abu-manneh, ‘the sultan and the bureaucracy

8/14/2019 Abu-Manneh, The Sultan and the Bureaucracy

1/19

The Sultan and the Bureaucracy: The Anti-Tanzimat Concepts of Grand Vizier Mahmud NedimPasaAuthor(s): Butrus Abu-MannehSource: International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Aug., 1990), pp. 257-274Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/164127.

Accessed: 05/10/2013 18:29

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at.http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Cambridge University Pressis collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to

International Journal of Middle East Studies.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 195.70.192.235 on Sat, 5 Oct 2013 18:29:00 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cuphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/164127?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/164127?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cup


2/19

Int. J. Middle East Stud. 22 (1990), 257-274. Printed in the United States of America

Butrus Abu-Manneh

THE SULTAN AND THE BUREAUCRACY:THE ANTI-TANZIMAT CONCEPTS OFGRAND VIZIER MAHMUD NEDIM PA?A

Mahmud Nedim Pasa was appointed grand vizier of the Ottoman Empire for thefirst time in September 1871 following the death of his predecessor in that office,Mehmed Amin Ali Pasa. His first tenure lasted until the end of July 1872. Hisrise to power represented the rise of a current in Ottoman politics that had beensuppressed in the 1860s, when Ali and Fuad dominated the Porte.About a decade before he became grand vizier, Mahmud Nedim had written atreatise in which he criticized the Tanzimat and advocated an alternative systemof government rooted in an idealized concept of early Ottoman history; in it hesaw the sultan as an all-powerful ruler who attended in person to the daily affairsof the state. During his tenure as grand vizier, Nedim tried to apply the prin-ciples that he had advocated, and in so doing he can be regardedas the precursorof the Hamidian era. Those principles represented a challenge to the ideals of theTanzimat, however, so it is necessary to explain what those ideals were beforedealing further with Nedim and his views.A number of characteristics underlay the Tanzimat reforms in the OttomanEmpire in the 19th century. The first and perhaps the most important was tobring to an end the absolute rule of the sultan and the arbitrary acts of hisgovernors, and to enforce the rule of law, both the shari'a (Muslim law) and thekdniiunstate law), which had suffered neglect in the preceding few generations."The Tanzimat was a decree that came to erase the old absolute ways," wrote thehistorian Lufti1 in justification of the dismissal of the aged statesman HiisrevPasa as grand vizier in 1840. Indeed, the declaration in the Gulhane Rescriptthat the decline of the state had resulted from not observing the shari'a andkdnun and that, henceforth, the life, honor, and property of all subjects would beguaranteed were not slogans, but fundamental principles to which the sultan andthe Porte adhered throughout most of the Tanzimat period.A second characteristic of the Tanzimat was the gradual shift of the locus ofpower from the palace to the Porte, i.e., to the bureaucracy, in contrast to thesituation under Sultan Mahmud II. This took place even though the sultancontinued to exercise the prerogative of dismissing grand viziers and otherministers. This shift meant that the bureaucracy over time included in its ranksnot only administratorsand reformersbut also statesmen and decisionmakers.2? 1990 Cambridge UniversityPress 0020-7438/90 $5.00 + .00

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


3/19

258 Butrus Abu-MannehWhile the first objective of the Tanzimat, to uproot injustice and oppression,was well received and widely hailed,3 the second was not achieved until after themid 1850s. In the intervening years Resid Pa?a, the leading figure among the newbureaucrats, waged a long struggle with a group of palace affiliates. Foremostamong them were the three damads (sons or brothers-in-law of the sultan)-Mehmed Said, Mehmed Ali, and Ahmed Fethi4 and Hasan Riza, a man ofpalace upbringing.5Throughout the first half of the Tanzimat period these menposed as the guardians of the sultan's power. The results of this struggle,however, were disastrous for both Re?id and his opponents. Ali Pa?a, Resid'ssuccessor as the leading statesman at the Porte,6 skillfully used the circumstancesto consolidate the ascendancy of the bureaucracyand the Porte. That ascendancylasted until his death in 1871. During this period, he and Fuad, assisted at timesby Miitercim Mehmed Rii?di,7 initiated and sustained many political and legalreforms. The first of these measures was the Hatt-i Humayuinof 1856, which initself was a semi-dictat of the European powers.8 The ultimate aim of thesereforms was to create a new Ottoman political community based upon equalcitizens enjoying equal political and civic rights, or what is known in Ottomanpolitics as the ideal of Ottomanism.9Had these measures been given the time andthe appropriate social and political milieu after the death of Ali in 1871, theywould have perhaps led in the following generations to a shift in the allegiance ofthe subjects from the person of the sultan to the state (in the European sense),and from community to the (Ottoman) nation.Ottomanism was yet another aspect of the Tanzimat, and one that arousedmuch resentment among many leading Muslim dignitaries in Istanbul andthroughout the empire. It had also caused a split within the bureaucracy.'10Mahmud Nedim, who, by the end of the 1860s had become a senior bureaucratand statesman, turned against the achievements of Ali and Fuad and, indeed,against much of what the Tanzimat stood for and worked to undermine thoseachievements when he became grand vizier.Though Mahmud Nedim" was younger than Ali and Fuad by only aboutthree years,12 they were considerably ahead of him in rank. He had been arelative latecomer to the offices of the Porte and had a different, perhaps even abad, start. He had come from a well-established upper-class family, his fatherGiircii Necib13was a high functionary in the later days of the reign of SultanMahmud II (1808-39), and his first clerical appointment was as a secretary(dTvankdtibi) to Damad Mehmed Said during the latter's first appointment tothe office of serasker (1837-39)'4 and then to the Ministry of Commerce (1839-40).15But after the death of Sultan Mahmud II, Mehmed Said seems to have losthis influence and was sent to the provinces.16Nedim, who found himself un-employed, accompanied his father to Baghdad when the latter was appointed itsgovernor-general in 1841.17After a year there he returned to Istanbul and in hismid-twenties he entered service at the Sublime Porte. Later, upon the recom-mendation of Ali and Fuad, he joined the circle of Mustafa Re?id.l8With a different background and coming from a different milieu than Re?id'sother disciples,'9 Nedim must have had to work very hard to suppress his truetendencies and accommodate himself to this group. Only in this way could he



4/19

The Sultan and the Bureaucracy 259improve his prospects. When Re?id was appointed grand vizier in 1846, MahmudNedim joined his staff and became one of his assistant secretaries (mektubcumu'advini),and a year later, his secretary.20At the same time Ali had becomeforeign minister. In June 1849, Nedim was promoted to the post of deputy amediand a few months later amedi.2' He stayed in this post even after the dismissal ofRe?id from the grand vizierate in 1852. Under grand vizier Mustafa Naili (May1853 through May 1854),22Nedim was promoted to the post of beylik(i,23 andshortly afterwards, in March 1854, he became saddret miistedarl.24 But the nextgrand vizier, Kibrisli Mehmed Emin, had him transferred to the newly createdpost of hdriciye musteqari,while Re?id Pa?aserved as foreign minister.25His removal from the grand vizier's office after a service of 8 years was, in fact,a demotion for Mahmud Nedim and a serious setback to his career. The fact thathe was associated with Re?id all those years, and that Re,id's power was now indecline, might provide an explanation. However, Nedim was misplaced at theforeign ministry, and as he did not know French, the language of diplomacy atthe time, his appointment there was bound to be temporary. The fact that he didnot learn French, or any other European language, throughout his years ofservice at the Porte, though many of his colleagues made the effort, was perhapsa barrier between him and European culture.At any rate, after no more than 6 months as undersecretary (muiisteadr), edimwas, at his own request, appointed governor general of the province of Saida inSyria in February 1855.26 This promoted him to the rank of vizier, which carriedwith it the title of pasha. In this way he crossed the line from bureaucrat tostatesman, though still a junior one. In December 1855, he was transferred toDamascus in the same capacity and stayed there until September 1856,27beforehe was transferred to Izmir (Smyrna) where he served for about 18 months. Inearly 1858, just a few weeks after the death of his former benefactor Re?id, hereturned to Istanbul.

During the 3 years of Nedim's absence from Istanbul, major political develop-ments had taken place. The conflict between Mustafa Re,id and the damadsMehmed Ali and Ahmed Fethi had undermined the prestige and credibility ofboth sides. Discrediting each other and mishandling the crisis that led to theCrimean War,28hey appeared unfit to lead the Porte any longer. Following that,Ali and Fuad emerged as the most senior statesmen,29 n spite of their young age.Together with MuiitercimRii?udi,a distinguished officer and statesman, theyformed an alliance.30Their rise indicated that the power struggle between palaceaffiliates and the bureaucracyhad gone in favor of the latter.This was the situation when Nedim returnedto Istanbul early in 1858. He hadgreat expectations, to be appointed as the head of the Tanzimat Council or ofthe Supreme Council of State (meclis-i vald) or as foreign minister,3' but none ofthem materialized. The best that he could obtain was a membership on theTanzimat Council. Six months later at the end of August 1858, he was appointedminister of commerce, while Ali was grand vizier.32His expectations had in fact been unfounded. According to Cevdet, his col-leagues had not even seriously considered him and perhaps did not trust him.33Moreover, he was politically powerless. After the decline of the palace circle and



5/19

260 Butrus Abu-Mannehthe death of Regid, there existed no political group to whom he could turn.Because he had not served in any senior position at Istanbul before, he could nothave built up a power base for himself, although his position as minister ofcommerce helped him to keep a foothold in the government.In September 1859, a group of religious zealots conspired to get rid of SultanAbdulmecid, along with his senior ministers including Ali and Fuad, and bringthe sultan's brother Abdulaziz to the throne.34It is unlikely that Nedim sup-ported that conspiracy while he was minister; there is no evidence that he did.However, toward the end of 1859, he was dismissed from the ministry of com-merce (azl edildi) and remained unemployed for about 6 months after that, whichwas undoubtedly a serious setback.35Finally, in July 1860, upon his own request(kendi talebi), he was sent as governor general (valT)to Tripoli in North Africa.36Tripoli was one of the less important posts in the provincial administration.The fact that he was left there for 7 years is suggestive. Nedim's elder brotherSagir Ahmed uiikriiwas also dismissed in 1861 from the post of prefect ofIstanbul (?ehir eminT)and remained without a job for the next 10 years, as longas Ali was alive.37That all this had taken place in the wake of the Kuleli affair (fidailer vak'asi)was perhaps a sign that a serious cleavage had occurred within the Ottomanbureaucracy and within the Muslim community as a whole. At any rate, what-ever the reasons for Nedim's shabby treatment, his family ties may have hadsomething to do with it. It is known that some of the leaders of the conspiringzealots had belonged to the Naqshbandi-Khalidi suborder,38to which Nedim'sfather, Giircu Necib, had also belonged.39This suggests that some leaders of thegroup and Giircii Necib's family shared a common outlook, and that may havebeen enough in Ali Pasa's eyes to disqualify them for office.As a Naqshbandi-Khalidi, Nedim's father would have brought up his son tobelieve in the principles of Orthodox Islam and that shari'a rules should besupreme in society and state. This explains why Mahmud Nedim was regardedby some Young Ottomans as a possible replacement for Ali in the later 1860s.40However, in spite of his upbringing, he seems to have had a change of mind,although his views always remainedwithin the framework of Islam.Nedim's three years of service as a secretary to Damad Mehmed Said mayhave had their influence upon him, as well. Mehmed Said was a palace man wholooked with suspicion on the rising new bureaucrats, regarding them as a threatto the prerogatives of the sultan, if not to the sultanate itself.41Such suspicionsseem to have been an exaggeration even in the eyes of Sultan Abdiilmecid, whoin 1848 had Mehmed Said exiled to Sinope in northern Anatolia. After a shortservice as governor general of Damascus in 1850, Mehmed Said retired frompublic service at a relatively early age and spent the last 20 years of his life in"solitude and prayers,"42avoiding people and "putting on the garment of der-vishes."43 Though Mahmud Nedim never followed suite, he seems to haveenjoyed the company of Sufis44 and liked occasionally to escape from thetroubled waters of Istanbul politics. Nedim turned out also to be as staunch asupporter of the sultan's power as Mehmed Said.



6/19

The Sultan and the Bureaucracy 261In most of the 12 years (1842-54) that Nedim served at the Porte, he seems to

have worked closely with Mustafa Re?id, but he does not seem to have beeninfluenced by him in a substantial way, as Ali was. However, the experience hegained during this period was crucial in that it gave him the opportunity tounderstand the functioning of the Porte and undoubtedly helped him to formu-late his views about the Ottoman system.In Tripoli, removed from the politics of Istanbul, Mahmud Nedim used thetime to reflect on the affairs of state. The outcome of these reflections was arejection of the Tanzimat and all that it stood for. The rise of Sultan Abdiilazizin 1861 led him to write a treatise which he called Ayine-yi [sic] Devlet (TheMirror of State) in which he summed up his views about the causes of Ottomandecline, the Tanzimat, and the means to revive the power of community andstate. It is not known whether Sultan Abdiilaziz saw the treatise. However, it isaddressed to him,45and if it reached the palace, it is likely that he did know of it,though without the knowledge of Ali or Fuad. In any case, it stayed in manu-script form and remained little known until it was printed in 1909, apparentlypublished by people opposing the post-Hamidian regime.46To write such a treatise was not unusual. We know of Fuad's "PoliticalTestament" and of a memorandum attributed to Ali published in French underthe title of Testamentpolitique, and of another sent from Crete in 1867.47Butthese memoranda were of a political nature and dealt with current affairs.Nedim's treatise, on the other hand, touched on political theory, analyzing theprinciples upon which the Ottoman state was founded, the reason for its decline,and the means for its revival as he saw them. Running to 61 printed pages, it wasmore a political credo than a memorandum, and it is extremely important inhelping us understand the man, and perhaps the rationale behind the measurestaken by him during his first grand vizierate (September 1871 to end of July1872). Moreover, it may have been representative of a trend in Ottoman politicsthat had been stifled by Ali and Fuad and denied representation in governmentin the 1860s. It may also have been written with the specific purpose of influ-encing the new sultan. In the foreword Nedim states his purpose "to makeknown to the Sultan the reality of former principles" (usul-u salife) (p. 7). Bydoing this, he thought he was serving the public good so that "the land, the[Muslim] millet and the government body (heyet-i devlet) will benefit from theattempt of the Sultan to rectify the order of things" (taslih-i umur) (p. 8).Nedim wanted the new sultan to rectify what went wrong in the state, pre-sumably during the reign of his brother and predecessor Sultan Abdiilmecid.During that period "neither wealth, nor power, nor [even] independence hadremained"(p. 65), he wrote, which shows his resentment over the measures takenand the policies followed during the Tanzimat period. What Nedim was suggest-ing to Sultan Abdiilaziz amounted to an alternativeto the Tanzimat reforms.

The basic contribution of the Gulhane Rescript had been to bring to an endthe absolute rule of the sultans.48After more than two decades of the Tanzimat,Nedim must have come to the conclusion that the Tanzimat were leading, in fact,to an order contrary to that which had existed in the heyday of the empire. In his



7/19

262 Butrus Abu-Mannehview the sultan was the mainstay of the state. Sultans of old, he wrote, "wereabsolute (mustakil), and their government was carried on according to theirwill."49 They were, moreover, fully involved in the affairs of state and gave themtheir whole attention. However, though their power was absolute, those sultansdid not exceed the bounds of law (p. 8). Consequently, their ministers did notoverstep the limits of justice and uprightness (pp. 8-9). Those sultans were notonly powerful but also determined and resolute.50In the early days, when thesultans had personally tended to the affairs of government, and when the lawsand regulations were kept within the bounds of the gerF'at,religious and com-munal zeal (gayret-i diniyye ve milliyye) were real, and "the union of hearts [thatbound together] the sultanate and [the Muslim] community, as well as Ottomanpower, increased day after day" (pp. 9-10). Moreover, when sultans managed theaffairs of state themselves, Muslim power grew, the Janissary corps and theulema were kept under control, and the interests of the state were kept apartfrom the private interests of its ministers(p. 10).That was the essence of the Ottoman order in Nedim's view. Under this orderthe state was powerful and its inhabitants, Muslims and non-Muslims alike(millet ve teba'a), were prosperous. But this system started to decline and thestate started to weaken when the sultans became unwary and ceased to attend tostate affairs in person as the earlier sultans had done. When this happened, thedirection of the affairs of state passed into the hands of officials, and the sultanswere not informed about the condition of the land and the people (pp. 10, 36).To preserve their positions and their independence, the officials and high ulemaflattered the Janissary corps much more than was justifiable and used them tofrighten the sultan. As a result, the Janissaries became unruly, and abuses andcorruption began to creep into the governmental system. Consequently, theunion that bound together the sultanate and the Muslim millet was breached,and the zeal of the community cooled (p. 11).It could be inferred from the introductory section of Nedim's treatise that thedecline of the sultan's power and the rise of the bureaucracyand the ulema lay atthe root of the state's and the Muslim millet's weakness. It is perhaps a super-ficial view about the causes of Ottoman decline, but it was the logical result ofthe emphasis he placed on the role of the sultan in the traditional Ottoman orderand on the direct relation between him and the Muslim community. Whether itwas historically true was irrelevant.Nedim's views reflected perhaps more the Tanzimat period than the Ottomanpast. It was a call for Sultan Abdiilaziz to take into his own hands the directionof the affairsof state and not to let Ali and Fuad usurp power.Nedim, as we have seen, was affiliatedwith Mustafa Resid for many years, butin spite of that it is difficult to regard him as Re?id's disciple. Nedim does notappear to have been convinced that the new measures of the Tanzimat wereactually beneficial to the state. In his treatise, he had some praise for the acts andmeasures of Sultan Mahmud II, but only severe criticism for the Tanzimat.There was a "mania" (heves), he wrote, to apply European practices to theOttoman sultanate (p. 15). Did applying these practices guarantee achievingpower and strength? He thought not. They were merely imitating things Euro-



8/19

The Sultan and the Bureaucracy 263pean (pp. 12-13) and by so doing were destroying six hundred years of Ottomanpractice and "new fundaments had not yet been found" (p. 15).We make new laws, he wrote, by translating paragraphs (fakardt) from Euro-pean laws and putting them together (p. 13). The ordinances of the seri'at(Muslim law) are no longer observed, and are even regarded as a hindrance tothe running of the state (p. 15). The responsibility for all this, writes Nedim, fallson the new bureaucratic class, which has usurped power and now controls thestate's destiny. The reforms have allowed this class to increase tremendously inboth number and power. The government has numerous ministries. In the past,one secretariat sufficed for the Porte; now each ministry has its own secretariat,not to mention provincial offices (pp. 26-27). The cost of maintaining thisinflated bureaucracy is enormous: all of these officials receive high monthlysalaries from the treasury(p. 27). No one in Istanbul will teach his son a trade ortrain him in commerce any longer because every parent wants his son to be agovernment official (p. 27). As a result, the treasury has suffered greatly. Theulema, whether in active service or not, receive high salaries as well (p. 27).During the reign of Sultan Mahmud II, taking money out of the treasury wasnot easy (p. 29), and there was no need to ask the merchants of Galata orforeigners for loans (p. 30). This new class of bureaucrats was extravagant andcorrupt (p. 28).Offices should be given to capable and experienced men of integrity whosedevotion and loyalty (saddkat) to the sultan were beyond doubt (pp. 35-36, 40,46). Nedim blamed much of the state's decline on incompetence, intrigue, andself-interest. "It is most important," he wrote, that "each state employ honestfunctionaries. . . and train efficient officials" (p. 40). When a new and inexpe-rienced official is appointed, he should be put under observation and scrutiny(harekatini tefahhus ve tecessus) (p. 40).Nowhere in his treatise does Nedim refer to the Hatt-i Humdytunof 1856,which granted equality to non-Muslims, but he was clearly against it. Justicekept the non-Muslims in the empire satisfied, he wrote; the kind and justtreatment (lutuf ve macdelet) the sultans had shown them in early times en-couraged them to serve the state well and even sacrifice their lives for it. Thistreatment led many willingly to become Muslims (p. 43). Following the Muslimconcept, it was justice, not equality, that mattered;justice and equity ('addlet veinsdf) were duties upon rulers and governments. "Ghazi Osman Khan, thefounder of the exalted state, succeeded in establishing a large state and [inincreasing] Muslim power by justice" (p. 43). As justice was at the foundation ofthe Ottoman state, so it was the abandoning of justice, and the oppression andhighhandedness of the government that led to the disorder of later years, to theweakness and decline of the state's power, and to the undermining of its inde-pendence (p. 44). But thanks to God, the rise of just, renovating (miijeddid), andresolute padishahs, Islamic power had been saved from great danger (p. 44).A third quality that Nedim would have liked to see in government func-tionaries was public zeal (gayret), both religious and communal (p. 52). But hewarned that zeal could turn into fanaticism, and that, in his view, was mis-guidance and should be avoided (pp. 52-53). Communal and religious zeal, he



9/19

264 Butrus Abu-Mannehwrote, along with love of country (vatan) and submission to those entrusted withauthority, were sacredduties and an obligation upon all Muslims (p. 53).It is obvious that Nedim was apprehensive about what would become of thestate if the Tanzimat reforms were to continue along the same course. TheOttoman state had its duty to Islam and the Muslim community. In his conclu-sion, he wrote that the Ottoman state had united the Muslim community(cem'iyet-i islamiyye) in the past after it had been scattered and divided, and hadpreserved and protected it. What was good in the past was still good today. Thewell-being of the Muslim community depends on the well-being of the state. Butthe well-being of the state depends on an all-powerful sultan (pp. 60-61). It wasthe obligation of each Muslim believer to obey the ruler and to show religiousand communal zeal, "because the Ottoman sultans who adorn the seat of theSupreme Caliphate (hilafet-i kubra) were the protectors of the faith, the com-munity, and the state. Submission to their orders is the first requirementfor thesurvival of the power of the state and of the [Muslim] community (millet)"(p. 53). Two decades later an Arab sheikh in Istanbul was to make the sameargument to support the Caliphate of Sultan Abdulhamid II (1876-1909), and tojustify his absolute rule.51The following recommendations were the essential principles of Nadim's trea-tise and were meant to undermine the achievements of the Tanzimat: that thecenter of power should be restored to the palace and that the sultan shouldattend in person to the affairs of the state; that the bureaucracyshould be fullysubject to him; that the sultan and the Muslim community should be united inpurpose; that justice, not equality between Muslims and non-Muslims, should bethe basis of the state; and that the Muslim community alone should form thebody politic. However, as long as Ali was alive, Sultan Abdiilaziz was unable tochallenge his control of the government. When Ali died in September 1871,Nedim himself became grand vizier and the sultan finally had the opportunity toput such views into practice.Sagir Ahmed-zade Mehmed Bey, a nephew of Mahmud Nedim, may havebeen a leader of a conspiracy of Young Ottomans, the aim of which was toremove Ali and other leading ministers from office by violent means and to bringMahmud Nedim to the grand vizierate.52But Nedim himself was probably notprivy to the plot,53 and when it was discovered in spring 1867, he returnedwithout delay from Tripoli to Istanbul and made his peace with Ali.54For somereason, Ali did not send him back to his post, but found it expedient to keep himin the capital.The timing of Nedim's return could not have been better for him. He was soonappointed a member of the High Council (meclisi vdld). In March 1868, hebecame minister of the navy (bahriye ndzri), a position he filled for the nextthree and a half years, a long time by Ottoman standards. It indicates, perhaps,that Ali chose to be tolerant towards at least some of his opponents, or may havewished to placate the Muslims who, according to Cevdet, harbored much resent-ment against him,55especially after the unpopular concessions he was forced togrant to end the uprising in Crete (1866-68). Immediately after his return fromCrete at the end of February 1868, he had appointed not only Mahmud Nedim



10/19

The Sultan and the Bureaucracy 265but some other junior statesmen of similar outlook to ministerial posts.56Nedimtook advantage of his post to strengthen his position. Fuad, who seems to havehad stronger feelings against Nedim than Ali did, died in early 1869,57andNedim succeeded in gaining the sultan's favor and securing the backing of palacecircles.58

By the time Ali died in early September 1871,59Nedim was ready to step intohis shoes. There is evidence that Ali was aware that this would happen.60At thetime, the British ambassador remarked that Nedim "had been so long on intimateterms with Ali and knew well his opinion upon most public matters."61But itwas not the policies of Ali which guided Nedim; it was his own views of theOttoman past.The appointment of Nedim to the grand vizierate had a direct and immediateeffect upon the fortunes of a number of statesmen who shared his politicaloutlook and had for the most part been denied high office since the end of the1850s; they too were appointed to prominent positions in the government.62Namik Pa?a (1804-92), a military man, was appointed to the presidency of theCouncil of State (sura-i devlet).63In the early 1860s, he had served as governorof Baghdad and, between April 1867 and April 1868, as serasker in Istanbul.64He was then dismissed and seems to have remained without a post for about 3/2years before he was given his new post by Nedim.65Much later in his long career,Namik Pasa fell under the influence of a mystic group of the Halveti suborder ofIbrahimiyye, which was of strong orthodox leanings,66 and his beliefs andactions took an ultraconservativeturn.67Another member of the group was Ahmed Muhtar Molla Bey, who becameseyh-uiil-Islam.A friend of Nedim and like him of a family of Georgian origin,68he was also, like Nedim, of Sufi disposition and wrote commentaries on Sufitracts.69Another minister of conservative outlook, a leftover of Ali's times, wasYusuf Kamil Pasa, a former grand vizier who served as minister of justice.70Onthe whole, Kamil tended to side with the palace against Ali and Fuad. He wasalso known to have been a protector of ?inasi and, after him, of Namik Kemaland Ziya, who later became leading members of the Young Ottoman move-ment.7' Still others were Ibrahim Edhem and Ahmed Vefik,72both of whombecame grand viziers under Sultan Abdulhamid II, and the minister of foreignaffairs, Server, whose wife was a niece of Sultan Abduiilaziz.73erver also servedfor a while in the same capacity under Abdulhamid II.With the support of this group Nedim felt he was in a position to put intopractice the principles advocated in his treatise. True to his word, he allowed theSultan to assume full and absolute control over the affairs of the state.74SultanAbdulaziz may have had tendencies for absolute power, but as long as Ali was incontrol he could not exercise a free hand.75Mahmud Nedim encouraged him onthat course at the expense of his own power as grand vizier. The view attributedto Yusuf Kamil that "the death of Ali [brought] the disintegration of the grandvizierate"76 (saddret-in inhilali), may not have been far from the truth.Among Nedim's first acts after becoming grand vizier was to rid himself ofAli and Fuad's associates and proteges and to shift high officials, especiallygovernors-general of provinces, from one place to another.77He also dismissed



11/19

266 Butrus Abu-Mannehmany high functionaries, among them All's son, Ali Fuad, who had held a seniorposition at the foreign ministry.78Another was Mehmed Ra?id, a young andvigorous provincial governor-general and a protege of Ali, who had been thegovernor-general of the province of Syria for the last 5/2 years. Nedim orderedhim by telegraph to transfer his responsibilities to the commanding general inDamascus within 24 hours and return to Istanbul without delay. As long asNedim was in office, both Ali Fuad and Ra?id remained unemployed.79Other senior functionaries of Ali's group were not only dismissed from office,but were not even allowed to remain in Istanbul; they were sent home to theprovinces. At the top of that list stood Hiiseyin Avni and 5irvani-zade MehmedRiidi. The former was a minister of war (serasker) and Ali's right-hand man inmilitary matters, and the latter, a protege of Fuad, was a senior minister in the1860s.80Another of Ali's ministers who suffered a similar fate at the hands ofNedim was Hiisnii Pa?a, the minister of police (zabtiye miiri) during the lastthree years of Ali's term.8' They all remained in exile until the fall of Nedim atthe end of July 1872. "Such acts," wrote the biographer Inal, "contradicted boththe rules of the Tanzimat and of justice."82When Yusuf Kamil, the president of the Council of State, and MiitercimMehmed Rii?di, the minister of justice (both leftovers from Ali's last govern-ment), protested Nedim's actions, they were both promptly dismissed. A littlelater, Yusuf Kamil was restored to the government as minister of justice,83butMiitercim Mehmed Ruiidi remained unemployed and bitterly resentful.84Nedimhad perhaps committed a tactical mistake by maltreating such a highly respectedold man who was senior to him in both age and service. By all these acts, Nedimthought he could intimidate the upper echelons of the bureaucracyand subjugateit to the absolute will of the sultan. His objective was to shift the locus of powerback to the palace where it had been during the reign of Mahmud II. This wasthe basic idea in his treatise, and this was apparently what he set out toaccomplish.But the bureaucracydid not accept this passively, and Nedim perhaps failed toestimate correctly the power it had gathered. Since the late 1850s and especiallyin the 1860s, the control of the army had passed from the hands of palaceaffiliates into the hands of officers independent of the palace like MiitercimMehmed Ru?di and Hiiseyin Avni. Coming from humble origins, these officersand many others like them owed much to the Tanzimat, which opened the wayfor social mobility, but owed nothing to the palace. Consequently, they supportedthe Tanzimat and had been close associates of Ali and Fuad. When they hadcome to occupy the office of serasker (commander-in-chief of the land forces),they automatically became members of the government as ministers of war inaccordance with the Ottoman tradition. In other words, during the 1860s, closecooperation was maintained between the army leadership and the bureaucracy.85

Not only was the Tanzimat bureaucracymuch more powerful than Nedim hadanticipated, but at the same time the prestige of the sultan was much weakerthan it had been just a few decades earlier. In addition, Sultan Abdiilaziz himselfseems to have lacked the ability and the tact to handle the situation. Finally, thereforms themselves, especially those measures undertaken by Ali and Fuad



12/19

The Sultan and the Bureaucracy 267beginning with the Hatt-i Humdyuinof 1856, had also weakened the sultan'spower.Those measures that had attempted to tackle the problem of communalplurality in the state at the time of changing political circumstances and that hadcome to be known by the name of Ottomanism (osmanhhk) were objectionable,in Nedim's view, because they put the sultan in a false position as having toapprove acts that contradicted the shari'a, which it was his duty to defend andpreserve. In this way, a gulf had been cut between the sultan and the Muslimcommunity.Ottomanism, moreover, had made the sultan the head of a state of legallyequal citizens. But in the eyes of Nedim this function overshadowed the sultan'straditional and primary function as the head of the Muslim community. Con-sequently, it was a source of weakness, as well, because it weakened the bond, orin Nedim's words "the union of hearts," between him and that community.Nedim saw the need to tighten this bond, regarding it as a source of strength forboth the sultan and the community. To achieve this, he called for a renewal ofMuslim religious and communal zeal (gayret).86 But it was not clear in histreatise how he was going to achieve it. When he became grand vizier (about 10years after he had written his treatise), the idea of an Ottoman caliphate pre-sented itself to him. To have this title reemphasized after it had been neglectedthroughout the Tanzimat years would undoubtedly serve the sultan in more thanone way.In his treatise, Nedim referred to the caliphate only in passing. In the sectionabout "zeal," he spoke of the duty of obedience to the sultan "because OttomanPadigahs adorn the seat of the Supreme Caliphate"(hilafet-i kibrd).87 But he didnot elaborate. In the meantime, however, several developments had taken placethat would support such a claim. First of all, there was a rise in the religioussentiment among Ottoman Muslims which "seems to have been a reactionagainst the . .. policies of Ali and the pressure of Europeans."88The rise of thissentiment was a sign for Nedim that Muslim public opinion would respondfavorably to a move towards Islamic values of state.

On the other hand, the Muslim world had begun to look to Istanbul. AsMuslim rulers in Asia and Africa fell under the sway of European colonialpowers, they turned towards the Ottoman Empire, the most powerful Muslimstate, for help. Only after 1871, did their envoys meet with a positive, thoughlimited, response.89This was the beginning of a pan-Islamic movement at whosecenter the Ottoman sultan found himself. It provided the sultan with a distin-guished place among Muslim rulers and a justification to claim the supremecaliphate. "This doctrine," states Bernard Lewis, "was advanced for the firsttime" under Sultan Abdtilaziz.90As Ali would presumably have objected to sucha doctrine, it was most probably advanced during the first grand vizierate ofNedim. Whatever help the Ottomans were able to provide for those rulers, thereis no doubt that the promotion of this doctrine helped to enhance the position ofthe sultan internally as well as externally.The idea of an Ottoman caliphate had undoubtedly appealed to many Muslimsthroughout the empire. But this was not in itself sufficient to arouse the religious



13/19

268 Butrus Abu-Mannehand communal zeal that Nedim sought. Thus, he looked for other means, thoughhis 11 months as grand vizier were not enough to find them.Muslims were endowed by nature (bilmecbuliyyet) with the quality of religiousand communal zeal, he wrote in his treatise. This quality, along with theobedience to those entrusted with authority (uli'l-amr), were in his view areligious duty (farzia).9' But, he warned, arousing religious zeal should beachieved without allowing fanaticism. "To turn religious zeal into fanaticism ...[was an act] of some coarse and ignorant people who wear the garb of ulema,"92he wrote. Nedim might have been sincere in wanting to avoid fanaticism. In amultireligious society, it would have imperiled relations between the variouscommunities, and accusing "some ulema" of fanaticism was perhaps an indica-tion of his distrust of the ulema. Maybe it was not an accident that some ulematook an active part in the movement that led to Nedim's dismissal, in May 1876,from his second tenure as grand vizier.93If Nedim had a plan in mind when hewrote the treatise, we may infer from this comment that the ulema had no placein it. He would use instead the Sufi sheikhs, especially those sheikhs of thepopular or semipopular orders.Nedim seems to have liked the company of Sufi sheikhs. His first master andperhaps real mentor, Damad Mehmed Said spent, as we have seen, the last twodecades of his life in their company. When he was in Tripoli, Nedim enjoyedfriendly relations with Muhammad Zafir, the sheikh of the Shadhili-Madanisuborder.94When he was governor-general of Adana (October 1873-April 1875),it was reported that he also associated with them.95 These close relations con-vinced him of the influence they could exert over ordinary Muslims. But in hisbrief tenure as grand vizier, Nedim could not possibly have done more thaninitiate steps towards a policy of using the Sufi sheikhs to arouse religious andcommunal zeal and to strengthen the bond between the sultan and the Muslimcommunity. It was left to Sultan Abdulhamid 11(1876-1909) to implement thepolicies laid down by Nedim.96One act, however, does shed light on the means that Nedim thought of forarousing communal zeal. On Wednesday, 23 Safer 1289 (2 May 1872) the news-paper BasTret,which seems to have been close to the Sublime Porte and waswidely read in Istanbul,97reported that a certain "Dervish Bey Efendi, a descen-dent of the .. . Abbasid dynasty [sic] who is living in the Sanjak of Hakkari [insoutheast Anatolia] and who until now. . . possessed a pair of sandals of theProphet," was on his way from Diyarbakir to Istanbul. He was bringing thesandals with him in order to hand them over to the Imperial Treasury.98For thenext 11 days, BasTretand other newspapers published on their front pagesDervish Efendi's itinerary. He crossed Anatolia from Diyarbakir in the south tothe port of Samsun on the Black Sea in the north. Several miracles were said tohave occurred along the way. When, for instance, the carriage carrying thesandals crossed a bridge over "the river of Amasya," the current, normallystrong, stopped, and the water stood still.99 And when the sandals reachedSamsun, they were received "with full honors and respect according to time-honored Muslim practice."100



14/19

The Sultan and the Bureaucracy 269A special boat, the 5i'ar-i Nusret, was sent to Samsun to transport Dervish

Efendi and "the exalted trust" to Istanbul. It arrived on 4 Rabi I. On Monday5 Rabi I [13 May], the offices of the Porte declared a holiday,'10and MahmudNedim, the grand vizier, Namik Pa?a, the president of the Council of State,ministers, ulema, (Sufi) sheikhs, high-ranking officers, and many other dignitarieswent down to the landing at Sirkeci. The grand vizier solemnly carried the boxthat contained the sandals and put it on a special carriage driven by four horses.About 50 men carryingtorches attended the carriageand about 50 special guardsescorted it, all praying and calling: "Ellah-ii Ekber. ..." Before the carriage rodethe grand vizier and a number of preachers (vdaizler)and behind it rode DervishEfendi mounted on a horse, and behind him the ministers, ulema, and sheikhs,all mounted. The procession went up the hill along the Divan Road (DivanYolu) to the Topkapi Palace. Police and troops lined the road. When theprocession reached the palace grounds, the grand vizier solemnly carried the boxto the hall where the sacred relics of the Prophet were kept. Then ministers,ulema, sheikhs, and the other dignitaries entered the hall for the blessing. Thesultan was to visit the place after Friday's prayers, after which it was to beopened to the public for three days.'02It was certainly a demonstration of piety,though with many political overtones.Many questions arise from this event. First of all, why were these sandalsdiscovered during the grand vizierate of Nedim? Had they been discovered alittle earlier, would they have received such attention?'03Whatever the answers,the event was not at all compatible with the tenets of orthodox Islam. Itobviously belonged to popular Islam, and was certainly a long way from Nedim'sown early training.To theorize about the political order was one thing, and to put those theoriesinto practice was another. Nedim had been very unhappy about the Tanzimatreforms. They meant for him the contraction of the sultan's power and the rise ofthe bureaucracy, in other words, the shifting of the locus of power from thepalace to the Porte, and the granting of equal rights to the non-Muslims, inviolation of the shari'a. The result had been the establishment of a state on thebasis of equal citizens rather than confessional communities, innovations whichNedim regarded as a source of weakness to state and community. The success ofhis alternative depended on a capable and determined sultan and a submissivebureaucracy. But Sultan Abdulaziz was not equal to the role that Nedim hadasked him to assume, and the bureaucracy did not acquiesce to any loss of itspower. What followed was a struggle between two concepts of political orderand perhaps between two political forces as well. Ali had been able to avoid sucha struggle in the 1860s and achieve stability as well as apply extensive reforms.But Ali had no successor. The struggle between the bureaucrats and the conser-vatives caused instability at the highest level, which in the end brought down thesultan himself.HAIFA UNIVERSITYHAIFA, ISRAEL



15/19

270 Butrus Abu-MannehNOTES

Author's note: It is a pleasure to express my gratitude to Professor Roderic H. Davison of GeorgeWashington University for reading this paper and commenting on it. His remarks were most useful. Iam grateful as well to the governing body of the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin for their fellowship,which allowed me the free time to write this article.'Ahmed Liitfi, TarTh-iLutfT, 8 vols. (Istanbul, A.H. 1290-1328), vol. 6:107: "Tanzimat usuiluatika-yi istibdddiyeyi imhd ifiin bir kdniunidi." See also Abdulrahman Seref, Tdr7hMusdhabeleri(Istanbul, A.H. 1339), p. 63; cf. Roderic H. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876(Princeton, N.J., 1963),p. 43.2According to Cevdet, Ali said in private that "the Lord has entrusted the well-being of the stateto five or six people. These should govern the fate of the state" (quoted in Serif Mardin, The Genesisof Young Ottoman Thought [Princeton, N.J., 1962], p. 111. See also Mardin's quotation fromF. Millingen, La Turquiesous le regne d'Abdul Aziz (Paris, 1868), p. 112. See also Stanford J. Shawand Ezel K. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, 2 vols. (New York, 1977),2:153.

3See, for instance, what Ahmed Arif Hikmet Bey (seyh-ul-Islam, 1846-1854) had written in hisDTvan(Istanbul, A.H. 1283), p. 263, concerning the Giilhane Rescript and Sultan Abdiilmecid; seealso Lutfi, Tarih, 6:55, 165.40n Mehmed Said, see Tdrih-i Atd (Istanbul, A.H. 1292), 2:198-202; on Mehmed Ali, see AhmedRifat, HadTkat-ulvuzerd zeyli (Istanbul, A.H. 1283), pp. 48-52; Mahmud K. Inal, Son sadrlazamlar(Istanbul, 1940), 1:59-73; on Fethi, see Tdrih-i 'Atd, 2:215-18. On their conflict with Resid, see Inal,Son sadrizamlar, 1:63-64; 'Ali Fu'ad, Rical-i miihimme-i siydsiye (Istanbul, 1928), pp. 11-14; Fatma'Aliyye, Ahmed Cevdet Pdsd ve zemdni (Istanbul, A.H. 1332), pp. 34-35, 42-43, 86, 92; MehmedMemduh, Esvdt-i sudur (Izmir, A.H. 1328),p. 13.50n Hasan Riza, see Sicill-i Osmani, 4 vols. (hereafter SO) (Istanbul, A.H. 1308-11), 2:399-400.60n Ali, see a short biography by his son cAli Fu'ad, Rical-i muhimme-i siydsiye, pp. 56-101. Seealso Inal, Son sadriazamlar, vol. 1:4-58; Ahmed Rifat, HadTkat-ulvuzerdzeyli, pp. 43-48; Davison,Reform, index. H. Bowen, Encyclopaediaof Islam, 2d ed. (El2), 1:396-98. Ahmet H. Ongunsu, IslamAnsiklopedisi, 1:335-40. Until now there has been no monograph on him in any language.7cAli Fu'ad, Rical-i muhimme-i siydsiye, pp. 94-96; Ahmed Cevdet, Tezakir, 4 vols. (Ankara,1953-67), 1:16; Davison, Reform, p. 53.8English translation in Jacob C. Hurewitz, ed., The Middle East and North Africa in WorldPolitics (New Haven, Conn., 1975), pp. 315-18; see also Davison, Reform, pp. 53-54, for the part ofsome European ambassadors in its drafting. See also Enver Z. Karal, Osmanli tarihi, VI: IslahdtFermani Devri, 1856-1861 (Ankara, 1954), pp. 1-12; Ahmet Refik, "Turikiye'deisldhdt ermdni," inTurk Tarih Encumeni Mecmuasi, no. 4 (81), 1922, pp. 193-215.9As far as I know, there is no research work in any language on "Ottomanism"; see, however,references in Davison, Reform, pp. 8; 56 f.; Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey(London, 1961),pp. 333-34; Mardin, Genesis, p. 14.'?For the reaction to the Hatt-i Humdyun, see Cevdet, Tezakir, 1:68-69; Davison, Reform,pp. 57-60; and Mardin, Genesis, p. 355."On Mahmud Nedim, see M. K. Inal, Son sadriazamlar (Istanbul, 1940), 1:259-314; Mehmed Z.Pakalin, Mahmud Nedim Pasa (Istanbul, 1940); R. Davison in El2, 6:68-69 and SO, 4:336-37.Strangelyenough there is no biography of Mahmud Nedim in Islam Ansiklopedisi.2Nedim was born in 1818;Ali and Fuad were born in 1815.'3As his name shows, Necib Pasa was of Georgian origin. He was perhaps born in Istanbul, but hisfather seems to have come there from Georgia. See [Andreas D. Mordtmann], Stambul und dasmoderne Turkenthum(Leipzig, 1877-78), 1:91.On Necib, see SO, 4:545-46.

4Inal, Son sadriazamlar, 1:259;Pakahlin,Mahmud Nedim Pasa (Istanbul, 1940), p. 1.'5See Nedim's autobiographicalpoem Hasbihdl, in Ayine ve hasbihdl (Istanbul, 1327/1909), p. 69.'6Tdrih-i Atd, 2:200-201.17Hasbihdl,p. 69.'Ibid., pp. 75-76.



16/19

The Sultan and the Bureaucracy 271

'9Inal,Son sadriazamlar, 1:259.20James Redhouse, TurkVedeninglizceye lugat kitdbi (Constantinople, 1921), p. 1954; "Chiefsecretary of a ministry." See also Mehmed Z. Pakalin, Osmanlh arih deyimleri ve terimleri sozlii.ii,3 vols. (Istanbul, 1946-54), 3:80.21Amediwas the receiver-generalof provincial correspondence addressed to the grand vizier; seePakalin, Deyimleri ve terimleri, 1:55-56.22Heis also known as Giritli Mustafa because he served as governor of Crete for many years. SeeInal, Son sadriazamlar 1:75, n. 1; SO 4:480-81.23BeylikCiwas the head of an office at the Porte which issued diplomas and ratified foreign treaties.For beylikci, see Pakalin, Deyimleri ve terimleri, 1:221.24He was a councillor and assistant to the grand vizier. For this post see SO, addenda to 4:806-7.25Minir Aktepe, ed., Vak'a-niivis Ahmed Lufti Efendi tarihi, cilt IX (Istanbul, 1984), p. 100. Itwas a new post, and the duties assigned to it were not clear. Carter V. Findley, in his book

BureaucraticReform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte, 1789-1922 (Princeton, N.J., 1980),renders it "undersecretary" see p. 170).26Liitf, Tdarh,9:114; see also Cevdet, Tezakir, 1:32;Inal, Son sadrlazamlar, 1:260.27Inal,Son sadriazamlar, 1:262, stated that Nedim served in Damascus between December 1855and August-September 1857 (Muharram, A.H. 1274), i.e., for about 20 months. Siireyya however, inSO 4:336, stated that he served there between December 1855 and September 1856. The truth is withSiireyya as there is a report from the British consul general in Beirut stating that Nedim had leftBeirut to go to Smyrna on 19 October 1856. (See F.O. 78/1219, Moore-Clarendon, despatch 54(Political), dated Beirut, 6 November 1856;see also Lutfi, Tdrih, 9:125, 129.2Mehmed Mamduh, Esvat-i SudufirIzmir, 1328 A.H.), p. 13. See also Inal, Son sadriazamlar,1:63.29AliFuad, Rical-i muihimme-isiyasiye, p. 19; Ahmed Rifat, pp. 46-47, pp. 68-69. See also forfurther bibliography R. Davison, "Fu-ad Pasa," in El2, 2:934-36; on Ali see also n. 6; see alsoFindley, BureaucraticReform, p. 154.

300On"the alliance" with MuiitercimRuidi see LuiitfT, drih, 9:175; Ali Fuad, Rical-i muhimme-isiyasiye, pp. 94-96; Fatma 'Aliyye, Ahmed Cevdet, p. 88, who called them perhaps after her father"akdnTm-ielase" (i.e., the three divine persons of the Christian Trinity). It should be added that alittle later the relationship between Ali and Riisdi cooled, and it was never warm again, see 5eref,TadrhMusdhabeleri(Istanbul, A.H. 1339), p. 203."On the expectations of Nedim, see Cevdet, Tezakir,2:92."32See nal, Son sadriazamlar, 1:263and Davison, El2, 6:68."33Cevdet, Tezaikir,2:92; Cevdet, Ma'ruizat,ed. Yusuf Halacoglu (Istanbul, 1980), p. 67; Inal, Sonsadriazamlar, 1:267-68.34On the "Fidailer Vak'asi,"known also as "Kuleli Vak'asi,"see Cevdet, Tezakir, 2:82-83, 85-86;Lufti, TarTh,9:152; Davison, Reform, pp. 100-103; n. 69, p. 102; Davison, "European Archives as aSource for Later Ottoman History," in Report on Current Research on the Middle East, 1958,pp. 33-45, especially pp. 38-41; Ulug Igdemir, Kuleli Vak'asihakkinda bir Arastirma(Ankara, 1937)."35See nal, Son sadriazamlar, 1:263;Davison, El2, 6:68.36On his service in Tripoli, see Ahmad al-Na'ib, al-Manhal al-Adhb f TarTkhTarablusal-Gharb,2 vols. (Istanbul, 1317 A.H.), 1:383-86; T. A. al-ZawT, Wulat Tarablus min Bidayat al-Fathal-Arabr ila Nihdyat al-Ahd al- Turki(Beirut, 1390/1970), pp. 128-29.37"OnSagir Ahmed Sukru, see SO 1:303; M. Aktepe, ed., Vaka-nuiivis hmed Lutfi Efendi Tarihi,cilt X (Istanbul, 1988), p. 29. He was the father of Mehmed Bey, one of the Young Ottoman leaders;see Mardin, The Genesisof Young Ottoman Thought (Princeton, N.J., 1962), pp. 10, 12, nn. 1, 3.38The leader Sheikh Ahmad al-Sulaimani belonged, it seems, to the Naqshbandi-Khalidi suborder.See Serif Mardin, Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey (Albany, N.Y., 1989), p. 59. One ofhis chief supporters, Hizargradli Hasan Feyzullah Efendi, was also a Naqshbandi sheikh (seeU. Igdemir, Kuleli Vakasi, pp. 62-63; SO, 4:40). On the release of Sheikh Feyzullah from exileincurred as a punishment, see Lutfit,Tdrah,9:26-27.39See my article, "The Naqshbandiyya-Mujaddidiyya in the Ottoman Lands in the Early 19thCentury,"WI., 22 (1982-84), 1-36, especially p. 24.



17/19

272 Butrus Abu-Manneh40SeeR. Davison, Reform, pp. 210-11; Cevdet, Ma'ruzdt,pp. 196 ff.41See Mehmed Said's attitude towards Resid in 1848 when the latter was grand vizier, in Fatma

'Aliyye, Ahmed Cevdet, pp. 42-43; Ali Fuad, Riciil-i muhimme-i siyasiye, p. 11.42TarihicAta, 2:201.43sO, 3:47-48; see also Ali Fuad, Rical-i muhimme-i siyasiye, p. 163.44Z. M. Mujahid, al-Aclam al-Sharqiyya, 4 vols. (Cairo, 1949-63), 3:125-26; al-Jawdaib,4 October1876.45Seepp. 7-8 of Nedim's treatise, Ayine ve Hasbihdl (Istanbul, A.H. 1327). Pakalin thinks that itwas published by one of Nedim's "relatives"; ee his Mahmud Nedim Papa(Istanbul, 1940), p. 8.46IHasbihdls a long autobiographical poem written in 1861-62 (perhaps at the same time of thetreatise). It was published as an addendum in pp. 68-78. The treatise was also followed by a longpoem (pp. 62-68) in praise of the Ottoman sultans, each of whom were named. Nedim seems to havewritten another treatise (risale) called Hikaye-i Melik-i Muzaffer (The Story of the Victorious King),perhaps in verse, but it cannot be found. Perhaps it was never published. See pp. 3-5 of Nedim,

Ayine ve Hasbihdl, where the editor had given a short biography of Nedim. He was apparently theauthor of another risale called Reddiye, in which he answered Ahmed Midhat in his book Uss-iInkildb, 2 vols. (Istanbul, A.H. 1294-95), but it was never published; see Inal, Son sadriazamlar,1:272 ff.4See R. H. Davison, "The Question of Ali Pasa's Political Testament," in InternationalJournal ofMiddle East Studies, II (1980), 209-25; R. H. Davison, "The Question of Fu'ad Pasa's PoliticalTestament," in Belleten 23,89 (1959), 119-36; Engin D. Akarli, Belgelerle Tanzimat: Osmanli sadria-zamlarindan Ali ve Fuad Pasalarin siyasi vasiyetnameleri(Istanbul, 1978).48Seen. 1 above; Mardin, Genesis, pp. 155 ff.49Nedim,Ayine, pp. 9, 36. Mustakil means "absolute," according to Redhouse p. 1846. See also"Istiklal," in El2, 3:260. Redhouse, however, gave the same meaning for muiistebid 1831). But,. Sami in Kamus-u Tuirkidifferentiatedbetween them. For mustakil he wrote "Kendiba#ina"which

can mean "absolute,"and for istibdad he added: "Hip bir nizam ve kanun tabi olmak . . . ," i.e., [he]who does not follow any order or law. See pp. 1340, 96, respectively, see also p. 103."Nedim, Ayine, p. 9. He summarizes that in five words: "vukiufveikddmve himmet."5'See my article, "Sultan Abdulhamid II and Shaikh Abulhuda al-Sayyadi," in Middle EasternStudies, 15 (1979), 131-53."2Cevdet, Ma'ruzdt,p. 197;Inal, Son sadriazamlar, 1:265;Abdulrahman Seref, Tdrrh Musdhabeleri(Istanbul, A.H. 1339), p. 173;Davison, El2, 6:68; Mardin, Genesis, p. 43."5This is the accepted view (see Inal, Son sadriazamlar, 1:265 ff. for Nedim's application to returnto Istanbul and the approval of the Porte). But Cevdet thought the contrary was true. He wrote inMa'ruizdt p. 197) that Nedim planned "to arrive in Istanbul on precisely the day the conspiratorsattacked the Porte." It is likely that Cevdet was biased because he disliked Nedim.54On his return, see BasbakanhlkArsivi, Meclis-i Mahsus, no. 1420 (dated 15 Safer 1284), where it

is stated that Nedim returned "me-zun-en ve muivakkaten"(by permission and [only] temporarily);see also Inal, Son sadriazamlar, 1:266. However, Ali may have suspected that Nedim was implicatedin the affair (see a quotation attributed to Said Pasa in Inal, Son sadriazamlar), but it requires afurtherinvestigation."55SeeInal, Son sadriazamlar, 1:38, quoting Cevdet; Davison, Reform, pp. 209-10; cf. Mardin,Genesis, pp. 113-14.56Comparethe list of ministers in Sdlndme-i Devlet-i Aliye for 1284 (1867-68), p. 35, and 1285(1868-69), p. 35; see also SO, 2:90; 3:230; 4:52 for the biographies of A. Cevdet, M. Safvet, andM. Qabuli, respectively; and 2:11 for Server who was appointed prefect of Istanbul (?ehir Emini) atthe same time."See Davison, El2, 2:935;on Fuad see also Ali Fuad, Rical-i muhimme-i siyasiye, pp. 141-74."Mahmud Celaluddin, Mir'dt-i HakTkat(Istanbul, A.H. 1326-27), vol. 1:35; Ali Fuad, Rical-i

muhimme-i siydsiye, p. 99.59Cevdetsays in Ma'ruzdt, p. 207, that the sultan waited two or three days before deciding finallyon Nedim.60According o Inal, Son sadriazamlar, 1:270.6'Elliot-Granville, F.O. 78/2177, despatch 329 dated Constantinople, 11 September 1871.



18/19

The Sultan and the Bureaucracy 27362A ist in the Salndme of 1289, p. 35.63He was appointed in 21 October 1871, after the dismissal from that post of Yusuf Kamil a

leftover from the time of Ali, see SO, 4:71, 539; Inal, Son sadriazamlar, 1:224.64This must have been an exceptional appointment, due perhaps to the fact that many high-ranking officers were in Crete.65On Namik Pasa, see I. A. Govsa, Turk Mehuirlari Ansiklopedisi (Istanbul, 1946), p. 274;Sehabeddin Akalin, "Mehmet Namik Pasa," in TarihDergisi (Eyliil, 1952),4:127-46.66SeeMardin, Genesis, pp. 58-59, n. 106. On this suborder, see Yasar N. Oztiirk, Kutsal GnilliiVeliKusadalhIbrahim Halveti (Istanbul, 1982).67According to I. Parmaksizoglu, when he was a member of the senate in 1877, Namik Pasasuggested that all ministers should be Muslims, but Miitercim Mehmed Ruldi Pasa opposed him andaccused him of "alrilik" (exceeding the limits); see TurkAnsiklopedisi, 25:114.68AbdulkadirAltunsu, Osmanli SeyhiiulislamlariAnkara, 1972), pp. 202-3. He was a grandson ofGrandVizier Koca Yusuf Pasa (on him see SO, 4:667-68).69Altunsu,Seyhiiulislamlarn, . 203; Mehmed T. Brussall, Osmanll Miiellifleri, 2:40; Seref, TarihMusdhabeleri,p. 307.70Infact he was left over from the period when Ali was president of the Council of State, butNedim brought about his dismissal in favor of Namik Pasa after about a month. On Y. Kamil seeSO, 4:71-72; Inal, Son Sadriazamlar, 1:196ff. On this episode, see ibid., 1:107,224 f.7See Inal, Son sadrlazamlar, 1:236f.; Ali Fuad, Rical-i muhimme-i siyasiye, pp. 162-63; Mardin,Genesis, p. 13 n. 5, p. 191, 233; Davison, Reform, p. 183.72SeeE. Z. Karal, OsmanlhTarihi, cilt VIII, Birinci Mesrutiyet ve Istibdad Devirleri, 1876-1907(Ankara, 1962), p. 280.73She was the daughter of Damad Halil Rifat by his wife Seniha Sultan. See SO, 3:11-12, and2:307; Sultan Abdiulazizwas her maternaluncle.74Celaluddin, Mir'at-i Hakikat, 1:35; cf. also Davison, Reform, p. 279; Findley, Bureaucratic

Reform, p. 222; Pakalin, Mahmud Nedim, p. 9.75It is reported that Sultan Abduiilazizhad said when Ali died that he was at last a free man; seeDavison, Reform, p. 279, n. 37; cf. Inal, Son sadriazamlar, 1:27.76The statement is quoted in Mahmud K. Inal, "Sultan Abduiilaziz-edair," in TTEM, n.s., 9 (May,1925), p. 177;see also Findley, BureaucraticReform, p. 221.17See Davison, Reform, pp. 281 f.; cf. Findley, BureaucraticReform, p. 153.78OnAli Fuad, see SO 3:578. He was 26 years old at the time, see Inal, Son sadriazamlar, 1:304and n. 2.790OnMehmed Rasid see SO, 2:356-57. On the way of his dismissal, see al-Jawadib dated 11October and 12 December 1871; for more information about him, see two long obituaries of him inal-Jinan 7 (1876), 473-75; and al-Jawadib,6 September 1876.'There is quite a bit of material about those two personalities. First of all, Inal, Son sadriazamlar,1:483-599 (for Avni), and 1:436-82 (for ,irvanizade Mehmed Riisdi). On Avni, see also M. Z.Pakalin, Huseyin Avni Pasa (Istanbul, 1941); see E. Kuran, El2, 3:621; concerning possible palaceinvolvement in Avni's exile see Inal, in TTEM, 9 (86), p. 178; Davison, Reform, pp. 264-65.8'On him, see SO 2:177; Davison, Reform, p. 282; Mordtmann, Stambul, 1:105.82TTEM,9 (86), p. 180."8See n. 70; SO, 2:386-87 and 4:71-72.4Inal, Son sadriazamlar, 1:107 f."See my article, "The Roots of the Ascendancy of Ali and Fu'ad at the Sublime Porte: 1855-1871,"forthcoming in the proceedings of the Congress on the Tanzimat held in Ankara, 31 Octoberto 3 November 1989.

"Nedim, Ayine, pp. 52-53.8Ibid.8See Davison, Reform, p. 271.89Ibid., pp. 272-77.9Bernard Lewis, TheEmergenceof Modern Turkey (London, 1961),p. 121. See also a call for pan-Islam in Basiret, no. 604, dated 14 Safer 1289 (23 April 1872) and no. 606 and in several otherfollowing issues; and Es'ad Efendi, Ittihad-i Islam (Istanbul, 1873), pp. 7-10, 21.



19/19

274 Butrus Abu-Manneh9'Nedim, Ayine, pp. 52-53.92Ibid.93See Davison, Reform, pp. 326-27; I. Hakki Uzuncarseli, Midhat Pasa ve Ylldlz Mahkemesi(Ankara, 1967), p. 14; see also [Midhat Pasa], Midhat Paa, IHayat-iSiydsiyesi Hidemati, MenfaHayatisi, ed. Ali Hayder Midhat (Istanbul, A.H. 1325), pp. 161-62.940n Sheikh Zafir, see Muhammad Z. Mujahid, al-A'lam al-sharqiyya, 4 vols. (Cairo, 1949-63),3:125-26; see also [I. al-Muwaylihi], Ma Hundlika (Cairo, 1895), pp. 200 ff.; see also Tahir A. al-ZawT,Acldm LTbiya(Tripoli, 1390/1971), pp. 363-64. Sheikh Zafir was the same sheikh who laterbecame close to Sultan Abdulhamid II; see my article, "Sultan Abdulhamid II and Shaikh Abulhudaal-Sayyadi," in Middle Eastern Studies, 15 (1979), 131-53; especially p. 139.95Al-Jawa'ib,4 October 1876;this was a weekly paper that appeared in Istanbul edited by AhmadFaris al-Shidyaq.96Seepp. 138-42 of my article cited in n. 94.970n BasTret, ee Selim Niizhet, Turk Gazeteciligi 1831-1931 (Istanbul, 1931), pp. 53-54; see alsoDavison, Reform, p. 276 quoting Mordtmann, Stambul, 1:242.98BasTret, o. 610, dated 23 Safer 1289 (2 May 1872); see also Hakaik-ul Vekdyi',no. 562, dated6 Rebi I 1289 (14 May 1872).99BasTret,o. 621, dated 6 Rebi I 1289 (14 May 1872).'lIbid., no. 615, dated 29 Safer 1289 (8 May 1872).'O'Ibid.,no. 621, dated 6 Rebi I 1289(14 May 1872).'02Thisdescription is based on BasTret,no. 621, on Hakdik-ul Vekadyi,no. 562, both dated 6 Rebi I1289, and on al-Jawadibof 15 May 1872.'03It s not clear whether the sandals are among the holy relics in the Topkapi Saray Museum inIstanbul. In a list of relics published by Kemal Qlg entitled Topkapi Miisezi Mukaddes EmanetlerResimli Rehberi (Istanbul, 1966?) no reference to "sandals" is given (I thank my colleague Dr. U.

Kupferschmidt for drawing my attention to this publication). But in a booklet published by TahsinOz, Hirka-i Saadet Dairesi ve Emanat-i Mukaddese (Istanbul, 1953), an entry on p. 32 entitled"Na'ilin'i Saadet" lists one wooden sandal, 0.23 [cm ] long, upon which the Throne Verse (Quran,2:256) is engraved. Whether this one sandal is what was discovered, or whether there are another pairof sandals is not clear. BasTretmentioned "a pair." For a photograph of a sandal of the Prophet, seeA. Schimmel, And Muhammad Is His Messenger (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1985), p. 41.

abu-manneh, ‘the sultan and the bureaucracy

Documents