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The Aesthetic (Rassvad) and the Religious (Brahmsvda) in Abhinavagupta's Kashmir aivismAuthor(s): Gerald James LarsonReviewed work(s):Source: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Oct., 1976), pp. 371-387Published by: University of Hawai'i PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1398282 .Accessed: 08/07/2012 16:51
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Gerald James Larson The aesthetic (rasasvada) and the religious (brahmdsvada) in Abhinavagupta's Kashmir Saivism
In recent years a significant number of publications have appeared analyzing the work of the well-known tenth and early eleventh-century Kashmir Saiva thinker, Abhinavagupta. In these publications there has been a noticeable division in focus. On one side, such Indologists and Sanskritists as S. K. De, E. Gerow, A. Aklujkar, R. Gnoli, S. Iyer, J. L. Masson, M. V. Patwardhan, V. Raghavan, D. S. Ruegg, G. Sastri and others have addressed themselves to problems of language and aesthetics in Abhinavagupta's work and have shown that Abhinavagupta made important contributions in these areas.' On the other side, researchers like Gopinath Kaviraj, K. C. Pandey, Andre Padoux, Lilian Silburn, and others have focused that attention on Abhinava- gupta's work in mystical theology, monistic philosophy, and the Hindu tantra and have shown that Abhinavagupta made equally important contributions in these areas.2 Both groups of scholars, of course, have made reference to both sides of Abhinavagupta's work and have referred, at least in passing, to possible connections between these two seemingly disparate dimensions in the corpus of Abhinavagupta. Thus far, however, few attempts have been made systematically to develop an overall theoretical clarification of Abhina- vagupta's intellectual contribution. Partly, to be sure, this reticence has been due to the lack of scholarly editions and translations of the vast and difficult corpus of Abhinavagupta, and, as a result, even now, though many primary and secondary works are becoming available, one must exercise caution in attempting to raise the issue of theoretical clarification, recognizing that corrections and amplifications will undoubtedly be necessary as further textual research proceeds. Nevertheless, one of the primary tasks of the historian of religious thought is precisely to raise issues of overall theoretical clarification, for only a broadly based, interdisciplinary approach (making use of Indology, philosophy, history, philology, and theology) is able to provide access to what the historian of religious thought must understand-namely, the religious significance of what he studies, or in this case, the religious significance of Abhinavagupta. Thus, this article is a tentative and exploratory attempt to raise the issue of theoretical clarification with respect to the work of Abhina- vagupta, an attempt which hopefully will prove useful, at least heuristically, not only to historians of religious thought but to researchers working in highly specialized aspects of the corpus of Abhinavagupta as well.
Unlike most ancient cultural traditions of India about which we know very
Gerald James Larson is Professor and Chairman of the Department of Religious Studies, University of California, Santa Barbara. AUTHOR'S NOTE: This paper was first presented at the meeting of the International Association for the History of Religions in Lancaster, England, in August of 1975. Philosophy East and West 26, no. 4, October 1976. ? by The University Press of Hawaii. All rights reserved.
little, the culture and history of Kashmir is not completely opaque to the intellectual historian. Especially in Kalhana's Rajatarahgint, written in the twelfth century A.D., we have an important quasi-history or near-history of the Kashmir area which provides a valuable and reasonably accurate picture of the social-cultural life of the region from the eighth or ninth centuries onward.3 Prior to the eighth century, we know that Kashmir was a center for Buddhist studies.4 Already in the reign of Asoka in the third century B.C., some Buddhist traditions had spread to the Kashmir region.5 Moreover, from the first few centuries A.D., beginning with the reign of Kaniska and thereafter, Kashmir became an important center for northern Buddhist developments including traditions of Sarvastivada, the Graeco-Buddhist art of Gandhara, and early Mahayana both in its popular manifestations and in its more intellectual formulations of Madhyamika and Yogacara. Running parallel through these Buddhist centuries in the Kashmir area there were also developing traditions of an archaic Naga cult together with the emergence of the early texts of Saivagama, although very little is known about these latter traditions prior to the eighth or the ninth century.6 At any rate, there is enough evidence, even for these earlier centuries, to suggest that, in spite of the geographical isolation of the Kashmir valley, the region was unusually cosmopolitan, wherein tradi- tions of Hindu, Buddhist, Jain, Central Asian and even Mediterranean culture freely intermingled and cross-fertilized one another.
It was, however, the political expansion under the powerful king, Lalitaditya, in the eighth century, and the cultural consolidation under King Avantivarman in the ninth century that presumably provided the social reality requisite for the emergence of what we now call Kashmir Saivism.7 Hindu culture in all of its dimensions was patronized and encouraged, including poetry, drama, music, dance, dars'ana, vydkarana, temple building, smrti, purdna, and tantra. Well-known br5hmana-panditas were brought from elsewhere in north India to Kashmir, and Abhinavagupta, in a later text, comments that his ancestor, Atrigupta, came to Kashmir by invitation of King Lalitaditya in this period.8 It should be noted, moreover, that even in this time of Hindu ascendancy, Buddhist studies were also encouraged, and one can only wonder about and perhaps envy the vigorous debates and intellectual exchange that must surely have taken place in the period. It should also be noted that this was probably the era of the great Sanikaracarya, and one is strongly tempted to believe the tradition which asserts that Safikara visited Kashmir during his career both to carry on his polemic against the Buddhists as well as to help reshape the older dualistic Saiva traditions in the region.9
In any case, a reshaping of the older Saiva traditions was precisely what took place, and the reshaping moved primarily in two distinct directions. Vasugupta and Kallata are credited with the founding of spanda-sistra, a collection of religious speculations focusing around the idea of consciousness as "vibration;" and Somananda and Utpaladeva are generally credited with
establishing pratyabhijhii-sstra, a collection of philosophical writings dealing mainly with the notion of "re-cognition."10 Both traditions apparently grew out of the older Saivagama and undoubtedly represent efforts to construct more sophisticated interpretations of Saivite religion and philosophy.ll These religiophilosophical traditions taken together are referred to as the Trika- that is, triple, threefold or "forming a triad," usually construed to mean the triad siva, sakti, and anu, or the triad pati, pasa, and pasu (that is, the lord, the fetters, the souls, respectively). The Sanskrit literature of the movement is extensive as can be seen in the numerous volumes of the Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies, and the active intellectual life of the movement runs from the late-eighth or early-ninth centuries through the twelfth or thirteenth centuries or roughly until the period that Kashmir came under the control of invading Muslims. Key figures in the movement, in addition to Vasugupta, Kallata, Somananda, and Utpaladeva, included Laksmana, Ramakantha, Abhinavagupta, Ksemaraja, Yogaraja, and Jayaratha.12 It was primarily, however, in the latter part of the tenth century and the early eleventh-and interestingly in the reign of the infamous Queen Didda13-that the school reached its highest point under the influence of one of the most remarkable minds that India has produced, Abhinavagupta.14 Coming from a famous brihamana family, Abhinavagupta was trained, according to tradition, in Saiva philosophy, the Kula and Krama systems of the Hindu tantra, Jain thought, and Mahayana Buddhist philosophy (primarily Yogacara).15 In addition, his numerous writings indicate a careful training in traditions of the philosophy of language as represented in Mimamsaka and Naiyayika thought as well as the linguistic speculations of the famed Bhartrhari, together with a careful training in alamkara-sastra or Sanskrit poetics as represented in the works of Bharata, Anandavardhana, Bhattanayaka, and Bhattatauta.16 He composed numerous works touching on many of these subjects and, according to all accounts, made distinctive contributions primarily in three areas: first, in the area of pratyabhijhii-sastra, in which his Isvarapratyabhijha- vivrtivimarsin, his LaghvTvrtti, and his Paramirthasara became perhaps most well known; second, in the area of alamkara-sastra, in which his Dhvanya- lokalocana and his AbhinavabharatT became famous; and finally in the area of tantra, in which he set forth a massive twelve-volume synthesis of the mystical Saiva philosophy and tantra, known as Tantrdloka.17 As just indicated, his corpus is so vast and difficult that there has been a tendency to focus on one or another aspect of his work, thereby creating the impression that these various areas of his interest were really quite separate. As translations and studies have emerged, however, and as one begins to get a picture of Abhinavagupta's technical terminology, which clearly carries over into all the areas of his interests (namely, philosophy of language, philosophy of religion, tantra and poetics), one begins to get a sense of an overall integrity and intellectual pro- gram that, in many ways, is one of the most remarkable legacies of classical or
medieval Indian culture, as valuable as and in many ways more impressive than that of Kalidasa, Nagarjuna, Vasubandhu, Saiikara, or Ramanuja. Subsequent development in Indian poetics, even down to our own time, is inconceivable apart from Abhinavagupta, and many of the later poetic- theologies of the Vaisnava Goswamins in north India as well as the later systematic interpretations of theistic Vai.nava and Saiva thought in south India undoubtedly owe much to his contribution.18
THE PROBLEM OF RASASVADA AND BRAHMASVADA
In order to get at this overall integrity or unified intellectual program of Abhinavagupta, I propose to focus my comments around the issue of the relationship between rasasvdda (the enjoyment of aesthetic tasting) and brahmisvada (the enjoyment of spiritual realization) in Abhinavagupta's thought. In terms of what we presently know of the Abhinavagupta corpus, this appears to be a crucial issue for understanding Abhinavagupta's unique theosophy or "metaphilosophy" together with his philosophy of language, his aesthetics or poetics, and his appropriation and reinterpretation of earlier traditions of Indian philosophy.19 Using this issue as a focus, I wish to suggest the following: (1) that Abhinavagupta assimilates but clearly goes beyond the older grammarian-philosophers, including Bhartrhari, by redefining the role and function of language; (2) that he assimilates but goes beyond any view that would reduce the religious experience to the aesthetic experience; and (3) that he assimilates but goes beyond the position of Advaita as a philoso- phical treatment of the monistic position. His overall intellectual vision, moreover, is not the negation of language, art, and philosophy, but rather a vigorous defense of their integrity and reality-an integrity and reality dialecti- cally construed vis-a-vis brahmisvida.
In the introduction of this article I referred to a split or divorce in research publications on Abhinavagupta with some focusing on his poetics and other focusing on his religious and philosophical speculations. That split or divorce, as I indicated at the beginning, is partly due to the extent and difficulty of Abhinavagupta's work, but one might also argue that it is, to some extent, symptomatic of a more general division in many cultures between those interested in what might be called the immediate, undifferentiated aesthetic dimension of experience and those interested in the more theoretical, discursive problems of logic, epistemology, and philosophy in general.20 In India this more general division is evidenced in the polarity, which can be traced over many centuries, between kavya and sistra. Most learned men were trained in both, but it is not unusual to find thinkers working in either one or the other. Moreover, one frequently senses a certain hostility or indifference in each toward the other. Masson and Patwardhan rather nicely capture, albeit in a somewhat anachronistic manner, what must surely have been in the minds of numerous poets when they comment,
One's mind is irreverently invaded by an image of Kalidasa politely bored, listening to Abhinavagupta explain to him the deeper significance of his plays, his ears really attuned to the joyous shouts of the spring festival taking place outside.21
At the same time, however, in many cultures there are at least a few seminal minds who attempt to bridge or assimilate divisions like this. In the history of European thought, for example, one thinks of Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, Heideg- ger, and so forth. In the intellectual history of India, unfortunately, one finds very few such minds, partly, I suppose, because patterns of education tended to limit the scope of a pandita to a rather narrow cultural focus; partly because caste restrictions limited learning largely to an elite priestly group, whose preoccupations were primarily religious; and partly also because of what Edgerton once called the "extraordinary norm" of moksa in Indian culture, which encouraged a kind of religious imperialism that devoured all other aspects of culture in a way unmatched in any but the most archaic of social environments.22
Whatever the reasons, India has produced few minds that have attempted to interpret the significance of the various aspects of culture in a balanced manner, and, hence, one is rather amazed to find Abhinavagupta and others in the Kashmir region in this period not only speaking about possible analogies or homologies between the aesthetic and the religious, but even more than that, writing extensive treatises on drama, poetry, music, language, religion, and philosophy.
Regarding the specific problem of rasavada and brahmasvada, it was evidently Bhattanayaka, toward the end of the ninth century, who first called attention to the issue.23 In an eleventh-century work of Mahimabhatta, Bhattanayaka is quoted as follows:
Dramatic performances and the music accompanying them feed the Rasa in all its fulness; hence the spectator, absorbed in the tasting of this, turning inward, feels pleasure through the whole performance. Sunk into his own being, he forgets everything (pertaining to practical life). There is manifested in him that flow of inborn pleasure, from which the yogins draw their satis- faction.24
Abhinavagupta himself refers to the issue in his AbhinavabharatL, a commentary on Bharata's Nf.tya-sastra. Abhinavagupta in the context of citing various views about the nature of the aesthetic experience discusses with approval a view which he characterizes as follows:
Therefore ... Rasa is revealed (bhivyamana) by a special power assumed by words in poetry and drama, the power of revelation (bhavani)-to be distin- guished from the power of denotation-consisting of the action of generalizing the determinants, etc. (i.e., vibhavas, anubhavas, etc.) This power has the faculty of suppressing the thick layer of mental stupor (moha) occupying our own consciousness. ...
Rasa, revealed by this power, is then enjoyed (bhuj) with a kind of enjoyment (bhoga), different from direct experience, memory, etc. This enjoyment, by virtue of the different forms of contact between sattva and rajah and tamah ... is characterized by a resting (visranti) on one's own consciousness (samvit), which due to the emergent state of sattva, is pervaded by beatitude (ananda) and light (prakisa), and is similar to the tasting (asvida) of the supreme brahman. (... parabrahmisvadasavidhena bhogena param bhujyata iti.)25 Clearly in this passage Abhinavagupta is only stressing a similarity (savidha) between rasdsvida and brahmasvada, and one sees even more clearly in other passages that whatever homology Abhinavagupta points to between the two experiences is often in the direction of allowing the fundamental and final dissimilarity between the two to emerge.26 For example, Abhinavagupta in another passage of AbhinavabhdratT comments,
Therefore, the tasting of Rasa (which consists in a camatkira different from any other kind of ordinary cognition) differs from memory, inference and any form of ordinary self-consciousness ... This tasting is distinguished (a) from perception of the ordinary sentiments (delight, etc.) aroused by the ordinary means of cognition (perception, infer- ence ... etc.); (b) from cognition without active participation of the thoughts of others (namely, yogi-pratyaksa); and (c) from the compact (ekaghana) experience of one's own beatitude, which is proper to yogins of higher orders (presumably brahmasvdda) ... Indeed, these three forms of congition are deprived of beauty (saundarya- virahat).27 Thus, although there is a striking family similarity between rasisvdda and brahmdsvdda, there appears to be no doubt in Abhinavagupta's mind that they cannot be reduced to one another. Visvanatha, a later fourteenth-century poetics writer, calls attention to this striking family likeness by commenting, Rasa is tasted by qualified persons. It is tasted by virtue of the emergence of sattva. It is made up of full Intelligence, Beatitude and Self-Luminosity. It is void of contact with any other knowable thing, twin brother to the tasting of brahman. It is animated by a camatkdra of a non-ordinary nature. It is tasted as if it were our very being, in indivisibility.28
In attempting to unpack the significance of this issue of rasisvada and brahmaisvdda in Abhinavagupta's work, it is useful to look, first, at his general views regarding language and poetics; secondly, at his theosophical or "meta- philosophical" views; and, finally, at possible interrelations between the two together with possible interrelations and contrasts with the Advaita position. Such a breakdown is not simply for the sake of ease of exposition but reflects to some extent Abhinavagupta's own approach.29
(1) Language andpoetics. Both Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta were familiar with older discussions among Naiyayikas, Mimamsakas, and gram- marians regarding the nature of words (sabda) and their meanings (artha). Prabhakara and some other Mimamsakas had argued for the theory of
anvitibhidhina, or the doctrine that meaning resides in words alone and that the relations between these words in a sentence provide the basis for a verbal judgment.30 Kumarila and other Mimamsakas had argued for the theory of abhihitinvaya or the doctrine that verbal meanings are more important than the words themselves and that these verbal meanings come to be related to one another in a verbal judgment by means of a secondary denotation or laksani.31 Various Naiyayikas had maintained a position, combining to some extent the views of both Prabhakara and Kumarila, and added evidently yet a third capacity of language known as titparyasakti or an "extradenotative function" which provides the "motive-power" of the verbal judgment.32 In all of these discussions, therefore, three primary functions of language were gradually being isolated: a primary denotative function (abhidha); a secondary or meta- phorical function (laksa.na); and an extra-denotative function or motive-power (tatparyasakti). Moreover, Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta were also familiar with the work of Bhartrhari and other grammarian philosophers who had argued for the theory of akhan.da-vikya-sphota or the doctrine that the primary vehicle of meaning is the sentence as a whole (vikya); that the meaning of words has to do with revealing the "integral linguistic symbol" or semantic significance (sphota), which exists quite apart from but is related to the ideal or actual pronunciation of the words; and that this meaning is grasped in the mind by an "immediate intuitive realization" (pratibhi).33 Also, Abhinavagupta was familiar with Bhartrhari's notion of sabda-brahman and the related theory that creation emerges from sabda-brahman via the pasyanti, the madhyama, and the vaikhari (that is, the pure potency of all possible meaning, the pasyantT; the intermediate phase of imagining specific meanings that might be uttered, the madhyamii; and the actual utterance in natural speech, the vaikharT).34
Older theorists in poetics and drama had worked, to a large extent, within the boundaries of these older discussions of the function of language, and, as a result, it is probably no accident that discussions of poetry were largely limited to such issues as figures of speech (alamkara)-that is to say, issues of secondary denotation, various kinds of metaphor, and so on. Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta, however, argue persuasively for another function of language, namely, vyahjani or "suggestion."35 This "suggestion" is referred to as dhvani (which means, literally, "sound" or "resonance") and refers to an evocative level of meaning which transcends the level of primary denotation as well as the level of metaphor. It emerges in the context of primary and secondary denotation, but it expresses an idea or a figure of speech or an emotion over and above the actually expressed primary or secondary utterance. Dhvani, manifested primarily in a medium such as poetry, is that dimension of meaning responsible for and inextricably allied with the realization of rasa or aesthetic tasting. For Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta the realization of rasa is not the experience of an emotion (either sthiyi-bhava, vibhiva, anubhava, or vyabhicdribhiva), although it occurs in these emotional environments. Rasa,
rather, is a sui generis realization of "tasting," evoked by dhvani (or vyahjana) in the cultivated spectator or reader (sahrdaya), sparked by pratibha or bhivani, correlated with the spectator's or reader's deepest impulses (samskiras or visanas), and accompanied by (a) a sense of distance from one's ordinary awareness in terms of time, space, inference, ordinary emotional involvements, and so forth (that is, it is alaukika), and, hence, an experience of "generaliza- tion" (sadhiaran-karana) as if one has been lifted out of one's particular condition; (b) a sense of elevated joy or bliss (ananda); (c) a sense of surprise or charm or wonder (camatkira); (d) a sense of profound harmony or appro- priateness (aucitya); and (e) a sense of relaxed tranquility (visranti).36 Crucial to understand, however, is that this realization of rasa is evoked by one of the functions of language-namely, language in its function of vyahjana or "suggestion." Hence, it is clearly savikalpa and can endure only so long as the vikalpa-medium endures, through which it is evoked. The ultimate experi- ence of the yogin, however, according to classical Yoga traditions of India and according to Abhinavagupta (and, of course, to the Buddhists as well), is always nirvikalpa; and, hence, the realization of rasa is an important yet finally rather pale foretaste of that final "tasting" of brahman.37 One might say that rasa-dhvani brings one to the boundary between savikalpa and nirvikalpa and as such becomes an important discovery or perspective for those attempting to express symbolically the inexpressible. Nevertheless, rasa-dhvani clearly operates in a linguistic environment and thus can never be more than a foretaste of that which is nirvikalpa.
This fundamental distinction between nirvikalpa and savikalpa is one of the basic reasons why in the recent debate between Masson and Patwardhan, on one side, and Gerow and Aklujkar, on the other, the latter two are probably correct in their suggestion that the problem of santa-rasa must have been something of an embarrassment to Abhinavagupta;38 for to admit the possi- bility of sinta-rasa is precisely to break down the distinction between savikalpa- experience and nirvikalpa-experience which would surely have been unaccept- able to Abhinavagupta. As a result, Abhinavagupta reinterprets santa-rasa, making it into the rasa of rasas or the ground of rasas and suggesting that its sthayibhava is not nirveda but rather tattva-jhiana-in other words, lifting isnta-rasa out of its context qua rasa and transmuting it to the level of brahmisvida.39
The fundamental distinction between nirvikalpa and savikalpa is probably also a basic reason for Abhinavagupta's need to reinterpret Bhartrhari. Whether Abhinavagupta himself is responsible for this shift or perhaps simply con- solidates what other Kashmir Saivas had been suggesting makes little difference. Bhartrhari asserts that sabda-brahman is equivalent to the level ofpasyant7, and this by implication suggests the well-known view of the grammarians that experience is always savikalpa and cannot be nirvikalpa.40 Abhinavagupta takes over many of Bhartrhari's views, but on this issue makes an important
addition. He suggests a category beyond the level of pasyanti, which he calls para-vik, equating it with the level of pure sakti or svatantryasakti in the scheme of thirty-six tattvas, thus preserving a place for nirvikalpa-experience and at the same time still providing an important place for Bhartrhari's linguistic philosophy. In the area of language and aesthetics, therefore, Abhinavagupta works out an interesting synthesis of older traditions.41 Anvitibhidhina, abhihitinvaya, sphota, and pratibhi are utilized in bringing forth a new aesthetic vision-the theory of rasa-dhvani-which aesthetic vision is linked in a pro- vocative or evocative manner in the homology with brahmisvada, the latter being preserved in its essence as nirvikalpa, while allowing the savikalpa dimensions to stand very much in the way construed by Bhartrhari in his analysis of pasyanti, madhyami, and vaikhar. In this synthesis Abhinavagupta accomplishes two exceedingly important results. First, he succeeds in consoli- dating a new interpretation of the function of language (namely, rasa-dhvani or vyahjana), thereby greatly expanding the expressive power of words and sentences. Second, he succeeds in preserving the transcendence of brahman or parama-siva as nirvikalpa or visvottlrna, while at the same time homologizing the "tasting" of the transcendent with the "tasting" of the aesthetic, thereby opening up the possibility of an interesting dialectic between spiritual experience and other kinds of experience.
(2) Theosophy or "metaphilosophy." As was true in the preceding discus- sion of language and aesthetics, so also on the level of his theosophy or "meta- philosophy," Abhinavagupta is working in a framework that presupposes older traditions of Indian philosophy. In one passage of his Isvarapraty- abhijhivivrtivimarsinT, for example, he explicitly indicates that his own views represent an assimilation and correction of Samkhya and other dualisms, Advaita Vedanta and Vijinanavada Buddhist thought. The truth would be established and all could agree, says Abhinavagupta, in that manner of special pleading so typical of an Indian pandita and at the same time so irritating to opponents, if only the Agamikas would give up their dualism, if the Advaita Vedantins would finally admit that miya is an inherent and active power in the ultimate, and if the Yogacarins would concede that their momentary consciousness-only requires an ultimate source in brahman or parama-siva.42 Abhinavagupta knows full well, of course, that his opponents will not concede these points, but the passage is interesting in terms of revealing the direction of Abhinavagupta's own thinking and in calling attention to the sources he was using and appropriating for his own philosophical reflection.
For Abhinavagupta the ultimate or parama-siva is in its deepest essence totally transcendent-that is to say, visvottTrna and anuttara. It is finally an unfathomable mystery.43 Yet this mysterious ultimate shines in its clarity, and in that shining is the presupposition or ground for all manifestation. Hence, the totally transcendent (visvottirna) is also the totally immanent (visvamaya) as universal consciousness (samvid, cit), as universal joy (ananda), and as
prakdsavimarsamaya-that is to say, made up of "pure undifferentiated light or clarity" (prakasa) and "pure unhindered awareness" (vimarsa). Prakasa or pure clarity implies perfect knowledge and is the ground or source for all knowing or jhana-sakti. Vimarsa or pure unhindered awareness implies com- plete spontaneity or freedom (svitantryasakti) and is the ground or source for all activity or kriya-sakti. Moreover, vimarsa as unhindered awareness is pure intuitive illumination, a kind of ultimate pratibha, which is the ground or source for the creative urge (iccha-sakti, para-vak) and which is the ground or source for bringing into being (bhavand) all levels of meaning. Such pure clarity and pure unhindered awareness presuppose, on the one hand, a com- plete subjectivity (ahantd) and a continuing, exhilarating wonder or surprise (camatkira) at the very being-ness of one's own being so to speak. This same realization, however, on the other hand, also presupposes a depth or fullness in awareness, a complete objectivity (idanta). Pure consciousness encompasses and sublimates, in other words, both pure subjectivity and pure objectivity; not, however, by the absolute negation of the two modes but rather by a brdadening or a sublimation of the modes. This "final" broadening or sublimation is nirvikalpa and hence goes beyond what language is capable of denoting, implying, or suggesting. Yet this inexpressible and ineffable ultimate is the very ground or presupposition for all language, and more than that, the very ground or presupposition for all manifestation. Abhinavagupta subsumes all of these analyses under what he symbolically calls the "pure" creation, including the tattvas of siva, sakti, sadisiva, isvara, and suddha-vidyd. He also symbolically relates this "pure" creation to the Saivite theism of Mahesvara and Sakti and correlates the various levels of emergence with various mantras and worlds. Clearly, however, his analysis is not theistic in the sense of the usual Vaisnava and Saiva theologies, and hence my preference for characterizing Abhinavagupta's vision as a Theosophy or perhaps a "meta- philosophy."44
Apart from the structures or possibilities of the "pure" creation, Abhina- vagupta goes on to characterize the "impure" or, perhaps better, the realized or expressed creation, which he breaks down for the sake of exposition into the miay-realm, the prakrti-realm, and the prthivT-realm.45 The maya-realm has for its structures what Abhinavagupta and the Kashmir Saivas call the pahca-kahcukas or five coverings of determinate becoming (kala); determinate of limited knowing (vidya); determinate enjoyment (raga); determinate time of past, present, and future (kala); and determinate location in space (niyati). In other words, the miay-realm is the structure of finitude or finite existence, and provides the presupposition for the purusa (the finite self or anu).46 The prakrti-realm includes buddhi, ahamkira, manas, the five sense-capacities, the five action-capacities and the five subtle elements, and is the sphere of the three gunas (sattva, rajas and tamas)-the whole realm functioning precisely as in the analysis of classical Samkhya, with the important exception that prakrti
is construed pluralistically.47 The prthivT-realm is, of course, the explicit, gross reality of the mahabhitas. The "impure" creation-that is to say, the maiyi- realm, the prakrti-realm and the prthivi-realm-is characterized respectively by the defilement of finitude (.nava-mala), the defilement of the subject-object dichotomy (miyTya-mala), and the defilement of ordinary existential action having samsaric consequences (or the karma-mala).48 Finally, it should be noted that these three realms-namely, maya, prakrti, and prthiv--are sym- bolically correlated with various mantras, deities and worlds as was true for the higher or "pure" creation.
All of these levels of emergence, according to Abhinavagupta and the Kashmir Saivas (ranging from the highest, "pure" sakti-level all the way through the lower "impure" myii, prakrti, and prthivT-levels) are manifesta- tions or reflections (tbhasa) of universal consciousness, either in its mode as subjectivity (ahanta or jTvibhisa) or in its mode as objectivity (idanta or ja.dibhasa).49 All of manifested or reflected reality, therefore, is of the nature of consciousness-only, and these objective and subjective modes or s'aktis of consciousness are construed as being momentary reflections of the highest level of pure, unhindered awareness (that is, of vimarsa, svdtantrya.akti, or pari-vdik) and of pure, radiant light (that is, prakisa, cit, samtmid). In terms of metaphors or similes this manifest world of reflections on all levels is compared to the realm of remembrance, or the realm of pure imagination, or the realm of yogic creation. Also, the manifest world as reflection is compared to the images in a mirror, or the images on a bhitti, that is to say, the screen or wall on which images are cast in a theatrical production.50
These reflections or ibhiisas spontaneously shine forth, remain for a moment, and then subside. They are symbolically described as the threefold process of creating (srsti), standing forth (sthiti), and withdrawing (samhara), and though these three processes reside ontologically in universal consciousness (samvid), they are epistemologically arranged or construed according to the karmic transactions that take place on the level of the "impure" creation. According to Abhinavagupta and the Kashmir Saivas, however, there are two additional processes or powers that are not due to ordinary karmic transactions, but are due rather to the unhindered awareness or will, the svdtantryasakti of universal consciousness. These two additional and independent powers are the tirodhana- sakti (the veiling or concealing capacity of universal consciousness)S1 and the anugraha-sakti (the gracious or welcoming capacity of universal consciousness). Usually these capacities are interpreted theologically in terms of the veiling and the grace of the Lord, but I suspect that Abhinavagupta and the Kashmir Saivas are interested in more at this point than a theological interpretation. I think, rather, that they are attempting to say something about the nature of universal consciousness and the related problem of epistemology. Universal consciousness as svatantryasakti, as I have already pointed out, in its very nature is the intuitive urge to express as indicated in the notions of iccha-sakti,
pratibhd, bhdvana, and pari-vik. No intelligible account is given for this inherent urge or desire. The Kashmir Saivas here simply follow older traditions and speak about the play or sport of brahman. Unlike Advaitins, however, the Kashmir Saivas do not finally strip brahman of all predication and account for multiplicity solely on the basis of an unintelligible (anirvacaniya) avidyd and maya. The Kashmir Saivas, to be sure, make use of the terms mayai and avidya, but they offer an interpretation of these notions, which attempts to maintain a significant relation between the one and the many, unity and multiplicity, or the absolute and relative. Insofar as universal consciousness encompasses subjectivity, it is pure, self-awareness and wonder or surprise (camatkara) at its own creative illumination (aham-vimarsa); and insofar as consciousness encompasses objectivity, it is sheer presence or fullness to itself (idam- vimarsa).52 Any expression of this awareness or fullness, however, presupposes or requires vikalpa-in other words, it requires limitation, differentiation, the isolation of subject and object in a verbal judgment or statement. Any expres- sion, in other words, is by definition tirodhana-sakti, a veiling or concealing in the sense that relata and relations are established which isolate, or differentiate what, in fact, cannot be isolated or differentiated. As a result, ignorance and error are basically privations or lacks. Universal consciousness appears as what it is not-that is to say, the Self appears in the not-self, and not-self appears in the Self. Miya, then, is not unintelligible (anirvacanlya) but, rather, the nonbeing of the not-self. Tirodhdna-sakti, in other words, is apohana-sakti (a negating or differentiating or removing capacity), an unavoidable result in the very act of expression or vikalpa, an act which leads, respectively, to the mdyi, prakrti and prthiv7 realms.53 At the same time, however, this very act of expression as differentiation suggests a negation of the first negation. This second negation cannot itself be expressed (for obviously that would be further vikalpa or infinite regress), but it is always suggested, or it hovers or it haunts any expression. Thus, expression always points beyond itself to that which can only be suggested or evoked but never articulated. This second negation, then, sparks a nirvikalpa-experience and is what, I would suggest, Abhinavagupta and the Kashmir Saivas mean by anugraha-sakti. Moreover, this "suggested" but inexpressible overcoming of differentiation is what is meant by the Kashmir Saiva notion of pratyabhijhi or "re-cognition," wherein I come to recognize what has always been true-namely, to use Hegelian terminology, that sub- stance finally is subject and that subject is finally the sublimated fullness (idam) and awareness (aham) of universal consciousness. Ordinarily I do not so "re-cognize" my true nature, for I am involved and, indeed, choose to be involved in seemingly endless differentiation or vikalpa-distinctions. At any point, however, the anugraha-sakti is present if I would but see it. It is for this reason, I would suggest, that Abhinavagupta and the pratyabhijhi-school of Kashmir Saivism talk about "instantaneous grace," for they are not at all
concerned about the arbitrary will of some deity, but rather with the very nature of universal consciousness itself.54
(3) Interrelations between the linguistic-aesthetic and the theosophical and a comparison with Advaita. If my exposition of Abhinavagupta's thought is in any sense correct, it can be argued that Abhinavagupta's Kashmir Saivism differs from Advaita monism in interesting and important ways. Although both traditions are monistic and although the Kashmir Saivas have been clearly influenced by Advaita thought, both traditions move finally in almost opposite ways. Whereas Advaita characterizes the relation between brahman and the manifest world as vivartavada (the theory of appearance), Abhinava- gupta and the Kashmir Saivas speak rather of abhasavada (the theory of reflection). Whereas Advaita suggests that miiy and avidya are finally anir- vacaniya, Abhinavagupta and the Kashmir Saivas speak rather about apohana or tirodhana-sakti (differentiation as negation). Whereas Advaita suggests that error is finally anirvacanlyakhyati, Abhinavagupta and the Kashmir Saivas speak rather about akhyati or svarupakhyiti (the nonrecognition of nondistinction). Whereas Advaita characterizes the absolute in terms of sat, cit, ananda, Abhinavagupta and the Kashmir Saivas refuse to exclude the dimensions of vimarsa, svatantryasakti, or iccha in the very being of the absolute.
Most important, however, is a difference regarding the role and function of language in the two systems, and this difference can be clarified by bringing together the linguistic-aesthetic dimension of Abhinavagupta's thought with the theosophical. For Abhinavagupta what appears to be important is the fullness or one might even say the "concretion" of the ultimate or absolute, which sublimates subjectivity and objectivity, is nirvikalpa and is actively present throughout the manifested or reflected world on all levels. Such an ultimate or absolute can only be suggested or evoked, and hence it was probably no accident that Abhinavagupta was preoccupied with that dimension of the vikalpa-realm which comes closest to evoking or manifesting the ultimate- namely, the aesthetic or suggestive use of language as found in poetry and drama. With the rasa-dhvani theory Abhinavagupta was able to point to a function of language which opens, enriches and expands our awareness, not in the direction of abstraction but rather in the direction of a resonant fullness wherein ordinary differentiations of time, space, ego, and so on, are sublimated. For Advaitins, on the other hand, what appears to be important is the vacuity, emptiness, or sheer abstraction of the ultimate or absolute, which is nirvikalpa but radically discontinous with the manifest world. Advaita appears to move in a direction of rigid, numerical oneness purged or purified of all distinctions.55 It was probably not an accident, therefore, that Advaitins generally rejected the theory of dhvani or vyahjana as a function of language and were rather pre- occupied with the problem of identity-propositions. Advaitins, for example, as Kunjunni Raja points out, were quite interested in the variety of metaphor
known as jahadajahallaksanai or bhdgatyagalaksanag, wherein a portion of primary denotation can be preserved in a verbal judgment while other portions can be rejected.56 This enabled the Advaitin to interpret such mahavakyini as "tat tvam asi" as identity-propositions-that is to say, the pure consciousness in the individual soul is identified with the pure consciousness in the Universal Soul.57 Finally, of course, both the Kashmir Saivas and the Advaitins have to admit that the ultimate or the absolute transcends conceptualization and expression, and as such the two systems are closely allied. When one begins to resonate to or intuit the "symptoms" of the absolute which the two systems evoke or point to, however, the resulting intuitive realizations appear to be interestingly different.
I have tried to show in this article that (1) Abhinavagupta not only appropriates but reworks the views of the older grammarian philosophers and alamkirikas in terms of developing the notion of vyanjana and rasa-dhvani and that this notion has important implications for his overall theoretical position; (2) that he makes use of the homology between rasivada and brahmisvdda while carefully refusing to reduce one to the other, thereby maintaining an interesting dialectic between spiritual experience and other kinds of experience; and (3) that he develops a monistic, theosophical perspective that appropriates and trans- mutes the Advaitin position in an important way. Let me conclude by suggesting that the force of his overall theoretical position appears to be that language, art, and philosophy are important components in any adequate religious anthropology. Each operates in a separate sphere and at the same time provides valuable input into the fullness of what a person is and into the fullness of what the ultimate is. A kind of conversation appears to take place in his intellectual vision between the various aspects of culture, and the result of that conversation is a vigorous affirmation of the value of man's total cultural life.
It is appropriate, I think, to close with the words of Abhinavagupta himself.
The person who comes thus to realize that knowledge (jhdna) and activity (kriyd) are solely manifestations of the svatantrya and that these manifestations are inseparable from oneself and from the very essence of the ultimate, whose form is the Lord (Isvararupa)-a person "resonating" in such a fashion (iti parimrsan), not partially (but completely), and who has come to see that knowledge and activity are really one-whatever such a person desires, just that he or she comes to show and do. Such a person is solely given over to the practice of "total abiding" (samavesa), even though still accompanied by a body. To be sure, such a person, while still in the body, is ajivanmukta; but such a person is even more than that; for when the ultimate realization has come, there is only paramesvara !58
1. S. K. De, History of Sanskrit Poetics (Calcutta, 1960; 2d rev. ed.), vol. 2, pp. 139-212; E. Gerow and A. Aklujkar, "On Santa Rasa in Sanskrit Poetics," Journal of the American Oriental Society 92, no. 1 (Jan.-Mar., 1972): 80-87; R. Gnoli, trans., The Aesthetic Experience according to Abhinavagupta (Varanasi, 1968; 2d rev. ed. Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, vol. 47), passim; Subramania Iyer, Bhartrhari (Poona, 1969; Silver Jubilee Series, 68), pp. 106ff., 128ff., 142ff., 147ff.; J. L. Masson and M. V. Patwardhan, Santarasa and Abhinavagupta's Philosophy of Aesthetics (Poona, 1969; Bhandarkar Oriental Series, no. 9), passim; V. Raghavan, The Number of Rasas (Adyar, 1940), passim; D. S. Ruegg, Contributions & I'histoire de la philosophie linquistique indienne (Paris, 1959; Publications de l'Institut de Civilisation Indienne (hereafter PICI), fas. 7), passim; and Gaurinath Sastri, The Philosophy of Word and Meaning (Calcutta, 1959; Calcutta Sanskrit College Research Series, no. V), see especially pp. 1-82.
2. Gopinath Kaviraj, "The Doctrine of Pratibha" in Aspects of Indian Thought (Burdwan, 1966), pp. 1-44; K. C. Pandey, Abhinavagupta. An Historical and Philosophical Study (Varanasi, 1963; 2d rev. ed. Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, vol. 1), pp. 289-460, 461ff.; Andre Padoux, Recherches sur la symbolique et l'energie de la parole dans certains textes tantriques (Paris, 1963; PICI, fas. 21), passim; and Lilian Silburn, trans., Le Paramarthasdra (Paris, 1957; PICI, fas. 5), pp. 5-56.
3. M. A. Stein, ed. and trans., Kalhana's RajatarahginT (1900; reprint ed.; Delhi, 1961), and see in addition to the text itself the useful collateral material provided by Stein in vol. 1, pp. 1-145; and volume 2, pp. 273-494.
4. For useful surveys of the history of the various religious traditions in Kashmir, see the following (in alphabetical order): P. N. K. Bamzai, A History of Kashmir (Delhi, 1962), pp. 84-107, 226-279; S. C. Banerji, Cultural Heritage of Kashmir (Calcutta, 1965), pp. 106ff.; Edward Conze, A Short History of Buddhism (Bombay, 1960), pp. 41ff., 64ff., and 87ff.; and S. C. Ray, Early History and Culture of Kashmir, 2d ed. (New Delhi, 1970), pp. 168-174.
5. Conze, op. cit., p. 42. 6. J. C. Chatterji, Kashmir Shaivism (Srinagar, 1962), pp. 1-14. 7. Bamzai, op. cit., pp. 108-136. 8. K. C. Pandey, op. cit., pp. 5-6. 9. Ibid., pp. 151ff.
10. Chatterji, op. cit., pp. 15-42; K. C. Pandey, op. cit., pp. 154ff.; and Silburn, Le Para- marthasira, op. cit., pp. 6ff.
11. For useful treatments of the Saiva traditions generally, see the following (in alphabetical order): R. G. Bhandarkar, Vaisnavism, Saivism and Minor Religious Systems (reprint; Varanasi, 1965), pp. 102ff.; Arabinda Basu, "Kashmir Saivism" in The Cultural Heritage of India (Calcutta, 1956), vol. 4, pp. 79ff.; J. C. Chatterji, Kashmir Shaivism, op. cit., pp. 15ff.; J. N. Farquhar, An Outline of the Religious Literature of India (reprint; Delhi, 1967), passim; J. Gonda, Visnuism and Sivaism (Oxford, 1970), passim; S. Kumaraswamiji, "Virasaivism" in Cul. Heritage of India, op. cit., vol. 4, pp. 98ff.; K. A. Nilakanta Sastri, "An Historical Sketch of Saivism" in The Cultural Heritage of India, vol. 4, pp. 63ff.; L. N. Sharma, Kashmir Saivism (Varanasi, 1972); and K. Siva- raman, Saivism in Philosophical Perspective (Delhi, 1973).
12. Chatterji, op. cit., pp. 15ff. 13. For a useful summary of Kalhana's description of political events from Avantivarman to
Queen Didda, see Bamzai, op. cit., pp. 109-136. For Kalhana's own account, see Stein, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 186ff.
14. K. C. Pandey, op. cit., pp. 3-26. 15. Ibid. 16. P. V. Kane, History of Sanskrit Poetics 4th ed. (Delhi, 1971 ;), pp. 236-243. 17. K. C. Pandey, op. cit., pp. 27-77; and for a good summary of Pandey's longer discussion,
see Lilian Silburn, Le Paramirthasira, op. cit., pp. 9-19. Editions of primary sources consulted for this paper are the following: (1) philosophical: Abhinavagupta's Isvarapratyabhijhavivrtivimar- sin (Bombay, 1938-1943; Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies (hereafter KSTS), nos. 60, 62, and 65); Abhinava's Isvarapratyabhijnavimarsini or LaghvTvrtti (Bombay, 1918 and 1921; KSTS, nos. 22 and 33); Abhinava's Paramirthasara in Lilian Silburn's edition, op. cit.; and in L. D. Barnett,
trans., "The Paramarthasara of Abhinavagupta," Journal of the Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, parts 3-4 (1910): 707-747; (2) aesthetic: portions of Abhinavagupta's Dhvanyaloka- locana and AbhinavabhiratT as found in Masson and Patwardhan, op. cit., passim, and in R. Gnoli, op. cit., pp. 3-114; (3) philosophical tantra: Abhinavagupta's Tantraloka with the commentary of Jayaratha called the Viveka (Bombay and Srinagar, 1918-1938; KSTS nos. 3, 28, 30, 36, 35, 39, 41, 47, 59, 57, and 58).
In addition to the works of Abhinavagupta, the following works of the Kashmir Saiva tradition have also been consulted: Ksemaraja's Pratyabhijiihrdaya in K. F. Leidecker, trans., Pratyabhij- iihrdayam: The Secret of Recognition (Adyar, 1938), and in J. Singh, trans., Pratyabhijhihrdayam (Delhi, 1963); Ksemaraja's Pardpravesika (Bombay, 1918; KSTS, no. 15); and the following translations and studies of Lilian Silburn: Vatulandtha-sutra, Le Vijhana Bhairava, La Bhakti dans le Sivaisme du Kashmir (Stavacintdmani), La Mahdrthamanjart (Paris, 1959, 1961, 1964 and 1968 respectively; PICI, fas., 8, 15, 19, 29). Finally, mention must be made of K. C. Pandey's copious textual notices in Appendix A of his Abhinavagupta, op. cit., pp. 733-907. The latter are invaluable and essential for any serious study of the vast corpus of Abhinavagupta.
18. E. C. Dimock, Jr., et al., The Literatures of India. An Introduction (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press; 1974), pp. 136-143.
19. Kashmir Saivism combines a strong emphasis on philosophy with an equally strong emphasis on mystical insight and tantric ritual. It, thus, transcends the usual notion of philosophy in India (for example, Samkhya, Yoga, Vedanta, etc.) as well as the usual notion of theology (a la Ramanuja, et al.). Insofar as it provides a foundation or structure for dealing with most of the traditional issues in Indian philosophy, it can be called a "metaphilosophy." Insofar as its notions are finally inseparable from elaborate rituals and mystical intuitions, it can be called a "theosophy."
20. For a useful discussion about the relation between worldviews and aesthetic vision, see Eliot Deutsch, Studies in Comparative Aesthetics (Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1975), preface, pp. 1-19, 39-74.
21. Masson and Patwardhan, op. cit., p. xvii. 22. F. Edgerton, "Dominant Ideas in the Formation of Indian Culture," Journal of the American
Oriental Society 62, pp. 151ff. 23. Masson and Patwardhan, op. cit., pp. 1-24; and Gnoli, op. cit., pp. xx-xxvi. 24. Gnoli, op. cit., p. xxvi, and for Sanskrit, see p. 48. 25. Ibid., pp. 45-48, and for Sanskrit, see p. 10. 26. See Masson and Patwardhan's excellent collection of passages on the issue, op. cit., pp. 60ff. 27. Gnoli, op. cit., p. 82. 28. Ibid., p. 47. 29. It appears to be the case that Abhinavagupta passed through three phases in his career: a
tantric phase, an aesthetic phase and a philosophical phase. See K. C. Pandey, op. cit., pp. 41ff.; and Silburn, Le Paramarthasara, op. cit., pp. 9-19.
30. G. Sastri, The Philosophy of Word and Meaning, op. cit., pp. 172ff.; K. Kunjunni Raja, Indian Theories of Meaning, 2d ed. (Adyar, 1969), pp. 191ff.
31. Ibid. 32. G. Sastri, op. cit., pp. 224ff. 33. Kunjunni Raja, op. cit., pp. 95-148; Subramania Iyer, op. cit., pp. 86ff.; and John Brough,
"Theories of General Linguistics in the Sanskrit Grammarians" and "Some Indian Theories of Meaning," both of which are in J. F. Staal, ed., A Reader on the Sanskrit Grammarians (Cambridge, Mass., 1972), pp. 402-414, and 414-423. For a useful survey of the philosophy of language in India, see J. F. Staal, "Sanskrit Philosophy of Language" in T. A. Sebeok, ed., Current Trends in Linguistics 5 (Mouton, 1969), pp. 499-531.
34. Gopinath Kaviraj, op. cit., pp. 1-44. 35. Kunjunni Raja, op. cit., pp. 275-315; and for an excellent discussion of the theory of rasa-
dhvani, see Dimock, et al., The Literatures of India, op. cit., pp. 136-143, 216-227. 36. Masson and Patwardhan, op. cit,, passim, and summarized, pp. 161-164; and Gnoli, op. cit.,
pp. xiv-lii. 37. Ibid. 38. Gerow and Aklujkar, op. cit., p. 82. 39. Ibid.
40. Kunjunni Raja, op. cit., p. 80. 41. Gopinath Kaviraj, op. cit., pp. 1-44; and K. C. Pandey, op. cit., pp. 47-51. It should be
noted here that Abhinavagupta's contribution with respect to issues in the philosophy of language and aesthetics appears to be mainly systematization and synthetic exposition. In almost every instance the seminal notions-for example, sphota, rasa-dhvani, etc.-come from elsewhere, namely, Bhartrhari, Anandavardhana, et al. It was Abhinavagupta's genius to relate these notions to one another and to think holistically about overall theoretical presentation.
42. IsvarapratyabhijiivivrtivimarsinT, vol. 3, p. 405, cited in K. C. Pandey, op. cit., p. 386. 43. Jayaratha's comment on Tantriloka 1, 65, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 105 (sarvikrtih visvamayah
nirakrtih visvottirnah), cited in K. C. Pandey, op. cit., p. 799. 44. The ultimate experience is described by Abhinavagupta in Tantriloka, 1, 41 as follows: ksine tu pasusamskare pumsah pripta-parasthiteh / vikasvaram tadvijiina.m paurusam nirvikalpakam //
op. cit., p. 78. 45. For a summary exposition of these levels of emergence (namely, sakti, miyd, prakrti and
prthvT), see Paramarthasara, vss. 4-22, either in the Barnett or Silburn editions already cited (see note 17).
46. Paramirthasdra, vs. 17. 47. Ibid., vss. 19-22. 48. See the quote in Jayaratha's commentary on Tantraloka VI, 61, op. cit., p. 56: devdilndm ca sarvesiim bhavinaim trividham malam / tatra api kirmam eva ekam mukhyam samsirakaranam //
and cited in K. C. Pandey, p. 816. 49. For a useful discussion of the theory of abhasa in Abhinavagupta, see chapter 4 of K. C.
Pandey, op. cit., pp. 382-427. 50. K. C. Pandey, op. cit., p. 326. 51. Ibid., pp. 440ff. 52. See notes 44 and 49. 53. In ITvarapratyabhijhC-vimarsinm (1.37), Abhinavagupta describesjhiina-sakti, smrti-sakti, and
apohana-sakti. Abhinavagupta concludes: anena saktitrayena visve vyavaharaih / tac ca bhagavata eva saktitraya m-yat tathabhitinubhavitr-smartr-vikalpayitr-svabhava-caitramaitrddyavabhasanam / sa eva hi tena tena vapusa janati, smarati vikalpayati ca /, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 110-111.
54. For a useful discussion of anugraha and the various means for liberation, see Silburn, Le Paramirthasara, op. cit., pp. 41-56.
55. For a helpful discussion of Advaita monism vis-a-vis Saiva monism, see K. Sivaraman, op. cit., pp. 127-152.
56. Kunjunni Raja, op. cit., pp. 251-254. 57. Ibid. 58. Isvarapratyabhijhi-vimarsin7 IV.1.15, op. cit., p. 269. The Sanskrit of the kiriki or verse
together with Abhinavagupta's comment is as follows: evam adhikiracatustayoktam yad vastu tatphalam aha
evam atmdnam etasya samyagjiinakriye tathi /
janan yatha Ipsitin pasyan jniiti ca karoti ca //15//
evam iti, ivararupam itmanam tasya ca svavyatirikte svitantryamiitraripejhiinakriye jinan evam- bhuto 'yam dtmd na tu kniid adidarsitah, ittham ca jiinakriye na tu tasya vyatirikte kecana,-iti pardmrsan yad yad icchati tat taj janati karoti ca samdvessaparo 'nena eva sarTrena; atatparas tu sati dehe jivanmuktas tatpite paramesvara eva iti //15 //
Lilian Silburn renders Abhinavagupta's comment in a less literal and more elegant way as follows: "L'homme qui a longuement pratiqu 1'ensevelissement en Siva (samivesa) et a la pleine reconnaissance de ses energies de connaissance et d'activite comme etant la pure autonomie du Seigneur, peut alors connaitre et faire tout ce qu'il desire bien qu'il soit encore associe a un corps. II est non seulement un jivanmukta, libere vivant au sens ordinaire du mot, mais il est foncierement libre car il utilise a son gre les pouvoirs divins propres a Paramesvara et vit dans une liberte eternelle." See Silburn, Le Paramarthasara, op. cit., pp. 54-55.
Article Contentsp. p. 372p. 373p. 374p. 375p. 376p. 377p. 378p. 379p. 380p. 381p. 382p. 383p. 384p. 385p. 386p. 387
Issue Table of ContentsPhilosophy East and West, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Oct., 1976), pp. 371-503Volume Information [pp. 499-503]Front MatterThe Aesthetic (Rassvad) and the Religious (Brahmsvda) in Abhinavagupta's Kashmir aivism [pp. 371-387]The Reconciliation of Neo-Confucianism with Christianity in the Writings of Joseph de Prmare, S. J. [pp. 389-410]Martin Buber and Asia [pp. 411-426]What Is Living and What Is Dead in Traditional Indian Philosophy [pp. 427-442]Hsn Tzu as a Religious Philosopher [pp. 443-461]Feature Review ArticleReview: untitled [pp. 463-477]
Books ReviewsReview: untitled [pp. 479-480]Review: untitled [pp. 480-481]Review: untitled [pp. 481-483]Review: untitled [pp. 483-485]Review: untitled [pp. 485-486]Review: untitled [pp. 486-487]CorrespondenceReply to Troy Organ's Review of "The Essential Aurobindo" and "Six Pillars: Introductions to the Major Works of Sri Aurobindo" [pp. 487-489]Rejoinder to Robert A. McDermott's Reply [pp. 489-492]Reply to Dina Paul's Review of "The Lion's Roar of Queen rmal" [pp. 492-493]Rejoinder to Alex and Hideko Waymans' Reply [pp. 493-494]
Books Received [p. 495]Current Periodicals [p. 497]Back Matter [p. 498-498]