academic entrepreneurship & evolution of academic …

ACADEMIC ENTREPRENEURSHIP & EVOLUTION OF ACADEMIC COOPERATION

Shibayama, S., Walsh J.P. & Baba, Y. (2012) Academic Entrepreneurship and Exchange of Scientific Resources: Material Transfer in Life and Materials Sciences in Japanese Universities. American Sociological Review, 77(5), 804-830.

Shibayama, S. (2012) Conflict between entrepreneurship and open science, and the transition of scientific norms. Journal of Technology Transfer, 37(4), 508-531.

Shibayama, S. (2015) Academic commercialization and changing nature of academic cooperation. Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 25(2): 513-532.

Walsh, J. P., Cohen, W. M. & Cho, C. (2007) Where excludability matters: Material versus intellectual property in academic biomedical research. Research Policy, 36: 1184-1203

BACKGROUND & MOTIVATION

11/3/2015 Copyright (C) 2015 Sotaro Shibayama 2

Academic Entrepreneurship (AE) a.k.a. academic commercialism, capitalism

“Global trend in academia emphasizing commercialization, link with industry, protection of intellectual property, etc.” (e.g., Slaughter & Leslie 1997; Etzkowitz 1998)

3 11/3/2015 Copyright (C) 2015 Sotaro Shibayama


Source: 特許行政年次報告書2014年版

University Patenting (Japan)

#Patent %Global patent


Source: METI 大学発ベンチャーに関する基礎調査

Total number of university startups (Japan)

’89 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 14

-08 09 10 11 12 13 14 ??

Why does this occur?

• From policy perspective: – Accountability; pressure from the public (Hackett

1990) – Financial constraint; let universities earn by

themselves

• From academics’ perspective: – Some academics care about practical contribution. – Diversified academic career: Lowered boundary

between academia and industry; Academics can go private in the middle of career (vice versa).

11/3/2015 6 Copyright (C) 2015 Sotaro Shibayama

How does this occur?

• Legal framework – Bayh-Dole Act in USA (1980)

– Similar legislature: Canada (1985), Spain (1986), UK(1998), Japan(1999), France (1999), Belgium (1999), Netherlands (1999), Denmark (2000), Germany(2001), Italy (2001), Australia (20002), Switzerland (2002), Sweden(2003), etc.

• Special organizations – Technology Licensing Offices (TLO)

– Intellectual Property Management Offices (IPMO)

… etc.



Establishment of Special Organizations (Japan)

Source: Shibayama, S., Saka, A. 2010. Academic entrepreneurship in japanese universities: Effects of university interventions on entrepreneurial and academic activities, NISTEP Working Paper. Tokyo, Japan: NISTEP.

Potential downsides

• Incompatibility between entrepreneurship and academic science

– e.g., Can you both patent and publish?

• YES: mutually reinforcing (Stokes 1997)

• NO: incompatible (Dasgupta 1994, Nelson 2004)

• What is the overall impact to the public?

– Yet to be answered.


Today’s Subject: Conflict with open science

• Academic entrepreneurship (≈ proprietary rights) – Scientific discoveries may be kept secret or

disseminated with constrained use. • Patenting -> secrecy

• Industry collaboration -> exclusive use

• Open science – Public research must be fully open for the public.


Examples of Open Science

• Scientific publication – Academics are supposed to publish all their findings. (Merton 1974)

• Open access – Scientific publications should be accessible for free.

• Open methodologies – Methods/protocols should be publicly accessible.

• Open data / resource sharing – Data from publicly funded projects should be deposited in public

database. – Research tools should be stored in central repositories (e.g., Jackson

Lab) and supplied at cost. – “Authors should release data and materials to enable others to verify

or replicate published findings.” (NAS 2003)


Conflict of AE and Open Science

Deliberate delay of publication or data omission

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Note: ***: p<0.001, **: p<0.01, *: p<0.05, †：p<0.1 Source: Blumenthal et al (1997); Campbell et al. (2002); Blumenthal et al(2006); Vogeli et al (2006)

Genetics (2000)

***

32%

19%

31%

11%

***

Life science (1993)

Commercial activities

YES NO YES NO

27%

17%

Life science (1994)

***

Industry funding

YES NO

Copyright (C) 2015 Sotaro Shibayama

Industry collaboration

11%

8%

**

Life science (2003)

YES NO

Denial to requests for material/data

Note: ***: p<0.001, **: p<0.01, *: p<0.05, †：p<0.1 Source: Blumenthal et al (1997); Campbell et al. (2002); Blumenthal et al(2006); Vogeli et al (2006)

13% 14%

5%

8%

***

Life science (1994)

Genomics (1997)

*


YES NO YES NO

11%

13%

7% 8%

*

Life science (2003)

Genomics (1997)

†

Industry funding

YES NO YES NO

11/3/2015 13

Conflict of AE and Open Science


Objective

• Most studies – Focus on entrepreneurial scientists; – Find them to be non-cooperative, not to share resources, etc. – As long the impact is limited to entrepreneurial individuals, the side

effects are manageable.

• This study – Focus on ordinary scientists; – Examine how they react to the context with increasing entrepreneurial

scientists?

11/3/2015 14 Past Present More entrepreneurial

Ordinary Entrepreneurial

METHODS AND DATA


Survey of Japanese Scientists

• Population: 12,928 scientists – Active researchers: received national funds in the last

5 years – Full and associate professors – 16 fields in biology, chemistry, agriculture, pharm,

medicine

• Random sample: 1,674 scientists – In top-45 Japanese universities – 698 responses (42% response rate) – Feb-Apr 2009


Instrument to measure “open science”


Request

Resources* Donor Recipient

Resource sharing (so-called “Material transfer”)

Description: #Sharing / year

11/3/2015 18

USA

2.8

3.5

2.9

2.4

Agriculture(2004)

Biomedical(2003)

Life science(1997)

Life science(2007)

JPN

Source: Lei et al (2009); Walsh et al (2007); Campbell et al. (2002); Shibayama et al. (2011)


Description: %Denial of sharing request (= Deviation from open science)

11/3/2015 19

USA

18%

12% 10% 9%

7%

11%

Biomedical(2003)

Life science(1997)

Genomics(1997)

Life science(1994)

Medical(1996)

Life science(2007)

JPN

Source: Walsh et al (2007); Campbell et al. (2002); Blumenthal et al (1997); Campbell et al. (2000); Shibayama et al. (2011)


Instrument to measure “Academic Entrepreneurship”


Collaboration with industry

Funding from industry

Patenting


Commercial negotiation

License income

Start-up

Business planning

Average at the community (field) level = AE Context

Survey at Individual level

%Collaboration with industry

%Funding from industry

%Patenting

%Commercial activities

Description: Academic Entrepreneurship


%Scientists involved in Entrepreneurial Activity (whole sample)

(N/A)

Description: Academic Entrepreneurship

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0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

%Commercial involvement %Industry collaboration %Industry funding

Pharm Agriculture Material Science Biology Medicine

activities

%Scientists involved in Entrepreneurial Activity (field level)


RESULTS


Denial to sharing requests

11/3/2015 24

10.4%

7.9%

10.1%

7.5%

Industry

funding

Commercialized

material

n.s. n.s.

**

23.8%

7.5%

Commercial

activities

Ordinary Entrepreneurial Note: χ2-test. **: p<0.01


Result 1

11/3/2015 25

• Involvement in entrepreneurial activities at individual level shows negative (but weak/insignificant) effect on “behavior” of open science.

• The effect, if any, is not as clear as in the US.

Question:

How has the entrepreneurial context affected ordinary

scientists?


Norm of Open Science

• Norm of “Communism” – Scientific findings are possessions of the

community and the individual’s ownership right is limited to recognition and esteem (Barber 1952; Merton 1973).

• Guideline for sharing – “An author’s obligation is not only to release data

and materials to enable others to verify or replicate published findings…” (NAS 2003).



11/3/2015 27

22%

33%

36%

6%

3%

Agree

Slightly agree

No opinion

Slightly disagree

Disagree

Scientists should cooperate even with their competitors for the advancement of science (5: Agree – 3: No opinion – 1: Disagree)



11/3/2015 28

Scientists should comply with a cooperation request

even if it does not benefit themselves at all. (5: Agree – 3: No opinion – 1: Disagree)

13%

32%

36%

13%

6%

Agree

Slightly agree

No opinion

Slightly disagree

Disagree


Norms by Fields

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0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

BasicBiology(N=52)

Clinicalmedicine

(N=96)

MaterialScience(N=63)

Agree

Slightly agree

No opinion

Slightly disagree

Disagree


even if it does not benefit themselves at all.


Norm and AE Context

11/3/2015 30

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

4.5

0% 20% 40% 60% 80%

Qu

est

ion

nai

re S

core

%Field-level Commercial Involvement

Pro

- O

pen

Science

P

ro-

Pro

prietary


even if it does not benefit themselves at all.


Result 2

• Norm of open science varies across scientific fields; it is negatively associated with the degree of AE (field level).

11/3/2015 31

Question:

How has the AE context actually changed the behavior of

ordinary scientists?


Prediction of Game Theory (1)

• Existence of free riders (entrepreneurial scientists) should discourage other players (ordinary scientists) from sharing.


0.2

.4.6

.8

%D

efe

ct

0 .2 .4 .6 .8%COM

Result 3-1: ↑ %Denial

33

% Entrepreneurial scientists

Average of ordinary scientists in each field

%D

enia

l to

sh

arin

g re

qu

est

s

0 20 40 60 80 (%)

0

20

4

0

60

8

0

(%)


Prediction of Game Theory (2) Option for donors

– Demand direct return from recipients

– What can be the return? • Money rarely used. authorship; future cooperation

Resources

Donor Recipient

Gratis Sharing (Open Science)

Donor Recipient

Direct Exchange Resources

Return

Result 3-2: ↑ %Cooperation with direct return

(as opposed to gratis sharing)

35

.2.3

.4.5

.6.7

%P

aid

0 .2 .4 .6 .8%COM


%Sh

arin

g w

ith

exp

ect

ed

coau

tho

rsh

ip

0 20 40 60 80 (%)

20

30

40

50

60

70

(%

)

Prediction of Game Theory (3)

Option for recipients

– Requesting a cooperation incurs cost (e.g., revealing research ideas, negotiation, making contracts).

– May be reasonable to concentrate on independent work

→ No deal


0.5

11

.5

#R

equ

est

0 .2 .4 .6 .8%COM

Result 3-3: ↓ #Requests

37


#Req

ue

sts

mad

e

0 20 40 60 80 (%)

0

0.5

1

1

.5


Result 3

• In fields of higher degree of AE, scientists are less willing to engage in non-rewarded cooperation

• Instead, they are more willing to engage in direct (paid) exchange.

• Moreover, scientists are less willing to engage in cooperation and the number of cooperation (#requests and #fulfilled) declines.


Summary

11/3/2015 39

Low AE

Co

mp

lied

D

en

ied

w/o return w/ return C

om

plie

d

De

nie

d

High AE

w/o return w/ return


ADDITIONAL RESULTS


Norm of Open Science vs. Practical Contribution



Source: Shibayama, S., Saka, A. 2010. Academic entrepreneurship in japanese universities: Effects of university interventions on entrepreneurial and academic activities, NISTEP Working Paper. Tokyo, Japan: NISTEP.

Regulation & Guideline of Universities

CONCLUSIONS


Summary

• Broad impact of academic entrepreneurship (AE) – Not only entrepreneurial scientists but also ordinary

scientists – Weakening norm of Open Science – Shift in cooperation forms:

NON-rewarded exchange ⇒ Direct exchange – Decrease in total transaction possibly due to limitations of

direct exchange

• The trend of AE may have facilitated practical application, but the fundamental basis of academic science may have been weakened.


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