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HUGO CHAVEZ, OIL AND THE BOLIVARIAN REVOLUTION............................................1

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I N T R O D U C T I O N

Venezuela is in the midst of dramatic change as President Hugo Chavez Frías takes the so-called “Bolivarian Revolution” to new heights. Named after early 19th-century Latin American liberator Simon Bolivar, the revolution is meant to redistribute power and wealth to the disenfranchised Venezuelan masses and create a new nation modeled after Fidel Castro’s Cuba.

In reality, Chavez is using more than $100 billion in oil revenues collected since he became president and his control of Venezuela’s political institutions to maintain tight control over the population in the event oil revenues – and the president’s popularity – should plummet. In recent months, the National Assembly has passed several laws and is advancing more legislation that restricts private economic activities, property rights, political rights and freedom of expression.

In addition, Chavez is spending billions of dollars to modernize and strengthen the National Armed Forces (FAN) of Venezuela. Chavez needs a large, strong military to maintain internal control over the population in case of unrest. At the same time, military and armed civilian reserves directly under his control provide an effective counterweight against any potential revolts within the FAN. Chavez wants to ensure that he does not lose control of the Bolivarian Revolution if oil prices and related export revenues ever collapse.

Changes in the military also reflect fundamental changes in Venezuela’s national security doctrine, which now sees the United States as the greatest threat to the country. Chavez knows he is directly challenging the United States, and he is therefore creating military and diplomatic alliances around the world to prepare himself for a potential conflict with Washington. In order to limit Venezuela’s vulnerabilities to the United States as much as possible, Chavez is planning on breaking the long-standing oil relationship between the two countries and on developing alternative markets for his oil exports.

Chavez plans to stay in power a long time, by his own account at least until 2021 when, under Venezuelan law, he would reach mandatory retirement age. Many disruptions could slow or interrupt Chavez’s plans. At this point, however, he appears to be firmly in control of his Bolivarian Revolution and should remain so for at least the next two to three years.

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R E A L I Z I N G T H E B O L I VA R I A N R E V O L U T I O N

Chavez’s efforts to transform Venezuela from a capitalist democracy to a democratically sanctioned authoritarian socialist state are not improvised. He is rapidly implementing a plan launched less than two weeks after Chavez-backed candidates were swept into power in regional elections in October 2004, giving him nearly complete political control over the country.

Recent opinion polls indicate that approximately 50 percent of the population opposes Chavez, but there is no credible opposition leadership anywhere in the country that can offer an alternative. Venezuela’s traditional parties lost touch with voters years before Chavez was elected. For three decades, party leaders refused to let younger members rise to the top and insisted instead on recycling the same old faces. Now they have little influence.

There are some new faces in the opposition ranks today that are critical of Chavez, but the damage has been done and the public is not listening. Furthermore, ever-increasing oil revenues that allow for ever-increasing government spending allow Chavez to buy all the support he needs.

With organized political opposition neutralized, Chavez’s intention is to consolidate the foundations of his new Cuban-style political system. The detailed plan was drafted quietly over the past year with the advice of Cuban political and security advisers and other international “consultants,” according to sources familiar with how the plan was developed.

Chavez officially launched the plan, entitled “Bolivarian Revolution: The New Strategic Map,” Nov. 12-13, 2004 in Caracas at a closed-door conference of several hundred senior civilian and military figures in the Chavez government. It is the foundation of what Chavez calls “the next stage” in the Bolivarian Revolution, with a core objective of tightening Chavez’s political and social control over all of Venezuela.

That control in turn will be backed by a strong military presence actively inserted into the country’s governing structures. That presence is designed to give the military access to the economic spoils accruing to those in power and the incentive to perpetuate the system. At the two-day conference in Caracas, Chavez ordered that the plan’s strategic objectives be fully achieved in two years – before the next presidential elections in December 2006. Chavez said recently that he would seek re-election and expects to win easily.

O B J E C T I V E S O F T H E N E W S T R A T E G I C M A P

The plan includes the following 10 points:

1. Create a new social structure.2. Articulate and optimize a new communications strategy.3. Accelerate the creation of a new democratic model of popular participation.4. Accelerate the creation of new state institutions.5. Activate a new anti-corruption strategy.6. Develop a new electoral strategy.

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7. Accelerate construction of a new productive model on the path to creating a new economic system.8. Continue installing a new territorial structure.9. Accelerate the creation of a new national military strategy.10. Continue leading the creation of a new multipolar international system.

With the exception of corruption, which predates Chavez by decades and which has gotten worse under his leadership, progress is quickly being made on all fronts. The most important changes under way are described below.

C O M M U N I C A T I O N S

Since Chavez’s October 2004 victory, the government’s communications strategy has evolved quickly. Internally, the strategy implemented by Information Minister Andres Izarra -- the CNN-trained Josef Goebbels of the Bolivarian Revolution -- seeks to aggressively repress any news not to the government’s liking, including items published by the foreign news media. The Law for Responsibility in Radio and Television, which went into effect in late January 2005, is a cornerstone of this strategy. The law is designed to severely restrict the media’s right to criticize the government and gives the government the power to impose stiff punishments for violators.

Externally, the Chavez government is financing a hemispheric communications satellite with Chinese cooperation that is scheduled to begin broadcasting the Bolivarian Telesur channel sometime in 2005, possibly within the next three to four months. Chavez hopes that Telesur, meant to be a South American Bolivarian version of Al Jazeera, will be similarly successful.

This communications strategy complements Chavez’s now near-total control over the country’s political institutions, which he has stacked with allies and followers. These institutions include the National Assembly, the Supreme Court (and the broader judicial system), the Attorney General’s office, the National Electoral Council, the armed forces (FAN), the National Guard (NG) and practically all of the country’s law enforcement agencies. N A T I O N A L D E F E N S E

Chavez has tightened his political control over the FAN and NG in several ways. He has promoted unqualified officers lacking charisma to senior general and admiral ranks, from which they can enrich themselves through corruption, which always has been widespread among Venezuelan generals and admirals. Many of these senior officers are bottom-of-the-class military graduates who for the most part do not command the loyalty of the lower ranks of the FAN and who owe their wealth to Chavez. He thereby has a sword hanging over their heads to ensure their loyalty. In order to prevent any potentially ambitious officers from trying to supplant him, he also makes sure they do not have direct control over the military’s weapons. Chavez leaves all sensitive responsibilities to the most trusted “chavista” (Chavez-loyalist) officers, the majority of whom are lower ranking.

Chavez also has established parallel command and control structures in all of the FAN’s branches and the NG, all the way down to the platoon level. The officers Chavez recruits for his parallel command

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and control are mainly junior ranking officers like lieutenants and captains. There are, however, some majors and even colonels in this group, which reports directly to, and takes orders only from, Chavez.

Chavez has essentially adopted Cuba’s national defense doctrine, going so far as importing hundreds of Cuban military advisers to train the Venezuelan military and adopting Cuba’s military uniforms as Venezuela’s own. Cuban military and security personnel have been deployed throughout the FAN. Their presence is an open secret. These Cuban personnel are tasked with helping the FAN’s nominal Venezuelan commanders implement the new national security doctrine that views the United States as the greatest external threat to Venezuela.

The Cubans are also in the FAN to help loyal chavista officers maintain control if there are new attempts within the FAN to topple Chavez from power. Venezuela’s oil is vitally important to Fidel Castro’s government in Havana. The Cubans in Venezuela are there to make sure nothing disrupts Havana’s oil relations with Caracas. In addition to these formal arrangements, Chavez has created numerous militia groups with tens of thousands of armed members who are committed to resisting a U.S. invasion.

This cooperation is the result of a close friendship between Chavez and Castro that began in 1994. Castro has anointed Chavez as his successor in continuing the leftist revolution in Latin America and has become his chief political adviser. Castro is hitching his wagon to Caracas and its cheap oil to try to perpetuate his regime after his death. The Bolivarian revolution is essentially the implementation of the Cuban revolution in Venezuela, adapted to suit Venezuelan circumstances, and its goal is to perpetuate Chavez’s stay in power, just as Castro has done in Cuba.

Chavez is not only expanding military cooperation with the Cubans but he is also seeking to redesign the military to defend against a potential U.S. invasion. In keeping with this new mission, Chavez is aligning Venezuela’s military also with Russia, China, Brazil and Spain in terms of acquiring weapons systems and communications equipment. Chavez has embarked on a buying spree that so far includes 100,000 Russian assault rifles, three dozen Russian attack helicopters, Chinese ground radar systems, Brazilian fixed-wing Super Tucano turboprop fighter-bombers and four Spanish-made corvettes. Chavez is also on record as wanting to buy $5 billion worth of Russian MiG-29 Fulcrum fighters.

D E T E R I O R A T I O N O F P R O P E R T Y R I G H T S

The government has moved quickly to develop a new state-controlled socialist economic model by expropriating productive, privately owned agricultural property throughout the country. Agriculture is the foundation of any developing economy, and land is the core wealth of any society. Land ownership, and having clear title to land, is the foundation of all modern property rights. It is a source of private wealth and also a pillar of political power, which is why Chavez is trying to seize control of all the large privately owned estates in the country. He wants to completely break the backs of the elites.

Venezuela has experienced dramatic changes in the legal interpretation of private property rights in the past five months. Fundamental changes in core laws emblematic of capitalist democracies have gone largely unnoticed, perhaps because they appear to be small developments – when viewed

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individually – in an increasingly chaotic Venezuelan society. As a result, the broader implications of the changes have been largely missed.

The legal protections traditionally afforded private property owners have been erased since Chavez launched his new Bolivarian strategy in November 2004, with rule of law and due process now redefined by the Chavez-controlled Supreme Court. Since December 2004, more than a dozen state governors have issued decrees suspending agricultural and mining activities on hundreds of privately owned rural properties throughout the country. The gubernatorial decrees assert the rights of state governments to unilaterally “intervene” on privately owned properties. Jhonny Yanez, the chavista governor of Cojedes state, recently referred to private property as “a relative concept.” Urban properties also have been recently expropriated by decree in Caracas and other cities.

The National Land Institute (INTI) announced in February 2005 that the legality of the ownership titles of more than 40,000 privately owned rural estates, mainly large farms and cattle ranches, was being evaluated. In March 2005, INTI seized five of the oldest, largest and most productive privately owned farming and ranching operations in Venezuela with a combined area of approximately 110,000 acres. INTI claimed the seizures were legal because the underlying ownership titles dating back to the mid-1800s were forgeries. The institute then interpreted this to mean that the land had always belonged to the state and that the state was now simply asserting its ownership rights. INTI President Eliecer Otaiza said the former owners could appeal his decision if they wished, but meanwhile they had to vacate the state’s property immediately.

The combined impact of these expropriation measures since December 2004 has been to dismantle legal protections for privately owned property. In both theory and practice, any privately owned property in Venezuela – dwellings, commercial establishments, warehouses, factories – is now vulnerable to expropriation by the Chavez government at any time and without any realistic expectation of a fair appeals process, since the courts are controlled by chavistas.

Foreign and Venezuelan property owners are at equal risk of expropriation. One of the five ranching estates seized by INTI was owned for more than a century by Vestey, a British cattle ranching firm. Vestey’s ranch in Venezuela also was the first large private estate that the Chavez government targeted for expropriation. The British government has kept silent on the issue, and Vestey plans to sue. Another Venezuelan agro-industrial enterprise owned by a British firm is Agroflora, which has several similar estates that are now being threatened with expropriation. So far, no major foreign-owned oil projects or other major ventures have been nationalized.

B U I L D I N G A G L O B A L M U L T I P O L A R S Y S T E M

In addition to his military restructuring, Chavez is using Venezuela’s oil skillfully to create regional and global networks of strategic alliances designed to enhance his international influence and protect him from natural enemies of the Bolivarian Revolution, namely the United States. Regionally, Chavez has used oil and other fuels sold at a discount and offered generous repayment terms to cash-strapped countries in Central America and the Caribbean. He has done the same in South America with countries like Argentina, Uruguay and Bolivia. The purpose of this tactic is to ensure that, in a confrontation with the United States at a venue like the Organization of American States (OAS),

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Chavez could easily neutralize U.S.-led efforts to impose sanctions on Venezuela.

Chavez is also cultivating political, economic, and strategic alliances with major global players such as Brazil, China, Russia, India, France, Spain and Iran that he sees as key to maintaining his independence and distance from the United States. Chavez sees these countries as markets for Venezuelan energy exports, sources of new investment capital and technological know-how, and suppliers of military hardware. He also sees them as natural allies given their common interests in challenging U.S. hegemony, which means they will not be inclined to back U.S. diplomatic efforts to contain Venezuela. However, if push came to shove, and these countries were forced to make a choice between Caracas and Washington, they would choose Washington -- though circumstances would have to be extreme.

Building alliances regionally and globally, while necessary for Chavez, will not be sufficient for him to establish the independence from the United States that he wants, and he knows this. On Dec. 24, 2004 in Beijing, Chavez announced the centerpiece of his multipolar strategy – his intention to free Venezuela completely from what he called its “oil supply dependency” on the United States. Chavez’s goal is to redirect his oil exports to secure his revenue streams in the conflict he sees coming with the United States. By redirecting exports going to the United States – China is currently his favored future export destination with India also in the mix – he can also further solidify alliances with globally influential countries.

Severing the Venezuelan-U.S. oil relationship, however, is not simply a question of sending barrels of oil in another direction. In February 2005, Chavez announced that he planned to sell CITGO and all of the oil refining assets in the United States owned by PDVSA. He needs to do this not only to bring in some extra cash but also to avoid any legal retaliation against CITGO when Venezuela stops shipping oil to the United States. CITGO’s refineries, however, will need to be replaced, so Chavez must prepare the necessary infrastructure for processing his oil elsewhere before he can safely stop sending crude to the United States.

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C O N T R I B U T O R S T O T H E R E V O L U T I O N

Chavez appears to be firmly in control of the Bolivarian Revolution, with nothing substantial threatening its progress. The depth of Chavez’s power, however, depends on many internal and external forces that he may not be able to control or influence directly. These forces may help or hinder the progress of Chavez’s plans. Some of the forces that might help are described below.

C H AV E Z ’ S C I R C U M S T A N T I A L A D VA N T A G E S

Venezuela’s considerable crude oil and natural gas reserves provide Chavez with a substantial stream of hard currency earnings to fund his Bolivarian Revolution, and a powerful weapon to acquire strategic influence globally and neutralize potential enemies. Venezuela’s oil revenues mean that the country can never be economically isolated.

Geographically, Venezuela is located on a continental mainland, and it is simultaneously a Caribbean, Atlantic, Andean and Amazonian country. This offers Venezuela many corridors to and from the South American heartland for the spread of commerce, strategic alliances and the Bolivarian Revolution. This geography also means that non-military containment strategies are highly unlikely to succeed against Caracas.

Moreover, Chavez has the stamp of democratic legitimacy. His critics at home and abroad, including the U.S. government, cannot effectively criticize him on the grounds that his hold on power is illegitimate. This alone can nullify nearly all potential efforts to bring international political pressure to bear on Chavez.

O I L P R I C E S A N D A S S E T S

Perhaps the greatest advantage Chavez has right now is the fact that oil prices continue to soar to new heights and bring in huge amounts of hard currency. Prices surged past a record $56 per barrel on March 16, 2005, and both private economists and those at PDVSA estimate that for every dollar added to oil prices Venezuela earns an additional $1 billion a year in oil export revenues. The year-to-date average price of Venezuela’s oil exports, which fetch below world-average prices because of their heaviness, was $39.82 per barrel as of March 25, 2005. The average price of Venezuelan oil exports for the week ending March 25 was $48.23 a barrel. On an annualized basis, this means Venezuela is on track this year to earn over $35 billion in oil export revenues, according to private economists in Caracas. Given that global oil demand is forecast to increase in the latter half of 2005, prices should remain buoyant for some time.

Today, with $25 billion in the Central Bank and billions more flooding into the country thanks to high oil prices, Chavez is awash in revenue, enabling him to continue giving direct cash subsidies to the poor. Recent polls show that Chavez’s popularity is directly related to his government’s “missions.” A majority of those who claim to support Chavez do not identify with his rhetoric about revolution and socialism, but they like the cash handouts they are receiving. Essentially, with oil prices where they are, Chavez can buy all of the support -- and votes -- that he needs. With prices likely to remain strong throughout 2005, Chavez will be able to pay for military hardware while simultaneously providing sweetheart oil deals to other countries for their support against any U.S. efforts to undermine him.

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C O N S T R A I N T S O N T H E R E V O L U T I O N

Of course, grand plans can always stumble over the unexpected, and many of the same forces that are working to Chavez’s advantage could turn against him.

C H AV E Z ’ S D E P E N D E N C E O N H I G H O I L P R I C E S

Of potentially great consequence for Chavez is the soundness of the Chinese economy. China’s economy looks strong on the surface, but it is in fact under immense strain and could easily fall into a crisis in the next nine to 18 months. If the Chinese economy stalls, it will take a significant portion of Asian economic activity with it. Demand for energy would drop and world prices would fall, although how far or how quickly depends on the severity of the downturn.

A collapse in oil prices would not only force Chavez to carefully consider his oil plans but also would expose Chavez to threats to his leadership. Without substantial oil revenues to support the government largesse that keeps the people and Chavez’s cronies happy, the political system he is implementing would become increasingly unpalatable. Chavez would then be subjected to the risks of both popular opposition as well as opposition from within his own ranks. The more accustomed everyone becomes to the spoils of high oil prices, the greater their dissatisfaction will be should oil prices fall.

Some Venezuelan economists think Chavez needs oil prices above $30 a barrel to sustain his Bolivarian Revolution financially over the medium and longer term. Chavez’s recent efforts to talk up OPEC’s price band to between $40 and $50 a barrel suggests the economists are probably right in estimating the floor price Chavez needs to keep his revolution running. Venezuela’s average oil export prices run about $8 a barrel less than OPEC’s.

U N E X P E C T E D U . S . A C T I O N

The Bush administration’s predisposition towards preemptive action against perceived enemies could yet become a factor for Chavez. The United States could conceivably get fed up with Chavez, opt to beat him to the punch, and decide to stop buying his oil if it saw clear writing on the wall indicating that Chavez was preparing to stop sending shipments.

Another problem for Chavez could be his support for extremist political organizations and armed militant groups in countries like Colombia, Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru. If Chavez alienates other governments in the region by supporting groups that seek to destabilize those governments, the Bush administration could (though this is not likely) achieve enough traction in venues like the OAS to censure or impose sanctions against Venezuela.

However, neither would have a great impact on Venezuela’s oil-based economy, since cash-strapped and energy-deficient countries in the region hooked on Chavez’s cheap oil would likely push for sanctions on non-petroleum goods, which Chavez would not find especially troublesome.

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I N T E R N A L D I V I S I O N S

Within Venezuela, Chavez’s management strategy is to encourage divisions between the military and various civilian groups that support him. Although he shares the country’s oil wealth with these groups, he does not share political power. Because Chavez has neutralized his political opposition, these groups have increasingly clamored for their pieces of the pie, and they are getting those pieces now. As long as oil prices remain high, Chavez can keep everyone happy. As soon as prices fall, however, there will be greater internal competition for the oil treasure, and groups that lose their seat at the table could decide to target Chavez.

Internal threats are far greater concerns for Chavez than external ones, and he knows this. This is why Chavez is going to such great lengths to create parallel forces and militias within and outside the FAN.

Individuals who might oppose Chavez are not interested in pursuing a different course from the one he has elaborated, since they too want power and petrodollars, but they also do not want to provoke decisive action from Washington before they feel Venezuela is prepared to handle it. They would simply like to keep a lower profile while they implement the next stage of the revolution. While this does not mean that a coup or assassination attempt is imminent, any internal moves against Chavez could set off a wider struggle that would destabilize the country as groups vie for power and control over Venezuela’s oil revenues. In the long run, however, these groups would not have an appreciable impact on the direction and goals of the Bolivarian Revolution since they all share the same goals.

V E N E Z U E L A’ S F U T U R E

Based on all of the above information, Stratfor sees events in Venezuela developing along the following lines over the next two years:

Chavez is solidly in control today, and we anticipate no major change in terms of his political power. Quite the contrary, the revolution will advance across the board, imposing greater political, economic and social controls over Venezuelan society.

Based on available information and intelligence at this point, we find the probability of Chavez’s imminent demise to be low, since he has multiple means of dealing with dissent at his disposal.

Chavez will very likely be re-elected in 2006, even if China stumbles, oil prices plummet and Castro dies. Chavez already controls Venezuela’s political and security institutions, his civilian followers are better organized and better armed than they used to be, and he has very substantial reserves of hard currency, crude oil and natural gas.

There is a strong undercurrent of opposition to Chavez -- easily 50 percent of the population -- but they have no leaders. Armed extremist opposition groups may engage in targeted attacks on infrastructure or government buildings, but these would bring swift reprisals from Chavez.

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After Chavez is re-elected in 2006, he will probably try to amend the Constitution as quickly as possible so he can continue seeking re-election. Since 2001, Chavez has repeatedly declared that he plans to continue governing Venezuela until 2021. He is not engaging in wishful thinking. Chavez plans to go the distance in Venezuela as Castro has done in Cuba; the leader of the Bolivarian Revolution could be around for a long time to come.

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