Case #1EFREN G. AMIT vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, REGIONAL OFFICE NO. VI, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN (VISAYAS), and THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTUREG.R. No. 176172, November 20, 2012

The special audit results, conducted by the respondent Commission on Audit (COA) on the Multi-Purpose Drying Pavement (MPDP) projects, under the Grains Production Enhancement Program of the Department of Agriculture Regional Field Unit No. (DA RFU) 6, are as follows:

1. Nineteen (19) MPDP projects in the Province of Iloilo do not exist, resulting to the loss of P1,130,000.00 on the part of the government.

2. The construction of 101 MPDP projects in the Province of Iloilo falls short of the standard measurement of 420 square meters as per approved plan and specifications of DA RFU 6, Iloilo City, resulting in an estimated loss of P879,301.00 on the part of the government.

3. The checks representing the reimbursement for the cost of materials for the construction of the MPDP projects were released to persons other than the payee, without authority from the recipient, MCPI, in violation of COA Circular 92-386 and Article 1240 (sic) of the Revised Penal Code.

4. The supplies and materials for the construction of the MPDP projects were procured by DA RFU 6, in violation of the Memorandum of Agreement.

For these irregularities, eleven (11) government employees (including Amit) — allegedly responsible for the ghost projects and the misappropriation — were administratively charged before the Ombudsman.

Amit was a Senior Agriculturist of DA RFU 6, designated to hold the concurrent positions of Chief of the Regional Agricultural Engineering Group, Iloilo City, and DA Provincial Coordinator of the Province of Antique for Infrastructure Projects. He approved five issue slips of materials for the construction of MPDP units.

The Ombudsman found all the officials so charged guilty of grave misconduct and dishonesty for conspiring in the falsification of documents to facilitate the disbursement and misappropriation of the funds intended for the MPDP projects. It imposed on all of the officials the penalty of dismissal from the public service, with forfeiture of benefits and disqualification from holding public office.

Amit moved to reconsider the decision, essentially objecting to the Ombudsman's finding of conspiracy. The Ombudsman denied the motion.

Thereafter, Amit filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Court with the CA. The CA denied the petition on the reasoning that the decision of the Ombudsman was supported by substantial evidence — i.e., affidavits, special audit report, and COA inspection report — that are entitled to great respect and credence.

The CA also ruled that the approval of the issue slips of construction materials for the MPDP projects is not ministerial, but involves the determination of the propriety or impropriety of approving the same, as well as the duty to verify whether the materials were actually issued and

received by the recipient farmers' organizations; and that Amit is not obliged to approve them, but he did despite knowledge that the DA was never in possession of construction materials because it was not involved in the requisition, canvass and purchase thereof. It affirmed the Ombudsman's ruling stated in the order denying the motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: Was Amit liable for gross misconduct?

HELD: YES

FIRST, Amit's acts did not result from a mere failure to exercise the necessary prudence in complying with the proper procedure. The performance of the complained acts was discretionary on his part. Amit's acts were done willfully and deliberately. They were done without regard to the high positions that he occupied, which impose upon him greater responsibility, and obliged him to be more circumspect in his actions or in the discharge of his official duties.

Amit, for instance, inexplicably signed the issue slips despite his alleged knowledge that these documents were unnecessary. With Amit's signing of the documents, however, the immediate release of the funds was facilitated. This indicates shortsightedness on the part of Amit which is so gross that it cannot be considered a result of indifference or carelessness.

SECOND, the Ombudsman's finding of conspiracy reveals the crucial role which Amit played in the commission of fraud with other officials. Amit's acts were one of the more, if not the most, indispensable, final, and operative acts that ultimately led to the consummation of the fraud.

Amit's role in the committed irregularities shows his concurrence — although based on circumstantial, not direct, evidence — with the other officials' objective to defraud the government. These acts pointed to one (1) criminal intent — with one participant performing a part of the transaction and the others performing other parts of the same transaction to complete the whole scheme, with a view of attaining the object which they were pursuing.

THIRD, Amit's defense — the alleged reliance on the acts of his subordinates in good faith — is simply unacceptable.

Public office is a public trust and public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice and lead modest lives . This high constitutional standard of conduct is not intended to be mere rhetoric; those in the public service are enjoined to fully comply with this standard or run the risk of facing administrative sanctions ranging from reprimand to the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service.

As such, Amit has the duty to supervise his subordinates — he must see to it that his subordinates have performed their functions in accordance with the law.

FOURTH, Amit did not wholly rely on the acts of his subordinates. As earlier mentioned, he performed functions using independent judgment. Amit signed the issue slips despite the absence of some of the required documents for the release of government funds for the MPDP projects. By his admission too, Amit voluntarily agreed to a system, per the Accounting Division's prodding, that purportedly shows disbursement of funds for supplies and materials, when

in truth and in fact, the disbursement is actually for reimbursement of advances by recipient farmers' organizations.

In Manuel v. Judge Calimag, Jr., we held:

It is settled that misconduct, misfeasance, or malfeasancewarranting removal from office of an officer must have direct relation to and be connected with the performance of official duties amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect and failure to discharge the duties of the office[.]

We declared in Office of the Ombudsman v. Apolonio that "if a nexus between the public [officer's] acts and functions is established, such act is properly referred to as misconduct."

Amit's acts were well within the scope of his functions. There is no doubt that his inability to live up to the standards so imposed on him in the performance of his duties is misconduct. In this case, the misconduct cannot be considered simple misconduct; it is grave misconduct, considering the presence of the qualifying elements of corrupt motive and flagrant disregard of the rules taken from a collective consideration of the circumstances of the case.

Case 2:SEVILLE vs. COA, Regional Office VI, Iloilo CityNovember 20, 2012ABAD,  J p:FACTS: The Commission on Audit (COA) Regional Office VI administratively charged 11 officials and employees of the Department of Agriculture (DA) Regional Field Unit in Iloilo City, including petitioner Sonia V. Seville, an Assistant Regional Director for Fisheries, before the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas.The complaint alleged that, as a result of a special audit of the Post Harvest Component of the Grains Production Enhancement Program of the DA, particularly the construction of Multi-Purpose Drying Pavements (MPDPs) projects in Iloilo from January 1, 1995 to June 30, 1999, it was discovered that she signed a ghost MPDP project in Sto. Rosario, Ajuy, Iloilo, out of the 120 such projects that were subject of the audit.She signed the disbursement voucher, in view of the absence of the Regional Director and the Assistant Regional Director for Administration. But she claimed that she acted in good faith, merely relying on the completeness and genuineness of the supporting documents that were shown to her. She had no prior knowledge of the MPDPs, which catered to rice production, since she was an Assistant Regional Director for Fisheries. She admitted, however, not conducting an actual physical inspection of the project since she believed that it was not her responsibility to do so. The investigators filed a separate criminal complaint against petitioner Seville for violation of the anti-graft and corrupt practices act before the Office of the Ombudsman to determine if she had any criminal liability for her acts. Subsequently, the investigation resulted in her exoneration, absent any proof that she took part in a conspiracy to defraud the government.

However, the Office of Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas found those charged in connection with the ghost MPDPs, including petitioner, guilty of Grave Misconduct and Gross Dishonesty, resulting in their dismissal from government service with forfeiture of benefits and disqualification from holding public office.

Petitioner Seville filed a petition for review of the Deputy Ombudsman's decision before the Court of Appeals. The CA rendered a decision, holding that her failure to verify the correctness and sufficiency of the documents presented to her for signing led to the unrequited disbursement of public funds. She filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied the same.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is liable for grave misconduct and gross dishonesty for signing the disbursement voucher for the particular ghost MPDP in Sto. Rosario, Ajuy, Iloilo.

HELD: NO.

In grave misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of an established rule must be evident.  Misconduct, in the administrative sense, is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action. On the other hand, dishonesty is intentionally making a false statement in any material fact or the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud.  Both are considered grave offenses for which the penalty of dismissal is meted even for first time offenders.

Here, the COA charged petitioner Seville administratively because the government released funds for that particular ghost project in Sto. Rosario, Ajuy, Iloilo. Seville anchors her innocence on good faith. Good faith implies honest intent, free from any knowledge of circumstances that ought to have prompted an individual to undertake an inquiry.

While Seville merely substituted for the absent Regional Director at that time, it is not an excuse for lightly shirking from the latter's duties and responsibilities. It was her responsibility when she signed that disbursement voucher for the Regional Director to verify the accuracy and completeness of the supporting documents presented to her. In the discharge of duties, a public officer must use prudence, caution, and attention which careful persons use in the management of their affairs. Public servants must show at all times utmost dedication to duty.

The Court finds, however, that Seville cannot be held liable for grave misconduct. Corruption, as an element of grave misconduct, consists in the official or employee's act of unlawfully or wrongfully using his position to gain benefit for one's self. Here, the Court is not convinced that under the circumstances then present, she had depraved motives.

Seville signed on the rare happenstance that both the Regional Director and the Assistant Regional Director for Administration were absent. That both signatories were absent when the Sto. Rosario project was presented to her for signature was a coincidence that cannot be imputed to her for she could not have orchestrated that for her gain, absent evidence to the contrary. She did not volunteer for the position nor is there proof that she lobbied for the OIC designation, it being provided by a DA internal regulation. She is liable for the lesser offense of simple misconduct since she should have exercised the necessary prudence to ensure that the proper procedure was complied with in the release of government funds.

As for the offense of gross dishonesty, the Court also clears petitioner from liability. Her participation in the release of funds is brought upon by her OIC designation and not spurred by corrupt intent. A post-harvest facility such as MPDP is related to rice farming and not within her knowledge as Assistant Director for Fisheries. To a certain extent, leniency can be afforded for her reliance on the credibility and expertise of her co-signatories namely the Chief of Crops

Sector Division and Chief of Finance and Administrative Division. Her error in judgment cannot be equated with gross dishonesty. The evidence does not prove conscious distortion of the truth or even an inclination to it.

Case 3:G.R. No. 193459               February 15, 2011MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ  vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES et. al.D E C I S I O NCARPIO MORALES, J.:

FACTS: The Ombudsman, Ma. Merceditas Gutierrez (petitioner), challenges via petition for certiorari and prohibition.

Before the 15th Congress opened its first session or on July 22, 2010, private respondents Risa Hontiveros, Lim, and spouses Pestaño (Baraquel group) filed an impeachment complaint against petitioner, upon the endorsement of Party-List Representatives Arlene Bag-ao and Walden Bello. After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 1, 2010, found both complaints sufficient in form, which complaints it considered to have been referred to it at exactly the same time. Meanwhile, the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the 15th Congress was published on September 2, 2010. After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 7, 2010, found the two complaints, which both allege culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust,12 sufficient in substance.

ISSUES and HELD:

1. Respondents raise the impropriety of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition. They argue that public respondent was not exercising any judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial function in taking cognizance of the two impeachment complaints as it was exercising a political act that is discretionary in nature.

Our Philippine SC and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition (judicial review) to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality.

2. Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments undermines their finality and may also lead to conflicts between Congress and the judiciary

Court held that the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr," judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review.

Also, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution. In the present case, petitioner invokes the Court’s expanded certiorari

jurisdiction, using the special civil actions of certiorari and prohibition as procedural vehicles. The Court finds it well-within its power to determine whether public respondent committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused its discretion in the exercise of its functions and prerogatives that could translate as lack or excess of jurisdiction, which would require corrective measures from the Court. Indubitably, the Court is not asserting its ascendancy over the Legislature in this instance, but simply upholding the supremacy of the Constitution as the repository of the sovereign will.

3. To petitioner, the actions taken by her office against Rep. Tupas and his father (for Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) influenced the proceedings taken by public respondent in such a way that bias and vindictiveness played a big part in arriving at the finding of sufficiency of form and substance of the complaints against her.

The Court finds petitioner’s allegations of bias and vindictiveness bereft of merit, there being hardly any indication thereof. Mere suspicion of partiality does not suffice. The act of the head of a collegial body cannot be considered as that of the entire body itself.

In the present case, Rep. Tupas, public respondent informs, did not, in fact, vote and merely presided over the proceedings when it decided on the sufficiency of form and substance of the complaints. Even petitioner’s counsel conceded during the oral arguments that there are no grounds to compel the inhibition of Rep. Tupas.

4. Petitioner further claims that public respondent failed to ascertain the sufficiency of form and substance of the complaints on the basis of the standards set by the Constitution and its own Impeachment Rules. (Accountability Issue

The determination of sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment complaint is an exponent of the express constitutional grant of rule-making powers of the House of Representatives which committed such determinative function to public respondent. In the discharge of that power and in the exercise of its discretion, the House has formulated determinable standards as to the form and substance of an impeachment complaint. Prudential considerations behove the Court to respect the compliance by the House of its duty to effectively carry out the constitutional purpose, absent any contravention of the minimum constitutional guidelines.

Contrary to petitioner’s position that the Impeachment Rules do not provide for comprehensible standards in determining the sufficiency of form and substance, the Impeachment Rules are clear in echoing the constitutional requirements and providing that there must be a "verified complaint or resolution,"   and that the substance requirement is met if there is "a recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the committee."

5. Petitioner urges the Court to look into the narration of facts constitutive of the offenses vis-à-vis her submissions disclaiming the allegations in the complaints.

This the Court cannot do. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislature. Clearly, the issue calls upon this court to decide a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of its judicial power. 

6. Petitioner reckons the start of the one-year bar from the filing of the first impeachment complaint against her on July 22, 2010 or four days before the opening on July 26, 2010 of the 15th Congress. She posits that within one year from July 22, 2010, no second impeachment complaint may be accepted and referred to public respondent.

The consideration behind the intended limitation refers to the element of   time, and not the number of complaints. It refers to “proceeding” no on the number of complaint” The impeachable officer should defend himself in only one impeachment proceeding, so that he will not be precluded from performing his official functions and duties. Similarly, Congress should run only one impeachment proceeding so as not to leave it with little time to attend to its main work of law-making. 

Case 4:Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

SECOND DIVISION

 

G.R. No. 110503 August 4, 1994

ANTONIO M. BOLASTIG, petitioner, vs.HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Panganiban, Benitez, Parlade, Africa & Barinaga Law Office (Pablaw) for petitioner.

 

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the resolution, dated March 18, 1993, of the Sandiganbayan, granting the motion of the Special Prosecution Officer to suspend the accused from office pendente lite and the resolution, dated March 29, 1993, denying reconsideration of the first resolution.

Petitioner Antonio M. Bolastig is governor of Samar. On August 31, 1989, an information was filed against him and two others for alleged overpricing of 100 reams of onion skin paper in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019). The Information alleged:

That on or about June 24, 1986, in the Municipality of Catbalogan, Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused ANTONIO M. BOLASTIG, PEDRO ASON and PRUDENCIO MACABENTA, all public officers, duly appointed and qualified as such, being the OIC Governor, Provincial Treasurer and Property Officer respectively, all of the Province of Samar, and being members of Bids and Awards Committee responsible for the purchase of office supplies for the Provincial Government of Samar and while in the performance of their respective positions, confederating and mutually helping one another and through manifest partiality and evident bad faith, did then and there wilfully and unlawfully enter into a purchase contract with REYNALDO ESPARAGUERRA, a private citizen, for the purchase of certain

office supplies, namely: one hundred (100) reams of Onion Skin size 11" x 17" at a unit price of Five Hundred Fifty pesos (P550.00) or a total price of Fifty-Five Thousand Pesos (P55,000.00), which contract was manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government as the prevailing unit price for said item was only Fifty-Five Pesos (P55.00) or a total price of Five Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P5,500.00), thereby causing undue injury to the government in the total amount of Forty-Nine Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P49,500.00).

On January 25, 1993, Special Prosecution Officer III Wilfredo Orencia moved for petitioner's suspension, citing sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 which provides in part:

Sec. 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. — Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property, whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office.

Issue: whether Sandiganbayan is correct in suspending petitioner as governor.

Held: Yes, sec 13 RA 3019 makes it mandatory for the sandiganbayan to suspend any public officer against whom a valid information charging violation of that law, or any offense involving fraud upon the government or public funds or property is filed.

Case 5G.R. No. 173268 August 23, 2012ERNESTO A. FAJARDO, Petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, Respondents.DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Doctrine: Under the "threefold liability rule," any act or omission of any public official or employee can result in criminal, civil, or administrative liability, each of which is independent of the other.

FACTS: Petitioner Ernesto A. Fajardo was employed by respondent Bureau of Customs (BOC) as a Clerk I from February 26, 1982 to February 29, 1988 and as a Clerk II from March 1, 1988. However, due to the exigency of the service, he was designated as a Special Collecting Officer at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) Customs House, Collection Division, Pasay City.

In May 2002, Nancy Marco (Marco), a Commission on Audit (COA) State Auditor detailed at the NAIA Customs House, was directed by her superior, Auditor Melinda Vega-Fria, to conduct a post audit of the abstract of collection of all collecting officers of the NAIA Customs House. In the course of her audit, State Auditor Marco noticed that in petitioner's daily abstract of collection dated August 16, 2002, he received checks in the amounts of P295,000.00, P247,000.00, P122,000.00, P108,000.00 and P105,000.00. To verify whether it was possible for him to receive such amounts in one day, a daily analysis of the sales of accountable forms with the corresponding documentary stamps was made.

In the Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM No. 2002-008) dated November 26, 2002, State Auditor Prudencia S. Bautista (Bautista) reported that petitioner has an unremitted collection from sales of accountable forms with money value and stamps in the amount of P20,118,355.00

for the period January 2002 to October 2002. Upon further investigation by State Auditor Marco, it was discovered that based on the analysis of the monthly sales of accountable forms and stamps, petitioner failed to remit the total amount of P53,214,258.0013from January 2000 to October 2002.

On January 6, 2003, Customs Commissioner Antonio M. Bernardo requested respondent National Bureau of Investigation-National Capital Region (NBI-NCR) to conduct an investigation on the reported misappropriation of public funds committed by petitioner.

On January 8, 2003, the resident auditors of NAIA Customs House, namely: Marco, Bautista, and Filomena Tolorio, executed separate "Sinumpaang Salaysay" at the NBI. They stated under oath that based on the Analysis of the Monthly Sales of Accountable Forms and Stamps for the years 2000 and 2001, and the period January 1, 2002 to October 31, 2002, and the Summary of Analysis of Sale of Stamps and Accountable Forms for the period January 2000 to October 2002, petitioner failed to remit the total amount of P53,214,258.00.21

Thereafter, on January 10, 2003, an Information for violation of Republic Act (RA) No. 7080 (Plunder) was filed against petitioner. The case was raffled to Branch 119 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City and docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-0043.23

On February 8, 2003, Customs District Collector Celso P. Templo demanded from petitioner the unremitted collection but the latter failed to return the money and duly account for the same.

Finding sufficient basis to commence an administrative investigation, Mary Susan S. Guillermo, the Director of the Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman, in an Order dated February 11, 2003, directed petitioner to file his counter-affidavit.

On May 19, 2003, petitioner filed his Counter-Affidavit categorically denying the accusation hurled against him. He claimed that there was no under remittance on his part because the sale of BOC forms does not automatically result in the sale of documentary stamps from the Documentary Stamp Metering Machine. He likewise assailed the validity of the AOM No. 2002-008 on the ground that it was not referred to the COA Legal and Adjudication Office as mandated by Section 1, subsection 2 of the General Guidelines of COA Memorandum No. 2002-053 dated August 26, 2003.

On May 3, 2005, the Ombudsman rendered a Decision finding petitioner guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct and is meted the corresponding penalty of DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE including all its accessory penalties and without prejudice to criminal prosecution.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration which was denied. Unfazed, petitioner elevated the case to the CA. On April 27, 2006, the CA affirmed the dismissal of petitioner.

ISSUE: WON the Ombudsman can directly dismiss petitioner from government service

HELD: YES. The Ombudsman has the power to dismiss erring public officials or employees. Petitioner contends that the Ombudsman in dismissing him from service disregarded Section 13, subparagraph 3, Article XI of the Constitution as well as Section 15(3) of RA No. 6770.69 which only vests in the Ombudsman the power to recommend the removal of a public official or employee. Petitioner's contention has no leg to stand on.

It is already well-settled that "the power of the Ombudsman to determine and impose administrative liability is not merely recommendatory but actually mandatory." As we have explained in Atty. Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, the fact "that the refusal, without just cause, of any officer to comply with the order of the Ombudsman to penalize an erring officer or employee is a ground for disciplinary action under Section 15(3) of RA No. 6770; is a strong indication that the Ombudsman's 'recommendation' is not merely advisory in nature but is actually mandatory within the bounds of law."

Case 06. RAMON A. DIAZ vs. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN219 SCRA 675GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

FACTS: The petitioner, Ramon Diaz, was chairman of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) in 1988, when Solicitor General Frank Chavez, then counsel for the PCGG in "American Inter-Fashion vs. PCGG," G.R. No. 79342, filed a pleading in that case, accusing Chairman Diaz with having lifted the sequestration on American Inter-fashion. Diaz moved to strike out the pleading for being untrue. Chavez called a press conference accusing Diaz of corruption and ineptness. He thereafter withdrew as counsel for the PCGG and Diaz resigned as chairman of the PCGG to become the Philippine Ambassador to Canada, President Aquino ordered acting PCGG Chairman Adolf Azcuna to investigate Chavez' charges but apparently the investigation was not pressed.

The Ombudsman ordered the Special Prosecutor, Raul Gonzales, together with Prosecutors Jose J. Parentela, Jr. and Diana L. Dungca, to investigate the charges also. The Senate likewise called upon the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to conduct an investigation of the Solicitor General's charges consisting of 8 counts of alleged ineptness and 24 counts of alleged corruption involving 13 sequestered companies, among them Metro Port Service, Inc. (METRO PORT), (subject of G.R. No. 102554) and the American Inter-Fashion (AIF), De Soleil Apparel Manufacturing Corporation (DSA) and Glorious Sun Fashion Garment Manufacturing Co., Inc. (GLORIOUS SUN), (subject of G.R. No. 101202). The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee was joined by the Ombudsman panel composed of Special Prosecutor Raul Gonzales and Tanodbayan Deputy Spl. Prosecutors Jose G. De Ferrer, Jose Parentela, Jr. and Diana Dungca in hearing Chavez' evidence consisting of the testimonies of 36 witnesses and volumes of documents. But while the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee of 16 senators dismissed all charges against the PCGG and the petitioner, Parentela (the only remaining member of the Ombudsman panel as a result of the suspension of Gonzales from the practice of law and the resignation of Dungca) found probable cause to conduct a preliminary investigation against the petitioner, with the approval of the Ombudsman.

Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez approved the recommendation to conduct a preliminary investigation against Diaz and others in ten (10) cases including those involving GLORIOUS SUN and METRO PORT. A panel of two (2) prosecutors, with Parentela, Jr. as chairman and Special Prosecution Officer Emmanuel M. Laurenzo as member, was constituted to conduct the preliminary investigation. The petitioner was served with a subpoena issued by Parentela requiring him to submit his sworn statement in connection with the charges against. Petitioner submitted his counter-affidavit on the charges.

Prosecutor Parentela recommended the filing of an information against the petitioner for violation of the Anti-Graft Law in the AIF/DSA/GLORIOUS SUN case. It was approved by the Ombudsman. Petitioner filed a motion for reinvestigation and to disqualify the Ombudsman. The panel issued a resolution in the METRO PORT case, finding a prima facie case of violation of R.A. 3019, Section 3, Paragraph (e), and recommending the filing of an information against petitioner

Diaz and Commissioner Mary Concepcion Bautista. This was approved by Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez. The petitioner and his co-accused, Mary Concepcion Bautista, filed a motion for reinvestigation and a second motion to disqualify or inhibit the Ombudsman, Conrado Vasquez, for alleged partiality.

The motion for reinvestigation of the METRO PORT case was denied by Special Prosecution Officer Luz L. Quiñones-Marcos. The Ombudsman inhibited himself from taking part in the cases against the petitioner.

An information in the METRO PORT case was filed with the Sandiganbayan against the petitioner and Commissioner Bautista for violation of R.A. No. 3019, Sec. 3, par. (e). Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the SC (G.R. No. 102554) alleging that respondent Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion in finding a prima facie case and filing an information for graft and corrupt practices against him on account of his actuations in the METRO PORT case.

Another information charging the petitioner with violation of the Anti-Graft Law in the AIF/DSA/GLORIOUS SUN case was filed by Parentela in the Sandiganbayan. When petitioner's motions to quash the information and for reinvestigation were denied by the Sandiganbayan, he also sought relief through a petition for certiorari and prohibition in this Court alleging that: 1.His right to due process was violated because the preliminary investigation was made by the same persons who gathered the evidence against him, hence, they did not possess the "cold neutrality of an impartial judge"; and 2.No formal sworn written complaint had been filed by Solicitor General Chavez against him.

The two petitions were consolidated.

ISSUES: Whether or not petitioner was denied due process because the preliminary

investigation was conducted by the same persons who "gathered" the evidence against him. Whether or not the preliminary investigation of Chavez' charges was invalid because

Chavez' charges had not been made in writing nor under oath.

HELD: 1. Petitioner's allegation that he was denied due process because the preliminary investigation was conducted by the same persons who "gathered" the evidence against him is not correct. On basis of the charges made by Chavez and the evidence which he presented at the joint investigation conducted by the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee and the Ombudsman panel, Parentela, with the approval of the Ombudsman, decided to conduct a preliminary investigation to enable the petitioner to refute the charges against him. He subpoenaed the petitioner. Petitioner submitted his counter-affidavit and Chavez filed a reply. Only after the investigating panel recommended the filing of informations, which the Ombudsman approved, did the petitioner and Commissioner Bautista ask for a reinvestigation which Special Prosecution Officer Quiñones-Marcos denied. He then filed a motion to quash the information on the theory that the preliminary investigation that was conducted by Special Prosecutor Parentela was null and void for not having followed the procedure prescribed in Section 3, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure and the doctrine in Cojuangco vs. PCGG, 190 SCRA 226 that: "the law enforcer who conducted the criminal investigation, gathered the evidence, and thereafter filed the complaint for the purpose of preliminary investigation, cannot be allowed to conduct the preliminary investigation of his own complaint." There is no merit in that argument. Parentela did not "gather" evidence for Chavez to use against the petitioner. He and Special Prosecution

Officer Laurenzo merely received Chavez' evidence, and petitioner's as well. The Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution of June 3, 1991, found that the preliminary investigation conducted by Parentela substantially complied with Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. In this case, unlike the Cojuangco case, Parentela was not the accuser and investigator rolled into one. Chavez was the accuser. Parentela preliminarily investigated the charges, evaluated the evidence which Chavez produced, and filed the information in the Sandiganbayan. As pointed out by that court, the differences between Cojuangco's case and the petitioner's case are the following: " . . . While in Cojuangco, it may be said that both the complainant and preliminary investigating officer were the PCGG, the same is not true in the present case. It is readily discernible that Chavez is the complainant, while the Office of the Ombudsman/Special Prosecutor is the investigating body in the instant complaint, thereby barring any probability of partiality that would require inhibition. It is Chavez who came up with the evidence, while Prosecutor Parentela evaluated the same to find out if he could make out a prima facie case." (pp. 151-152, Rollo.) Clearly, both the preliminary investigation which Parentela conducted and the information which he filed in the Sandiganbayan are valid.

2. There is no merit in the petitioner's contention that the preliminary investigation of Chavez' charges was invalid because Chavez' charges had not been made in writing nor under oath. In his pleadings in American Inter-fashion Corp., et al. vs. PCGG, G.R. No. 79342, Chavez accused Diaz of conspiracy to defraud the government of its rights to the ill-gotten 100% dividends of Eastern Telecommunications Phils., Inc., and of "gross misconduct and gross violation of his sworn duty as PCGG chairman to discharge his functions in accordance with law". His testimony at the joint fact-finding investigation conducted by the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee and the Ombudsman panel was given under oath. His sworn testimony, as transcribed, provided a sufficient basis for the Ombudsman to investigate his charges for the Ombudsman may investigate "complaints filed in any form or manner," even complaints not drawn up in the usual form. This is provided for in Section 12, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3, Rule I of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman), issued on April 10, 1990.

Case 7:LEDESMA V. CAFACTS:Atty. Ronaldo P. Ledesma is the Chairman of the First Division of the Board of Special Inquiry (BSI) of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID). In a letter-complaint filed by Augusto Somalio with the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FIIB) of the Office of the Ombudsman, an investigation was requested on alleged anomalies surrounding the extension of the Temporary Resident Visas (TRVs) of 2 foreign nationals. The FIIB investigation revealed 7 other cases of TRV extensions tainted with similar irregularities. As a result, the FIIB, as nominal complainant, filed before the Administrative Adjudication Bureau (AAB) of the Office of the Ombudsman a formal complaint against Ledesma. Also charged administratively were Atty. ArthelCaronongan and Ma. Elena P. Ang, Board Member and Executive Assistant, respectively, in Ledesma’s division. With respect to Ledesma, the complaint was treated as both a criminal and an administrative charge and docketed as OMB-0-98-0214 (criminal aspect), for 9 counts of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and for falsification of public documents, and OMB-ADM-0-98-0038 (administrative aspect), for 9 counts of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Falsification of Public Documents and Gross Neglect of Duty. The complaint against Ledesma, Caronongan and Ang alleged the following illegal acts: (a) irregularly granting TRVs beyond the prescribed period; and (b) using “recycled” or photocopied applications for a TRV extension without the applicants affixing their signatures anew to validate the correctness and truthfulness of the information previously stated therein. Specifically, Ledesma and Caronongan allegedly signed the

Memorandum of Transmittal to the Board of Commission (BOC) of the BID, forwarding the applications for TRV extension of several aliens whose papers were questionable.

In a Joint Resolution, Graft Investigation Officer Marlyn M. Reyes resolved the administrative cases filed against Ledesma, Caronongan and Ang, recommending the suspension of Ledesma from the service for one year for Conduct Prejudicial to the Interest of the Service; dismissal of the case against Caronongan, the same having been rendered moot and academic; and the dismissal of the case against Ang for lack of sufficient evidence.

Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo L. Aportadera, Jr. reviewed the Joint Resolution which was approved by Ombudsman Desierto. In the meantime, the Ombudsman approved a Resolution of Graft Investigation Officer Marilou B. Ancheta-Mejica, dismissing the criminal charges against Ledesma for insufficiency of evidence. Ledesma filed a motion for reconsideration in the administrative case alleging that the BOC which reviews all applications for TRVs extension, approved the TRVs in question, hence, Ledesma argued that it effectively declared the applications for extension regular and in order and waived any infirmity thereon. In an Order dated February 8 2000, Graft Officer Reyes recommended the denial of the motion for reconsideration which was approved by the Ombudsman on March 24, 2000 but reduced the period of suspension from 1 year to 9 months without pay. On April 13, 2000, Ledesma filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, which included a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary prohibitory mandatory injunction and/or temporary restraining order to enjoin the Ombudsman, et al. from implementing the order of suspension. The Court of Appeals issued the TRO. In its Decision the Court of Appeals affirmed Ledesma’s suspension but reduced the period from 9 months to 6 months and 1 day without pay. With the denial of his motion for reconsideration, Ledesma filed the petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:Whether the findings of the Ombudsman “may not be said to be merely recommendatory.

HELD:YES. The word “recommend,” under Section 13(3) of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, cannot be given its literal meaning; that is, that the Ombudsman’s action is only advisory in nature rather than one having any binding effect. Section 15 of RA 6770 is substantially the same as Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution which provides for the powers, functions and duties of the Ombudsman. Subparagraph 3 thereof, however, qualifies the “order” “to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute” an officer or employee – akin to the questioned issuances in the present case.

That the refusal, without just cause, of any officer to comply with such an order of the Ombudsman to penalize an erring officer or employee is a ground for disciplinary action, is a strong indication that the Ombudsman’s “recommendation” is not merely advisory in nature but is actually mandatory within the bounds of law. This should not be interpreted as usurpation by the Ombudsman of the authority of the head of office or any officer concerned. It has long been settled that the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public official is not an exclusive authority but a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged. By stating therefore that the Ombudsman “recommends” the action to be taken against an erring officer or employee, the provisions in the Constitution and in RA 6770 intended that the implementation of the order be coursed through the proper officer, which in this case would be the head of the BID.

It is likewise apparent that under RA 6770, the lawmakers intended to provide the Office of the Ombudsman with sufficient muscle to ensure that it can effectively carry out its mandate as protector of the people against inept and corrupt government officers and employees. The Office was granted the power to punish for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. It was given disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies (with the exception only of impeachable officers, members of Congress and the Judiciary). Also, it can preventively suspend any officer under its authority pending an investigation when the case so warrants. The foregoing interpretation is consistent with the wisdom and spirit behind the creation of the Office of the Ombudsman. It is clear from the records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission that the framers of our Constitution intended to create a stronger and more effective Ombudsman, independent and beyond the reach of political influences and vested with powers that are not merely persuasive in character. The Constitutional Commission left to Congress to empower the Ombudsman with prosecutorial functions which it did when RA 6770 was enacted. In the case of Uy v. Sandiganbayan, it was held that "the Philippine Ombudsman departs from the classical Ombudsman model whose function is merely to receive and process the people’s complaints against corrupt and abusive government personnel. The Philippine Ombudsman, as protector of the people, is armed with the power to prosecute erring public officers and employees, giving him an active role in the enforcement of laws on anti-graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses that may be committed by such officers and employees. The legislature has vested him with broad powers to enable him to implement his own actions"

Case 8:BAGONG KAPISANAN V. DOLOT

FACTS:The controversy stemmed from the February 6, 1999 Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) signed by Barangay 901 and Barangay 902, represented by their respective chairmen, Azer E. Dolot (Dolot) and Silverio S. Tañada (Tañada); and Inpart Engineering (Inpart), represented by respondent Antonio Benzon (Benzon). Both barangays adopted and approved the said undertaking as reflected in Resolution No. 99-006.

The MOA was formulated to address the repair and rehabilitation of the water system of Punta Tenement and to manage the water distribution in the tenement as well as to handle the payment of the back accounts of its tenants to Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS).

Punta Tenement filed a complaint for dishonesty and corruption before the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) against their barangay chairmen, Dolot and Tañada; and Benzon and other barangay kagawads and barangay treasurer. The barangay officials were impleaded for their participation in the execution of the separate resolutions from their respective barangays and the subsequent Joint Resolution authorizing Dolot and Tañada to sign the MOA.

Punta Tenement alleged that the respondents conspired to defraud the tenants by not remitting to MWSS the agreed barangay share of P0.125 or 50% of P0.25 per 20 liter-container from the cost of water collection paid by the tenement residents which was intended to pay the back account with MWSS as instructed by the MOA. The MWSS back account was said to be around P2,214,792.87 covering the years 2000-2003.

On May 5, 2005, the Ombudsman rendered a decision finding all the respondents guilty of dishonesty and imposing upon them the penalty of dismissal from the service.

The Ombudsman found that Inpart was already reneging on its MOA obligation as early as 1999, but the respondents failed to act on the problem. It opined that the respondents, at that point, should have noticed that the funds intended for the MWSS back account were not being remitted by Inpart and should have resolved it. They, however, chose to ignore it. It also found the authority of Dolot and Tañada to appoint aguadores, or those who would collect water payments, questionable.

Aggrieved, the respondents filed their respective motions for reconsideration. The Ombudsman denied.

Undaunted, the respondents appealed the case to the CA via a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. The CA reversed the assailed ruling of the Ombudsman.

Punta Tenement moved for the reconsideration of the said decision arguing that the special audit report of the Commission on Audit of the Manila City Auditor’s Office clearly demonstrated the respondents’ acts of corruption when they submitted improvised, not official, receipts of collections for the Patubig project. Likewise, the Ombudsman filed its Motion for Reconsideration asking for the re-evaluation of the CA decision.

The CA, in its Amended Decision, partly granted Punta Tenement’s motion for reconsideration. The CA ruled that the respondents were indeed remiss in their duties but the penalty of dismissal from service would be too harsh. It noted that “the collections intended for Barangays 901 and 902 were spent for noble Barangay projects. The special audit report submitted by the COA of the Manila City Auditor’s Office covered these collections and not those being referred to for the payment of the water back accounts. This is entirely separate and independent proof and in no way connected with the issue of non-remittance of collections intended to pay the tenants’ water back accounts with the Manila Water Company as assumed by the contractor – I[n]part Engineering.”

ISSUES/ARGUMENTS:I. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in imposing [a] very light penalty to a grave

Administrative Offense of Dishonesty. II. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in exonerating the rest of the respondents

despite the fact that these respondents have direct and continuous participation in the anomalous transaction to date

HELD:

Punta Tenement insists that the CA was not correct in imposing a penalty of suspension despite its finding that Dolot and Tañada were guilty of dishonesty. It also faults the CA for absolving the other respondents despite their direct participation in the questionable patubig project. The petition is partly meritorious.

Dishonesty is defined as the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.

In the case at bench, the supposed acts of dishonesty by Dolot and Tañada were convincingly established. Based on the contract, both barangays were to receive P0.25/20 liter as their share in the water distribution arrangement. From the said amount, 50% was allocated for the payment of back account with MWSS, while the remaining 50% was earmarked to their other barangay-related projects. The provision was very clear and categorical. Inpart was never tasked to pay the barangays’ back account as the money allocated for payment was agreed to be deducted from the barangays’ share. Apart from the self-serving declaration of Dolot and Tañada that it was Inpart’s obligation to remit payments to MWSS, nothing in the records would show that they had an arrangement to such effect.

Thus, the Court cannot accept their flimsy excuse that it was the contractor’s job to remit payments to the MWSS. As public servants and representatives of their respective barangays, it behooves upon Dolot and Tañada to ensure that the main goals of the MOA, which were to distribute water to the tenants and pay the tenement’s back account with the MWSS, are faithfully followed. Even assuming that Inpart was the one delegated to pay the barangays’ back account, the respondents should have checked on the status of the payment. They failed to demand accountability from Inpart to ensure that their payments were properly documented and remitted to MWSS. Their inaction demonstrated a lack of concern for the welfare of their constituents. Simply stated, they reneged on their sworn duty to be true to their constituents. Dolot and Tañada tried to convince the Court that they had no power over the situation. It was not the case, however. The MOA, in fact, provided that they had a say on who should be appointed as “aguadors” or collectors of the water distribution set-up.

These two respondents cannot feign ignorance of the fact that their chosen people acted as collectors for the water distribution set-up and had the first access to the money collected before the money was supposed to be turned over to Inpart less their commission/share. They could have easily effected the proper recording of payments and allocation of shares, and secured the money for the MWSS repayment. These nonfeasance seriously tainted their integrity as public servants.

Furthermore, as observed by the Ombudsman, Inpart had started violating the MOA in 1999, but the two respondents failed to investigate them. They tolerated the fact that no proper receipts were being issued to the tenants for the proper recording of their payments. They even refused to cooperate with the Commission of Audit when the latter asked them for documents regarding the patubig project.22 They misled the tenants into believing that the water collections were being properly accounted for and were being remitted to pay the tenement’s back account with MWSS.

The Court agrees with the findings of the Ombudsman and the CA that Dolot and Tañada were guilty of dishonesty. Well-settled is the rule that the findings of fact of the Ombudsman are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence and are accorded due respect and weight, especially when they are affirmed by the CA.23 It is not the task of this Court to analyze and weigh the parties’ evidence all over again except when there is serious ground to believe that a possible miscarriage of justice would thereby result. Although there are exceptions25 to this rule, the Court finds none in this case.

In administrative cases, only substantial evidence is required to support any findings. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Evidently, the circumstances of the case all point to the inexcusable misfeasance of Dolot and Tañada. Dishonesty is a malevolent act that puts serious doubt upon one’s ability to perform his duties with the integrity and uprightness demanded of a public officer or employee.

When an individual is found guilty of dishonesty, the corresponding penalty is dismissal from employment or service. The underlying reason for this is because when a public official or government employee is disciplined, the object sought is not the punishment of such officer or employee but the improvement of the public service and the preservation of the public’s faith and confidence in the government. A finding of dishonesty necessarily carries with it the penalty of dismissal from the office he is holding or serving.

Moreover, considering the proven facts, the Court cannot reduce the penalty. Section 53 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, dated April 15, 2003, reads:

Section 53. Extenuating, Mitigating, Aggravating or Alternative Circumstances. – In the determination of the penalties imposed, mitigating, aggravating and alternative circumstances attendant to the commission of the offense shall be considered. The following circumstances shall be appreciated: a. Physical illness b. Good faith c. Taking undue advantage of official position d. Taking undue advantage of subordinate e. Undue disclosure of confidential information f. Use of government property in the commission of the offenseg. Habitualityh. Offense is committed during office hours and within the premises of the office or building i. Employment of fraudulent means to commit or conceal the offense j. Length of service in the government k. Education, or l. Other analogous circumstances

In this case, however, the Court finds no mitigating circumstance at all. Thus, the Court has no disposition except to impose the penalty of dismissal.

The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees lays down the state policy to promote a high standard of ethics in public service, and enjoins public officials and employees to discharge their duties with utmost responsibility, integrity and competence. Section 4 of the Code lays down the norms of conduct which every public official and employee shall observe in the discharge and execution of their official duties, specifically providing that they shall at all times respect the rights of others, and refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, and public interest. It is the bounden duty of public officials and government employees to remain true to the people at all times.

As public officials, Dolot and Taiiada are expected to exhibit the highest degree of dedicatior:. in deference to their foremost duty of accountability to the people. No less than the Constitution sanctifies the principle that public office is a public trust, and enjoins all public officers and employees to serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency. Doubtless, Dolot and Taiiada committed

infractions of such a grave nature justifying sanctions of commensurate degree. To allow them to remain as accountable public officers, despite their questionable acts, would be rewarding them for their misdeed.

As to the other respondents, the Court affirms the dismissal of the complaint against them for lack of evidence proving, even in the slightest degree, that they had a direct hand in the mishandling of the tenement's patubig project. They merely signed the resolution approving the MOA in their capacities as. barangaykagawads, a laudable remedy to alleviate the plight of the members of the Punta Tenement.

Case 9:(Case is semi-detailed baka kasi tanungin ni sir specifically ‘yung mga charges against CJ Corona.)

CORONA vs. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 200242. July 17, 2012EN BANC VILLARAMA, JR., J p:

FACTS: On December 12, 2011, a caucus was held by the majority bloc of the HOR during which a verified complaint for impeachment against petitioner was submitted by the leadership of the Committee on Justice. Complaint was voted in session and 188 Members signed and endorsed it, way above the one-third vote required by the Constitution.

On December 13, 2011, the complaint was transmitted to the Senate which convened as an impeachment court. On December 15, 2011, petitioner received a copy of the complaint charging him with culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust and graft and corruption, allegedly committed as follows:

ARTICLE I – BETRAYAL OF PUBLIC TRUST THROUGH HIS TRACK RECORD MARKED BY PARTIALITY AND SUBSERVIENCE IN CASES INVOLVING THE ARROYO ADMINISTRATION.

ARTICLE II - CULPABLE VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION /BETRAYAL OF PUBLIC TRUST WHEN HE FAILED TO DISCLOSE TO THE PUBLIC HIS STATEMENT OF ASSETS, LIABILITIES AND NET WORTH AS REQUIRED UNDER SEC. 17, ART. XI OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.

ARTICLE III - CULPABLE VIOLATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION / BETRAYAL OF PUBLIC TRUST BY FAILING TO MEET AND OBSERVE THE STRINGENT STANDARDS UNDER ART. VIII, SECTION 7 (3) OF THE CONSTITUTION THAT PROVIDES THAT "[A] MEMBER OF THE JUDICIARY MUST BE A PERSON OF PROVEN COMPETENCE, INTEGRITY, PROBITY, AND INDEPENDENCE" IN ALLOWING THE SUPREME COURT TO ACT ON MERE LETTERS FILED BY A COUNSEL WHICH CAUSED THE ISSUANCE OF FLIP-FLOPPING DECISIONS IN FINAL AND EXECUTORY CASES; IN CREATING AN EXCESSIVE ENTANGLEMENT WITH MRS. ARROYO THROUGH HER APPOINTMENT OF HIS WIFE TO OFFICE; AND IN DISCUSSING WITH LITIGANTS REGARDING CASES PENDING BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT.

ARTICLE IV - BETRAYAL OF PUBLIC TRUST WHEN HE BLATANTLY DISREGARDED THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS BY ISSUING A "STATUS QUO ANTE" ORDER AGAINST THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN THE CASE CONCERNING THE IMPEACHMENT OF THEN OMBUDSMAN MERCEDITAS NAVARRO-GUTIERREZ.

ARTICLE V - BETRAYAL OF PUBLIC TRUST THROUGH WANTON ARBITRARINESS AND PARTIALITY IN CONSISTENTLY DISREGARDING THE PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA IN THE CASES INVOLVING THE 16 NEWLY-CREATED CITIES, AND THE PROMOTION OF DINAGAT ISLAND INTO A PROVINCE.

ARTICLE VI – BETRAYAL OF PUBLIC TRUST BY ARROGATING UNTO HIMSELF, AND TO A COMMITTEE HE CREATED, THE AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION TO IMPROPERLY INVESTIGATE A JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE PURPOSE OF EXCULPATING HIM.

ARTICLE VII - BETRAYAL OF PUBLIC TRUST THROUGH HIS PARTIALITY IN GRANTING A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER (TRO) IN FAVOR OF FORMER PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AND HER HUSBAND JOSE MIGUEL ARROYO IN ORDER TO GIVE THEM AN OPPORTUNITY TO ESCAPE PROSECUTION AND TO FRUSTRATE THE ENDS OF JUSTICE.

ARTICLE VIII - BETRAYAL OF PUBLIC TRUST WHEN HE FAILED AND REFUSED TO ACCOUNT FOR THE JUDICIARY DEVELOPMENT FUND (JDF) AND SPECIAL ALLOWANCE FOR THE JUDICIARY (SAJ) COLLECTIONS.

Petitioner filed his Answer assailing the "blitzkrieg" fashion by which the impeachment complaint was signed by the Members of the HOR and immediately transmitted to the Senate. As to the charges against him, petitioner denied the same but admitted having once served the Offices of the President and Vice-President during the term of former PGMA and granted the request for courtesy call only to Mr. Dante Jimenez of the VACC while Mr. Lauro Vizconde appeared with Mr. Jimenez without prior permission or invitation. Petitioner argued at length that the acts, misdeeds or offenses imputed to him were either false or baseless, and otherwise not illegal nor improper. He prayed for the outright dismissal of the complaint for failing to meet the requirements of the Constitution or that the Impeachment Court enter a judgment of acquittal for all the articles of impeachment.

Respondent Senate of the Philippines acting as an Impeachment Court, commenced trial proceedings against the petitioner. Petitioner's motion for a preliminary hearing was denied. On January 18, 2012, Atty. Enriqueta E. Vidal, Clerk of Court of this Court, in compliance with a subpoena issued by the Impeachment Court, took the witness stand and submitted the SALNs of petitioner for the years 2002 to 2010. Other prosecution witnesses also testified regarding petitioner's SALNs for the previous years (Marianito Dimaandal, Records Custodian of Malacañang Palace, Atty. Randy A. Rutaquio, Register of Deeds of Taguig and Atty. Carlo V. Alcantara, Acting Register of Deeds of Quezon City).

In compliance with the directive of the Impeachment Court, the prosecution and defense submitted their respective memoranda on the question of whether the prosecution may present evidence to prove the allegations in paragraphs 2.3 (failure to report some properties in SALN) and 2.4 (acquisition of ill-gotten wealth and failure to disclose in SALN such bank accounts with huge deposits and 300-sq.m. Megaworld property at the Fort in Taguig) under Article II (par. 2.2. refers to petitioner's alleged failure to disclose to the public his SALN as required by the Constitution).

On January 27, 2012, the Impeachment Court issued a Resolution 5 which allowede the prosecution to present evidence regarding the charges against the Chief Justice. It also granted the prosecution's request for subpoena directed to the officers of two private banks where petitioner allegedly deposited millions in peso and dollar currencies.

On February 8, 2012, PSBank filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to enjoin the Impeachment Court and the HOR prosecutors from implementing the aforesaid subpoena. On the same day, the present petition was filed arguing that the Impeachment Court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it:

(1) proceeded to trial on the basis of the complaint filed by respondent Representatives which complaint is constitutionally infirm and defective for lack of probable cause; (2) did not strike out the charges discussed in Art. II of the complaint which, aside from being a "hodge-podge" of multiple charges, do not constitute allegations in law, much less ultimate facts, being all premised on suspicion and/or hearsay; (3) allowed the presentation of evidence on charges of alleged corruption and unexplained wealth which violates petitioner's right to due process;(4) issued the subpoena for the production of petitioner's alleged bank accounts as requested by the prosecution despite the same being the result of an illegal act ("fruit of the poisonous tree") considering that those documents submitted by the prosecution violates the absolute confidentiality of such accounts under Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 6426 (Foreign Currency Deposits Act) which is also penalized under Sec. 10 thereof.

Petitioner thus prayed for issuance of TRO or a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the proceedings before the Impeachment Court and declare the Impeachment Complaint null and void ab initio.

On February 13, 2012, petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition claiming that his right to due process is being violated in the ongoing impeachment proceedings because certain Senator-Judges have lost the cold neutrality of impartial judges by acting as prosecutors.

Respondents assert that the Impeachment Court did not commit any grave abuse of discretion; it has, in fact, been conducting the proceedings judiciously. Respondents maintain that subjecting the ongoing impeachment trial to judicial review defeats the very essence of impeachment. They contend that the constitutional command of public accountability to petitioner and his obligation to fully disclose his assets, liabilities and net worth prevail over his claim of confidentiality of deposits; hence, the subpoena subject of this case were correctly and judiciously issued. It simply aims to enforce the principle of public accountability and ensure that the transgressions of impeachable public officials are corrected, the injury being claimed by petitioner allegedly resulting from the impeachment trial has no factual and legal basis. It is thus prayed that the present petition, as well as petitioner's prayer for issuance of a TRO/preliminary injunction, be dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court may be invoked to assail matters or incidents arising from impeachment proceedings, and to obtain injunctive relief for alleged violations of right to due process of the person being tried by the Senate sitting as Impeachment Court.

HELD: YES.

Impeachment and Judicial Review

The precise role of the judiciary in impeachment cases is a matter of utmost importance to ensure the effective functioning of the separate branches while preserving the structure of checks and balance in our government. Moreover, in this jurisdiction, the acts of any branch or

instrumentality of the government, including those traditionally entrusted to the political departments, are proper subjects of judicial review if tainted with grave abuse or arbitrariness.

Impeachment refers to the power of Congress to remove a public official for serious crimes or misconduct as provided in the Constitution.

Our own Constitution's provisions on impeachment were adopted from the US Constitution. Petitioner was impeached through the mode provided under Art. XI, par. 4, Sec. 3, in a manner that he claims was accomplished with undue haste and under a complaint which is defective for lack of probable cause. Petitioner likewise assails the Senate in proceeding with the trial under the said complaint, and in the alleged partiality exhibited by some Senator-Judges who were apparently aiding the prosecution during the hearings.

On the other hand, respondents contend that the issues raised in the Supplemental Petition regarding the behavior of certain Senator-Judges in the course of the impeachment trial are issues that do not concern, or allege any violation of, the three express and exclusive constitutional limitations on the Senate's sole power to try and decide impeachment cases. They argue that unless there is a clear transgression of these constitutional limitations, this Court may not exercise its power of expanded judicial review over the actions of Senator-Judges during the proceedings. By the nature of the functions they discharge when sitting as an Impeachment Court, Senator-Judges are clearly entitled to propound questions on the witnesses, prosecutors and counsel during the trial. Petitioner thus failed to prove any semblance of partiality on the part of any Senator-Judges. But whether the Senate Impeachment Rules were followed or not, is a political question that is not within this Court's power of expanded judicial review.

In the first impeachment case decided by this Court, Francisco, Jr. v. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. we ruled that the power of judicial review in this jurisdiction includes the power of review over justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings. Subsequently, in Gutierrez v. House of Representatives Committee on Justice, the Court resolved the question of the validity of the simultaneous referral of two impeachment complaints against petitioner Ombudsman which was allegedly a violation of the due process clause and of the one-year bar provision.

On the basis of these precedents, petitioner asks this Court to determine whether respondents committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused its discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives that could translate as lack or excess of jurisdiction, which would require corrective measures from the Court.

Mootness

In the meantime, the impeachment trial had been concluded with the conviction of petitioner by more than the required majority vote of the Senator-Judges. Petitioner immediately accepted the verdict and without any protest vacated his office. In fact, the Judicial and Bar Council is already in the process of screening applicants and nominees, and the President of the Philippines is expected to appoint a new Chief Justice within the prescribed 90-day period from among those candidates shortlisted by the JBC. Unarguably, the constitutional issue raised by petitioner had been mooted by supervening events and his own acts.

An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy so that a determination thereof would be without practical use and value. In

such cases, there is no actual substantial relief to which the petitioner would be entitled to and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.

WHEREFORE, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for injunctive relief/s is DISMISSED on the ground of MOOTNESS.

Case 9:CJ Corona vs. SenateGR No. 200242July 17, 2012

Facts:Before this Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for immediate issuance of temporary restraining order (TRO) and writ of preliminary injunction filed by the former Chief Justice of this Court, Renato C. Corona, assailing the impeachment case initiated by the respondent Members of the House of Representatives (HOR) and trial being conducted by respondent Senate of the Philippines.

The present petition was filed arguing that the Impeachment Court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it: (1) proceeded to trial on the basis of the complaint filed by respondent Representatives which complaint is constitutionally infirm and defective for lack of probable cause; (2) did not strike out the charges discussed in Art. II of the complaint which, aside from being a “hodge-podge” of multiple charges, do not constitute allegations in law, much less ultimate facts, being all premised on suspicion and/or hearsay; assuming arguendo that the retention of Par. 2.3 is correct, the ruling of the Impeachment Court to retain Par. 2.3 effectively allows the introduction of evidence under Par. 2.3, as vehicle to prove Par. 2.4 and therefore its earlier resolution was nothing more than a hollow relief, bringing no real protection to petitioner; (3) allowed the presentation of evidence on charges of alleged corruption and unexplained wealth which violates petitioner’s right to due process because first, Art. II does not mention “graft and corruption” or unlawfully acquired wealth as grounds for impeachment, and second, it is clear under Sec. 2, Art. XI of the Constitution that “graft and corruption” is a separate and distinct ground from “culpable violation of the Constitution” and “betrayal of public trust”; and (4) issued the subpoena for the production of petitioner’s alleged bank accounts as requested by the prosecution despite the same being the result of an illegal act (“fruit of the poisonous tree”) considering that those documents submitted by the prosecution violates the absolute confidentiality of such accounts under Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 6426 (Foreign Currency Deposits Act) which is also penalized under Sec. 10 thereof.

Issue:1. Had the impeachment court commited grave abuse of discetion?2. Whether or not the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court may be invoked to assail matters or incidents arising from impeachment proceedings, and to obtain injunctive relief for alleged violations of right to due process of the person being tried by the Senate sitting as Impeachment Court.3. Had the constitutional issues raised in this case been mooted out?

Ruling:1. Citing the case of Nixon v. United States, respondents contend that to allow a public official being impeached to raise before this Court any and all issues relative to the substance of the impeachment complaint would result in an unnecessarily long and tedious process that may even

go beyond the terms of the Senator-Judges hearing the impeachment case. Such scenario is clearly not what the Constitution intended.

Traversing the allegations of the petition, respondents assert that the Impeachment Court did not commit any grave abuse of discretion; it has, in fact, been conducting the proceedings judiciously. Respondents maintain that subjecting the ongoing impeachment trial to judicial review defeats the very essence of impeachment. They contend that the constitutional command of public accountability to petitioner and his obligation to fully disclose his assets, liabilities and net worth prevail over his claim of confidentiality of deposits; hence, the subpoena subject of this case were correctly and judiciously issued. Considering that the ongoing impeachment proceedings, which was initiated and is being conducted in accordance with the Constitution, simply aims to enforce the principle of public accountability and ensure that the transgressions of impeachable public officials are corrected, the injury being claimed by petitioner allegedly resulting from the impeachment trial has no factual and legal basis. It is thus prayed that the present petition, as well as petitioner’s prayer for issuance of a TRO/preliminary injunction, be dismissed.

2. Impeachment and Judicial Review

Impeachment, described as "the most formidable weapon in the arsenal of democracy," was foreseen as creating divisions, partialities and enmities, or highlighting pre-existing factions with the greatest danger that "the decision will be regulated more by the comparative strength of parties, than by the real demonstrations of innocence or guilt." Given their concededly political character, the precise role of the judiciary in impeachment cases is a matter of utmost importance to ensure the effective functioning of the separate branches while preserving the structure of checks and balance in our government. Moreover, in this jurisdiction, the acts of any branch or instrumentality of the government, including those traditionally entrusted to the political departments, are proper subjects of judicial review if tainted with grave abuse or arbitrariness.Impeachment refers to the power of Congress to remove a public official for serious crimes or misconduct as provided in the Constitution. A mechanism designed to check abuse of power, impeachment has its roots in Athens and was adopted in the United States (US) through the influence of English common law on the Framers of the US Constitution.

By the nature of the functions they discharge when sitting as an Impeachment Court, Senator-Judges are clearly entitled to propound questions on the witnesses, prosecutors and counsel during the trial. Petitioner thus failed to prove any semblance of partiality on the part of any Senator-Judges. But whether the Senate Impeachment Rules were followed or not, is a political question that is not within this Court’s power of expanded judicial review.

In the first impeachment case decided by this Court, Francisco, Jr. v. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. we ruled that the power of judicial review in this jurisdiction includes the power of review over justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings. Subsequently, in Gutierrez v. House of Representatives Committee on Justice, the Court resolved the question of the validity of the simultaneous referral of two impeachment complaints against petitioner Ombudsman which was allegedly a violation of the due process clause and of the one-year bar provision.

On the basis of these precedents, petitioner asks this Court to determine whether respondents committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused its discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives that could translate as lack or excess of jurisdiction, which would require corrective measures from the Court.

3. The impeachment trial had been concluded with the conviction of petitioner by more than the required majority vote of the Senator-Judges. Petitioner immediately accepted the verdict and without any protest vacated his office. In fact, the Judicial and Bar Council is already in the process of screening applicants and nominees, and the President of the Philippines is expected to appoint a new Chief Justice within the prescribed 90-day period from among those candidates shortlisted by the JBC. Unarguably, the constitutional issue raised by petitioner had been mooted by supervening events and his own acts. An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy so that a determination thereof would be without practical use and value. In such cases, there is no actual substantial relief to which the petitioner would be entitled to and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.