial periods in the Afghan war have also beenunderscored.21 Washington’s frustration at itsinability to persuade the Pakistani army and in-telligence apparatus to cease supporting the Af-ghan Taliban and other militants has been grow-ing over the years. It is clear from leaked docu-ments that Washington remains convinced thatPakistan will never cooperate fully in fightingthe whole range of extremist groups. It is alsowell understood by the U.S. administration thatPakistan is preparing for the eventual U.S. with-drawal from Afghanistan, viewing the militantgroups as insurance and as a means of exertinginfluence inside Afghanistan and against India.The assessment of former U.S. ambassador AnneW. Patterson is blunt: “There is no chance that


14 One India (Bangalore), June 7, 2010.15 Reuters, June 8, 2010.16 The Washington Post, July 1, 2010.17 Ibid.18 The Sunday Times (London), June 13, 2010.

19 The Wall Street Journal, July 18, 2010.20 The Washington Post, July 26, 2010.21 The New York Times, July 25, 2010.

The return ofthe Taliban toAfghanistanwould pose amajor threat toIndia’s security.


Pakistan will view enhanced assistance levels inany field as sufficient compensation for abandon-ing support for these groups, which it sees as animportant part of its national security apparatusagainst India.” She noted that burgeoning U.S.-India ties “[feed] Pakistani establishment para-noia and pushes them closer to both Afghan andKashmir focused terrorist groups.”22

These revelationsalso made it clear thatIndia had been system-atically targeted by thePakistani security ser-vices. The bombing ofthe Indian embassy in2008 was at the behest ofthe ISI, which also paidthe Haqqani terror net-work to eliminate Indianworkers in Afghanistan

and gave orders to orchestrate attacks on In-dian consulates there.23 That the Pakistani se-curity complex had engendered targeting of In-dian interests in Afghanistan was hardly newsin New Delhi. But Indian policymakers have beendeeply dismayed by Washington’s reluctanceto counter Pakistan’s designs in Afghanistan.

Though New Delhi continues to insist thatit will not retreat from Afghanistan, there are clearsigns that it is scaling down its presence. Al-most half of the Indian personnel working onvarious projects have returned home; some In-dian schemes have been put on hold, and theIndians are not taking on any new projects.Training programs for Afghan personnel are nowtaking place in India.

INDIA DEBATES ITS OPTIONS

The Indian government is debating its op-tions in Afghanistan in a strategic space thatseems to have shrunk over the past few years.

By failing to craft its own narrative on Afghani-stan and Pakistan ever since U.S. troops wentinto Afghanistan in the wake of 9/11, New Delhihas allowed the West, and increasingly Pakistan,to dictate the contours of its policy toward theregion.

Two major strands can be discerned in thepresent debate. On the one hand, there are thosewho maintain that despite the recent setbacks,New Delhi should continue to rely on Washing-ton to secure its Afghanistan and Pakistan in-terests.24 In their opinion, there is a fundamen-tal convergence between the Indian governmentand the Obama administration in viewing Paki-stan as the source of Afghanistan’s insecurityand in believing that the world must act togetherto cure Islamabad of its political malaise. In iden-tifying the borderlands between Pakistan andAfghanistan as the single most important threatto global peace and security, arguing thatIslamabad is part of the problem rather than thesolution, and asking India to join an internationalconcert in managing the Afghanistan-Pakistanregion, Washington has made significant depar-tures from its traditional posture toward SouthAsia. The Indians would, therefore, be bestserved by coordinating their counterterroriststrategy with the United States and should helpWashington by addressing Pakistan’s fears ofIndian meddling on its western frontiers, un-founded as they might be; it has even been sug-gested that New Delhi should not hesitate toreach out to the Pakistani army.25

The other side of the debate is becomingimpatient with New Delhi’s continued relianceon Washington to pull its chestnuts out of thefire. According to this argument, a fundamentalschism has emerged between the U.S. and In-dian positions as the Obama administration hassystematically ignored Indian interests andsensibilities.26 While actively discouraging ahigher Indian profile in Afghanistan for fear ofoffending Pakistan, the administration has failed

22 The Guardian (London), Nov. 30, 2010.23 The Indian Express, July 27, 2010.

24 Ibid., Mar. 3, 2010.25 Ibid., Jan. 27, 2010.26 The Tribune (Chandigarh), Aug. 19, 2010.

By giving thePakistanis aleading role in theAfghan state, theWest is sowingthe seeds ofregional turmoil.

/ 37

to persuade Islamabad to takeIndian concerns more seriously.Anxious for a semblance of vic-tory, the West has decided tocourt the “good” Taliban withPakistan’s help, thus under-scoring Islamabad’s centralityin the unfolding strategic dy-namic in the region, much to theIndian government’s discomfi-ture. By pursuing a strategy thatwill give the Pakistanis the lead-ing role in the nascent Afghanstate structures, the West, how-ever, is only sowing the seedsof future regional turmoil. WhileWashington may have no vitalinterest in determining who ac-tually governs the country solong as Afghan territory is notused as a springboard for at-tacks on American soil, NewDelhi most certainly does. TheTaliban—good or bad—arehostile to India in many fundamental ways. Theabandonment of the goal of establishing afunctioning Afghan state and a moderate Pa-kistan is liable to put a greater pressure onIndian security.27

India’s influence in Afghanistan rose sig-nificantly as U.S. support for Pakistan waned inthe immediate wake of 9/11 and Washingtondemanded that Islamabad adopt policies longadvocated by the Indians. Moreover, Indiaemerged as a major economic actor in Afghani-stan trying to bolster that state’s capacity invarious measures. But by refusing to use hardpower and asserting its profile more forcefully,New Delhi soon made itself irrelevant as the anti-Taliban campaign proved far more intractablethan expected, leading to a widening gap be-tween the strategic perceptions of the Indiangovernment and U.S administrations. The Obamaadministration, intent on moving out of Afghani-

stan, has managed to signal to India’s adversar-ies that they can shape the post-American erato serve their own ends. New Delhi lost the trustof its own allies in Afghanistan: For if it wouldnot stand up for its own interests, few saw thebenefit of aligning with it. The Indian presencewhich looked formidable during the George W.Bush era began unraveling with the advent ofthe Obama administration, which deepened itssecurity dependence on Pakistan in the hope ofachieving rapid success.

Moreover, Pakistan’s weak democracy andpowerful military and intelligence apparatus hasfailed to get a grip on the problem that nowthreatens to overwhelm the Pakistani state it-self. The three-year extension granted to thePakistani army chief of staff Gen. Ashfaq ParvezKayani will ensure that a return to meaningfuldemocracy will continue to elude Pakistan andthat the army’s inflexible India-centric securityperception will render rapprochement with NewDelhi a nonstarter. Kayani is also clear about hisdetermination to call the shots in Kabul. He re-mains wedded to the notion of “strategicdepth”—that is, to making Afghanistan the kind


India’s extensive economic activity and investments inAfghanistan have played an important role in helping theflailing government of President Hamid Karzai (left), withIndian prime minister Mahmohan Singh, New Delhi, May2010, to retain and enhance its legitimacy by bringing theAfghan economy back on track.

27 The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), Mar. 2010; BusinessStandard, Sept. 15, 2010.


of proprietary hinterland for Pakistan, free ofIndian or other outside influence, as had beenthe case from 1992 to 2001.28 Despite the tide ofreligious fanaticism sweeping across Pakistan,most recently exemplified by the assassination ofliberal governor of the Punjab province, SalmanTaseer,29 the Pakistani security establishment con-tinues to view religious extremist groups as as-sets that could be exploited to serve strategic in-terests during and after the endgame in Afghani-stan. The latest Afghan war review has indicatedthat the Obama administration was setting condi-tions to begin the “responsible reduction” of U.S.forces in Afghanistan in July 2011. Fearing U.S.withdrawal soon, Hamid Karzai now seems readyto hitch his wagon to Pakistan. He views Paki-stan as playing a positive role by helping to denyterrorists sanctuary and by using its leverage oversome elements of the Afghan Taliban. Facing thecollapse of the nation-building project in Afghani-stan on the one hand and Pakistan’s rising influ-ence on the other, India’s policy in Afghanistanstands at a crossroads.

FORGING NEW ALIGNMENTS

To preserve its interests in a rapidly evolv-ing strategic milieu, New Delhi is trying to co-operate more closely with states such as Rus-sia and Iran, with which it has convergent in-terests vis-à-vis Afghanistan and Pakistan.None of these states would accept a funda-mentalist Sunni-dominated regime in Kabul orthe reemergence of Afghanistan as a base forjihadist terrorism directed at neighboringstates. The Indian government has reached outto Moscow at the highest political levels, reit-erating the two nations’ shared positions onAfghanistan and institutionalizing cooperationon this issue.30

Moscow, for its part, having kept itself aloof

from Afghanistan and Pakistan for years afterthe Taliban’s ouster, is refocusing on Afghani-stan as Islamist extremism and drug traffickingemanating from Central Asia have reemerged asmajor threats to its national security. It hostedthe presidents of Afghanistan, Pakistan, andTajikistan in August 2010, promised to investheavily in developing Afghan infrastructure andnatural resources, and repeatedly laid down cer-tain “red lines” for the Taliban’s integration intothe political process, notably renunciation ofviolence, cessation of the armed struggle, ac-ceptance of the Afghan constitution, and a com-plete break with al-Qaeda.31 During Prime Min-ister Vladimir Putin’s visit to New Delhi in March2010, the Indian government sought Russiansupport in countering what it viewed as a U.S.-Pakistan axis in Afghanistan.32

Iran is the third part of this triangle, andNew Delhi’s outreach to Tehran became moreserious after signals from the Iranians that therelationship was drifting. The two countrieshad worked closely when the Taliban was inpower in Kabul and continued to cooperate onseveral infrastructure projects allowing transitfacilities for Indian goods, but the Indian deci-sion to vote against Iran at the InternationalAtomic Energy Agency on the nuclear issueled to a chilling of the bilateral relationship.33

Now New Delhi is trying to revive its partner-ship with Tehran in Afghanistan. In the sec-ond governmental-level visit in less than amonth, Iran’s deputy foreign minister was inIndia in early August 2010, and the two sidesdecided to hold “structured and regular con-sultations”34 on the issue of Afghanistan.

In defiance of the international sanctions,the Indian government is encouraging Indiancompanies to invest in the Iranian energy sectorso that economic interests can underpin the bi-

28 Dawn (Karachi), Feb. 2, 2010.29 The Telegraph (London), Jan. 13, 2011.30 The Hindu, Aug. 3, 2010.

31 Ibid.32 RT TV (Moscow), Mar. 12, 2010; Rediff News ( Mumbai),Mar. 12, 2010.33 The Indian Express, Nov. 27, 2009.34 Thaindian News (Bangkok), Aug. 2, 2010; see, also, HarshV. Pant, “Delhi’s Tehran Conundrum,” The Wall Street Jour-nal, Sept. 20, 2010.

/ 39Pant: India’s Afghan Policy

Viewing Afghanistan as Islamabad’s “strategic depth,” aproprietary hinterland free of outside influence,Pakistan’s chief of staff Gen. Ashfaq Parvez (right), withBritish chief of General Staff, Gen. Sir Richard Dannatt,in London, March 25, 2009, is determined to call theshots in Kabul and to deny India any foothold in thatcountry.

lateral political realignment.35 Forits part, Tehran is worried about thepotential major role for leaders ofthe almost exclusively SunniTaliban in the emerging political or-der in Afghanistan. It has even en-couraged New Delhi to send moreassistance to provinces in north-ern and western Afghanistan thatare under the control of those as-sociated with the Northern Alliance.At the Iranians’ initiative, India isnow part of a trilateral Afghan-Ira-nian-Indian effort to counterPakistan’s attempts to freeze Indiaout of various regional initiatives.36

India’s ties with Iran, however, re-main circumscribed by Iranian de-fiance of the international commu-nity on the nuclear issue and India’sdesire to be viewed as a respon-sible rising power. New Delhi is alsoseeking reassurances from Mos-cow and Tehran that the threestates are in unanimity on Afghani-stan and Pakistan. It remains to be seen, how-ever, if India’s gravitation toward Russia andIran would be enough to arrest the slide of thesituation in Afghanistan-Pakistan to India’sdetriment.

CONCLUSION

For some members of the Indian strategiccommunity, Afghanistan is a litmus test for theircountry’s ascendance as a regional and globalpower. India’s capacity to deal with instability inits own backyard will in the final analysis deter-mine its rise as a global power of major import,so failure in Afghanistan is not an option.

India has a range of interests in Afghani-stan that it would like to preserve and enhance,notably containment of Islamist extremism, the

use of Afghanistan as a gateway to the energy-rich and strategically important Central Asianregion, and assertion of its regional preeminence.Yet the most important goal for New Delhi re-mains the prevention of Pakistan from regainingits central role in Afghan affairs. The last timePakistan enjoyed such a position was the 1990s,and Indian security interests suffered to an un-precedented degree. But then India was a weakerstate, marginal in the strategic equations of themajor global powers, and so could be easily ig-nored. Today, as India considers itself a risingglobal power with many more cards to play inAfghanistan than ever before, it is highly un-likely that it would give up on Kabul without afight. Because India has core interests to pro-tect in its periphery, it will continue to play animportant role in Afghanistan with or withoutU.S. approval. Washington, therefore, would dowell to take Indian concerns into account as theAfghan endgame looms larger.

35 South Asia Monitor (Society for Policy Studies, New Delhi),Sept. 13, 2010; Press TV (Tehran), Nov. 1, 2010.36 The Indian Express, Sept. 21, 2010.

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/ 41

Turkey’s Christiansunder Siegeby John Eibner

T he brutal murder of the head of Turkey’s Catholic Church, Bishop LuigiPadovese, on June 3, 2010, has rattled the country’s small, diverse, and hard-pressed Christian community.1 The 62-year-old bishop, who spearheaded the

Vatican’s efforts to improve Muslim-Christian relations in Turkey, was stabbed re-peatedly at his Iskenderun home by his driver and bodyguard Murat Altun, who con-cluded the slaughter by decapitating Padovese and shouting, “I killed the Great Satan.Allahu Akhbar!” He then told the police that he had acted in obedience to a “com-mand from God.”2

Though bearing all the hallmarks of a jihadist execution, the murder was met bydenials and obfuscation—not only by the Turkish authorities but also by Western gov-ernments and the Vatican. This is not wholly surprising. In the post-9/11 era, it hasbecome commonplace to deny connections between Islam and acts of violence despitemuch evidence to the contrary.3 But while this denial has undoubtedly sought to win thehearts and minds of Muslims, as opposed to Christians, Jews, or any other religiousgroup, it has served to encourage Islamist terrorism and to exacerbate the persecutionof non-Muslim minorities even in the most secularized Muslim states. For all PresidentBarack Obama’s high praise for its “strong, vibrant, secular democracy,”4 and PrimeMinister Recep Tayyip Erdoðan’s “Alliance of Civilizations” rhetoric, Turkey is verymuch entrenched in the clash of civilizations paradigm. Unless Ankara is prepared tocombat the widespread “Christophobia” that fuels violence and other forms of repres-sion, the country’s Christians are doomed to remain an oppressed and discriminatedagainst minority, and Turkey’s aspirations of democratic transformation and full integra-

Eibner: Turkish Christians

John Eibner, chief executive officer of Chris-tian Solidarity International-USA, focuses onreligious and ethnic conflict, mainly in theMiddle East, North-East Africa and EasternEurope. He has visited these regions on nu-merous human rights fact-finding and humani-tarian aid missions.

1 According to International Religious Freedom Report 2009,U.S. Department of State, Washington D.C., there are approxi-mately 90,000 Christians in Turkey. Vatican sources claim atotal of 30,000 Catholics. Catholic News Agency (Rome), Nov.27, 2006.2 Asia News (Bangkok), June 7, 2010.3 Daniel Pipes, “Denying [Islamist] Terrorism,” The New YorkSun, Feb. 8, 2005.4 “Remarks by President Obama to the Turkish Parliament,”in Ankara, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, Apr.6, 2009.

tion with Europe will remain stillborn.


THE VICTIM AND HIS MISSION

Consecrated bishop in November 2004, halfa year following Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger’s el-evation to the papacy, Padovese belonged to thebody of intellectually sharp, proactive clerics whoshare Benedict XVI’s ecumenical understandingof the church and its global mission of evangeliza-tion, especially in the Islamic Middle East where acentury of intensive de-Christianization now threat-ens the faith’s regional existence.

Padovese’s mission in Turkey was to helpsave the country’s Christian community from ex-tinction and to create conditions for its religiousand cultural renaissance. Rejecting the church’shistoric dhimmi status as a protected religiousminority under Islam—which reduced it to littlemore than a submissive worshipping agencywith no other legitimate activity—he viewedTurkey’s European Union candidacy as a goldenopportunity for winning significant conces-

sions from Ankara andpinned high hopes on theSpecial Assembly for theMiddle East of the Synodof Bishops, which tookplace in Rome in October2010.5 However, the synodended on a sour note.While confirming the Sec-ond Vatican Council’spositive shift in attitude to-ward Judaism and un-equivocal rejection ofanti-Semitism, the Middle

Eastern bishops sought to enhance the securityof their flocks by playing an anti-Israel card andcriticizing Israel—the one country of the regionwith a growing Christian population—with a di-rectness that was not employed in relation to anyIslamic state, no matter how repressive.

Had it not been for his murder, the bishop

would have traveled to meet the pope in Cypruson the very next day for the launch of the synod’sInstrumentum laboris, the Vatican’s strategicplan for reviving Christianity in its Middle East-ern cradle, to which Padovese was a substantialcontributor.

Though written in low-key Vatican jargon, theInstrumentum laboris is full of radical implicationsfor Turkey and the broader Middle East.6 In con-trast to the common post-9/11 predilection todownplay Islamism’s less savory aspects, thedocument does not gloss over the disadvantagedposition of Christians in the Islamic world and iden-tifies the issue of human rights, including religiousfreedom, as central to the well-being of the wholeof society:

Oftentimes, relations between Christians andMuslims are difficult, principally becauseMuslims make no distinction between religionand politics, thereby relegating Christians tothe precarious position of being considerednon-citizens, despite the fact that they werecitizens of their countries long before the riseof Islam. The key to harmonious living be-tween Christians and Muslims is to recognizereligious freedom and human rights.7

This harmonious living was to be achievedthrough a policy of dialogue—defined byBenedict XVI at the beginning of his papacy as “avital necessity, on which in large measure our fu-ture depends”8—that would identify the commonground between the two religions: service to soci-ety, respect for common moral values, the avoid-ance of syncretism, joint opposition to the athe-ism, materialism, and relativism emanating from theWestern world, and a collective rejection of reli-gious-based violence, that is—killing in the nameof God.

The Instrumentum laboris also encourageda search—together with Muslim reformers—for a

5 Bishop Luigi Padovese, “Christians in Turkey: From theCradle of Christianity to the Persecuted Minority,” presenta-tion, St. Louis Catholic Parish, Ansbach, Germany, June 18,2009.

Padovese’smission was tosave Turkey’sChristiancommunity fromextinction andcreate conditionsfor its renaissance.

6 “The Catholic Church in the Middle East: Communion andWitness. ‘Now the company of those who believed were of oneheart and soul’ (Acts 4:32),” Synod of Bishops, Special Assem-bly for the Middle East, Vatican City, June 6, 2010.7 Ibid., p. 37.8 “Address of His Holiness Benedict XVI,” meeting withrepresentatives of Muslim communities, Cologne, LibreriaEditrice Vaticana (Rome), Aug. 20, 2005.

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new system of church-state relations,which it referred to as “positivelaicity.” But the Vatican does not up-hold Turkey’s secularism—which theGeorge W. Bush and Obama adminis-trations have praised as a model forthe Islamic world—as the answer. “InTurkey,” the Instrumentum laborisnotes—undoubtedly on account ofthe influence of Bishop Padovese—“the idea of ‘laicity’ is currently pos-ing more problems for full religiousfreedom in the country.” The workingdocument did not elaborate but sim-ply stated that the aim of this “posi-tive,” as opposed to “Turkish laicity,”would be to help eliminate the theo-cratic character of government andallow for greater equality among citi-zens of different religions, therebyfostering the promotion of a sounddemocracy, positively secular in na-ture, which also fully acknowledgesthe role of religion in public life while completelyrespecting the distinction between the religiousand civic orders.9

These were the principles that guidedPadovese’s Turkish mission. He worked in theclear knowledge that “faithfully witnessing toChrist”—as the synod’s preparatory documentacknowledges—“can lead to persecution.”10 Andso it did.

CONSPIRACY OF SILENCE

Within hours of Padovese’s death, the pro-vincial governor preempted the results of policeinvestigations with the announcement that themurder was not politically motivated but rathercommitted by a lone lunatic.11 Moreover, in anattempt to eliminate any Islamic motive, NTV Tur-key announced that the murderer was not actu-ally a Muslim but a convert to Catholicism.12

Then the police leaked word—allegedly from theassassin—that he had been “forced to sufferabuse” in a homosexual relationship with thebishop and that the killing had been an act of “le-gitimate defense.”13

It is true that Turkey’s minister for culture andtourism, Ertuðrul Günay, issued a short message ofcondolences on behalf of the government14 andthat the foreign ministry expressed regret to theinternational media. But neither President Abdul-lah Gül nor Prime Minister Erdoðan expressed theirown condolences or publicly addressed the mur-der of the head of their country’s Catholic Church,and even the foreign ministry’s statement took careto highlight the murderer’s alleged “psychologicalproblems.”15

Erdoðan’s silence in response to this nationaltragedy was particularly striking. Together withSpanish prime minister Jose Luis RodriguesZapatero, the Turkish prime minister and leader of


The brutal murder on June 3, 2010, of the head of Turkey’sCatholic church, Bishop Luigi Padovese, seen here in2006 leading the funeral procession of another slainpriest, Andrea Santoro, was met by denials andobfuscation—not only by the Turkish authorities butalso by Western governments and even the Vatican.

9 “The Catholic Church in the Middle East,” pp. 10-12.10 Ibid., p. 44.11 ANSA News Agency, Vatican City, June 3, 2010.

12 Agence France-Presse, June 4, 2010.13 Asia News, June 7, 2010.14 Press release, Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism,June 3, 2010.15 CNN, June 3, 2010.


the ruling Islamist Peace and Justice Party (AKP)has been a principal architect and cosponsor ofthe U.N.’s flagship program to promote a global“Alliance of Civilizations.” Diversity, cross-cul-tural dialogue, and opposition to isolation of“the other” were among the principles articu-lated by Erdoðan in his attempts to present Tur-key as “the best panacea against ‘clash of civi-lizations’ theories.”16 The beheading of a senior

Christian cleric by aMuslim zealot could notbut send an unmistak-able message that thisvery clash was in fullswing on Erdoðan’shome turf.

Moreover, at thetime of the murder,Erdoðan was both send-ing thinly veiled threatsof Turkey’s growing im-

patience with the slow progress of its EU applica-tion and seeking to enhance his stature through-out the Islamic world with menacing anti-Israeldiplomacy in response to its interception of theTurkey-originated Gaza flotilla.17 He thus hadnothing to gain and much to lose by generatingheadlines about Padovese’s execution.

So did Washington and its European allies.If Western diplomats spoke at all about thebishop’s murder, it was in the same hushed tonesthat are used when referring to Turkey’s Arme-nian genocide of World War I, its subsequentuse of terror against remnant Christian communi-ties and Kurdish villages, its 1974 invasion ofCyprus and subsequent ethnic cleansing of theoccupied Christian population, and its blockadeof neighboring Armenia.

Well aware of the absence of backing fromWestern powers, the Vatican acted swiftly toavoid confrontation with Turkey. Notwithstand-ing an early observation by Vatican spokesmanFederico Lombardi that the murder highlightedthe “difficult conditions” of the church in the

region,18 the official explanation was swiftly har-monized with that of Ankara. In a statementbroadcast on Vatican Radio on the same day,Lombardi negated his previous comment by stat-ing that “political motivations for the attack orother motivations linked to socio-political ten-sions are to be excluded.” He also stressed thekiller’s “mental imbalance”19 as if solo psycho-paths might be a primary source of the church’sdifficult conditions in the Islamic world.

The day after the murder, while en route toone of Europe’s hot spots of Muslim-Christiancommunal tension—the divided island of Cy-prus—Pope Benedict XVI himself sought toquash speculation about its motivation. He ad-mitted that he still had “very little information”about the killing, yet endorsed—much to the be-wilderment of Christians in Turkey—the Turkishgovernment’s reflexive denial of a religious-po-litical motive when he declared, “We must notattribute the fact [of Bishop Padovese’s murder]to Turkey … What is certain is that it was not areligious or political assassination.”20

THE LESSONS OF REGENSBURG

Why did the pope so swiftly deny political orreligious motives for Padovese’s murder when somuch about the crime was still shrouded in mys-tery? Benedict XVI provided a motive when heexplained, “We do not want this tragic situation tobecome mixed up with dialogue with Islam or withall the problems of our journey [to Cyprus].”21 Aquarrel with Ankara at this particular juncturecould certainly have had damaging repercussionsfor the church, but behind the pontiff’s timidity,lay his keen awareness of how easy it was totrigger the destructive rage of the Islamic powersand the temporal weakness of his church.

Indeed, a few months before his ascendancyin May 2005, the pope-to-be caused consterna-

16 Recep Tayyip Erdoðan, statement, opening session, Alli-ance of Civilizations Forum, Madrid, Jan. 15, 2008.17 Ynet News (Tel Aviv), June 1, 2010.

18 Associated Press, June 3, 2010.19 Radio Vatican, June 3, 2010.20 Ibid., June 4, 2010.21 Ibid.

Pope Benedictendorsedthe Turkishgovernment’sdenial of areligious-politicalmotive.

/ 45

tion in Turkey by declaring his opposition to itsapplication for EU membership because “histori-cally and culturally, Turkey has little in commonwith Europe.”22 Upon Ratzinger’s election to thepapacy, Erdoðan opined that his “rhetoric maychange from now on … because this post, thisresponsibility, requires it.”23

Benedict XVI did lower his tone but not be-fore the mass demonstrations, violence, andthreats that followed his now famous RegensburgUniversity lecture of September 2006—just twomonths before he was scheduled to travel toIstanbul for his first papal foray into the world ofIslam. At Regensburg, the pope broached one ofthe key issues obstructing harmonious relationsbetween the Muslim and non-Muslim worlds: thesensitive question of violent jihad as a legitimatemeans of advancing the Islamic faith.24

In his address, the pope overstepped a redline drawn by Muslim political elites throughoutthe world. Erdoðan joined angry Muslim clericsand statesmen, demanding that the pope apolo-gize for his “wrong, ugly, and unfortunate state-ments” and calling into question whether theplanned papal visit to Istanbul would take place.25

He was followed by Director for Religious AffairsAli Bardakoðlu—the overseer of the Turkishstate’s massive financial support for Islamic in-stitutions, including those in Europe, especiallyGermany26—who condemned the pope’s mes-sage as reflecting “anger, hostility, and hatred”in addition to a “Crusader and holy-war mental-ity.”27 The deputy chairman of Erdoðan’s AKPParty, Salih Kapusuz, announced that theRegensburg speech would place Benedict XVIin the “same category as Hitler and Mussolini.”28

Left isolated and exposed by Washingtonand Europe, the pope quickly succumbed to pres-sure. To be sure, he did not retract a single worduttered at Regensburg,and his apology wasmore of a regretful expla-nation than an admissionof error, but his humbleand appeasing demeanorwas conciliatory enoughto salvage his church’sdialogue with Islam andkeep the door open toIstanbul. Since then, hehas taken extraordinarypains to temper his lan-guage and make flattering gestures to avoid fren-zied Muslim responses.

Consider Benedict XVI’s November 2006 visitto Turkey—his first as pope to a Muslim-major-ity country. While reiterating the Vatican’s cus-tomary plea for religious liberty, his remarks wereovershadowed by his gestures of goodwill aimedat underscoring his esteem for Islam and Turkey’sIslamist government, notably his prayer facingMecca in Istanbul’s Blue Mosque and his praisefor Erdoðan’s role in launching the Alliance ofCivilizations.29

The biggest plum for Erdoðan was the indi-cation that the pope would now welcome Turkey’smembership in the EU.30 Although the Vaticanmade no mention of it, the Turkish press an-nounced that Benedict XVI had endorsedErdoðan’s plan to establish a bureau of Turkey’sDirectorate of Religious Affairs in Brussels to“counter efforts to inflame Islamophobia.”31

The Regensburg speech led to the harmoni-zation of the Vatican’s diplomatic language withthat of Turkey and the Alliance of Civilizations,on which the Padovese murder had no apparenteffect. Anti-Christian violence remains a power-ful factor in influencing the language of the churchas it struggles to balance its fundamental, unwa-


22 Le Figaro (Paris), Aug. 13, 2004; CatholicCulture.org,Dec. 17, 2004.23 Inter-Press Service (Rome), Apr. 20, 2005; Agence France-Presse, Apr. 21, 2005.24 Benedict XVI, “Faith, Reason and the University: Memo-ries and Reflections,” University of Regensburg, Sept. 12,2006.25 Yeni Þafak (Istanbul), Sept. 17, 2006; Middle East MediaResearch Institute (MEMRI), Special Dispatch, no. 1297, Sept.22, 2006.26 Ali Bardakoðlu, “The Structure, Mission and Social Func-tion of the Directorate of Religious Affairs,” accessed Dec. 31,2010.27 MEMRI, Special Dispatch, no. 1297, Sept. 22, 2006.

28 Ibid.29 Catholic News Agency, Nov. 29, 2006.30 The Sunday Times (London), Nov. 29, 2006.31 Today’s Zaman (Istanbul), May 14, 2009.

Pope Benedicthas takenextraordinarypains to temperhis language toavoid frenziedMuslimresponses.


vering advocacy of religious freedom and oppo-sition to killing in the name of God with the pursuitof dialogue with Turkey and other Muslim major-ity states.

THE PLOT THICKENS

Not all Christians in Turkey accepted the de-nials and obfuscation of Ankara and the Vaticanabout the circumstances surrounding the murder.Foremost among them was the archbishop ofSmyrna, Ruggero Franceschini—Padovese’s suc-cessor as head of the country’s Catholic Church—who rejected the official explanation of his

colleague’s murder andmaintained that the popehad received “bad coun-sel” prior to his denial ofthe murder’s political orreligious motives.32

The archbishop hadlived in Iskenderun, wherethe murder took place, andhad known the assassinand his family personally.In the hope of ascertain-

ing the true facts, he immediately visited the sceneof the crime, subsequently telling the press thathe could not accept the “usual hastily concocted,pious lie” about the murderer’s insanity. He alsodismissed the claim that the assassin was a Catho-lic convert, confirming that he was a non-practic-ing Muslim.33

The archbishop did not doubt the murder’sreligious and political motivation. “I believe thatwith this murder, which has an explicitly religiouselement, we are faced with something that goesbeyond government,” he said. “It points towardsnostalgic, perhaps anarchist groups who want todestabilize the government. The very modalities ofthe murder aim to manipulate public opinion.”34

What the archbishop suspected was a crimestage-managed by Turkey’s “deep state”—an

opaque underworld where powerful elementswithin the state, especially the military and secu-rity services, act in conjunction with violent ex-tremist groups, such as the ultra-nationalist GreyWolves and the Islamist Hezbollah, as well as theapolitical criminal underworld, to undertake spe-cial, illegal operations in the political interest ofthe country’s ruling elite.35

Until recently, the deep state was imbued withthe secularist ideology of the republic’s foundingfather, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. But since comingto power in 2003, Erdoðan’s AKP has vigorouslyendeavored to lay hands on all levers of powerincluding the deep state with a view to promotingits Islamist, “neo-Ottoman” vision for the coun-try.36 This has in turn produced a schizophrenicdeep state with older elements loyal to the Kemalistopposition and newer elements loyal to the AKP’sIslamist agenda.

Since 2007, the Turkish media has feastedon a steady stream of revelations about an ex-tensive deep state network called “Ergenekon.”Government prosecutors have secured the ar-rest and indictment of scores of retired and still-serving military and security officials for alleg-edly plotting to destabilize the AKP-dominatedgovernment. Show trials are already underway.

Deep state documents released by the pros-ecution, if taken at face value, point to Ergenekonas a source of anti-church activity, including thetorture and Islamic-style ritual murder of three evan-gelical Christian book publishers in the town ofMalatya in April 2006.37

The Ergenekon conspiracy has been simi-larly linked with the murder of the 61-year-oldCatholic priest, Fr. Andrea Santoro—shot andkilled in his Trabzon church in February 2006.Witnesses report that the convicted killer, a 16-year-old, shouted “Allahu Akbar” immediately

32 Documentation Information Catholiques Internationales(Menzingen, Switzerland), June 28, 2010.33 Asia News, June 10, 2010.34 Ibid.

Plain-speakingabout persecutionof Christiansinvites hostilereactions,sometimesdeadly.

35 Gareth H. Jenkins, “Between Fact and Fiction: Turkey’sErgenekon Investigation,” Silk Road paper, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Johns Hopkins University, Washington,D.C., Aug. 2009; H. Akim Ünver, “Turkey’s ‘Deep-State’ andthe Ergenekon Conundrum,” The Middle East Institute, PolicyBrief, no. 23, Apr. 2009.36 Michael Rubin, “Erdoðan, Ergenekon, and the Struggle forTurkey,” Mideast Monitor, Aug. 8, 2008.37 Today’s Zaman, Nov. 22, 2008, Jan. 17, 2009, Apr. 13,2010.

/ 47

before firing his pistol.38 BishopPadovese said at the time thatthe assassination “did not seemincidental” as it occurred whilepassions were aroused by theDanish cartoon affair.39 Theformer papal nuncio to Turkey,Msgr. Antonio Lucibello, hadsimilarly argued that there was amastermind behind Santoro’smurder.40

Prosecutors also ascribedthe January 2007 murder of theArmenian Christian journalist,Hrant Dink, by a 17-year-old, tothe Ergenekon.41 A vigorous andwell-known campaigner againstTurkey’s denial of the Armeniangenocide, Dink had been con-victed of having violated article302 of the penal code banning“insults to Turkishness.” Thehanged body of Dink’s Turkishlawyer, Hakan Karadað, wasfound in suspicious circum-stances the day after the Padovese murder.42

It is far from certain whether the alleged anti-AKP Ergenekon conspiracy is a reality, orwhether it is largely an AKP fabrication, designedto cover the efforts of Erdoðan’s Islamists to turnthe deep state into an instrument for promotingtheir own agenda.43 But whoever may be pullingthe strings, Kemalists or Islamists, the deep stateis no friend of Turkey’s Christians.

A TURKISH ANTI-CHRISTIAN AGENDA

Persecution, however, is by no means limitedto the deep state. Like their counterparts in most

of the Islamic Middle East, Turkey’s Christiansare effective hostages to the arbitrary actions ofpowerful elites, made up of Islamic state and non-state actors who collectively monopolize vio-lence. The oldest Christians retain living memoryof the state-sponsored mass deportations andmassacres that culminated in the World War IArmenian genocide. During the twentieth cen-tury, Turkey’s Christian population has droppedto the verge of extinction.44 The last anti-Chris-tian mass violence was the 1955 deep state-sparked, anti-Greek pogrom in Istanbul, whichalso took a heavy toll on the city’s Jewish andArmenian populations.45

Such memories are reinforced in the youngergeneration of Christians by continuing acts ofsmaller scale and more discriminative violence.


Inside Istanbul’s 17th century Blue Mosque, Pope BenedictXVI (center, with the Mufti of Istanbul, November 30, 2006)prays silently. The pontiff dismayed many Turkish Christiansby declaring, a day after Bishop Padovese’s murder, thatTurkey should not be held culpable for the tragic event andthat what “is certain is that it was not a religious or politicalassassination.”

38 Reuters, Oct. 4, 2007.39 Catholic News Service, Feb. 6, 2006.40 Asia News, Feb. 7, 2006.41 BBC News, Feb. 4, 2008.42 Today’s Zaman, June 5, 2010.43 Rubin, “Erdoðan, Ergenekon and the Struggle for Turkey.”

44 Ahmet Igduygu, Sule Toktas, and Bayram Ali Soner, “ThePolitics of Population in a Nation-building Process: Emigra-tion of Non-Muslims from Turkey,” Ethnic and Racial Studies,Feb. 2008, p. 363.45 Ünver, “Turkey’s ‘Deep-State’ and the Ergenekon Co-nundrum.”

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In February 2006, for example, a Slovenian priestwas attacked by a gang of teenagers in the parishcompound in Izmir (Smyrna), and five months latera 74-year-old clergyman was stabbed by youngTurks on a street in Trabzon, following whichPadovese told the media, “The climate has changed… it is the Catholic priests that are being at-tacked.”46 In December 2007, another priest wasknifed by a teenager as he left his church follow-ing Sunday mass.47

A leader of the Turkish Protestant commu-nity, Rev. Behnan Konutgan, recently recordedcases of violence against church property and the

physical harassment ofchurch members while anoted Turkish sociologistof religion, Ali Carkoðlu,has argued that no non-Muslim religious gather-ing in Turkey is com-pletely risk free.48

What little protectivelaw there is, whether na-tional or international,

does not have the strength to provide adequatedefense. Plain-speaking about persecution inviteshostile reactions, sometimes deadly. The church’slanguage of dialogue is powerfully influenced bythis reality. But there are some voices in Turkeythat do not always cower to the violence-backedtaboos of official Christian-Muslim dialogue or ofthe Alliance of Civilizations.

At the end of 2009, Bartholomew I, the nor-mally subservient Ecumenical Orthodox patriarchof Constantinople, appeared on CBS’s 60 Min-utes and shocked Turkey’s political establishment.Speaking to Bob Simon, the patriarch reported nosignificant improvement in conditions for thechurch. Instead, he argued that Turkey’s Chris-tians were second class citizens and that he per-sonally felt “crucified” by a state that wanted to

see his church die out. Asked whether Erdoðanhad responded to the petitions submitted to himin the course of many meetings, Bartholomew an-swered, “Never.”49

Turkey’s rulers lashed out angrily. “We con-sider the crucifixion metaphor an extremely unfor-tunate metaphor,” argued Foreign Minister AhmetDavutoðlu. “In our history, there have never beencrucifixions, and there never will be. I couldn’treally reconcile this metaphor with his mature per-sonality.”50 President Gül endorsed the foreignminister’s assessment while the head of the rulingAKP’s international relations section, KürsatTüzmen, menacingly retorted, “If there is some-one who is being crucified, it is the politician, se-curity officials, and others. If he [the patriarch] is areligious and spiritual leader, he should be muchmore cautious when making a statement. Some-one who really loves his country has to be moreresponsible.”51

Bartholomew seems to have touched a rawnerve. For all its Alliance of Civilizations rheto-ric, Erdoðan’s Islamist government has maintaineda tight stranglehold on the country’s Christianinstitutions and blocked reforms that could leadto the growth of Christianity. True, the govern-ment has made some minor concessions to Chris-tian institutions, including legislation that cre-ates new but very limited possibilities for Chris-tian foundations to recover some confiscatedproperty,52 but this was little more than a ploy toplease the European Union and Washington andpales into insignificance by such hostile mea-sures as the refusal to reopen the Halki Theo-logical Seminary—the only institution in Turkeywhere Orthodox clergy could be trained—beforeGreece and Bulgaria improved the conditions oftheir Muslim minorities.53 In other words, Ankaradoes not recognize the right of the Orthodox Church,or any other church for that matter, to run a theo-logical seminary as a religious liberty but merely

46 Asia News, Feb. 9, 2006; BBC News, July 2, 2006.47 Voice of America, Dec. 16, 2007.48 Behnan Konutgan, “Christians Still Second-class Citizensunder Turkish Secularism,” International Journal for Reli-gious Freedom, 1 (2009): 99-110; Compass Direct News, Dec.4, 2009.

49 60 Minutes, CBS, Dec. 17, 2009.50 Today’s Zaman, Dec. 22, 2009.51 Hürriyet (Istanbul), Dec. 21, 2009.52 Otmar Oehring, “Turkey: What Difference Does the LatestFoundations Law Make?” Forum 18 (Oslo), Mar. 13, 2008.53 Hürriyet, Dec. 21, 2009.

The Turkishpublic as a wholesees Christiansas dangerous,subversive alienswithin society.

/ 49

as an instrument of deal-mak-ing with Western powers forthe purposes of enhancingthe position of Islam.

Indeed, while Turkey’schurches have long enjoyedfreedom of worship, they haveremained without legal statusto this very day. Most of theirwork takes place in the legalframework of foundations thatoperate under the strict super-vision of the General Director-ate for Foundations54 andother state institutions—in-cluding a secret national secu-rity department whose man-date is to control non-Muslimminorities.55 They have, more-over, been entangled in laby-rinthine negotiations andlengthy and expensive courtcases for the return of confis-cated property as well as per-mission to expand their engage-ment with society through theprovision of education andother charitable activity. Churches have experi-enced grave setbacks in addition to the abovementioned murders, notably: The state con-ducted a four-year prosecution of two Turkish,evangelical Protestant converts from Islam oncharges of “insulting Turkishness.” Althoughthese charges were dropped for lack of evidencein October 2010, the converts were forced to payfines of $3,170 each or go to prison for sevenmonths for “collecting information on citizens.”56

Ankara is taking legal action to confiscatelands that historically belonged to the Syriac Or-thodox Monastery of Mor Gabriel (founded in

379 CE), whose bishop has encouraged perse-cuted Christian refugees to return to the area andrebuild their villages.57

Less than a year before his death, Padovesewas especially disappointed by the rejection ofhis appeal for the status of the Church of St. Paulin Tarsus to be changed from a museum to a func-tioning place of regular worship. Not only hadthe pope made a personal appeal in this respect,but the archbishop of Cologne, Cardinal Meisner,had asked Erdoðan for the return of the church“as a gesture of European cooperation.” TheTurkish media reported that Ankara turned downthese requests from the pope, Cardinal Meisner,and Bishop Padovese, notwithstanding theCatholic leaders’ pledge to support the buildingof a mosque in Germany on condition that theTurkish government hand over the holy site tothe church, together with permission for the con-


During the twentieth century, Turkey’s Christian populationhas dropped to the verge of extinction. The oldest Christiansretain living memory of the state-sponsored mass deportationsand massacres that culminated in the World War I Armeniangenocide; the younger generation has experienced numerousacts of smaller scale and more discriminative violence. HereOrthodox faithful journey to the Black Sea Sumela Monastery,on August 15, 2010, after the government authorized prayer onthe site in fulfillment of its pledges to the EU to expand minorityrights.

54 Orphan Kemal Cengiz, “Minority Foundations in Turkey:From Past To Future,” part 1, Today’s Zaman, June 16, 2010,part 2, June 18, 2010.55 “Religious Freedom in Turkey: Situation of ReligiousMinorities,” European Parliament, Directorate General ExternalPolicies of the Union, Policy Department External Policies,Luxembourg, Feb. 2008, p. 10.56 Compass Direct News, Oct. 19, 2010. 57 The Wall Street Journal, Mar. 7, 2009.


struction of a center for pilgrims.58

The Islamist Erdoðan maintains continuitywith his ultranationalist predecessors by refusingto respect the historic, ecumenical character ofthe Patriarchate of Constantinople—i.e., its titularascendancy over the other patriarchates of the300 million-strong Orthodox communion world-wide—and by requiring that the patriarch be aTurkish citizen by birth. Last October, the Turkishauthorities allowed the right-wing NationalistMovement Party to conduct Islamic prayers atthe ancient Armenian Cathedral of the Holy Virginat Ani.59

RAGING CHRISTOPHOBIA

Padovese believed that there would be noend to the war against the church in Turkey untilthe public as a whole rejected the widely-acceptednegative stereotypes of Christians as dangerous,subversive aliens within society, and he especiallyblamed the popular Turkish media for perpetuat-

ing a climate of hate. Hehighlighted as an exampletwo cases involving thelate Fr. Santoro. In the first,he was run out of a vil-lage near Trabzon by agroup of children whilelocal adults incited theyouth with applause. Thelocal newspaper reportedthe incident with the head-line “Priest Sighted on theCoast Road,” as if his

presence there justified the mob action againsthim.60 The second case followed Santoro’s mur-der when the daily Vatan alleged that the assassi-nated priest had been guilty of distributing moneyto young people to entice them to visit hischurch.61

Turkey’s Christians were especially alarmedby the mass popular hysteria whipped up by the2006 blockbuster Valley of the Wolves, an action-packed adventure film set in post-Saddam Iraq.Reviewing the movie in Spiegel, Cem Özdemir—amember of the European Parliament of Turkishdescent—decried its pandering to “racist senti-ments” and its making “Christians and Jews ap-pear as repugnant, conspiratorial holy warriorshoping to use blood-drenched swords to expandor reclaim the empire of their God.”62

Far from distancing themselves from themovie, ultra-nationalists and those at high levelsin the Islamist camp praised it. “The film is abso-lutely magnificent … It is completely true to life,”exclaimed the parliament speaker (and later deputyprime minister) Bülent Arønç. Unconcerned aboutthe damaging implications of the film’s negativeimages of Christians and Jews, Turkey’s PresidentGül refused to condemn it, saying it was no worsethan many Hollywood films.63 Erdoðan’s piouswife is reportedly a fan of the racist film.64

The Christophobia of the boulevard press and“Istanbulywood” can also be found in state docu-ments. A national intelligence report, exposed bythe Cumhuriyet newspaper in June 2005, revealedsimilar dangerous sentiments that are at odds withthe principles espoused by Erdoðan at showcaseAlliance of Civilizations events.

Titled “Reactionary Elements and Risks,” thereport put Islamist terrorist groups on a par withChristian missionaries, who, it claimed, cover Tur-key “like a spider’s web” and promote divisions insensitive areas such as the Black Sea and easternAnatolia. According to the report, the Christianevangelizers included Catholics, Orthodox, andProtestants, as well as other Christian and non-Christian groups such as the Jehovah’s Witnessesand the Baha’is, with the latter concentrating ongovernment officials, liberal businessmen, and per-forming and other artists.65

Echoing the tenor of the intelligence report,

58 Catholic News Service, Aug. 3, 2009; Hürriyet, Aug. 6,2009.59 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Oct. 1, 2010.60 Asia News, Feb. 8, 2006.61 Ibid., Mar. 14, 2006.

62 Spiegel Online (Hamburg), Feb. 22, 2006.63 The Times (London), Feb. 17, 2006.64 Deutsche Welle (Bonn), Feb. 20, 2006.65 Compass Direct News, June 22, 2005.

More than half ofTurkish Muslimsbelieve thatChristians shouldnot be allowedto express theirreligious viewsin public.

/ 51Eibner: Turkish Christians

66 Forum 18, July 10, 2007.67 Compass Direct News, June 22, 2005.68 Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London:Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 15.

Turkish state minister Mehmet Aydøn, who over-sees the state’s Directorate for Religious Affairsand who has served as an advisor to the Na-tional Security Council on religious issues, ar-gued that the goal of Christian missionaries wasto “break up the historical, religious, national,and cultural unity of the people of Turkey,” add-ing that much evangelizing was “done in se-cret.”66 This claim was echoed by Erdoðan’s in-terior minister Abdülkadir Asku, who told theTurkish parliament that Christian missionariesexploited religious and ethnic differences andnatural disasters to win the hearts of poor people.Having highlighted the secret and subversivenature of this allegedly devious effort, he notedan embarrassingly small success rate: 338 con-verts to Christianity (and six converts to Juda-ism) out of 70 million Turks during the previousseven years.67

DEEP PREJUDICE

When Erdoðan, as an Islamist oppositionpolitician, announced in 1997 that “the minaretsare our bayonets, the domes our helmets, themosques our barracks and the faithful our army”—lines from a poem of by Ziya Gökalp, a nineteenth-century architect of Turkish nationalism based ona synthesis of Islam and Turkish ethnicity—hewas not only making a statement about the role ofIslam in promoting the interests of the Turkishstate but also indicating the unity of religion andnationalism in Turkish perception. As historianBernard Lewis explained, “One may speak of Chris-tian Arabs—but a Christian Turk is an absurdityand a contradiction in terms. Even today, afterthirty-five years of the secular republic, a non-Muslim in Turkey may be called a Turkish citizen,but never a Turk.”68

Much has changed in Turkey over the pasthalf century but not the fundamental character ofTurkish nationalism. The Turkish nation still thinks

of itself in terms of Islam and Turkish ethnicity,leaving little scope for the full integration of non-Muslims into the life of the nation. Most Chris-tians in Turkey belong to ethnic minorities. Inthe case of the Greeks and Armenians, they areidentified in the publicmind with historicallyhostile states. RomanCatholics and Protes-tants are linked with theWestern powers that im-posed humiliating condi-tions on the Ottoman Em-pire, notably the capitu-lations for the protectionof non-Muslims and thesponsorship of Christianmissionary activity.

Four academics of Turkish background havehighlighted this Islamo-Turkish supremacism in a2008 EU-commissioned report. They argued:

Despite laicism, the Turkish state has notbeen able to overcome the segregation of non-Muslim minorities and to integrate them intothe nation as citizens with equal rights. Whilethe Muslim Turks have been the “we,” thenon-Muslim minorities have been categorizedas “the other”… they have been rather per-ceived as “domestic foreigners.”

The authors make further observationsabout the prevailing concept of nationality inthe context of the need for the state to end reli-gious-based discrimination:

Notwithstanding the spirit of the foundingtext of the republic, the notion of Turkishcitizenship was shaped according to the le-gal context that prevailed before theTanzimat reforms of 1839. Although the newrepublic defined itself as a secular state,Sunni Islam has been functional in the na-tion-building process as a uniting, commoncultural factor of the majority of Turkey’sinhabitants. A person who is not a Muslimis usually referred to as a minority person ora Turkish citizen, but not a Turk. Turk des-ignates an ethno-religious characteristic of apolitical community.69

There is littlescope for the fullintegration ofnon-Muslimsinto the life ofthe Turkishnation.


The extent to which this cultural phenomenonstill influences Turkish society at the grassrootslevel is evident from the findings of an EU-financedpublic opinion survey conducted in 2008 by twoTurkish scholars as a part of the International So-cial Survey Program. It discovered that

• One third of Turkish Muslims would ob-ject to having a Christian as a neighbor.

• More than half believe that Christiansshould not be allowedto openly express theirreligious views inprinted publication orin public meetings.

• More than half areopposed to Christiansserving in the army,security services, po-lice force, and politicalparties.

• Just under half believe Christians shouldnot be active in the provision of healthservices.70

The road from such views to outright dis-crimination and a heightened threat of violence isvery short indeed.

CONCLUSION

All available evidence points to the presenceof important religious and political elements in theassassination of Bishop Padovese. If truth is toprevail over “pious lies”—as the archbishop ofSmyrna desires—Ankara and the Vatican will haveto cooperate to ensure a full and transparent en-

quiry into the bishop’s death. The credibility ofan enquiry will depend on open examination ofthe details of the murderous act itself as well ason the broader circumstances surrounding it,including other violent acts of Christophobiaand the encouragement of xenophobic attitudesby the media, the entertainment industry, andthe educational system. This means penetratingthe netherworld of connections between theTurkish government, the deep state, and radicalpolitical groups, and examining the institutionalsources of Turkish Christophobia.

Such a joint investigation, perhaps withthe assistance of the deceased bishop’s home-land, Italy, or with the United States as Turkey’smost important ally, would be an expression ofChristian-Muslim dialogue in practice. A gov-ernment-sponsored campaign to combatChristophobia in Turkish society would dem-onstrate Turkey’s commitment to bring to anend its own historic clash of civilizations andreplace it with a strong, equitable alliance ofcivilizations.

In the months that have passed sincePadovese’s beheading, Erdoðan and his Islamistgovernment have not taken such steps. This fail-ure is a sign of a lack of political will to break fromTurkey’s historic tradition of Islamic and Turkishsupremacism. Unless determination is publiclydemonstrated, Turkey will entrench itself stilldeeper in an Ottoman-oriented Islam that is in-creasingly at odds with its Christian minorities,its former non-Muslim ally Israel, and the West.

The soft power of the modern papacy, withits appeals for religious liberty, can exercise apositive influence on Turkey and the rest ofthe Islamic world. But Islamic powers can see,as did Stalin, an absence of papal military divi-sions in the current clash of civilizations. Un-less the thoroughly secularized nations of whatwas once Christendom provide firmer back-bone, the Vatican will have little choice but tobend with the breeze.69 “Religious Freedom in Turkey. Situation of Religious

Minorities,” pp. 2, 10.70 Compass Direct News, Dec. 4, 2009; Hürriyet, Nov. 17,2009.

There is a lackof political willto break fromTurkey’s traditionof Islamicand Turkishsupremacism.

/ 53Rosen: Palestinian Statehood Resolution

Abbas vs. Obamaby Steven J. Rosen

Having sidelined Barack Obama’s peace initiative by refusing to return to the ne-gotiations table without apriori Israeli concessions, the Palestinian leadershipseeks to secure an international declaration of statehood at the next U.N. Gen-

eral Assembly session in September 2011. This “date certain” strategy, whereby itsentitlement to a state will be fulfilled by the world powers, has long been preferred bythe Palestinian leadership to any arduous, bilateral negotiation with Israel, which wouldrequire painful concessions. The Palestinians enjoy wide support in many Europeancapitals, and they know that the Obama administration is close to their positions onmany of the core issues. So forcing the statehood demand into a multilateral forum canentice governments into satisfying the Palestinian aspirations by a fixed date.

Steven J. Rosen served for twenty-three yearsas a senior official of the American Israel PublicAffairs Committee. He is now director of theWashington Project of the Middle East Forum.

EUROPEAN SUPPORT

Some key European leaders have showngrowing receptivity to setting a date for thecreation of a Palestinian state. Their frustra-tion has mounted since the breakdown of theOslo negotiations when Yasser Arafatlaunched his war of terror in September 2000,then rejected Bill Clinton’s final proposal inJanuary 2001. In 2002, the Europeans hatchedthe idea of a “road map” for Arab-Israeli reso-lution as a way to create deadlines for the es-tablishment of a Palestinian state,1 and Euro-pean Union pressure led to the creation of theQuartet (the United States, U.N., EuropeanUnion, and Russia), and to the Quartet’s firststatement on September 17, 2002, announcing“a concrete, three-phase implementation road

map that could achieve a final settlement withinthree years.”2

But the Bush administration was unwillingto go all the way with fixed deadlines and a datecertain because it recognized that this would freethe Palestinians from the responsibility to com-promise with Israel. Bush insisted that the roadmap deadlines be conditional: Transition fromone phase to the next would be “performancebased”—i.e., based on the responsibilities of theparties themselves. The road map announced“clear phases, timelines, target dates, and bench-marks.”3 But the Quartet partners were forced toagree that “progress between the three phaseswould be strictly based on the parties’ compli-ance with specific performance benchmarks to

1 “Chronological Review of Events Relating to the Question ofPalestine,” Monthly Media Monitoring Review, U.N. Informa-tion System on the Question of Palestine, Nov. 2002.2 “Communiqué Issued by the Quartet ,” United Nations, NewYork, Sept. 17, 2002.3 “A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-StateSolution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” United Nations,New York, Apr. 30, 2003.


be monitored ... based upon the consensus judg-ment of the Quartet of whether conditions areappropriate to proceed.”4

For these reasons, the road map did notachieve its stated goal of “a final settlementwithin three years,” and European frustrationcontinued to mount. In July 2009, Europe’s then-foreign policy chief Javier Solana called for theU.N. Security Council to recognize a Palestinianstate by a certain deadline even if Israelis andPalestinians had failed to agree among them-selves: “After a fixed deadline, a U.N. SecurityCouncil resolution should proclaim the adop-tion of the two-state solution ... set a calendarfor implementation ... [and] accept the Palestin-ian state as a full member of the UN. … If theparties are not able to stick to [the timetable],

then a solution backed by the interna-tional community should be put on thetable.”5

French foreign minister BernardKouchner moved in the same directionin February 2010: “One can imagine aPalestinian state being ... recognized bythe international community, even be-fore negotiating its borders. I would betempted by that.”6 Kouchner and hisSpanish counterpart Miguel AngelMoratinos wrote on February 23, 2010,that the European Union “must not con-fine itself to the … outlines of the finalsettlement” but “should collectivelyrecognize the Palestinian State ... Thereis no more time to lose. Europe must pavethe way.”7 Then in July 2010, Kouchnersaid, “France supports the creation of aviable, independent, democratic Pales-tinian state ... by the first quarter of2012.”8

But none of this happened. Solana,Moratinos, and Kouchner are no longerin their positions, and Europe has notdelivered what the Palestinians sought.

PALESTINIAN GAINS

The Palestinian leadership has taken itsown initiative to force a deadline for statehoodwithout negotiations. In a major address at al-Quds University on June 22, 2009, Salam Fayyadof the Palestinian Authority announced a 24-month program to build the institutions of state-hood, so that “the Palestinian State [will] be-come—by the end of next year or within twoyears at most—a firm reality.” He predicted thatthe “building of institutions ... within two yearswill enable us to swing back the position of the

4 “Quartet Statement on the Middle East,” European Union @the United Nations, New York, Sept. 17, 2002.

The Palestinian campaign to have an independentstate declared at the earliest possible date regardlessof Israel’s consent received a major boost whenPresident Obama, in his remarks to the openingsession of the United Nations General Assembly onSeptember 22, 2010, proclaimed, “When we comeback here next year, we can have an agreement thatwill lead to a new member of the United Nations—an independent state of Palestine.”

5 Reuters, July 12, 2009.6 France 24 TV, Feb. 22, 2010.7 Bernard Kouchner and Miguel Angel Moratinos, “A Palestin-ian State: When?” Le Monde (Paris), Feb. 23, 2010.8 Bernard Kouchner, “Viable Palestinian State by 2012,” Ma’anNews Agency (Bethlehem), July 27, 2010.

/ 55

international community in sup-port of our right to an indepen-dent, fully sovereign State onthe 1967 border and with EastJerusalem as its capital.”9 OnAugust 26, 2009, Fayyad issuedthe details of his program forbuilding statehood institutionswithin two years.10

His initiative was quicklyadopted by the Middle EastQuartet, which declared onMarch 19, 2010, that “negotia-tions should lead to a settlementnegotiated between the partieswithin 24 months.”11

“It’s not a coincidencethat the Europeans came outwith a landmark statement,”Fayyad boasted. “All of a sud-den everyone is talking abouta two-year timeline. The Quar-tet on March 19 of this yearsaid two years. Well, their two years is longerthan ours—we started a bit earlier.”12 On Au-gust 20, 2010, the Quartet made another state-ment shortening its timeline to match that ofFayyad, declaring that “a settlement ... canbe completed within one year” instead of thetwo years it had announced just five monthsearlier.13

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton an-nounced the same timeline, saying, “Direct ne-gotiations to resolve all final status issues ...can be completed within one year.”14 Special

Envoy George Mitchell gave Clinton’s reasons:

Prime Minister Netanyahu said ... that hebelieved it could be done within a year. Presi-dent Abbas has expressed similar sentimentsto me. So we believe it can be done within ayear ... Both the United States and the Quar-tet have said that we believe there should bedirect talks without preconditions ... If thosenegotiations are conducted seriously ... theycan produce such an agreement within 12months.15

Indeed, Netanyahu did give a nod to the2011 target date, perhaps as an indication of hisown sincerity about peace talks. In his Septem-ber 8, 2010 Rosh Hoshana greeting, the primeminister said, “I believe that we should makeevery effort to reach a historic compromise forpeace over the coming year.”16 Then during apress conference in Sderot on September 21,2010, Netanyahu added, “My goal is not to con-

Rosen: Palestinian Statehood Resolution

Palestinian Authority prime minister Salam Fayyad (left),here with Israel’s president Shimon Peres, New York,September 21, 2010, announced an ambitious 24-monthprogram to build the institutions of statehood, so that aPalestinian state would become “a firm reality” by the endof this period at most.

9 Salam Fayyad, address at al-Quds University, Abu Dis,Prime Minister’s Office, Palestinian National Authority, June22, 2009.10 “Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State: Program ofthe Thirteenth Government,” Palestinian National Authority,U.N. Information System on the Question of Palestine, Aug.2009.11 “Statement by Middle East Quartet,” Moscow, Mar. 19,2010.12 “Fayyad: ‘Build, build despite the occupation,’” PalestineNote website, Washington, D.C., July 30, 2010.13 Quartet statement, United Nations, New York, Aug. 20,2010.14 Political Transcript Wire, Aug. 20, 2010.

15 Ibid.16 “Rosh Hashanah Greeting from PM Netanyahu,” IsraelMinistry of Foreign Affairs, Jerusalem, Sept. 8, 2010.

Photo

will

not d

isplay

.


duct a process but to complete it ... to reach ahistoric peace. ... [through] accelerated negotia-tions within one year in order to achieve a frame-work agreement.”17

But the most important victory for thePalestinian date-certaincampaign was the dra-matic pronouncement byObama in his remarks tothe opening session ofthe United Nations Gen-eral Assembly on Sep-tember 22, 2010. Obamasaid, “When we comeback here next year, wecan have an agreementthat will lead to a newmember of the United

Nations—an independent state of Palestine.”18

This was the only line in Obama’s 2010 speechthat received an enthusiastic ovation.

The Palestinians remained unimpressed.Palestinian Authority chairman Mahmoud Abbasresponded, “I hope this is not just a slogan, andwhen the time comes, he says, ‘We are sorry wecould not [do it]. Leave it for next year.’” Hecontinued, “[It] is a promise and a debt aroundyour neck, and it must be realized so that Pales-tine becomes a full member state of the UnitedNations.”19

THE FINAL PUSH

The Palestinians now have a plan to receivepayment for all these promises and collect onthis “debt.” In January 2011, the PalestinianAuthority (PA) announced that it had prepareda draft resolution to be introduced in the U.N.Security Council in September 2011 whenObama’s one-year promise falls due.20 This in-

cludes formal recognition of a Palestinian stateby the most authoritative organ of the worldbody and admission of Palestine as a memberstate of the United Nations. And it enshrinestwo additional key principles: (1) that the pre-1967 armistice line should be the basis for fu-ture negotiations over borders, and (2) that east-ern Jerusalem be the capital of this Palestinianstate.

In his announcement of the draft resolu-tion, Riad Malki of the PA said, “Such recogni-tion would create political and legal pressureon Israel to withdraw its forces from the land ofanother state that is recognized within the ‘67borders by the international organization.”21 Itwould also have the effect of making easternJerusalem, where more than half the Jews inIsrael’s capital live, occupied territory, invali-dating the titles to their homes. It would give anew state of Palestine legal standing to seekindictment of Israel’s leaders before the Inter-national Criminal Court and to litigate a greatvariety of claims before the International Courtof Justice.

When Obama, Hillary Clinton, and Mitchellmade their several statements approving targetdates, they framed the goal in every case as datesby which bilateral direct negotiations betweenTel Aviv and the PA should be completed. It wasnot the administration’s intent to incur an obli-gation to support statehood by those dates ifthe negotiations did not occur, certainly not ifthe Palestinians themselves refused to negoti-ate. But since the onset of this administration,the Palestinians have in fact refused to engagein direct talks unless the Israeli governmentyielded to a precondition: that there be no con-struction of any homes for Jews in easternJerusalem nor anywhere on the West Bank. Thisis, as Clinton acknowledged, an unprecedentedprecondition. Israeli building on the West Bank,she said on October 31, 2009, has “always beenan issue within the negotiations. … There’snever been a precondition.”22

It was notthe Obamaadministration’sintent to supportstatehood bycertain dates ifnegotiations didnot occur.

17 Benjamin Netanyahu, press conference in Sderot, IsraelMinistry of Foreign Affairs, Jerusalem, Sept. 21, 2010.18 Barack Obama, remarks to the United Nations General As-sembly, New York, White House Press Office, Sept. 22, 2010.19 World Bulletin (Istanbul), Nov. 11, 2010.20 Ha’aretz (Tel Aviv), Jan. 10, 2011.

21 Ibid.22 Benjamin Netanyahu and Hillary Clinton, remarks in Jerusa-lem, U.S. State Department, Oct. 31, 2009.

/ 57Rosen: Palestinian Statehood Resolution

Since the start of the Obama administration, PA presidentMahmoud Abbas has refused to engage in direct talksbefore the stoppage of all Jewish construction activitiesin eastern Jerusalem and the West Bank, despite havingnegotiated with seven previous Israeli prime ministerswithout such preconditions.

In fact, Abbas himself ne-gotiated with seven previousIsraeli prime ministers withoutsuch preconditions. For seven-teen years—from the Madridconference of October 1991through Abbas’s discussionswith Israeli prime minister EhudOlmert, which ended in 2008—a subject of recent disclosuresby Al-Jazeera television—nego-tiations moved forward whileconstruction of homes for Jewsin eastern Jerusalem and theWest Bank continued. Madrid,Oslo I, Oslo II, the Hebron pro-tocol, the Wye River memoran-dum, Camp David, Taba, thedisengagement from Gaza, andOlmert’s offer to Abbas—allthese events over the course oftwo decades were made pos-sible by a continuing agreementto disagree about Israeli construction of Jewishhomes in Jewish neighborhoods outside the pre-1967 line in East Jerusalem.

But now, on Obama’s watch, the PA is re-fusing to negotiate. This is a direct violation ofthe commitment the Palestinians made at thestart of the Oslo process, which includedArafat’s pledge to Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabinon September 9, 1993, that the “PLO commitsitself to the Middle East peace process, and to apeaceful resolution of the conflict between thetwo sides, and declares that all outstanding is-sues relating to permanent status will be re-solved through negotiations.”23 It is also a di-rect violation of the pledge that Abbas himselfmade barely three years ago at the Annapolisconference, witnessed by the foreign ministersof fifty-seven countries: “We agree to immedi-ately launch good-faith bilateral negotiations ...vigorous, ongoing, and continuous negotia-

tions.”24 Yet the Obama administration has beenutterly silent about the Palestinian refusal tonegotiate, issuing not a single audible word ofcriticism.25

Obama has certainly not been reticent tocriticize what he sees as the failures on the Is-raeli side. On at least thirteen separate occa-sions, starting just weeks after Netanyahu tookoffice, he and his top officials have issuedsharply expressed objections to the building poli-cies of the Israeli government, often doing so inthe presence of the Israeli prime minister him-self. For example, on March 9, 2010, Vice Presi-dent Biden condemned “the decision by the gov-ernment of Israel to advance planning for newhousing units in East Jerusalem.”26 SecretaryClinton said, “The president was very clear

23 Exchange of letters between Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat,Sept. 9, 1993, MidEast Web archive.

24 Annapolis agreement, The Guardian (London), Nov. 27,2007.25 Steven J. Rosen, “Why Isn’t Obama Pressuring the Pales-tinians?” Foreign Policy, Jan. 4, 2011.26 Joseph R. Biden, Jr., statement in Jerusalem, White HousePress Office, Mar. 9, 2010.


27 Ahmed Ali Aboul Gheit, Egyptian foreign minister, andHillary Clinton, remarks in Washington, D.C., U.S. Depart-ment of State, May 27, 2009.28 “Mahmoud Abbas: I Reached Understandings with Olmerton Borders,” Middle East Media Research Institute, Washing-ton, D.C., Nov. 16, 2010; The Jerusalem Post, Jan. 22, 2011.

when Prime Minister Netanyahu was here. Hewants to see a stop to settlements ... That iswhat we have communicated very clearly ... Andwe intend to press that point.”27

Mahmoud Abbas has attributed the hard-ening of his own stand toward Israeli settle-

ments to the example setby Obama. “PresidentObama stated in Cairothat Israel must stop allconstruction activitiesin the settlements. Couldwe demand less thanthat?”28

The administrationdid not mean to producethis result. Obama’s en-voy, George Mitchell, ar-gued, “We do not be-

lieve in preconditions. And we urge others notto impose preconditions.” Despite this, to re-peat, neither Mitchell nor any other member of

Previousnegotiationsmoved forwardwhile constructionof homes forJews in easternJerusalemcontinued.

the Obama team has said anything pointedabout Abbas’s refusal to negotiate unless hispreconditions are met.

In February 2011, Abbas succeeded in put-ting Obama on the defensive at the U.N. Secu-rity Council by rejecting the administration’scompromise formula and forcing it to veto a Pal-estinian resolution condemning Israeli settle-ments as an obstacle to peace.29 In September2011, he will be going to the Security Council,daring the president to veto, and putting him inthe hot seat. A veto would not be received wellin the Muslim world, a key target of Obama’soutreach, which is why he is looking for av-enues for multilateral cooperation that wouldpreempt the need for unilateral measures likethe veto.30 And if Obama does nonetheless vetoa statehood resolution that has wide interna-tional support, he will be under pressure to off-set this with fresh gestures toward the Palestin-ians. Obama’s dilemma is that, either way, therefusal to negotiate will be rewarded. And ne-gotiation of the issues between the Palestin-ians and the Israelis will still be nowhere in sight.

29 BBC News, Feb. 18, 2011.30 Steven J. Rosen, “Will Obama Use His U.N. Veto?”Commentary, Sept. 2010.

Muslim Group: “Christmas Is Evil”London—Fanatics from a banned Islamic hate group have launched a nationwide poster campaign denouncingChristmas as evil. Organisers plan to put up thousands of placards around the UK claiming the season ofgoodwill is responsible for rape, teenage pregnancies, abortion, promiscuity, crime and pedophilia. They hopethe campaign will help “destroy Christmas” in this country and lead to Britons converting to Islam instead.

The placards feature an apparently festive scene with an image of the Star of Bethlehem over a Christmastree. But under a banner announcing “the evils of Christmas,” it features a message mocking the song the “12Days of Christmas.”

It reads: “On the first day of Christmas, my true love gave to me an STD [sexually transmitted disease].“On the second day, debt, on the third rape, the fourth teenage pregnancies, and then there was abortion.”According to the posters, Christmas is also responsible for paganism, domestic violence, homelessness,

vandalism, alcohol and drugs. Another offence of Christmas, it proclaims, is “claiming God has a son.”Daily Mail, Dec. 23, 2010

/ 59 Schenker: Syrian Terrorism

Damascus on Trialby David Schenker

In September 2008, the U.S. Federal Court in Washington, D.C., rendered a $413million civil judgment against the government of Syria for its provision of support andmaterial aid to the killers of two American contractors in Iraq.1 Syria’s appeal is

pending, but should it lose, the victims’ families will undoubtedly endeavor to attachSyrian assets in the United States and abroad.

Until now, with the exception of sanctions, financial designations, and periodic cross-border direct action, Washington has imposed little cost on Damascus for its consistentsupport for terrorist attacks in Iraq since the 2003 war. And while the financial implica-tions of this court verdict are unlikely to change Damascus’s standing support for terror-ism, it will impose an unprecedented price on Bashar al-Assad’s increasingly recklessregime.

David Schenker, the Aufzien fellow and directorof the Program on Arab Politics at the Washing-ton Institute for Near East Policy, previouslyserved as the Pentagon’s top policy aide on theArab countries of the Levant.

SUPPORT FOR THE INSURGENCY

In December 2010, U.S. counterterrorismofficials reported an uptick in the number of in-surgents entering Iraq via Syria.2 It was the mostsignificant reference to a Syrian role in the move-ment of jihadists since December 2009 when Iraqiprime minister Nouri al-Maliki blamed Damascusfor car bomb attacks that killed more than onehundred in Baghdad. But it was only the latestin a long series of U.S. complaints about Syrianprovision of support to Iraqi insurgents, a de-velopment that started even prior to the 2003U.S.-led invasion. Indeed, as Washington wassurging troops to the region in 2003 in prepara-tion for the blitz on Baghdad, Damascus wasdeploying its own counter-force to fight theAmericans.

In the months leading up to the invasion,the Assad regime allowed the establishment ofan office across the street from the U.S. embassyin Damascus where insurgent hopefuls couldsign up and get on a bus to Baghdad for theopportunity to repel the invaders.3 While bra-zen, Damascus’s support and encouragement forWashington’s enemies in Iraq came as little sur-prise. From the very start, Syria made no secretof its intent to undermine the U.S. invasion. Justdays after the start of military operations, forexample, then-Syrian foreign minister FarouqShara publicly announced that “Syria’s interestis to see the invaders defeated in Iraq.”4

The defeat of the U.S. project in Iraq was aninterest Damascus shared with Tehran. So muchso that, according to then-Syrian vice presidentAbdel Halim Khaddam, on the eve of the inva-sion, the two countries forged an agreement toencourage “resistance” against U.S. forces in Iraq.5

1 Associated Press, Oct. 3, 2008.2 Ibid., Dec. 5, 2010.3 David Schenker, testimony in Francis Gates, et al. v. SyrianArab Republic, et al., U.S. District Court for the District ofColumbia, Civil Action No. 06-1500 (RMC), Sept. 2008.4 BBC News, Apr. 1, 2003.


The Assad regime also took other steps in-cluding recruiting local staff—such as the Aleppo-based militant Islamist cleric Abu al-Qaqa—to helporganize the infiltrations across Syrian territory.6To ensure that these dangerous Islamists did

not plant domestic rootsthat might threaten theAssad regime, Syria’s se-curity apparatus appar-ently documented thepresence of these killers.Then-deputy secretary ofdefense Paul Wolfowitzdisplayed some of theevidence of this officialSyrian complicity duringtestimony before theSenate Armed Services

Committee in September 2003.Holding up passports belonging to foreign

fighters encountered by U.S. forces in Iraq,Wolfowitz said,

A foreigner who came into Iraq on March 24th

through Syria—not a Syrian, but throughSyria. The entry permit on his passport saidhe came to, quote, “volunteer for jihad.”Here’s another one, came into Iraq throughSyria—same crossing point. The entry per-mit said, “to join the Arab volunteers.” Andhere’s a third one that came in on April 7th. 7

Wolfowitz’s statements were subsequentlyaugmented by those of a dozen or so U.S. Cen-tral Command (CENTCOM) flag officers, also fo-cusing on the movement of jihadists throughSyrian territory and Assad regime complicity inthe endeavor. In March 2007, for example,CENTCOM revealed that training camps hadbeen established on Syrian territory for Iraqi andforeign fighters.8

The most prominent of these statements,however, was issued by then-U.S. commanderin Iraq Gen. David Petraeus, who during testi-mony to Congress on September 10, 2007, pre-sented maps illustrating Syria’s pivotal role asthe source of foreign fighters entering Iraq.9 Onlya week earlier, during an interview with al-Watanal-Arabi, the general described how Syria al-lowed thousands of insurgents to arrive at Dam-ascus International Airport and then cross theIraqi border.10 These foreign fighters, he ex-plained, supplied the main manpower pool forthe majority of suicide bombings in Iraq. Thatsame month, the centrality of Syria to the insur-gency was corroborated by the Sinjar docu-ments, a trove of al-Qaeda materials captured byU.S. forces in Iraq.11

Syrian conduct during the war—in particu-lar the state’s burgeoning support for and toler-ance of al-Qaeda’s transit—came as a surpriseto many. After all, following September 11, 2001,Damascus provided intelligence on al-Qaeda toWashington that helped save American lives.But Syria was playing a double game by sup-porting terrorists moving to Iraq while simulta-neously supplying information on future at-tacks—outside of the Middle East—to Wash-ington. Damascus hoped this would purchaseimmunity, but the gambit failed. After Secretaryof Defense Donald Rumsfeld accused Syria inMarch 2003 of providing night vision gogglesto Saddam and declared that Washington would“consider such trafficking as hostile acts and[would] hold the Syrian government account-able for such shipments,”12 Damascus cut offthe intelligence sharing.

As a Syrian foreign ministry official con-fided to New Yorker correspondent Seymour

5 Author interview with Abdel Halim Khaddam, Paris, Nov.10, 2008.6 Sami Moubayed, “The Islamic Revival in Syria,” MideastMonitor, Sept.-Oct. 2006.7 Paul Wolfowitz, deputy secretary of defense, presentationbefore the Senate Committee on Armed Services, Washington,D.C., Sept. 9, 2003.8 ABC News, The Blotter, Mar. 22, 2007.

Syria supportedterrorists movingto Iraq whilesupplyinginformation onattacks outsidethe Middle East.

9 “Charts to Accompany the Testimony of Gen. David Petraeus,”Multi-National Force-Iraq, Sept. 10-11, 2010.10 Al-Watan al-Arabi (Riyadh), Aug. 29, 2007. Excerpts fromGen. Petraeus’s interview in al-Watan al-Arabi, Tony Badran,trans., Sept. 4, 2007.11 For full English translations, see “Personal Information forForeign Fighters,” Harmony Project, Combating Terrorism Cen-ter, West Point, accessed Jan. 18, 2011.12 Donald Rumsfeld and Gen. Richard Myers, Pentagon brief-ing, Washington, D.C., Mar. 28, 2003.

/ 61

Hersh, if Washington had agreed to dis-cuss these issues in a back channel, theintelligence sharing might have continued.“But when you publicly try to humiliate acountry,” he said, “it’ll become stubborn.”13

While Damascus sought to blame Wash-ington for the breakdown of the channel,by the time the cooperation had ceased,Syria had been actively facilitating themovement of jihadists into Iraq for months.In addition to killing U.S. soldiers and inno-cent Iraqi civilians, these insurgents alsocaptured and killed dozens of U.S. civiliansworking in Iraq.

THE CASE AGAINST DAMASCUS

Two of those American contractors ex-ecuted by al-Qaeda in Iraq were Olin Eu-gene “Jack” Armstrong and Jack Hensley.In 2004, Thailand resident Armstrong andHensley, who was based in Marietta, Geor-gia, were employed as contract managersby private construction subcontractors inIraq. The two were kidnapped from their resi-dential housing in Iraq on September 16 ofthat year. On September 20 and 21 respec-tively, videos documenting the gruesomebeheadings of Armstrong and Hensley wereposted on an online web forum associated withal-Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi.14

Remains of the victims were found in Baghdadsoon after.

In August 2006, the families of Armstrongand Hensley brought a civil action against thegovernment of Syria, President Bashar al-Assad,Syrian military intelligence, and its director, AssifShawkat. The action, launched by the estates ofArmstrong and Hensley—under the name ofestate administrator Francis Gates—alleged thatDamascus “provided material support and re-

sources” to al-Qaeda in Iraq and sought eco-nomic damages, compensation for grief, pain,and suffering, and punitive damages arising fromtheir deaths.15

A three-day evidentiary hearing was heldin January 2008 to establish the facts of thecase. Four American expert witnesses testifiedhow Syria facilitated the movement of jihadiststo Iraq, how the Assad regime provided sup-port and sanctuary to the Zarqawi network,and how the regime—and specifically thepresident and his brother-in-law, military intel-ligence chief Shawkat—were aware of the ac-

Schenker: Syrian Terrorism

In the months leading up to the 2003 U.S.-ledinvasion of Iraq, Syrian president Bashar al-Assad (right), here with fallen Egyptian presidentHusni Mubarak, Cairo, November 3, 2009,allowed insurgent hopefuls to sign up and geton a bus to Baghdad for the opportunity to repelthe coalition forces. As the turmoil in Iraqincreased in the ensuing years, vast numbers ofal-Qaeda terrorists and other insurgents wereallowed to cross from Syria into Iraq.

13 Seymour Hersh, “The Syrian Bet,” The New Yorker, July28, 2003.14 Fox News, Sept. 22, 2004. 15 Francis Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic.


tivities of Zarqawi and al-Qaeda.16 The govern-ment of Syria neither answered the suit nor ap-peared in court.

On September 26, 2008, the U.S. DistrictCourt for the District of Columbia issued itsmemorandum opinion. In her ruling, Judge Rose-mary Collyer wrote,

Plaintiffs proved, by evidence satisfactoryto the Court, that Syria provided substantialassistance to Zarqawi and al-Qaeda in Iraqand that this led to the deaths by beheadingof Jack Armstrong and Jack Hensley. … Theevidence shows that Syria supported, pro-tected, harbored, and subsidized a terroristgroup whose modus operandi was the target-ing, brutalization, and murder of Americanand Iraqi citizens.17

Most importantly, in her ruling, Judge Collyer

concluded that consistent with precedent,Damascus could in fact be held liable fordamages pursuant to the Foreign Sover-eign Immunities Act (FSIA).18 Under theinternational principle of sovereign immu-nity, U.S. courts have no jurisdiction overforeign states aside from certain enumer-ated exceptions codified by a U.S. federalstatute in the act. Cases of state-sponsoredterrorism are one exception. As of January28, 2008, U.S. law “waives sovereign im-munity for states that sponsor terrorismand provides a private right of actionagainst such states.”19 Because Assad andShawkat were not individually served withthe action, the court ruled that they wouldnot be defendants.

Based on this ruling, the court awardeddamages requested by the Armstrong andHensley estates. In terms of economic dam-ages—lost income incurred by prematuredeath—the compensation was relativelylow, slightly over $1 million each. However,the especially cruel and prolonged tech-

nique of execution—and the resultant suffer-ing of the victims and surviving family mem-bers—produced substantial damages awards.Most significant were the pain and sufferingand punitive damages, which were especiallyhigh “in hopes that [these] substantial awardswill deter further Syrian sponsorship of terror-ists.”20 The court awarded to each family $50million for pain and suffering, and $150 millionfor punitive damages. All told, the civil judg-ment against Syria totaled $413,909,587.

THE SYRIAN LINE OF DEFENSE

Although the mammoth judgment did notget much attention in the U.S. media, Damascus

On September 26, 2008, the U.S. District Courtfor the District of Columbia ruled that Syria“supported, protected, harbored, and subsi-dized” the Iraq-based terrorist group headedby Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, thus being culpablefor the beheading of two U.S. contractors bythis group.

16 Ibid., testimony by David Schenker and Matthew Levitt,Washington Institute for Near East Policy; Evan Kohlmann,NEFA Foundation; Marius Deeb, professor, Johns HopkinsSchool of Advanced International Studies.17 Ibid.

18 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a), 1605A.19 Francis Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic. The languageappears in the Defense Authorization Act for FY2008, PublicLaw No. 100-181, 122 Stat. 3, 338-344 (2008).20 Ibid.

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clearly took note of the award.21 On October24, 2008—less than a month after the initial rul-ing—it filed a notice of appeal. In its effort tooverturn the ruling, the government of Syriaengaged Johnson administration attorney gen-eral Ramsey Clark as its counsel.22

Retention of Clark by the Assad regime wasnot very surprising. Clark has a prodigiousrecord of defending publicly reviled individualsand causes. His clientele list is a veritable “Who’sWho” of dictators and perpetrators of genocidethat includes Radovan Karadzic, SlobodanMilosevic, Saddam Hussein, and ElizaphanNtakirutimana (first member of the clergy to beconvicted of genocide by the International Crimi-nal Tribunal for Rwanda). Perhaps of more rel-evance to this case, in the early 1990s, Clark de-fended the Palestine Liberation Organization inthe suit brought by the family of the murderedAmerican Leon Klinghoffer.

The appeal motion did not address the alle-gations of Syrian material support to terroristswho killed Americans. Rather, it centered largelyon two jurisdictional matters. The first of Syria’sarguments was that the case should be dismissedbecause “no service of process has been deliv-ered by DHL [international delivery company]to Syria and no legally sufficient showing of ser-vice of process has been made.” Indeed, accord-ing to the appeal brief, the signature document-ing receipt by the Foreign Ministry in Damascusof the package alerting Syria of the legal action“could have been photocopied from an earliersignature … and could readily have been theproduct of manipulation and falsification.” In anyevent, the brief continued, DHL is unreliable and“the Internet is rife with anguished, indignantcomplaints by DHL customers.”23

Damascus conceded that “Essam” was infact the name of the person who typically signsfor packages at the Foreign Ministry, but it main-

tained that DHL perpetrated fraud to cover-upincompetence and that the government of Syriawas never aware of the suit. While Syria’s DHLconspiracy theory was entertaining, indicationssuggest the court will not find the explanationcompelling.

More interesting was Clark’s second argu-ment as to why the case should have been dis-missed or remanded tothe district court. Syriaargued that the terrorismexception to sovereignimmunity that allowedthe action to be broughtwas unconstitutional“because it gives the Ex-ecutive and Legislativebranches incentive andopportunity … to misusethe exception to deny equal sovereignty for po-litical purposes.”24 Most recently, the briefnoted, these branches terminated cases and un-dermined the judiciary’s independence with re-gard to Libya.

In addition to expressing concerns aboutpreservation of balance of powers in the UnitedStates, Syria argued that by singling out the state,the suit violated article II of the U.N. charter,which, Syria said, establishes the principle of “sov-ereign equality of all [U.N.] Members.” “By forceof the U.S. Secretary’s designation [of Syria as astate sponsor of terrorism],” the brief laments,Syria is “deprived of its fundamental right of equalsovereignty.”25

Worse, the brief continued, the enormousjudgment—which Syria described as “economicwarfare”—would only “further inflame anti-American passions [and] invite retaliation.”

The near half a billion dollars in damages andpenalties assessed against Syria for the deathsof two Americans in this case … can only fillSyrians and most of the rest of the worldwith wonder at the monetary demands U.S.laws place on American deaths and America’s

Schenker: Syrian Terrorism

21 Reports of the judgment appeared in Naharnet News Desk(Beirut), Oct. 5, 2008; Tayyar al-Mustaqbal website, Oct. 5,2008.22 Now Lebanon (Beirut), Dec. 21, 2008.23 Corrected Brief of the Syrian Arab Republic, U.S. DistrictCourt of Appeals for the District of Columbia, Aug. 31, 2010.

24 Ibid.25 Ibid.

The Assad regimeargued thatthe judgmentwould result inArabs hatingAmericans more.


non-accountability for the lives it takes. Witha gross domestic product per capita of $7,000,it would take 30,000 years for the averageSyrian to earn the sum awarded for the deathof one American in this case.26

In short, the Assad regime argued that themammoth judgment leveled against Syria by theU.S. District Court with the expressed purpose ofnot letting “depraved lawlessness go unremarkedand without consequence” will only result in Ar-abs hating Americans more.27 Consistent with thelong-standing Damascus modus operandi, Syria’slawyers essentially threaten violence against theUnited States unless the initial verdict is reversed.

PRECEDENTS

Notwithstanding the seeming novelty of thedefense’s strategy—attacking the constitution-

ality of the Foreign SovereignImmunity Act exception forstate sponsors of terrorism—Damascus and Clark are em-ploying this tack in othercases. During another recentcivil action, two Americanstaken hostage in 1988 by theSyrian-supported KurdistanWorkers Party (PKK) soughtdamages against Damascusfor its provision of materialsupport to the terrorist orga-nization.28 In this case, too,the U.S. District Court for theDistrict of Columbia did notaccept Damascus’s argumentthat the terrorism exceptionwas unconstitutional.

At the time of publication,the appeal verdict was pend-ing, but judgments in severalprevious cases suggest thatthe Court of Appeals will af-

firm precedent and deny Syria’s argument thatthe FSIA exception is unconstitutional, just as ithas previously found that the U.N. charter isnot self-executing and has no jurisdiction in U.S.courts.

Syria is only the latest state to be held ac-countable in U.S. courts for its role in killingAmericans. Most famously, in 1998, the familyof Alisa Flatow, who was killed in a bus bombingperpetrated by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, wona $247 million award from the group’s Iraniansponsors. But significant judgments have alsobeen rendered against Tehran for kidnappings,tortures, and murders perpetrated in Lebanonby its client Hezbollah and in Israel by Hamas.In 1997 and 2010, nearly $4 billion in civil judg-ments were rendered against Iran in U.S. courtsby the victims of the 1983 Marine barracks bomb-ing in Lebanon. Likewise, in 2007, U.S. courtsawarded $6 billion to six American families and

In its effort to overturn the court ruling, the government ofSyria engaged Johnson administration attorney generalRamsey Clark as counsel. Clark has a prodigious record ofdefending publicly reviled individuals and causes. In the early1990s, Clark defended the Palestine Liberation Organizationin the suit brought by the family of the murdered AmericanLeon Klinghoffer. Here Clark (left) meets with Hamas’s IsmailHaneya (right) in Gaza City, January 5, 2011.

26 Ibid.27 Francis Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic.

28 See Mary Nell Wyatt, et al v. Syrian Arab Republic, et al,Civil Action No. 08-0502, U.S. District Court of Appeals forthe District of Columbia, Sept. 8, 2010.

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UTA airlines after Libya was found responsiblefor downing Flight 772 by a bomb over Niger in1989. Ultimately, the UTA settlement was foldedinto the $1.5 billion fund established by Libya in2008 to compensate Lockerbie, La Belle, and allother pending terrorism claims against Libya.29

While these astronomical figures wouldoptimally constitute a deterrent for terrorist re-gimes, regrettably they have not proven effec-tive. The problem, obviously, is that the judg-ments are exceedingly difficult to collect. After a$1.3 billion judgment was levied against Iran in2010, U.S. District Court Judge Royce C.Lamberth calculated that more than $9 billion inuncollected torts had been ordered againstTehran, a sum that made the money a “meaning-less charade.”30 Federal courts have frozen someIranian funds, including a $2 billion account atCitibank.31 Still other victims of Iran havesought, thus far unsuccessfully, to attach an-cient Iranian artifacts in Chicago museums.32

As with Iran, wresting assets from Syria tosatisfy the awards to the Armstrong and Hensleyfamilies will also prove a challenge. Damascushas relatively few assets in the United States,and diplomatic property is inviolable. Still, attor-ney Steven Perles, who represented the fami-lies, remains optimistic. To date, according tohis assessment, he has recovered some $70-$75million in frozen Iranian assets for his clients.33

And should the verdict be upheld, he says heintends to focus on Syrian assets in Europe“where a number of countries recognize com-pensatory [if not punitive] damages from Ameri-can courts.” While compensation remains a dis-tant prospect, as long as these judgments arepending—if Iran is any example—it may becomeincreasingly difficult for Damascus to do busi-ness in Europe.

In any event, it is increasingly clear thatbecause the Assad regime has contributed to so

many American deaths in Iraq and elsewhere inthe region, this lawsuit is sure to generate doz-ens more. Indeed, Perles himself has pledged to“financially pound the Syrians until they do what[Libyan leader] Qaddafi did and compensate thefamilies for the deaths of their loved ones.”34

More suits against Damascus await.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The $413 million civil judgment representsthe latest in a growing series of irritants in theU.S.-Syrian relationship. Since 1979, when Syriawas added as an inaugural member of the StateDepartment list of state sponsors of terrorism,U.S. relations with Damascus have never beengood. Nevertheless, despite the pariah moniker,over time, relations between Washington andthe terrorist state reached a condition of nor-malcy. This persisted until the Bush-era deterio-ration triggered by Syr-ian provision of assis-tance to insurgents inIraq and the subsequentassassination of formerLebanese premier RafiqHariri in 2005, a murderwidely believed to havea Syrian connection.

Despite the Obamaadministration’s sincereefforts to reset the rela-tionship, improve the ties via a more active pro-gram of diplomatic engagement, and split Syriafrom its 30-year strategic relationship with Iran,over the first two years of this presidency, thebilateral dynamic has only gotten worse. Since2010, Washington has watched Syrian supportfor terrorism and meddling in Lebanon increase.Meanwhile, Assad regime coordination withTehran appears to be on the upswing.

An early item on President Obama’s agendawas the appointment of a new ambassador to

29 CNN, Nov. 21, 2008.30 ABC News, The Blotter, Apr. 3, 2010.31 The Wall Street Journal, Dec. 12, 2009.32 See Daniel Pipes, “The University of Chicago vs. Victimsof Terror,” Lion’s Den Blog, June 28, 2006.33 Fulton County Daily Report (Atlanta), Oct. 13, 2008.

34 Author interview with Steven Perles, Washington, D.C.,Jan. 10, 2011.

As long as theseU.S. judgmentsare pending, itmay be difficultfor Damascusto do businessin Europe.


Damascus, a post that had been vacant sincethe Hariri killing. In February 2010, Robert Fordwas appointed to the post, but his confirmationwas scuttled when President Assad hosted Iran’spresident Mahmoud Ahmedinejad andHezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah for a trilat-eral meeting in Damascus on February 26.35

Ford was given a recess appointment at theend of 2010 congressional term and was dis-patched to Syria in January 2011.36 But it is un-clear what he will be able to accomplish. In theface of two years of good will gestures by theObama administration, Syria has provided in-creasingly lethal and destabilizing support toHezbollah, believed to include SCUD and/orFatah 110 missiles, and perhaps game-changingMANPAD systems, which can target Israeli F-16s over Lebanon. In addition to providing on-going training to Hamas in Syria, recently re-leased State Department cables suggest the pres-ence of Hezbollah military facilities on Syriansoil.37 At the same time, Damascus continues itspolicy of noncooperation with the International

35 Ha’aretz (Tel Aviv), Feb. 26, 2010.36 The Washington Post, Dec. 29, 2010.37 “Is Now the Time to Raise Hizballah with Syria?” USEMBDamascus Cable, Nov. 19, 2009, released by WikiLeaks, Dec.6, 2010.

Atomic Energy Agency investigation of theNorth Korean nuclear facility in al-Kibar de-stroyed by Israel in 2007.38 Finally, the humanrights situation in Syria remains appalling andshows no signs of improving.39

This $413 million judgment joins the peren-nial catalogue of U.S.-Syrian issues for discus-sion. And although it is unlikely to become apriority issue, the outstanding award does servean important purpose on the list. For unlike theother items—which pose a concern for regionalstability and a threat to regional friends—thepending damages highlight that Syria’s behav-ior is not just a problem for other states but forWashington. While it is possible that this Syr-ian obligation will ultimately be met through aLibya-style arrangement where the Assad regimejettisons its support for terrorism, ends its questfor nuclear weapons, and changes its strategicorientation in exchange for a rapprochementwith Washington, this kind of deal remains adistant hope at best. In the meantime, the Gatesv. Syria verdict is a useful reminder that Syriansupport for terrorism kills Americans.

38 Der Spiegel (Hamburg), Feb. 11, 2009.39 “Syria–Amnesty International Report 2010,” Amnesty In-ternational, London, accessed Jan. 19, 2011.

Syria Orchestrated Muhammad Cartoon RiotsThe government of Syria was active in organizing the 2006 riots that erupted across the Arab worldfollowing the publication of controversial cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad, Oslo daily Aftenpostenreported Monday, quoting U.S. diplomatic cables released by WikiLeaks.

The cartoons were originally published in neighboring Denmark in 2005. Their publication resultedin violent protests, including attacks on several embassies in Damascus in early February 2006. Embas-sies targeted included those of Norway, Denmark, and Sweden.

A U.S. diplomatic cable published by Aftenposten said the Syrian premier had “several days beforethe demonstrations, instructed the Grand Mufti Sheikh Hassoun to issue a strongly worded directive tothe imams delivering Friday sermons in the mosques of Damascus.”

The riots ended when Syria “felt that ‘the message had been delivered,’” the cable said, quoting aSunni sheikh whose name was blacked out. The incident resulted in the evacuation of Norwegian diplo-mats and demands for compensation.

Ha’aretz, Dec. 27, 2010

/ 67 Yemini: NGOs against Israel

NGOs vs. Israelby Ben-Dror Yemini

On January 5, 2011, after months of heated public debate, the Israeli Knesset established a parliamentary committee of inquiry to probe foreign funding of Israeli nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) involved in the international

Israel delegitimization campaign.1 Was this a draconian, McCarthyist encroachment onthe freedom of press as claimed by left-wing groups and politicians, or a legitimateattempt by a besieged democracy to fend off hostile intervention in its internal affairs asargued by the legislation’s proponents?

Ben-Dror Yemini is the opinion-editor of theIsraeli daily Maariv.

INTERNATIONAL OBSESSION

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has histori-cally attracted extraordinary, and largely dispro-portionate, international attention. Not becauseof its ferocity: The number of Palestinians killedby Israelis (and vice versa) over the past six de-cades is probably smaller than the 9,000 MuslimBosnians massacred in Srebrenica in July 1995by their Serb and Croatian compatriots2 and de-cidedly smaller than the death toll from otherconflicts throughout the globe that range in thehundreds of thousands if not millions.3

Nor has this obsession been driven by hu-manitarian considerations. Not only is the GazaStrip not in the throes of a deep crisis, but thehumanitarian situation there is better than insome of the countries whose ships have beensent on occasion to break “the siege” of Gaza.Infant mortality in the Gaza Strip, for example, is17.71 per thousand births compared to Turkey’s24.84 or the global average of 444; life expect-ancy in Turkey is 72.23 years whereas in Gaza itis 73.68, much higher than the global average of

66.12, not to mention such Arab or Islamic coun-tries as Yemen (63.36), Sudan (52.52), or Somalia(50).5 Even by more advanced indicators, suchas personal computer use or Internet access,Gazans are in a much better position than manyof the world’s inhabitants.6 In the words of theSlovenian philosopher Slavoj Zizek, no Israel-lover by any stretch of imagination, “an averageCongolese citizen would probably have sold hismother into slavery to be able to move to theWest Bank.”7

But whatever its underlying causes, the in-tense international meddling in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, whether by governments or byNGOs, has become a major obstacle to the peace-ful resolution of this century-long feud.

1 The Jerusalem Post, Jan. 5, 2011; BBC News, Jan. 19, 2011.2 The New York Times, Nov. 11, 2004.3 This has also applied to the wider conflict between Israel andthe Arab states. See Gunnar Heinsohn and Daniel Pipes, “Arab-Israeli Fatalities Rank 49th,” FrontPage Magazine, Oct. 8,2007.4 “Infant Mortality Rate,” The World Factbook 2011, CentralIntelligence Agency (CIA), McLean, Va., accessed Feb. 8, 2011.5 “Life Expectancy at Birth,” The World Factbook 2011, CIA,accessed Feb. 8, 2011.6 “Internet Users,” The World Factbook 2011, CIA, accessedFeb. 8, 2011.7 “Violence and Left in Dark Times: Bernard-Henri-Levy andSlavoj Zizek,” Intelligence2: The World of Debate, Sept. 16,2008.


RIGHTS DEFENDERS OR PEACE AVERTERS?

The two-state solution—Israel plus a Pal-estinian state in most of the West Bank and theGaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital—has long been identified by the majority of theinternational community, or at least by the West,as the key to Arab-Israeli peace. In these cir-cumstances, one would expect the internationalcommunity to help remove the main obstaclesbetween the two sides by allaying Israel’s se-curity fears and by devising economic and de-mographic proposals for the resolution of thePalestinian refugee problem. Yet an examinationof the international intervention in the conflictreveals a highly disturbing pattern: The greaterthe intervention, the more both sides harden,not moderate, their positions. Rather than fa-cilitating peace and reconciliation, the interna-tional funds invested in the conflict have pro-duced an organizational and ideological infra-

structure that inhibits the chances for a futureagreement.

More specifically, the European Union asa whole and the European states individuallyfinance a long list of associations dealing withthe Palestinian-Israeli conflict that are part ofa wider conglomerate seeking to perpetuatethe conflict.8 The political discourse has fun-damentally changed, and this is no longer theera of peace organizations but rather that ofhuman rights organizations, many of which aredeeply involved in protecting Palestinian“rights.”

Granted, there are Palestinian rights thatdeserve support and protection. But there arejust as many false claims for rights that are de-signed to harm Israel and prevent reconcilia-tion rather than improve the Palestinian condi-tion. Foremost among them is “the right of re-turn”—the standard Arab and Palestinian eu-phemism for Israel’s destruction through de-mographic subversion. For example, in an in-ternal meeting in March 2009, Palestinian Au-thority (PA) president Mahmoud Abbas ac-knowledged that the repatriation of even onemillion Palestinian refugees “would mean the

end of Israel.”9 In fact, there is no such right. Itdoes not exist; nor has it been recognized orimplemented on the political level virtually any-where in the world, and certainly not as a tool todestroy an existing nation-state. Only last year,the European Court of Human Rights ruledagainst a Greek demand for a “right to return” tothe Turkish part of Cyprus stating that there isno such absolute right.10 But this does not pre-vent many groups from cultivating this destruc-tive fantasy.

For argument’s sake, imagine that the inter-national community convinces Israeli prime min-ister Benjamin Netanyahu and PA presidentAbbas to return to the negotiations table, and

8 Steven J. Rosen, “The Arab Lobby: The European Compo-nent,” Middle East Quarterly, Fall 2010, pp. 17-32.9 The Jerusalem Post, Jan. 24, 2011; see, also, Saeb Erekat,“The Returning Issue of Palestine’s Refugees,” The Guardian(London), Dec. 10, 2010.10 Demopoulos v. Turkey, European Court of Human Rights,Strasbourg, France, Mar. 1, 2010.

The Dutch government funds the radicalwebsite The Electronic Intifada, whosecofounder Ali Abunimah considers PA presi-dent Abbas a “collaborator” and advocatedthe “one state solution”—the replacementof Israel by an Arab and Muslim state in whichJews would be reduced to a permanent min-ority as dhimmis.

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that news of an agreement leaks out. The broadcontours of such an agreement would presum-ably be along the principles laid down by Presi-dent Bill Clinton in December 2000 (about 95percent of the West Bank given to the Palestin-ians with Israeli compensation in kind for an-nexed territories; Jerusalem partitioned on ademographic basis; no return of refugees toIsrael with the problem solved by an interna-tional effort) or the not-so-different Ehud Olmertproposals at the 2007 Annapolis summit, mostof which were apparently accepted by the Pal-estinian leadership in the ensuing negotiations.11

Would this breakthrough be welcomed bythese NGOs? Hardly. A significant number ofhuman rights groups will do precisely what theyhave been doing in previous years: They willconduct an international campaign against theagreement claiming it “fails to address the ba-sic rights of the Palestinian people,” first andforemost, the “right of return.”

These groups are part of a new empire—an empire comprised of official, internationalbodies such as the Human Rights Council ofthe United Nations in Geneva, the U.N. GeneralAssembly, and the many “human rights”groups that voice a similar position. The auto-matic majority bloc of nondemocratic states ininternational bodies is a sad testament to thestate of the world community; the identificationof human rights organizations with this dark ma-jority is a tragedy for world human rights. Thereis little discussion of the lack of human rights insuch brutal dictatorships as Syria or Libya; butthere is a disproportionate focus on Israel bythese bodies,12 which in turn creates the falseimpression that Israel, and not such states asSudan or Iran (or North Korea for that matter), isthe foremost threat to world peace.

How has this come to pass? The West fi-nances an extensive network of NGOs with fund-ing often going to projects feigning defense of

human rights. In reality, the absolute majority ofthese groups has a radical, political agenda,which at times is not only anti-Israel or anti-Zi-onist but also anti-West.13 There are many inthe West who hope that a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict will help resolve the wider con-flict between East and West. This is an illusion.The Afghan and Pakistani Taliban or al-Qaedaterrorists would have difficulty finding Israel onthe map.

REJECTIONIST NETWORK

The EU supports dozens of Israeli groupsdealing with the conflict, but only a handful ofthese deal with the conflict’s political dimension,

Yemini: NGOs against Israel

Omar Barghouti is a Palestinian doctoralstudent at Tel Aviv University and aprominent activist in the anti-Israel BDS(Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions)movement. Despite lip service to humanrights, the driving force behind the movementis rejection of the two-state solution andcastigation of any Israeli-Palestiniancooperation or Palestinian concessions forthe sake of peace.

11 Ha’aretz (Tel Aviv), Jan. 24, 2011.12 See, for instance, Bat Ye’or, “Delegitimizing the JewishState,” Middle East Quarterly, Winter 2011, pp. 3-14. It wasonly on January 26, 2011, after Mu‘ammar al-Qadhafi had beenslaughtering his subjects in full view of the world for some time,that Libya was expelled from the U.N. Human Rights Council.

13 Gerald M. Steinberg, “NGOs Make War on Israel,” MiddleEast Quarterly, Summer 2004, pp. 13-25.

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notably the Israeli group Peace Now and theIsraeli-Palestinian Geneva Initiative, both ofwhich support the two-state solution. By con-trast, there are numerous groups that, while pay-ing lip service to the two-state solution, rejectIsrael’s right to exist.

Consider the Israeli-Arab groups Adalah14

and Mossawa15—both of which are openly op-posed to Israel’s existence as a Jewish state—that is to its very existence—and support the“right of return.” Or consider the Israeli Com-mittee against House Demolitions, headed byJeff Halper, who roams the world lambasting notonly Israel but also “global capitalism.” He hasgone so far as to deride the 2002 Saudi peaceproposal as an attempt “to placate the Arabstreet” and to accuse Arab leaders of seek-ing Israel’s regional hegemony in order totighten their grip over their oppressed masses.16

The anti-Israel campaign has hardly been motivated byhumanitarian considerations. Not only is the Gaza Stripnot in the throes of a deep crisis, but the humanitariansituation there is better than in some of the countries,notably Turkey, whose ships have been sent on occasion tobreak “the siege” of Gaza. Here, pro-Palestinian Turkishdemonstrators welcome a ship back to Istanbul from a Gaza-bound flotilla.

Furthermore, the Israeli Commit-tee against House Demolitionspublicly supports the “right of re-turn” and the total boycotting ofIsrael. Yet this radical group is fi-nanced by the EU to the tune of€169,661 (US$232,198, for theyears 2010-12).17

On the Palestinian side, theDutch government funds themilitant website The ElectronicIntifada,18 whose cofounder AliAbunimah considers PA presi-dent Abbas a “collaborator.” Notsurprisingly, Abunimah is fiercelyopposed to the peace process,subscribing instead to the “onestate solution”19—the replace-ment of Israel by an Arab andMuslim state in which Jewswould be reduced to a permanentminority as dhimmis, historicallyaccorded a legally and socially in-ferior existence in Islam.

Likewise, the Ramallah-based Palestinian group al-Haq receives sup-port from the Swedish, Dutch, and Canadiangovernments,20 presumably to bolster its formalhuman rights agenda. Yet this organization isopenly committed to the “right of return,”21 asis the Ramallah-based, Palestinian-run NGO De-velopment Center. Funded by the World Bank

14 “Adalah,” NGO Monitor, Jerusalem, accessed Feb. 8, 2011.15 “About Mossawa,” Mossawa, Haifa, accessed Feb. 8, 2011.

16 Jeff Halper, “A Just Street or Apartheid?” Counterpunch,May 3, 2007; YouTube, “Peace in the Middle East: Jeff Halperspeaks at UCI, Part 3 of 8,” accessed Feb. 9, 2011.17 “Why BDS?” The Israeli Committee against House Demo-lition, Jerusalem, accessed Feb. 9, 2011; “Projects: Home Demo-litions and the Law,” Delegation of the European Union toIsrael, Ramat Gan, accessed Feb. 9, 2011.18 “Vragen en Antwoorden over Partnerorganisatie ElectronicIntifada,” Interchurch Organisation for Development Coopera-tion (ICCO), Utrecht, Netherlands, accessed Feb. 9, 2011.19 Ali Abunimah, “Why Israel Won’t Survive,” The Elec-tronic Intifada, Jan. 19, 2009; “One Country: A New Book fromEI Cofounder Ali Abunimah,” The Electronic Intifada, accessedFeb. 9, 2011.20 “Donors for 2005/2006,” al-Haq, Ramallah, accessed Feb.9, 2011.21 “A Joint Open Letter to the Member States of the UNGeneral Assembly from Palestinian Human Rights Organiza-tions,” al-Haq, Ramallah, Oct. 1, 2009.

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/ 71 Yemini: NGOs against Israel

and a string of European states, including France,Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland, and the Nether-lands, it disburses millions of dollars to Israeliand Palestinian associations, supposedly for theprotection of human rights. But a glance at thelist of the supported groups or their leadersreadily reveals that most of them are also in-volved in political activism22—including promo-tion of the “right of return”—and many of themsupport the anti-Israel boycott, divestment, andsanctions (BDS) movement.

This hydra-like BDS is supported by doz-ens of different organizations. The EU or indi-vidual Western states do not directly finance themovement, yet they fund numerous groups thatsubsidize and support it. What makes this matterparticularly galling is that the ultimate goal of theBDS movement is not just the end of the Israeli“occupation” of the West Bank and Gaza, butrather Israel’s demise.23 The leaders and mem-bers of the BDS movement travel around the worldand speak on human rights, democracy, andequality. But behind this lip service to universalvalues underlie the same extremist objectivespreached by al-Qaeda, the Iranian ayatollahs, orHamas: rejection of the two-state solution andcastigation of any Israeli-Palestinian coopera-tion or Palestinian concessions for the sake of

peace, as collaboration with one of the world’sworst ever regimes. As one of the movement’sleaders, Omar Barghouti, candidly admitted:“The end of the occupation is not the end of ourstruggle.”24 Paradoxically, Barghouti is a studentat Tel Aviv University, the same university hewishes to have boycotted.

CONCLUSION

A vast and intricate network of NGOs,funded by the European Union and individualEuropean states, is busy fanning Palestinianand Arab rejectionism,whether through thepromotion of “the rightof return,” support forthe BDS campaign, ordiscouragement of ac-ceptance of Israel.25 Notall members of this net-work are in contact withone another, nor do theynecessarily share thesame specific goals. Yet they are unified by prin-cipled and ideological opposition to the two-state solution, and by implication—to Israel’svery existence. Should Israeli lawmakers befaulted for trying to resist this trend?

22 “Human Rights and Good Governance Secretariat (HR/GG)NGO Grant Recipients 2010-2012,” NGO Development Cen-ter, Ramallah and al-Rimal, Gaza, accessed Feb. 9, 2011; “Do-nors,” idem, accessed Feb. 9, 2011.23 “Palestinian United Call for BDS against Israel,” Palestin-ian BDS National Committee, July 9, 2005.

24 “Boycott Divestment Sanction Israel,” YouTube, accessedFeb. 9, 2011.25 “Overview of European Governmental Funding for NGOs,”NGO Monitor, Jerusalem, June 10, 2010.

The ultimate goalof the boycott,divestment,and sanctions movement isIsrael’s demise.

Palestinians Think Life Is ImprovingDr. Nabil Kukali, founder and director-general of the Palestinian Center for Public Opinion, said that theimprovement of the economic situation in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Gaza Strip in 2010 comparedwith the foregoing years “gave the Palestinian public a feeling of optimism that their financial situation in 2011will be further improved.”

Palestinian Center for Public Opinionpoll covering Dec.10-20, 2010


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/ 73Joffe: Egypt’s Antiquities

Egypt’s AntiquitiesCaught in the Revolution

by Alexander H. Joffe

The initial spasm of images from the Cairo Museum shocked observers. As tens of thou-sands of demonstrators confronted the security forces in what quickly evolved into the firstpopular revolution in Egypt’s history, the museum was ransacked in a scene reminiscent ofthe looted tombs of ancient Egyptian kings. A statue of Tutankhamun astride a panther wasripped from its base but then cast to the floor when thieves discovered it was gilded andnot solid gold. A boat model from a tomb was smashed, the figures huddled in the boat-house pulverized but the navigator at the bow still pointing sadly forward. Two mummieswere beheaded, mouths agape; it was rumored that they were Tut’s grandparents.

The extent of the chaos was unknown but ominous. Egypt’s antiquities were suddenlycaught up in a revolution. But those antiquities have always been both a tool to createEgypt and Egyptians in the present as well as a telling map of Egyptian society.

Alexander H. Joffe is a Middle Eastern historianand archaeologist. He is the author of “MuseumMadness in Iraq,” published in the Spring 2004Middle East Quarterly. He has taught archaeol-ogy at the Pennsylvania State University andPurchase College, State University of New York.

For his part, Zahi Hawass, secretary-generalof the Supreme Council of Antiquities, reacted withcharacteristic histrionics, which for once mighthave been justified: “Of course, I was so worried.I have been protecting antiquities all my life. I feltif the Cairo Museum is robbed, Egypt will neverbe able to get up again.”2 Hawass’s ego is per-petually on display; every television documen-tary about ancient Egypt appears contractuallybound to feature him in his full braggadocio, andhe has long been the absolute master of whicharchaeologist does and does not work in Egypt.

But after forty-eight hours, his assessment ofthe situation changed. Hawass, appointedMubarak’s minister for antiquities after the erup-

1 The Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 28, 2011.2 The Washington Post, Jan. 30, 2011.

D A T E L I N E

CONFLICTING NARRATIVES

A second narrative quickly appeared. In thisone, the police, military, and most importantly“everyday Egyptians,” joined together to pro-tect museums and sites. Farid Saad, a 40-year-old engineer, was quoted as saying, “I’m stand-ing here to defend and to protect our nationaltreasure.”1 The nation was united in protectionof its past.


cal Iraqis and probably mu-seum insiders and profes-sional thieves during theU.S-led invasion.6 Thoughthe site had been used as afiring position to attack U.S.

forces, Washington was blamed for the lootingand for failing to secure Iraq’s thousands of ar-chaeological sites, many of which were mined forantiquities that have disappeared, presumablyonto world markets.

Even as Mubarak held on, Hawass’s positivenarrative of the regime in command was challengedby telephone calls, faxes, and tweets that wereaggregated on various web sites outside of hiscontrol. Near Cairo, reports indicated that lootersattacked tombs and antiquities storehouses inSaqqara and Abusir. In Middle Egypt, the site ofEhnasya was attacked, but in Upper Egypt, Luxorand Aswan, sites with major tourism interests, werereported to be safe. And in a curious echo of an-cient Egypt, “Sinai Bedouins” apparently attackedthe Qantara Museum. Some allegations have evenemerged that the thugs and villains who attackedthe Cairo Museum, and who attacked oppositiondemonstrators gathered on Tahrir Square, werepolicemen and goons in the employ of the regime.True or not, such allegations have galvanized theopposition. After the fall, Hawass was forced toadmit that another gilded statue of Tutankhamunwas missing from the Cairo Museum, along withother objects. “I have said if the Egyptian [Cairo]Museum is safe, then Egypt is safe. However, I amnow concerned Egypt is not safe.”7 As ever, thefate of Egypt was tied together with that of itsleaders and its past.

WHY ANTIQUITIES?

But why were antiquities targeted? The sim-plest answer is that most of Egypt’s eighty-threemillion people survive on approximately US$2 per

3 The New York Times, Feb. 1, 2011.4 Zahi Hawass, “State of Egyptian Antiquities,” Zahi Hawasswebsite, Feb. 3, 2011.5 “Afghanistan: Hidden Treasures from the National Museum,Kabul,” National Geographic, accessed Feb. 8, 2011.

6 Alexander H. Joffe, “Museum Madness in Baghdad,” MiddleEast Quarterly, Spring 2004, pp. 31-43.7 NewsCore Agency, Feb. 13, 2011.

The positive narrative ofthe regime in command waschallenged by telephonecalls, faxes, and tweets.

tion of chaos, now reportedthat nothing much had beenstolen or destroyed, that allthe museums were safe, thatthe people stood unitedagainst the looters, and thateven the looted objects had been restored. “Peopleare asking me, ‘Do you think Egypt will be likeAfghanistan?’” he recounted. “And I say, ‘No,Egyptians are different—they love me because Iprotect antiquities.’”3

After seventy-two hours, Hawass was evenmore resolute:

I am the only source of continuing truth con-cerning antiquities, and these rumors are aimedat making the Egyptian people look bad. Ifanything happens to the museum, I wouldbravely tell everyone all over the world be-cause I am a man of honor, and I would neverhide anything from you. It is from my heartthat I tell people everywhere that I am theguardian of these monuments that belong tothe whole world.4

Now Egypt’s monuments belonged to theworld, but the source of all truth was made clear.The identification of Egypt’s antiquities with asingle man is not simply supremely egotistic buttelling of a tradition where rulers point to monu-ments and demand respect, legitimacy, and obedi-ence. It is only one of many apparent constants inEgyptian history.

Whether or not Egyptians are different fromtheir Iraqi or Afghan brethren, however, remainsto be seen. As the Taliban came to power, the con-tents of the Afghan National Museum in Kabulwere moved to safe locations.5 The museum itselfwas destroyed in 1994. Other antiquities, most no-tably the Buddhas of Bamiyan, were destroyedby the Taliban in a campaign of iconoclasm in 2001.The Baghdad Museum was looted in 2003 by lo-

/ 75

day. Antiquities represent valuable com-modities to be exploited, whether directlyas gold and other precious metals or assaleable items on a black market. Theworld’s antiquities markets and museumscould easily absorb better objects, disguisetheir recent origins, or hide them in stasisfor years. This happens every day with lootfrom every corner of the earth. Wealthycollectors would be made aware of theseobjects as well, and private deals arranged.Common objects, which were not destroyedin the search for more excellent ones, wouldalso be absorbed and marketed at the streetlevel in places such as London and Geneva.Tourism annually contributes $15 billion toEgypt’s gross domestic product of some$216 billion. How much looted objectswould bring in is unknown.

Looting tombs has a particular antiq-uity in Egypt. In ancient Egypt, tombs ofcommoners and kings were often lootedjust hours after the burial. The practice ofsending the deceased toward the afterlife withelaborate and even lavish equipment was takento an extreme by Egyptians. To these customs,the world owes thanks for the preponderanceof items that fill museums today, which origi-nated in the grave. Pyramids were burrowedinto, subterranean chambers were mined, andmummies were torn open in search of gold, sil-ver, and precious stones. Little seems differenttoday. As in the past, stolen loot will fill thestomachs of Egyptians.

But another answer to why Egypt’s antiqui-ties have been targeted has to do with the rela-tionship of past and present in Egypt. National-ism everywhere uses the imagery of the past andthe fruits of archaeology to create a narrativeabout the greatness of today, in particular the“nation” and its leaders. The Egyptian state hasnot been an exception, but there are features thatmake it unlike other places. For one thing, Egypt,despite its immense size and subregions, has al-ways been a single geographical and cultural unit.It was unified under a single dynasty—really mili-tary rule that later assumed theocratic dimen-sions—before 3200 BCE. Egypt is a container,

bordered by deserts to the west and east, popu-lated with unruly sand dwellers, and to the southin Nubia by tribes that are racially distinct.

The novelty of pharaonic antiquities was notlost on Egypt’s Greco-Roman, Byzantine, and Is-lamic rulers. The mythical power of Egyptianhieroglyphs and their mystical knowledge werecompelling, and objects from scarabs all the wayup to obelisks were bought, sold, and gifted. Butthe Islamic era also created a new series of monu-ments and narratives regarding Egypt’s singu-larity and glory. The neighborhoods of old Cairowere the Fatimid, Mamluk, and Ottoman core ofthe city; they contained alleys and lanes, man-sions and apartments that were the settings forNaguib Mahfouz’s novels. Al-Azhar seminary,Khan al-Khali bazaar, and the al-Hussein mosquewere the monumental core of another authenticand distinct Egyptian culture.

That culture did not always mesh with thepharaonic past. In 1156, al-Aziz Uthman, son ofSaladin, tried to demolish one of the Giza pyra-mids. The fourteenth-century Sufi MuhammadSaim ad-Dahr is reputed to have smashed the noseof the Great Sphinx when he saw peasants making

Joffe: Egypt’s Antiquities

D A T E L I N E

Zahi Hawass, secretary-general of the SupremeCouncil of Antiquities and longtime gatekeeperto Egypt’s hallowed past, sought to downplaythe extent of the plundering of the country’smuseums amid the revolution, arguing thatnothing much had been stolen or destroyed andthat people stood united against the looters.

Photo

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.


offerings. After an earthquake in 1300 loosenedthe casing stones of the Giza pyramids, Sultan an-Nasir Nasir ad-Din al-Hassan took the opportu-nity a few decades later to remove them to buildthe mosques and fortresses of the still new city ofCairo. Symbols always vie with utility even forrulers. But the Islamic heritage of Egypt forms an-other important strand in the modern identity ofEgypt, one that complements yet stands some-what at odds with the more dramatic pagan monu-ments of the pharaohs.

Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt in 1799 ush-ered in antiquarian and then scientific research.His hundreds of artists and savants spread outacross the land as part of a vast scientific andmilitary enterprise documenting things as theywere on the very edge of modernity. Europeanspoured into the country and by the middle of thenineteenth century the continent’s museums werefilled with Egyptian objects and even monuments,torn from that country with no thought for sci-ence and still less for Egyptians. A sense of viola-

tion formed a thread in the growing Egyptiannational consciousness and was made more in-tense by the British occupation of the countryin 1882. But this began the golden age of Egyp-tian archaeology, tourism, and the growth ofthe modern state. The Oriental style that shapedCairo and Alexandria and the obvious privileg-ing of the pharaohs was a joint European andEgyptian project. Egyptian art and literaturevalorized the age of the pharaoh in the poemsand plays of Ahmad Shawki and Mahfouz’searly novels. Like Iraq and its Mesopotamianpast, and Lebanon with its Phoenician past,the achievements of Egyptian ancestors wereinspiration and legitimization for the emerginggreatness of the present.

DIVERGENT IDENTITIES

But the Nasserite revolution of 1952 andpan-Arabism brought contradictions into theopen. Was Egypt part of the “Arab nation” orwas it Egyptian? The nearly simultaneous riseof the Muslim Brotherhood brought out similarcontradictions with respect to Islam. Was Egyptan Arab or Egyptian country, or part of a Mus-

lim world that knew no earthly borders? Just whatis Egypt and Egyptian nationalism?

These questions, too, have a certain antiquity.Egypt was always ruled from the core outward, butthe pharaoh spent much time traveling the lengthof his realm paying obeisance to local deities, check-ing up on local authorities, and putting down rebel-lions. In the core today, in Cairo and its surround-ings, where there is a developed upper and middleclass, the answers will likely lean toward a national-ist explanation of pride and connection to the past.Egypt’s pharaonic past is integral in the same waythat the Cairo Museum, built in 1902, is an inextri-cable part of that city where a medieval Muslimcore melds with the Oriental style of the nineteenthand early twentieth centuries while flanked by thelooming monuments of antiquity to the west, andeverywhere surrounded by the ugly towers andslums of modernity. That geography points to theshape of today’s problems.

As in the past, more remote areas of the Nile

At the Cairo Museum, a statue ofTutankhamun astride a panther wasripped from its base but then cast to thefloor when thieves discovered it wasgilded and not solid gold.

/ 77

delta and those in Middleand Upper Egypt, whichare removed from the po-litical, cultural, and reli-gious centers at Memphisor Cairo, were more underdeveloped, impover-ished, backward, and traditional in outlook andpractice. Only a few sites, such as Luxor andThebes were patronized by the royalty and laterby the modern Egyptian regimes in the name oftourism. The Bedouins of the Sinai rankled un-der the pharaoh’s control and yearned to breakfree and lash out. In all these respects, little haschanged today. The interpretation of national-ism and treatment of the past will likely followthis geography, at least for a while. Everywhere,however, the competing Islamic narrative looms.

Egypt at least is an integral unit. One usefulcontrast is with Iraq. Ancient Mesopotamia sawthe land divided into Babylonia in the south andAssyria in the north. These two regions were so-cially and ethnically distinct, but from an earlytime, Mesopotamian kings created a mythologi-cal vision of unity, which they then used as justi-fication for violently attacking and dominatingtheir neighbors. Unity was a fiction but a divineone. The reality consisted of fractious tribes, ag-ricultural villages, competing city-states, and vio-lent politics. This was no less true for SaddamHussein at-Tikriti than it was for Sargon of Akkad,the “true king,” who rose from cup-bearer to theking of Kish to the king’s killer, and went on tounite Mesopotamia and found a dynasty. Kingsthemselves were the greatest source of disorder.

In ancient Egyptian tradition, one of thegreatest roles of the ruler was ma’at, the legiti-mate maintenance of order and balance. Ofcourse, minions of the ruler recorded this preten-sion for posterity, but fear of chaos was perva-sive, not only for the ruler but the ruled. Inva-sions by desert tribes, the annual floods—whichcould bring too much water or not enough, orbring it too early or too late in the growing sea-son—and famine, hunger, and violence were alltoo real. The reward of living in a rich ecosystemis plenty with the caveat that nature is fickle. Akind of national awareness emerged in ancientEgypt, at least with respect to xenophobia to-

ward foreigners, in partthrough fear of chaos. Thefact that the kings of Egyptwere depicted literally asgods who held heaven and

earth together was another metaphysical dimen-sion of the ancient Egyptian “nation,” alwaysbacked up by military force. Piety vied with pov-erty and with fear. But then as now, the statewas the provider. Most ancient Egyptians werebound to various royal or temple establishments.Despite any liberalization undertaken byMubarak, state and military industries continueto dominate the Egyptian economy. The fate ofmany Egyptians was and is tied directly to theregime.

UNCERTAIN FUTURE

A similar sort of chaos is playing out in Egypttoday. Price subsidies for food and fuel accountfor 7 percent of the state’s budget, and more than40 percent of Egypt’s food is imported.8 Food in-flation reached 17 percent in December 2010,9 andhundreds of thousands of university graduatesare unable to find jobs.10 Chaos thus has manysources—an educated population shut out fromprosperity and an underclass on the verge of hun-ger. Antiquities—identified now with the Mubarakregime and a potential source of revenue for im-poverished Egyptians—have suffered from timeimmemorial. The upper and middle class Egyp-tians who locked arms to protect the Cairo Mu-seum from the initial bout of looting are too fewand spread too thin to defend even a fraction ofEgypt’s museums and monuments. But the riot-ing that has unfolded, perhaps with the regime’scontrivance, has given Egyptians a clear pictureof chaos. Egypt’s prisons have been emptied ofcriminals, terrorists, and political prisoners, and

Joffe: Egypt’s Antiquities

8 Al-Masry al-Youm (Cairo), June 8, 2010.9 The Egyptian Gazette (Cairo), Jan. 18, 2011.10 “Youth Unemployment, Existing Policies and Way For-ward: Evidence from Egypt and Tunisia,” The World Bank,Washington, D.C., Apr. 2008.

D A T E L I N EState and military industriesdominate, and the fate ofmany Egyptians is tieddirectly to the regime.


reports indicate that loot-ing of shops and homes iswidespread.11 The armystands as the last defenderof order and balance and may yet step in torestore order, end the neo-liberal economic ex-periment, and defend its own prerogatives. Ithas done so for 5,000 years.

As the Muslim Brotherhood emerges fromthe shadows to participate and perhaps domi-nate the revolution, the question of its regardfor antiquity must also be raised. Egypt’s Islam-ists also have a vision of the past. It is difficultto discern what their attitudes toward antiqui-ties would be except indirectly. For example,Egypt’s grand mufti Ali Gomaa issued a fatwa in2006 banning the display of statues in homesand was joined in his condemnation by SheikhYusuf al-Qaradawi. The fatwa was condemnedby Egyptian intellectuals and even by the Mus-lim Brotherhood.12

It is also well to remember that Khalid al-Islambouli cried, “I have killed the pharaoh,” af-ter shooting Anwar Sadat on October 6, 1981.13

The pharaoh is not a positive Qur’anic imagebut a tyrant. The Luxor massacre of 1997, wheresixty-two tourists were slaughtered, saw the Is-lamist al-Gama’a al-Islamiya attack the Templeof Hatshepsut. The modern Egyptian and West-ern relationship with the Egyptian past was thesetting for the attack. Tourism was clearly in-tended to be the victim. How the Muslim Broth-erhood, dedicated to Islamizing Egypt, woulddeal with tourism, museums, and antiquities isunclear. Certainly, in the short term, for the sakeof foreign currency and appearances, little willchange. But the example of Afghanistan underthe Taliban is in the background. The destruc-tion wrought on remains of the Jewish temples

in Jerusalem by the Pales-tinian Islamic authoritiesshould also be mentioned.Perhaps most telling, how-

ever, is the almost complete erasure of Islamichistorical remains from the cities of Mecca andMedina, including structures associated withMuhammad.14

An Egypt dominated by the military will al-most certainly seek to restore both the country’ssymbols and the practical mechanisms of tour-ism. Whether the military can ride the crocodileof popular unrest and a population empoweredby social media yet lacking meaningful liberaldemocratic roots remains to be seen. But thereligious desire to create a rupture with the pastin the name of fighting idolatry is deep.

In all this, the practicality and wisdom ofrepatriating antiquities to Egypt is dubious. ZahiHawass in particular has been determined in hispursuit of antiquities that were taken from Egyptover the past centuries. The Rosetta Stone,found by French engineers but taken as Britishwar booty, tops his list. But even objects givenby Egypt as gifts have come under his acquisi-tive eye. Cleopatra’s Needle in Central Park waserected in 1881, a gift from the Khedive of Egypt.But 130 years of standing out in the rain does noobelisk good, and Hawass has demanded that itbe preserved, or he will take it back. His pursuitof Egyptian objects outside of Egypt has beenalmost as relentless as his drive to become theface of Egyptian archaeology everywhere.

The pharaoh is gone and so is Hawass.15

In the meantime, those concerned aboutEgypt’s past can only sit back and watch as agenuinely Egyptian transformation takes place,one in which the relationship of past andpresent will inevitably be redefined yet alongfamiliar lines.

11 The Gulf Today (Dubai), Jan. 30, 2011.12 Middle East Online (London), Apr. 3, 2006.13 Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and theRoad to 9/11 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), p. 50.

The practicality and wisdomof repatriating antiquitiesto Egypt is dubious.

14 “Muslims start petition to stop Saudi destruction of Meccaand ‘The House of Mohammed,’” Militant Islam Monitor, Sept.29, 2005.15 The New York Times, Mar. 3, 2011.

/ 79 Alfoneh: Ahmadinejad’s Network

All Ahmadinejad’s Menby Ali Alfoneh

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s sacking of foreign minister Manouchehr Mottaki has openedanother chapter in the ongoing power struggle between the president and the supremeleader, Ali Khamene’i. Interpersonal as it may seem, this confrontation symbolizes thestruggle between the Islamic Republic’s old elites and Ahmadinejad’s burgeoning pa-tronage network, which challenges their authority. How has the president managed tobuild such a formidable power base? Who are the key members of his coterie, and willthey enable their benefactor to outsmart the supreme leader to become Iran’s effectiveruler?

Ali Alfoneh is a resident fellow at the AmericanEnterprise Institute.

WAS KHAMENE’I THE REAL TARGET?

On December 13, 2010, while the foreignminister was on an official visit to Senegal,Ahmadinejad replaced Mottaki with Ali-AkbarSalehi, former Iran Atomic Energy Organizationdirector.1 Following the public outrage aboutdismissing a cabinet minister on a diplomaticmission, “an informed source” claimed that thegovernment was unaware that Mottaki wasabroad.2 But upon release of the news thatAhmadinejad himself had ordered Mottaki todeliver a personal message to the Senegalesepresident,3 first vice president Mohammed-RezaRahimi and senior assistant Mojtaba SamarehHashemi said that Mottaki had been informedof the dismissal prior to the trip—a claim whichthe foreign minister denied.4

A model career diplomat, Mottaki was nevera key player in the Islamic Republic regime and

owed his cabinet membership to Khamene’i.This, along with newly revealed informationabout the circumstances of his sacking, pro-vides insights into Ahmadinejad’s real target:the supreme leader.

According to Ayandeh News, approximatelya week prior to Mottaki’s dismissal, Ahmadinejadhad privately complained to Khamene’i of “lackof coordination between [government] agenciesand [the presidency’s] restricted authority” andhad voiced his resolve to replace the foreign min-ister. No decision was made, and Ahmadinejaddid not raise the issue on his next meeting withKhamene’i on December 6, 2010. However, uponleaving the supreme leader’s office, the presidenttold one of Khamene’i’s secretaries that “he hadforgotten to raise the issue of Mottaki’s dismissalwith Ayatollah Khamene’i and asked him to in-form him [Khamene’i] about it.”5

1 Tabnak News Agency (Tehran), Dec. 13, 2010.2 Khabar Online (Tehran), Dec. 19, 2010.3 Farda News (Tehran), Jan. 1, 2011.4 Ibid., Dec. 19, 2010.5 Ayandeh News (Tehran), Jan. 2, 2011.

D A T E L I N E


Khamene’i has hith-erto failed to comment onMottaki’s dismissal in pub-lic but gave the green lightto various foes, such as par-liamentarians and the press, to criticizeAhmadinejad.6 He also opened another frontagainst the president as the judiciary announcedit was investigating corruption charges againstVice President Rahimi.7 But as Ahmadinejad ig-nored the public outrage, Khamene’i took a de-fensive position. According to Ayandeh News,in a conversation “with one of the grandees,”Khamene’i stressed that “Mottaki’s dismissalhad not been coordinated with him and that hisapproval had not been sought concerning ap-pointment of the acting foreign minister [Ali-Akbar Salehi].”8

THE PRESIDENT’S PERMANENT PURGE

The sacking of Mottaki continues a relent-less purge begun during Ahmadinejad’s first termin office. Upon entering the presidential palace in2005, he faced the same challenge encounteredby all his predecessors: Though the presidenthas the prerogative of appointing cabinet minis-ters, more often than not, these appointmentsare imposed on him by the regime’s ruling elites.

Ahmadinejad, however, has moved awayfrom the political traditions and elites of thepast and has systematically purged those cabi-net ministers forced on him by other groups,beginning with the roads and transportationminister, Mohammed Rahmati,9 whom he hadinherited from his predecessor, PresidentMohammed Khatami. From the camp of Aya-tollah Ali-Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani,Ahmadinejad dismissed economy and finance

minister, Davoud Danesh-Ja’fari,10 and oil minister,Mohammed-Kazem VaziriHamaneh.11 He even dis-missed cabinet ministers

imposed on him by Khamene’i, including inte-rior minister, Hojjat al-Eslam Mostafa Pour-Mohammedi,12 and intelligence minister, Hojjatal-Eslam Gholam-Hossein Mohseni Ezhehi.13

Other ministers dismissed by Ahmadinejad werecooperatives minister, Mohammed NazemiArdakani;14 education minister, MahmoudFarshidi;15 industry and mines minister, Ali-Reza Tahmasbi;16 and welfare and social se-curity ministers, Mohammed NazemiArdakani17 and Parviz Kazemi.18 Mottaki’s dis-missal—the first purge in Ahmadinejad’s sec-ond tenure—eliminates any pro-Khamene’iand pro-Ali Larijani representatives in thecabinet since the foreign minister was activein Larijani’s 2005 presidential bid.19

AHMADINEJAD’S NETWORK

Ahmadinejad’s history of purging, as wellas his sacking of Mottaki, have demonstratedthat inclusion in the president’s network, ratherthan subservience to Khamene’i, who is eitherunwilling or incapable of defending his own fa-vorites, is the best career move for the IslamicRepublic’s elites. Members of what Iranians callthe “Party of the Wind (Hezb-e Bad),” rangingfrom American University professor HamidMowlana,20 to Tehran University professor

6 Parsineh (Tehran), Dec. 13, 2010; Mehr News Agency (Tehran),Dec. 13, 2010; Kayhan (Tehran), Dec. 14, 2010.7 Asr-e Iran (Tehran), Dec. 20, 2010.8 Ayandeh News, Jan. 2, 2011.9 Aftab News Agency (Tehran), July 7, 2008.

Inclusion in Ahmadinejad’snetwork is the bestcareer move for theIslamic Republic’s elites.

10 Fars News Agency (Tehran), Apr. 4, 2008.11 Now-Andish News (Tehran), Aug. 19, 2007.12 Farda News, May 17, 2008.13 Tabnak News Agency, July 26, 2009.14 Aftab News Agency, Oct. 28, 2006.15 Ibid., Nov. 23, 2007.16 Fars News Agency, Aug. 8, 2007.17 Hamshahri (Tehran), Nov. 18, 2006.18 Aftab News Agency, Sept. 25, 2006.19 Radio Farda (Prague), Dec. 14, 2010.20 “President Appoints Professor Mowlana as Advisor,” Presi-dent of the Islamic Republic of Iran website (Tehran), Aug. 19,2008.

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Sadegh Zibakalam,21 who recently defectedfrom Rafsanjani’s camp with his praise ofAhmadinejad’s chief of staff Esfandiar Rahim-Mashaei, are trying to join the president’s ranks.This, however, is easier said than done. BagherAlayi, Ahmadinejad’s classmate at Iran Univer-sity of Science and Technology (IUST) in the1970s, recalls his colleague’s university network:

They did not easily allow anyone to jointheir team … They had to be completelyconvinced that this person thought the sameway as themselves and to be convinced ofhis loyalty before allowing him to join theirranks. They would also make investigations,and even then would be careful.22

Ahmadinejad has not changed much sincehis university days. His network is recruitedfrom a closed circuit comprising his fellowIUST alumni, local government and securityexecutives who served in the northwesternparts of Iran in the 1980s, Islamic Revolution-ary Guard Corps (IRGC) officers who receivedcivilian academic degrees from IUST in the 1990s,those who served Ahmadinejad during his brieftenure as Tehran mayor (2003-05), along with afew family members, and some high rankingIRGC officers who seem to have a power baseindependent of Ahmadinejad.

AHMADINEJAD’S MENTOR AND STRATEGIST

To find the roots of Ahmadinejad’s circle oftrust, one must look into the political dynamicsat play at Iran University of Science and Tech-nology on the eve of the 1979 revolution. It wasthere that the future president’s road to radicalpolitics began and where he forged the most im-portant friendship of his life with SamarehHashemi, his fellow IUST student, religious men-tor, and political strategist. Unlike Ahmadinejad,

who hails from an unprivileged family of immi-grants to Tehran, Hashemi belongs to the reli-gious upper-middle class in Kerman province,is the nephew of Islamist theoretician and primeminister, the late Mohammed-Javad Bahonar,and is also the uncle of current parliamentarianMohammedreza Bahonar. In the immediate af-termath of the revolution, Hashemi andAhmadinejad headed a radical Islamist studentfaction at IUST,23 following the line of “the late[Ayatollah Ali] Ghoddousi, representative of theleader’s deputy [Grand Ayatollah Hussein-AliMontazeri24] at the IUST,” unlike the other fac-tion which followed the “representative of theleader at the university.”25

Hashemi and Ahmadinejad’s group suffereda major setback at the November 1979 seizure ofthe U.S. embassy in Tehran. Inspired by the late

D A T E L I N E

Alfoneh: Ahmadinejad’s Network

The sacking of Iran’s foreign minister,Manouchehr Mottaki, on December 13,2010, was a clear snub to Iran’s supremeleader, Ali Khamene’i, and opened anotherchapter in the ongoing power strugglebetween him and President Ahmadinejad.

21 Mahramaneh News (Tehran), Jan. 19, 2011.22 Shahrvand-e Emrouz (Tehran), Nov. 13, 2007.

23 Ebtekar (Tehran) Apr. 16, 2008.24 See, “An Ayatollah Condemns an Unjust Ruler,” MiddleEast Quarterly, Spring 2010, pp. 73-6.25 Shahrvand-e Emrouz, Nov. 13, 2007.


quer the country!”29

The NorthwesternRing. The path to con-quest went through execu-tive and security positionsin the northwestern parts

of Iran, which at the time was in a state ofcivil war—either because of ethnic conflictover Kurdistan or political upheavals as a re-sult of Grand Ayatollah Mohammed-KazemShariatmadari’s rivalry with Grand AyatollahRuhollah Khomeini—which challenged centralgovernment authority. Ahmadinejad himselfserved as governor of Makou and Khoy andadvised the governor generals of KordestanArdebil.30 His colleagues from this era, knownas the “Ardebil ring” (perhaps better called thenorthwestern ring), are heavily representedin Ahmadinejad’s second cabinet. These in-clude Hashemi, who served as West Azerbaijangovernor general and Kordestan’s politicaldeputy, and who is today a senior assistant toAhmadinejad;31 Esfandiar Rahim-Mashaei,Ahmadinejad’s chief of staff, who establishedthe IRGC intelligence unit in Kurdistan and waspromoted to the local security council of theWest Azerbaijan province;32 first vice presidentRahimi, who served as Kordestan governor gen-eral;33 housing and urban development minis-ter, Ali Nikzad, who was Ardebil governor gen-eral;34 welfare minister and former commanderof the Revolutionary Guards, Sadegh Mahsouli,who served as West Azerbaijan deputy gover-nor in the early 1980s,35 and Martyr Foundationdirector, Masoud Zaribafan, who is a relative ofAhmadinejad’s and served as Mahabad gover-nor and also on the Tehran Islamic City Councilwhen Ahmadinejad was mayor.36

26 Tabnak News Agency, Apr. 23, 2008.27 Shahrvand-e Emrouz, Nov. 13, 2007.28 “Negahi Be Tarikhcheh-ye Showra-ye Ali-ye Enghelab-eFarhangi,” Secretariat of Supreme Council of Cultural Revolu-tion website (Tehran), accessed Jan. 3, 2011.

29 Shahrvand-e Emrouz, Nov. 13, 2007.30 “Zendeginameh,” Presidency of the Islamic Republic of Iranwebsite (Tehran), accessed Jan. 3, 2011.31 Hamshahri, Apr. 14, 2009.32 “Mashaei Yek Moemen Va Yek Modir-e Velayat-MadarAst,” Masha News (Tehran), accessed Jan. 3, 2011.33 Mardomsalari (Tehran), Apr. 22, 2008.34 Fars News Agency, Aug. 21, 2009.35 Jahan News Agency (Tehran), Nov. 8, 2009.

The Revolutionary Guards’participation in Iran’seconomic life is a priceAhmadinejad has had topay to remain in office.

Ayatollah MohammedBeheshti, the Islamic Re-publican Party cofounder,their faction had opposedthe takeover. Beheshti him-self had held secret nego-tiations with U.S. diplomats a week before theseizure and was not interested in the release ofthe documents,26 instead advocating the take-over of the Soviet embassy. But the seizure ofthe U.S. embassy and the taking of U.S. diplo-mats as hostages proved a tremendous successfor the perpetrators. Envious of the prestige ofthe leftist hostage takers, Hashemi andAhmadinejad readily aligned themselves withthe rightist revolutionary faction, especially theIslamic Republican Party. They established theOffice of the Consolidation of Unity StudentOrganization and together with the late partyfirebrand, Hassan Ayat, set in motion what be-came known as the Cultural Revolution,27

namely, the closure of universities in Iran forover a year, the purge of Iranian universities ofundesirable academics and students—includ-ing Marxists—and the rewriting of academic ma-terials according to the Islamic Republic’s ideo-logical and political doctrines.28

BUILDING THE RINGS OF POWER

The Cultural Revolution did not prove theastounding success Ahmadinejad and Hashemihad hoped for, and its management was soonhanded over to the Supreme Council for the Cul-tural Revolution. The two students abandoneduniversity life in pursuit of further revolution-ary adventures in the shadow of the Iraqi inva-sion of Iran in 1980, but they allegedly swore totheir leftist opponents, “We will return to con-

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The Science and TechnologyRing. Following the end of theIran-Iraq war, many former Revo-lutionary Guards officers pur-sued academic studies to preparethemselves for public office. Sodid Ahmadinejad and SamarehHashemi who returned to the uni-versity. Back at IUST, they keptthe university’s doors wide opento friends they had made in theGuards and security services in thenorthwestern parts during the war.In the 1990s, the IUST developedinto a veritable PhD factory forthe Revolutionary Guards, whichexplains the over-representationof IUST and IUST/IRGC alumniin Ahmadinejad’s cabinet. The listincludes commerce minister,Mehdi Ghazanfari;37 industry minister, AliakbarMehrabian, who is also Ahmadinejad’s nephew;38

labor and social affairs minister, Abdel RezaSheikholeslami;39 and roads and transportationminister, Hamid Behbahani.40

The Tehran Municipality Ring.Ahmadinejad’s tenure as mayor of Tehranproved as important to his network as his uni-versity days and executive posts in northwest-ern Iran.41 Prominent Tehran municipality per-sonalities of his coterie include recently sackedNational Youth Organization director, MehrdadBazrpash;42 science and technology deputy,Nasrin Soltankhah;43 and industry minister,

D A T E L I N E

Alfoneh: Ahmadinejad’s Network

Aliakbar Mehrabian.44 Parallel with the riseof Rahim-Mashaei came a meteoric rise byformer Mashaei subordinates at the Tehranmunicipality during Ahmadinejad’s tenure asmayor. Hamid Baghayi, Iranian cultural heri-tage handicrafts and tourism organization di-rector, is the most prominent among Mashaei’sprotégés.45

MEN OF THE IRGC

Apart from those guardsmen who aresomehow related to Ahmadinejad, there are alsoa number of IRGC officers who do not seem toowe their appointments to the president’s be-nevolence and may well be the choice of theRevolutionary Guards. The list includes formerIRGC Quds Force members, cabinet secretary,Majid Doustali,46 and defense and armedforces logistics minister, Ahmad Vahidi.47 Apart

Samareh Hashemi (right), presidential “senior advisor”and deputy interior minister for political affairs, has beena close friend and collaborator of Ahmadinejad (left) sinceuniversity days and played a key role in his ascendancy.

36 Alef News Agency (Tehran), Mar. 4, 2007.37 Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA, Tehran), Dec. 16,2009.38 Ham-Mihan News Agency (Tehran), May 7, Aug. 23, 2009.39 Jame’-ye Eslami-ye Karegaran-e Esfahan (Isfahan), Aug. 25,2009.40 Hamshahri, July 29, 2008.41 For a survey of Ahmadinejad’s tenure as Tehran mayor, seeFrederic Tellier, “The Iranian Moment,” Policy Focus, no. 52,The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington,D.C., Feb. 2006.42 Ham-Mihan News Agency, May 10, 2009.43 Fars News Agency, Sept. 21, 2009.

44 Ham-Mihan News Agency, Aug. 23, 2009.45 “Baghayi: Beravid Khaneh-ye Mashaei Ra Bebinid.”Mahramaneh News, Jan. 11, 2011.46 “Tabarshenasi-ye Koudetachian,” Enghelab-e Eslami DarTab’id (Paris), accessed Dec. 8, 2009.47 Tabnak News Agency, Sept. 1, 2009.


48 “Mo’arrefi-ye Mohandes Reza Taghipour Be ‘Onvan-e Vazir-e Ertebatat Be Majles,” Ministry of Information Technology andCommunication website (Tehran), Aug. 21, 2009.49 Hamshahri, Mar. 25, 2007.50 Jam-e Jam (Tehran) Aug. 29, 2009.51 “Hamidreza Hajibabayi Kist?” Kanoun-e Farhangian-eEsfahan website (Isfahan), Nov. 13, 2009.52 Tabnak News Agency, Nov. 8, 2009.53 Hamshahri, Mar. 25, 2008.54 Ibid., Apr. 4, 2007.55 Fars News Agency, Aug. 21, 2009.

from Hashemi, Mehrabian,Mahsouli, and Sheikh al-Eslami mentioned above,other former IRGC officersin Ahmadinejad’s secondcabinet include communications and informationtechnology minister, Reza Taghipour Anvari;48

cooperatives minister, Mohammed Abbasi;49 cul-ture and Islamic guidance minister, MohammedHosseini;50 education minister, HamidrezaHajibabayi;51 energy minister, Majid Namjou;52

interior minister, Mohammed-Mostafa Najjar;53

oil minister, Masoud Mirkazemi;54 and scienceand higher education minister, KamranDaneshjou.55

The strong cabinet presence of former IRGCofficers who have a shorter acquaintance withAhmadinejad, and who neither belong to thenorthwestern ring nor owe their civilian aca-demic degrees to Ahmadinejad and Hashemi,has important implications. It suggests thatAhmadinejad has had to reciprocate the IRGC’scontribution to his reelection. Increased IRGCparticipation in the country’s economic life andits seizure of publicly-owned economic enter-prises—such as Iran Telecommunications in

The Revolutionary Guards’power will only grow as thecivilian politicians continuetheir war of attrition.

the largest trade in the his-tory of the Tehran StockExchange56—is anotherprice Ahmadinejad has hadto pay to remain in office.

CONCLUSION

Ahmadinejad’s sacking of Mottaki is thelatest example of his systematic purge of politi-cal rivals and their replacement with his ownprotégés, so as to make the cabinet cohesiveand relatively easy to control. At the same time,this patronage network excludes members ofpowerful elites who have ruled Iran since 1979,and who will consequently feel free to criticizethe president since they are not involved in thedecision-making process.

No less importantly, the move constitutesyet another public snub to Khamene’i, whoseems unwilling and unable to protect his ownprotégés, thus opening the door to his furtherweakening. Is Khamene’i ready for a showdownwith Ahmadinejad, or will he continue to watchhis prestige crumble amidst his rival’s provoca-tions? Regardless of the outcome of the powerstruggle between the two, a third party couldbe the ultimate victor: the Islamic Revolution-ary Guard Corps, whose power will only growas the civilian politicians continue their war ofattrition.

56 Ali Alfoneh, “The Revolutionary Guards’ Looting of Iran’sEconomy,” Middle East Outlook, American Enterprise Insti-tute, Washington, D.C., June 2010.

/ 85 Khashan: Tripoli, Lebanon

Lebanon’s Islamist Strongholdby Hilal Khashan

Syrian president Bashar al-Assad has apparently retained the hope of a military returnto Lebanon from where he summarily withdrew in 2005 following the Rafiq Hariri as-sassination. In a 2008 interview with a Lebanese newspaper, he accused the northerncity of Tripoli of becoming a base for Islamists who posed a direct threat to Syria’ssecurity.1 More recently, Rifat Eid, head of Tripoli’s Alawite Arab Democratic Party,described the city as the “Lebanese Kandahar.”2

These charges could not be further from the truth. Far from posing a threat to itsimmediate neighborhood, let alone to Syrian security, Tripoli’s hopelessly fragmentedSalafi movement is primarily non-combative, its more militant groups having long beendefeated and pacified. Its devout and conservative nature notwithstanding, this move-ment is very much a cathartic reaction to the city’s prolonged political marginalizationand economic deprivation. To exaggerate the threat of Tripoli’s Salafis is tantamount tofattening the sheep before the slaughter.

D A T E L I N E

Hilal Khashan is a professor of political scienceat the American University of Beirut and theauthor of many books and articles on Arab poli-tics including Arabs at the Crossroads: Politi-cal Identity and Nationalism (University Pressof Florida, 2000).

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

From its founding by the Phoenician sea-farers in the eighth century BCE to the collapseof the Ottoman Empire in 1918, Tripoli maintainedits status as one of the foremost cities in theeastern Mediterranean. During the Arab-Islamicera, its port was second only to Alexandria’s,serving at different periods as the economic life-line of Aleppo, Damascus, and Baghdad.

This privileged status came to an abrupt

end in the wake of World War I when Tripoli’sinclusion in Lebanon—against the will of itsMuslim population, which would rather havebeen included in Syria—instantly marginalizedthe city. In its place, Beirut rose to prominenceas the capital of the new political entity and themajor site of its economy. Likewise, for someMaronite nationalists, Tripoli’s inclusion in Leba-non threatened the slight Christian majority re-ported by the 1932 population census. Theleader of the National Bloc, Emile Edde, for ex-ample, demanded the incorporation of Tripoli andits environs into Syria in order to preserveMaronite political predominance.3

For their part, the French, who created mod-

1 Al-Bayraq (Beirut), Sept. 30, 2008.2 Asharq al-Awsat (London), Oct. 7, 2010.3 Meir Zamir, Lebanon’s Quest: The Road to Statehood 1926-1939 (London: I. B. Tauris, 1997), p. 107.


ern Lebanon as an essen-tially Christian state, hadlittle interest in maintainingthe leading political, so-cial, and commercial stand-ing of predominantly Sunni Tripoli, and the city’seconomic suppression during the French man-date (1920-43) became a tacit policy of the Leba-nese state after independence. Still, Tripoli man-aged to reemerge as a provincial hub, unencum-bered by the stress of the country’s Beirut-baseddivisive confessional politics, serving the eco-nomic, educational, medical, and commercialneeds of northern Lebanon and northwesternSyria. This, however, was not due to govern-ment policy but rather to private investments bynorthern Lebanese and the influx of Syrian capi-tal after the introduction of nationalization mea-sures in that country.

FROM RELIGIOUS AND CULTURAL TOLERANCE TO JIHADISM

Tripoli is often referred to as the seat ofLebanon’s multifaceted Salafi trend, whose gen-esis coincides with the withdrawal of the lastFrench mandate troops from the country in 1946.Home to the first Salafi reformer Rashid Rida(1865-1935), this profoundly conservative anddevout city remained a rare oasis of religiousand cultural diversity until the mid-1970s. Thiswas a place where, despite infrequent social, in-terfaith interaction, Christian missionary schoolsproliferated and central roads and boulevardsbore decidedly Christian names such as NunsStreet, Churches Street, Archbishop Street, andSaint Elias Street.4 In Tripoli, Islamic religiositytolerated the existence of Lebanon’s only gam-bling club (known as Cheval Blanc Casino) longbefore the opening of Casino du Liban in 1959.Taverns and cabarets stood alongside mosquesand religious institutes without a hitch.

The advent of reli-gious organizations on aconsiderable scale duringthe 1950s and 1960s didnot radicalize Tripoli or re-

duce its toleration of religious and cultural di-versity. Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood launchedits activities in the city in 1956 under the name ofIbadurrahman (Servants of God). In 1964, FathiYakan transformed the group into al-Jama’a al-Islamiya (Islamic Group), which operated as anon-dissident and charitable movement. How-ever, the repercussions of the 1967 Six-Day Warwith Israel altered the city’s collective psycheand swayed it toward Islamism. This coincidedwith the militarization of the Lebanese Maronites,who were heartened by Israel’s stunning vic-tory as they sought to stem the growing tide ofarmed Palestinian groups. Lebanon was now onthe fast track to civil war.

CIVIL WAR AND RELIGIOUS MOBILIZATION

Tripoli had its share of the civil war, whichraged in Lebanon from 1975 to 1989. Initial set-backs at the hands of the Syrian-supportedMaronite Mirada militia of then-presidentSuleiman Franjiyye and the inability of Tripoli’ssmall pan-Arab and leftist parties successfullyto confront them on the battlefield, encouragedthe rise of jihadist movements. Sheikh Salimash-Shahhal, who in 1947 had founded thecountry’s first Salafi movement al-Jama’aMuslimun (literally meaning “the group is Mus-lim”), transformed it into a modest military forcein 1976 under the name of Nuwwat al-Jaysh al-Islami (Nucleus of the Islamic Army). Other smallgroups such as al-Muqawama ash-Shaabiya(Popular Resistance), Harakat Lubnan al-Arabi(Movement for Arab Lebanon) and Jundullah(Warriors of God) splintered from al-Jama’a al-Islamiya and joined Tripoli’s burgeoningHarakat at-Tawhid al-Islami (Islamic UnityMovement) under the leadership of Sheikh SaidShaaban, who eventually transformed the cityinto an Islamic emirate between 1983 and 1985.54 Ash-Shiraa (Beirut), Nov. 7, 2010.

Between 1983 and 1985,Sheikh Said Shaabantransformed the city intoan Islamic emirate.

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Outward manifestations ofmodernity disappeared withthe imposition of a total banon the sale of alcoholic bev-erages as well as the shut-tering of movie theaters, Eu-ropean-style roadside cafes,and tennis and golf courts.

Shaaban took advan-tage of the rising pan-Islam-ist sentiment among Tripoli’sreligious and conservativepopulation. He received amajor boost from the suc-cess of the Islamic revolutionin Iran, with which he identi-fied, and from whose finan-cial largesse he benefitted.He also relied heavily on thefinancial and military sup-port of Yasser Arafat’s Fatahmovement, which main-tained a strong military pres-ence in Tripoli, especially innearby Nahr al-Barid and al-Baddawi Palestinian refugee camps. DuringIsrael’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon, Yakan createdtwo guerrilla movements to combat the IsraeliDefense Forces (IDF): al-Mujahideen (TheJihadists) in Tripoli and al-Fajr (Dawn) in Sidon.

The Israeli eviction of the Palestine Libera-tion Organization from southern Lebanon andBeirut in 1982 and the Syrian expulsion of Fatahguerrillas from Tripoli in 1983 were followed in1985 by a withering assault by Syrian alliesagainst at-Tawhid forces, which ended in de-stroying the movement’s military machine. Theanti-at-Tawhid coalition included the Baath Party,the Communist Party, the Syrian Social Nation-alist Party, and the Alawite Arab DemocraticParty. Syrian intelligence operatives and Leba-nese Alawites raided at-Tawhid’s stronghold inBab at-Tibbane and massacred some six hun-dred Sunnis.6 This singular incident caused an

enduring schism between Tripoli and the Syrianregime and served as an impetus for the subse-quent emergence of extremely radical jihadistgroups, especially Usbat an-Nur (Partisans ofthe Divine Light) of Sheikh Hisham ash-Sharidi,assassinated by Fatah operatives in 1991.7 Themore lethal Islamist Abdulkarim as-Saadi tookover the group and reintroduced it as Usbat al-Ansar (The Partisans League).

SAUDI VS. HEZBOLLAH RADICALIZING

Embittered by the 1985 events, Tripoli’sSalafi movement gathered momentum with theend of the civil war, which prompted many north-ern Lebanese clerics to return from Saudi Arabiawhere they had been schooled in radicalWahhabi-type religious training. In 1995, theseIslamists killed Nizar Halabi, head of the pro-

D A T E L I N E

Khashan: Tripoli, Lebanon

5 Asharq al-Awsat, May 25, 2007.6 Al-Mustaqbal (Beirut), Dec. 5, 2007. 7 Asharq al-Awsat, May 25, 2007.

Until the mid-1970s, the profoundly conservative and devoutcity of Tripoli remained a rare oasis of religious and culturaldiversity. The city has now become synonymous with poverty,misery, and deprivation. Minimum monthly wages are as low as$170, compared to the average Lebanese wage of $335. Whereas28 percent of the Lebanese population is below the povertyline, in Tripoli, the rate is 57 percent.

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Syrian and Sufi-inspired Jam’iyat al-Mashari al-Khayriya al-Islamiya (Association of IslamicCharitable Projects, known as the Ahbash), trig-gering a harsh government response. Many Is-lamists fled to the Dinniye Mountain east of Tri-poli and regrouped into a 300-man strong radi-cal movement.8 Their excommunicatory ideologytoward moderate Muslims and rejection of non-Muslims in line with the religious edicts of IbnTaymiyah, the famously radical medieval scholar,outraged the government and invited its wrath.In January 2000, the Lebanese army routed thegroup, killed its leader Bassam al-Kanj, and ap-prehended dozens of combatants. Otherssought refuge in Ein al-Hilwa Palestinian refu-gee camp near Sidon.9

The Lebanese authorities pardoned jailedSalafis shortly after the assassination of formerprime minister Rafiq Hariri in 2005. In fact, SaadHariri, who succeeded his slain father as leaderof the Future Trend movement, opened up toradical Sunni movements with the prodding ofRiyadh, which wanted to ensure that Sunnis

were capable of standing upto the Iranian-backed ShiiteHezbollah.10 Salafi move-ments sprang up in Tripoli’spoor neighborhoods such asBab at-Tibbane, as-Suwayqa,Abi Samra, and at-Tal. Thesight of heavily bearded,armed young men and tur-baned Salafis striding in alleysmade the once bustling cityaustere and unwelcoming.11

The Hariri assassinationamounted to a coup thatblunted the Saudis’ thrust intoLebanon and reaffirmed thepreeminence of the Syrian-Hezbollah entente. Riyadh’sresponse came in the form ofarming Tripoli’s Salafis so asto allow them to stand up to

Hezbollah. As noted by the Lebanese daily al-Akhbar, “the regional underpinnings of Tripoli’ssurging jihadist Salafists are directly linked tothe conflict between Damascus and Riyadh overcontrolling Lebanon.” Indeed, while beingbankrolled by Qatar, Kuwait, and the United ArabEmirates, “every single activity by any Salafimovement is doomed to failure if it doesn’t re-ceive Saudi support.”12 Saudi aid is presentlyfunneled through the ministry of religious en-dowments and a number of private associationswhose activities are closely monitored by the gov-ernment.13 Philanthropic associations promotingjihad, such as al-Haramain, have been discontin-ued after the 9/11 attacks.

The ease with which Hezbollah managedto defeat Hariri’s al-Mustaqbal militia in Beirutin 2008 convinced the Saudi leadership thatthey could not rely on northern LebaneseSalafis, who formed the backbone of the prime

8 Now Lebanon (Beirut), accessed Feb. 7, 2011.9 Al-Markazia (Beirut), accessed Dec. 2, 2010.

10 Al-Akhbar (Beirut), June 8, 2010.11 Author interview with Rashid Jamali, former head of theTripoli municipality, Tripoli, Dec. 18, 2010.12 Al-Akhbar, Sept. 5, Oct. 21, 2010.13 King Abdulaziz Foundation for Research and Archives,Riyadh, accessed Feb. 5, 2011.

The destruction of the Islamist group, Fatah al-Islam, by theLebanese army in the Nahr al-Barid Palestinian refugee campin May to September 2007 delivered a crippling blow to theradical Salafi movement in the Tripoli area.

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minister’s militia, to serveas a countervailing militaryforce to Hezbollah.14 Theyhave thus curtailed most oftheir military assistance andcontented themselves withpromoting as-Salafiya al-Ilmiya, or official Salafi,that eschews involvement in politics. So did theother Gulf Cooperation Council states, which sup-port Tripoli’s as-Salafiya al-Irja’iya,15 the Salafipreaching group that separates belief and actionand limits itself to the former.

The destruction of Fatah al-Islam by theLebanese army in the Nahr al-Barid Palestinianrefugee camp in May to September 2007 deliv-ered a crippling blow to as-Salafiya al-Jihadiya(Jihadist Salafi), whose remnants had gone un-derground into sleeper cells. Having made itsdebut in the refugee camp in 2006, Fatah al-Is-lam doubled its initial strength of 150 fighterswithin less than a year as the army intelligence’spersecution of young, northern LebaneseSunnis, who asked for weapons to counter theShiite power surge, drove them into the arms ofthe newly-established militant group. Thegrowth, however, of this millennial movementwas preventable. Fatah al-Islam’s rise attests tothe clumsiness of Lebanese army intelligenceand the heavy army and civilian toll during theNahr al-Barid fighting.

Lebanese Salafis lay the blame onHezbollah for refusing to involve them in con-fronting the IDF and its South Lebanon Armysurrogate, accusing Hezbollah of pretentiouslylabeling itself “al-Muqawama al-Islamiya” (Is-lamic Resistance).16 In response to the denialof their access to the anti-Israel military cam-paign, the Salafis directed their energies againstthe national government.

In support of Hezbollah during the 2006

summer war against Israel,Yakan, the leader of theTripoli-based IslamicGroup, established the Is-lamic Action Front that in-cluded five pro-Syrian

Sunni Islamic groups: the two factions ofTripoli’s at-Tawhid movement of HashemMinqara and Bilal Shaaban, al-Fajr forces ofAbdullah at-Tiryaqi, Abdel Nasser Jabri’s Islamicgroup in Beirut, and Zuhair Jaid in the ShufMountains. The front disintegrated shortly af-ter Yakan’s death when cofounder HashemMinqara deemed it no longer viable becausesome of its leaders were simply using it for po-litical and financial gain.17

When the fighting raged in Tripoli in May2008 between Sunnis and Alawites, the founderof the Salafi movement, Dai al-Islam ash-Shahhal,exhorted “all committed Lebanese Muslim youngmen to prepare psychologically and logisticallyto embark upon a new period [of armed resis-tance].” He made it clear that he was not lookingfor volunteers from abroad but “direly neededfinancial assistance.”18 Later, as the final show-down loomed large in connection with the Haririassassination indictments, Shahhal warnedHezbollah against “inciting Sunni fratricide in or-der to render the sect politically irrelevant.”19 Yetfor all his exertions, he failed to persuade the Sau-dis to resume their financial support for rebuild-ing the Salafis’ military machine.

POVERTY-STRICKEN SALAFIS

Tripoli has no place on the Lebanese eco-nomic, developmental, and tourist map as itsname “has become synonymous with poverty,misery, and deprivation.”20 With free medical

D A T E L I N E

Khashan: Tripoli, Lebanon

The Hariri assassinationblunted the Saudis’ thrust intoLebanon and reaffirmed thepreeminence of the Syrian-Hezbollah entente.

14 Al-Akhbar, Oct. 21, 2010.15 Hana Ulayan, “At-Tayyarat al-Wahabiyya fish Shamal:bayna an-Nahj ad-Dini wal Maghnatis as-Sisyasi,” Harakat at-Tawhid al-Islami-Majlis al-Qiyada website, Dec. 16, 2010.16 In March 1978, Israel invaded southern Lebanon, estab-lished a narrow security zone, and created the Southern Leba-nese Army (SLA). It dismantled the SLA and unilaterally with-drew from the security zone in May 2000.

17 Al-Akhbar, Dec. 1, 2009.18 Asharq al-Awsat, May 13, 2008.19 As-Safir (Beirut), Jan. 2, 2010.20 Talal Khuja, “Tarablus bayna al-Qal’a al-Mughlaqa wa-l-Madina al-Maftuha,” Middle East Transparent website, Oct.27, 2010.


21 Ash-Shiraa, Nov. 1, 2010.22 Author interview with Jamali.23 Al-Liwaa (Beirut), Jan. 10, 2011.24 Makram Sader, “Tatawur al-Qita al-Masrifi 1990-2010,”Association of Banks in Lebanon, Beirut, Dec. 2010.

services virtually nonexist-ent, and minimum monthlywages often as low as $170,compared to the averageLebanese wage of $335; with a youth unemploy-ment rate of 45 percent and a truancy rate thatexceeds 20 percent, it is not difficult to under-stand why Tripoli is such an ideal breedingground for Salafis. Whereas 28 percent of theLebanese population is below the poverty line,in Tripoli, it is 57 percent.21 Annual per capitaexpenditure in Lebanon averages $2,700, but inTripoli it is $1,700—compared to $4,300 in Beirut.With 9,700 persons per square kilometer, it isovercrowded.22

Tripoli’s economic decline dates back to the1970s when the city suffered a number of severeblows: Iraq’s construction of the Basra offshoreoil terminal and the Kirkuk pipeline terminal inTurkey’s Ceyhan rendered Tripoli’s terminal use-less. The city’s decaying oil refinery, which pre-viously provided about 40 percent of Lebanon’sannual refined oil needs, was permanently shutdown in 1993. Its full rehabilitation at an esti-mated cost of $300 million can save the countryup to $ 1.2 billion from the importation of refinedoil derivatives.23 Nevertheless, there is a long-standing Lebanese policy against governmentinvestment in the city. In addition, Beirut receives83 percent of Lebanon’s total banking credit com-pared to Tripoli’s 2 percent.24

Since 1975, Tripoli has lost 80 percent ofits economy. Forty percent was lost in 1989alone as a result of the Assad government’sdecision to allow the Syrian private sector toimport from the international market. While thecivil war cut off Tripoli from its traditional north-ern Lebanese, Christian market, the Syrianssevered all economic and social ties betweenthe city and the cities of Homs, Hama, andTartus. The scarcity of employment opportuni-

ties has negatively shapedthe worldview of many ofTripoli’s young men andmotivated them to seek sal-

vation in religious extremism.

GLIMMER OF HOPE

Representatives from six moderate, north-ern Lebanese Salafi movements disapproved ofFatah al-Islam’s militancy that culminated in theMay 2007 all-out confrontation with the Leba-nese army. The joint statement they issued un-derlined that Shari‘a (Islamic law) stresses,among other things, the preservation of the pil-lars of dignified human living that include reli-gion, family honor, personal safety, and pecuni-ary assets. The unequivocal statement called foran immediate end to the fighting, eviction of theradicals from the Nahr al-Barid refugee camp,and promotion of allegiance to state authority.25

Combating jihadists remind many Tripoli resi-dents, including benign Salafis, of the three darkyears of terror when at-Tawhid reigned supremein the city. Their religiosity notwithstanding,most Tripoli residents are averse to the imposi-tion of Shari‘a rule in the city.26

People in Tripoli’s depressed areas havelittle faith in the government and exhibit unmis-takable disenchantment with the willingness ofthe Lebanese political system to redeem them.27

The city may be a bastion of the Salafi move-ment, but its roots are essentially non-belliger-ent. Militancy is not entrenched as in some Shiiteneighborhoods in Lebanon or in Islamist societ-ies like Yemen or Somalia. Deconstructing thephenomenon of Tripoli’s Islamic radicalism isclearly a function of integrating it economicallyand culturally in the Lebanese political system.It is quite remarkable that the city has not turnedfar worse after more than ninety years of delib-erate marginalization.

Militancy is not entrenchedas in Islamist societies likeYemen or Somalia.

25 Now Lebanon, May 22, 2007.26 Lebanese prime minister Najib Mikati’s website, accessedFeb. 7, 2011.27 Author interview with Jamali.

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The Arab Public Sphere in Israel: Media Spaceand Cultural Resistance. By Amal Jamal.Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana Univer-sity Press, 2009. 182 pp. $24.95, paper.

The problems with this book begin with thetitle as the book is not at all about “the Arabpublic sphere.” It is a superficial review of thedifferences between the Hebrew and Arabicmedia operating in Israel, one overflowing withbias and anti-Israeli bile.

Jamal, an Israeli Druze from the Galilee area,is one of a minority of Druze intellectuals whoidentify themselves as Palestinian Arabs. Thushis aim throughout is to twist things to conformto his conspiracist take on Israeli society, in whichTel Aviv plots to manipulate the minds of itsArab citizens and subjugate them by means ofmedia control.

Relying on two unscientific surveys, Jamalessentially shows that Arabs read and listen tothe Hebrew media less than do Jews, who inturn listen to and follow the Arabic media lessthan do Arabs. This conclusion is not only trivialbut self-evident. But Jamal is not content withprinting a few tables and statistics taken fromsurveys.

His agenda is apparent everywhere in thebook in his choice of rhetoric:

He uses the term “hegemonial” with regu-larity while Israel has a “ferocious military gov-ernment” engaged in “cultural imperialism” viaits “media policy” against its “Palestinian” mi-nority. Pity the poor reader who does not realizethat the Israeli government does not control anyof the country’s Arabic media. With no sense ofhis own self-contradiction, he insists that Jerusa-lem is obsessed with the control and surveil-lance of the Arab media, but at the same time,faults it for ignoring Arab opinion and the Arabicmedia altogether.

The book is most notable for what it at-tempts to hide: Israel is the only place in theMiddle East where Arabs enjoy a free press, sofree it is often openly seditious. The Israeli me-

Brief Reviewsdia, for the most part, are owned by the privatesector, which is predominantly leftist. Besides,the explosion of Internet technology and count-less Arab and Arabic blogs from inside and out-side Israel, make his claims about “control of themedia” and “mind control through the media”simply laughable.

Jamal’s book is an ideological assaultagainst Israel disguised as an academic ex-ploration that ill-serves his readers and mockshis academic pretensions.

Steven Plaut University of Haifa

Edward Said: The Charisma of Criticism. By H.Aram Veeser. New York: Routledge, 2010. 260pp. $39.95.

In this hagiography of the late Edward Said,Veeser, of the English department at City Col-

Reviews


lege of New York, purports to present the manbehind the myth, a devotee of Savile Row tailorswho, at the same time, allegedly chastised theWest and the Palestine Liberation Organization(PLO) with equal gusto.

To his credit, Veeser unmasks several con-tradictions within the character of his icon, ac-knowledging, for example, that despite his wishto “preserve a distance” from the PLO, Saideventually supported it. The author sees thissomehow as a “political error” in which Saidstole “victory from youthful fighters” and, bycooperating with the PLO, mistakenly handedit to “corrupt old men.” Never mind that these“youthful fighters” were financially and mor-ally supported in their butchery of Israeli civil-ians by the “old men”; Said’s change of heartwas a “tragic irony” that came a “decade toolate.”

Veeser dilates upon Said’s magnum opus,Orientalism, but critical examination is absent.Throughout his life’s work, Said substituted onestereotype for another. Indeed, European influ-ence in the Middle East and North Africa didexist for a few hundred years, but before, dur-ing, and, to some degree, after the influence ofEuropeans began to be felt, it was the OttomanEmpire, another active and aggressive colonialpower, which had the greatest influence in theregion.

Thus Said’s true legacy is one of defend-ing Islamic imperialism and indulging in politi-cized rhetoric heavy with accusations and re-sentment, an appraisal not shared by Veeser.Said’s work was intellectually shallow and sev-eral of his assertions about his background areapparently fraudulent.1 One is never quite surewhether his support for Arab violence was dueto tribalism, insecurity about his origins, or tohis undoubted capacity for self-pity, an unat-tractive characteristic not rendered invisible bythe cut of a Savile Row suit.

Reut R. CohenVan Nuys, Calif.

The Goldstone Report: The Legacy of the Land-mark UN Investigation of the Gaza Conflict. Ed-ited by Adam Horowitz, Lizzy Ratner, and PhilipWeiss. New York: Nation Books, 2011. 480 pp.$18.95, paper.

Ever since its release in September 2009, theGoldstone “Report of the United Nations FactFinding Mission on the Gaza Conflict” has beenthe catalyst for contentious debate over the le-gitimacy of the Jewish state. With the over-whelming thrust of the report condemning Is-rael for war crimes and crimes against humanity,it is invoked by the boycott, divestment, andsanctions (BDS) movement against Israel anddrives a lawfare campaign against the country’sleaders, using the law and legal systems for stra-tegic political ends. Supporters of Israel fromacross the political spectrum have criticized themission for its biased mandate, lack of objectiv-ity, and duplicitous methodology. With the re-port already thoroughly scrutinized and dis-sected, is there anything significant to add?

There is, but readers will not find it in thisbook.

There is nothing, for example, about the chal-lenges to the assumption that the vast majorityof Gazan fatalities were civilian. The authorsnever mention reports indicating that many ofthose killed in Gaza were young men who fit theage and gender profile of combatants. Indeed,Hamas’s recent revelations confirming manycombatants among the fatalities underscorethese findings, confirm Israel’s original esti-mates, and invalidate the Goldstone report’s cen-tral thesis that Israel was intentionally targetingcivilians.

But the authors, all journalists, find no roomfor facts that might undermine the underlyingassumptions of the report. Instead, they devotethe bulk of the book to reprinting large sectionsof the report, interspersed with excerpts fromwitness testimonies although this material isreadily available in its entirety online. There isno serious attempt to probe the report or ana-lyze its shortcomings. The last quarter of thebook consists of eleven selected essays, writ-ten by prominent anti-Israel activists or emo-tional pro-Palestinian advocates, with one ex-

1 Justus Reid Weiner, “‘My Beautiful Old House’ and OtherFabrications by Edward Said,” Commentary, Sept. 1999.

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ception. Their arguments are tiresomely familiar:“The real purpose of the 2005 withdrawal of Jew-ish settlements in Gaza was to consolidateIsrael’s continued occupation”; “Israeli forcesdeliberately targeted civilians and civilian ob-jects”; “None of the Goldstone Mission’s majorfactual findings have been successfully re-futed,” etc. Actually such claims have beenwidely disputed, but these arguments are notincluded.

The single negative assessment—a reprintof an article by Moshe Halbertal—containsthoughtful if relatively mild criticism but is im-mediately followed by an attempt to discredit it.Its inclusion does not succeed in masking thebook’s overt, political agenda—to bolster thepro-BDS-delegitimize-Israel position.

Ricki HollanderCAMERA

India’s Israel Policy. By P.R. Kumaraswamy. NewYork: Columbia University Press, 2010. 376 pp.$55.

India’s bilateral, under-explored relationshipwith Israel is wrapped in myths that Kuma-raswamy, associate professor at JawaharlalNehru University, New Delhi, debunks in his au-thoritative study. He also answers a number ofquestions: Why did India wait for far-reachinginternational changes before modifying its policyof non-recognition toward Israel? Is there a pat-tern in India’s new-found relationship with Is-rael? How relevant has the role played by thedomestic Muslim population been in shapingIndia’s Israel policy?

Kumaraswamy covers the period 1920-92,dividing it into four phases: (1) India’s national-ist struggle and an unfavorable disposition to-ward Jewish political aspirations in Palestine;(2) the formation of the state of Israel in May1948 and Prime Minister Nehru’s assurances inMarch 1952 of normalized relations with Israel;(3) the decision in 1952 to defer recognition ofIsrael while Delhi’s attitude toward Jerusalemhardened; (4) Prime Minister P.V. NarasimhaRao’s reversal of the traditional policy and es-tablishment of full diplomatic relations with Is-rael in 1992.

Kumaraswamy demonstrates the relation-ship’s complexities with its public and privaterealms frequently diverging. New Delhi’s non-recognition of Israel in 1949 did not prevent itfrom seeking agricultural assistance from theJewish state. Nor did public denunciations ofIsrael prevent Nehru from seeking military as-sistance from David Ben-Gurion in 1962 duringthe Sino-Indian conflict. The lack of diplomaticrelations between the two countries did not pre-vent India’s external intelligence arm—the Re-search and Analysis Wing—from sending itspersonnel to Israel for specialized training, es-pecially following the assassination of IndiraGandhi in 1984.

Kumaraswamy’s chronological divisionscould use some fine-tuning. As the author him-self notes, the groundwork to establish diplomaticrelations with Israel in 1992 was prepared duringthe tenure of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi whoundertook a number of significant, conciliatoryinitiatives toward Israel. Thus the rather long thirdphase (1952-92) should perhaps have been di-vided further.


Additionally, while the author does exam-ine the role of international factors on the bilat-eral relationship between Delhi and Jerusalem,he treats them as too minor a factor. As one ofthe first countries to escape the yoke of colo-nialism, India sought to burnish its “anti-impe-rialist” credentials. In the period following theSuez crisis, when Israel worked together withformer colonial powers Britain and France, NewDelhi was compelled to adopt an anti-Israelistance so it could be seen as a leader of theanti-imperialist forces. The study would havebenefited from an expansion on this internationalcontext and how the external environment con-strained New Delhi’s foreign policy in its bilat-eral ties with Israel.

Despite this minor critique, the book remainsthe definitive account of bilateral relations be-tween India and Israel and serves as the au-thoritative study on the subject.

Hussein SolomonUniversity of the Free State, South Africa

Language, Memory, and Identity in the MiddleEast: The Case for Lebanon. By Franck Salameh.Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010. 289 pp.$80.

Most books on Lebanon crafted with sym-pathy and discernment are exercises in exploringthe spirit of this singular country and its people.Salameh, a language professor at Boston College,demonstrates a unique approach to understand-ing that singularity. The essence of his thesis isthat language—one rooted in the distant past andleavened with a multiplicity of more contempo-rary influences—continues to leave its imprintboth on how the Lebanese communicate in thepopular domain but also on what makes Lebanonthe extraordinary human venture it is.

Salameh attempts to solve this puzzle by con-tending that there is no “single homogenous Arabcultural mass” but a diversity of ethnicities, lan-guages, and peoples across the Middle East. Infact, Arabic, the supposed glue that holds to-gether this disparate mass of humanity, “is a deadlanguage.” No Arab really speaks Arabic: Differ-ent peoples in their respective countries speakEgyptian, Tunisian, Moroccan, or Lebanese.

There is no cohesive Arab nation, no collectiveArab memory, and thus no living “pure” Arabiclanguage.

The case of Lebanon’s language and its au-thenticity was elevated to a sacred mission bySaïd Akl, poet, linguist, and philosopher, who as-sumes a central role in Salameh’s narrative. Hepaints a vivid human portrait of the great man(born in 1912 and still living) who, among otherthings, proposed a Lebanese alphabet to replacethe Arabic, thus liberating the spoken languagefrom its Arabic moorings, much like the decisionby Atatürk to write Turkish in Latin characters.For Akl, that alphabet is nothing more than aPhoenician creation, so that introducing Latinizedcharacters into Lebanon would actually be an actof cultural recovery. For most Muslims and Ar-abs, however, it would be a separatist rebellionand viewed as a declaration of war against theArab world.

The sub-text of the language controversythen is the struggle of a Christian community inLebanon to survive and flourish in the Muslim

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Middle East that is experiencing a sweeping Is-lamist tidal wave. Also, the debate as to whetherthe Lebanese are really Arabs has yet to be re-solved. Akl and other intellectuals—for instance,Charles Corm and Michel Chiha—hammeredaway at the notion that the Lebanese are not Ar-abs at all. For them, and now for Salameh, theneighborhood norms of Islam and Arabic haveno authority to overwhelm or suppress the spe-cific features of Lebanon.

Salameh’s meticulous research makes for amost worthy book that makes a significant con-tribution to the literature. His study elucidates acore aspect of national identity with repercus-sions for all the Arabic-speaking countries. Theauthor questions a conventional and sanctifiedconcept of an Arab world which, battered andbruised by internecine political rivalries and ani-mosities, is as desiccated as a Middle Easterndesert in the heat of summer.

Mordechai NisanThe Rothberg International School

Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Radical State: How Jihad Is Winning over De-mocracy in the West. By Abigail R. Esman. SantaBarbara: Praeger Security International, 2010. 245pp. $34.95.

With an artful interweaving of the Nether-lands’ past thirty years, plus her own experiencesas a resident there, and personalized accounts ofinteractions with prominent Dutch leaders in poli-tics, art, and academia, Esman offers a clear andpowerfully evocative account of the processwhereby Islamist political agitators, violent Mus-lim criminals, and Muslim terrorist ideologues are,step by step, bringing about the demise of a West-ern democracy.

Her book charts the descent of both Dutchsociety and government into a self-intensifyingspiral of increasing submission to Muslim intol-erance. Honor killings, genital mutilation, childand forced marriages, violence against homosexu-als, the silencing of criticism through intimidationand murder, and a meteoric rise in high-profileincidents of anti-Semitism all combine to trans-form what was once one of the most stable and

tolerant nations in Europe into a dark and inhos-pitable home for non-Muslim Dutch.

Perhaps as threatening as the events them-selves are the responses, or lack thereof, fromDutch leaders. Esman skillfully examines thegovernment’s inept and counterproductive leg-islation and the refusal of many in positions ofleadership in media, academia, and education todeal with these Muslim-inspired, socio-religiousdynamics. Muslim threats to Dutch civil libertiesand democracy are unquestionably a dire men-ace, but the way in which Dutch officials dismissthese threats is itself of even greater concern.

She concludes that tolerance of intoleranceis not tolerance but appeasement, and appease-ment emboldens the aggressor. Thus Holland’sdecades-long forbearance with intolerant Islam-ists has resulted in the growth of a young,radicalized, Muslim population that is pushingthe Netherlands into a form of national and cul-tural suicide.

Esman’s message concerns not just the Neth-


erlands but, as her title suggests, the West as awhole.

David Meir-LeviScholars for Peace in the Middle East

Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism.By John Calvert. London: Hurst & Co., 2010. 377pp. $29.50.

Undoubtedly, the Egyptian radical SayyidQutb (1906-66) has been one of the most influen-tial thinkers in the history of Islamism. It is there-fore surprising that despite the frequency andvolume of references made to him, this is the firstcomprehensive biography of him in English.Calvert, an associate professor of history atCreighton University, Nebraska, has produced abiography that is lively, sensitive, and methodi-cal, and represents a landmark study of seriousvalue to students, academics, and general read-ers alike.

Qutb lived through eventful times, andCalvert’s study is as much a political history ofmodern Egypt through the prism of Sayyid Qutbas it is a biography of the man and a study of histhought. A rare intellectual within the movement,Qutb is a figure whose life narrative is every bit asimportant as his ideological output. “I preferredthe clamour of the storm to the silence of tranquil-lity,” he once maintained, but he said this whenhe was a prominent literary critic—long before hebecame an Islamist radical. Qutb’s radical articu-lation of Islamist ideology during his final yearsusually receives the most attention, but Calvertplaces such thinking within the wider context ofQutb’s life as a whole and details how it evolvedto this final incarnation. Qutb laid the founda-tions for Islamism’s most extreme manifestationsfollowing his execution. Still, Calvert is careful toobserve that Qutb himself would have been hor-rified by the Islamist excommunication of self-pro-claimed Muslims and the resulting wantonslaughter and indifference to noncombatant sta-tus witnessed today. True, Qutb popularized thecondemnation of Muslims in the culture and civi-lization around him as living in a state of “igno-rance” or “barbarism” comparable to the pre-Is-lamic era. However, he never characterized them

as “infidels” as his successors did. Likewise,though he was clearly a dissenter who endorsedrevolutionary violence, his radicalism was notstagnant but was a position he embraced gradu-ally following years of systematic abuse.

Civil servant, literary critic, revolutionaryicon, Qur’anic commentator, persecuted dissenter,feted martyr: Calvert’s biography captures themany faces of Qutb. For his followers, Qutb’s per-secution by Nasser’s regime is an ordeal compa-rable to the trials of Ahmad ibn Hanbal (d. 855) orIbn Taymiyya (d. 1328). Yet Qutb was not a cleric,and the literalist heirs of Ibn Hanbal and IbnTaymiyya have frequently denounced Qutb’s figu-rative and spiritual readings of Islamic scriptureas deviant. Examining the breadth of Qutb’s pro-lific writings, Calvert concludes that it is the am-biguity of Qutb’s thought that is the key to hisdangerous legacy.

Richard PhelpsQuilliam Foundation, London

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