abrams sense of past origins of sociology

8/11/2019 Abrams Sense of Past Origins of Sociology

1/16

The ast and resent Society

The Sense of the Past and the Origins of SociologyAuthor(s): Philip AbramsSource: Past & Present, No. 55 (May, 1972), pp. 18-32Published by: Oxford University Presson behalf of The Past and Present Society

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2/16


3/16

THE SENSE OF

THE

PAST

AND THE ORIGINS OF SOCIOLOGY

I9

Whether uch an

enterprise

s,

in

principle,philosophically

r

empirically

iable

s a matter or debate.

Personally

think t

is,

and that it is just this emphasis n sociologywhichgives the

discipline

ts

mportance,

r

at

least

ts seriousness.

Still,

t can

be

argued

thatthe

ways

n

which

ociology

as

so

far

gone

about

the

explanation

f

tendency,

r

transition,

ave

been

flawed

y

a

radically

unsound

methodology.

And

it can be

argued

that much of this

unsoundness

s

rooted n the

manner

n

which

ociologists

onceive

of the

past.

Some

conception

f the

past

is

inescapable. Sociology

roceeds

in

itsmost

ypical

orms

y way

of

the

yping

f

tructural

ystems

for example, industrialism, eudalism, egal-rational uthority.

But f

structuralism

f

thiskind

s

to

explain

nything

t

mustbe

by

advancing xplanations

n

terms

f

the

principles

f

structuring,

r

of

what

Piaget

n

a

stronger hrase

calls the

transformationaws

of

structures.4

Now it is

plainly

not the

case that all

structuring

s

chronological

tructuring:

his

would not

be so for

linguistic

r

mathematicaltructuresor

example.

But

it

is

necessarily

he

case

in

thefields f

history,

ociology

nd

anthropology,

he

ocial

ciences

for

which the

idea

of

action

in

time is the essential lement n

explanation.5Analysis fthemechanics fhistoricalransitionsthe

proper

asic

activity

f the

practitioners

fthese

ciences.

The

only

reference he

idea of

structuralransformationan have here is

a

reference

o

historical

rocess.

Far

from

detaching

ocial

analysis

from

hronology,

tructuralism

n

the

social sciences

ntailshistori-

cally

grounded

xplanation.

I would

agree

with Gellnerthat the

resonance nd

appeal

of

sociology

n

recent

years prings

rom he

impression

he

subject

gives

of

dealing

directly

ith

he

mechanics

of

the

transitionhat

rightly

oncerns s most

industrialization.6

But I amnotas confidents he seemstobe that ociology as been

attacking

his

problem

n

any

particularly

seful

way.

What seems

to

have

happened,

rather,

s

that

structural

ypes

have

been

put

together

n

a

generally

mpressionistic

nd

historically

asual manner

4J.

Piaget,

Structuralism

London,

1971):

Were it

not

for

the idea of

transformation

tructures

would

lose

all

explanatory

mport,

since

they

would

collapse

into static forms

p.

12).

5

To

this

extent

would

agree

with

W.

G. Runciman

(Sociology

n

its

Place,

Cambridge,

1970)

that there can be

no

serious distinction between

history,

sociology

nd

anthropology.

But

by

the

same token

disagree

with his further

claim

that all three

disciplines

can

be reduced

to some

sort of

psychology.

It

is

just their central emphasis on historicalstructuring hat makes them non-

reducible.

Men make their

own

history,

but

they

make it

in

spite

of

themselves

Marx)

-

it is their

efforto

understand

he in

spite

of that

gives

these

disciplines

their

autonomy.

6

E.

Gellner,

Thought

nd

Change Chicago,

1964).

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4/16

20

PAST AND

PRESENT

NUMBER

55

-

consider he

way

n

which

ureaucracy

nd anomiewere dentified

as

emergent

roperties

f

ndustrialism

y

Weber nd Durkheim or

example. And secondly, ogically rdered ontrasts etween truc-

tural

types

have

been

treated,

uite

naively

or

the

most

part,

as

though

hey ffectively

ndicated

hronologically

rdered ransitions.

On this

basis

a

sociological ast

has

been worked

p,

a

past

which

s

linked to the

present

not

by

carefully

bservedand

temporally

located ocial

interaction

ut

by inferentiallyecessary

onnections

between

oncepts.

Discussions

f

the decline

f

community,

f the

traditional

orking

lass and

ofthe

problems

f

modernizationn the

contextof contrasts etween

developing

and

modern social

systemsreamong he better nown ontemporaryxamples f the

application

f thismode of

thought.

In

each case a

perspective

n

present

ocial

experience

s

gained

by postulating

tendentious

relationship

etweenwhat

s

observednow and a

structural

ype

associated

irmly

ut

unspecifically

ith he

past .

The

function

of

he

ociologist's

ast

n otherwords as not

been

to

provide

frame

of referenceor

mpirical

tudies f

the

mechanics

f

transition

ut

instead

o furnish

rationale

or

ide-stepping

uchtedious

historical

chores

nd

moving

t once o

the

onstruction

f

predictiventerpreta-

tions fthepresent. We have heoddspectacle f disciplinewhich

claims

mportance

ust

because

t

takes

he

problem

f

the

temporal

transformationf

tructures its central

nalytical

ssue,

but

which t

the ametime

ppears

ommitted

o a

sense

ofthe

past

which

ctually

directs attention

way

from

the need for

analyses

of

structural

transitions a

temporally

nd

culturally

ituated

rocess.

Parsons's

influentialnd

representativessay

The

Institutionalramework

f

Economic

Development

s

perhaps

ur bestrecent

xample

f both

sides

of

this ambivalence

n

sociology.'

Unlike

Rostow,

Hoselitz

and a number fothers8 ho canbe said to use the dea ofstages f

development

n

a

fairly

mechanical

way

n

producing

cenarios

f

development olicy,

arsons

displays

good

deal

of

refinement

nd

subtlety

n

applying

is

modelof ndustrializationo the

predicament

of the

underdeveloped

ountries.

He

allows for

example

hat

the

actual

present

f these

ountries

s

importantly

nlike he

past

of

the

European

ountries

s a result fthe

ntervening

istory

fthe atter.

Nevertheless,

hen ll

his

refinementsnd modifications

re

made,

he

7

T. Parsons, The Institutional rameworkof Economic Development , in

Structure nd Process

n Modern

Society

Glencoe,

Illinois,

1960).

8

Cf.

W.

W.

Rostow,

The

Stages of

Economic Growth

Cambridge,

1962);

B.

Hoselitz,

Sociological

Factors in

Economic

Development Glencoe,

Illinois,

1960).



5/16

THE

SENSE

OF THE

PAST

AND THE

ORIGINS

OF

SOCIOLOGY 21

problem

f

development

emains

ne of

adjusting

he

history

f the

underdeveloped

ountries o a model of

structural ransformation

abstracted romEuropeanand American xperience. Although e

sees

that,

as a resultof the

time

ag

in

industrialization,

olitical

institutions ill be

relatively

ore

mportant

n the

underdeveloped

countries

han

hey

were n

Europe,

he

trajectory

f

ndustrialization

remains

essentially

he

same;

the

point

of

departure

traditional

society)

nd

the

destination

industrialociety)

retreated s

conform-

ing

in

all

important

espects

o a

common

model. For such

a

procedure

o

make

ny

ense t all t must

e

assumed,

s it

s,

that he

pasts

of the

developed

nd

underdeveloped

ountries

re

basically

similar ndbasically nproblematic.

Robert

Nisbet,

criticizing

hathe calls the

metaphor

f

develop-

ment

in

Social

Change

and

History,9

and

Andre Gunder

Frank,

criticizing

hat

he calls

the

deal-typical

ndex

pproach

o

the

study

of transition

n The

Sociology

of

Development

nd

the Under-

development

f

Sociology ,lo

have

exposed

some of the more

startlingonsequences

f

this

tate

of

affairs.

In this

paper

want

to consider auses

rather

han

consequences,

owever.

How is

it

that

sociology

has

remained o

unregenerate

n its commitmento

a sense f hepastwhichwe havebeen old gain ndagain ontributes

moreto

ignorance

han

to

knowledge?

The

paper

s not

meant

o

provideyet

another

ccasion

for

historians

o feel

superior

t

the

expense

of

sociology.

The

attempt

o

understand

he

mechanics f

transition

nvolved n

structural

hange

eemsto me

unquestionably

more

mportant

han he

sort

of

thing

hat

normally oes

on

in most

Departments

f

History.

We

have, oo,

enough

xamples

f success

in this

sort

of

enterprise

o

know

thatthe work s not

in

principle

futile:

he

best

example, suppose,

s

the

first olume of

Capital.

So it becomes questionworth skingwhy ociologists avebeenso

unsuccessful

n

striking

fruitful

alance

betweenthe

typing

f

structuresnd

the

empirical nalysis

f

transition

why hey

have

forthe most

part

felt

hat

the need

to order tructural

ypes

nd

relate

hem

equentially

s a

first

rder

of

business and

have

n

proportion

eglected

he

business

of

using

structural

oncepts

o

inform

historical

investigation.11

The

ordering

of

structural

ypes

is

a

relevant

euristic

etting

or

he

analysis

f

change.

It

cannot

9Published Oxford,1969.

10

A. G.

Frank,

Latin

America:

Underdevelopment

r

Revolution

New

York,

1964).

The

essay

cited is

also

published separately,

New

York,

1968.

11

T.

Parsons, Societies,

Evolutionary

nd

Comparative

Perspectives, .

III;

and see

Nisbet,

p.

cit.,

h.

8.



6/16

22

PAST AND PRESENT

NUMBER

55

be a substitute

or

t.

How did

sociologists

ome

to

adopt

an idea of

history

hich

o

directly

mplied

he

opposite?

We may startfromJohnBurrow'sobservationhat the social

sciences

were in the

first nstance

response

o

anarchy:

social

anarchy

s a

fear,

ntelletcual

narchy

s

a

fact .'2 More

mportantly

perhaps

he

social and cultural onfusion f the

time

was understood

not as an

effect f wickedness

as

a

comparable

isorder ad

been

understoodn the

seventeenth

entury),

ut as an effect f

history.

The

sense

of disorderwas

ubiquitous

nd acture. Its

intensity

as

such

that

many

eltunable to

say,

at

even

the most

modest evel of

abstraction,

hatwas

going

n.

The

predicament

as welldescribed

byLamartinen his account fwht twas ike o ivethroughhe ast

months

f the

JulyMonarchy:

Thesetimes re imes f

chaos;

opinions

re

scramble;

arties

re

jumble;

the

language

of new ideas has not

been

created;

nothing

s more difficult

han

to

give good

definitionfoneself

n

religion,

n

philosophy,

n

politics.

One

feels,

ne

knows,

one

lives,

and at need one dies for ne's

cause,

but one cannot

name t.

It s the

problem

f

he ime o

classifyhings

nd

men.

The

world

has

umbled

ts

catalogue.13

But

the

collapse

of

meaning

ad

in

addition

specifically

istorical

content. Eric

Hobsbawm

has drawn ttention

o

the

propensity

n

all societies o use thepast as a resource oreither nticipatingr

prescribing

he

future.14

It

was

precisely

he

possibility

f

such

thought

hat the

pace

and

scope

of

change

n the mid-nineteenth

century

eemed

o

undermine.

The

senseof

the

meaninglessness

f

the

present

was felt s a matter f

the

ack of

relationship

etween

present

nd

past.

The

generation

hat

gave

birth

o

sociology

was

probably

he

first

eneration

f

human

eings

ver

o have

xperienced

within he

pan

of

their

wn

ifetime

ocially

nduced ocial

change

f

a

totally

transformativeature

-

change

which could not be

identified,xplainedand accommodated s a limitedhistorical

variation

within he

encompassing

rder

f the

past.

One

faced

for

the first

ime

a situation

n

which

the

idea

of historical ction

or

accident

conquest,

evolution

r

plague

-

could

not

begin

so

it

seemed)

o account or he

ways

n which

he

present

iffered

rom

he

past.

To

act

effectively

n the

present,

frame

f reference hich

allowed

one to

identify

he structure f

one's

situation,

nd

so

to

anticipate

he

consequences

f

one's

actions,

was

essential. But

such

a

frame

f

reference

ould

not

be

derived

irectly

rom he

study

f

12

J.

Burrow,

Evolution nd

Society

Cambridge,

1966),

p. 93.

13

Cited

by

C.

Geertz

Ideology

as

a Cultural

System

in D.

Apter

(ed.),

Ideology

nd Discontent

New

York,

1964), P. 43.

14

E.

J.

Hobsbawm,

The

Social

Function of

the

Past ,

above

pp. 3-17.



7/16

THE

SENSE

OF

THE PAST AND

THE

ORIGINS

OF

SOCIOLOGY

23

the

present

the

worldhad

umbled

ts

catalogue.

Nor could

t

be

derived

aively

rom

nowledge

f

the

past

because

the

nature f

the

historical onnection fpast and presenthad becomeobscure, he

conventional

ategories

f

historical

hought

ould

not

grasp

it.

Hitherto he

past

had

provided

he

pattern

or

he

present

n

quite

straightforward

ays.

History

ad

been an

unproblematic

atter

f

recording

uration nd

succession.

Neither uration or uccession

had

appeared

o

bring

henature f the

principles

f social

organiza-

tion

nto

question.

But

that was

just

what

happened

n the mid-

nineteenth

entury.

One did

not need to

be

very

ophisticated

o feelthat he

present

whenconsideredn relation o thepastwasdeeply nigmatic. The

merchants nd landlords

who

joined

together

o form he

Bristol

Statistical

ociety

n

1838

weredriven o an interest

n

socialresearch

by

motives

not

very

differentromthose

which were

to

inspire

Durkheim r

LePlay.

In a

simple

state of

society they

noted]

a

man

may

know

tolerably

well

what

his duties o the

poor

are .

.

but

what

shall be said of thatartificialnd

complicated

state

of

things

when

a

nation manufactures or

half the world

-

and

when the

consequence

unavoidably

is

the enormous

distance between

the labourer and his virtual and sub-divided

employer?'5

The

rapid

nd

amazingly

amifiedxtensionfthedivision f abour

was

the

beginning

f

the

problem.

But

ayer

pon

ayer

f

complica-

tion had been

heaped upon

it

until

ll effectiveense of

historically

anchored

rocess

was ost.

Even

Bagehot,

he

east

flappable

hinker

of

his

generation,

ensed

the

dilemma.

The

greatest iving

contrast ,

e

was

moved

to remark

n

1861,

is

between

he old

Eastern and

customary

ivilizations nd

the new

Western and

changeable

ivilizations .16

Whatresources

ere

vailable or

making

enseof he

xperience

f

living

n a

changeable

ivilization?

Only

knowledge

f the

past.

Somehow

hat

knowledge

ad

to

be used

to

yield

up

a new under-

standing

of what was

happening

n the

present.

G.

H.

Lewes

expressed

he

problem

ery learly.

Like most fhis

contemporaries

he found

himself

n an

age

of universal

narchy

f

thought ,

n

age

' anxious

to reconstruct .

.

but

as

yet mpotent

-

impotent

because

the

anarchy

was

historically

nduced and

historically

ncompre-

hensible.

In

this

plight ,

he

concluded,

we

may hope

for the

future

ut can

clingonly

to

the

past:

that

alone

is

secure,

well-

grounded. The past must formthe basis of certaintynd the

15

J.

of

the Statistical

Soc.,

ii

(1839).

16

W.

Bagehot,

Physics

nd Politics

London,

1872),

P. 114.



8/16

24

PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER

55

materials

or

speculation . 1

In

turning

o the

past,

then,

the

intentionwas somehow to

transcend

mere

history.

Here

the

emergingocial sciences aced fundamentaltrategichoice. Was

the

past

o

be

understoods a structural

ystem

r

as

a field

f

history

Because

the

most

urgent

ssue

was

to

identify

he

general rganizing

principles

f industrial

ociety

nd

the

general rinciples

f

change

involved

in

industrialization,

t was

perhaps

natural that

the

historical haracter

f the

past

should

n the first

nstance

ave been

ignored,

hat

he

first

esponse

houldhave been a

set of

attempts

o

reify

oth he

past

as a structural

ype

nd

history

s

a

developmental

process.

What

was

not so

natural,

ut nevertheless

appened

n

almost very ase,was that his ntitial laborate onstructionf deal

types

id

not

ead social cientistsack

o

substantive

nvestigations

f

historicalransitionn

particular

ettings

ut

was

allowed

o stand s

being

n itself

theoretically

nd

empiricallydequate

lternative

o

such

nvestigations.

venMax

Weber

n

TheProtestantthic

ndthe

Spirit fCapitalism,18

henearest

hing

o

an

example

f

good

histori-

cal

sociology

whichthe

founding

athers

f the

discipline

were

to

produce,

was

astoundingly

asual about

he

detailed istorical alida-

tion

f

his

rgument.

One of he

hings

whichmakes

t so

difficult

or

studentso answer hestandardxaminationuestionwhich nvites

them o

compare

Weber's ccount

f the

development

f

capitalism

with

hat fKarl Marx s thatMarx s

simply

muchbetter

historian

thanWeber.

Marx

was,

of

course,

lways

primarily

nterestedn

the

mechanics

of

transition,

he

relational

asis of ndustrialization.

y

comparison

the construction

f

developmentalypes

has

a

second-order,

ven

a

background,

mportance

n his

thought.

Nevertheless

t is

strange

that

ociologists

n

general

houldnot

havebeen

ed

as Marx

was from

thereificationf thestages ndprocesses fdevelopmento thesort

of

empirical

historical

ociology

Marx

himself chieved.

We can

hardly xplain

the

failure

y suggesting

hat

the

sociologists

were

work-shy.

On

the

contrary

he

important

nineteenth-century

sociologists

ere

t least as industriouss

Marx.

It

is

possible

hat

Spencer

ccumulated

more

data

than

ny

other cholar

as

yet

done.

Nor were he

early

ociologists

isinclined

o

handle

historical ata

Weber for

one seems

to have had an inexhaustible

nterest

n such

17

G. H. Lewes, The State of Historical Sciences in France , cited in

Burrow,

op.

cit.,

p.

94.

18

M.

Weber,

The Protestant

thic and the

Spirit

of

Capitalism,

irst

ublished

in

Archiv

fur

Socialwissonschaft

nd Social

politik,

vols.

xx and

xxI

(1904-5),

English

translation

by

T.

Parsons

(New

York,

1930).



9/16

THE

SENSE

OF THE PAST

AND THE ORIGINS

OF

SOCIOLOGY

25

material.

Generally

t

was

through

he

reinterpretation

f

historical

materials

hat

hey

oped

o

achieve

n

understanding

fthe

meaning

ofthepresent. What s odd s that hey emainedommittedoways

of

using

historical materials

that

were

both

ahistorical and

historicist.

t

is

this

historical

istoricismf

ociology

hat

needs

o

be

explained.

The

explanation

eems

to have two main elements.

First

there

was

the intellectual

scendancy

f evolutionism.

Second one must

recognize

he

apparent ower

f

the

analytical aradigm

roduced

y

the treatment f

the

past

as a structural

ype.

It did

permit

s,

Marxism

apart, nothing

lse

did,

a

generalized

ccount of

the

structurendtendencyf ndustrialism.An exhaustivexplanation

would

also have to consider he

importance

f

some

questions

f

academic

convenience nd convention.

In

establishing

ts

own

academic

credentials,

ociology

had above all

to

differentiate

tself

from

history.

Since

it, too,

dealt

in historical

materials

and

problems,

hedifferentiation

irtually

ad

to

be

in terms

f

sociology's

special

methodology.

Once

methodology

ecame

he

hallmark

f he

discipline

t this level

it

was

surprisinglyasy

for t to

prove

an

obstacle

o

the

adoption

f new

ways

f

dealing

with

he

problems

s

well. It is bizarre but not unrevealinghat we should observe

attempts

o

demonstrate

hat

Stanley

lkins s not

really

historian

or that

Barrington

oore

Jr.

s not

really

sociologist.19

But this

is

by

the

way.

As an

empirical

cience

of the

aws

of

tendency,ociology prang

directly

romthe

sense,

pervasive

nd

disturbing

s it

was,

of a

changeable

civilization. Either

changeability

made civilization

unpredictable

a

prospect

ot even Herbert

pencer

was

sanguine

enough

o

embrace

or it

was

scientifically

rdered

n

ways

which

appropriateontemplationould reveal. Appropriateontemplation

in turn was felt to

involve

three

things:

first,

he

discovery

f a

conceptual anguage

apable

of

differentiating

etween

present

nd

past,

f

marking

utthe

rajectory

f

change;

hen

general

tructural

characterizationf the

present

s distinct

rom

he

past;

and

finally

the dentificationf the

processes

f

change

or

growth

n

terms

f

which

past, present

nd futurewere bound

together.

For each

of

these

purposes

t

was

not

historical ctionbut

objectified

istorical

19

S.

Elkins,

Slavery (Chicago,

1959)

and

Barrington

Moore

Jr.,

The

Social

Origins fDictatorshipndDemocracyBensonPress,Boston,1966)areamongthe

betterknown recent tudies to

have created

ntra-disciplinary

oul-searching y

demonstrating

he

unavoidably nter-disciplinary

ature

of

explanation

n the

social

sciences. For current

examples

of

pedantic boundary disputes

of

this

kind,

see The American

Sociologist,

i

(New

York,

1971).



10/16

26

PAST AND

PRESENT

NUMBER

55

process

that

was of

interest. The

idea that

process

could be

ascertained

nly

through

areful

observational

tudies

of

action

occurred overy ewpeople.

In

passing

we

might

note that he

problem

f

putting ogether

suitable

anguage

f

concepts

was

itself n

acute one. Few

things

are as evidentn

early

ineteenth-century

ocial

nalysis

s the

want f

appropriate

erms o

specify

he

variationsn

social

experience

hat

observers wished to

discuss. The

vocabulary

that served to

describe traditional ocial

relationshipsimply

ould not

grip

the

experience

f

the

present

with

ny

precision.

Compare

he

vigour

of

thefirst

art

f

this

tatement

y

Cobbettwith he

impness

f

the

end: When master nd manwere theterms veryonewas in his

place

and

all

were

free;

now

in

fact t is an affair f

masters nd

slaves .20

Now

of course

t

was not

really

n affair f masters nd

slaves. But

Cobbett's

repertoire

f

concepts

imply

ould

not

get

him

any

nearer. Nor was it sufficiento see the

present imply

s

a

negation

f

the

past:

Shelley's tring

f

negatives

sceptreless,

uncircumscribed,

nclassed,

ribeless nd

nationless,

xempt

from

awe,

worship

nd

degree 21

was

a

good

intuitive

esponse

o the

situation ut no basis for

nalysis.

In the event the vocabularyproblemwas solved under the

umbrella f

the

general

ttempt

o characterize

he

present

s a

type

of social

order,

and to infer from

the

supposed typological

properties

f

types

of social order

supposed

aws of

tendency

r

principles

f social

development.

The

overriding ecessity

was

to

obtain

n

objective,

bstract

ardstick

utside he

flux

f

the

present

situation the

complicated

nd artificialtate

f

things

to which

the

present

ituation ould be referrednd

n terms f which

t

could

thencebe known. To this end

the

emerging

ocial sciences eized

hold ofhistoryn twoways. First n the form f a seriesof bold

conceptual

polarities,

xplicit

ntitheses etween

past

and

present

whichNisbethas called

the unit deas of

sociology.

Second n

the

form f a set of

ambitious

escriptive

heories f the

stages

f social

development.

The effect

fboth

procedures

as

to

turn

history

nto

an

object.22

20

W.

Cobbett,

olitical

egister,

xxxvi

London,

1835)

p.

767.

21

P.

B.

Shelley,

Prometheus

nbound ,

Act

III,

Scene

v,

The

Complete

Poetical

Works

Oxford, 907).

22

R. Nisbet,The Sociological raditionNew York,1966). If one weredisposed o accept heargumenthat heprincipal ropertyftheculture f

capitalism

s a

process

f reification

n

which

ll

secondaryelationships

end

increasingly

o

be

perceived

s

relationships

etween

hings,

ne

could then

add to

Engels's nalysis

fthe

way

n

which

hereal

onnectednessf

man nd

(cont.

n

p.

27)



11/16

THE

SENSE

OF

THE

PAST

AND THE

ORIGINS OF

SOCIOLOGY

27

The

attempt

o

formulate

aws of

development

s a

matter f

explicit

historical

rocess

was

of

course a

conspicuous

ailure. Its

empirical ifficultieserequicklypparentomost bservers. Thus

HenrySidgwick

bserved n

I885

how:

With

equal

confidence

history

s

represented

s

leading

up,

now to the

naive

and

unqualified

ndividualism

of

Spencer,

now to the

carefully uarded

and

regulated

socialism of

Schaeffle,

now to

Comte's dream of

securing

seven-

roomed

houses for ll

working

men

....

Guidance,

truly,

s here

enough

and

to

spare;

but

how shall the

bewildered

tatesman

elect his

guidance

when his

sociological

doctors exhibit

such

portentous

disagreement?

Not

surprisinglyidgwick

nded

by

begging

his

audience to take

no

steps

calculated o

foster

elusions f this

kind .23

The

more

importantpistemologicalifficultiesf evolutionaryociologywere

no

less

effectively

xposed,

first

y

would-be

evolutionists

uch

as

Hobhouse and

Ginsberg,

hen

definitivelyy

Popper.24

Two

years

after

Popper's

first

nslaught

n

sociological

historicism

arsons

proposed

he

repudiation

f

all interest

n

diachronic

nalysis

nd the

reorientationf

sociology

round the

synchronic

nvestigation

f

systems

f

action n terms

f

formalized

historical

roperties.26

What

actually

appened

t this

point,

however,

was

that,

lthough

the

discrediting

f the

vert

ntellectual

trategies

f

evolutionism

as

acknowledged,

he

nfrastructuref

evolutionismemainedmbeddedin

sociological

hought.

It washere hat he

conceptual olarities

f

sociology's

unit ideas

were

important.

Status

and

contract,

community

nd

association,

organic

and

mechanical

solidarity,

traditional

nd

legal-rational

uthority,

he

folk

ommunity

nd

the

urban

ommunity

all

thesedouble

concepts

were

ways

of

trying

o

apprehend

nd

identify

he

changes

n the

structural

ormat f

society

ssociated

with

ndustrialization.More

or less

explicitly

he

changes

indicated

n the

conceptual

antitheses

were

treated

as

necessary

oncomitantsf

industrialization,

n

idea

which

urfaced

from ime o time

most

recently

n thework fClarkKerrandhis

colleagues

n the

I96os)

in

the

notion fthe

logic

of

ndustrialism .26

There

couldbe

and was

wide-ranging

ispute

s

to the

xactnature

f

(note

22

cont.)

his

history

s lost for

fair in

the

veils

of

fetishism

pun by

philosophers,

political

theorists

nd

jurists

the

observation

that

the

peculiar

contribution f

the

sociologist

o

this

process

has

been,

as a final

ronic

transformation,

o

turn

history

tself

nto

a

thing.

13

British

Association forthe

Advancementof

Science,

Proceedings

London,

1885).

24

L. T. Hobhouse, Social Development Allen and Unwin, London, 1924)and Morals in Evolution

(Macmillan, London,

I901);

M.

Ginsberg,

The

Diversity

of

Morals

(London,

1956);

K.

Popper,

The

Poverty of

Historicism

(London,

1957).

2r

T.

Parsons,

The

Structure

f

Social

Action

Glencoe, Illinois,

1937).

26

C.

Kerr,

et

al.,

Industrialism nd

Industrial

Man

(London,

1962).



12/16

28

PAST

AND

PRESENT

NUMBER

55

the

ogic

of

ndustrialismut the

salience f the

dea as a

governing

focus

of

thought

emained

trong.

Not all

of

the

early

ociologists

adoptedthe device of conceptualpolarizationn its fullest orm.

Often

the

polarity

was

merely mplied

n

the

assertion f some

distinctive

rocessual

roperty

f

ndustrialization:he

emergence

f

chronic

anomie,

urbanism as a

way

of

life, bureaucratization,

secularization,

he

isolation

of the

conjugal family.

But the

procedure

s

really

he

same.

It is

a matter

f

abbreviating

istory.

It

involved

the

observation f

key

structural

ifferences

n

the

constitution

f the

present

s distinct rom he

past.

But t

did

not

necessarily

nvolve

ny

needto show

how,

historically,

he

differences

hadbeeneffected. t was theobservationf contrasted oments f

development

hat

mattered.

Having

characterized

ast

and

present

as

states

f

being

n

terms f

some

keyproperties,

ne could

go

on

to

infer aws

of

tendency y logical

rather

han historical

rocedures.

Whatever hedifficultiesf he

method,

ts

heer

conomy

as

among

its

principal

ttractions.

Quite

imply,

herewas no

quicker

method

of

producing

theoreticalccount f where

ociety

was

going

or of

whatwere ts

significant

tructural

omponents.

It

did

matter,

f

course,

to show

that

the

past postulatedby

sociology

the

world

of

the

extended

amily,

f

community

nd

corporation,

ffolk ulture nd traditionalism hadbeen

really

here

in some

concrete

ense. But to

see

how thiswas

done

s

to

see still

more

learly

ow

profoundly

nhistorical

he whole

nterprise

eally

was. The

point

fter ll

was not

to

know he

past

butto establish n

idea of the

past

which ould be used as

a

comparative

ase for

he

understanding

f

the

present.

Once

the

flood f

ethnographic

ata

became available and once it became clear that the

Iroquois,

the

ancient icts nd the

rish n

Manchester

ere,

nalytically,

he

ame

thing,

he

essential

rrelevance

f

history

n

the constructionf

this

past was revealed. This did not, of course,at all reduce the

importance

f

calling

t

the

past.

That

importance

as

irreducible.

But

it

sprang

from

he

sociologists'

oncern o

achieve

theory

f

modernity,

nd

if

possible

f

modernization,

ot

from

ny

nterest

n

the

mechanics f

historical

ransition.

As

J.

F.

McLennan

put

t n

a

general

ubric

or

the

social sciences

withwhichmostof his co-

workers eem to

have been

thoroughlyympathetic:

The first

hing

to be done is to inform urselves of the facts

relating

o

the

least

developed

races

...their

condition,

as it

may

be observed

today,

is

trulythemost ancient conditionofman. It is the lowest and simplest...

and .. inthe cience fhistoryldmeans ot ld nchronologyut n struc-

ture. That is most ancient which lies nearest the

beginning

of human

progress

considered as

a

development.27

27

T. F.

McLennan,

Studies

in Ancient

History,

2nd

ser.

(London,

1896),

p.

16.



13/16

THE

SENSE

OF THE

PAST

AND

THE

ORIGINS OF SOCIOLOGY

29

There are fewclearer

tatements

f the central

trategy

f the

social

sciences and fewmore

ndicative

f their

ndifference

o

anythingthat could be

called,

strictly,

he historical

past. Long

after

McLennan's

hopeful

nvolvement ith vert

notions

f

progress

nd

development

ad been

abandoned,

he

conceptionsmplicit

n the

idea of

systems

being

old in structure remained rooted

in

sociological

method.

Some

consequences

f

this method re worth

noting.

It is

not

just

that t directs

ttention

way

from

he need

for

propositional

theories

bout

the

organization

f

change

n

particular

istorical

contexts;

or that it

permitted

eople

like

Bagehot

to

regard

the

workinglasses s primitive

28

itseconomy,legance ndapparent

effectiveness

n

differentiatingast

and

present

have

encouraged

stateof

affairs

n

which

high

proportion

f

sociological

esearch

s

in

fact

research

n

myths

which

sociologists

ave

invented.

The

sociology

fthe

family

rovides

ome

ovely xamples

fthis

process.

Family

ociology

as

until

uite

recently

een dominated

y

the

dea

of the

classical

pre-industrial

amily,

r,

as W.

J.

Goode

puts

it,

a

pretty

icture

f

ifedownon

Grandma's arm . With

reference

to this

construct,

ssembled

by

means of

McLennan's brand

of

structuralistoryndtheskilfulxtrapolationrom tof dealtypes,

a

whole seriesof

quite

detailed

myths

were

formulatedbout what

happens,

nd has to

happen,

to the

family

n the course

of

indus-

trialization.

Goode,

who has

been more

nvolved han

nyone

lse

in

the

dismantling

fthis

particular

ody

of

myth,

ow

concludes hat

no

determinate

elationship

an

be established ither

way

between

family atterns

nd

industrialization.29

his,

however,

s

not

so

much

definitive

inding

s a

statementhat he

ground

s now

clear

for the

sort of

research

hat

ought

to

have been done

in

the first

place. Meanwhile an expensiveresearchunit in Cambridgehas

devoted

everal

years

o

proving

he

non-existencen

pre-industrial

England

nd

elsewhere

f

type

f

family

hich

o-onefamiliar ith

the

historical

vidence ver aid

did

exist.3

This sort f

thing

s

the

least

of the costs

of

sociology's

idden

historical

istoricism.The

higher

osts

are

paid

in

the

terms f

referencembodied n

whole

strategies

f

sociological

hought.

A

case in

point

wouldbe the

use

28

Bagehot, op. cit., pp. 82-5; cf. Nisbet, Social Change and History.

29

W.

J.

Goode,

Industrialisation and

Family

Change

in

B.

F. Hoselitz

and

W.

E. Moore

(eds.),

Industrialisation

nd

Soczety

New

York,

1963),

PP. 237-59.

30

T. P.

R.

Laslett,

The

World We

Have

Lost

(London,

1965), pp.

8I-Io6.



14/16

30

PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER

55

that has been made of

Professor arsons's nfluential

roposal

to

analyse

ocialaction n terms f a

scheme

f

pattern ariables.31The

pattern

ariables

ppeared

as an

integral art

of Parsons's

manifesto or new

sociology wenty-five

ears go,

the

attempt

o

reconstitute

ociology

s an

analysis

f the

structure

f social action

dissociated rom he

study

of

tendency.

In

pursuit

f this

object

Parsons

proposed

hat

orientations

o action

could

be

investigated

schematically

n terms of a

limitednumber of

pure types.

He

recommended hatthese

types

hould be

organized

n fouror

five

pairs

f

opposities.

The four

airs

f

pattern

ariables

variableways

of

patterning

ction)

forwhich

he

foundmostuse were dentified

s

follows: articularismersus niversalism;ffectivityersus ffective

neutrality;

scription

ersus

achievement;

nd

diffuseness ersus

specificity.

This set of variationss offereds

encompassing,

f not

the

full

range

f

possible

modes of

action,

t least

such

a

large

field

that

ffectively

ll

systems

f

action an be

brought

within he

scope

of

sociological nalysis.

The merit laimed or he

pattern

ariables

as

analytical

tools

in

other words is

precisely

that

they

are

independent

f,

they

rise

above,

any

particular

istorical

ontext.

They

are

quite simply

alue-free ools. Yet

the use that

has

been

made ofthem,npartbyParsonsbutmore specially ysomeofhis

followers,

akes hishard

o believe. It turns ut that

hey

o

have,

again

n the structural

ense,

referenceo

history

r at least

to the

difference

etween

past

and

present,

raditionalismnd

modernity,

after

ll.

Thus

Sutton,

Hoselitz nd

many

thers

ave

dentified

he

difference

etween

modern and

pre-modern

ocial

systems

s a

polarity

f

universalism,

ffective-neutrality,

chievement

rientation

and functional

pecificity

n the one hand and of

particularism,

affectivity,

scription

nd

functional iffuseness

n the

other.32

Whether arsons ntendedhispolaritieso servethe turn f socio-

logical

historicism

n

this

way

s not clear. His

categories lainly

are anchored

n

quite

familiar ontrasts etween

the

presumed

properties

f

industrialismnd

pre-industrialism,

owever,

nd

the

use that has been

made

of

them

s in this

ense

legitimate.

They

do serve

as one more

device

enabling

ociology

o

theorize

bout

31

T.

Parsons,

The Social

System

Glencoe,

Illinois,

I95I).

Parsons's

con-

structs re

of

course an

explicit

extension of Weber's

distinctionbetween

the

properties

f

traditionality

nd

rationality :

M.

Weber,

The

Theory f

Social

and EconomicOrganisation New York, 1947).

32

Frank,

Latin

America:

Underdevelopment

r

Revolution,

discusses

this

procedure

at

some

length.

F. X.

Sutton,

Social

Theory

and

Comparative

Politics in

H. Eckstein and D.

Apter

(eds.),

Comparative

Politics

(Glencoe,

Illinois,

1963).



15/16

THE SENSE

OF

THE

PAST

AND

THE ORIGINS

OF SOCIOLOGY

31

the course

of

development

ithout

eference

o the mechanics

f

transition.

Consider a final example. The literatureof contemporary

sociology

s

full of

general

haracterizations

f

advanced

ndustrial

society

as

mass

society,

he

acquisitive

ociety,

he affluent

ociety

and most

recently

he

chaotic

society.

Most

particular

esearch

projects

proceed

under

the intellectual

uspices

of one or other

of

these

characterizations.

one

of the

characterizations

s the

result

of

cholarly

istorical

nalysis.

All of

them

depend,

however,

n

the

actuality

f an

assumedhistorical

rocess.

Daniel Bell's account

f

the

theory

f mass

societyprovides

good example

of what

is

involved:

The

revolutions

n

transport

nd communications

ave

brought

men nto

closer

ontact ith

ach

other nd bound

hem

n new

ways;

hedivision

f

labour

has

made them

more

nterdependent;

remors

n one

part

of

society

affect

ll

others.

Despite

his

greaternterdependence,

owever,

ndividuals

have

grown

more

stranged

rom ne nother.

The old

primary

ies f

family

and local

community

ave

been

shattered;

ncient

parochial

faiths

re

questioned;

ew

unifying

eliefs

r values

have

taken heir

place.

Most

important

hecritical

tandards

fan educated

lite

no

longer

hapeopinion

ortaste.

As a result

mores

ndmorals

re n constant

lux,

elations

etween

individuals

re

tangential

r

compartmentalized

ather han

rganic.

At the

same ime

greatermobility,patial

nd

social,

ntensifiesoncern

ver

tatus.

Instead f a fixed rknown tatus ymbolizedydress rtitle, achperson

assumes

multiplicity

froles

nd

constantly

as

to

prove

imself

n a succes-

sion

of new

ituations.

Because of

all

this,

he ndividual

oses a coherent

sense

f self.

His

anxietiesncrease.

There

ensues

search

or

newfaiths.

The

stage

s set

forthe charismatic

eader,

he

secular

messiah,

who

by

bestowingupon

each

person

the semblance

of

necessary

grace

and

of fulness

of

personality

upplies

substitute

or

heolder

nifying

elief hat

hemass

society

as

destroyed.33

Whether

r not

this

ype

f

characterization,

hich s

quite

prevalent

in

sociology,

s based

on

good

history

r not

is not

immediately

relevant.

The

important

eature

f such

thinking

s that n

it the

characterizationf historical rocessand the characterizationf

present

tructure

re

totally nterdependent.

ach

pervades

the

other nd

the

conception

s a whole

s

inconceivable

ithout oth.

All

questions

of

how the various

transformations

ntailed n

the

movement

etween

structural

ypes

were

effected

re,

however,

firmly

et aside.

The

point

s

notto focus

nvestigation

n the ocial

organization

f

historical

rocess

utto set

up

a frame freferenceor

research n

a

thing

alled the

social structure

f the

present.

And

yet

structure

s defined

n terms which

have

meaning

only

in

terms fconceptionsfprocess. We arefacedwith he ameparadox

33

D.

Bell,

The End

of Ideology

Glencoe,

Illinois,

1960).

Professor

Bell is

not,

of

course,

espousing

the

theory

f mass

society

n this

passage.

His

exposi-

tion

of it is nonetheless

well-takenfor that.



16/16

32

PAST

AND PRESENT

NUMBER

55

as before: he dentificationf tructural

ypes,

he

formal ifferentia-

tion of

past

and

present,

s

effected ith such

elan

and internal

cogencyhattendsupby pparently aking nnecessarynyfurther

study

f

the

nterveningtructuringhrough

hich

he

past presum-

ably

became

the

present.

Yet,

of

course,

t is

only

uch

work hat

will tell us whether

ur structural

oncepts

make

sense,

et alone

whether

hey

xplain

nything.

The academic nd intellectual

issociation f

history

nd

sociology

seems, hen,

o

have

had

the

effectf

deterring

oth

disciplines

rom

attending eriously

o the most

important

ssues

involved

n the

understanding

f social transition.

Many

current

ccountsof the

historian's ast, requiring s theydo a wholesalerejection f any

form f structural

nalysis,

trikeme as no

better uitedthan the

normal ersion f

he

ociologist's ast

o dealwith hese ssues. This

is not he

place

to considerwhat

hanges

fheart

r shifts f

emphasis

would

be

needed

o

produce

more ruitfulnd

sociological istory.

What I have tried o do is

to

show

how one

could

begin

to

move

towards more

penetrating

istorical

ociology.

The essential

tep

is

notto

abandon he structural

yping

f

past

and

present

ut rather

to

recognize

hat

he

function f structural

ypes

s notto

allow

us to

by-pass istory y nferringogically ecessaryendencies,ut on the

contrary

o direct ttention

o thosekinds f historical

nquiry

which

we should

expect,

heoretically,

o

explainphenomena

f structural

transformation.

Universityf

Durham

Philip

Abrams

abrams sense of past origins of sociology

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