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ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND THE DIMINISHED SUBJECTDennis Hayesaa Canterbury Christ Church University/Academics For Academic Freedom,

Online publication date: 05 July 2010

To cite this Article Hayes, Dennis(2009) 'ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND THE DIMINISHED SUBJECT', British Journal ofEducational Studies, 57: 2, 127 145

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British Journal of Educational Studies, ISSN 0007-1005DOI number: 10.1111/j.1467-8527.2009.00432.x

Vol. 57, No. 2, June 2009, pp 127145

127

2009 The AuthorJournal compilation 2009 SES. Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, OxfordOX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.

Blackwell Publishing LtdOxford, UKBJESBritish Journal of Educational Studies0007-10051467-8527 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and SES 2009XXXORIGINAL ARTICLEACADEMIC FREEDOM AND THE DIMINISHED SUBJECTACADEMIC FREEDOM AND THE DIMINISHED SUBJECT

ACADEMIC FREEDOM ANDTHE DIMINISHED SUBJECT

byDennisHayes,Canterbury Christ Church University/Academics For

Academic Freedom

ABSTRACT: Discussions about freedom of speech and academic freedom

today are about the limits to those freedoms. However, these discussionstake place mostly in the higher education trade press and do not receiveany serious attention from academics and educationalists. In this paperseveral key arguments for limiting academic freedom are identified,examined and placed in an historical context. That contextualisationshows that with the disappearance of social and political struggles toextend freedom in society there has come a narrowing of academiclife and a new and impoverished concept of academic freedom fora diminished idea of the human subject, of humanity and of human

potential.

Keywords: free speech, academic freedom, diminished subject

1. Introduction

Debates about academic freedom and free speech in universities,the press, and wider society are now almost all about the limits to these

freedoms. When Bill Rammell, then Minister of State for LifelongLearning, Further and Higher Education, began a debate aboutacademic freedom in British universities with a paper to the FabianSociety in 2007, he said with confidence: There are already, andalways have been, limits to academic freedom (Rammell, 2007).Likewise, an exhibition at the British Library on Taking Libertieshas a section on Free Speech and its limits (British Library, 200809). The Director of Liberty, Shami Chakrabarti, is fond of noting

that there are limits to free speech, adding casual qualifications topoliticians and the press when she is defending free speech, suchas: There are some limits on free speech, I agree (Hansard, 2005)and All democracies place necessary and proportionate limits onfree speech (Traynor et al., 2006). There are many more examples.

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2009 The AuthorJournal compilation 2009 SES

No defence of unqualified free speech, therefore, comes from whereyou might, however naively, most expect it.

Statements made by Vice-Chancellors, academics, politicians andhigher education unions and advisory bodies all celebrate academic

freedom and free speech, with the caveat But .... Then follows theirfavourite examples of what is unacceptable, such as the views of theBritish National Party (BNP) or the Ku Klux Klan (KKK). However,the most popular but is the vague moralistic claim that academicfreedom comes with responsibilities (see Hayes, 2008 and below).

The National Union of Students in the UK supports what it callsa No Platform policy for certain racist fascist or violent groups.There are ill-defined epithets that label clearly identifiable groupssuch as the BNP and Hizb ut-Tahrir (see Hayes and Reynolds, 2008).

Legislation, speech codes, equality language guidelines anduniversity policies on staff and student safety enshrine limits to whatcan be said in order not to cause physical or mental distress (seeEcclestone and Hayes, 2008).

Occasionally there are high profile academic freedom caseswhere members of staff, or students, get into serious trouble forexpressing their views and many lose or leave their jobs; LaurenceSummers (Harvard), Frank Ellis (Leeds), Sal Fiore (Wolverhampton),

Gary McLennan and John Hookham (Queensland University ofTechnology) and Hicham Yezza (Nottingham) are just a few examplesof individuals who, in order, fell foul of feminist outrage, anti-raciststaff and student campaigners, postmodernism, management attitudes,and government-promoted hysteria.

Such are the day to day attacks on academic freedom that arereported at least in pages of the trade press, in The Chronicle of HigherEducation and the Times Higher Education supplement. Academicswith the slightest interest in the politics of higher education will be

aware of them.The question this introductory set of thoughts raises is whether

this apparently restrictive and censorious climate indicates thatanything has changed about how academics, policy makers and themedia conceive of academic freedom. Or is it merely an example ofconstant and continual conflict on the fringes of academia aboutthe limits to that freedom? The relative disinterest of academics,particularly those now designated as professors of higher education,

in writing and researching about academic freedom would suggestthat such conflicts are seen as marginal conflicts about where to setnecessary limits. There are no high profile defenders of absolutefree speech and academic freedom amongst those paid to thinkabout higher education.



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When academics address the issue they tend to conclude thatacademic freedom is more complicated than it appears to be. DavidPalfreyman, of the Oxford Centre for Higher Education PolicyStudies (OxCHEPS), in his careful, if formal and legalistic, dis-

cussion of the putative threats to academic freedom begins withthis remark:

Academic freedom can be a difficult concept to define in theory,and one sometimes abused in practice when inappropriately invokedby academics/faculty in employment law disputes with theiruniversity (and occasionally by students in the context of campusfree speech). (Palfreyman, 2006/2007, p. 1)

James Arthur calls academic freedom a contested concept thatneeds to be argued for because it is differently understood (Arthur,2006, p. 113). Louis Menand, introducing an influential collectionof essays on academic freedom with a paper on The Limits toAcademic Freedom argues that:

The concept of academic freedom ... has always been problematic.It is inherently problematic. Like any ideal concept, it requires awilling suspension of disbelief in order properly and efficiently todo its work. (Menand, 1996, p. 6)

Academic freedom is difficult, contested and problematic accordingto its academic defenders, many of whom want to see the idea as inneed of further complication, or of a new conceptualisation (Dworkin,1996; Rorty, 1996). Rarely do they think that it is a pretty uselessconcept (for an exception see Fish, 2008).

While academic specialists in higher education ignore the topicof academic freedom, and those who are interested see the issueas in some sense or other complicated, the interesting debates are

conducted at a popular and polemical level. Leaving aside thesemantic point that polemical in its current disparaging usage byacademics means says something interesting and original, it isimportant that there is some clarity of thought about the polemicsin these debates to take the discussion further.

2. Contemporary Arguments about Academic Freedom

There are five current attitudes to academic freedom that can bedrawn out of the popular debates about the limits to academicfreedom. They are to be found in various forms in these debatesand, as the discussion of them will show, they are not mutuallyexclusive.



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First: Academic Freedom is not Under Threat and there areProper Limits to it

If academic freedom is thought of as merely the freedom to under-

take research as individual academics, most do not see it as in anysubstantial way as being under threat. The limits to it are merelymodern variations of previous and proper limits. The problems thatare addressed in the press are a result of academics transgressingtheir true academic authority based on evidence from their research.They comment on matters in other disciplines or on actions anddecisions by management, or engage in politics, or express opinionsthat are eccentric and extreme. It is a result of this transgression oftheir proper role that they become the subject of sensational andexaggerated journalism. The proper limit to academic freedom isacademic authority based on research.

It is tempting to blame this narrowness, at least in the UK, on theResearch Assessment Exercise (RAE), which has made a focus onresearch a requirement of funding and career success; but mostacademics throughout the ages were narrow scholars in this way.Even opponents of the RAE and similar assessments accept theargument that academic freedom is about freedom to research and

this gives academics authority to speak where no others have thatauthority neither university management, the state, politicians orthe populace.

This is a powerful position and seems to provide a foundation forthe professional privilege of academic freedom. It is inadequate forthree reasons. The first, and most important, is that stimulating andcreative work in universities often comes from inter-disciplinaryinterest, from the transgression of boundaries. The dullness of muchacademic research may be an expression of the disappearance of

this inter-disciplinary interest. This narrow attitude undermines notonly the possibility of exciting academic debate in universities butacademic research itself.

Second, it ignores the influence of research funding bodies,government particularly in subjects such as education and teachertraining in which politicians take a particular interest and qualityassurance bodies in determining the focus of research. Universitymanagement can have a very important role here and not just

through forming ethics committees to oversee research. They areoften directly political. Take, for example, their unthinking anduncritical celebration of political agendas, including using EveryChild Matters as a framework for all educational research, thepromotion of personal well-being in health and education and



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environmental sustainability through the institution. Not recognisingthese as political initiatives is a result of research parochialism as itwould be exposed in wider debate. Third, is that this argument is areflection of the fact that academics are sanguine about academic

freedom because they engage in self-censorship. They avoidcontentious issues and generally are compliant not only in search offunding streams but as a result of not being exposed to the potentialstimulus of academics from other disciplines and being compliant inthe face of government agendas. Self-censorship is obviously difficultto evidence, but the lack of willingness of academics to engage indebate, which is a feature of research conferences, does indicate anunwillingness to put ideas to the test of more than the one or twoquestions we have time for. More time for questions would meanmore time for self-censorship, bias and conscious or unconsciousblindness to alternative viewpoints to be exposed.

This, of course, is to blame academics for being their own enemywithin. Philosopher and writer Alan Ryan is critical of the damagingsuggestion [...] that freedom of speech and inquiry is under attackfrom students and their teachers (Ryan, 1999, p. 142); but a narrowresearch focus, compliance and self-censorship are a feature of thisattack.

In this climate, partly created by the New Labour governmenthe represented, Bill Rammells instrumentalist defence of academicfreedom in order to combat extremism in universities throughrational debate was unlikely to have any impact. Not because itsets an instrumentalist goal for academic freedom and thereforemakes it unfree, but because the narrow concept of academicfreedom as applying only to research is so widely held that themajority of academics will be uninterested in his defence. Thosethat were interested in what he said, being partisan defenders of

an instrumentalist approach to academic freedom in the interestof various radical causes themselves, saw his defence of academicfreedom as a veiled attack on minority, Muslin communities.

Whether this first argument reflects an ostrich-like, indifferent,or sanguine attitude to academic freedom, it is a tragedy for thetradition and the ideal of the academy as a place of open debateand scholarship in pursuit of knowledge. As debate in civic societyand social engagement in general has declined, so the university

has experienced a similar decline. The consequences and theprofundity of that decline in the academy are seldom noticed.The academy is not a geographical location for technical researchersbut the societal embodiment of the commitment to the pursuit ofknowledge.



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Second: Academic Freedom must be Restricted to Counter the IncreasedThreat from Fascist and Racist Groups and Individuals

This is not only the basis of the No Platform policies of the National

Union of Students in the UK the idea that racist and extreme viewsneed to be suppressed permeates into most university equalitypolicies. It is obviously based on a fantastic distortion of theinfluence of such groups and even of their current character. Thereis no real threat of the sort the proponents of this put forward, forexample one activist often hearing the sound of jackboots marchingdown the campus corridors. This sort of talk is self-delusion.

Whatever the reality, the No Platform position does major damageto academic freedom and free speech. It is highly symbolic in thatit is a marker to millions of students and the academy in generalthat there are certain views that must not be heard. It transformsthe idea of open debate in the university into a platform for theexposition of views. This in turn, assumes there is no reasoning aboutwhat is heard on the platform but that it affects individuals in amechanical or causal way. This is why the absurd claim is made thatracial attacks increase in an area whenever a BNP speaker is givena platform. This is a false generalisation, but even if it is true in certain

instances it is mere correlation and no causal link between racistspeech and racist action is established. The idea of speech as merelyhaving a causal effect on an audience is to treat them as less than human.This comes out in two assumptions. The first is that some studentswill be gullible and so weak minded they will be persuaded by theracist rhetoric. Incidentally, this appears to be an assumption madeabout the whole of the working class who need to be protected fromthe utterances of such groups for the same reason! The second isthat some students, particularly those from ethnic minorities, might

be so hurt by what they hear that they need to be protected from it.Part of being educated used to mean you could hear any

arguments and learn to answer them. Is there not a whiff of classprejudice and racism in these arguments? Are the working classand ethnic minorities incapable of reasoning and need to beprotected by middle-class student activists? In the early 1990s NatHentoff gave the example of a more positive response, in a debateat Harvard, to a call from a white student in favour of speech codes.

He believed black students might be driven away from universityand not receive any education if racist speech was not punished:

A black student rose and said that the white student had a hell ofa nerve to assume that he in the face of racist speech would



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pack up his books and go home. Hes been familiar with that kindof speech all his life, and he had never felt the need to run awayfrom it. Hed handled it before and he could again.

The black student then looked at his white colleague andsaid that it was condescending to say that blacks have to beprotected from racist speech. It is more racist and insulting,he emphasised, to say that than to call me a nigger. (Hentoff,1991, p. 83)

It was a minority view then and almost non-existent now. It isnon-existent because the idea of a resilient student, such as Hentoffsblack law student, has been entirely replaced by a more vulnerablepicture of ethnic minorities and other groups. There are some hopefulsigns that British students are starting to reject this condescendingand insulting view of their ability to make up their own minds byopposing No Platform policies (Hayes and Reynolds, 2008).However, No Platform policies, although ineffective and irrelevantas the groups they protect students from, remain a beacon forrestrictions on academic freedom.

University authorities, students and some radical academics areall too happy to use modified forms of No Platform to remove or

silence academics they consider racist. The arguments are often thatthey are not experts in the field and have no right to speak usingthe first argument and defining academic freedom as being basedon research. The duplicitous nature of this argument was exposedwhen there was a campaign to sack Oxford academic David Colemanfor his association with Migration Watch UK. Unfortunately for theprotesters this was his area of research expertise, being as he was aprofessor of demography, but they did not seem to care.

Third: Academic Freedom is being Curtailed by Commercial Pressures thatare leading to the Marketisation and Privatisation of the Academy

The most common cry from radical academics and higher educationtrade unionists is about the marketisation of the university and thecommodification of knowledge. It is hard to understand these oftrepeated phrases. Vague talk about the market in which knowledgeis sold means little. For knowledge, or even a university course, to

become a commodity it would have to be purchased and its valuedetermined in a free market. There is no such market, so we are inthe realm of metaphor. There is management speak, there aremission statements and the like, and increasingly private fundingof university activities often through knowledge transfer. Some



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object to the funding of military research projects or to a varietyof companies undertaking research that may lead to commercialproducts. Others are happy to receive funding, with or without strings.Whatever people object to about business involvement the evidence

against such funding has to be more than ad hominemand addressnot whether the company is moral, or green, but whether the fundingin some way causes bias in the research process and outcomes.

Arguments about the involvement of private companies affectingacademic freedom seem peculiarly state-blind. While the governmentinterferes in all aspects of university life, reducing programmes toskills based training regimes and research to economically or sociallyuseful research, academics look away. The argument about the threatto academic freedom from he who pays the piper does not seem tobe addressed to the real paymaster of the university sector.

It does seem to be a common assumption that those providingprivate funding will seek certain outcomes. However, this is not anecessary feature of any funding, public or private. What is morecommon with either funding is the suppression or toning down ofunacceptable research results. The obsession with private fundingseems to be driven by anti-capitalist ideology or anxiety aboutworking conditions and pay more than any real threat to academic

freedom. But why should private funding make life more difficult foracademics? The assumption is that the market will not support themin the same way and they will be more vulnerable than when fundedby the state. This fearful consciousness is more likely to undermineresistance to change than a robust acceptance and may become aself-fulfilling prophesy. Many university departments survive onprivate funding, yet their academic freedom and confidence isunaffected. The jury is out here and there needs to be a real debateabout private funding and academic freedom.

Fourth: Academic Freedom is under Threat in order to meet the Challengesposed post 9/11

A recent spate of books on academic freedom after 9/11 show arising concern with explicit government censorship and the use ofuniversities as weapons in the war against terror (Doumani, 2006;Gerstmann and Streb, 2008; ONeil, 2008). They are often intellectual

ragbags of books adding corporate power, terrorism, the wiredworld and other popular themes to their contents. But at least theyare raising the issue of academic freedom in a way not seen fortwenty years (see below). The situation post 9/11 appears to be new.Concerns about the curtailment of free speech and academic



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freedom are a feature of wartime. But in a situation of a supposedlypermanent war against terror arguments about wartime censorshipcan no longer be defended by reference to short-term necessity.

The discussions that come out of this new situation are both positive

and negative. In an attempt to identify Western values, free speechand academic freedom are obvious candidates. Paradoxically itseems that universities and colleges, and now even schools, are seento be places were extremists can gain a platform and brainwashsusceptible students into joining extremist groups.

Bill Rammells paper expresses this paradox particularly well.He does not support No Platform, recognising the contradictorynature of allowing free speech and academic freedom for Muslimviews, however extreme, and not allowing this freedom for legalgroups labelled fascist and racist. The old left have always had apartial view of free speech and academic freedom, seeing them as aprivilege for those who hold acceptable views. Unlike them, Rammellis consistent. Free speech and academic freedom within the law isnot a partisan matter for him. Where he does not differ from theleft, as previously mentioned, is in having an instrument view ofacademic freedom serving certain social ends by combatingextremism. That said, he clearly defends defeating their arguments

and just not refusing to hear them. What motivates him is the fearthat, unless academic freedom is used to challenge extremist views,then academic freedom will be undermined by violent extremism.

Despite this unusual defence of academic freedom by a governmentminister, the general climate of fear leads to universities seeingbuilding community cohesion and in the future the surveillance ofoverseas students as their business. Already there are absurd actionsbeing taken by university authorities in a panic about extremism.The paradigm example of which is the University of Nottingham

calling in the police because a member of staff had downloadedthe al-Qaeda Training Manual, something freely available on theInternet and on US government web sites (Nilsen et al., 2008). Suchincidents are sure to increase.

Fifth: Absolute Academic Freedom and Free Speech are no longer possiblebecause most Speech is now Potentially Harmful

The tired example of the limits to free speech, that derives fromJustice Oliver Wendell Jones, that it is unacceptable to falsely shoutFire in a crowded theatre, has had a revival in popular discussionsof free speech. The only change is that Cinema replaces Theatre.Wendell Jones was upholding the conviction of two socialists for



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giving out anti-draft leaflets. This act, like shouting Fire, was beyondeven the most stringent protection of free speech and so, by inference,giving out anti-draft materials constituted a clear and presentdanger and could not be protected.

Is shouting Fire in this way free speech? Consider this alternativequestion: Is pressing the fire alarm in a crowded cinema free speech?Obviously it is not. It is action. There is little attention given to thisfalse analogy in the academic freedom literature but interestedacademics could make a start by looking at Alan Dershowitzsanalysis Shouting Fire (1989). The analysis of the analogy is not ofinterest here where we are concerned with its use as an example ofan undeniable limit to free speech. This rhetorical use has a simpleaim: to blur the distinction between speech and action. At a discussionhosted by the Henry Jackson Society at the House of Commons inNovember 2008 on Legal Jihad: How Islamist lawfare is stifling Westernfree speech on Radical Islamthe speaker, Brooke Goldstein, used thisexample to justify restrictions on free speech, and a member of theaudience observed that perhaps issues were so contentious now thatall speech on important matters was like shouting Fire in a crowdedcinema. He apologised for his inarticulate expression of his thoughts,but the idea was profound. In public and academic debate any

utterance can now be deemed hurtful, offensive and harmful. It is anironic extension of Mills harm principle to all speech.It is impossible to argue that free speech and academic freedom

have been constrained by a false analogy. But something has changedto allow so crude an assimilation of speech and (psychological) harm.Explaining that change explains what has altered in our understandingof free speech and academic freedom.

3. What is Academic Freedom?Despite these fearful attitudes and the arguments that see academicfreedom as difficult, contested and problematic it is a very simplematter. When Academics For Academic Freedom (AFAF) was foundedand several people, including myself, Simon Davies, Dolan Cummings,Roy Harris and James Woudhuysen among others were wording thestatement of academic freedom, we gave a shorthand definition asthe responsibility to speak your mind and challenge conven-

tional wisdom (see www.afaf.org.uk; Fuller, 2009; Hayes, 2006). Ithas an echo of Edgars injunction at the end of King Learto Speakwhat we feel, not what we ought to say. Academic freedom is notcomplicated. The AFAF statement is an injunction to say what youthink and applies to academics and to students. What is difficult or

http://www.afaf.org.uk/http://www.afaf.org.uk/


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complicated about that? Unless you want to complicate it and tocomplicate it is an attempt to undermine both freedom of speechand academic freedom.

Freedom of Speech and Academic Freedom

The use of the term speech here refers to rational speech and notthe mere utterance of sounds, invective or curses. The Fire exampleand its contemporary and more challenging versions, such as Hizbut-Tahrirs obsession with insulting Islam or the Prophet, are notrelevant to free speech in this sense. They are misleading and theonly connection with free speech is that both involve the utteranceof sounds. But as the example of setting off the fire alarm shows,sounds are not required to cause distress or indeed to insult someonesreligion. The issue of whether or not to ban words/deeds that insultis another matter that cannot be addressed here, though the bestanswer is not to prosecute unless the context clearly shows that theutterance or expression is action and not poorly articulated speech.

This is not to confuse free speech and academic freedom. Indeedthe very separation of them requires that academic freedomis merely another phrase for academic research. Once this idea is

rooted in peoples minds, whatever else is said can be arrogantlydismissed as merely the free speech of citizens or opining. This isto put the distinction politely and it is often put in a way that showsacademic contempt for ordinary people and their views.

The distinction between academic freedom and free speechshows a professional narrowness about academic life that isessentially anti-intellectual. New and interesting old ideas do notjust arise in the classroom or laboratory but in the student union,in bars, in campus debates and the various common rooms. The

attempt by think tanks to create Caf Society through Coffee HouseDebates and Philo Pubs shows some awareness of what is lackingin contemporary academic life.

A better way of looking at both is to see them as part of a continuum:speech leads to questions and to research which leads to furtherquestions and further research and so on. Reality is not as tidy asthis but the academy is the place where, in any civilised society, ideasof any sort can be expressed and challenged or taken up and then

challenged in this way.As Roy Harris has argued, free speech is foundational. It takespriority over all others because without it the very concept offreedom is lost (Harris, 2005). It has this priority because formingour own opinions on the basis of experience includes the experience



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of the opinions of others. But if others are not free to voice theiropinions, we cannot reliably learn what they believe or why. If werestrict freedom of speech in any way it makes freedom of thoughtimpossible.

The responsibility of individuals to speak their mind requiresthat the academy, which embodies academic freedom, has a similarresponsibility to undertake what Harris calls their primary duty to champion freedom of speech against all encroachments bylegislators, pressure groups and trends in public opinion (Harris,2005).

These are individual and corporate responsibilities. A thirdresponsibility can also be drawn out of the remark, mentioned atthe beginning of this paper, that academic freedom comes withresponsibilities. What is normally meant is a contingent responsibilitysuch as not upsetting students, and making them feel safe. Thesesorts of external injunctions are just that and have no connectionwith academic freedom. They are moral or emotional pressures.The responsibility that comes with academic freedom is logicallyconnected with it. That responsibility is the requirement to try to beclear, coherent, truthful and to constantly question your beliefs. Thisis an epistemological responsibility and it is the only responsibility

that is implied by academic freedom.The idea that there should be contingent restrictions on academicfreedom imposed by government, managers, equalities or ethicscommittees is something new and shows a lack of confidence inacademic freedom that is a pointer to what differentiates the con-temporary understanding of academic freedom from previousunderstandings.

4. A Short History of Academic FreedomIn the last Penguin Education Special, an edition on Academic Freedom,Anthony Arblaster begins his discussion with this statement:

Academic freedom which is a rather pompous term for freedomof, and within, education is today under threat from severalquarters, and urgently needs to be defended. And the need isnot merely to defend what there is, but to extend freedom into

institutions and areas where it barely exists at all except as ahollow phrase, repeated in the equally hollow rituals (speech days,degree ceremonies and the like) in which a fossilised educationsystem celebrates its own conservatism. Academic freedom anddemocracy go hand in hand. For the principal, though not the only,



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threats to freedom in education derive from the authoritarianstructures of educational institutions. A society which constantlyadvertises itself as free and democratic manages to tolerate anextraordinary degree of authoritarianism within almost all its

major institutions. The contradiction between pretensions andpractice is unlikely to last indefinitely. Sooner or later a choice willhave to be made between greater freedom and democracy or less.There are signs that our rulers have already made their choice for repression. The rest of us have to decide whether to accept thisor resist. (Arblaster, 1974, p. 9)

Setting Arblasters views out at length here is an attempt to addressahistorical approaches to academic freedom. His opening paragraph

sets the concern with academic freedom as part of a struggle to winwider freedom and democracy within state institutions and widersociety. His designation of the term academic freedom as pompousis an attempt to put it in its rightful place within that wider struggle.Today there is no such movement to democratise social institutions.Even the Council for Academic Freedom and Democracy (CAFD),for whom he wrote the book, has, in line with the decline in thestruggle for freedom and democracy, become the Council forAcademic Freedom and Academic Standards(CAFAS) (my italics).

It is easy to forget that until the end of the last century freedomto speak even wrongly and foolishly was lauded and restrictions or limitswere minor and restricted to actions such as Jew-baiting or Negro-baiting, and it was always held to be essential for people to be criticalof every proposal that asks for a surrender of liberty (Laski, 1972,p. 128). Today, arguing for bans and restrictions on liberty ratherthan the criticism of bans and restrictions is the norm. Harold J. Laski,who made this demand that we criticise all proposals to surrender liberty,

gives this account of the importance of freedom of the mind:[I]f his experience is to count, a man must be able to state itfreely. The right to speak it, to print it, to seek in concert withothers its translation into the event, is fundamental to liberty. If heis driven, in this realm, to silence and inactivity, he becomes adumb and inarticulate creature whose personality is neglectedin the making of policy. Without freedom of the mind and ofassociation a man has no means of self-protection in our social

order. He may speak wrongly or foolishly; he may associate withothers for purposes that are abhorrent to the majority of men. Yeta denial of his right to do these things is a denial of his happiness.Thereby he becomes an instrument of other peoples ends andnot himself an end. (Laski, 1972, pp. 7273)



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Laskis book LIBERTYwas republished many times over half acentury and remains a reminder of how liberty of the mind perhaps a better term than academic freedom was cherishedbecause people have no other means of self-protection in society.

The contemporary assumption is the reverse; that society and thestate must protect people from speech and not allow those whospeak wrongly or foolishly, or work towards abhorrent purposes, todo so. This action is for their own and other peoples protection.

This is not to deny that academic freedom was at that time seenby some to be a special kind of freedom that transcended thenormal conceptions of freedoms in that it involves exceptionalprivileges (Robbins, 1966, p. 46). This is certainly true, but the context,not the content and justification, of this professional privilege ismost important. When that context was no longer present it becamealmost impossible for academics to defend that privilege.

We can mark the end of the historical phase in which free speechand academic freedom were seen as part of a wider struggle forgreater liberty and democracy with the collapse of communism in1989 and with it the idea of alternative visions of society. The reasonsfor this claim and the political background most relevant to thearguments in this paper are discussed elsewhere (Ecclestone and

Hayes, 2008, ch.7). Suffice to say that it was around this time thatpeople looked more and more to the state to grant liberties.The classic example of a state-granted liberty in relation to freedom

of the mind is the amendment to the 1988 Education Reform Actmoved by Lord Hillhead, better known still as Roy Jenkins. Thisstatement of academic freedom is today part of the articles andinstruments of governance of almost all universities and colleges inthe UK. It gives academics freedom within the law to question andtest received wisdom, and to put forward new ideas and controversial

or unpopular opinions without placing themselves in jeopardy oflosing their jobs or privileges they may have at their institutions.

The statement seemed to settle the matter except for the caveatsand university mission statements that undermine its efficacy. Thesequalifications to the statement, formal and informal, can only leadto a climate of fear. Conrad Russell, author of a book about AcademicFreedom shortly after the act became law, makes this commentabout fear and how it can incline academics towards self-censorship:

The point is not that academics may not be dismissed for theiropinions: it is that they need freedom from fear that they mightbe so dismissed. Without it, they cannot be counted on to do theirwork well. A saint, or indeed a particularly rumbustious sinner,



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might well succeed in doing his best work under the threat ofdismissal. Many people, though, are made of less stern stuff. Thetemptation to trim unpopular conclusions, to cut out the extrasentence which unambiguously spells out the provocative finding,

is one to which most academics are not immune. (Russell, 1993,p. 23)

Legal defences cannot create a climate in which freedom of themind flourishes because they were not fought for by academics butgiven. Academic struggle, like the wider struggle for freedoms, hadvanished. Today the Hillhead amendment remains for the most parthidden by management and forgotten by staff.

It may seem to readers that the situation in the United States isdifferent and the debates about the first amendment, politicalcorrectness and speech codes make for a more vibrant defence offreedom of the mind (see Downs, 2005). There is some truth in thisbut it must not be exaggerated, as this debate does not reflect astruggle for liberty in wider society but often seems like internecinesquabbling between departments, faculty and management.

These snapshots from the history of academic freedom showingthe decline from a vibrant politics of academic freedom to a defensive

legalistic and narrow approach in the 1990s bring us to the presentperiod and return us to the obsession with setting limits to academicfreedom and the concern with (psychological) harm.

5. Academic Freedom for a Diminished Subject

If we consider the arguments about limits set out above, there is atheme at times strong at other times weaker to all of them. Thisis of the vulnerable academic and student. The first argument about

normal limits is said to protect vulnerable, mostly ethnic groups asdoes the second argument about the threat from racists and fascists,but implies that these groups are vulnerable to hear these arguments.The third argument about marketisation implies that academics areunable to function and must be inevitable victims of business involve-ment in the sector. However, unlike the others, it does call for someresistance but as those who follow the arguments will know, thatresistance is often on behalf of vulnerable groups, both students and

academics, who need protection from the rapacious market.The fourth argument about extremists implies that students inparticular are easily brainwashed without intervention from universitymanagement and academic staff. The final argument about vigorousargument being potentially hurtful is perhaps the clearest example



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of the theme of vulnerability. This theme leads to a sixth argumentwhich explains why free speech and academic freedom are every-where limited.

Sixth: Academic Freedom is to be Limited because of a Diminished Viewof Humanity

Attitudes to young people are indicative of a societys attitude toitself, to how it sees the future of humanity. In looking at attitudesto students we can see how the academy, whose members articulateand institutionalise a philosophy of humanity, see those who willmost influence society as its graduates.

The changed conception of a student is not as an autonomousperson embarking on the pursuit of knowledge, but as a vulnerablelearner. That the term learner rather than knower has widecurrency today is a feature of the infantilisation of young people.They are treated as if they were still in the primary school. They arewelcomed with their parents, they are recommended counsellingcourses to help them in the transition from school, courses in copingwith stress and examinations. They face not challenging ideas but anarmy of support services all re-enforcing institutional and subjective

perceptions of vulnerability. One new university in the north ofEngland even produces a leaflet suggesting that the study of academicand professional subjects might be psychologically upsetting. Ifyou are studying nursing you might discover that people are sick, orin sociology that people are poor the conclusion is that you mayneed professional counselling help to cope. Examples of initiativessuch as these are manifold and most readers will be familiar withthem (see Ecclestone and Hayes, 2008, ch. 5; Hayes, 2005, 2009).

Likewise lecturers are now asked to see themselves as lead learners

and to give more of their time to counselling and supportingstudents. They too are stressed and bullied and increasingly in needof as much support as students. The higher education unions aboveall relish the role of supporting vulnerable lecturers and are foreverresearching stress and bullying and offering counselling lines andpersonal support (see Ecclestone and Hayes, 2008). In what is nowalmost a therapeutic environment vigorous challenges to youngpeoples ideas the traditional role of a university are going to be

seen as attacks on them. Already criticism is being made the basisfor legal remedies, I got a poor mark, and grade because you weretoo critical. You did not like me!

The notion of being student-centred is now commonplace.Putting the student at the heart of the university means that the



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passing on and advancement of knowledge is not there. And if thatstudent is seen as a vulnerable person whose vulnerability is yourconcern, then it is difficult to challenge their thoughts and beliefs.

If we do not challenge beliefs, however hurtful this may be, we do

not fail merely in our duty as academics but fail humanity. In abrilliant discussion of freedom of speech, philosopher Tony Skillensays this about challenging beliefs:

Ones beliefs are close to the centre of who one is and criticismof them can cut deep and meet protective resistance. But it is ofthe essence of human rationality that beliefs are held as valid, asjustified by their correspondence to what is the case. The mindexpresses itself and thus exposes itself to change through criticism.

Criticism and discussion respect these dimensions of rationality,whereas silencing smashes at them, practically denying the capacity,not only to reach views through some process of experience andreflection, but to go beyond them through further formativeactivity. This contempt also applies to your status as hearer ofspeech, denying your capacity to reason and reflect on what youhear. You are treated as if words could actually causally affect youin an almost physical way rather than through their according toyour grasp of things and thus their being acceptable to you.(Skillen, 1982, p. 145)

The perception we have of a young person, a student, and of humanity,is exemplified by the attitude that Skillen castigates as contempt. Itexpresses a profoundly diminished sense of human potential.

6. A Diminished Academic Freedom for a Diminished Subject

This contempt in the university is a destructive form of self-contempt.

If we no longer value freedom of the mind in the way describedabove we no longer value academic freedom. If we no longer valueacademic freedom, we may as well drop the concept altogether, asStanley Fish suggests:

Invoking academic freedomcarries with it the danger of thinkingthat we are doing something noble and even vaguely religious,when in fact what we are doing, or should be interested in doing,is no more or less than our academic jobs. (Fish, 2008)

The disappearance of the struggle to extend freedom and democracy,and the subsequent retreat to a legally granted contractual protection,left the academic world open to other societal influences, inparticular to the therapeutic culture that replaced that wider social



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and political struggle for liberty. Academics have a choice. Tobecome another profession with no noble goals, or to accept theresponsibility to defend free speech and academic freedom andhope to make the ivory tower a beacon for the defence of freedom

in wider society. The choice between the noble and the ignoble isyours.

7. References

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CorrespondenceDr Dennis HayesCanterbury Christ Church UniversityCanterbury

KentCT1 1QUE-mail: [email protected]

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