accepting testimony - weiner, m
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8/10/2019 Accepting Testimony - Weiner, M.
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Accepting TestimonyAuthor(s): Matthew WeinerSource: The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 53, No. 211 (Apr., 2003), pp. 256-264Published by: Wileyfor The Philosophical QuarterlyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3542868.
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8/10/2019 Accepting Testimony - Weiner, M.
2/10
The
hilosophical
uarterly,
ol.
3,
No.
11
ISSN
oo31-8o94
April 003
DISCUSSIONS
ACCEPTING TESTIMONY
BY MATTHEW WEINER
I
defend
he
cceptance
rincipleor
testimony
APT),
that earersre
ustj#ed
n
accepting
testimony
nless
hey
ave
ositive
vidence
gainst
ts
eliability,
gainst
lizabeth
ricker's
ocal
reductionist
iew. ocal
eductionism,
he octrine
hat
earers
eed
videncehat
particulariece
of
testimony
s reliable
if
they
reto be
justified
n
believing
t,
must n
pain
of
cepticism
e
complementedy principle
hat
rantsefault
ustification
o ome
estimony;argue
hat
APT)
is the
rinciple
equired.
consider
wo
lternative
eaker
rinciples
s
complements
o
ocal
reductionism;
ne
ields
ounter-intuitiveesultsnless e
ccept
APT)
as
well,
whilehe thers
tooweak o
nableocal eductionismo void
cepticism.
I.
Introduction
Recently
many
philosophers
ave stressed he
mportance
f
testimony
s
a
source
of
our
knowledge.
uring
a
day
in a
strange ity,
we
rely
n what we are told and
have
been told for
ll
mannerof
nformation,
ven for he
knowledge
f what
city
we are in.' As
Sosa
says,
we
rely
n
testimony
or ur
grasp
of
history,
eography,
science and
more'.2
f
we were not
generallyustified
n
accepting
the word of
others,
we
would know
very
ittle.
o
avoid
this,
satisfactory
ccountof
testimony
must onformo the non-scepticalonstraint':
NSC.
Testimony
ften
ustifies eople
in
beliefswhich
they
annotconfirm t
first
hand,
including
eliefs bout the
near
or
distant)
ast,
beliefs bout
places
they
have never
isited,
nd beliefs bout
science,
nterlia.3
We
must
sk, hen,
what
consequences NSC)
has
for
he
epistemology
f
testimony.
Elizabeth Fricker
as
argued
for
'local
reductionist' iew of
testimony,
hich
disclaims
he need to find
videncefor he
general
reliability
f
testimony,
ut em-
phasizes
the need to
examinethe
evidencefor he
trustworthinessf
any
particular
I See
C.AJ.
Coady, estimony:
PhilosophicaltudyOxford: larendon
ress,
992),
pp.
6-7.
2
E.
Sosa,
Testimony
nd
Coherence',
n
B.K.
Matilal
nd A.
Chakrabarti
eds),
Knowing
from
Words
Dordrecht:
luwer,
994),
P- 9-67,
t
p.
59-
3
(NSC)
s much
ike
Christopher
nsole's
commonense
estraint':eehis
Seeing
ff
he
Local
Threat o
Irreducible
nowledge
y Testimony',
he
hilosophical
uarter~y,0 (2000),
pp.44-56,
t
p.
44;
my
xposition
f he
ialectic
n
general
wesmuch
o nsole's.
C The
Editors f The
hilosophical
uarterly,
003.
Published
y
Blackwell
ublishing,600
Garsington
oad,
Oxford
x4
2DSQ
UK,
and
350
Main
Street,
alden,
MA
02148,
USA.
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8/10/2019 Accepting Testimony - Weiner, M.
3/10
ACCEPTING ESTIMONY
257
piece
of
testimony
hat we
accept.
In
particular,
rickerdenies that
we
should
always
give
testimony
he benefit f the
doubt: there re
many
kinds
of
testimony
thatwe should not
believe unlesswe
have
some
specific
vidence hat
supports
ts
trustworthiness.hus she deniesthe acceptance principle ortestimony'derived
from
urge):
APT.
We are
ustified
n
accepting
nything
hatwe are
told unless here s
positive
evidence
gainst oing
o.4
I
shall
argue
that ocal
reductionism
ithout
APT)
will
be
unable to
satisfyNSC).
To avoid
widespread
cepticism
bout
testimony,
e
must
grant
efault
ustification
to all
testimony.
2.
Local nd
lobal
eductionism
As a
preliminary,
should
say
something
bout
the idea
of
default
ustification.
shall define
default
ustification
s
a
justification
or
belief hat
does
not
depend
on
other
beliefs ased
ultimately
n
the believer's
ast
or
current
xperiences. xperi-
ences which
ground
beliefs
providing justification
ver
and
above
any
default
justification
or
believing
ome
proposition
rovide positive
videnceor
that
pro-
position.
The
question
s
when,
if
ever,
someone has
a
default
ustification
or
believing
estimony.
Hume's
accountof
the
epistemology
f
testimony
rants
t no
default
ustification
whatsoever.
On
his
account,
the
justifications
e
gain
from
testimony
an be
reduced to
ustifications
ained
from
erception,
memory
nd
reason. We
believe
testimony
ecause of
our
observation
f
the
veracity
f human
testimony',
hich s
'discovered
by experience'.5
n
my
terms,
he
Humean view
is that
our
experience
gives
us
positive
vidence
hat
estimony
s
reliable.This
evidence
tself
annot
rely
on
what we
have been
told,
ince
otherwise
e would
not be
justified
n
accepting
the
evidence
ntil
we
had
established ome
ustification
or
ccepting
he
testimony.
The
Humean view
thus
requires
what
Fricker
alls
a
'global'
reduction,
which
'would
require
hat
hearer
have
evidence
hatmost
f
what
he
has
ever
earnt
hrough
testimony
s
true,
here
his
videncedoes not n
any way
rest n
knowledgecquired
by
her
through
estimony'.6
ricker alls this iewof
testimonylobal
eductionism:
GR.
To
be
justified
n
believing
much
of
what I
am
told,
must have
positive
evidence
of
the
truth f
mostof
what
have
been
told,
where
this
evidence
relies
nly
n
non-testimonial
ustifications.7
Fricker,
owever,
denies that
global
reduction s
necessary
o
justify
eliance on
testimony.
atherthan
treating
ll
testimony
t
once,
we can
focus
on a
particular
4This
s a
special
ase of
Burge's
riginal
cceptance
rinciple,
hich
s
not
restrictedo
testimony:
ee
his
Content
reservation',hilosophicaleview,
02
(1993),p.457-88, tp.467.5
Hume,
Enquiries
oncerning
uman
nderstanding
nd
Concerning
he
Principles
f
Morals,
d.
P.H.
Nidditch
Oxford
P,
1975),
X,
p.
88.
6
E.
Fricker,
Against
ullibility',
n
Matilal
nd
Chakrabarti,
p.125-61,
t
p.
134-
7
I
have
ast
his
rinciple
nd
thenext wo
n the
irst
erson
n
order o avoid
onflating
evidence
athered
y
n
ndividual ith
vidence
atheredy
he
ommunity,
s
Hume eems
to:
ee
Coady,
Testimony,
p.
8o-i.
?
The
Editors fThe
hilosophicaluarterly,
003
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8/10/2019 Accepting Testimony - Weiner, M.
4/10
258
MATTHEW
WEINER
piece
of
testimony.
What Fricker alls
a localreductions
provided
p. 133)
when
a
hearer has evidence that
the
particularpeaker
n
question
s to be trusted
with
respect
o her current
tterance,
ithout
ssuming
his
very
act'.Local
reductionism
requires local reduction s a justificationorrelying n any particular iece of
testimony:
LR.
To be
justified
n
believing particular hing
hat have
been
told,
must
have evidenceof the
reliability
f
that
speaker
with
respect
o that
piece
of
testimony,
here his
vidence oes not
rely
n that
estimony.
In
(LR),
part
ofthe
hearer's vidence
or he
current tterance's rustworthiness
ay
come
from
estimony
ther han
the
current
tterance.
nly
reliance n the
current
utterances excluded.
It is debatable whether ocal reductionisms compatiblewithgranting efault
justification
o
any testimony.
ricker,
s
I
shall
show,
thinks
hat ome but not all
testimony
ives
us default
ustification,
ut nsole has
argued
that
his s
inconsistent
with ocal
reductionism. ather han
attempt
o resolve his
uestion,
shall
modify
local
reductionismo make room
explicitly
or
default
ustification:
LR*. To be
justified
n
believing particular hing
hat have
been
told,
must
eitherhave default
ustification
or
believing
hat
he
testimony
s
reliable,
r
have
positive
vidence
of
the
reliability
f
that
speaker
with
respect
o that
piece
of
testimony,
here his vidence
does not
rely
n that
estimony.
To
apply
LR*)
we need a
principle
hat tateswhen
testimony
ives
default
usti-
fication.
APT)
is one such
principle, iving
default
ustification
o
all
testimony;
other
principles
ould
give
default
ustification
o some subsetof
testimony,
r
to
none at all.
(LR*)
with
APT)
is
arguably
not
locally
reductionistt
all,
since the
clause
requiring
local
reduction s never
nvoked.
t
does,
however,
hare with
local
reductionismhe
characteristichatour
ustification
or
believing particular
piece
of
testimonyepends
on
the evidence
hat t
s
trustworthy,
hen there s
any
positive
vidence or r
against
ts
rustworthiness.
(GR) can be dismissed uickly:t s incompatible ithNSC). Forboth GR) and
(NSC)
to
hold,
ndividual
earerswould have to
be able to
gather
ositive
vidence
forthe
generalreliability
f
testimony,
hichwould
require
confirming
he
truth,
without
elying
n
any testimony,
f
many
of the
things
hat
they
have
been told.
This is
implausible;
s
Coady
points
out
(p. 82),
'it
seems
absurd to
suggest
hat,
individually,
e
have done
anything
ike
the
amount of
field-work
hat
[(GR)]
requires'.
We
rely
on
testimony
ven
in
the first-hand
bservations
hatwe
use
to
gather
videncefor he
reliability
f our
informants.or
instance,
f
Alice
tellsme
that
she
will mail a
letter,
may
wish
to
verify
his
testimony
s
evidence
of her
veracity,ywatching
er
drop
an
envelope
nto
certain lue
metal
ontainer.
ut,
watching
his,
only
know
that have
seen Alice mail a
letter
ecause
I
have
been
told
that imilar
ontainers re mailboxes r
that
people
have
received etters
put
in
them.
f
gave
up
all
beliefs
ained
through estimony,
could never
gather
he
evidencethat
llowed
me
to
get
them
back.
(GR)
thus
violates
NSC),
thatwe are
justified
n
believing
wide
range
of
testimony.
?
The Editors f
The
hilosophicaluarterl,003
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8/10/2019 Accepting Testimony - Weiner, M.
5/10
ACCEPTING ESTIMONY
259
This
argument gainst GR),
however,
oes not
immediately
ell
against LR*),
even
a
version of
(LR*)
on
which no
testimony
rovides
default
ustification.
According
o thisversion f ocal
reductionism,
ustification
or
believing
estimony
requires ositive videncefor hetestimony'srustworthiness,utI maybe able to
rely
n
other
estimony
o
provide
he evidencefor he trustworthinessf this
esti-
mony.Only
reliance
n this
estimony
tself
s
explicitly
orbidden.
hus if
Alice has
said she will
mail a
letter,
might
ry
o
obtainevidence f her
veracity y watching
her
do so.
My knowledge
hat he is
mailing
letter
will
depend
on
testimony,
or
instance,
bout
what
mailboxes ook
ike,
but thisneed not
be Alice's
own
testimony.
Thus
I
shall have
obtainednon-circularvidence
for
her
veracity,
nd
thereby
or
the truth
f
her
future
estimony.
o
long
as
a
local reduction f one
piece
of
testimony
an
rely
on
other
estimony
n
this nd similar
ways,
hen
LR*)
will
not
require n impossiblemount ffield-worknorder osatisfyNSC).
We must
sk, then,
when a local
reduction
f
testimony
an
rely
n other
esti-
mony.
n
thenext ection shall
rgue
that
LR*)
withno default
ustification
annot
rely
n
testimony
ften
nough
o
salvage
NSC).
3.
The
needfor
ome
efaultjustification
For beliefs ased on
past testimony
o
be available
for
se
in a
local
reduction,
hose
beliefsmust themselves
e
justified.
According
to
(LR*),
this
requires positive
evidence
for
the
trustworthiness
f
the
past testimony,
nless that
testimony ives
defaultustification. s Leslie Stevenson ointsout,our relianceon testimonyan
involve
a
regress
f
dependence,
ustifying
's
testimony,
r
that
f
people
ike
A,
or
testimony
bout
topics
ike
p, by
appeal
to the
testimony
f
B,
or of
people
of a
kind
which
B
exemplifies,
r
about
topics
ike
q'.8
If
no
testimony
ives
default
ustifica-
tion,
hen
we
need
positive
vidence n
order
to
accept
each
piece
of
testimony
o
which we
might
appeal,
and
the
regress
can
only
end with
testimony
whose
reliability
an
be established
ithout
ppeal
to
any
other
estimony.
Establishing
he
reliability
f this
regress-stopping
estimony
ould
require
posi-
tive evidence for ts
trustworthinesshich
does not
presuppose
he
reliability
f
testimonyt all.Anyother estimonyhathadbeenreduced othis estimonyould
in
turn be
supported
by
this
non-testimonial
ositive
evidence.
Only testimony
supported y
non-testimonial
vidence
n
this
way
would be
acceptable,
ccording
to
(LR*),
without efault
ustification;
ny
other
estimony
ould
fall
victim o
the
regress
fjustifications.
ince
NSC)
requires
hatwe
should
be
ustified
n
accepting
testimony
n
a
wide
range
of
subjects,
o
satisfy
NSC)
we
would have to have
positive
on-testimonial
vidence
n
support
f
testimony
n
a
wide
range
of
topics.
This,
however,
would
amount
o
a
global
reduction;
he
argument
gainst
GR)
has
shown
hat
we
cannot
gather
ositive
on-testimonial
vidence n
support
f
enough
testimonyosatisfyNSC). So (LR*)without efaultustificationollapses nto GR).
Bothare
incompatible
ith
NSC):
they
xclude
oo
many
estimonial
ustifications.
To
avoid this
ollapse
nto
GR),
we
must
upplementLR*)
with
ome
principle
determining
hich
testimony
ives
default
ustification.
his
privileged
estimony
8
L.F.
Stevenson,
Why
BelieveWhat
People Say?',
Synthese,4
(1993),PP. 429-51,
t
p. 437.
C
The
Editors
f
The
hilosophical
uarterly,
003
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8/10/2019 Accepting Testimony - Weiner, M.
6/10
260
MATTHEW
WEINER
can
stop
the
regress
f
dependence: estimony
elieved
on a
default
ustification
an
providepositive
vidence
for
a local
reduction
f other
non-privileged
estimony.
Thus
the
rgument
hat t
s
mpossible
o confirm
ost
estimony
ithout
ppealing
to othertestimony illnot bear on (LR*), when it is combinedwitha principle
granting
efault
ustification
though
shall
how n
?5
that
imilar
rguments
efute
excessively
eak
default
ustification
rinciples).
I
shall
argue
that
APT)
is
the
necessary
efault
ustificationrinciple,
o
that
we
are
ustified
n
believing
nything
e
are
told,
unless here
s
positive
vidence
gainst
the
testimony's
rustworthiness.
APT)
gives
default
ustification
o all
testimony
rather
than
a
proper
subset. Weaker
principles
which
privilege
proper
subsets,
I
claim,
face one
of two
problems.
The first
roblem
occurs
when
accepting
he
weaker
principle
ut
rejecting
APT) yields
mplausible
esults
oncerning
whether
certain eliefs re ustified. he secondproblem ccurswhentheweakerprinciples
too weak
to allow
LR)
and
(NSC)
to
be reconciled.
I
shall
defend
APT)
against
wo lternative
eaker
rinciples
mplicit
n
Fricker's
analysis;
ach
weaker
rinciple
aces
one
of
these wo
problems.
he
first
rinciple
s
essentially
hatwe have
default
ustification
or
elieving
whatwe are
toldbeforewe
reach
full
maturity,
ut not
afterwards.
his,
I
argue
n
?4,
yields
ounter-intuitive
results
oncerning
estimonial
ustification.
he
second
principle
s
essentially
hat
everyone
s
competent
o
form
accurate beliefs
concerning
ertain
topics,
and
that
we have default
ustification
or
believing estimony
n those
topics.
This,
I
argue n?5, stooweaktoreconcileLR*)withNSC).
4.
Developmentalestimony
Fricker
oints
out that
whether his s
ustified
r
not,
everyone
ccepts testimony
uncritically
t
an
early
age.
It is
during
his
developmental
hase'
that a
person
comes to know
the
world-picture
f
common
sense,
ncluding
he
common sense
conception
f
the
link
of
testimony
tself'.9 nce we
have
acquired
the
common
sense
world-picture,
e
enter
he
mature
phase,
n
which the
nature
of
testimony,
as
a
link
which
common
ense]
reveals,
ntails
hatour
belief
n
whatothers
ellus
shouldalwaysbe governed yourmonitoringf themfor rustworthiness'p. 403).
For
Fricker,
he
common sense
world-picture rovides
the
background
gainst
whichwe
learn new
things,
ut t is
common
ense not
to
accept
what we
are told
unless
ur
monitoring ields
ositive
vidence hat
ur nformant
s
trustworthy.
et
the
common
ense
world-picture
ncludes
manythings
hatwe were
told
during
he
developmental
hase
and
accepted
without
equiring
ositive
vidence.So we
are
only
ustified
n
accepting
he common
sense
world-picture
f
we
were
ustified
n
simple
cceptance
f
developmental-phaseestimony.
This
suggests
he
acceptance
principle
or
evelopmental
estimony':
APDT. We are ustifiednaccepting omethinghatwe are toldduring urdevelop-
mental
hase,
unless
here s
positive
vidence
gainst
oing
o.
This
principleustifies
s
in
accepting
he
common
ense
world-picture,
ecause
the
9
Fricker,
Telling
nd
Trusting:
eductionism
nd
Anti-Reductionismn
the
Epistemo-
logy
f
Testimony',
Mind,
104
1995),
P- 393-411,
t
p. 402.
C
The
Editors f The
hilosophicaluarterly,
003
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8/10/2019 Accepting Testimony - Weiner, M.
7/10
ACCEPTING
ESTIMONY
26I
pieces
of
that
picture
re
acquiredby accepting
estimony
uring
he
developmental
phase.
On
(APDT),
therefore,
he
regress
f ocal reductions f
testimony
ay
end
at
a
piece
of the common sense
world-picture,
hich
we are
ustified
n
accepting
without ositive vidence. o (LR*) complemented y APDT) mayallowus togain
testimonial
ustification
n the wide
range
of
topicsrequired
y NSC);
at
least,
he
argument
have
presented
gainst
he
possibility
f
global
reduction oes not
show
that
we cannotreducemost
estimony
o the
common ense
world-picture.
The
objection
to
(APDT)
is that t
privileges estimony
eard in the
develop-
mental
phase
over
testimony
eard n
themature
hase,
whereas
here s no reason
for his.
f
APDT)
holds but
APT)
does
not,
then
estimony
eard
n
the
develop-
mental
hase providesustification
or elief n the
absence
of
positive
vidence f ts
reliability,
ut
testimony
eard
n
the
mature
hase provides
o
ustification
ithout
thispositive vidence.This is thewrongwayround.Developinghearers re surely
worse
udges
of
testimony
han
maturehearers.
n
the
developmental hase
we are
not
yet
familiar
withthe
conditions nder which
people
lie or
make
mistakes;
we
begin
to learn
these
things
s
we
adopt
the common sense
world-picture,
nd
we shall
earnmorewithmature
xperience.
o
developing
hinkersre
more
ikely
to
neglect
omething
hat
fora
mature
thinker ould be
evidence
of
testimony's
unreliability,
nd the
ustification
hat
heyget
from
nsupported estimony
hould
be seen as weaker
han the
ustification
hat
mature hinkers
et
from
nsupported
testimony.
Two maturethinkers, lice and Sarah, are each wonderingwhat theyellow
boxes on street
orners o. Each was
once told thatthe
boxes control
raffic
ights,
and
each has no other vidence
oncerning
he matter r
concerning
he
reliability
of
that
testimony.
lice, however,
was told
this
n
her
developmental hase,
and
Sarah
was told t
n
her
mature
hase.
Surely
arah's
entitlemento
belief s
at
least
as
strong
s
Alice's.
After
ll,
when Sarah
was
told,
he had
already
mastered he
common
sense criteria
or
when
testimony
s
not to be
believed;
that he
has no
evidence
against
the
testimony's
eliability
means
that
the
testimony
id not fail
these
riteria.When
Alice
was
toldwhat
theboxes
do,
she had not
yet
mastered he
common ensecriteria or ccepting estimony;hemight avefailed odetect ome
signs
f
nsincerity
r
incompetence
hat
would have
served
s
evidence
gainst
he
testimony,
ad
she been more
mature.
o
put
this
nother
way,
Alice
accepted
what
she was
told t an
age
when he
did notfind
nything ishy
bout Santa
Claus. Yet
if
we
accept
(APDT)
and
deny
the
stronger
APT),
we
are leftwith
the counter-
intuitive
esult hat
Alice s
ustified
n
believing
hat
he was told nd Sarah
is
not.
I
conclude
that,
f
we
accept APDT),
we should also
accept
the
strongerAPT).
Otherwise
testimony
eard in
the
developmental hase
will
be
privileged
ver
testimony
eard n
the
mature
phase,
though
here
s no
reason to believe t
more
reliable.
5.
Mundane
estimony
(APT)
may
seem to treat ll
testimony
like
n
an
implausible
way.
Fricker
p. 407)
points
ut that
some
people
or
types
f
people
on some
topics
re
reliable,
thers n
others
ren't'.She
suggests
hat
we
may
generally
make
the default
ssumption
hat
?
The Editors
of
The
Philosophical
uarter~y,
003
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8/10/2019 Accepting Testimony - Weiner, M.
8/10
262
MATTHEW
WEINER
testimony
eflects he teller's
eliefs,
ut
that
we
may
make the default
ssumption
that
hosebeliefs
re correctwith
espect
o a
subclass f
tellings nly,
iz
hose
with
subject
matters or
which
common sense
psychological
nowledge
icenses
one
to
expectthe speakerto be competent bout them:such as her name,whereshe
lives,
what
she
had for
breakfast,
hat s
in
clear view
n
front
f
her,
nd so
forth'
(p.
405).
I
take
t,
particularly
iven
he
istof
examples,
hat
Fricker
means to
pick
out
subject
matters
bout
which
ll
speakers
may
be
expected
o be
competent,
n
the absence
of
evidence to the
contrary.
shall
call these
subject
matters
mundane
topics;hey
argely omprise hings
hat re
readily
vailable to
speakers'
enses
nd
memory,
s well
as
things
such
s
one's
date of
birth)
hat
lmost
veryone
s
told
by
someonewho
saw or
rememberedt.
Fricker's
ccount
of
default
ssumptions uggests
he
acceptance
principle
or
mundane estimony:
APMT. We
are
justified
n
accepting
omething
hat
we are told
concerning
mundane
opic
unless
here s
positive
vidence
gainst
oing
o.'0
This
principle,
shall
argue,
is
too weak
to
reconcile
LR*)
with
NSC).
The
problem
s that too few
topics
of
testimony
re
mundane.
f
we
requirepositive
evidence o
ustify
elieving estimony
n
any
non-mundane
opic,
we shallnever
be
justified
n
believing
estimony
n the
wide
range
of
topics
equired y
NSC).
An
example
is
knowledge
of
historical
happenings
beyond living
memory.
Common sensedoes not tellus that veryones competentoncerning nybutthe
mostfamous
historical
appenings,
o
history
s
not
a
mundane
topic.
Most
of
our
historical eliefs
ome from
estimony
omehow;
what licenses us
to
accept
this
testimony?
APMT)
willnot
directly
icense
his
estimony's
cceptance.
f
we
accept
(APMT)
but not
(APT),
a
local
reduction f a
piece
of
historical
estimony
ill
require positive
evidence of the
testimony's
eliability
hat
depends
only
on
testimony
cceptedthrough
APMT)
and
on
our own
observation,
memory
nd
in-
duction. shall
howthat
hough
his
may
be
practical
or
hort
hainsof
testimony,
it
will
be
unduly
burdensome orthe
engthy
hains that
tretch
ack to
historical
events.
(APMT)
would
sometimes llow
us to
gain
justification
or
accepting
non-
mundane
testimony
y
accepting
estimony
n a
mundane
topic
that
mplies
he
speaker's
ompetence
oncerning
he
non-mundane
opic.
Suppose
Janet
ells
Mary
that
he
Pittsburgh
irateswon
today's
baseball
game.
This
is not
a mundane
opic,
since
common
sense
does
not tell
Mary
that
everyone
nows
whether
he
Pirates
won
today.
Thus
(APMT)
does not
ustify
Mary
n
accepting
his
estimony
ithout
further
upport.
uppose
further,
owever,
hat
Janet
says
that
she
attended he
game.
This
is
mundane,
ince
common ense
tells
Mary
that
Janet
knows
whether
she
attended
baseball
game today;
so
by (APMT) Mary is ustifiedn believing
that
Janet
attended
the
game.
This in
turn
provides
evidence that
Janet
knows
whether
he
Pirates
won,
which
ustifies
Mary
in
accepting
anet's
original
esti-
mony
hat
hey
id win.
10
APMT)
s
much ike he
principleTCP)
proposed y
Stevenson,
Why
Believe
What
People ay?',
.
442,
whodoes
not laim
hatt
yields
nything
ike
NSC).
C The
Editors
f
The
hilosophical
uarterly,003
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8/10/2019 Accepting Testimony - Weiner, M.
9/10
ACCEPTING
ESTIMONY
263
As a chain of
testimonyroceeds,
however,
he evidence
hatmustbe cited
grows
increasingly
nwieldy. uppose
Mary
tellsBarbara that the Pirateswon
today.
f
Mary
adds that
Janet
told her
so,
thiswill be mundane
testimony;
t is common
sense thatMary knows whether anettold her something. o (APMT) justifies
Barbara
n
believing hatJanet
old
Mary
that he Pirates
won. The
problem
s
that
so
far
Barbara has no
positive
vidence
hatJanet's estimony
s reliable.For her
to
get
that
vidence,
Mary
must lso tellher
thatJanet
aid that he attended he
game.
(APMT)
justifies
arbara
in
believing
hat
Janet
said
this,
ince what
Janet
told
Mary
is
mundane for
Mary;
given
this,
APMT)
justifies
he
belief that
Janet
attended
he
game,
sincewhether he attended he
game
is
mundane
forJanet;
his
belief
n
turn
providespositive
videnceforthe
reliability
f
Janet's
report
n
the
outcome of the
game.
If
Barbara
then
wishes
to
give anyone
else
ustification
or
believing hat he Pirateswon,she must aythatMarysaid that anet aid that he
Pirates
won,
and
also that
Mary
said
thatJanet
aid
that he had attended he
game.
This
recapitulation
fthewhole chain of
testimony
ill
quickly
ecome
mpractical,
particularly
or chain
beginning
ith n
eyewitness
o
a
historicalvent.
Another
trategy
or
btaining ositive
vidence
for teller's
eliability
ould be
to
verify
ther
estimonyy
that eller nd to infer
nductively
hat he current esti-
mony
was reliable. This
strategy,
owever,
faces
a
dilemma. Either
the
other
testimony
hat we
verify
s mundane or it is not.
Verifying
ary's
testimony
n
mundane
topics
will
not
provide
evidence for her
reliability
n
a
non-mundane
topic. t willonlyreinforce hat common sense tellsus, that she is competent n
mundane
opics
and sincere).
videnceofher
reliability
n non-mundane
opics, y
definition,
ust
go beyond
hese
deliverances f common ense. On theother
hand,
ifwe
seek to
verifyMary's
testimony
n non-mundane
opics,
we face the
problem
ofhow to do so.
My
discussion fhistorical
estimony
as shown
how difficultt s to
verify
estimony
n
a
non-mundane
opic
f
hehearer an
rely
n
testimonynly
s
permitted y APMT).
The few ases
n
which hehearer
may
be able to
verify
hat
Mary
has said
concerning
on-mundane
opics
willnot
yield
ufficientvidence or
her
general
eliability
n
non-mundane
opics.
(APMT) alone, then, s too weak. Ifwe restrictefault cceptanceto mundane
testimony,
e lose
testimonial
ustification
n a
wide
variety
f
topics. LR*)
with
(APMT)
fails o
satisfyNSC);
it reducesus to
scepticism
bout almost
ll
but the
plainest yewitness
eports.
6.
Testimony
nderhe
cceptance
rinciple
To
conclude,
shall
show that
APT)
does not
face the
problems
hat
APDT)
and
(APMT)
face.
(APMT)
yields
too little
estimonial
ustification;
f
we have default
justification
nly
on
mundane
topics,
we are not able to
obtain testimonial
usti-
fication n thewiderangeoftopicsrequiredby NSC). On (APT),we are ustified
in
accepting estimony
n
any
topic
so
long
as
there s no
positive
vidence
gainst
accepting
that
testimony.
his
will
immediately
llow us to obtain
testimonial
justification
n the
wide
range
of
topics equired y NSC).
(APT)
will
also allow
us to obtain
positive
vidence for the
trustworthinessf
many
ndividual
ieces
of
testimony.
When one
piece
of
testimony
onfirms hat
?
The Editors f
The
hilosophical
jarterly,
00oo3
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http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp -
8/10/2019 Accepting Testimony - Weiner, M.
10/10
264
MATTHEW WEINER
another
ays,
t will
provide
ositive
vidence
or
hetruth
f
that
estimony;
hiswill
providepositive
vidence
forthe
speaker's
reliability
nd
thus for he truth f
the
rest of
that
speaker's
testimony.
n the other
hand,
two
pieces
of
contradictory
testimonymay each providepositive videnceagainstthe trustworthinessf the
other.
n this nd similar
ways
we
may
obtain a wide
variety
f evidencefor
nd
against
he trustworthiness
f various
pieces
of
testimony,
ithout
oing
an
imposs-
ible amount
of field-work.
his
shows
how
(LR*)
with
APT)
can come close to
a
strictocal reductionist
iew;
though ny
piece
of
testimony
an be
accepted
without
a local
reduction,
fthere
s
no
positive
vidence or
r
against
t,
the
acceptance
of
most
testimony
ill
depend
on
a
local reduction
n which we do consider
the
available
positive
vidence.
(APDT)
was
rejected
because
it
yields
counter-intuitive
esults
concerning
justificationyprivilegingevelopmentalestimonyver mature estimony.APT)
privileges
ll
testimonyqually,
o it willnot
yield
he counter-intuitive
symmetries
that
APDT)
does.
Its
very ymmetry,
owever,
may
seem counter-intuitive.
e are
not nclined o
give
credence o
all
testimonyqually,
ven
when
we are
told
things
by strangers
nd we seem to
have no evidence
concerning
heir
testimony.
stranger
ho
tellsus the time
even
withno watch
visible)
eemsmore credible
han
a
stranger
ho
gives
us
a
stock
ip.
We
can,
however,
ccount
for his
symmetry
nder
APT). Experience
hould
teach us that tock
ips
are
particularly
ikely
o be
unreliable. ither
we
will
have
confirmedhisdirectly y investigatingtocktips,or we will have confirmedt
indirectly y learning
what
n
human
psychology
eads
people
to tell others
bout
financialmatters
ven
when
they
ack
good
information.
his
experience
rovides
positive
vidence
gainst
stock
ip
even
when we have
no
particular
nformation
about the
speaker;
he
topic
of the
testimony
s
enough
o
providepositive
vidence
of tsuntrustworthiness.
Accepting
APT),
then,
llows
us to
ustify
ur extensive eliance
on
testimony
while
avoiding
ounter-intuitiveesults
oncerningustification;
either f the
pro-
posed
alternativesan do so. Under
APT), verifying
estimony
s
about as burden-
some as itought o be. When there s something ishyboutthetestimony either
we have
specific
vidence
gainst
ts
trustworthiness,
r
general xperience
ellsus
that
his ort
f
testimony
s not reliable thenwe need
positive
videncebeforewe
are
ustified
n
believing
what we
are
told. When there
s
nothing ishy
bout the
testimony,
owever,
we
are
ustified
n
giving
t
thebenefit f
the
doubt.'
University
f ittsburgh
I
An
earlier ersion fthis
aper
was
read t
the
Graduate onferencen
Philosophy
t
the
University
f
llinois,
rbana-Champaign;
ark
Sargent
ommentednd
Gary
Ebbs
chaired. hanks o
audiencemembersor
elpful
iscussions,
articularly
manda oen and
Ben
Bayer.
hanks lsofor
xtremely
elpful
omments
o
Nuel
Belnap
nd two
eferees
or
The
hilosophicaluarterly.
C The
Editors f The
hilosophical
uarterly,003