acta slavica iaponica no. 16 text.pdf · - vi - should be taken into account: the chinese speakers...

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Preface

The Slavic Research Center (SRC) of Hokkaido University held an international symposium entitled “Eager Eyes Fixed on Slavic Eurasia: Change and Progress” in Sapporo, Japan, on July 6 and 7 of 2006. The symposium was mainly funded by a special scientific research grant from the Japanese Ministry of Education’s Twenty-first Century Center of Excellence Program (“Making a Discipline of Slavic Eurasian Studies: 2003–2008,” project leader, Ieda Osamu) and partly assisted by Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (“An Emerging New Eurasian Order: Russia, China and Its Interactions toward its Neighbors: 2006–2009,” project leader, Iwashita Akihiro).

The symposium started with an opening speech, Martha Brill Olcott’s “Eyes on Central Asia: How To Understand the Winners and Losers.” The aim of the symposium was to redefine the former Soviet space in international relations, paying closest attention to the “surrounding regions” of Eurasia. Well-known specialists on the region came together in Sapporo to debate topics such as “Russian Foreign Policy Reconsidered,” “South Asia and Eurasia,” “Central Asia and Eurasian Cooperation,” “Challenges of the Sino-Russian Border,” and “Russia in East Asia.”

All of the sessions noted China’s presence in the region. Central Asian issues and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization were mentioned in the sessions on South Asia and East Asia. Every participant recognized the crucial importance of increasing interactions in and around Eurasia. Eighteen papers were submitted to the symposium: four from Japan, three from China, two each from Russia and the United States, and one each from Korea, Hungary, India, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, and Australia. As China is a decisive factor in the region, differences within the country

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should be taken into account: the Chinese speakers came respectively from Beijing, Shanghai, and Harbin. At the symposium, the SRC showed the will to function as a hub center for Eurasian Studies on Northeast Asia as it forges new ties of research cooperation with academic institutions in South Asia that share common interests on the topic.

Considering the topics we debated during the symposium were far reaching and diversified, we decided to invite experts in specific fields. Five excellent contributions came from Russia, China, India, Korea, and Japan. They covered the new dynamics of the bilateral and multilateral relations emerging and developing in Eurasia as an entity. Their presence undoubtedly strengthened the contents of the proceedings.

The first volume is entitled “Russia and Its Neighbors in Crisis.” Here, we selected twelve papers for Central Asia—Heart of Eurasia, Russian Foreign Policy, and South Asian views on Eurasia. The first part, “Geopolitics at the Crossroads of Eurasia,” covers Central Asia. As an opening chapter, Olcott shows us as an introduction to not only the part but also the volume as a whole how to keep our “eyes” on the region while tackling issues deriving from the “crossroad nature” of Central Asia. She fully analyzes the power orientations and balance sheets of foreign influence over the region—coming from the United States, Russia, and China. Nevertheless, she does not seem to accept the so-called “Great Game” concept as prevailed in the nineteenth century in the region. The active existence and creditable performance of the Central Asian states are progressing well.

Also in the same volume, Farkhod Tolipov, Sun Zhuangzhi, and Yuasa Takeshi follow the same topic from a different perspective. Recently, owing to some political disturbances in Central Asia, local experts face the challenge of expressing their own sincere and objective analyses. Tolipov has done this with success. His well-balanced contribution should be respected and accepted by most readers. Sun Zhuangzhi’s presence is also splendid. He is one of the most famous specialists in China in the Central Asian issue. His observations and conclusion closely relate to China’s official position. Understanding his chapter is a must for further discussion on China’s attitudes toward the region. Yuasa Takeshi is a leading Japanese scholar on the foreign policy of Russia and Central Asia. He tries to depict the details of Japan’s non-veiled involvement in Central Asia, using only resources that he knows. The information should be shared with other researchers to develop the

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discussion on why and how Japan could develop active commitment toward the region.

The second part of the volume, “Russian Foreign Policy Multivectored,” is vital for reconsidering Russian foreign policy. As Russia’s revival is creating a “regional hegemon,” some Western researchers cast doubt on the goodwill and orientation of Russian foreign policy: Russia is beginning to use its resources to maintain and increase its sphere of influence over its surrounding neighbors, and Russia is proceeding to ally with other powers to counterbalance the United States. Indeed, Vladimir Putin’s recent speeches contain some of the elements that the researchers considered, but the exact orientation of Russian foreign policy should be tested against not only the discourse but also the realities in and around Russia.

First, we introduce a Russian scholar’s view on Putin’s foreign policy. Tatiana Zakaurtseva covers all-round orientations. Readers can easily acquire current basic knowledge from her chapter. László Póti’s work functions to reduce political exaggeration and make Russian foreign policy understandable. His persuasive analysis on Russian policy toward Central Europe calms down some sensational views on Russia and gives some hints for comparative studies on its foreign policy toward Eurasia. Mark N. Katz, observing three challenges in Russian foreign policy, i.e., from the West, from the Muslim world, and from China, concludes that Russia faces difficulties in overcoming the dilemma. Ko Sangtu, using a theoretical framework, analyzes the shift in Russian foreign policy from bandwagoning with the United States to counterbalancing the United States. Ko’s chapter sheds some light on the Russian upsurge, while Póti and Katz’s discussions pay great attention to the weakness of Russia (the latter sounding bitter to Russia, while the former has a more positive tone). A feature of Russian foreign policy is that it is now multifaceted and multivectored. What aspect to emphasize leads often to different conclusions. How to compile these differences in a consistent manner remains in the readers’ own hands.

The third part, “Russia and Its Southern Front,” is unique and notable in the volume. Iwashita Akihiro’s chapter combines the argument on Russian foreign policy with Russo-South Asian relations. He proposes a new model for analyzing Eurasia in international relations: border dynamism versus power balance. In this hypothesis, he endeavors to reveal the essential difference between Russo-Chinese relations and

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Russo-Indian relations. His theoretical work is backed by empirical studies on Russo-South Asian relations. Nirmala Joshi and Fazal-ur-Rahman’s contributions to the volume represent a historic precedent for the Slavic Research Center. We have never invited Indian or Pakistani experts on Eurasia before. The two South Asian strategists’ discussions during the symposium profoundly attracted all of the participants. As the Eurasian world widens and Russian and Chinese relations with South Asia deepen, Indo-Pak dialogue on Eurasia represents an emerging new order in the region. Yoshida Osamu, a Japanese specialist on South Asian international relations, moderates the discussion and puts it in a global context. He wraps up the current meaning and importance of Indo-Pak relations for Eurasian unity.

The fruits of the contributing authors’ intellectual endeavors are much appreciated. It is our goal that these small but important academic contributions by some of the leaders of our field of study prove to be an impetus for further academic inquiry. If this goal is achieved, it will be our great pleasure.

This volume greatly benefited from the contribution of Japanese colleagues, who participated as discussants in the symposium. For the first volume, we particularly owe Hyodo Shinji, senior researcher at the National Institute for Defense Studies, and Oka Natsuko, senior researcher at the Institute of Developing Economies, for adding fuel to the discussion. I would like to express my gratitude to Seth Cervantes, lecturer at Tomakomai Komazawa University, for his special contributions during the editing phase of this volume. I owe much to Ito Kaoru for kindly agreeing to take on the laborious task of designing the cover of the volume. I would also like to thank Hosono Mitsue, Okada Yukari and Miyazaki Haruka for their tireless efforts towards the completion of this volume.

Iwashita Akihiro Editor

Sapporo, 2007

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Eyes on Central Asia: How to Understand the Winners and Losers Martha Brill OLCOTT The Need for a Perspective on Central Asia’s Importance The collapse of the USSR led to almost immediate discussion of a supposed new “Great Game” in Central Asia. The US was purportedly vying for influence with Russia and China, while regional powers like Iran and Turkey were said to be competing with each other, and even with the European states, Japan, and other Asian countries.

But for all the discussion of a new “Great Game” in Central Asia, after fifteen years of independence, the five states of Central Asia have not been consigned to any single geopolitical “camp.” Neither Russia, nor China, nor the US is able to dictate outcomes in this region, and while Turkey and Iran are both active in the region, neither plays a decisive role. In fact, all five states have sought balance in their international relations, lining up more closely with the US, Russia, and China as opportunities to advance their own national interests seem to warrant, while simultaneously maintaining a very inviting hand to virtually all the major industrial powers, to Japan, India, Korea, Germany, the UK, France, and even to the smaller European nations, as opportunities to advance their own national economic agendas were offered.

This does not mean that major actors in the international community have not competed for influence in Central Asia; they most certainly have. But Russia and China excepted, virtually no other international actors

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were unwilling to make securing their influence in the region a foreign policy priority. This includes the US, which did accord priority to this region in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks on American soil in September 2001, but US priorities once again shifted in 2003, with the decision to attack Iraq.

Some countries entered the competition with little sense of why, save that international competitors were eager to be engaged in the region. Those, like Russia, Turkey, and Iran, that viewed their national security as directly tied to the Central Asian states often lacked effective levers to advance their cause, and this was particularly true of Russia in the first years after the collapse of the USSR. By contrast, China, which certainly had the capacity to advance its interests, took a “go slow” approach, Beijing not wanting to make its move too quickly as long as China’s long-term goals remained uncompromised.

With time, a number of countries even dropped out of the competition, while others began to formulate a clearer idea of what their national interests were vis-à-vis the Central Asian states. There is certainly much to attract the world’s largest economies to Central Asia. The area has vast energy resources and presents new transcontinental transport alternatives. And neglect of the region has potential costs as well, given the potential for radical Islamic terrorism and for international criminal groups to become entrenched, tied in part to opium production and heroin trade through the region.

Nonetheless, most western democracies have decided that the states of Central Asia are of real, but secondary, importance for their energy, and for national security more generally. While fearful of the political vacuum that defeat of President Hamid Karzai’s regime in Afghanistan would create, most NATO nations remain unwilling to commit large numbers of troops to the military operation there. Similarly, Central Asia’s oil reserves, while relatively large (Kazakh oil reserves in particular), can only be a secondary or tertiary source for western countries, while Central Asian gas, of more direct interest to European states in particular, cannot fully substitute Russian gas, so must be secured in ways that do not fully alienate Russia.

By contrast, for Russia and China, securing long-term access to Central Asia’s energy resources would make a huge difference to their energy supply, both for domestic use and in the case of Russia allowing

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them to better serve the export market. Civil unrest in Central Asia would likely have a direct impact on both Russia’s and China’s internal security.

And, in fact, it is China’s, but more especially Russia’s, interest in the region, and in the region’s energy resources in particular, that has been motivating many western governments to increase their engagement in the region. This is very apparent in US policy, in particular. In a somewhat simplified restatement of the policy, Russia and China are depicted as threats to solidifying the stability of these regimes, while an increased western presence is depicted as promoting the building of markets and democratic polities, all necessary for securing the long-term independence of these regimes. Other countries simply want to secure the investments of their national “flag-bearing” energy companies.

In an almost mirror image, especially since 2001, both Russia and China have justified their increased engagement partly as an effort to limit US influence in the region. And they soften their economic requests with promises of political protection, which, since the Rose Revolution in Georgia in late 2003, the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan in 2005, and the violence in Andijian, Uzbekistan, two months later, seem more attractive to several Central Asian leaders than US and EU pressure to democratize.

However, this article will argue that the degree of geopolitical competition that currently exists in Central Asia poses no particular risk either for the region, or for western security interests more generally. The Central Asian states are becoming increasingly competent in defending their own national interests, and most have devised complex foreign policy strategies that rather successfully play off the competing foreign interests that seek to influence them.

Even more importantly, as this article will detail, while “all eyes” may be on Central Asia, they are oftentimes not steadfastly focused, with foreign actors often pursuing conflicting policies that underestimate the complexity of the region. While the region may seemingly suffer from overengagement by the international community, it may actually be a victim of underengagement. US Policies in Central Asia US policy-makers shook up the strategic balance in Central Asia in the autumn of 2001 when it opened bases both in Uzbekistan and in

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Kyrgyzstan, increased foreign assistance to the Central Asian states, and started talking about new kinds of strategic partnerships and alliances. Yet the limits of the US strategic engagement in the region were set by the Bush administration’s decision to go to war in Iraq, and by the subsequent decision to use this military engagement to lead a global campaign to advance the cause of democratic governance. This made the Central Asian states much less attractive to the US, and also made the US a far more problematic partner for many Central Asian leaders.

The US Department of Defense always served as the region’s strongest advocate within the administration, using these states as a launching pad for military and humanitarian operations in Afghanistan. A few even provided some ancillary support in Iraq.

The Pentagon never expected any of these states to follow the path of Latvia, Lithuania, or Estonia into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), but the Bush administration did expect the region to continue to provide support in the global repositioning of US forces. But by late 2005, it was quite clear that this was a not-to-be realized goal, at least for the life of the Bush administration. The US was forced out of its base in Uzbekistan, after already-difficult negotiations were broken off in the wake of US criticism over Tashkent’s handling of events in Andijian, and the refusal of the Uzbek government to permit an OSCE- or UN-sponsored inquiry into them. And it took the US almost 15 months to negotiate new terms for their facility in Kyrgyzstan, with Washington settling for a short-term agreement with substantially increased costs to the US side.

Increases in US assistance to the region never came close to mirroring Central Asian expectations. While there was an increase in US assistance to the region, in most categories, it proved short lived; US military assistance increased quite strikingly in 2002 and 2003, only to drop sharply in FY2004 and FY2005, when the relative importance of these bases began to diminish. And US security assistance in the region was designed to respond to immediate US security needs, targeting border security in particular, rather than to provide support for a comprehensive overhaul of the internal and external security systems, something that the Central Asian states were anxious to receive.

So it should not have been surprising that the US relationship with Uzbekistan began to turn sour in 2004, after the Bush administration had fully embraced the call for the global spread of democratic governance,


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and as a consequence of this, the US secretary of state refused to certify Uzbekistan as having made progress in human rights, resulting in nearly $20 million of assistance to the Uzbek government being cut off.

After the European and US displeasure over Uzbekistan’s refusal to allow an OSCE or UN inquiry into the civilian deaths there, it was effectively a foregone conclusion that the US presence would not be long term. The Pentagon had already begun to “step down” the state of readiness of their base in Uzbekistan, but did wish to preserve long-term basing rights as protection against future security risks in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and as a year-round entry point for northern Afghanistan. As a result, they were quite unhappy when the Uzbeks requested the withdrawal of US forces in the late summer of 2005, invoking a six-month termination clause in the original agreement.

The Uzbeks were clearly playing tough with the US, having discussed their desire to break out of Washington’s sphere of influence in bilateral meetings between President Islam Karimov and both his Russian and his Chinese counterparts. And the US presence in the region was also raised at the July 2005 Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit, held in Astana, Kazakhstan, at which all six member nations (Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) called on Washington to set a date for its military withdrawal from the region.

The faltering US-Uzbek relationship made it very important for the US to retain control of the US military facility at Manas Airport, which is renewed annually and now serves as a major logistical hub for US operations in Afghanistan. It has also provided about a hundred local jobs and revenue for the government and local suppliers, which under the Akaev regime, included close family members, which left some in the Kyrgyz opposition demanding that the US compensate the Kyrgyz government for “lost” revenue, lost because President Askar Akaev accepted an agreement that provided relatively little rent—under $30 million per year—but made commitments to purchase all fuel and many other supplies through local merchants.

Kyrgyz president Kurmanbek Bakiev reaffirmed the status of the base during a visit by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to Kyrgyzstan in August 2005, shortly after Bakiev’s election, but the negotiations over the base continued for over a year, after the new government demanded $200 million annually in rent. In the end, the Kyrgyz and US governments agreed to a base arrangement that included

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rent for the base as part of a larger and broader foreign assistance package. But the basing issue will continue to arise, and is likely to remain a factor causing friction between the two countries, as both the opposition and the government remain “suspicious” of the US, the government in part because it is committed to trying to balance relations with the US with close ties with both Russia and China, and the opposition because they feel that the US has not been supportive enough of their efforts to continue the “Tulip Revolution” that ousted Akaev until a real democratic system is introduced in Kyrgyzstan.

Although there is no military base there, Kazakhstan is the Central Asian state of greatest interest to US leaders, largely because of the country’s vast oil and gas reserves, whose largest fossil-fuel deposits are being developed in partnership with US energy companies. The government in Astana is an important partner for Washington, and for this reason, even with Kazakhstan’s initial opposition to the US-led military action in Iraq, the Kazakhs did eventually decide to send a small group of twenty-seven troops to Iraq to support the US-led international effort, after initially opposing the war in terms that were only slightly more measured than those of Russia.

Turkmenistan and Tajikistan do not figure as prominently in US strategic thinking about Central Asia. Until now, Turkmenistan has facilitated the passage of large volumes of humanitarian assistance bound for Afghanistan through its territory, and quietly allowed repairs and occasional refueling. There has also been increased cooperation between US and Turkmen officials to interdict heroin and opium crossing the country. The principal US security concern in Tajikistan is improving narcotics interdiction. Tajikistan’s government is eager to cooperate even more closely with the United States. NATO forces are allowed to use highways bound for Afghanistan and enjoy access to bases, but the road between these two countries has high mountain passes that are impassable during the long winter.

While Washington never had any realistic expectation that the Central Asian states would be admitted into any of the key European political and economic associations, US policy-makers did hope that these states would make steady progress towards becoming democracies with market economies. Over the past fifteen years, the region’s progress towards democracy has been erratic at best. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan made some early progress towards creating more open and democratic


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polities in the mid-1990s, only to move in the other direction over the next several years. Kyrgyzstan’s color revolution in March 2005, which led to Askar Akaev’s replacement by Kurmanbek Bakiev, was the most ambiguous of the post-Soviet popular protests that resulted in a regime change. But the government of President Bakiev and Prime Minister Feliks Kulov has also faced strong opposition since taking power, although the adoption of a new constitution providing for greater power for the parliament in November 2006 could prove a stabilizer for the regime, and a source of pressure for other governments to introduce greater balance in their highly centralized presidential systems.

Kazakhstan, too, has made very uneven progress towards establishing democratic political institutions, holding what were judged by the OSCE to be flawed elections for parliament and president in 2004 and 2005 respectively. Nonetheless, President Nursultan Nazarbaev’s claims that his country’s progress in political and economic institution building merits Kazakhstan having the chance to be the first post-Soviet state to preside over the OSCE (in 2009).

Nazarbaev is likely to prove an even less enthusiastic political reformer if his request to the OSCE is rebuffed, demonstrating the increasing Central Asian self-possession in international affairs. With Kazakhstan on track to pump more oil for export each day than Iran by 2010, the United States no longer fears that the long-term access of western nations to Caspian oil might be at risk. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline is already a reality, and the Kazakhs have committed some of their new output to this route starting sometime after 2008.

The US-Kazakh relationship has been capable of weathering potentially difficult crises, including the ongoing New York-based trials and investigation into corruption in Kazakhstan’s oil industry. Although these cast a shadow over President Nazarbaev, both sides have proved able to compartmentalize the corruption scandal and keep it from damaging the bilateral relationship.

Over time, the Kazakhs have become much more businesslike in their dealings with western oil companies and the management of their national oil sector more generally. But they are seeking balance in investment in their hydrocarbon sector. This has been a contributing factor in the growing frustration of US policy-makers who have sought to expand US and western access to Caspian oil and gas. While there are always many

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mutterings over Russian pressure on the Central Asians, in reality, the situation is far more complex.

As is discussed a little later on, Russia has sought to consolidate its position in the Central Asian gas industry in particular, and expand its holdings in the region’s oil sector. But the Central Asian states, for all their much-professed desire to have alternative pipeline routes that bypass Russia, have not been terribly enthusiastic about leaping on the bandwagon to support US-sponsored alternatives.

The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline was already operating before Kazakhstan made a firm, but very imprecise, commitment to ship substantial amounts of oil across this route once “big oil” from Kashagan was available. They have also given more tempered support for the building of undersea gas and oil pipelines across the Caspian, an idea recently revived by the US and some European states. In the last few years of his life Turkmen president Saparmurat Niiazov became more enthusiastic about the idea of getting its gas to Europe through routes that bypass Russia. The government of Gurbanguly Berdymuhammedov, which came to power in December 2006 has promised a more receptive environment to Western investors whose partnership in the gas production side of the project, without which the supply of Turkmen gas for such a pipeline cannot be assured.

In the mid-1990s, there were western firms keenly interested in investing in Turkmen production. Exxon and Royal Dutch Shell hoped to use Turkmen gas to open the door to develop Iranian gas fields through building a pipeline across Iran. Unocal put together an international consortium to ship Turkmen oil and gas across Afghanistan. Continued US sanctions put paid to the first project, while the deteriorating political situation in Afghanistan, and the newly acquired knowledge of al Qaeda camps in that country, led Unocal to walk away from its project.

Even today, there is no commercial interest behind the idea of a Turkmen-Afghan-Pakistani pipeline, despite the fact that the ADB is backing this project and prospects for the commercial sale of gas from Pakistan to India have improved. Even if conditions of doing business in Turkmenistan improve, investors still confront deteriorating political conditions in Afghanistan.

The same is also true of the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline. The US administration is interested in the project, and so too are a number of European governments (Hungary, Romania, and Austria in particular) as


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this pipeline, which would connect with the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline currently under construction, would supply gas to the planned Nabucco pipeline that would go from Turkey to the Austrian border. Like the TAP pipeline, which could have ADB loan guarantees for participants, this project might obtain similar assurances from the EBRD, but Russia, too, has offered to supply gas to Nabucco, making this project less dependent upon Caspian gas.

But international financial institutions seem more eager for these projects than do western oil companies. Both projects have received new life since the Russian-Ukrainian gas fiasco of January 2006, when after failure to reach a gas price accord, Russia turned off gas supplies to Ukraine, and Ukraine bled off gas for their own usage, precipitating a further drop in gas pressure and effectively cutting off gas to Gazprom’s European partners, but both still lack major western investors. Russia in Central Asia Initially, both Russia and China accepted the US military presence in Central Asia as an inevitable part of the US’ retaliation against the “9/11” attacks. But neither country was willing to have its national interests overshadowed, and both have taken advantage of the increasingly ambivalent attitude of regional leaders towards the US to make further inroads into the economies and security environments of the region. Based on improving bilateral relationships with Moscow and Beijing, plus the expanding forum provided by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Central Asian states view Russia’s and China’s engagement in the region as less hegemonic than those of a decade earlier. In fact, with time, given its “democratization” agenda, Washington is coming to be viewed as the greater threat to the region’s nondemocratic ruling elites.

Although some are reluctant to say so publicly, many of Central Asia’s leaders share Russia’s and China’s displeasure regarding the shift in the focus of the “War on Terror” from Afghanistan to a long-term war of “liberation” in Iraq.

Somewhat ironically, the increased US security presence in Central Asia worked to Russia’s advantage. Vladimir Putin has extracted concessions from states in the region that might otherwise not have been granted, such as basing rights for the Russian military in Kant, a long-term

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lease for a Russian military base in Tajikistan, and a series of bilateral military accords with Tashkent, which were augmented by Tashkent’s reentry into the Russian-dominated CSTO (Collective Security Treat Organization) in 2006. Much of the enhanced Russian military presence is more show than substance, designed to demonstrate to a Russian domestic audience that Vladimir Putin is successfully reasserting Russian prominence in traditional areas of geopolitical domination, even in the face of US encroachments.

The various bilateral relationships between the Central Asian states and Russia have each had their ups and downs, but Central Asia’s officials are often quite eager to promote better bilateral relations with Russia. Partnership with Russia is fine, as long as Moscow does not dictate the terms or demand exclusivity. There also seems to be substantially improved cooperation between the internal security agencies of the countries in the region, an area in which Russia is seen as having an edge.

While this might change when a new generation comes to power, most of Central Asia’s ruling elite share more common goals with their Russian counterparts than they do with leaders from most other parts of the world, not to mention a common language. They also all share a sense of annoyance for having been judged as “bad boys” by the United States (and to a lesser degree, by the Europeans).

Russia remains a major arms merchant in the region, given the virtual dependence of all of Central Asia’s military on Russian (or, more accurately, Soviet) equipment, and the ease with which spare parts can be obtained and repairs carried out. The Kyrgyzs and Kazakhs cite this as an important reason for continued close military cooperation with Russia. The Uzbeks continue to obtain equipment from the Russians. And now, some of this equipment is being bought with the help of Chinese financing.

Although all of these countries are increasingly reaching out to a global market, Russia’s private and state capital is continuing to capture a piece of these markets in ways that are not likely to be ephemeral. Russia is still a major trading partner for all the states of the region, particularly on the import side, and the economies of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, in particular, are still heavily dependent on goods coming from Russia.

Russia has the largest economy in the region, and despite its own incomplete economic reforms, unprecedented high oil prices have added to the already-ample capital available for export. Geography also favors


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Moscow’s desire to play a major economic role in the region, especially in the energy sectors.

Russian capital is most visible in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, two states that have pledged to form a common economic space with Russia (a project that at best is moving forward very slowly). But Kyrgyzstan is already a World Trade Organization (WTO) member, and now that Russia has cleared most obstacles for WTO members, and Kazakhstan is rapidly moving toward it, economic ties between the three countries are sure to deepen.

The Kyrgyzs and the Kazakhs have been committed to maintaining close ties to Russia in economic and security relations. From the Kazakh point of view, maintaining good relations with Russia means Moscow should be less likely to take up the plight of the local ethnic Russians, who remain generally dissatisfied with their de facto second-class status in independent Kazakhstan.

Russia is still Kazakhstan’s dominant trade partner, and an important source of investment in small and medium-sized enterprises in Kazakhstan, which still lack western investors. Russian economic recovery makes the regional market stronger. Ruble appreciation means that Kazakh products become more competitive at home and in Russia.

In October 2004, Putin got the leaders of four of the states in the region to agree to Russian membership of the Central Asian Cooperation Organization. Moscow’s participation can perhaps reinvigorate this almost entirely ineffective organization.

Energy is one of the cornerstones of the new Russian geopolitics, and nowhere has it been used with greater effectiveness than in the Kremlin’s relationships with the five Central Asian states. Over the past five years, Russian energy companies have deepened their cooperation with Central Asian partners in oil, gas, and hydroelectric energy. All this is part of a general reassertion of Russian influence in the region, in which economic partnerships are being advanced as part of a broader package security guarantee. For Russia, certainly, these partnerships have real economic benefit as well, and many offer substantial benefit to the Central Asian economies and not infrequently to prominent political figures. These partnerships also reinforce Soviet-era dependencies and create levers that Russia can use to influence domestic developments in these states.

Moscow is seeking a major voice on legal questions concerning the development of offshore Caspian oil and gas reserves, dominance in

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Central Asia’s gas industry, and control of Central Asian hydroelectric power. They have been far less successful in the first than in the latter two areas. The Kazakhs and Russians have already delineated their national zones, with wide areas of common development, and several joint projects in the Kazakh offshore sector are already being developed by LUKoil, Rosneft, and the Kazakh national oil and gas company, KazMunaiGaz. But the legal status of the Caspian Sea is still being worked out by the five littoral nations (Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan).

The biggest challenge for Russia will not be gaining access to Central Asia’s gas but being able to afford the necessary improvements to the pipeline system to market it.

Russia is eager to sew up Central Asia’s gas in long-term transport contracts. Kazakhstan is likely to be Russia’s most dependable gas partner in Central Asia. Kazakhstan’s gas exports are fewer than those of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, but Kazakhstan could have much more gas to export than was once expected. The full measure of Kazakhstan’s undersea gas reserves is not yet known, nor is the quantity of associated gas in the oil projects that will be made available for export. But geography added to a competitive gas market means the Kazakhs are pressed to take a lower purchase price than they would like in order to maximize their transit fees (on Uzbek and Turkmen gas), as well as ensure at least some access to Gazprom’s export routes.

The Kazakh and Russian gas industries are working in tandem on these questions of natural gas transit through Kazakhstan, for the Kazakhs are trying to have their gas sent to market ahead of the Turkmen. But there remain many unresolved questions about shipping gas from Kazakhstan for processing in Russia.

Gazprom also signed a cooperation agreement with both Kyrgyzstan and the reorganized Uzbek state gas company, Uzbekneftegaz, the latter a major producer and supplier of energy for the Central Asian region. Gazprom subsidiary, Zarubezhneftegaz, and LUKoil have also committed to a plan that, if completed, would lead to $2 billion of investment in joint-venture projects in Uzbekistan’s oil and gas sector.

Russia’s growing partnerships with Central Asia’s other gas producers have put Turkmenistan in a difficult position, because they increase Russia’s ability to isolate Ashgabat, forcing the Turkmen to surrender more control over the marketing and development of their gas industry to Russia. The Turkmen-Russian relationship remains very


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difficult, with a 25-year agreement signed in 2003 lasting just over a year before Ashgabat cut off supplies to get payment terms improved from their part-barter basis. Niiazov’s Turkmenistan was a difficult friend for Moscow. Just how difficult is a subject of some speculation, as the complicated cash and barter deals through which Moscow purchased Turkmen gas almost certainly benefited President Niiazov directly or through his family members.

Low purchase prices for Turkmen gas maximize the profit of Gazprom’s sales in Europe, as it permits the cheaper and more efficient Turkmen gas to be used in the Russian economy, and the Russian gas to be shipped abroad. The current sales agreement between Russia and Turkmenistan for the sale of gas to Ukraine, negotiated in late 2005, was even more profitable, as it sets up an old Soviet-style ledger-based asset swap, allowing Turkmen reserves to be nominally sold to Ukraine, while in fact they are being used in Russia. And this leaves aside the transit fees that the middleman, in this case the rather mysterious RusUkrEnergo, is collecting. Future gas agreements involving Turkmenistan are likely to be no less convoluted, but seem certain to provide more income for the Turkmen side.

Following Saparmurat Niiazov’s death, US and European leaders hoped to convince his successor that Turkmenistan’s interests are best served by sending its gas to Europe across the Caspian Sea and bypassing Russia. But Russia’s President Vladimir Putin rushed in and got the Turkmen to commit to expand pipeline routes across Kazakhstan into Russia, which increases the likelihood that China will use this route to ship Turkmen gas as well.

The United Energy Systems of Russia (RAO-UES) have also been moving into Central Asia quite aggressively in the past few years. Like Gazprom, RAO-UES would like to use Central Asian energy to serve European markets. Its management has calculated that developing some of the water resources in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan would be far more economical than developing hydroelectric power in parts of Siberia, given the presence of the Soviet-era unified electrical grid throughout Central Asia.

RAO-UES has been an actor in northern Kazakhstan since the early 1990s, and in the last few years, they have expanded their role to incorporate large hydroelectric stations in both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, where most of Central Asia’s water resources are found, in the case of

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Tajikistan in conjunction with Russian aluminum magnate Oleg Deripaska, who has substantial business interests in Tajikistan. The US, too, is interested in Central Asia’s hydroelectric reserves, and hopes to induce a US firm (hopefully AES, a Texas company with considerable investment in Tajikistan) to be become interested in them, in order to divert electricity to Afghanistan as part of US-sponsored reconstruction efforts there.

Russia’s leaders are aware of the geopolitical influence that Russia would gain by controlling Central Asia’s hydroelectric power and gas pipeline system. This is obviously their goal, and one for which they are seeking new levers for its achievement. China: Tomorrow’s Superpower The increased US presence in Central Asia brought Washington’s military presence to within a few hundred miles of the Chinese border, and left Beijing feeling that they had to give more thought to protecting their long-term interests in the region. China, which shares borders with Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, views the region as one of great potential consequence, having the potential for security problems and for meeting Beijing’s growing energy needs.

Everyone recognized that the US military presence in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan was an encroachment on Russia’s sphere of influence. Chinese sensibilities were thought to be affected by the opening of the US bases. Thus, there were few concessions that China could gain from Washington, although one that they did get, the designation of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement as an international terrorist organization, was important in Beijing. It had direct consequences in Central Asia, as it led to the outlawing of local Uighur groups.

Beijing has focused on bilateral as well as multilateral initiatives. The US military presence in the region has contributed to the strengthening of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), of which all the Central Asian states except Turkmenistan are members, as are both Russia and China.

The SCO’s first-ever joint military exercises were held in the summer of 2003. The SCO’s Anti-Terrorism Center was opened in January 2004 and formally inaugurated at the SCO head of state meeting held there in June 2004. The Chinese are also pushing hard for bilateral military


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cooperation with other SCO states, and in 2005 and 2006, they made real inroads in this regard with the Kyrgyzs, the Kazakhs, and most significantly, with the Uzbeks. As they do not share a border with China, Tashkent sees only positive aspects to bilateral military cooperation with Beijing.

The SCO has not yet fully evolved as an organization, nor is its final membership set. But with Beijing and Moscow both placing real primacy on an organization in which military and intelligence cooperation is a realistic goal, it seems unlikely that other states will be asked to take full membership any time soon. But observer states like Iran may receive a lot of attention, as happened at the 10th-anniversary summit of the SCO in China in June 2006. This attention certainly suited both Russia and China vis-à-vis their concerns about US policy on Iran, but neither country is likely to sacrifice its longer-term strategic advantage in Central Asia by expanding the organization prematurely.

China’s size and economic potential make Beijing at least a silent presence in virtually every setting of importance involving the Central Asian states—and sometimes it is a visible and vocal one. Trade with China is increasingly important to all the Central Asian states. Unlike in the first years of independence, it is legal trade and investment that is now being encouraged by the various Central Asian governments. China’s economic presence is largest in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. Kyrgyzstan hopes to be a gateway to China, because they are both members of the WTO and China is a major investor in Kazakhstan’s oil industry, as a way to ensure increased access to Caspian oil and gas reserves. The Kazakhs and Chinese are building a new jointly owned 2,900-kilometer oil pipeline to link Kenkiiak in Kazakhstan to Atyrau in China. The prospect of supplying China could create new synergies between the oil industries of both Kazakhstan and Russia. These synergies could also be used by Kazakhstan to parry Chinese pressure in other sectors.

At the same time, China’s economic and geopolitical potential is making at least two of the Central Asian states that share borders with it quite nervous. The Tajik-Chinese border is relatively short and of limited strategic importance to the Chinese, but the same cannot be said of China’s borders with both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The 2002 treaty between Kyrgyzstan and China turned into a major political crisis for President Akaev, with opposition figures accusing him of treason for signing it.

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The Kazakhs and the Kyrgyzs understand that there is no way that the fate of their countries can be fully separated from that of China. Yet there is little indication that they have become more nervous about China in the past few years. In fact, the opposite seems to be true. Both countries seem a little more comfortable in their ability to manage this relationship, which they see as sometimes requiring concessions on their part, as was the case with the delineation of borders. But the relationship with China is still more problematic than that with Russia, because China’s potential power seems almost limitless, and the needs of its growing population could overwhelm those of the Central Asians. For the near term, however, China’s posture toward the Central Asian states seems quite predictable and generally supportive.

The Chinese have contracted to begin moving up to 30 bcm of Turkmen gas annually in 2009 using a pipeline that will go through Kazakhstan, linking up with the existing Bukhara-Tashkent-Almaty pipeline and extending it to the border at Alashankou. The Chinese also are negotiating to have Kazakh gas shipped along this route or through a new pipeline from Ishim in Russia, to Astana, through Karaganda and eventually to Alashankou. It is hard to believe that the Chinese would support both options simultaneously, and Russia will certainly be lobbying hard for the second route to be built first, as most industry analysts do not believe that Turkmenistan will have enough production to support contractual obligations to both Russia and China.

The China National Petroleum Company (CNPC) also signed a $600 million agreement with Uzbekneftegaz for some 23 smaller oil fields in the Bukhara area. Very little information has been made public about this agreement, but the location of these fields (near the main gas pipeline) suggests that Beijing is hopeful that there will be large amounts of associated gas available from these projects.

China’s most important economic partner in Central Asia is Kazakhstan. Cooperation with China allows Kazakhstan new transit options. The Chinese National Petroleum Company (CNPC) owns a controlling interest in Aktobemunaigaz, a production company in western Kazakhstan. But Chinese ambitions vis-à-vis Kazakhstan extend much further. In 2003, the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) and China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec) made a bid to buy British Gas’ share of Kazakhstan’s massive offshore Kashagan deposit, a bid that was blocked by the consortia partners, who in the end


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were forced to allow Kazakhstan’s own national company (KazMunaiGaz) to acquire half the BG stake, and absorbed the other half themselves. CNPC did manage to acquire the small North Buzachi field, and then finally in 2005, CNPC purchased the assets of PetraKazakhstan, giving them the assets from the Kumkol field and shared control of the Shymkent refinery (with KazMunaiGaz). The Chinese have made a major financial commitment to securing oil from Kazakhstan, paying over $4 billion for PetraKazakhstan, and planning a pipeline that will run from Atyrau through Kenkiiak, on to Kumkol, Atasu, and then to Alashankou on the Kazakh-Chinese border. By late 2005, two stretches were already operational.

China’s rise need not be at Russia’s expense, but might well contribute to the mutual advantage of Moscow, Astana, and Beijing. Should Russia move forward with plans to construct a new pipeline to link Western Siberian oil with China, there may well be extra capacity for Kazakhstani oil to move north to add supply to this route as well.

China, too, is an interested client for surplus electric power. The Russians are also interested in supplying this market, as are the Kazakhs, who are planning a joint project with China to develop a $4 billion coal-fired power plant at Ekibastuz, near the Russian-Chinese border. Kyrgyzstan also is interested in selling hydroelectric power to China (which seems more interested in developing its own hydroelectric power than in buying foreign-produced electricity). And in both the Kazakh and Kyrgyz cases, the hope is that such purchases might make China less aggressive about diverting upstream water that traditionally flowed into Central Asia. Tajikistan, too, is attracted by the Chinese market, and even more so by the prospects of exporting surplus energy to Afghanistan, and then on to the large markets of India and Pakistan. The latter route is particularly interesting to US authorities. It would have a developmental impact in Afghanistan and would lead Tajikistan to diversify its resource ownership base beyond Russia. Central Asia’s Role in the Broader International Community The “great powers” may have spent the last few years jockeying for a position in Central Asia, but so too have a number of other international actors—regional powers like Turkey and Iran, and global actors like the

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remaining G8 nations—each of whom has played a smaller role than the three countries discussed here.

India has been the one player largely absent from the region, despite the best efforts of all five Central Asian countries to lure it in, and Indian leaders did not participate in the Asia-focused security summit held under a Kazakh initiative in June 2006. Indian leaders have shown increased interest in securing access to Central Asia’s energy reserves, but their efforts are likely to be too little, too late, to acquire a dominant position. Japan was initially very active in Kyrgyzstan, Singapore, in Kazakhstan, and Korea, in Uzbekistan, but none of the three had interest in expanding or consolidating its position. Of the international financial institutions, the ADB has the most active agenda in the region, and the Asian countries make their influence felt through their contributions to it.

Turkey and Iran are both very active in Central Asia, but neither power has been able to exert a decisive influence over the economic, political, or security dimension of any of the Central Asian states. The one possible exception is Iran and Tajikistan, as these two Persian-speaking countries do maintain close cultural and economic ties, despite the secular orientation of the Immomali Rahkmonov regime, and the Sunni rather than Shiia background of the Tajik population. Iran, too, is interested in investing in Tajikistan’s hydroelectric power, as Teheran has its own interest in expanding into South Asia’s hydroelectric market. Iran, with a contiguous land border with Turkmenistan, could play a greater role in the region if its international position were rehabilitated. Turkey enjoys very good ties with all of the Central Asian states, and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Erzurum pipelines are likely to enhance Turkey’s role in the European energy market. Istanbul is also the jumping-off point for much international travel and business to the region, but the idea of Turkey leading a formal or informal community of Turkic states has faded from most Central Asian leaders’ (and Turkish leaders’) consciousness.

The European states, especially those that distrust Russia’s dominant position in their energy market, have expressed great interest in helping secure the independence of the Central Asian states. This is also a concern of Japanese leaders. The Europeans have sought to do this via the EU’s European Neighborhood program. But although two of the three presidents in the EU troika have made Central Asia a particular focus of their presidencies, there is little new thinking and no new resources being brought to bear to solve the region’s problems.


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For all the talk of great games, the risk of global terrorism, and the “strategic importance” of this region, from the viewpoint of the key international players, the Central Asian region is divided into states that have no pressing need for help—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan—and those that are difficult to engage—Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. The unstated priority of all is to try and secure access to the region’s energy resources for their national companies, and to hope against hope that the area will remain stable enough to see them fully exploited.

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The Foreign Policy Orientations of Central Asian States: Positive and Negative Diversification Farkhod TOLIPOV The Problem of Diversification and Geopolitical Stability Many explain the attractiveness of this region with reference to its richness in natural resources (e.g., oil and gas, gold, cotton, uranium, and other non-mineral resources). Conventional wisdom, at first glance, dictates that world powers prioritize these natural resources to indicate their strategic interests in Central Asia and establish relations with its states. These economically motivated geopolitical activities in Central Asia were reinforced and envisaged by Western and Russian social scientists soon after the collapse of the former Soviet Union. Zbigniew Brzezinski, for instance, in his brilliant book, wrote: “Access to that resource [natural gas and oil] and sharing in its potential wealth represent objectives that stir national ambitions, motivate corporate interests, rekindle historical claims, revive imperial aspirations and fuel international rivalries . . . The geostrategic implications for America are clear: America is too distant to be dominant in this part of Eurasia but too powerful not to be engaged . . . Russia is too weak to regain imperial domination over the region or to exclude others from it, but it is also too

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close and too strong to be excluded.”1 Many began to use the term “diversification” to explain the process

of the inevitable multiplication of directions for the transportation of oil, gas and other resources of Central Asia to world markets. But this term is applied not only with respect to the transportation of the mineral resources of the Caspian region to world markets but also to indicate the foreign policy orientations of all five Central Asian countries. Thus, diversification or pluralization (the term applied by Brzezinski) is twofold: economic and geopolitical.

However, all these are just visible manifestations, or forms, of the geopolitical transformation of Central Asia. But its essence consists in the change of geopolitical code or status of the region concerned in the international political system. Post-Soviet Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, for the first time in their history, are acting as independent actors in international relations. This very fact is either ignored by many researchers or even misrepresented in favor of traditional and obsolete perceptions based on consideration of these states only from the viewpoint of which a great power dominates here.

In a very complicated international context, the overall search for local (national) as well as what can be called “external identity” (strategic orientation) by Central Asian countries can take either positive or negative forms and meanings. I call this phenomenon positive and negative diversification. Negative diversification revitalizes the classical balance of power in international relations and the zero-sum game played between great powers usually at the expense of the Central Asian states. Positive diversification avoids the zero-sum approach and is inclusive in character: it means not only the equal involvement of external powers but also, more importantly, a more coordinated policy among the Central Asian states.

The strategic importance of Central Asia not only lies in the economic sphere but is also predetermined from the viewpoint of regional and international security. The ongoing “war on terror” in Afghanistan, a country adjacent to Central Asia (according to some views, even part of Central Asia), is further proof of this region’s importance.

The newly independent countries of Central Asia found themselves, so to speak, doubly confused: by the process of the New World Order

1 Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy аnd Its Geostrategic Imperatives (New York: Basic Books, 1997), 125, 148.

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formation that they have to enter on the one hand, and by the necessity to understand their selfness on the other. In other words, they are in an awkward state of confusion regarding concepts of independence and interdependence.

Moreover, during the Soviet era, there was no question of global orientation, or of their place in the world and among civilizations. Now, such choices as West or East, Asia or Europe or Eurasia, America or Russia are increasingly articulated in Central Asian scholarly and political debate.

Meanwhile, it has become a common view that the September 11 attacks in 2001 constituted a turning point in the process of reshaping the international system in the post-Cold War era. Many also argue that a strategic character of cooperation between the United States and Uzbekistan grew in the context of 9/11. It is true that following this date, international attention towards Central Asia increased considerably. However, it should be emphasized that right after the dismantlement of the former Soviet Union, the Central Asian region suddenly found itself the focus of international attention. The old-fashioned notion of a “Great Game,” which once again has been revitalized, denotes a permanent geopolitical rivalry among global powers over Central Asia.

Today, we can firmly assume that we are witnessing a new, third reincarnation of the Great Game over this part of the world. The first two were held in the format of two actors: the Russian Empire versus the British Empire (late nineteenth–early twentieth century) and the Soviet Union versus the United States (1979–1989 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan).

The current Great Game is distinguished by several peculiarities. First, it is multilevel, multinational, and multifaceted. Too many actors are playing this game. Second, if there were two actors, as was the case with the previous two major games, then the zero-sum-game rule might be the most relevant and inescapable mode of competition over Central Asia. To date, this is impossible due to the multiplication of actors, and they cannot appeal to the zero-sum modality: those who are involved, and they are either state- and non-state actors, can create alliances and counter-alliances; state interests intermingle with companies’ interests; yesterday’s adversary becomes tomorrow’s partner and vice versa. Third, Central Asians themselves have become players, and in these geopolitical circumstances are indeed entangled. The end result is a “small game” of

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Central Asians among themselves against the background of the “Great Game” being played by outside powers.

So the geopolitical situation is ambiguous for all sides. Countries of the region are highly susceptible to any geopolitical influence and change. This is why we can consider the term of geopolitical stability. It is not to say that geopolitical equilibrium should be maintained because it is an element of the obsolete balance of the power mode of international relations that we considered above. Rather, it is to say that the region should be freed from negative diversification, and its outward orientation should not obstruct and undermine its inward orientation. It goes further from the positive diversification concept to a recognition of a higher independent status for the region of Central Asia, which would possess its own system of collective security.

Meanwhile, Central Asian studies in the West are full of controversies and misperceptions. Let us look at two main misperceptions amongst many. One view is that America cannot but keep a low profile in Central Asia. The dominant analytical view about the possible US posture in the region has stemmed so far from the traditional perception that Central Asia is part of the Russian sphere of influence and even dominance. A similar approach is that any American undertaking in Central Asia should definitely be coordinated with Russia.

Another persistent stereotype emanates from the view that Central Asia is a conflict-prone region, and that there is a deep distrust among Central Asians, especially the struggle between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan for domination of the region. An even bigger and more widespread misperception is that of Uzbek expansionism in Central Asia.

Meanwhile, there is one common response to all contemporary challenges, including geopolitical ones, and one way to correct misperceived stereotypes about the region, which is the regional integration of all Central Asian countries.

There is also another reason that integration in Central Asia is very much needed: there is a strong trend toward economic and political regionalization across the world that makes Central Asian regional self-determination vitally important. Central Asian countries are all involved (to different degrees and for different reasons) in all sorts of regional state alliances such as the CIS, GUUAM, the Eurasian Economic Community (EEC), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), the Organization of Islamic Conference


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(OIC) and, finally, the Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO). It seems that the CIS and the CACO and the processes taking place between them will determine the very near future. Analysis of integration/reintegration processes across the former Soviet territory has demonstrated that their efficiency and prospects will depend less on economic than on security factors. In fact, in the context of varied economic options embraced by the CIS countries and of the growing contradictions between integration within the post-Soviet territory and integration into the world community, the principle allowing different countries to integrate into the CIS at their own pace (the principle used as an excuse for all sorts of alliances among two, four, etc. states) proves to be vulnerable.

In conclusion, the destructive geopolitics of outside powers and mutual mistrust of states within the region serve as a token of negative diversification. But constructive geopolitics, which is equal to inclusion of outside powers in Central Asian affairs and full integration of countries within the region serve as a token of positive diversification. So it is the responsibility of Central Asians to choose a way to better diversify their foreign policies. Central Asia between the EEC, SCO and GCA The Central Asian region finds itself locked between three major organizations: the EEC, SCO, and the Greater Central Asia (GCA). The last is not an organization but a conceptual project, which tends to challenge the former two.

The EEC is the latest model in the 15-year-long process of reintegration modeling in the post-Soviet space. There are two-, four-, six- and twelve-state model integrations within the CIS, including the Commonwealth itself. This kind of experimentation looks as if it copied the European different-speed approach to the overall integration process. This means that among the CIS countries, some have decided on so-called deeper integration (reminiscent of a European first echelon), while others are supposed to join later. By the content of the economic agenda, declaration of goals and political character, this organization is not distinctive compared to the CIS itself. Indeed, the EEC just duplicates, to a great extent, what exists in the CIS, namely the custom union, free trade

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zone, energy and transport projects. In 2004, the secretary general of the EEC, Grigorii Rapota, stated that “energy and transport, being the basic infrastructure elements, can spur the development of national economies and the integration of member countries in general.”2

Yet, interestingly, the custom union, planned for 2005–2006, remains a project so far. But it is symptomatic that this process goes in parallel with another process: the creation of a Single Economic Space (also duplicating an analogous idea of the CIS, by the way), this time by Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. I believe that the different patterns of reintegration of former Soviet states discredit the very idea of integration because these states split from a single super-state simultaneously and cannot apply a different-speed model; this is in stark contrast to Europeans who are moving towards creating such a super-state.

Side by side with this integrationist experimentation, six CIS states have been engaged in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) that was created on the basis of the 1992 CIS Treaty on Collective Security. Uzbekistan, which was initially a part of the Treaty, did not prolong its participation in the Treaty in 1998. However, recent geopolitical trends in the post-Soviet space and the democratic revolutionary wave that alarmed the current regime in Uzbekistan compelled the president of this state to return to the CSTO. On June 23, 2006, an announcement was made at the CSTO summit in Minsk that Uzbekistan had become a [seventh] full-fledged member of the Organization.3

Meanwhile, during the last summit of the Central Asian Cooperation Organization held in St. Petersburg on October 6, 2005, the member states—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Russia—announced that the CACO had merged with the EEC. In fact, this event was the third strike on Central Asian regional unity since their independence. The first strike took place when the Russian Federation became a full-fledged member of CACO in 2004. Russia’s membership distorted the geographical configuration and natural political composition of Central Asia’s attempts at regional organization. The second strike took place with the recent Shanghai Cooperation Organization ultimatum to the

2 “Rapota: EvrAzES iavliaetsia deistvuiushei model’iu budushchego Evraziiskogo Soiuza gosudarstv,” RIA Novosti, June 18, 2004. 3 For details of this event, see: http://www.centrasia.ru, June 30, 2006.


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West, primarily the US, to shut down military bases in Central Asia, followed by Uzbekistan’s direct demand for the withdrawal of these contingents. The third strike—merging CACO with the EEC—threatens the self-value and independent existence of Central Asia. It raises the question of whether this third strike on Central Asia represents the genuine end of its newly gained independence.

The SCO is another organization focused in its activity mostly (not to say exclusively) on the region of Central Asia. Analysis of the process of SCO evolution reveals the existence of a certain geopolitical intention. This can be traced to a consideration of two dimensions of the organization: its geographical configuration and political composition. It consists of two global powers and four relatively small, weak Central Asian states. These are not just six states but rather, six unequal states, from the viewpoint of political, economic, military, demographic and social potential. So in reality, the SCO is a politically asymmetric organization.

More important is that another dimension, the geographical dimension, plays a critical role. The appearance of the SCO was possible only after and only in connection with the dissolution of the former Soviet state that brought about the geopolitical transformation of the post-Soviet space. At the same time, its appearance was stipulated by the character of the ongoing formation of the post-Cold War new world order. These two factors of post-Soviet geopolitical transformation and the new world order provide the key to “unraveling the mystery” of the SCO.4 As a result, the security problematique that was put on its agenda recently has not been free from geopolitical distortions. The perception prevails nowadays among politicians and analysts that this is something like a Russian-Chinese joint project to establish control over Central Asia and prevent the entrance of the United States. In any case, however, with or without the US presence, Russian-Chinese geopolitical control of this kind is just another form of external dominance of the region’s countries and of their falling into a new form of dependence.

Meanwhile, although the SCO is not a military bloc, many believe that the organization pretends to play the role of security provider for the region. They point to the SCO Convention on fighting terrorism, religious

4 Farkhod Tolipov, “On the Role of the Central Asian Cooperation Organization within the SCO,” Central Asia and Caucasus 27, no. 3 (2004).

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extremism and separatism adopted in 2001 and the Regional Anti-terrorist Structure (RATS) created a year later as tools of the organization to provide security. At the same time, one can observe a strange phenomenon: a juxtaposition of multilateral, bilateral and unilateral mechanisms of fighting terrorism in the SCO area.5

By and large, the SCO geopolitical message to the international community regarding its intention to deal with security is regularly sent each year. In their last summit on June 15, 2006, SCO members adopted a traditional declaration in which they stated that the Organization possesses the potential to play an independent role in maintaining stability and security in its zone of responsibility. In case of extraordinary situations threatening peace, stability and security in the region, the Declaration says, the SCO member states will immediately start contact and consultation regarding joint operational reaction aiming at protecting the interests of the Organization and member states. The Declaration also announced that a mechanism of regional conflict prevention within the SCO would be created.6

The GCA is a multifaceted, multipurpose macro-project aimed at bringing Central Asian countries and Afghanistan together for the realization of a huge set of social and economic development objectives as well as tasks involved with democratic transformation. This project was advanced by the Central Asia and Caucasus Institute of Johns Hopkins University in 2005. Frederick Starr in his conceptual article on the GCA argued that it would demonstrate the existence of long-term US interests in Central Asia. It would be a reflection of the fact that for the promotion of peace and development, Central Asia should be regarded as a single region united by common interests and needs. The emergence of such a zone of cooperation that deters extremist forces and manifests itself as an attractive model for other Muslim societies would produce serious benefits both for the region and for the United States.7

According to the GCA project, its purpose is multiple by character. It implies: counter-terrorism; security assistance; the fight against extremism

5 For details, see: Farkhod Tolipov, “Multilateralism, Bilateralism and Unilateralism in Fighting Terrorism in the SCO Area,” The China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly 3, no. 5 (2006). 6 http://www.centrasia.org, June 16, 2006. 7 S. Frederick Starr, “A Partnership for Central Asia,” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 4 (2005).


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and drug trafficking; strengthening the regional economy and state institutions to a level where the region will be able to play the role of political and economic bridge between the Near East and South and East Asia; development of regional trade and transport infrastructure; and support of democratic processes in predominantly Muslim societies at the regional level.

The authors of the project emphasized that GCA will not challenge the interests of Russia or China, although the latter two can voice their objection to it. Indeed, these two great powers seem to go against the idea of a Greater Central Asia. Very recently, after a meeting of SCO parliamentary representatives, Speaker of the Russian Duma Boris Gryzlov stated that Russia would not tolerate the creation of another international organization in Central Asia under the aegis of the US.8 This statement, just like the previous 2005 SCO ultimatum to the US regarding its base withdrawal, sounded as if it had been made on behalf of Central Asia.

A Kyrgyz expert on Afghanistan provides the following contemplation on the GCA: “Most of the Western initiatives in the sphere of security (just like in other spheres as well) have an evident anti-Russian, anti-Chinese and in some instances anti-Iranian direction. In this context, any projects implying regional integration within some new space configurations (like ‘Greater Central Asia’) reflect only endeavors to fix by all means American influence in the region.”9

In any case, the critics of the GCA project seem to exaggerate the likelihood of an American challenge to Russian and Chinese interests in the region. Indeed, it is unlikely that the US will threaten Russia or China by using the territory of Central Asian countries. This can be easily explained on the basis of “challenge and response theory.” The crux of the matter is that any challenge by America to Russian and Chinese vital interests from this territory will inevitably be assessed by Russia (China) as an action unfriendly with respect to Russia (China) and force Russian (Chinese) counter-measures directed toward Central Asia, not America, in terms of direct response. In turn, it is against not only the strategic

8 http://www.vedomosti.ru/newsline/index.shtml?2006/05/30/270917. See also RIA Novosti, http://www.rian.ru/world/foreign_russia/20060530/48800682.html. 9 Aleksandr Kniazev, “Afganskaia situatsiia i proekt ‘Bol’shoi Tsentral’noi Azii,’” part 1 and 2, December 20, 2005, December 23, 2005, http://www.apn.kz/.

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interests of the United States, who has (or can have) allies in this region, but also the vital and strategic interests of Central Asians themselves.

So we see that the ongoing geopolitical competition of external great powers over Central Asia has placed the countries of the region in a symbolic triangle. Following the entrance of Uzbekistan into the SCO in 2001, Central Asia once became, in a sense, a “GCA.” After the merger of the CACO with the EEC in October 2005, Central Asia was once again reborn as a “GCA.” The current GCA project, as it is, of course has a right to exist just like the EEC and SCO. Surprisingly, Central Asian countries are compelled to answer the following question: who is really taking care of the region? These three projects are to a great degree in direct rivalry with each other. Each has its strengths and weaknesses, and in this sense, none of them should be speeded up unless Central Asia creates, consolidates and demonstrates its own historical unity. Central Asia does not need to be Bigger, but rather, Central Asia needs to be Greater. Therefore, any macro-projects will remain incomplete unless the normal project is complete, namely that of “Central Asia.”

NATO and the OSCE are two other international organizations fulfilling their own missions in Central Asia. To a significant degree, they also can be considered for the role of “security provider” in the region. NATO accomplishes a very important task in Afghanistan by having taken command in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Such a mission in the country, which is out of the NATO zone of responsibility, may seem to be the cause of geopolitical outcomes. However, the Alliance is perhaps the only organization in the world today capable of coping with the Afghan issue as well as with threats to international security spreading from this country’s territory.

All Central Asian countries participate in the NATO “Partnership for Peace” (PfP) Program. This fact could also lead, among other things, to a re-orientation of their security and foreign policy agendas toward adaptation to Western standards. Since 1994 (when the PfP was first announced) until now all Central Asian countries have been engaged in various PfP programs that have been included side by side with military as well as non-military projects. In general, as Roger McDermott rightly argues, “Growing support exists within the Central Asian militaries for deeper engagement with the United States as well as expanded participation within NATO’s PfP. Although the challenges are significant, options for greater levels of successful engagement can be found in


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examples from the experiences of the former Warsaw Pact members, and indeed elsewhere within the former Soviet Union.”10

One can assume that, a “market of security services” alongside a “market of integration models” is emerging in Central Asia. By and large, for the time being, the expansion of these “markets” has just complicated the security environment of the region concerned and has entangled Central Asia’s own efforts in creating a regional collective security system. It is in the sphere of security where the negative diversification of Central Asian states’ foreign policies can be easily observed because this sphere is tied very closely to geopolitics.

We can assume that the countries concerned have, since their independence, been preoccupied with the old-fashioned balance of power mode of international relations. This happened less because they were so narrow-minded as to overlook the advantages of cooperation with developed countries and great powers and more because the external powers’ attitude towards the region has not been in favor of geopolitical stability. Since these powers have seen and now see the region and its geopolitical status differently, their Central Asian policies seem competitive with respect to each other.

Central Asians themselves have contributed to geopolitical instability in the region by neglecting the self-value of regional unification. Four countries’ readiness and consent to sacrifice the CACO for the sake of a bigger and fuzzier EEC reflects their subordinate international self-determination at the expense of what can be called coordinated international self-determination. Democratization and Integration as Geopolitical Questions The national and regional self-determination of Central Asians is also at stake. So is the process of democratization. Two processes, democratization and regional integration, vitally depend on the dual nature of nationalism in this region. This phenomenon, the dual nature of nationalism, stems from the common origin and common history of the peoples residing in this region on the one hand, and from the artificial 10 Roger N. McDermott, Countering Global Terrorism: Developing the Antiterrorist Capabilities of the Central Asian Militaries (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2004), 27.

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(geopolitical) division of their common territory into five quasi-states in the early twenty-first century on the other. This is why both integration and democratization in this part of the world cannot escape geopolitical realities.

Meanwhile, it is not accidental that the democratization process (better to say “expectations of democratization”) in the newly independent states (NIS) of Central Asia passed through three conditionally intermingled stages: universalism, nationalism, and skepticism. At first stage, euphoria over universal democracy prevailed in public opinion and political rhetoric. Democracy was unconditionally recognized as a universal value and the ultimate political goal of reform. At the second stage, the failure of this process, or rather, the reluctance of state leadership to spur democratic motion, led to a substitution of universalism with the concept of national democracy, a concept that was in reality a justification for a delay of democratization. At the third stage, a troublesome tendency began to grow in the society and polity of the Central Asian states. For the most part, the spread of the idea of so-called “enlightened authoritarianism” has become the most adequate model of a political system. That idea stems from the skeptical social mood concerning chances of democracy in the NIS.

The “wind of color revolution” that recently swept over some post-Soviet countries and the “spirit of color revolution” existing today in all post-Soviet countries are a clear symptom of the turning point in the post-Soviet history. Interestingly, the current debates about democracy in the NIS again reveal the geopolitical dimension of what classically was a non-geopolitical phenomenon. Contemplations regarding the alleged American involvement in the regime change attempts—the color revolutions—in the NIS dominate current overall discussion about what should have been a natural democratic evolution. Public conviction that the United States inspired the so-called 2003 “Rose Revolution” in Georgia, the 2004 “Orange Revolution in Ukraine,” the March 2005 “Tulip Revolution” in Kyrgyzstan and the May 2005 unrest in Andijan (Uzbekistan) are widespread nowadays. But convincing evidence of an American “democratic plot” has not yet been provided in any of these countries. Allegations about such a conspiracy are mostly based on assertions that US-based organizations provided funds to local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) for various seminars, education, training, publications, etc. However, this kind of open activity is a textbook


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example of a “mission.” We can safely assume that the dilemma of a “democratic plot versus a democratic mission” faces all NIS.

On the other hand, the dominant power in the CIS—Russia—supported these convictions; most Russian officials and analysts believe that America continues to challenge Russian interests in post-Soviet countries by attempting to bring democratic and “pro-American” forces there to power.11 We can assume that Russian geopolitical apprehensions about democracy will compel Russia to try to delay or even obstruct any major progress in democratization in the NIS. The Russian expert Sergei Markedonov rightly points out that Russia chose a strategy of containment with respect to the post-Soviet space. “Containment” or “stabilization” is the quintessence of the Russian policy within the CIS. “Such concepts as development, progress, democracy,” he writes, “in the Russian political lexicon have given way in favor of the US and EU who pursue their own interests. Instrumentally, this mission is being realized through support of existing “parties of power” and rejection of dialogue with opposition. Today, such a scenario is being realized in the Russian relations with Belarus, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and to a lesser degree with Armenia and Azerbaijan . . . thereby, the Kremlin deprives itself of insurance against a sudden change of the leadership [in those countries].”12

In this context, three inter-related and fundamental questions need to be resolved by Central Asians both academically and politically, namely: • Will their nationalism play a centripetal or centrifugal role in the

process of regional integration and democratization? • Will they be able to succeed in regional integration on their own or is

this possible only under the aegis of Russia? • What will be the fate of democracy in the condition of an external

“democracy push” from one side and “democracy containment” from

11 In particular, Russia supported Uzbekistan when the Andijan events took place on May 13, 2005. In the aftermath of these events, Uzbekistan blamed the US for its alleged involvement, and Uzbekistan-United States relations worsened dramatically. One of the direct results of this was the withdrawal of the American military base from the territory of Uzbekistan. This, in turn, was fully in Russia’s interests. 12 Sergei Markedonov, “Kak vernut’ znachenie Strany,” http://www.prognosis.ru/news/ modernization/2006/4/17/markedonov.html.

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the other?

First question. It should be noted that nationalism in Central Asia is a threefold phenomenon. It exists on three levels: micro-, macro- and mega-levels. Micro-nationalism is a permanent identity of local, sub-national communities based on tribal and kinship relationships. Macro-nationalism is an ideology of nation- and state-building that has evolved since the dissolution of the former Soviet Union. Mega-nationalism is an integrationist motion, which was also re-actualized in 1991 but reflects the historical unity of the Central Asian peoples based on their common origin and reflected in the 1991-proclaimed political program. From this point of view, objectively, the process proceeds in its development from the micro-level to the mega-level.

However, subjectively, leadership in Central Asian countries find itself vulnerable to a geopolitical game. The latter cannot but distort nationalism in the direction of negative diversification.

Second question. As a result of distorted nationalism, the genuine integration process in Central Asia also turns into a distorted phenomenon. The above-mentioned artificial division of former Turkestan into five parts can nowadays manifests itself in two possible ways. Since the division, the ethno-geographical settlement of peoples of the region does not coincide with their politico-geographical accommodation. Huge groups of the Central Asian population are settled in a cross-border manner. This cross-border settlement of populations can either undermine any integrationist undertaking or, on the contrary, serve as a stimulating factor. This depends on the modalities of the ongoing geopolitical “Great Game” and on the strategies Central Asian states choose in this game.

Objectively, the geopolitical processes can predetermine Central Asia’s unification efforts as a form of their response to geopolitical pressure from external great powers. However, subjectively, a misunderstanding by leaders of their countries’ national interests can push them into dependence on a particular external power. It is obvious that any external security umbrella for Central Asia will mean dependence, but it is also evident that the creation of a regional collective security system is being suspended by old-fashioned divide-and-rule geopolitics.

By and large, integration in the region is a self-value for the peoples residing here and it should not be under the aegis of any external power. However, people often confuse the essence of post-Soviet integration in


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the frameworks of the CIS (which is now unavoidably under the Russian aegis) and the restoration of pre-Soviet Central Asian regional integration. Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbaev emphasized that Post-Soviet countries need a “new development ideology of society, based not only on economic pragmatism but also on unique common historical and cultural roots, and close interaction of our peoples.” 13 Although this was expressed with respect to CIS countries, it should be noted that it could be applied, above all, to Central Asian peoples. This new development ideology should be non-Soviet by nature, whereas today’s regional evolution reflects only the Soviet tradition of anti-Americanism, anti-democratism and geopolitical conformism.

Third question. I believe there is one way out of this dilemma: the “democracy push” will only increase and “democracy containment” will fade. This statement stems from the view that the former is a long-term strategy while the latter is a short-term strategy. In turn, the former stems from the idea that modernization and democratization of any NIS is not a “one-moment” task and cannot be realized over night, but the latter stems from the perception that an allegedly Western geopolitical plot is behind any “democracy push.” This perception, however, cannot live long if the state pursuing a containment strategy itself democratizes one way or another.14

On the other hand, just as in the case of nationalism and as a natural extension of that nationalism, micro-democracy, macro-democracy and mega-democracy can be revealed in Central Asian historical and modern socio-political development. All three levels are mutually dependent. To the extent that democracy means allegiance to the common will of the corresponding population, such allegiance of the same people in Central Asian-specific conditions develops from the micro-level of local

13 Nursultan Nazarbaev’s speech at the international forum in Astana on “Eurasian Integration: Tendencies of Contemporary Development and Challenges of Globalization,” June 18, 2004, http://www.kisi.kz/. 14 Surprisingly, however, one can also observe some tendency away from the “push for democracy” policy. For example, in the wake of Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbaev’s visit to the United States, US President George W. Bush downplayed concerns about Kazakhstan’s recent democratization record, emphasizing that the Central Asian nation appears committed to building institutions “that will enable liberty to flourish.” Bush characterized Kazakhstan as a “free nation.” See: Joshua Kucera, “Bush: Kazakhstan Is A ‘Free Nation,’” Eurasia Insight, September 29, 2006, http://www.eurasianet.org.

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communities to the national and regional levels. The latter—the regional dimension of democracy—is often overlooked in much contemplation about democratization in this part of the world. In this sense, one can talk not only about nation- and state-building but also about region-building. However, the current leadership has been too preoccupied since independence by the so-called national modeling of democracy and has thereby not only overlooked universal standards but also neglected the regional content of democracy.

There is one common answer to all three of the above questions: the will of the leaders of Central Asia. This is a subjective factor, and it has played a crucial role throughout the whole period of independence since 1991. Over-personification of political processes in Central Asia cannot but distort and suspend natural regional identification, regional integration and regional democracy in this part of the world. Due to over-personification of policy in all these countries, democracy has failed, nationalism has been exaggerated and regionalism suspended.

Once, when three presidents decided on their own at Belovezhskaia Pusha (near Minsk, the capital of Belarus) to shut down the USSR and create the CIS, they stated: “From now on, the Soviet Union no longer exists as a state or as a geopolitical reality.” This meant that the geopolitical integrity of the post-Soviet states had officially disappeared, and that was the subjective will of certain people, not an objective historical law. This statement is still in force, and unless Russia, the creator of the CIS, denounces that geopolitical reality, the CIS will remain all but genuinely integrated. Any pro-unification experiment within the CIS will depend primarily on two factors: Russia’s foreign policy, and the development of the newly independent states as independent political actors in the international system.15

In this context, it often seems that Russia, or at least certain political circles in Russia, have not rid themselves of the remnants of empirical stereotypes and prejudices about the former Soviet area, especially Central Asia. In particular, this can be seen in how Russia reacted to the recent “wave of democracy” in this area.

I agree with Russian analyst Sergei Markedonov who argues that

15 Farkhod Tolipov, “CACO Merges with EEC: The Third Strike on Central Asia’s Independence,” Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, October 19, 2005, http://www .cacianalyst.org.


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“revolutions in the CIS countries are the second step of the overall revolutionary process in the ‘world socialist system.’ In the first stage, there was a collapse of the external Soviet empire. Nowadays, a final liquidation of the internal empire of the USSR is ongoing. Initially, leaders of the former Soviet republics used European and democratic rhetoric but in practice, they had been creating a model of controlled democracy. As a result, the CIS countries are stuck on their transition path from socialism to a market economy and democracy. ‘The middle model’ of development seemed too inefficient. Controlled democracy appeared to be poorly managed and poorly democratic. In fact, ‘color revolutions’ are a reaction to half-measure reforms.”16

I also agree with Markedonov’s view that in perspective, the realization of a national-democratic project in the CIS will cause a chain of new revolutions, those of cadres. The current leaders of the old regimes will soon leave the political scene. A new generation of politicians and managers will come into power. I believe that Markedonov is right in saying that the Soviet project that is being inserted on a Eurasian scale today will not be accepted. The post-Soviet space as a politico-geographic symbol is likely to at last disappear. Each country that choses national-democratic self-determination will identify itself without a historical connection to the fallen Soviet Union.17 Conclusion Central Asia needs not only to complete the process of national self-determination, but also to create an adequate collective security identity. In fact, the latter stems from the former.

However, the Central Asian region has constantly since its independence suffered from strong external geopolitical pressure. This pressure implies that Central Asians could not and cannot accomplish post-Soviet reintegration on their own, as was originally announced in 1991.

In other words, geopolitical reasoning prevails in almost all regional and CIS-wide politicalndence discourse on the mode, direction and ends 16 Sergei Markedonov, “SNG kak sovetskii proekt s treskom provalilsa,” TsentrAzia, April 11, 2005, http://www.centrasia.org. 17 Markedonov, “SNG.”

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of the overall post-Soviet transformation, thereby obscuring what can be called “the independent choice” of newly independent countries. It seems that the former Soviet republics, which were suddenly given de jure independence in 1991, remain unready for de facto independence.

It is clear today that Central Asian countries cannot escape the Great Game being played out in the region. But the problem here is that external powers can be obsessed with the illusion that they are able to manage regional conflicts.18 These powers themselves should find the “magic formula” of constellation of their interests in Central Asia. On the other hand, Central Asian states themselves should plan by all means a real integration process. But it is also clear that the current leadership of the countries of the region is unable to pursue such a policy. In this context, I agree with Kazakh analyst Sanat Kushkumbaev when he stated: “Optimal transparency in different spheres of political, social, economic and cultural life of Central Asian societies is impossible with the conservation of existing political systems, which make these processes, to a great degree, subjective.”19

The countries of the region need to develop a “Central Asia first” strategy to be able to overcome archaization and self-isolation of the region from the outside world, and to avoid negative diversification in their foreign policy orientations. But it seems for this to come true that the independence, democratization and modernization of newly independent countries, which split from the former Soviet superstate, need large-scale international support. It would be interesting to consider the applicability of an international “Marshall Plan” model to the countries of Central Asia in their undertaking of regional cooperation efforts. This would be a means and a form of positive diversification of the foreign policies of Central Asian states.

18 Sanat Kushkumbaev, Tsentral’naia Aziia na putiakh integratsii: geopolitika, etnichnost’, bezopasnost’ (Almaty: “Qazaqstan,” 2002), 115. 19 Kushkumbaev, Tsentral’naia Aziia, 141.

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The Relationship between China and Central Asia SUN Zhuangzhi Preface The present relationship between China and Central Asia is defined by geographic, political, economic and security factors. This is the basis behind the policy of China towards Central Asian countries.

In terms of geography, China and Central Asia are neighbors. For the nations of Central Asia, China is an outlet to the sea, while the countries of Central Asia can help China establish inland communications to Europe and West Asia.

In terms of politics, China and the nations of Central Asia have long standing ties. Now, China and Central Asia hold similar views on many national and international problems, and advantageous political relations have been formed among these nations.

In terms of economics, China and the countries of Central Asia have complementary advantages that offer the possibility of extensive cooperation. For China, the energy resources, metals, leather goods and other commodities, as well as the raw materials and markets of Central Asia, are very important. At the same time, China’s industrial, consumer and agricultural products and markets hold a strong attraction for the countries of Central Asia.

In terms of security, China and the nations of Central Asia share common interests. The actions of ethnic separatists, religious extremists and the threat of transnational crime, terrorism and regional conflict are mutual concerns. Maintaining the stability of Central Asia and the western

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border areas of China benefits everyone. Although there have been cultural exchanges and trade between

China and Central Asia for thousands of years, it was only after the recent independence of the Central Asian nations that an equal and mutually beneficial relationship was established among the countries. Over the past decade, sound foundations have been laid to form strategic cooperation in the twenty-first century between China and Central Asia.

Establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization has created favorable conditions and new opportunities for developing Sino-Central Asian relations.

Still, there are problems between China and the Central Asian countries. The main divergence in their views is over economic issues, such as bilateral trade and water utilization. In addition, there are different opinions over some internal and external policies. China and Central Asia in the New World Order China and Central Asia are geographically neighbors. Central Asia offers China the prospect of a transportation corridor for overland communication between China and Europe, while China gives Central Asia safe, secure passage to the Pacific Ocean.

Thousands of years ago, China and Central Asia enjoyed common prosperity through the “Silk Road,” but this relationship was completely severed. However, in the early 1990s, as the result of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, five new countries emerged in the central region of the Asian continent: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. With this development, a new historical period in the relationship between China and Central Asia began. The Effects of the New Order on China and Central Asia The bipolar order ended too suddenly to allow for the formation of a new, mature and stable international situation. The end of the confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States did not mean that geopolitical and geoeconomic rifts disappeared. On the contrary, the relationships between countries and regions became more complicated. Because there are more international players, changes are now accelerating. For this reason, there will likely be some significant changes

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during the period of the formation of the new world order. Countries or blocs of countries with great power may once again determine international relationships. For this reason, many strategic relations need to be regulated.

The challenge brought by the new order to China is different from that of the Central Asian countries. As a powerful socialist country among developing countries, China plays an indispensable, ongoing role in the international arena. China has been pursuing independent, self-reliant domestic and foreign policies.

For some time, China faced rather severe international conditions, because relationships between China and the two poles, i.e., the United States and the Soviet Union, were both tense. Generally speaking, the breakup of the old system of international relations has been advantageous to China. This change has greatly improved the international situation of China as well as relations between China and the Great Powers.

The Central Asian countries tend to be economically less developed, not including Kazakhstan. They are also landlocked countries that have been separated from the outside world for a long time. With the abrupt change in the international situation, the nations of Central Asia suddenly declared their independence. However, it was not like a ripe melon that falls off its stem naturally. The prompt declarations of independence tangibly influenced the internal and foreign affairs of the Central Asian countries. These countries have had to take a protracted, torturous route to find a suitable place in the new international order.1

The change of the world order also brought China and the five central Asian countries numerous difficulties. Because they fall into the category of developing nations, they face many internal economic and social problems. Detrimental factors in their surroundings also often threaten the economic and political security of China and the Central Asian countries. Comparison of the International Strategies of China with the Central Asian Countries Position in the international order is determined by economic and political strength, geographical conditions and many other factors. Since launching its reforms and opening to the outside world, China, with its vast territory 1 Kasymzhomart Тоkaev, Pod stiagom nezavisimosti: ocherki o vneshnei politike Kazakhstana (Almaty: Bilim, 1997), 15–16.

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and large population, has achieved significant economic growth. In contrast, there are evident differences in the social and economic

development of the five Central Asian countries. Each one of them has its own advantages, particularly in terms of natural resources. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are bigger and somewhat more flourishing countries, while the other three countries are relatively less developed nations, whose economies are restrained by their poorer natural conditions. These nations are greatly dependent on agriculture and animal husbandry.

The national strength and geographical location of China is different from that of the five Central Asian countries. As a result, China and these five countries have worked out different foreign policies and international strategies. Firstly, they had distinct international orientations, and secondly, they did not follow each other in choosing cooperative partners. Cultural Characteristics The international strategies of China and the Central Asian republics have different foundations. China and Central Asia are both on the Asian continent and have traditionally been called Eastern countries. China is an ancient state and has greatly contributed to the development of world civilization. Although Central Asia has a similar cultural tradition, it has been also influenced by Europe. While China does not have a strong religious tradition, Central Asia was part of the Islamic world.

Over the past 5,000 years, China has been economically and culturally independent, and has played a key role in East Asia and Southeast Asia. China has always been an influential power in the region. In contrast, Central Asian countries have a history of failed attempts to obtain political independence, while having to withstand invasion from powerful neighbors. The Way of Development China has decided to construct “socialism with Chinese characteristics.” The Central Asian republics have followed the development formal model of the West, but (although) they have persisted in the centralization of state power and their particular economic system. Geopolitical Relations China and Central Asia are neighbors with common economic and security interests. Each looks on the other as a “buffer” and trusts the


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other as a cooperative partner. The geopolitical strategies of China and the Central Asian countries coincide to some degree. For example, they have the same orientation in terms of external relations and common views on many international problems. China and Central Asia are interdependent geographically.

At present, China’s international strategy is focused on the East. Its important economic partners and foreign trade are around the Pacific Ocean, where there are also matters of territorial sovereignty, such as the Taiwan problem. The international strategies of the Central Asian countries are different according to whether they are dealing with a “near neighbor” or a “far neighbor.”2 To offset the influence and control of Russia, the nations of Central Asia give priority to the West.

Although China and the Central Asian republics do not give each other top priority in terms of international strategy, neither side can overlook the existence and actions of the other. The Roles That China and Central Asia Will Play in the International Relations of the Twenty First Century China and Central Asia will, without a doubt, play important roles in international political and economic affairs. China has an active economy and adheres to the policy of reform and opening to the world. The opportunities provided by its large market have a strong appeal to every country. China can also firmly and unshakably represent the interests of the developing countries in international affairs.

At the same time, the five countries that comprise Central Asia are the passageways for east-west and north-south overland communications. Furthermore, they have many strategic mineral resources.

Because China and the five Central Asian countries occupy geographic positions that have very important strategic meaning, they can exert immediate influence on the economic development, security and stability of the whole world. China and the countries of Central Asia are newly emerging forces in multiple-dimensional, international political and economic relations. The powers that once belonged to the same bloc experience keen competition and more contradictions today. Therefore, China and the Central Asian countries can establish relations with all the 2 XUE Jundu and XING Guangcheng, eds., Zhongguo yu ZhongYa [China and Central Asia] (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 1999), 145–146.

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Powers at the same time, without regard to ideology or geopolitics. The trend of globalization, and the advancement of science and

technology, has been improving the circumstances of China and the Central Asian countries.

In the twenty-first century, China will look to play an important role in the following respects:

1. As a safeguard against hegemonism to ensure world peace; 2. As a resolute safeguard for the rights and interests of the Third

World in international affairs; 3. As a positive force in the UN and other international organizations;

and 4. As an accelerator of the development of the world’s economy.

The roles that the Central Asian nations will play include:

1. As the focal point of Eurasia, it is indispensable for the

development of the regional economy and overland communications;

2. As a counter balance to the Great Powers; 3. To play an important role in the establishment of a Eurasian

security system; and 4. Central Asia can also play a role in environmental protection and

surmounting ecological crises.3 The Development of Cooperation between China and Central Asian Countries Good political relations between China and the Central Asian countries have sound foundations. As early as the eleventh century BC, ancient residents of China and Central Asia began to trade. In the second century BC, China and Central Asia established diplomatic relations. The history of the Silk Road was a history of friendly exchange and mutual prosperity 3 SUN Zhuangzhi, ZhongYa Xingeju yu Diqu Anquan [Central Asia: The New Order and Regional Security] (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2001), 64–66.


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between China and the Central Asian countries. The Political Basis of Bilateral Cooperation Today, China and Central Asia are building a closer political relationship because they share a 3,300-kilometer common boundary as well as blood and cultural ties.

China’s fundamental policies toward Central Asia include:

1. Peaceful, good-neighborly relations; 2. Cooperation on the basis of mutual benefit and common

prosperity; 3. Respecting the choices of the Central Asian people and

noninterference in the internal affairs of other nations; and 4. Respecting independent sovereignty as well as promoting regional

stability.

On July 5, 1996, when China’s president Jiang Zemin gave a speech at the Parliament of Kazakhstan, he promoted the relationships between China and the Central Asian countries to a strategic level appropriate for the twenty-first century. He said that because China and the Central Asian countries had common interests, China hoped to create a glorious future of friendly cooperation and common development with the Central Asian countries, being good neighbors, good friends, and good partners forever.4 The leaders of the Central Asian countries generally approved this proposal.

In June 2004, chairman of the People’s Republic of China Hu Jintao visited Uzbekistan. Hu said in a speech at the Uzbek Parliament that China was delighted with the progress made by the Central Asian countries in economic development and hoped for everlasting stability and sustained development in the region. Along with the international community, China is willing to renew its efforts to preserve stability and promote development in Central Asia, said Hu. Meanwhile, Hu recalled that China and Central Asian nations fostered close ties through the “Silk Road” by learning from each other as early as the second century BC. The traditional friendship opened a new chapter in the past decade when the 4 Renmin Ribao, July 6, 1996.

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two sides further developed neighborly friendship, based on equality and mutual benefit, and expanded cooperation in various fields, said Hu.

China and the Central Asian countries have supported each other on issues related to sovereignty and territorial integrity and solved pending problems left by history, including delimitation of the borders, which laid the foundations for deeper mutual trust, he noted.

As for regional security, Hu said, China and the Central Asian countries have conducted bilateral and multilateral cooperation and made remarkable progress in the fight against the “three major threats” to regional security, namely terrorism, separatism and extremism.

Recalling the past and looking forward to the future, China is fully confident of developing neighborly and friendly relations with the Central Asian nations and ready to push the ties to a new high, Hu emphasized.5

China will work closely with all Central Asian nations to safeguard regional stability, as well as to expand economic and cultural exchanges, President Hu Jintao said. Moreover, China has cooperated closely with the nations through bilateral and multilateral channels to effectively fight against terrorism, separatism and extremism, which severely threaten the safety and security of the region.

To push forward the development of the relationship between China and Central Asia, Hu put forward four suggestions:

1. Deepening a friendly neighborhood atmosphere and increasing mutual political trust through intensifying high-level exchanges and perfecting regional cooperation mechanisms;

2. Enhancing security coordination and maintaining regional stability, and earnestly carrying out the convention of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and other bilateral agreements;

3. Adhering to the principle of mutual benefit and trust to accelerate pragmatic cooperation though the enlargement of investment; and

4. Scaling-up cultural exchanges and consolidating traditional friendships by encouraging contacts among cultural, media, academic, tourism and social groups.6

5 Renmin Ribao, June 17, 2004. 6 Zhongguo Ribao, June 16, 2004.


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Exchanging Visits of Leaders and Developing Political Relations China was one of the first countries to establish diplomatic relations with the five Central Asian republics. On December 27, 1991, the government of China recognized the independence of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. In early January 1992, a Chinese delegation visited Central Asia and signed a communiqué establishing diplomatic relations with the governments of the five Central Asian republics.

Since 1992, various government departments and groups from China and the Central Asian countries have exchanged consultation visits in order to develop cooperation. In March 1992, the president of Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov, made an official visit to China. This was the first official visit to China of a leader from the ex-Soviet republics following their independence. In May 1992, the president of Kyrgyzstan and then in November 1992, the president of Turkmenistan, officially visited China. In March 1993, the leader of Tajikistan, and in October 1993, the president of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbaev, also made their first state visits to China. After 1994, the leaders of the five Central Asian countries made third, fourth and even seventh visits to China.

In early July of 1996, the then president of China, Jiang Zemin, completed official visits to Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. In June 2000, President Jiang visited the other two Central Asian countries, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. In 1998 and 1999, President Jiang completed a working visit to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. In recent years, the Chinese leaders have made numerous trips to Central Asian countries. In May 2003 and in July 2005, the new leader of China, Hu Jintao, visited Kazakhstan and he completed a state visit to Uzbekistan in June 2004. The premier of China, Wen Jiabao, visited Kyrgyzstan in September 2004 and Tajikistan in September 2006.

In a senior visits between the leaders of China and the Central Asian countries, there was an exchange of views on significant international situations and problems of common interest. In addition, during these visits, both sides signed a series of important treaties, agreements and other cooperative documents. These meetings were very beneficial in promoting bilateral understanding and trust, and thus laid the legal foundations for developing broad, ongoing bilateral relationships.

Other visits between China and the Central Asian countries have included parliamentary delegations, officials of the Ministry of Foreign

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Affairs, other governmental departments, political parties, and groups and organizations. Economic Cooperation between China and the Central Asian Countries The leaders of China and the Central Asian countries take economic and trade cooperation seriously. In April 1994, China’s premier Li Peng declared the following basic principles regarding economic cooperation between China and the Central Asian countries in Almaty, Kazakhstan:

1. Equality and mutual benefits acting according to economic laws; 2. Diversifying the types of cooperation; 3. Proceeding from the actual situation and making full use of local

resources; 4. Improving the conditions of communication and transportation,

building a “New Silk Road”; 5. Providing modest economic aid to the Central Asian countries as

an expression of friendship; and 6. Developing multilateral economic cooperation, promoting

common prosperity.7

China and the five Central Asian countries have separately signed agreements on economic and trade cooperation, protecting investment, banking cooperation, traffic and other areas of cooperation. China and the Central Asian nations have also organized joint, bilateral committees for economic and trade and scientific and technical cooperation among governments. On several occasions, the government of China has also provided the Central Asian countries with loans on favorable terms as well as gratis economic assistance. In addition, there are also hundreds of joint ventures involving China in Central Asia.

Trade between China and the Central Asian countries has been expanding by leaps and bounds. In 1992, import and export trade between China and the five Central Asian countries totaled $459.35 million. It increased to $872.41 million in 1997 and to over $2.3 billion in 2002. The total volume of trade between China and the five Central Asian countries

7 Renmin Ribao, April 27, 1994.


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increased to over $8.730 billion in 2005.8 China is one of the principal trade partners of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.

Central Asia is rich in natural resources. The oil, natural gas and non-ferrous metals of Kazakhstan, the gold and uranium of Uzbekistan, and the oil and natural gas of Turkmenistan are the material foundations of their economic development. There are also quite rich gold and uranium deposits as well as abundant water power resources in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The strategic location of Central Asia is to a certain extent determined by its rich natural resources and the fact that most of these resources can be exported to the world market. The five Central Asian states have worked out very ambitious plans to exploit and export these natural resources.

China is a coastal country contiguous to Central Asia. It is possible that China will provide the nations of Central Asia with help because its economy is growing fast and it has a need for new sources of energy. China and the Central Asian States began energy cooperation some time ago. In June and August 1997, the Chinese Oil and Natural Gas Company won International Competitive Bids (ICB) for the operation of the Aktyubinsk oilfield of Kazakhstan. In addition, China in September 2004 began the construction of a petroleum pipeline from the Western area of Kazakhstan to China, and this project was completed in December 2005.

Therefore, the Central Asian states strongly desire to build a “New Silk Road.” The “New Silk Road” would extend from East China to Europe and include railways, highways, pipelines, airlines and energy cables, etc. The “New Silk Road” would be longer than the ancient route and have greater economic significance. Not only will this improve traffic conditions, but it will also help the Central Asian countries establish extensive economic and trade relations with other Eurasian countries.

The government of China and the governments of the five Central Asian countries have signed a series of agreements on international rail, highway and airline transportation. In September 1995, the governments of China and Kazakhstan signed an agreement on using China’s seaport at Lianyungang to transit Kazakhstan’s goods.9 By the end of 1997, China had opened nine land ports for commercial use to Central Asia. In 1999,

8 China’s Customs Statistics, December 1997, December 2002, December 2005. 9 “Agreement on the Utilization of Lianyungang Port to Handle and Transship the Transit Freights of Kazakhstan,” China and Kazakhstan, http://www.cctv.com/lm/1039/20/3.html.

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China built the Nanjiang (South Xinjiang) railway, which will connect with the railways of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.

The revival of the “New Silk Road” has been often mentioned in the documents signed by the leaders of China and the Central Asian countries. Now, it has new significance and is becoming a symbol of friendly relationships. The leader of Kyrgyzstan even put forward a tentative idea of diplomacy of the “Silk Road.”

The first step of China’s “great development of the Western area” is to build gas pipelines and other transport installations. The “New Silk Road” has wonderful prospects. Security Cooperation between China and the Central Asian Countries China and Central Asia share a very long border. Thus, they have many common security interests. This means that they must improve security cooperation through bilateral or multilateral contacts and coordination to defend regional stability. Regional Security: Some Threatening Factors

1. Historically speaking, Central Asia has experienced many periods of conflict and instability. After the independence of the five Central Asian countries, the problems left over by the “Cold War” and other contradictions between nations and religions brought with them very serious security problems. Besides, the newly independent republics lacked sufficient regional security. Afghanistan is a Central Asian country with many nationalities. Tajiks constitute 30 percent of the population and Uzbeks constitute 12 percent. The war in Afghanistan had lasted for over 20 years and put enormous pressure on the stability of this region. The relations between dissimilar areas in some Central Asian countries remain very complicated. For this reason to a certain degree, in Tajikistan civil war occurred in the beginning of 1990s, and in Kyrgyzstan there was turmoil in the spring of 2005. Thus, the internal political situation of these countries makes it difficult for them to achieve stability.

2. International crime. International criminal gangs take advantage of Central Asia to smuggle drugs and weapons. The smugglers even plant narcotics in Central Asia and sometimes stir up internal strife


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for the purposes of their smuggling activities; 3. Ultra-religious forces. Ultra-religious organizations have

significant influence in some areas of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan; these organizations also maintain contact with some foreign political forces. In 1999 and 2000, Islamic extremists committed a series of acts of terrorism that destroyed regional stability.

4. Ecological problems. The Aral Sea of Central Asia is in a serious ecological crisis. The sudden decrease in the water level of the Aral Sea has already affected the health of some 35 million people and the regional economy. In addition, there are other ecological security problems caused by radioactive contamination, air pollution and land salinization.

5. Overpopulation and ethnic problems. The population of Central Asia is growing very quickly and is not evenly distributed. In many areas, the natural environment is so harsh that it cannot support the growing population. Besides, there are more than 100 ethnicities in Central Asia. Strong ethnic and tribal sentiments may be a factor leading to instability.

In addition, there are many other factors threatening regional security,

such as the keen military competition of foreign countries in Central Asia and contradictions among the Central Asian states themselves. Progress of Security Relationships China and the Central Asian countries are quite similar in their security strategies: practicing defensive policies; subordinating the enhancement of national defense to economic development; defending world peace and opposing aggression and the arms race; supporting the peaceful settlement of disputes, arms control and disarmament.

The leaders of China and the Central Asian states, in bilateral and multilateral meetings, have very vigorously displayed a conscientious attitude towards security cooperation and building trust. Upholding regional security and striking against religious extremism, international terrorism, national separatism and international crime are important topics for senior-level meetings between China and the Central Asian states.

Efforts to uphold national and regional security by the Central Asian

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countries have enjoyed the support and help of China. The government of China sent delegations to the meetings held in Almaty and Tashkent, the Asian Conference on Coordination and Confidence proposed by Kazakhstan, the Forum on Central Asia’s Security and Cooperation and the Conference on a Nuclear-free Zone in Central Asia proposed by Uzbekistan.

In February 1995, the Chinese government issued an official statement, giving a security pledge to Kazakhstan. China promised not to use nuclear weapons against Kazakhstan.10

The military-security cooperation between China and the Central Asian countries is continuously growing. National defense ministers of Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have visited China, as has the chief of the General Staff of the armed forces of Kazakhstan. The national defense minister and the chief of the General Staff of China have also visited some Central Asian countries.

In 1992, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan began negotiating on border disarmament. From 1992 to 1995, they held 22 rounds of negotiations.

On April 26, 1996, the presidents of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan signed a confidence building agreement. The five nations pledged to take steps to increase trust along the border in areas controlled by their military forces. This agreement has promoted peace, stability and tranquility along the borders shared by China and the other four countries. This agreement is a piece of pioneering work to strengthen regional security.

On April 24, 1997, the presidents of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan signed another agreement on reducing military forces along their common borders. This was the first document on border disarmament in the Asia-Pacific region and was of significant political and military importance. It was a good example of trust.

In June 2002, Chinese president Jiang Zemin arrived in Almaty to attend the first summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA). When Jiang addressed the summit, he applauded the conference for having gradually developed into a unique and valuable forum for the deliberation of issues concerning Asian security and cooperation. Jiang noted that China, a conference member 10 Renmin Ribao, February 9, 1995.


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and a friendly neighbor of Kazakhstan, has been an active participant in the conference’s activities. Commenting on the current security situation in Asia, Jiang said the continent still faces the arduous task of fighting terrorism, with some local conflicts intensifying and extremist forces acting unchecked. The facts have proven that China’s foreign policy and diplomatic practices have contributed to Asian peace, stability and security, Jiang said.11

At the second summit of the CICA, which was held in June 2006 in Almaty, President Hu Jintao called for the building of a harmonious Asia of enduring peace and common prosperity. He urged Asian countries to increase mutual trust and coordination to build a new type of security architecture. “We should respect every country’s right to safeguard national unity, pursue its development strategy and formulate domestic and foreign policies independently,” he said. Hu also stressed that the CICA Forum has become a platform where different civilizations carry out dialogues and different countries seek mutual understanding.12 The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and New Development of Relations between China and Central Asian Countries The Shanghai Cooperation Organization grew out of the “Shanghai Five,” which grew out of the strengthened border confidence and disarmament agreements among China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Each meeting and the documents of “the Shanghai Five” countries and “the Shanghai Cooperation Organization” were important for the regional security of Central Asia. Among them, there were four top-level meetings in Central Asia, which were especially significant to regional security.

On July 3, 1998, the presidents of China, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and a special envoy of Russia’s president, attended a meeting held in Almaty, Kazakhstan. The leaders discussed promoting regional peace and stability and strengthening economic cooperation. After the meeting, a joint statement of the five countries was issued. Since then, the

11 Zhongguo Ribao, June 5, 2002. 12 “President Hu: Creating a Harmonious Asia,” Xinhua News Agency, June 19, 2006, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-06/19/content_4713773.htm.

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meetings of the five countries have changed from bilateral (with China on one side and Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan on the other) to multilateral meetings.

On August 24, 1999, the presidents of the five countries held talks in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. The joint statement issued after this meeting expressed the intention to strike firmly against activities disrupting regional stability.

In 2000, the meetings of the five countries were institutionalized. At the end of March, national defense ministers of the five countries met in Astana, Kazakhstan, and signed a joint communiqué. On April 21, 2000, the persons in charge of the security law enforcement agencies of the five countries, who had met in December 1999 and decided on the foundation of the “Bishkek Group,” held a second meeting in Moscow and signed two documents.

On July 5, 2000 the presidents of the five countries held their fifth meeting in Dushanbe and reached a common understanding to promote cooperation for the twenty-first century. The president of Uzbekistan attended this meeting as an observer and the president of China, Jiang Zemin, gave an important speech with the following points: Deepen security cooperation and support one another against threats to regional security.13 After the meeting, the leaders of the five countries signed the “Dushanbe statement.”

On the fifth anniversary of the Shanghai Five in June 2001, the heads of state of its members and the president of Uzbekistan met in Shanghai, the birthplace of the mechanism. First, they signed a joint declaration admitting Uzbekistan as a member of the Shanghai Five mechanism and then jointly issued the Declaration on the Establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The document announced that for the purpose of upgrading the level of cooperation to more effectively seize opportunities and deal with new challenges and threats, the six states had decided to establish the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on the basis of the Shanghai Five mechanism.

In June 2002, the heads of SCO member states met in St. Petersburg and signed the SCO Charter, which clearly expounded the SCO’s purposes and principles, organizational structure, form of operation, cooperation orientation and external relations, marking the actual 13 Renmin Ribao, July 6, 2000.


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establishment of this new organization following the precepts of international law.

According to the SCO Charter and the Declaration on the Establishment of the SCO, the main purposes of the SCO are: strengthening mutual trust and good-neighborliness and friendship among member states; developing their effective cooperation in political affairs, the economy and trade, science and technology, culture, education, energy, transportation, environmental protection and other fields; working together to maintain regional peace, security and stability; and promoting the creation of a new international political and economic order featuring democracy, justice and rationality.

The SCO abides by the following basic principles: adherence to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations; respect for each other’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, mutual non-use and non-threat of use of force; equality among all member states; settlement of all questions through consultation; non-alignment and non-orientation against another country or organization; opening to the outside world and willingness to carry out all forms of dialogues, exchanges and cooperation with other countries and relevant international or regional organizations.

The SCO stands for and acts on a new security concept anchored on mutual trust, disarmament and cooperative security, a new state-to-state relationship with partnership instead of alignment at its core, and a new model of regional cooperation featuring concerted efforts of countries of all sizes and mutually beneficial cooperation. In the course of development, a Shanghai spirit gradually took shape, a spirit characterized by mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, cooperation, respect for diversified civilizations and common development.14

The SCO is an intergovernmental international organization. Its member states cover an area of over 30 million square kilometers, or about three fifths of Eurasia, with a population of 1.455 billion, about a quarter of the world’s population.

At present, SCO cooperation has covered wide-ranging areas such as security, the economy, transportation, culture, disaster relief and law enforcement, with security and economic cooperation being the priorities. Up to now the SCO has already held six summits of leaders and five 14 http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/sco/t57970.htm.

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meetings of premiers. Since 2004, it has accepted Mongolia, Iran, Pakistan and India as observers. Security Cooperation SCO security cooperation focuses on the fight against terrorism, separatism and extremism. The SCO was among the first international organizations to explicitly advocate the fight against these three evil forces. On June 15, 2001, the day on which the SCO was founded, the Shanghai Convention against Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism was signed, clearly defining terrorism, separatism and extremism for the first time in the international arena. It outlined specific directions, modalities and principles of the concerted fight against the three evil forces, thus helping to lay solid legal foundations for SCO security cooperation. At the June 2002 St. Petersburg summit, the Agreement of the SCO Member States on Counter-terrorism Regional Structure was signed. China and Kyrgyzstan conducted a bilateral joint anti-terrorism military exercise within the SCO framework in October 2002, and the SCO member states held a successful multilateral joint anti-terrorism military maneuver in August 2003. The SCO has also decided to set up an anti-narcotic cooperative mechanism as soon as possible, and talks on relevant documents are actively under way.15

Of the 10 documents signed by the heads of state of the six SCO members on June 15, 2006, four are about security cooperation, including an anti-terrorism resolution for the 2007–2009 period, an agreement on joint anti-terrorism actions among member countries, and an agreement on cutting off the infiltration channels of terrorists, separatists and extremists. The six SCO members also vowed to enhance international information security and eliminate possible dangers of using information and communication technologies for criminal or terrorist purposes—a move indicating the SCO’s security cooperation has gone far beyond regional disarmament and border issues to tackle conventional as well as unconventional threats and challenges facing the whole of humanity.16

15 SUN Zhuangzhi, ZhongYa Anquan yu Afuhan Wenti [The Central Asian Security and Issue of Afghanistan] (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe, 2003), 278, 291–292. 16 “SCO Outlines New Norm of Int’l Relations,” Official website of SCO Summit, http://english.scosummit2006.org/en_spzq/2006-06/16/content_815.htm.


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Economic Cooperation Economic cooperation is a key area of cooperation for the SCO and serves as the material foundations and guarantee for the SCO’s smooth development. Heads of government of the six member states held the first meeting in Almaty on September 14, 2001, to discuss regional economic cooperation and signed the Memorandum between the Governments of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on the Basic Objectives and Orientation of Regional Economic Cooperation and the Launching of a Process of Trade and Investment Facilitation. The year 2002 saw the establishment of mechanisms for economic and trade as well as successive transportation ministerial meetings as initial attempts to explore avenues of substantive cooperation in trade, investment, transportation, energy and other areas. The SCO heads of government met in Beijing for a second time on September 23, 2003, and adopted a plan for multilateral economic and trade cooperation of the SCO member states, in which priority areas, main tasks and implementation mechanism of economic-trade cooperation among the six SCO member states were identified. This laid important foundations for economic cooperation among the six member states for a fairly long time to come.

China and other SCO members are working on 127 joint projects covering the areas of trade, investment, customs, finance, taxation, transportation, energy, agriculture, technology, telecommunications, environment, health and education. The SCO has also set up seven specialist panels to study and coordinate action in such fields as customs, transportation, energy and telecommunications. On the sidelines of the summit in 2006, some $2 billion worth of business contracts and loan agreements were inked, with the deals involving a highway project connecting Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, two high-voltage electricity lines in Tajikistan, a cement plant in Kyrgyzstan, and a hydropower station in Kazakhstan. The goal of the SCO in economic cooperation is to realize the free flow of goods, service, capital and technology by 2020 among its members.17

The purposes, potential and smooth development of the SCO have attracted worldwide attention. An increasing number of countries and international organizations have proposed establishing contacts and 17 “What Drives SCO Forward?” Official Website of SCO Summit, http://english .scosummit2006.org/en_spzq/2006-06/16/content_814.htm.

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cooperation with the SCO. The organization follows a principle of openness and is ready to conduct dialogue, exchanges and cooperation in all forms with other nations and international organizations.

The SCO Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in November 2002 adopted the Interim Scheme of Relations between the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Other International Organizations and States, formally initiating SCO external relations. The scheme provides that other countries and international organizations may be invited to attend as guests to meetings of the SCO Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and diplomatic consultations, and the SCO, similarly, may send representatives to attend activities of other international organizations. To date, SCO representatives have attended several meetings such as the Special Session of the Counter-terrorism Committee of the UN Security Council in March 2003, the Meeting of the OSCE Partners for Cooperation in Vienna in April, the Fifth High-level Meeting between the United Nations and Regional Organizations in New York in July, and the OSCE Conference on Preventing and Combatting Terrorism in Lisbon in September 2003.18

The summit on June 15, 2006, in Shanghai reviewed the developments of the organization since it was established five years ago, analyzed international and regional situations, and studied the organization’s future development and outline cooperation plans. “Although there are big differences among the SCO member states in ideology, culture and level of economic development, the reason that the SCO has made such rapid progress and outstanding achievements lies in our insistence on the Shanghai Spirit,” China’s president Hu said. The Chinese government has played its due role in establishing and developing the SCO by working closely with member states to boost mutual trust and trade cooperation, he said. “China will make joint efforts with the other countries to lift bilateral relations to a new height and promote the SCO to make new progress,” said Hu. He also noted that China has basically put in place $900 million worth of loans for other members of the SCO. The loans were made in the form of preferential buyers’ credit for SCO member states who buy Chinese exports.19

18 http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/sco/t57970.htm. 19 “Hu Anticipates Successful SCO Summit,” China.com, May 31, 2006, http://english .china.com/ zh_cn/news/china/11020307/20060531/13363399.html.


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Top legislators of the six member states of the SCO met on May 30, 2006 for the first time in Moscow. In his speech at the meeting, Wu Bangguo, chairman of the Standing Committee of China’s National People’s Congress (NPC), hailed the achievements of the group since its founding and made a three-point proposal aimed at improving cooperation among the parliaments of the SCO member states. First, he said, the parliaments should cooperate to ensure the ratification of agreements at an early date and supervise their implementation to provide legal guarantees for exchanges and cooperation within the regional bloc. Secondly, Wu said, the bloc’s parliaments should promote cooperation on issues of common concern, such as regional security and economic cooperation. Thirdly, Wu said, the parliaments should diversify their cooperation in a flexible manner.20 The legislators pledged greater parliamentary efforts to provide legal guarantees for cooperation in the organization, to boost exchanges of legislative experience and information, and to ratify relevant agreements. Conclusion From the political and security policies of China toward Central Asia arise new contents along with the development of bilateral relationships and a positive change in the international situation. For the last ten years or more, China has made concerted efforts with Central Asian countries to bring their relations to a new high. After entering the new century, China has been reiterating to the leaders the importance of the Central Asian countries shaping a new type of cooperative relationship from a strategic-level aspect in meetings. In June and December of 2002, China signed with Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan respectively the Friendship Treaty of Good-neighborly Relations. The treaties settled the desire of China and the countries and peoples of Central Asia to sincerely renew and develop their centuries-old friendship in the form of law that became the guiding principles behind the development of friendly Sino-Kyrgyzstan and Sino-Kazakhstan relations in the new century. Statistics show that the trading turnover between China and Central Asian 20 “China’s Top Lawmaker Calls for Closer SCO Parliamentary Co-op,” Xinhua News Agency, May 30, 2006, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-05/30/content _4621896.htm.

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countries was more than $8.7 billion in 2005, which was 18 times higher than the 1992 figure. At the same time, China’s investment in the region has exceeded $7 billion.

The security policy of China toward Central Asia is based on respect for the independence of those counties. The Chinese side reiterated its adherence to its non-first-use policy to never strike nor threaten to use its nuclear weapons arsenal on Central Asian countries. China and Central Asian countries consider terrorism, separatism and extremism as severe threats to global security and stability, and will expand bilateral and multilateral cooperation to campaign against these threats. The two sides will, within the bilateral agreed framework, continue to effectively strike against terrorism in all forms and terrorist groups and terrorists recognized by the United Nations, including the “East Turkistan” force that poses a direct threat to regional security and stability.21

In terms of politics, Chinese leaders brought forward a policy of “keeping good-neighborly relations, maintaining safe-bordering relations and bringing prosperity to neighbors.” This policy was to further develop a strategically bilateral relationship in a longterm and friendly way by signing a series of important legal papers; to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the countries of Central Asia; to enhance mutual understanding and to propel extensive cooperation through regular meetings and friendly contacts in different levels and fields; to support Central Asian countries in choosing the roads suitable for their own conditions in development; and to deal with international and regional affairs through mutual support.

In terms of security, China would like to see Central Asia keeping the region stable, which is thought to be in accordance with China’s strategic interests. China has pledged to bring security to the Central Asian countries; to ensure peace in the bordering regions; to strengthen cooperation in the field of military security and to strike against the “Three Forces,” which include Uyghur separatists in coalition with Central Asian countries, to provide assistance to these countries; to uphold Central Asia to be a non-nuclear region and drug-free region; and to begin cooperation on multilateral levels after enhancing bilateral cooperation between China and Central Asian countries.

The Central Asian countries have thought highly of the active and 21 Renmin Ribao, May 18, 2004.


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realistic foreign policy that China holds in the region. In the future, China will go on attaching importance to relationships with Central Asian countries as usual. Some of the areas that have remained problematic for the two sides will hopefully be resolved or improved upon. Economic factors will continue to be more important in Chinese policy towards Central Asian countries.

Four of the six members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization are Central Asian countries, and this will have a very great bearing on how cooperation will be organized. China will work closely with all Central Asian nations to safeguard regional stability as well as to expand economic and cultural exchanges. Ongoing cooperation between China and the Central Asian countries within the framework of the SCO can help serve regional economic integration and can help solve common security and development problems.

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Japan’s Multilateral Approach toward Central Asia YUASA Takeshi Introduction While keeping its position as top donor for the economic development of Central Asian countries, Japan’s lack of strategy toward Central Asia has been pointed out.1 On the other hand, Japan has attempted several times to work over and formulate big policy pictures for engagement in the region, not only in the field of economic assistance, but also in the sphere of diplomatic strategy.

In this article, I do not argue the necessity of strategy for Japan. Neither do I consider directly why Japan has to be engaged in the region. However, I describe through what process the policy-oriented concept on Central Asia has been established within Japan. Through an analysis of

1 Michael Robert Hickok, “The Other End of the Silk Road: Japan’s Eurasian Initiative,” Central Asian Survey 19, no. 1 (2000): 17–39; Esen Usubaliev, “Politika Iaponii v stranakh Tsentral’noi Azii v kontekste vosmozhnogo poiavleniia novogo tsentra sily,” Tsentral’naia Aziia i Kavkaz 17, no. 5 (2001): 159–165; Adel’ Erkinovich Abishev, “Politika i interesy Iaponii,” in Politika i interesy mirovykh derzhav v Kazakhstane, ed. Bulat Klychaevich Sultanov (Almaty: Daik-Press, 2002), 175–186; UYAMA Tomohiko, “Japanese Policies in Relation to Kazakhstan: Is There a ‘Strategy’?” in Thinking Strategically: The Major Powers, Kazakhstan, and the Central Asian Nexus, ed. Robert Legvold (Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences / MIT Press, 2003), 165–186; Christopher Len, “Japan’s Central Asian Diplomacy: Motivations, Implications and Prospects for the Region,” The China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly 3, no. 3 (2005): 127–149; Martha Brill Olcott, Central Asia’s Second Chance (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), 79–80.

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the process, I will show the tendency of Japan’s approach to Central Asia: multilateralism. In this context, two major policies receive particular attention: Eurasian diplomacy2 in 1997 and the Central Asia plus Japan dialogue (CAJ dialogue) since 2004. Concepts of Eurasian diplomacy and the CAJ dialogue are rare examples for understanding geopolitics that have long been forgotten in Japanese diplomacy. I position both policies as a direction of Japanese foreign policy since the 1990s, from which time Japan has pursued a multilateral approach in the Asia-Pacific region.

Of course, it may be argued that these concepts are spur-of-the-moment ideas by politicians with an ambiguous understanding of geopolitics and not worthy of examination. However, I would like to find meaning in a situation where, when Japan faced the serious problem of coping with international affairs after the collapse of the bipolar camps during the Cold War, many governmental staff and statesmen in Japan asserted the importance of Eurasia as a region of political and cultural diversity. Hereafter, I will outline the concept of multilateralism for Japanese foreign policy, which is related closely to its attitude toward Central Asia. Regional Multilateralism in Japanese Diplomacy Multilateralism, according to John G. Ruggie, is an institutional form that coordinates relations among three or more states on the basis of generalized principles of conduct. As examples, he adapts the most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment and the collective security regime. He also extracts two corollaries for the definition: indivisibility and diffuse reciprocity. The former is a logical condition for the generalized organizing principles that cannot indiscriminately divide members of a collectivity with respect to the range of behaviors in question.3 Both of these corollaries were expanded after the end of the Cold War, because conditions that encourage cooperative relations among states had emerged with the end of ideological confrontation and with globalization.4

2 “Address by Prime Minister HASHIMOTO Ryutaro to the Japan Association of Corporate Executives, 24 July 1997,” http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/0731douyukai.html. 3 John G. Ruggie, ed., Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 10–14. 4 KATO Akira, “Anzenhosho ni okeru takokukan-kyochoshugi” [Multilateralism in

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To evaluate Japan’s diplomacy after the Cold War, much has been written about Japanese-style multilateralism not only at the global level (like the United Nations and G8) but also at the regional level.5 As specified in the first Diplomatic Blue Book published in 1957, soon after entering the United Nations, Japan set forth its three diplomatic pillars to which it still adheres: a UN-centered diplomacy, cooperation with the free (democratic) world, and membership in the Asian community. These principles are all related to the ideals of Japanese diplomacy on multilateralism at both the global and regional level.

Discussions on Japan’s regional multilateralism may be reasonably classified into the following two main topics, to which Japan’s policy toward Central Asia is also linked. As Soeya Yoshihide, a professor at Keio University, observed,6 Japanese diplomacy after World War II was established by the “middle-way” alternative of Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru (1946–1947, 1948–1954), in which Japan entered into an alliance with the United States while maintaining a national constitution that does not recognize the right of belligerency. However, the “Yoshida Doctrine” sometimes restricted Japanese diplomacy, with criticism from both the left and the right within Japan. It also cleaved national identity in a diplomatic sense, such as should Japan be a peaceful country or a major power in world politics? It is interesting that, in this context, Soeya proposes a “middle-power diplomacy” that stresses conflict prevention and multilateral cooperation abroad, while reserving the right of full-scale confrontation with major powers.

Moreover, discussions on Japanese multilateralism are linked with the emerging tendencies of regionalism in the Asia-Pacific region. Japan has not committed any acts of coercive intervention 7 against its neighboring countries in a strategic sense; it has mainly concentrated its Security], Kokusai mondai, no. 470 (1999): 29–44. 5 FUKUSHIMA Akiko, Japanese Foreign Policy: The Emerging Logic of Multilateralism (London: Macmillan, 1999). 6 SOEYA Yoshihide, Nihon no “Midoru-pawa” gaiko: sengo nihon no sentaku to koso [Japan’s “Middle Power” Diplomacy: Japan’s Alternatives and Initiatives after World War II] (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo, 2005). 7 In this article, intervention is defined, quoting from Joseph S. Nye’s work, as “external actions that influence the domestic affairs of another sovereign state.” It includes not only highly coercive action such as military invasion, but also less coercive action such as speeches or broadcasts. See Joseph S. Nye Jr., Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History, 4th ed. (New York: Longman, 2003), 154–155.

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interests on economic affairs while being protected by the security umbrella of the United States. The end of the Cold War, however, encouraged a rebirth of “Japan’s Asian policy” with a change in the international environment during the 1990s. It was a critical period for Japanese foreign policy, seeking a new way to survive in the post-Cold War world where so-called bilateral stability no longer existed. Since the end of 1996, Japan had set its field for dialogue on security issues with almost all of its neighboring countries.8 This period overlapped with the era of Hashimoto Ryutaro as prime minister (January 1996 to July 1998).

In this sense, Japan’s policy toward its neighboring countries in the 1990s was characterized by a tendency towards multilateralism that sought frameworks for dialogue including on security issues. This enthusiasm for multilateral security dialogues in the Asia-Pacific region was a result of changing perceptions about bilateral relationships between each country in this region and the United States. Regional-level and global-level multilateralism exist in parallel such as the United Nations, while most countries allied with the United States in Asia understand the importance of bilateralism; their hub-and-spoke relations are with the United States.9 First Bilateral Approach to Central Asia Although enthusiasm for a more multilateral approach at the regional level has grown, Japan had no clear multilateral concept when it started to construct relationships with the Central Asian states after the collapse of the Soviet Union.10 Japan instead has stressed bilateral approaches to creating relations with them, especially with Uzbekistan. According to Magosaki Ukeru, the first Japanese ambassador to Uzbekistan, the first step toward enlarging Japan’s presence in Central Asia was the visit of a

8 INOGUCHI Takashi, ed., Japan’s Asian Policy: Revival and Response (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 8–15. 9 HOSHINO Toshiya, “Nihon no takokukan gaikou” [Japan’s Multilateral Diplomacy], in Nihon no Higashi Ajia koso [Japan’s Initiative toward East Asia], ed. SOEYA Yoshihide and TADOKORO Masayuki, Gendai Higashi Ajia to Nihon, 1 (Tokyo: Keio Gijuku Daigaku shuppankai, 2004), 247–270. 10 Japan recognized Central Asian countries as soon as they declared their independence in December 1991, and established diplomatic relationships with them in January 1992. Japanese embassies in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan were opened in January 1993.


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delegation headed by Chino Tadao, former Vice Minister of Financing and International Affairs of the Ministry of Finance (MOF), in February 1992, and the first visit of Uzbek president Islam Karimov to Japan in May 1992. These visits reflected Japanese support for Uzbekistan; when Uzbekistan got into difficulties by its strict macro-economic policy introduced by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Japan started administering grants to Uzbekistan and for other development assistance.11

So far, there is no clear evidence whether these episodes reflected a concrete strategy of Japan toward Central Asia. Uyama Tomohiko picks up a feature of Japan’s Central Asian policy as “its dependence on chance and personal influence.” 12 This generalization may fit even Chino’s activities within the region. On the other hand, Magosaki suggested that the decision of the Japanese government was political in nature, and beyond “a simple emotionally loaded argument.” He commented that he could not imagine that the MOF had decided on such assistance only by the request of an ambassador.13

Obviously, Uzbekistan welcomed the Japanese approach. The first Japanese approach to Uzbekistan has contributed to sustaining stable relations between the two countries, while Uzbekistan has continued its pragmatic balancing and bargaining policy toward Russia and the United States. Japan’s policy toward not only Uzbekistan but also the rest of Central Asia started with its assistance, which now exceeds that from European countries and the United States. In this sense, Japan and the Central Asian states reached a peak regarding mutual understanding and cooperation in a bilateral framework. Prologue to Multilateralism: The Obuchi Mission and Eurasian Diplomacy The relationship between Japan and Central Asian countries developed so steadily that it led to a major foreign policy tendency during the summer of 1997, which eventually became the Mission for Dialogue with Russia and Central Asia headed by a leading member of the Japanese Diet, 11 MAGOSAKI Ukeru, “Uzubekisutan: Waga gaiko kotohajime” [Uzbekistan: How I began my work there as a diplomat], Chuo koron , February 1996, 40–51. 12 Uyama, “Japanese Policies in Relation to Kazakhstan,” 168. 13 Magosaki, “Uzubekisutan: Waga gaiko kotohajime,” 48.

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Obuchi Keizo (hereafter the “Obuchi Mission”), and the “Eurasian diplomacy” speech by Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro.

The Obuchi Mission traveled to Russia, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan from June 28 to July 9, 1997. Its main goals were to discuss with their Russian counterparts in Russia “the development of Japanese-Russian relations, especially in the framework of the Asia-Pacific perspective” and to visit the four Central Asian countries to discuss with leading figures the development of relations between Japan and these countries, seeking a future of cooperative relations.14 It was a huge delegation with 61 members in all including diet members, leaders of the business community, and scholars and experts on Central Asia.

In the final report of the mission, Obuchi offered several suggestions of which many were eventually realized. As far as relations with Russia are concerned, three issues have come to the fore. First, the final report suggested holding a summit meeting between Japan and Russia as a follow-up to the latest bilateral meeting between Japanese prime minister Hashimoto and Russian president Boris Yeltsin at a G8 summit in Denver, June 1997. As the report suggested, bilateral relations between Japan and Russia developed through the so-called “Krasnoiarsk Process.” Second, related to this momentum, Obuchi’s report proposed that Japan support Russia’s joining the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Japan officially supported Russia’s entry into APEC at the Krasnoiarsk summit meeting (November 1–2, 1997) and Russia joined the ministerial and summit meeting of APEC in Vancouver, November 21–25, 1997.15 Third, the bilateral consultative framework proposed by Yeltsin during the visit of the Obuchi Mission, called “the 21st Century Committee,” was revealed as the “Japan-Russia 21st Century Committee,” co-chaired by Sakurauchi Yoshio, Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Japanese Diet, and Yuri M. Luzhkov, mayor of Moscow.16

14 Zaidan Hojin Kokusai Koryu Senta [Japan Center for International Exchange], ed., Roshia Chuo Ajia taiwa misshon hokoku: Yurasia gaiko he no josho [Report of the Mission for Dialogue with Russia and Central Asia: Introduction toward Eurasian Diplomacy] (Tokyo: Roshia Chuo Ajia taiwa misshon, 1998), 7. 15 As for evidence of Japan’s influence regarding this issue, see SATO Kazuo and KOMAKI Akiyoshi, Kensho Nichi-Ro shunou kosho: Reisen-go no mosaku [Inspecting Summit Meeting between Japan and Russia] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2003), 129–132. 16 According to the final report, Yeltsin proposed that Obuchi become a chairman of the


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Obviously, Japan has held fast to its policy of maintaining economic support of Central Asian countries as Obuchi’s report also stressed. Moreover, according to the proposals in Obuchi’s report, a direct airline between Japan and Uzbekistan was realized in 2003. The report also suggested establishing a parliament members’ assembly with Central Asian counterparts and a think-tank for Central Asian regional studies in Tokyo. As an aside, the report encouraged Japanese establishments, especially the prime minister, to visit Central Asia. Although ministers such as Foreign Minister Watanabe Michio have traveled to Central Asia, the former prime minister of Japan had, up to that point, not visited the region in long time. However, from August 28 to 30, 2006, Koizumi Junichiro at last made his first official visit as the Japanese prime minister to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan during the final days of his tenure as prime minister.

It is probably correct to assume in part that Hashimoto’s “Eurasian diplomacy” speech is an argument based on the results of the Obuchi Mission. The positive stance towards Russia suggested by Obuchi’s report remained in Hashimoto’s speech. However, it was an argument from not only a Central Asian perspective, but also included the perspectives of Russia, China, and the Caucasus. The “Eurasian diplomacy” concept, therefore, became a guideline with a wider geographic range, which was an exceptional case for Japanese foreign policy after World War II.

Hashimoto argued the necessity of forging “a perspective of Eurasian diplomacy viewed from the ‘Pacific,’” while he understood that enlargement of NATO to the east in the mid-1990s was “Eurasian diplomacy viewed from the Atlantic.” The main goal of his speech was to express the standpoint of Japanese diplomacy toward Russia, China, and “the Silk Road region” encompassing the Central Asian and the Caucasus republics in the former Soviet Union.

Although Hashimoto’s thesis pointed to a new direction of Japanese diplomacy, he confirmed the traditional basic policy of Japan: the maintenance of the Japan-US security regime and the creation of frameworks in this region through, for example, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and APEC. In this sense, Eurasian diplomacy was also an extrapolative concept for the traditional foreign policy of Japan after World War II. While continuing bilateral relations with the US under the committee. See Roshia Chuo Ajia taiwa misshon hokoku, 12.

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framework of the Japan-US alliance, it sought the possibility of constructing a more multilateral approach toward the Eurasian continent.

In his speech, Hashimoto talked about policy toward Russia stressing three principles: trust, mutual benefit, and a long-term perspective. These principles were connected with the results of the Hashimoto and Yeltsin meeting in Krasnoiarsk, which included the statement, “[B]ased on the Tokyo declaration [Japan and Russia] are making their utmost efforts to conclude a peace treaty by the year of 2000.” As Hiroshi Kimura suggested, Hashimoto’s speech on Eurasian diplomacy was “an epoch-making speech considering the necessity of turning a zero-sum to a non-zero-sum game.”17

Regarding relations with Central Asian countries, on the other hand, Hashimoto argues:

Japan has already used Official Development Assistance (ODA) and other means to help the development of the New Independent States of Central Asia, and has sought to enhance its bilateral relations with these countries. In the future, Japan’s foreign policy toward this region will be crafted as an organic component of the broad scheme of relations with Eurasia. In this process, I believe there is a need to develop even more elaborated foreign policies than in the past. (emphasis mine)

After making this argument, Hashimoto pointed out three directions

for cooperation: (1) political dialogue aiming to enhance trust and mutual understanding; (2) economic cooperation as well as cooperation for natural resource development aiming to foster prosperity; and (3) cooperation to build peace through nuclear non-proliferation, democratization and the fostering of stability. Compared with the wording in the proposal of Obuchi’s report, these directions can be attributed to Obuchi’s recommendations.

Japan received favorable reactions to the speech from the Russian side. Compared with the policy-oriented argument in the US at that time,

17 KIMURA Hiroshi, Toi ringoku: Roshia to Nihon [Distant Neighbors: Russia and Japan] (Kyoto: Sekai Shiso Sha, 2002), 698–702. In his previous work published on the same topic in English, Japanese-Russian Relations under Gorbachev and Yeltsin, Distant Neighbors, 2 (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2000), Kimura did not assess clearly that Hashimoto’s speech was “epoch-making”; rather, he pointed to a distorted understanding of Russians in interpreting the speech “in a way that was convenient for Russia.”


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such as Zbigniew Brzezinski’s The Grand Chessboard, which considered how the US could control Eurasia, the Japanese idea was welcome to the Russians because it stressed “trust and mutual understanding.”18 On the other side, however, the Japanese government was criticized for sending out the wrong signal to Russia. Russia was led to believe that Japan had changed its policy toward Russia to promote economic cooperation and a peace treaty by putting aside the territorial issue.19

At that time, Prime Minister Hashimoto seemed to enthusiastically promote a new foreign policy direction based on regional multilateralism. On January 14, 1997, he made a speech arguing for the development of stable Japanese relations with ASEAN,20 and that Japan had made a start in establishing and institutionalizing the framework of ASEAN plus three (China, Japan, and South Korea) from November 1997. A month after the Eurasian diplomacy speech, Hashimoto made another speech enlarging his view regarding relations with China.21 These consecutive proposals for new directions of Japanese foreign policy toward Asian and Eurasian countries may have depended on the personality and political ambition of Hashimoto himself. 22 Furthermore, they were an expression of the 18 As examples of Russian reactions, see Anatolii Shmyrev, “Tri tokiiskikh printsipa: moskove ne meshaet sdelat’ shag navstrechu Iaponii,” Nezavisimaia gazeta, July 30, 1997; Vsevolod Ovchinnikov, “Chto sluchit Moskve ‘doktorina Khashimoto,’” Rossiiskaia gazeta, August 13, 1997. 19 See, for example, HAKAMADA Shigeki, “‘Sogo genso’ wo haishita Nichi-Ro kankei no kochiku wo” [Constructing Relations between Japan and Russia without “Mutual Illusion”], Foresight 9, no. 4 (1998): 10–13. 20 Journalists called the speech “the Hashimoto doctrine.” The text of the speech can be viewed at http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/hasimotosouri/speech/1997/0114ase-seisaku.html. 21 “Seeking a New Foreign Policy toward China” (Speech by Prime Minister HASHIMOTO Ryutaro to the Yomiuri International Economic Society, August 28, 1997). An English version is available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/seeking.html. 22 Hashimoto displayed leadership in constructing Eurasian diplomacy, commenting in a later interview that “the concept was in my mind even in the past,” and “it would be rather led by the prime minister’s side.” See HASHIMOTO Ryutaro, “Nihon gaiko intabyu shirizu (4): HASHIMOTO Ryutaro (kohen); Nodo-teki gaiko wo mezashite” [Interview Series on Japanese Foreign Policy (4), HASHIMOTO Ryutaro (the latter part), Searching for Active Diplomacy], by IOKIBE Makoto, in Kokusai mondai, no. 505 (2002): 80–103. About the policy-making process of Eurasian diplomacy, see also TAMBA Minoru, Nichiro Gaiko hiwa [The Secret Story of Japanese-Russian Diplomacy] (Tokyo: Chuo Koron Shinsha, 2004), 16; NISHIMURA Yoichi, “‘Yurashia gaiko’ no butai ura” [Backstage of Eurasian Diplomacy], Sekai, January 1998, 138–147; SATO and KOMAKI, Kensho Nichi-Ro shunou kosho: Reisen-go no mosaku, 93–96.

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motivation within and around the Japanese government to propose an original foreign policy that could be adapted to drastically changing world politics such as NATO enlargement or Russo-Chinese rapprochement. These directions share an understanding of constructing a new strategy of foreign policy in the post-Cold War world. Akino Yutaka, then an associate professor at Tsukuba University and a member of the Obuchi Mission, oriented the desirable Japanese strategy that “while developing Silk Road diplomacy toward Central Asia as the new heartland, Japan should try to achieve a breakthrough in relations with Russia in the game of the new international system in Eurasia by the US, China, India, and the EU.”23

On the other side, however, there was a weak point in Eurasian diplomacy as a foreign policy concept seeking a multilateral approach. First, although it tried to grasp the whole region under the term of Eurasia, this multilateral approach narrowed toward the end with emphasis on sub-regional divisions such as its relations with Russia, China, and the “Silk Road countries.” In this sense, multilateralism in Eurasian diplomacy ended bilaterally after all. This might have been inevitable because Hashimoto’s Eurasian diplomacy focused mainly on making a breakthrough in Japanese-Russian relations, including the territorial issue. Regarding policy toward Central Asia, Eurasian diplomacy was a concept that was not sufficiently funded to realize the project, compared to when Japan took its first step in constructing relations with these countries.

Eurasian diplomacy was, after all, not an everlasting concept. Although it adapted positively during the Hashimoto administration and its successor, the Obuchi administration (from July 30, 1998 to April 5, 2000), the chance of presenting the concept as a specific direction of Japanese foreign policy decreased with time, while the Krasnoiarsk process failed to meet the deadline to conclude the bilateral peace treaty. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan has used the term “Silk Road diplomacy,” originally part of Eurasian diplomacy, as a substitute for the concept.24 23 AKINO Yutaka, “‘Shuyaku’ no za wo owareta Roshia ga Nihon he sekkin” [Russia, Ousted from the Role of Leading Actor, Makes an Approach to Japan], Sekaishuho, December 30, 1997, 6–9. In this article, Akino assessed the Krasnoyarsk process so optimistically that the “positive performance” to conclude a future peace treaty between Japan and Russia would end up becoming a reality. 24 See, for example, Gaiko Forum, December 1998, a special issue on “Silk Road


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Reconstructing Multilateralism: Central Asia plus Japan Dialogue Japanese Policy toward Central Asia after 9/11 Although Eurasian diplomacy had diminished as a policy slogan, the importance of Central Asia has consolidated steadily in Japan, and its relationship with Central Asia is becoming closer. In 1993, the total bilateral ODA donated to the five Central Asian countries was $2.57 million, eventually reaching $24.227 million in 2003. By 2003, the accumulated bilateral ODA toward the countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus reached $1.98 billion.25 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has constructed a new formation toward Central Asia; with the existing embassies in Tashkent and Almaty, it has also opened embassies in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan. 26 In 2004, the Ministry reshuffled its own department on Central Asia, and the Central Asia and Caucasus Division was established under the European Affairs Bureau in place of the New Independent States Assistance Division that concerned all CIS countries including Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova.27 Japan also realized the importance of measures against terrorism in Central Asia as a priority for international security, especially after a group of Japanese geologists were taken hostage by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in 1999 and US operations in Afghanistan and Central Asia after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. As a foreign minister in the Koizumi administration, Kawaguchi Yoriko argued in 2003 that “People’s understanding about international relations and security or, in other words, their threat perception, has changed drastically” after 9/11, and it has been strongly impressed on them that “even non-governmental actors like terrorists might be enemies jeopardizing national security.”28 Japanese assistance in Diplomacy.” The Ministry of Foreign Affairs cooperated in editing the journal. 25 Gaimusho, Keizai Kyoryokukyoku, ed., Seifu kaihatsu enjo (ODA) kunibetsu deta bukku, 2004 [Japan’s Official Development Assistance: Annual Report, 2004] (2005): 199–204. 26 The Japanese Embassy in Kazakhstan changed its location from Almaty to Astana in 2005. 27 After their reorganization, these three countries are covered by the Central and South Eastern Europe Division. 28 KAWAGUCHI Yoriko, “Henka suru anzenhosho kankyo to Nihon gaiko” [The Changing Security Environment and Japanese Diplomacy], Ronza, March 2003, 181.

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reconstructing post-Taliban Afghanistan can be interpreted as an effective measure of international cooperation against terrorism.29

Policy-makers tried to gradually present opinions that linked terrorism with the situation in Central Asia. Here is an example written by Motegi Toshimitsu who served as the senior vice minister for Kawaguchi until October 2003. In his book published while in the Foreign Ministry, Motegi analyzed the contemporary regional situation classifying Asia into the three categories of Pacific Asia (or Oceanic Asia), Silk Road Asia (or South-West and Central Asia), and a non-geographic concept, Islamic Asia:

During the Cold War era, nobody paid attention to Central Asia strategically or politically. However, after the Cold War, it became a region where many problems such as narco-trafficking, refugees, and terrorism frequently occur, probably owing to freedom from the weight of the Soviet Union. Just as in the Middle East, Silk Road Asia is also a region with disturbing factors in international society. Central Asian countries have taken on complicated aspects sandwiched among powers and influential regions such as China, India, and the Middle East . . . “Regional powers” such as Japan, China, and India are required to describe visions of how to stabilize the whole area, which include the issue of engagement toward Central Asia.30

Furthermore, Motegi pointed out that Japan’s ODA will shift its

target region from ASEAN countries that have already developed sufficiently to Silk Road Asia or Islamic Asia. Motegi also linked economic assistance to anti-terror measures, as Kawaguchi did.

Even official remarks released from the Japanese government suggest cooperation in security affairs including the anti-terror issue between Japan and Central Asian countries. On April 12, 2002, at the Boao Forum for Asia on Hainan Island, China, Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro called for “a widened sphere of cooperation, including Central and West Asia.” He also stressed the creation of a “new momentum for cooperation in the five areas of energy, the environment, currency and finances, trade

29 http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/afghanistan/f_shien.html (in Japanese). 30 MOTEGI Toshimitsu, Nihon gaiko no kosoryoku [Japan’s Diplomatic Initiative] (Tokyo: Tokuma Shoten, 2003), 114–117.


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and investment and development assistance.”31 Before this speech, on January 14 in Singapore, Koizumi proposed an “Initiative for Japan-ASEAN Comprehensive Economic Partnership” vowing to establish a free trade zone among them in the future.32 This was evaluated as the first step of the concept of an Asian community from Japan. In this speech, Koizumi also argued that security cooperation should be drastically intensified, including on transnational issues such as terrorism. His proposal in Boao was also presented in the same context based on a comprehensive approach to region-wide security in Asia.

On the basis of the statement in Boao, in July 2002, the Silk Road Energy Mission headed by Sugiura Seiken, Senior Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, dispatched to Central Asia the first comprehensive delegation since the Obuchi Mission. Immediately after the delegation’s visit, on July 29, President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan visited Japan to conclude the bilateral statement on friendship, strategic partnership and cooperation, which suggested cooperation in the fields of politics and security, including anti-terrorism measures.33

It is difficult to evaluate whether Koizumi’s diplomacy followed his predecessor’s policy faithfully, especially in terms of Japan’s relations with other Asian countries. However, as far as the multilateral approaches toward Asian and Eurasian countries are concerned, there has been a clear continuity since the mid-1990s. Japan has tried to cooperate multilaterally at least with ASEAN and Central Asian countries not only in economic terms but also in terms of politics and security. Emerging Epistemic Community The Central Asia plus Japan dialogue (CAJ dialogue), which kicked off in the summer of 2004, evolved from the Silk Road diplomacy. Although this process started with Foreign Minister Kawaguchi’s round visit among Central Asian countries from August 25–31, it is probably correct to suppose that the staff of the Foreign Ministry, especially the Division of 31 “Asia in a New Century: Change and Opportunity” (Speech by the prime minister of Japan, Koizumi Junichiro, at the Boao Forum for Asia, April 12, 2002), http://www.mofa.go.jp/asia-paci/china/boao0204/speech.html. 32 “Japan and ASEAN in East Asia: A Sincere and Open Partnership” (Speech by the prime minister of Japan, KOIZUMI Junichiro, Singapore, January 14, 2002), http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0201/speech.html. 33 http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/uzbekistan/pv0207/joint.html.

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Central Asia and the Caucasus led by Michii Rokuichiro, had considered the new direction of Japan’s policy toward Central Asia beforehand. We caught a glimpse of the internal dispute from Kawaguchi’s comments at the National Diet. On February 5, 2004, during a discussion at a special committee of the House of Councilors, Kawaguchi evaluated her own actions toward Central Asia in that she had already set many meetings with her counterparts from Central Asia because of the importance of diplomacy vis-à-vis Central Asia. She also stressed Japan’s role in Central Asia, while commenting, “I hear many voices (from Central Asia) greatly appreciating Japan’s influence and contribution in the region,” and listing rival regional frameworks such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO).34

In this period, a group of experts worthy of the name “epistemic community” grew in Japan. They shared the necessity of creating a new framework for cooperation with the Central Asian states. Today, their influence is confirmed in several publications. For instance, the Japan Institute of International Affairs released a report, Evolution of International Relations in Central Asia, appending policy-oriented implications and ideas such as “Central Asia is a frontier for Japanese foreign policy where we can amplify the same principle of diplomacy toward Asian countries, or where Japan can enlarge its presence.”35

In a 2004 essay, Kimura Hiroshi also argued that Japan should take the initiative to create a beneficial international environment through engagement toward Central Asia. The title of the essay, “Central Asia and Japan: Importance as an Example,” suggests the future policy’s catchphrase of “Central Asia plus Japan.” In this essay, he pointed out that there is no direct point of contact between Central Asian countries and Japan, but indirect contact through Russia. “Japan can be ‘an example’ not only to neighboring Russia by establishing friendly relations with Central Asian states,” discusses Kimura, “but also to Central Asian nations in fields such as the economy, politics and diplomacy and security.”36

These discourses suggest Japanese scholars’ tendency in 34 Kawaguchi’s comment to Takano Hiroshi, a member of the House of Councilors. On April 6, 2004, she made almost the same comment to Iwamoto Tsukasa at the Committee on Foreign and Defense Affairs, the House of Councilors. 35 http://www.jiia.or.jp/pdf/russia_centre/h14_c-asia/03_kasai.pdf (in Japanese). 36 KIMURA Hiroshi, “Chuo Ajia to Nihon” [Central Asia and Japan], Ampoken Houkoku, January 27, 2004.


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understanding the necessity of strengthening relations with Central Asian states and of reconsidering principles; most of them seem to share a consensus of constructing a multilateral approach pursuing region-wide issues, while considering the importance of bilateral relations with each Central Asian state. These ideas were put together at a symposium hosted by the Central Asia and Caucasus Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on March 25, 2004. It is interesting that perspectives on multilateralism in Central Asia were proposed from the Japanese side in response to the idea presented by panelists from Central Asia. According to the transcript, Kadyrbek Sarbaev, Director General of the Asian Bureau of Kyrgyzstan, said that the contemporary presence of major powers in Central Asia has generally been described as “Central Asia plus three,” i.e., Russia, the United States and China. To strengthen the role of major powers in Central Asia, Sarbaev said, “It is important and necessary to point out the role of Japan in the process emerging in Central Asia today. I firmly believe that Japan is an active partner rather than an indirect partner for Central Asia. Considering that contemporary Central Asia is confronted with dual serious problems, i.e., security and economic development, Japan can contribute to the latter in particular , to improve the economic situation in Central Asian countries.”37 As a response to Sarbaev’s remark, Tanaka Tetsuji, advisor to Kyrgyz president Askar Akaev, argued, “It is possible to imagine a pattern like Central Asia plus Japan as a regional integration (framework) in economics. Considering the economic influence of Korea or Turkey on Central Asia, I can also propose another framework like Central Asia plus one (i.e., Japan) and observers. Anyway, I think that we should encourage the construction of a common economic zone in Central Asia, while making use of a framework like ‘Central Asia plus alpha.’”38

In addition to such discussions among experts, there is another condition for the construction of Japan’s new direction on its policy towards Central Asia, that is, the expansion and maturation of the range and scope of experts in Japan on Central Asia since the 1990s. Even

37 Japan, Gaimusho, Chuo Ajia Kokasasu shitsu [Central Asia and the Caucasus Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs], ed., Chuo Ajia sinpoziumu: Chuo Ajia ni okeru chiiki kyoryoku no genjo to mirai [Symposium on Central Asia: Present and Future for Regional Cooperation in Central Asia] (2005), 13–16. 38 Japan, Gaimusho, Chuo Ajia Kokasasu shitsu, Chuo Ajia sinpozium, 72.

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within the Foreign Ministry, the staff, many having majored in the Russian, Turkish and Persian languages, is well informed about the region through on-the-job experience in the field. With this as a background, the CAJ dialogue has been indicated through a bottom-up policy-making process. Starting the Dialogue and Its Problems During Foreign Minister Kawaguchi’s visit to Central Asia in the summer of 2004, she twice proposed the goals of the CAJ dialogue. In August 26, she gave a policy speech entitled “Adding a New Dimension: Central Asia plus Japan” at the University of World Economy and Diplomacy in Tashkent. 39 Based on the concept of “Eurasian diplomacy,” she emphasized Japan’s attitude toward Central Asia as follows:

It goes without saying that there are many changes we have no control over. The sweeping changes to international security as a result of 9/11 are only one example of this, and suddenly, Central Asia finds itself in the middle of a dramatically shifted regional strategic environment. I can tell you emphatically that Japan has no selfish objectives towards Central Asia. A country that does not engage in the use of force and a country with no political, territorial, or other potential sources of conflict with the countries of Central Asia, Japan is a natural partner for Central Asia, and the foundations have already been laid. In reflection of Central Asia’s geopolitical importance, Japan has a major interest in securing peace and stability in this region, as it affects the peace and stability of the entire Eurasian continent.

With this understanding of the security environment in Central Asia,

she pondered “what Japan can do to promote both stability and development in this region” and proposed three principles for Central Asia plus Japan: respecting diversity, competition and coordination, and open cooperation. Here, Kawaguchi stressed the importance of intra-regional cooperation: “By Central Asia taking on such an intra-regional framework, I believe that stability and prosperity can be attained much faster and more steadily than by each country acting only independently.” She also suggested the future enlargement of the dialogue geographically toward Afghanistan. This subject was partly realized when the foreign minister of 39 http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/uzbekistan/speech0408.html.


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Afghanistan participated as a guest at the second ministerial meeting of the dialogue in June 2006.

After her policy speech in Tashkent, on August 28, the first ministerial meeting of the CAJ dialogue was held at Astana where all foreign ministers from Central Asia except Turkmenistan met together in a hall. It would have been a positive result had the ambassador of Turkmenistan to Kazakhstan represented his country, as it have been given impetus towards isolationism. Given its prior impetus towards isolationism, the representation of the Turkmenistan ambassador to Kazakhstan would be a positive result.

The joint statement also insists on Central Asia’s “geopolitical importance,” just as Eurasian diplomacy did. Moreover, the CAJ dialogue would be better than Eurasian diplomacy in respect of listing in the appendix of the statement examples of cooperation, issues and other matters to be addressed in each field such as counter-terrorism, drugs, transportation, water, etc.40 These subjects were classified systematically at the first senior officials’ meeting (SOM) in March 4, 2005. The dialogue will be pursued through the five pillars of (1) political dialogue, (2) intra-regional cooperation, (3) business promotion, (4) intellectual dialogue and (5) cultural and people-to-people exchange. While stressing the importance of intra-regional cooperation for realizing peace and stability and economic prosperity, SOM listed ten possible areas of intra-regional cooperation including counter-terrorism, drug trafficking, mining, the environment, water, energy, etc.41

The current foreign minister, Aso Taro, succeeded and developed these principles and pillars of the dialogue. For example, in his policy speech entitled “Central Asia as a Corridor of Peace and Stability” on June 1, 2006, he stressed the following guidelines governing Japan’s diplomatic relations with Central Asia: (1) approaching the region from a broad-based perspective; (2) supporting “open regional cooperation”; and (3) seeking partnerships rooted in universal values (democracy, a market

40 Joint Statement “Central Asia + Japan” Dialogue/Foreign Ministers’ Meeting: Relations between Japan and Central Asia as They Enter a New Era, Astana, August 28, 2004; KOMATSU Ichiro, “‘Chuo Ajia + Nihon’: Tai Chuo Ajia seisaku no shin tenkai” [“Central Asia plus Japan”: A New Policy Development toward Central Asia], Gaiko Forum, no. 197 (2004): 20–27. 41 http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2005/3/0304-2.html.

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economy, the safeguarding of human rights, and the rule of law).42 In addition, the policy evolved in the sense that he puts forward “universal values” more strongly than did Kawaguchi in her speech in Tashkent two years ago in which she emphasized “the crucial nature of the development of human rights and democratization in Central Asia.” As a result of the second and latest ministerial meeting in June 5, 2006, member states released an action plan for the dialogue. These were concrete plans to develop each of the pillars mentioned above, especially that of intra-regional cooperation.43

For the further development of the CAJ dialogue, there are several issues to resolve. The first is how to balance interests and preferences among member states. In general, all Central Asian states behave with regional cooperation at first sight. In detail, however, as the president of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, suggested in his bilateral talks with Kawaguchi, the dialogue should be implemented while taking into consideration that each state in Central Asia has its own self-interest.44

Second, the dialogue should maintain continuity. So far, the regular meetings at each level seem to be consolidated and mature; there have been two meetings both at the ministerial and the SOM level. In addition, the first “track two”-level meeting named “Tokyo dialogue” was held on March 30, 2006. Moreover, the participants of the second ministerial meeting suggested in the action plan exploring the possibility of holding a summit meeting in the future within the dialogue framework.

Third, and perhaps most importantly, the dialogue should create a perspective on how to harmonize with other regional frameworks for international cooperation. Will the CAJ dialogue become competitive or cooperative with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Eurasian Economic Community?45

42 http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/speech0606.html. 43 http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/dialogue/action0606.html. 44 Yomiuri Shimbun, August 29, 2004. 45 See, for example, as anxiety that the dialogue will become a challenging framework against the SCO, Konstantin O. Sarkisov, “Novaia bipoliarnaia konfrontatsiia,” Nezavisimaia gazeta, June 8, 2006. Another Russian expert evaluated Japan’s initiative positively: Aleksei Malashenko, “Tsentral’naia Aziia: nikto ne khotel pobezhdat’,” NG-Dipkur’er, January 16, 2006.


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Conclusion The process of creating Eurasian diplomacy and the CAJ dialogue has been an important movement in Japanese foreign policy, in which the challenge of including geopolitics-oriented ideas has been met. It is also represents a unique opportunity for Japan to search for a way for regional multilateralism because, as well as most Asian countries in alliance with the United States, Japan understands the importance of such bilateral, hub-and-spoke relations with the US, and depends on the security umbrella delivered by the US. Suffice it to say here that Japan has just started to learn how to establish its regional multilateralism, although the process may be naïve. In this sense, Japan’s multilateral approaches during the Hashimoto administration should be verified in detail as a crucial diplomatic episode. As mentioned earlier, he had tried to promote a new foreign policy direction based on regional multilateralism not only toward the Eurasian continent but also toward the Asia-Pacific region, including ASEAN countries.

When Eurasian diplomacy and the CAJ dialogue are evaluated separately, the former was an initiative constructed by a top-down policy-making process, while the latter has been constructed by a relatively bottom-up process. However, both processes have not yet matured, as Ruggie defines multilateralism with the dual corollaries of indivisibility and diffuse reciprocity. For example, to establish indivisibility in Japan’s multilateral approach to Central Asian states, all participants in the framework should share the norm for regional stability. Because of the geographical remoteness of this region, however, there was a lack of urgency in Japan to face threats against regional stability.

The framework of the dialogue has just been set up through the multilateral approach toward Central Asia, and it is too early to forecast whether the process will create substantial products for regional cooperation. In the post-World War II era, as mentioned above, Japan’s foreign policy toward neighboring countries was based on bilateral relations, and it was difficult for Japan to switch to multilateral relations mainly based on comprehensive regional considerations. This was a factor that doomed Hashimoto’s initiative in addressing issues relating to Eurasia from a broad point of view. As far as the contemporary CAJ dialogue process is concerned, in order to overcome obstacles among

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member states such as geographical remoteness, it is a critical subject for Japan whether substantial actions will work effectively during the process, for instance, in the area of measures against terrorism and drug trafficking, which are listed in the latest action plan of the CAJ dialogue.

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The Current Foreign Policy of Russia Tatiana ZAKAURTSEVA Putin’s Changing Strategy Russian president Vladimir Putin decisively turned the tendency towards a balanced foreign policy into one of the main pillars of his general strategy. For him, this task was no more difficult in his second term than during his first. Back in 2000, he gained instant popularity that has remained the same through both his terms in office. His popularity rating has stayed well above 52 percent since then. Russians liked his tough approach toward Chechen terrorists including those who emigrated, his attractive personal qualities (youth, seriousness, dedication, intelligence, even his hobbies of judo and mountain skiing) and his determination to satisfy their increasing desire for order and a strong state after the chaos and lawlessness of the 1990s.1 Putin’s popularity, coupled with a degree of fear among segments of Russia’s population over his past connection with the special services, resulted in a widespread consent to Putin’s new rules of the game and his predominance in all spheres of politics, including foreign policy.

During his first term in office, Putin carried out an upgrading of national security, military and foreign policy concepts to ensure Russia’s progress toward a multidirectional, balanced, and pragmatic external

1 For an interesting analysis of Putin’s ascent to power, see Lilia Shevtsova, “Power and Leadership in Putin’s Russia,” in Russia after the Fall, ed., Andrew C. Kuchins (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), 62–78.

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strategy. During his second term in office, Putin continued to implement his new policy without encountering any serious resistance at home. Addressing the Federal Assembly with his annual message at the start of that term, he said: “It is important to make the foreign policy serve the comprehensive development and modernization of the country.”2

Russian foreign minster Sergei Lavrov, a Putin appointee and an experienced diplomat thanks to his many years of service as the Russian representative to the UN and a convinced adherent of the multilateral approach in diplomacy, is best suited to pursuing “the new Russian course” in international affairs. After the Beslan school hostage crisis in September, 2004, he said that Russia saw terrorism as the main threat. At the fifty-ninth session of the UN General Assembly during “the days of Beslan,” Russia put forward a complex program for the development of antiterrorist cooperation.3

Beslan, the two civilian Tupolev airliners brought down in a “terrorist attack,” the unwillingness of Western partners to understand Russia’s concerns, and the growth of anti-Russian criticism concerning Chechnya, as well as the simultaneous increase in instability in the post-Soviet states along Russia’s borders have made Putin choose a hard line. In order to protect the citizens, it has been decided to direct all efforts at strengthening the unity of the country as the main condition for the protection of Russian sovereignty and integrity.

Despite the seriousness of these issues, the new Russian leadership realizes that Russia faces even more immediate and concrete threats and challenges from other directions: extremist Islamic support for Chechen and other separatists and terrorists in the Caucasus; the split of the Commonwealth of Independent States after the “color revolutions” in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan; Russia’s own difficulties with some CIS states (Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova); and regional problems in its western part (Kaliningrad) because of the enlargement of the European Union to twenty-five members in May 2004 and in its eastern part, where there is rapid growth of China’s power coupled with increased

2 Rossiiskaia gazeta, July 13, 2004. 3 Sergei V. Lavrov, “Pered litsom obshchei ugrozi,” Diplomaticheskii ezhegodnik 2004 (2005), 17–20.

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immigration of Chinese nationals into sparsely populated and backward regions of Eastern Russia that China claimed as her own in the past.4

The sheer diversity, both in character and geography, of security challenges led the Kremlin to develop a multidirectional, balanced strategy. Given Russia’s geostrategic position and economic situation, the Kremlin could not afford to plunge into a new Cold War with the West, which Russia needs both as a valuable partner for the political and economic modernization of post-Soviet Russia as well as a balance to counter numerous security problems, which ranged from the real threat of terrorism to the potential challenge of the Chinese giant in the East. At the same time, Moscow realized that close cooperation with China would prevent US and NATO hegemony in world affairs and rebuff Islamic extremism in the south. The CIS zone also required a balanced policy in order to overcome conflicts and instability there.

At the beginning of his presidency, Vladimir Putin also recognized that internal reforms and the modernization drive required “the widest possible integration of Russia into the system of global economic interactions.” 5 Russia still needs the West as a valuable source of technology, capital, and management know-how. However, Russia’s leaders realized that in dealing with Western partners, Russia could not expect preferential treatment or easy concessions. Instead, Moscow faced stiff competition and tough bargaining on every economic issue. Putin also understood that the Russian Federation needed to increase economic cooperation in other directions. China and India looked attractive as markets for Russian weapons as well as civilian goods. Russia had to try to collect on debts owed by a score of Arab and African nations. CIS countries could develop into attractive economic partners of the Russian Federation.

The changes in conditions of the energy markets due to the prolonged military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq have made the current oil price hike possible. Since 2004, Russia has been able to have a profit in her budget and in 2005, created a reserve of gold and hard currency

4 For details, see Evgenii P. Bazhanov, Aktual’nye problemy mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii: izbrannye trudy v trekh tomakh, tom 1 (Moscow: Nauchnaia kniga, 2001), 237–241, 277–288, 297–301. 5 Kontseptsiia vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii (28 iiunia 2000) (Moscow: Administration of the President of the Russian Federation, 2000), 4.

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resources in her stabilization fund that as of November 1, 2006, had reached $ 76.6 billion.6

During Putin’s second term, it became possible to repay ahead of schedule Russia’s debt to the Paris Club. This served as the basis for changes in the tactics of Russian diplomacy in international relations.

Putin continued his strategy to help Russia regain her “great power” position. He did not do this by renewing the confrontation with the US, which Moscow neither needed nor wanted and certainly could not afford. But the lowering of Russia’s dependence on Western loans in 2005 and the breech by Western partners of their promise to renounce their discrimination against Russia in world trade (the preservation of the Jackson-Vanik amendment and America turning into the last obstacle to Russia’s admission to the WTO) changed the situation.

The changes in Russian foreign policy during the last year have also been related to the domestic situation.

Putin’s foreign policy generally garnered Russian popular support, partly because he usually received automatic endorsement by the majority of the population. But Putin’s policy was rooted in the genuine needs of Russia and the prevailing mood of the society’s elites. Nevertheless, liberals criticized Putin’s excessive and unwarranted toughness vis-à-vis the West and “reaching out to those labeled by Washington as ‘states of concern’—Iran, Iraq, Libya, Cuba, and North Korea.”7 Liberals detected in the Kremlin’s strategy a retreat into the past. Incidentally, conservatives and extremists saw such a retreat, too, but, unlike liberals, felt good about it.

Putin’s aspiration to make Russian foreign policy more independent corresponds to the moods of the conservative part of the Russian elite ideologizing the Soviet past.

Former foreign minister of Russia and present-day president of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry Evgenii Primakov joyfully greeted the changes in Putin’s course in international affairs. He wrote that “the

6 MDM Bank, Ezhednevnyi obzor: rossiiskii fondovyi rynok, November 2, 2006, http://invest.mdmbank.ru/files/invest/analitd/20061102.pdf. 7 For an illustration of such reservations, see Dmitri Trenin, “From Pragmatism to Strategic Choice: Is Russia’s Security Policy Finally Becoming Realistic?” in Kuchins, Russia after the Fall, 187–191.


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foreign policy in 2005 was successful in all directions including the American and the European ones.”8

Andrew Kuchins, Director of the Moscow Carnegie Center, claims that Putin is striving for partnership with Washington not as a junior partner meekly accepting US hegemony, but on an equal footing. To establish this equality, the Kremlin continues to strive for multipolarity.

“Similar to China, Russia is becoming one among few countries that will pursue an independent foreign policy course and play a significant role in a number of key regions—Europe, Northeast Asia, and the so-called Greater Middle East—the areas with predominantly Muslim populations southward from Russia.”9

As the foreign policy concept adopted on June 28, 2000 says, “Russia will seek the formation of a multipolar system of international relations adequately reflecting the multifaceted nature of the contemporary world with its diversity of interests.”

The Kremlin believed this position was necessary not only to satisfy Russia’s own ambitions, but also to guarantee world peace and security. From the Russian point of view, a unipolar world “may destabilize the international situation, provoke tensions and an arms race, and deepen both confrontations between states and ethnic and religious rivalry.”

Having adopted this multidirectional balanced external strategy, Putin is continuing to implement it. He regularly meets with US president George W. Bush, who is currently serving his second term in office. The Russian president intensively courts European leaders and strives to patch up relations with CIS countries. Putin is developing contacts with European leaders. He hurried to invite newly elected heads of state Angela Merkel and Romano Prodi to Russia and established contacts with the new leaders of former Soviet allies in Eastern and Central Europe and the leader of the Canadian conservatives who won the elections in January 2006.

On the other side of the globe, Putin energetically promoted ties with China and India and hosted in Russia the leader of North Korea, a former Soviet ally. He also welcomed Iranian and new Palestinian leaders in Moscow.

8 Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn’, no. 1–2 (2006): 5. 9 Andrew Kuchins, “Moskva na pereput’e vetrov s Zapada i Vostoka,” Nezavisimaia gazeta, December 26, 2005.

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In reality, Putin did not want to turn back. He did not want to distance Russia from the West. The Russian president remained eager to promote partnership with the West, including the US, but on an equal footing, that would preserve to the extent possible Russia’s great power status and interests and retain good relations with other parts of the world and individual countries.

The second Bush administration in Washington was not ready to accommodate the Kremlin’s aspirations. It appeared to Moscow that conservative Republicans came to the White House determined to undo Clinton’s foreign policy, including its Russian component. The Bush administration criticized Russia for its alleged strengthening of authoritarianism, state regulation of the economy, and control over nongovernmental organizations. As usual, the US president was ready to talk to Russia on topics he considered important (like nonproliferation and arms control), but simply disregarded Moscow’s opinions and priorities in other areas.10

In general, the Republican White House held a rather negative view of Russia. Washington disliked Putin’s background, his political entourage, and his attempts to curb the freedom of the media and to recentralize the country. It appeared to Washington that Moscow was maneuvering itself for a new round of geopolitical competition with Cold War era overtones.11 Russia’s Goals in the Post-Soviet Space Changes in Russian foreign policy became known in 2005. A series of “color revolutions” in neighboring countries of the CIS (the last one happened in Kyrgyzstan) have as their consequence the aspiration of the new elites to integration without Russia’s participation.

It has become known that the victorious opposition received financial support from the West. Some of the new leaders took an anti-Russian position. They started a rapprochement with the US and Europe and started moving toward joining NATO.

10 See Gennadii Gerasimov, “W. i ego komanda: dalek on ot Moskvy i ee problem,” Novoe vremia, 2001, no. 7: 31–34. 11 Nikolai Zlobin, “Khuzhe kholodnoi voiny,” Nezavisimaia gazeta, May 12, 2006.


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In order to make his position clear, President Putin in his annual message to the Federal Assembly accused the West of double standards and paid much attention to the question of strengthening cooperation with the republics of Central Asia. He expressed in much stronger terms Russia’s dissatisfaction with the US’s allegedly anti-Iran and anti-DPRK missile defense plans and actions, NATO enlargement closer to Russian borders, Western attitudes toward Iran’s nuclear program and the situation in Kosovo, EU treatment of Russia in the energy field, US global unilateralism in general and other issues at the Conference on Security Policy in Munich on February 10, 2007, where leading political and military representatives of 26 NATO member countries were present.12

It looks like a reorientation towards the East, but in reality, it is just a balancing of the multivectoral policy.

Using the resources available, Russia is striving to preserve her influence in the neighboring states. It is the geopolitical aspect of Russia’s foreign policy.

The Russian leadership declared that it was in favor of a diversification of its customers and has begun using her energy resources to turn Russia into “a great energy power.” It is very important for Moscow to restore Russia as a global center of power that needs the appropriate surrounding.

Russia will not return to her imperial policy of the past, but operates in the sphere of her prevalent interests by economic means of strengthening her influence. Former Soviet republics have been losing their Russian preferences. The CIS has become internally unstable. Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova have created the Union of Democratic Choice and orient themselves only to the US and the EU.

Of eleven CIS member countries, Russia has only five allies that are members of either one or both the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Eurasian Economic Community (EEC). They are Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. In November 2005, Russia concluded a treaty of alliance with Uzbekistan.13 12 See Vladimir Putin, “Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy,” February 10, 2007, Munich, President of Russia Official Web Portal, http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2007/02/10/0138_type82912type82914type82917type84779_118135.shtml. 13 See more details in Sergei Lavrov, “ODKB protiv global’nykh i transgranichnykh ugroz: iskluchitel’noe interv’iu ministra inostrannykh del RF S. Lavrova,” Zhurnal

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These are pragmatic alliances based only on the coincidence of interests, not on a sense of common destiny.

The nature of a political regime in an allied state is of no relevance to the Russian leadership. During the “color revolutions,” the troops at the Russian bases did not interfere in the events in Georgia. Instead, Russia acted as an intermediary in the wake of political crises.

Russia’s political resources in the post-Soviet space are not depleted and she can compete with her main rivals in the struggle for influence—the US, the European Union, and China. These resources are based on the economic and civilizational and cultural attractiveness of Russia. She can live without exploiting her partners’ resources, but rather can share with them her own resources and act as a leader of economic modernization and a guarantor of the security of the common space.

Some of Russia’s partners perceive the shift in world prices as a form of economic pressure. However, it is just the result of their refusal to have close allied relations with Russia that is providing the opportunity to disencumber themselves from Russian guardianship and to act without the support they are accustomed to. In the future, they will have to look for new patrons in the West.

The turn of Russia’s interests toward Eurasia makes her policy in the Asia-Pacific region especially important. Russia in the Asia-Pacific Region Developing good relations with the Asia-Pacific region (APR) is another important goal for Russian foreign policy. Moscow’s priorities there are to protect her national security; use the region’s potential to develop Russia’s economy; consolidate multipolarity in international relations; and advance Russia as a respected pole of influence in international relations.14

The current situation in the APR appears beneficial to Russian interests: there are no hostile blocs or states; Russia is not directly

Voennyi diplomat, 2006, no. 2: 23–27. 14 See Aleksei D. Voskresenskii, ed., Vostok/Zapad: regional’nye podsistemy i regional’nye problemy mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2002), 81–104, 370–380, 451–492.


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involved in local conflicts; and the Russian Federation is welcomed as a participant in the political and economic life in the APR.15

However, Russia’s foreign policy must respond to various problems in the region that have an impact on Russian interests. The most visible and potentially most destructive problem is the deepening gap in economic development between eastern Russia and her neighboring Asian states. If Russia fails to improve the economic situation in Siberia and her Far Eastern reaches, her neighbors will sense the weakness and begin to exert demographic and economic pressure. Russia cannot single-handedly overcome economic backwardness and must rely on assistance from foreign partners.

At the same time, Russia must develop an understanding of the problems that confront her Asian neighbors: diminished natural resources, environmental degradation, overpopulation, terrorism, drug trafficking, unemployment, and deadly diseases are all problems that transcend the region’s national borders. Finding solutions will require international cooperation.

Regional “hot spots,” particularly the Korean and Taiwan issues and disputes over islands in the South China Sea, form the second group of problems. Moscow’s approach to all such problems is identical and straightforward: she encourages all relevant parties to search for a peaceful, orderly solution to differences. The same position is taken towards the Russian-Japanese dispute over the South Kurile Islands.

The third set of APR problems is connected with the proliferation of nuclear weapons, particularly the nuclear programs of India and Pakistan. Russia also strongly opposes North Korea’s missile and nuclear ambitions. She insists on a peaceful settlement in all these cases.16

Finally, the possibility of an arms race and increased tensions among leading Pacific powers (China, Japan, and US) raises a fourth set of problems. The Kremlin believes this rivalry can be toned down through improved multinational security and economic mechanisms.17

15 For details, see Evgenii P. Bazhanov, ed., Aziatsko-Tikhookeanskii region v usloviiakh globalizatsii (Moscow: Nauchnaia kniga, 2001), 4–23, 67–82, 136–151, 219–232. 16 For details, see Bazhanov, Aktual’nye problemy mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii, tom 2, 54–57. 17 Vladimir Fedotov, Perspektivy formirovaniia sistem mnogostoronnei bezopasnosti v Severo-Vostochnoi Azii (Moscow: Nauchnaia kniga, 2003), 67–85.

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As for individual countries in the region, Russia’s interests focus on China, Japan, and the two Korean states. Russian-Chinese relations have developed into a strategic partnership, and are characterized by both sides as “the best in their entire history.” This development has been shaped by a combination of factors: the two sides have learned the bitter lessons of past confrontations; they have managed to solve some long-standing historical disputes over territory and concentration of troops on their common border; they have overcome political-ideological differences and feel an affinity as reforming societies in need of a peaceful, external environment; and they are economically interdependent. Common concerns in the international arena, including similar views on multipolarity, hegemonism, and the UN role, are also powerful driving forces behind the Russian-Chinese partnership.18

Difficulties still crop up in Russian-Chinese relations. One irritant is the growing number of Chinese immigrants moving into Russia’s sparsely populated and economically backward Far East. Another potential problem may result from the changing balance of power between Russia and China. For the first time in modern history, China may become stronger than her northern neighbor. If this possibility materializes, the PRC may exert geopolitical pressure on a weakened Russia. Such worries are already being voiced in Moscow.19

Japan, unlike China, does not ignite such worries in Russian society. Indeed, Russians perceive Japan favorably and are impressed by the quality of Japanese goods and achievements in science and technology. Moreover, Moscow sees Japan’s independent and strong position as a balance against the US and China. Moscow also envisions Japan as one of the most important future economic partners of the Russian Federation in the Far East.20

In 2005, Russia and Japan celebrated the hundredth and fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of official relations between the two countries. President Putin’s visit to Japan in November 2005 became 18 For details, see Dzhamil’ Akhmedovich Asfari, Rossiisko-kitaiskie otnosheniia: realisticheskii vzgliad na ikh istoriiu, sovremennoe sostoianie i perspektivy (Moscow: Diplomaticheskaia akademiia, 1999), 50–71. 19 See, for instance, Vasilii Mikheev and Iakov Berger, Problemy i perspektivy razvitiia Kitaia (Moscow, 2003), 14–16.. 20 See Patoh Shodiev, Iaponia v sovremennom mire (Moscow: Nauchnaia kniga, 2001), 82–122.


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another step forward in the development of bilateral relations. His negotiations with the Japanese prime minister resulted in the signing of a package of eighteen documents on economic, humanitarian, security, and other cooperation. At a press conference, the president of Russia said in particular that “much attention was being paid to the problem of a peace treaty . . . Both Russia and Japan are unanimous in their opinion that the solution to this issue should be sought on the basis of partnership and mutual respect and mutual trust . . . At the same time, we realize that the settlement of such complex problems will hardly be easy. It will require goodwill, farsightedness, and statesmen’s thinking.”21

On the Korean Peninsula, Russia maintains close and relatively problem-free links with South Korea. As for North Korea, Moscow opposes military or “strangulation” policies, which she believes would have negative consequences for the APR and global security. In the new century, Russia has somewhat improved her relations with North Korea that were practically frozen after the collapse of the USSR. At the same time, the Kremlin insists that North Korea permanently renounce her nuclear ambitions in exchange for genuine security guarantees.22 Russia actively participates in the six-party talks on these problems and welcomes any steps that may lead to a rapprochement between the North and the South, particularly the restoration of the Trans-Korean Railroad that, if linked to the Trans-Siberian Railroad, could bring benefits to the Russian economy, too.

The demand for energy and other resources and the economic growth of China, Japan, South Korea, and India increasingly stimulate the development of the Russian economy and are attractive objects for it. Russia has to step up her activities in the eastern direction of her foreign policy. The growth of Asian economies and the redistribution of power in the world are increasing the chances for the creation of the real multipolarity that Russia aspires to.

Considering the role and place of Russia in the Asia-Pacific region, one cannot but pay attention to its participation in APEC. APEC is a very 21 Statements to the press and questions and answers by president of Russia Vladimir Putin and prime minister of Japan Koizumi Junichiro following the completion of the Russo-Japanese negotiations at the highest level, Tokyo, November 21, 2005; see www.mid.ru. 22 See Iurii E. Fokine, ed., Piatyi Rossiisko-koreiskii forum (Moscow: Nauchnaia kniga, 2004).

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important forum where meetings of the highest-level representatives of Russia, China, Japan, the US, the ROK, and many other countries take place. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is another forum that offers such unique opportunities, and the end of 2005, saw the first-ever participation of the Russian president to be followed by his visit to the APEC summit in Hanoi in November 2006. These developments show that Russia is increasingly active in building complex relations with all leading Asia-Pacific actors and the creation of an intertwined network of organizations and arrangements in the region. The Impact of the War in Iraq on the Russian Position The crisis in Iraq has not significantly changed Russia’s foreign policy toward Asia, although she has increased attention to “hot spots” in an effort to settle disputes peacefully on the basis of collective efforts of all parties involved. In 2002–2003, during the Afghan campaign, Russia provided the coalition forces and the US military with secret data and maps of minefields, rendered diplomatic support, and gave her own resources to help deploy US military bases in Central Asia. Yet, the interaction encountered unwillingness to take into account Russia’s interests. Hopes for an improvement in relations with the West proved to be futile. Another stage of NATO’s eastward enlargement began in late 2002, which is a disputable and touchy theme for a Russian society that has not lost the momentum-generated vision of the Alliance as an enemy. In 2003, Russia sided with France and Germany when it opposed the US military intervention in Iraq without UN backing.

In the summer of 2005, the members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) demanded that the US set deadlines for the withdrawal of US military forces from Central Asia. Uzbekistan’s leader, frightened by the Western condemnation of his methods of suppression of riots in Andijan, managed to make the US troops leave his country. Andrew Kuchins called this a joint victory for Russia and China as the leading members of the SCO and “the first weakening of US influence in the region where their geopolitical consolidation has been going on for two decades.”23

23 Kuchins, “Moskva na pereput’e vetrov s Zapada i Vostoka.”


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Western political scientists often call the Shanghai Cooperation Organization an “anti-NATO” organization. India and Pakistan, as well as Iran and Mongolia, were represented at the SCO summit on June 15, 2006 in Shanghai. Also, a contact group with Afghanistan was created. President Putin said in an interview that since the creation of the SCO on June 15, 2001, it had “rapidly gained weight and turned into an influential organization and an important element of stability in the Eurasian space.”24 Even before the 9/11 attacks, the SCO leaders favored the creation of a regional antiterrorist structure, as they encountered international bands of terrorists in their own territories. At the same time, Russia and China see this region as “a sphere of their interests” and both are interested in regional stability.25

The war in Iraq put pro-Western opposition into motion. Moscow, Beijing, and the Central Asian states are worried that the fire of the “color revolutions” might bring about instability and a loss of legitimacy. Geopolitics is returning to Eurasia. Changes in the balance of power are accompanied by the return of the ideological component in China-Russia-US relations. The SCO leaders implement solutions to their concerns through firm resistance to the actions of the US and Europe for the promotion of democracy, which are starting to look like an export of their ideology in world affairs.

Not opposing openly the idea of democratization, Russia offers its own version of “sovereign democracy.” She insists on the preservation of national traditions that sometimes do not coincide with American or West European traditions. Russia urges “letting the apple become ripe.” She stands for a gradual development of democratic institutions in the countries of Eurasia. The thrust of the US and Europe in “the promotion of democracy” is dangerous, because it serves as a basis for new alliances in the countries that propose gradual steps.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization declares its goal to confront terrorism. The US and the US-initiated antiterrorist coalition in Iraq do the same. It would seem that a joining of efforts could provide security for the whole “Southern belt” of Eurasia and the whole Greater Middle East.

24 Vladimir Putin, “ShOS – novaia model’ uspeshnogo mezhdunarodnogo sotrudnichestva,” Rossiiskaia gazeta, June 15, 2006. 25 See “Deklaratsiia piatiletiia Shankhaiskoi organizatsii sotrudnichestva,” Problemy Dal’nego Vostoka, 2006, no. 4: 9–12.

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However, the aspiration of Russia’s Western partners to speed up the “proliferation of democracy” and to support opposition in the post-Soviet states is causing fears that the war against terror might turn into a struggle for the West to gain new spheres of influence.

Partly due to negative objective circumstances and partly through her own fault, Russia has lost her former allies. Now, she is mobilizing all available resources to preserve her partnership with the oil- and gas-rich Central Asian states. This region is turning into an area of great importance for Russia. On the other hand, the reaction of Moscow to the events in Iraq and Central Asia is transforming into an aspiration to increase her control over the internal politics there under the slogan of consolidation against outside forces. Some Western public opinion sees this as a threat to democracy and urges its leaders to put pressure on Moscow, thus increasing Russia’s impression of outside threats. The circle becomes complete. Mutual distrust becomes stronger.

But for Russia, it is very important that the war in Iraq caused discord in the camp of the Western allies and touched upon the fundamental issue of international relations. Sharp discussion on the question of forceful unilateral action without UN approval has cast doubts on the traditional principles of the world order. For Russia, these discords between her European partners and the US have had extremely negative consequences. Russia is the staunchest advocate of the UN. She stands for a careful attitude to its reform and for preservation of universally recognized traditions.

The meeting at the summit in Shanghai between President Putin and the leader of Iran, labeled a “terrorist state” by US vice president Richard Cheney, again showed that notions of terrorism are very different. The role of the UN in the definition of terrorism and in the legitimacy of any actions against terrorism has become greater. Organizations with the goal of fighting terrorism should unite different countries.

President Putin notes in his article published in China, India, Pakistan, and Iran that “a spirit of Shanghai” has taken shape and that the organization demonstrates an example of equal partnership of states with cultural and civilizational differences and accumulates the experience of interaction with new observer countries.26 Historically, Iran is similar to

26 Putin, “ShOS – novaia model’ uspeshnogo mezhdunarodnogo sotrudnichestva.”


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Iraq in terms of “difficulty” of dealing with, but efforts to engage Iran in discussion without the threat of military intervention are very important.

In the opinion of former Russian foreign minister Igor Ivanov, the Iraq crisis confirmed that the period of transition to a new world order is inadmissibly delayed and that this has led to permanent instability.27 There has hardly ever been another period with so many unresolved crises existing simultaneously.

Russia is striving to create such a world order in which every state will bear its share of responsibility for the future of mankind, and the world community in its turn will safeguard the lawful interests of each of its members. The Russian principle of multipolarity is prosperity and security through international interaction and the preservation of national identity.28

The majority of experts are sure it is possible to solve the problem of Iraq through joint efforts and to prevent US-Russian relations from deteriorating. US-Russia Relations Conservative forces in the administration of George W. Bush and the “patriots” in the Russian establishment think equally in the category of the zero-sum-game rivalry typical of Cold War times. However, both presidents still adhere to a policy aimed at the creation of partnership-like relations, although they make concessions to critical public sentiments in their countries. The US reoriented its foreign policy to the struggle against terrorism and recognized Russia as a very valuable partner. Russian-US relations, now united by the common goal of fighting international terrorism, began to ascend to new heights.

However, the Iraq crisis provoked new tensions between the two partners. Moscow felt that it was unadvisable and extremely dangerous to use force to provoke regime change without the backing of the United Nations. From the Russian point of view, if “rule of the fist” becomes the

27 Igor Ivanov, “Novyi vneshnepoliticheskii god dlia mira i Rossii,” Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn’, 2003, no. 9–10: 10–17. 28 Ivanov, “Novyi vneshnepoliticheskii god dlia mira i Rossii.”

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norm, then the world will again slide to chaos, war, and finally, global conflict.29

Now it is Washington’s turn to believe in the victorious might of its ideology. The earlier, hegemonic-messianic motives have been augmented by calls for vengeance and a determination to guarantee the absolute security of America.30 Such policies, as historical experience proves, lead to the formation of a united antihegemonic front, and then large-scale conflicts erupt. What will the outcome be this time? Antihegemonic ideas have already surfaced in various countries.31

And yet, Russia’s leadership believes that the twenty-first century will not witness a repetition of past scenarios. First, the US has already felt negative repercussions of its coercive imposition of democracy in Afghanistan and Iraq. Difficulties will continue to grow. Second, domestic opposition to the US government’s hegemonic policies is already growing. The US is a democratic country. For many politicians and citizens, a foreign policy fraught with violations of international law and human sacrifices is unacceptable. Third, Washington lacks sufficient financial resources to pay for Pax Americana.

Fourth, and this is probably the main factor, the sheer number and scale of challenges in the modern world make it absolutely impossible for any one state, even one as powerful as the US, to handle them alone. To successfully counter the multitude of threats—terrorism, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, organized crime, regional, local, and internal conflicts, to mention a few—the international community must develop a close and equal partnership led by the United Nations and other multinational bodies and based on international law. As the authoritative diplomatic yearbook, Diplomaticheskii ezhegodnik, published by the Russian Foreign Ministry’s Diplomatic Academy, put it, “in our globalizing world, any seemingly insignificant problem in any least important country rushes beyond local borders and undermines international stability through the influx of refugees, terrorist attacks, drug

29 See, for example, Alexandr Sentiabrev, “Irakskii urok – 2003,” Obozrevatel’, 2003, no. 6: 45–51. 30 See The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: President of the US, 2002), 5–6. 31 Evgenii Bazhanov, “Amerika na rasput’e: so vsemi ili protiv vsekh?” Rossiiskaia Federatsia segodnia, 2003, no. 11: 58.


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trafficking, thefts of nuclear materials, and disruption of transportation and communication links.”32

Moscow concludes that “despite the growing urge of Washington to achieve unilateral hegemony and to turn other members of the global society into ‘junior partners,’ the realities of modern times push and will continue to push the United States toward more realistic and reasonable cooperative policies.”33

Russia certainly takes all this into account in determining her own strategy in the international arena and recognizes that the majority of problems that the US tries to solve are equally important to Russia. While the US cannot handle all these problems alone, the Russian Federation in turn urgently needs to cooperate with the US not only in the field of foreign policy but also in order to achieve its internal goals—creating an effective market economy and a sustainable democracy.

Consequently, Russian leadership acknowledges that the US, not as the predominant leader but as the most developed and influential state, plays the world’s most important role in securing global economic progress and political stability.34 “We all depend on the US . . . but the US, and this is the peculiarity of the contemporary globalizing world, increasingly depends on others. There are hundreds of links that bind US and Russia into one system, making them hostages to each other’s stability and prosperity.”35 Moscow will undoubtedly continue its strategy of cooperation with Washington while arguing against hegemonism. Russia and Europe President Putin stressed at the ambassadors’ meeting at the Foreign Ministry of Russia on July 12, 2004, that “Europe remains one of our traditional priorities.”

Russia’s relations with Europe have a much longer history than her contacts with the United States. These relations have been controversial, embracing both cooperation and competition, and at times hostility.

32 Diplomaticheskii ezhegodnik, 2003, 22–23. 33 Diplomaticheskii ezhegodnik, 24. 34 Viacheslav Nikonov, “Rossiia v poiskakh mesta v mire,” Vestnik, 2001, no. 2: 21–25. 35 See Evgenii Bazhanov, “Neizbezhnost’ mnogopoliusnogo mira,” Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn’, 2003, no. 8: 51.

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Russian society was permanently split into Westernizers and Slavophiles. While the Westernizers pushed for the full integration of Russia into Europe, the Slavophiles saw an alien and menacing civilization in Europe. They wanted to distance Russia from the West and orient the country toward the East. Russia’s debate over her European connections is not over. Similarly, Europeans have not yet completely shed their historical fears and distrust of the giant to the east.36

Another obstacle to improved Russian-European relations is posed by geopolitical differences. Russia is a Eurasian country geographically, but culturally, it belongs to Europe. This is partly thanks to the formation of Russia as a great power as well the European civilization proliferating its influence in the great geographic space reaching the Asia-Pacific region and the shores of Japan, China, and Korea.

Russia has a long history as a great power and will not be satisfied with a minor, second-rate role on the European scene. NATO’s expansion will not improve Russia’s stature, but at the same time, Russia cannot join NATO: powerful neighbors in the East, particularly China, would vehemently oppose Russia’s alliance with the Western military bloc. India, Iran, and Arab countries would also lose much of their confidence in Russia. Suspicions of a conspiracy (“European,” “Christian,” “White Race,” etc.) will grow.

NATO members, for their part, would not welcome Russia as one of their own. Russian membership would be counter to US interests since the US does not want any competitors to its primary role in the alliance. Europe’s leading powers (Germany, France, and Great Britain) also harbor apprehensions about Russia’s presence within the alliance. As for NATO’s East European members, Russian membership would negate the purpose of their own partnership in the alliance. Further, NATO as a whole is wary of the China factor: should problems develop on the Russian-Chinese border, NATO would have—at least legally and formally—to side with Russia if she were its member. The same concerns apply to Russia’s conflicts with separatists and extremists in the South. Such a prospect would not appeal to NATO members.

36 For a thorough discussion of these issues, see Nikolai P. Shmelev, ed., Evropa: vchera, segodnia, zavtra (Moscow: Ekonomika, 2002), 13–138, 355–388, 481–499, 564–588, 719–736.


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NATO enlargement through incorporation of CIS countries spells nothing good for Russia. The intense mutual distrust and suspicion accumulated during the forty years of confrontation makes Russia wary. Ukraine and Georgia joining NATO would mean a growing dependence of her former allies on the NATO decision-making system both in the political and military spheres.

Russia strives for the creation of a Greater Europe united on the basis of common values and the capability to defend them jointly and to resolve regional conflicts (including the “frozen” conflicts in the Balkans, Cyprus, or the post-Soviet space). But it is important to take into account the concerns of all parties. Imposition of variants of fast settlement and forceful pressure is counterproductive as it creates new hotbeds of tension and security risk.

Political-ideological problems also impede closer relations between Russia and Europe. Russia is in the initial stages of building a democratic society. Communists and nationalists who preach undemocratic and anti-Western ideas are prominent in public discussion. Russian officials pursue policies that add to Europe’s anxieties: Chechnya, controls over the mass media, the centralization of political power, and increased supervision over foreign-sponsored nongovernmental organizations, although all these restrictions and controls can be found in the West, too, especially after the 9/11 attacks.

Western criticism cuts to the quick in Russia. Authorities believe that their attempts to safeguard the Russian Federation and to prevent the collapse of the state are purposely opposed by unfriendly forces in the West in order to weaken Russia and to provoke her disintegration.37

Hurdles also remain in economic interactions between Russia and the West. Russia’s fledgling economy creates misunderstandings, tensions, and disputes with Europe over a range of issues that include quality control, pricing, customs duties, and ecological standards. Her economic problems preclude Russia’s entry into the European Union.38 Russia perceives that it encounters discrimination in some European markets,

37 See, for example, President Putin’s interview on Russian TV Channel 1, November 7, 2003. 38 See Gaga Ediberidze, “Integratsionnye protsessy i problemy bezopasnosti v Evrope” (dissertatsiia na soiskanie uchenoi stepeni kandidata politicheskikh nauk, Diplomaticheskaia Akademiia MID RF, 2002), 112–129.

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while members of the European business community do not yet find Russian markets sufficiently attractive or safe enough for investment.

Russian foreign minister Lavrov said after his meeting with members of the Committee on International Affairs of the European Parliament in Strasbourg on May 18, 2006 that realization of the four “roadmaps” of common spaces would help Russia to conclude a new treaty on partnership with the European Union to replace the expiring agreement. Russia and Europe are not only economic partners, but they also traditionally compete in some areas of trade and economic relations.

Social problems exacerbate economic problems. Corruption and crime scare Europeans away from Russia. Moreover, Russia “exports” criminal elements to Europe and serves as a transit route for the drug trade and illegal immigration from the east. Because of these fears, the problem of Russian access to Kaliningrad and visa requirements in general have become a matter of conflict between Russia and other European states.

Despite these obstacles, there is a great potential for a deeper partnership between Russia and Europe. The most important contributing factor is Russia’s strategy for development.

Globalization makes it impossible for Russia to isolate herself and to embark on any new extravagant social experiment in an attempt to develop along some “third path,” that is, neither capitalism nor communism, which some proponents of its exaggerated uniqueness preach and which would be bound to lead Russia to third-world country status. Leading centers of the contemporary world, notably the West, China, India, and Southeast Asia are becoming increasingly interdependent and are continuing to forge ahead in all spheres. If Russia does not cooperate with this process of globalization, she may simply collapse.

As Russia’s economic and political values align increasingly with the realities of the globalizing world, Russia and Europe will share more security priorities. Russia will accommodate herself to a more definite role in the world. After this, Russia’s uneasiness over NATO’s possible new steps toward expansion will surely diminish, while the European countries will no longer depend on NATO as a shield against Russia. Military deterrence and the balance of power calculations will fade away from the agenda of Russian-European relations.

The two sides are already beginning to realize that they have more in common in their security needs than ever before. They face the same


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threats, which require joint countermeasures. Sooner or later, they will create a comprehensive security system for the entire Eurasian continent, encompassing Europe, Russia, and perhaps even China, Japan, and a unified Korea. Russia will become an indispensable partner in this process.

Economic interdependence will also grow. With the Middle East unstable and conflict, Russia will most certainly reinforce her position as a principal supplier of oil and gas to the West. The West and Russia will forge cooperative efforts in the extraction, delivery, refining, and distribution of energy supplies in Siberia, the Caspian Sea, and the Russian Far East. Considering Russia’s rich deposits of many other raw materials, Russian-European economic cooperation has endless vistas. As market reforms progress, Russia will eventually be a lucrative target for investments in other areas—from information technologies and science to banking and industry and environmental tourism, and even agriculture (Russia still owning a very sizable share of the world’s fertile land) remains promising despite the grave consequences of Russia’s mindless social experiments over its peasants in the past.

Economic progress will lead to social progress. Unemployment and widespread corruption will decrease the way it happened in Europe in the 1950s and 1960s. There are already some signs that the much-criticized consolidation of power in Russia is not such a bad thing. According to Russian prosecutor general Iurii Chaika, by December 2006, as many as thirty-five thousand officials at all levels of authority “were caught red-handed,” that is, various kinds of legal action had been initiated against them.39 Russia hopes these measures will help suppress routes of illegal immigration and the drug trade and crush organized crime.

To accomplish these tasks, Russia needs European cooperation, and this has already begun to develop in Afghanistan and Central Asia, where Russian-European cooperation is already under way to suppress the drug trade and illegal immigration.

As the social situation and standards improve, barriers to travel and to the movement of labor and students will begin to fall. The Schengen visa agreement will expand to include Russia, and it will help to promote further cultural ties. More and more Russian students will study in Europe and gradually, Russia’s political and economic elites will consist of those who studied in Europe and understand and share its values. 39 Izvestiia, December 7, 2006.

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The process of Russian-European accommodation will develop gradually and experience ups and downs. This partnership will not result in Russia’s full incorporation into the Western community. Because of her history, size, power, level of development, geography, security, and economic requirements, Russia will remain a separate entity, a bridge between the West and the East. Moscow’s Interests in the Middle East Due to the Middle East’s vast human and natural resources as well as its geography, the region is strategically important to world peace and the world economy. For this reason alone, it is attracting Russia’s attention. The proximity of the Middle East to Russia is further focusing Moscow’s attention on protecting four broad areas of interest.

First of all, the security of Russia depends on the security of the Middle East. Any disturbance to the peace and stability of the region may undermine Russia’s security, draw her into destructive conflicts, or damage her economic interests. Moscow must also assure that the states, movements, and citizens of the Middle East maintain a positive attitude towards the Russian Federation and not threaten Russia’s territorial integrity, sovereignty, or internal peace.

Second, Russia has political goals in the Middle East. She wants to work closely with all states in the region to pursue peace and cooperation, solve global problems, and create a stable, multipolar international system.

The third aspect of Russia’s Middle East policy is economic. The Russian government intends to actively participate in extracting Caspian oil and exporting it to world markets. Russia also needs access to the energy resources of the Persian Gulf and other parts of the Middle East. Russia wants to export technology and goods to the Middle East as well as to import their products and attract Middle Eastern investors to the Russian economy. And, of course, Moscow would also like to recover huge debts from Iraq, Syria, and Libya.

Another aspect of Russia’s interest in the Middle East is cultural. Russia’s Muslim population numbers over twenty million. Moscow must find a path that facilitates religious, spiritual, and ethnic contact between


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the peoples of Russia and the Middle East, yet must steer away from any negative political consequences.40

To promote Russian interests in the Middle East, Moscow needs to give attention to resolving outstanding security threats. Islamic extremism and international terrorism present the most pressing and dangerous problems. Members of extremist groups penetrate the territory of the Russian Federation, fight in Chechnya, smuggle in weapons and money, recruit local youth, and preach separation of Muslim areas from Russia. Russia will join with the US, international organizations, and other governments in the region to eradicate terrorism and will intensify her efforts to tackle terrorism’s root causes: poverty and social injustice.

The Israeli-Arab conflict must also be resolved if we are to achieve lasting peace and stability in the Middle East. In Russia’s view, a fair solution to the conflict must include a return of occupied lands to Arab nations, the creation of a Palestinian state, and security guarantees for every participant of the conflict, including Israel.

Russia encourages the negotiation process at all levels and directions and is ready to serve as a peace broker and a venue for negotiations. To help the peace process, all parties must be constructive, flexible, and impartial.

The spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missile capabilities threatens not only the peace and stability of the Middle East, but the security of Russia—both directly and indirectly. Russia would certainly be vulnerable to attack if Middle Eastern states acquire either WMD or medium- or long-range missiles.

Consequently, Moscow insists on the total elimination and prohibition of WMD in the Middle East and would also like to see the missile capabilities in the region limited to the lowest level possible.

It would seem reasonable to begin immediate efforts to turn the entire Middle East into a zone free of all WMD. The fact that this is a long-term and difficult objective only increases the urgency to act. Existing anti-WMD measures should be enforced in a reasonable and balanced manner that will not aggravate the threats of proliferation and conflict.

40 A comprehensive analysis of Russia’s current policies in the Middle East can be found in, for example, Iurii Ionov, “Strategicheskie interesy Rossii v blizhnevostochnom regione” (dissertatiia na soiskanie uchenoi stepeni kandidata politicheskikh nauk, Diplomaticheskaia Akademiia, 2003).

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Russia believes Israeli efforts to acquire WMD and missile capabilities must not be condoned. Israel’s neighbors would feel compelled to seek similar capabilities in self-defense. Further, the increase in exports of conventional weapons to this region must be halted. The influx of weapons is fueling an arms race spiraling ever further toward more sophisticated and destructive systems. Another particularly sore subject in the region is the preferential treatment accorded to various Middle Eastern nations on arms acquisition. The practice of generously providing some states with weapons while denying arms to others ignites further jealously, distrust, and fear.41 Some New Aspects of Russian Foreign Policy For Russia, the year 2006 was “the Year of Prestige.” Russia presided in the G8 throughout the whole year. In May, she succeeded Romania as the chair of the Council of Europe.

In European organizations, Russia stands in support of intercivilizational concord. The fact that a fifth of Russia’s populations is Muslim helps to establish constructive dialogue with Muslim communities in Europe. Russia wants to proliferate in Europe the initiative of “The Alliance of Civilizations” proposed by the UN secretary general, Turkey, and Spain.42

The decision concerning Russia’s inclusion into the rotation cycle and her first presidency was taken in Canada in June 2002. Russia considered the decision as a recognition of her growing role in the contemporary world by her partners. That the EU, US, Japan, and the European Three in the G8 generate and coordinate collective approaches to the most important global problems is very important for Russia.

Since 2004, Russia’s participation in the G8 has grown into a big and independent direction of the foreign policy of Vladimir Putin who has managed to establish good personal relations with the majority of leaders

41 For details on Russian approaches to Middle Eastern problems, see Vladimir Dontsov, ed., Islam i sovremennye mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia (Moscow: Nauchnaia kniga, 2001). 42 Stenogramma vystupleniia Ministra inostrannykh del Rossii S. V. Lavrova po itogam vstrechi s chlenami Komiteta po mezhdunarodnym delam Evroparlamenta, Strasburg, 18 maia 2006 goda, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russian Federation, no. 862-18-05-2006, May 18, 2006, www.mid.ru.


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of the industrial democracies and to alleviate the impression left from some unfortunate steps taken by Russia in the past.

The G8 has become for Russia an important mechanism to promote her foreign policy interests. Russia introduced to the agenda such issues as energy security, education, and the struggle against contagious diseases. All parties to the G8 summit in St. Petersburg that took place in July 2006 considered it successful. It is noteworthy that the heads of China and India, the two Asian giants, were present in St. Petersburg at that time. Although they are not formal members of the group so far, they had talks with the Russian president there and even held an unprecedented tripartite meeting with him.

The St. Petersburg G8 summit discussed in a constructive way all items on its agenda. At the closing press conference, Vladimir Putin made a particularly interesting observation that illustrated to a certain extent modern Russia’s perception of both the G8 and the present-day state of world affairs that has ceased to be bipolar, yet has not, contrary to the expectations of some, become a unipolarity controlled by one single superpower. He pointed out that after the end of the Cold War, the world has not become more stable and “has not become safe. It has become less predictable. And, as the whole system of international relations in decades past was elaborated to serve a bipolar world, we of course still lack all the instruments necessary to answer the challenges and threats of today.”43

In conclusion, I would like to stress the following: the last two years have shown us some definite changes in Russian foreign policy. It remains complex, but now its Eastern component is increasing and the whole strategy appears more balanced at present. Thanks to overcoming latent disintegration trends—most dramatically exemplified by the situation in Chechnya—and positive economic developments in terms of the growing GDP, ahead-of-schedule payments of foreign debts, and active investment efforts abroad, Russia and its foreign policy in the new century have become much more confident. It pragmatically seeks new partners, consolidates relations with old ones, rewards its friends, and does not offer the other cheek to its offenders, successfully ridding herself of defeatism and self-disparagement. To put it in a nutshell, the time has come when it is “more profitable to be friendly and reliably cooperative

43 Vladimir Putin, “Press-konferentsiia po itogam vstrechi glav gosudarstv i pravitel’stv ‘Gruppy vos’mi,’” July 17, 2006, St. Petersburg.

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with Russia.”44 There is nothing special and no privileges are implied, because this is the only way that any big, strong, and influential actor in the world arena should be dealt with.

44 See Vladimir Putin, “S sovremennoi Rossiei vygodnee druzhit’ i nadezhno sotrudnichat’,” Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn’, 2006, no. 7: 3–11 (Rech Prezidenta RF na soveshchanii v MIDe, 26–27 iiunia 2006 g.).

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The Rediscovered Backyard: Central Europe in Russian Foreign Policy László PÓTI More than one and a half decades after the change of regimes, the dissolution-disintegration-divorce of states in East-Central Europe, and the end of the Cold War, the European continent finds itself in a position when its Western part has already widened itself to the East (NATO and the EU), while the biggest entity of its Eastern part, Russia, has consolidated itself internally, and has reached a fairly wide consensus on its foreign policy, and is keen on ensuring a new increased role both in world and European politics.

Central Europe1 literally occupies a central position in the system of relations between Russia and Europe. This position is very unique: the one-time Soviet allies have joined the basic West European institutions, and by now, they have become the borderland of the West towards the post-Soviet space. As it is usually referred to in a well-known saying, Central Europe’s status has changed from the Western periphery of the East to the Eastern periphery of the West.

At this juncture of the ongoing changes, it is appropriate to construct a balance sheet of the evolution of relations between Russia and Central Europe. This article is aimed at the analysis of the following questions. Has there been any special Russian foreign policy concept or strategy with 1 In this article, I refer to Central Europe in a restricted sense, meaning the V4 countries—namely Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary.

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regard to relations with Central Europe? How has Russia’s policy towards Central Europe evolved over the last fifteen years? And what is the essence of Russian energy policy? The Conceptual-Doctrinal Background to Russian Policy toward Europe/Russia’s European Policy In order to provide adequate answers to the questions formed in the introduction, it is necessary to cover the topic very briefly in the conceptual-doctrinal evolution of the new Russian foreign and security policy at three levels of analysis. First, how does Russian foreign and security policy relate to international relations theory? Second, what has been the outcome of the grand debates about Russia’s international orientation? Third, what is the end result of the official concept and doctrine making of the nineties?

As to the first, the formation of the new Russian foreign and security policy thinking—at the level of IR theory—is a story of a gradual movement from an idealist/liberal paradigm to that of a realist one. The starting point that had its roots in the Gorbachevian “new thinking,” which propagated the creation of a new world community in a world that is more and more interdependent and based on a common set of values, attached great importance to international organizations and regimes, regarded cooperation as the main characteristic of international interaction, and was thinking almost in terms of a world government. The new and ever-evolving policy, relying more and more on realism, has put national interests at the center, further highlighting the difference of interests between states in a multipolar world. As one analyst put it, “Russian decision-makers appear more prone to perceive the outside world in terms of conflict, clashes of interest, and zero-sum games than through the lenses of mutual interest and common approaches; thinking in terms of spheres of influence, windows of opportunity, and power vacuums has gained an astonishing degree of respectability.”2

As to the second level of analysis, during the first years of the evolution of the new Russian foreign and security policy, the main

2 Mette Skak, From Empire to Anarchy: Postcommunist Foreign Policy and International Relations (London: Hurst and Company, 1996), 174.

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dividing line was between two schools of thought, whose debate relatively soon resulted in a kind of synthesis that has become the mainstream school of thought determining the official course. The first approach can be labeled as Atlantist, Westernized, or liberal internationalist. According to this, Russia is an organic part of the European civilization; its interests are close or identical to those of the West; the quickest integration of the country into the European and world community is desired; relations with the West should be the highest priority; Russia does not have any enemies; and Russia does not want to be a global power. The second school of thought—usually labeled as Eurasianist—claims that Russia is neither part of the European nor of the Asian civilization, but a special mixture of the two. Since its interests differ from the West, Russia should not be integrated into Europe, but rather, it should be the center of integration itself of the region surrounding it. Relations with the CIS countries should be its top priority, and Russia should stick to its great power status, and not regard any state as an enemy. As a result of the debate between these schools of thought, a synthesis of the two began to dominate the political discourse by 1993–1994, called geopolitical realism.3 This approach departs not from civilizational, ideological, or other premises, but rather from the realities of the geopolitical region surrounding Russia. Representatives of this school—adopting a kind of Russian Monroe doctrine—regard the post-Soviet space as a sphere vital to Russian interests, engage in conflicts with the West, but do not consider them inevitable. They try to balance between Europe and Asia, want to avoid the isolation of Russia, and strive to obtain great power status only in the longer run.

Since the formation of the Russian Federation, there have been three waves of issuing official foreign and security policy doctrines, and a number of semiofficial concepts have been elaborated in which Russian policy towards Europe has been formed: the foreign policy concept and military doctrine (1993), the national security concept (1997), and the national security concept, the military doctrine, and foreign policy concept (2000).

As for Europe, some more or less constant features of the Russian approach can be observed. First, on the one hand, increasing priority has 3 The term was coined by Olga Aleksandrova, a senior researcher of the once Cologne-based Institute for East European and International Studies (now in Berlin).

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been given to relations with European multilateral institutions, but preserving in parallel the traditional bilateral relations in channeling Russian interests into the continent. Second, at this institutional level, there is an obvious preference of all-European organizations as opposed to Western European institutions. Third, in the blurring of NATO and the EU, these two institutions are usually referred to as “the West.” To the extent that the EU is distinguished, it has been perceived positively. From its originally almost neglected position, the EU gradually gained more importance from the Russian vantage point, and the organization began to be regarded first as one of the centers of a multipolar world, and then as a desirable “equal and constructive” partner for Russia. Currently valid documents, however, do not contain a single conceptual elaboration of a distinctive place within the EU in the Russian foreign policy hierarchy. The most relevant document, the foreign policy concept, limits itself by stating that “relations with the EU have key importance,” and it is an “important political and economic partner” of Russia. The few paragraphs dealing with the EU are descriptive, not at all innovative, or ambitious, and quite defensive due to repeated reference to the Russian expectation “to take its interests into account in the process of enlargement.” With regard to the EU forming a common security and defense policy, the document presents a wait-and-see position.

However, it would be misleading if we stopped the characterization of the mainstream Russian conceptual perception of Europe at this point. Influential input from think tanks into Russian perception making have resulted in proposing, as a minimum, to build relations with the EU that would lead to a “permanent association,”4 or even going beyond that, “setting the long-term goal—within 2–3 decades—of the accession of Russia to the EU.”5

Even if these propositions have not become completely part of the official discourse, important shifts could be observed since the beginning of the Putin era. Foreign minister Igor Ivanov, evaluating the past ten years of Russian foreign policy in April 2001, reaffirmed the second place of Europe in the foreign policy hierarchy, and called the EU a “natural and

4 Rossiia i osnovnye instituty bezopasnosti Evropy, http://pubs.carnegie.ru/books/2000/ 06dt/toc.asp. 5 Sovet po vneshnei i oboronnoi politike, Strategiia dlia Rossii: Povestka dlia prezidenta-2000, http://www.svop.ru/book2000/chapter2.htm.


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very perspective partner . . . (Russia’s relations with which) have been given new quality,”6 or on another occasion, revived the notion of building a “strategic partnership” with it (italic added). The language of Russian-EU joint statements has systematically used this latter notion since the sixth summit in October 2000. Is There a Conceptual-Doctrinal Base for Russian Foreign Policy toward Central Europe/Russia’s Central European Policy? The above analysis applied to the three levels shows that there has not been any specific Central-European concept elaborated by Moscow, but rather, this region has increasingly come to be treated as part of Russia’s European policy. At the level of the international theory context of the evolving new Russian foreign policy thinking, the shift from a benign, idealist/liberal position to a conflict-centered neorealist standpoint does not give any tangible answer to our question. As far as the second level is concerned, the gradual switch from the pro-Western position towards geopolitical realism that integrated the thoughts of the Eurasian approach has contributed to the perception of the further separation of Russia and Central Europe. At the last—official doctrine—level of analysis we can find some substantial elements. The first foreign policy concept published in early 1993 does contain a special paragraph dedicated to East-Central Europe, reaffirming that East-Central Europe is a region of vital Russian interest.

The military doctrine adopted later that year does not touch upon the region, and only refers to it vaguely in the part dealing with “the potential sources of external military danger for the Russian Federation,” listing “the expansion of military blocs and alliances to the detriment of the interests of the Russian Federation’s military security.”7

The new foreign policy concept already adopted under Putin in 2000 also mentions the region, but in a much more modest fashion and dropping the expression, “region of vital interest”: “A topical task in relations with the states of Central and Eastern Europe is, as before, preserving existing human, economic, and cultural ties, overcoming crisis 6 Lecture delivered at the meeting of the Russian Association of International Studies entitled “Foreign policy of Russia today,” 20 April 2001, Moscow. www.ln.mid.ru. 7 http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/russia-mil-doc.html#polbase.

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phenomena, and providing additional impetus to cooperation in accordance with the new conditions and Russian interests.”

In the academic community, little interest towards the region could be identified over the past decade and a half. The only major exception was a special report of the influential Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (Sovet po vneshnei i oboronnoi politike: SVOP), a strong opinion-formulating body that included foreign policy experts, leading business leaders, and official foreign policy-makers. It was in February 1997 that SVOP published a document entitled “Eastern and Central Europe and the Interests of Russia.” This was the first public conceptual material created in post-Soviet Russia with regards to the region under analysis—and up until now, the last one. This seventeen-page report analyzes in four chapters the specifics of the transition of these countries, their economic prospects and foreign policy reorientation, and finally, tries to identify Russian interests.8

The document starts with stating that the “story of relations between Russia and the East-Central European countries in the nineties was the story of Russia’s departure from the region.” It was an inevitable departure, and the end of the Cold War decreased the strategic importance of the region. As to the enlargement of NATO and the EU, the report emphasizes the complicated and complex character of this process, which is suggested to be a long and in some cases, a delayed one. The main Russian interest in this regard is to “enter in due time the markets of the most probable future members of the EU, because thus, the Russian position will strengthen in the European space.” The paper introduces the idea of promoting economic cooperation in a trilateral format, i.e., the Western side, the Central European side, and Russia. It would be a mistake—the document warns—to perceive the EU as a rival; Russia cannot be a competitor. Russia cannot stop the forthcoming enlargements either, so in order to minimize possible damage to Russian interests, Moscow should seek solutions “there where the decisions are made, with the EU and NATO member countries.”

Another important thesis of the report was that “economic relations between Russia and the East-Central European countries are not strong enough to bear the burden of political problems. Practice shows that the 8 Bíró Zoltán, “Kelet-Közép Európa és Oroszország érdekei,” Külpolitika 2 (1997): 110–132.


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less these relations are politicized, the more successful they are.” At the academic level, publications directly dealing with Central

Europe have been rare. An interesting indirect proof of the academic neglect of autonomous Central European studies is illustrated by the story of the Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System of the Russian Academy of Sciences’ director, Oleg Bogomolov, a well-known economist. This used to be the one and only Soviet scientific institution dealing with the socialist region. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the change of regime in Russia, first it was renamed the Institute of International Economic and Political Studies, and second, at the end of 2005, it became part of the Institute of Economics.

In sum, there is no evidence of any well-formulated public Russian foreign policy strategy vis-à-vis Central Europe, neither at the theoretical, nor at the official level, or at the academic level. Nevertheless, terminologically, it is interesting to note that Eastern/Central Europe has been called in Russian political discourse, the “far abroad” (dal’nee zarubezh’e), the “middle abroad” (srednee zarubezh’e), and the “near West” (blizhnii zapad), which all are rooted in the well-known expression of “near abroad” (covering the post-Soviet space) and refer to some kind of special status of a region.

However, there are two extremely opposing views on the issue of whether there is any Russian strategy towards the region. The first—and this is held by the majority of the Russian academia and foreign policy establishment—is that there is no Russian strategic approach toward Central Europe, and the only difference between them is that part of this group urges the elaboration of a strategic vision while another part does not consider it necessary. The opposing view holds that Russia has a well-formulated strategy towards Central Europe, and its content is “new imperialism.” The main proponent of this approach is Janusz Bugajski, who wrote a book on Russian East-Central European relations entitled Cold Peace.9 The American analyst summarizes in six points Russia’s 9 Bugajski is one of the best known American analysts on this topic and an exemplifying figure of the radical critique of Russia; see Janusz Bugajski, Cold Peace: Russia’s New Imperialism (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004). The fact that Bugajski is not a marginal holder of this view is supported by the endorsement of the book by Zbigniew Brzeziński, who wrote that “Russia’s Policies towards the Countries of the Former Soviet Bloc are still Being Influenced by an Ominously Imperialist Nostalgia.” http://www.greenwood.com/ catalog/C8362.aspx.

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alleged strategy in Eastern Europe:10 to achieve preeminent influence over foreign policy orientation and security policy, increasing economic benefits and monopolistic positions, and increasing dependence on Russian energy supplies, to limit the scope of Western institutional enlargement in the European CIS, to rebuild a larger sphere of influence, and finally, to weaken transatlantic relations.

Another recent example of the increasingly critical Western evaluation of Russia’s European policy comes from an op-ed piece in the Washington Post that cited Bruce Jackson as qualifying Russian policy as an “aggressive, thought-out game.” When questioned about his comments in the Washington Post, Jackson asserted that there does “seem to be an overarching and very aggressive diplomatic campaign going on, whether it be threatening Georgia or threatening the European Union.” (italic added) Russian Policy towards Central Europe The evolution of Russian-Eastern/Central European relations in the nineties has been a process of their “standardization.”11 This has included the following elements that also characterize the present state of affairs. First, Russian policy toward Central Europe (CE) is not an especially significant part of Russia’s domestic policy but rather a normal part of Russian foreign policy. Second, CE has radically been devaluated and has found its naturally low place in the system of priorities of Russian foreign policy.12 Third, as a matter of fact, the region has lost its autonomous value from the Russian perspective, and is approached indirectly, i.e., in the context of Russian European policy. Fourth, instead of the previous bloc approach, Russian policy handles these countries individually or regionally—that is, differentiation has come to the fore. Fifth, these relations have been demilitarized, and de-ideologized. Finally, all major 10 This includes European post-Soviet states, the Baltic states, Central Europe and the Balkans. 11 The expression belongs to Gerhard Mangott (Permanent Fellow at the Austrian Institute of International Relations), Russian Policies on Central and Eastern Europe: An Overview (manuscript, 1999). 12 For example, as opposed to the 1993 version of the foreign policy concept, the 2000 version does not refer to Eastern/Central Europe as a region of vital Russian interest. See Diplomaticheskii vestnik, no. 3–4 (February 1993), and no. 8 (August 2000).


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problems that had to do with the Soviet past (the Warsaw Past, Soviet interventions, the consequences of troop withdrawal, inherited debts) have been settled.

In order to accommodate the evolution of the Russian position towards Central Europe, it is worthwhile examining the dynamics of this process by way of periodization: • 1990–1991: Attempts at limited sovereignty under the “Kvitsinskii

doctrine” • 1992–1994: Democratic neglect under the “Kozyrev doctrine” • 1995–2000: Rediscovery of the region within the NATO-EU

enlargement context • 2000–present: Geoeconomic approach under the Putin doctrine

The first period overlaps with the final stage of the dissolution of the

Soviet Union. The new democracies of Central Europe had already made their regime change in 1989–1990, while the Soviet Union still existed until the end of 1991. Russian attempts at achieving some kind of limited sovereignty in Central Europe came in two ways: in the field of economy and in the field of security. As to the first, there was a Soviet proposal for a kind of COMECON-2, first put forward by the academic community, then as a semiofficial proposal to the Polish side, but the unanimous rejection by all possible partners rendered the issue obsolete. In the field of security, Moscow applied the so-called Kvitsinskii doctrine13 under which it tried to insert a special clause into the bilateral treaties—which were being negotiated at the time—between the Soviet Union and the former Warsaw Pact countries. This effort, with the temporary exception of Romania, remained unsuccessful.

The next period witnessed a completely different Russian attitude towards Central Europe. It can best be characterized as a period of “democratic neglect.” This means that Moscow adopted an indifferent attitude towards the region resulting from the ongoing democratic change of Russia itself. In the period of “romantic Atlanticism” of the first few years of Russia’s ever-evolving new foreign policy, Moscow viewed the 13 Iulii Kvitsinskii, deputy foreign minister, was the head of the Soviet delegation in the bilateral talks with the ex-socialist countries.

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Central European countries as going in the same direction, as natural partners. A good summary of the typical Russian approach toward the region can be found in a 1992 SVOP report. The report argues that the Central European countries “are striving toward the West, geographically, they are separated from Russia, and they do not possess such means and technologies with the help of which they could take a share in Russia’s reconstruction.”14

The marked shift in general Russian foreign policy characterized in the introductory part of the paper by 1993–1994 also resulted in shifts in Russia’s policy towards Central Europe beginning in 1995. This shift can be interpreted, first of all, in the context of NATO and EU enlargement. The Russian interest in the Central European region began to increase significantly as soon as the decision about NATO extension was made in early 1995 with the announcement of the PfP.

Moscow’s policy vis-à-vis NATO enlargement has gone through several phases beginning with quasi-membership (1992–1993), through active opposition (1995–1996), bargaining (1996), and finally, becoming a quasi-member (1997). Within the framework of this evolving Russian policy, the role of Central Europe has radically increased due to the simple fact that this region was a target of NATO/EU enlargement. The Russian strategy was to use the Central European enlargement to renew its security status in Europe, and it worked. The NATO-Russia Founding Act adopted in May 1997—just some weeks before the invitation of the three Central European countries—the establishment of priority relations between the two entities, and granted Russia quasi-member status by introducing the NATO-Russia Permanent Council, and participation in the decision-making process of the so-called 19+1 format although without veto privileges.

As to EU enlargement, the original neutral Russian attitude has become more sophisticated, and Moscow has identified both positive and negative expected consequences for its own interests. Among the positive consequences, the following were mentioned. • The widening of the zone of political and economic stability in

Europe;

14 Nezavisimaia gazeta, August 19, 1992.


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• The increased attractiveness of the European part of Russia for investors;

• Contribution to Russia’s integration into the all-European economic space, first of all, into the united transport and communication system; and

• Increased potential for trade due to simplified unified regulatory procedures, and account.

The perceived possible negative consequences are usually referred to

as follows: • The continued reorientation of new members toward EU markets,

further decreasing Russia’s trade with new EU members; • The redirection of foreign investment to new members at the expense

of Russia; • Russia being further pushed to the edge of the continent, while the

number of those opposing EU cooperation with Russia continues to increase;

• The crossing of borders being more complicated due to the visa regime; and

• The maintenance of day-to-day relations with Kaliningrad becoming more problematic.

It is clear that both the perceived negative and positive consequences

of EU enlargement have to do with economic considerations, while political or security policy fears have emerged only marginally. In the beginning, the Russian strategy—when the issue of enlargement became apparent—was defined as the “minimization” of the negative consequences. Originally—as early as the beginning of 1997—it was thought that this would be done in a trilateral format, namely by Russia’s direct involvement in the accession talks of the candidate countries and the EU. When this turned out to be impossible, Moscow changed its tactics and began to follow a two-track policy. On the one hand, it began to actively establish economic and financial bridgeheads in the countries of the expected first wave of enlargement; on the other hand, it tried, in the different fora of Russian-EU dialogue, to achieve special Russian

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interests being taken into account during the accession talks.15 The issue of Kaliningrad was a unique problem with its exclave

status in Russian-EU relations during the accession period of the ten candidate countries. Besides the fact of the importance of this issue, I touch upon it because one of the countries under analysis, Poland, was involved in the initial Russian proposals. Namely, Moscow proposed to establish a corridor through Poland to Kaliningrad, but politically, this was a very badly perceived issue by the Polish side, as it was a reminder of the corridor in the interwar years between Germany and Königsberg.16

Among others, one of the most problematic issues was the movement of Russian citizens between mainland Russia and Kaliningrad. The original positions of the two sides were completely opposing: the EU stuck to the visa regime, while Moscow rejected the idea that a Russian citizen should have a visa in order to travel to another Russian region. As the above map indicates, Russian citizens can reach Kaliningrad by airplane or by ship without entering any other country. But using any other means of transport (roads or railway), one has to cross either Lithuania or Poland, both of which were candidate countries at the time. After long talks, the compromise was found in two types of documents. The first is the so-called Facilitated Transit Document (FTD) that allows for multiple entry, and can be applied for at the consulates of Lithuania, free of charge, and is valid for three years. The other is the Facilitated Rail Transit Document (FRTD), and can only be used once, free of charge, and can be acquired at the railway cashier. This case shows that the two sides could find a solution despite opposing positions. The FTD and the FRTD are not visas per se, but they practically function like a visa regime although in a facilitated manner, which is rather a Russian face-saving result, but fitting nicely into Moscow’s long-term aim of reaching a visa-free agreement with the EU.

The current Russian strategy with regard to EU enlargement departs from the consideration that it has no means to change the strategic choice of the CE countries to join the EU, and it is not useful to regard the EU as a rival of Russia in the region. Instead, Moscow should pursue a policy of trilateral engagement. The original “damage-limiting” course and the idea

15 There was a non-specified list of Russian desires that was officially handed over to the EU in 1999. 16 The German name for Kaliningrad.


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of trilateral accession talks have been substituted for a more creative and businesslike approach. Its core is, instead of a formal involvement in trilateral negotiation formats, the implementation of trilateral EU-CE-Russia economic projects. The idea is to avoid presenting the EU and Russia as two opposing poles, but rather as “complementary parts of the European economic unity.”17 In the institutional domain, Russia also succeeded in establishing a well-structured relationship with a permanent body for managing relations with the EU that resembles somewhat the NATO-Russia Council.

17 “Tsentral’naia i Vostochnaia Evropa i interesy Rossii,” www.svop.ru/doklad03.htm.

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The current stage of Russian policy towards Central Europe is best characterized by the geoeconomic approach under the Putin doctrine. In general, the Putin doctrine basically means the reconstruction of Russia both domestically and internationally as a great power. With regard to Central Europe, a geoeconomic approach is embodied, first of all, in active economic policy towards the region. Therefore, it is proper to label current Russian policy toward CE as “economized.”18 The main fields of this new “economized” Russian policy are, first of all, the energy and finance sectors.19 (Some have commented that this is a phenomenon of Russians being back again, but this time, “not by tanks but banks.”)

Let us have a quick look at EU-CE-Russian economic relations. The most important consequences can be detected in trade relations. As far as trade is concerned, the enlargement of the EU has further increased the basically asymmetric relationship between the two entities. Before the enlargement, the EU represented Russia’s largest trading partner, accounting for 36.7 percent of Russia’s import and 33.2 percent of its export, while Russia was the EU’s sixth-largest partner with 3.3 percent of its import and 1.9 percent of its export. After the first complete year of EU enlargement, the numbers are: 48.26 percent (the EU’s share of Russian imports) and 56.72 percent (the EU’s share of Russian exports), and 9.09 percent (imports from Russia) and 5.3 percent (exports to Russia) in 2005.20 This means a significant increase in all areas of trade, further deepening Russia’s dependence on the EU, while for the EU, Russia has become their number four trading partner.

Russia has always had a considerable share in the EU’s energy import. The enlargement dramatically increased the relevant indicators, and real dependency evolved: before enlargement, Russia’s share in the EU’s gas import was 10 percent, and in the oil import, 20 percent. After enlargement, the appropriate ratios stood at 67 and 30 percent, respectively. At this point, it has to be emphasized that the often-referred-to thesis that there is an EU directive to cap dependence on one energy supplier is a myth; there is no evidence of such official EU 18 The statement of foreign minister Ivanov that “energy diplomacy” has become a new direction of foreign policy is also applicable in ECE. 19 The existing Yamal pipeline in Poland, and another planned gas pipeline through Poland and Slovakia, and the increased Russian share of Hungary’s chemical industry are illustrative examples of this. 20 http://ec.europa.eu/comm/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/russia/index_en.htm.


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decision. The Energy Issue in Russian-Central European Relations With the Central European countries, the EU absorbed nations that are extremely dependent on Russian energy resources. These four countries depend on Russia both for their crude oil and gas imports between 42.8 and 100 percent.

It is not only the sheer size and share of Russia as an energy supplier to Central Europe, but also the almost unavoidable transit role of the Visegrad countries that underlines their importance in Russian energy policy. It can be seen on the maps below that, with the exception of the planned Northern Pipeline connecting Russia and Germany directly, there is no other way to deliver gas or oil from Russia to Western Europe than through Central Europe.

Russia’s share in EU’s import

Before enlargement

After enlargement

gas 10 67 oil 20 30

The Share of Russian Gas Export According to the Main Target Countries (2004, %)

EU25 66.6 EU15 48.1 New EU members 18.5 CIS countries 19.6

The Share of Russian Crude Oil Export According to the Main Target Countries (2004, %)

EU25 72.8 EU15 47.7 New EU members 25.1 CIS countries 9.3

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The share of Russia in the V4 countries’ energy import (2004, %)21 Crude oil Gas Poland 96.3 53.0 Hungary 99.9 77.3 Czech Republic 69.9 42.8 Slovakia 100.0 100.0

21 Ludvig Zsuzsanna, Oroszország és a kibővült Európai Unió gazdasági kapcsolatai - közép-kelet-európai szemmel (PhD diss., Corvinus University of Budapest, 2006).


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The situation is very similar in the field of oil transport to Western

Europe. Practically all pipelines go through the encircled Visegrad countries.

Besides energy supplies, Russia is also present in the Visegrad countries in other energy-related areas in two typical forms: the gas trade in these countries, and the gasoline station system market. Examples of the former is Russian state-owned giant Gazprom’s 50 percent share in Slovrusgas (Slovakia), 49 percent share in Europol Gaz (Poland), and 49 percent share in Panrusgas (Hungary).

The Visegrad countries made little serious effort to diversify their energy supplies; only the Czech Republic and Poland made certain steps to find alternative gas sources, namely from Norway. But the issue of diversification came to the fore after the Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute at the end of 2005. As a result of Russia’s decision to stop deliveries to Ukraine, in different Central European countries, a 20–30 percent decrease was occasionally registered, because of Ukraine’s alleged

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“stealing” of gas. Consequently, in Brussels and in the countries concerned, the problem of dependence and diversification began to be discussed intensively. Hungarian economic and transport minister János Kóka called a meeting of energy ministers from Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovenia, and Slovakia to discuss ways of cutting their dependence on Russian natural gas deliveries. Kóka said he would submit any joint findings from the meeting to the EU. Austria, which holds the rotating EU chair, called again on Europeans to diversify the sources of their energy supplies.22

The other response came from Poland that initiated the creation of a so-called “energy NATO” during the January 2006 summit in Davos. Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz, prime minister of Poland, wrote in the Financial Times that “such an energy security treaty could follow formulas contained in the 1949 Washington Treaty, an agreement that allowed for effective transatlantic co-operation, or provisions of the modified Treaty of Brussels that established the Western European Union in 1948. A European energy security treaty along these lines could become a real tool that would give us some badly needed certainty, as well as security in crisis situations. That is why it is essential that the treaty contains a clearly and firmly stated guarantee clause based on the “musketeer principle”: “All for one—one for all.”23 In response the Russian foreign minister, Lavrov said that he had “heard other calls to create an ‘energy NATO [of consumers to prevent blackmail by suppliers], and this idea certainly is confrontational.”24 The Debate about the Character of Russian Energy Policy in Europe The main question is whether energy policy is a special Russian foreign policy instrument, and if so, what is its content? There are two opposing answers to this question. One school of thought says that—as one analyst put it—“For the Kremlin, energy has come to represent the principal tool in foreign policy, with Moscow using energy to interfere and influence 22 See RFE/RL Newsline, January 6, and January 19, 2006. 23 Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz, “Europe’s Energy Musketeers Must Stand Together,” Financial Times, February 9, 2006. http://www.ft.com/home/uk. 24 RFE/RL Newsline, January 20, 2006.


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domestic political processes across Europe and elsewhere, and halt geopolitical shifts such as expansion of NATO and the EU.”25 Even the US vice president commented recently that “Russia has a choice to make. No legitimate interest is served when oil and gas become tools of intimidation or blackmail.”26 Others describe Russian energy policy as “energy imperialism,”27 or as an “energy weapon,”28 and recommend a tough EU response in order to let Russia “understand its future as Europe’s preeminent energy supplier is at risk.”29 The representatives of this approach also refer to the problem of Russia not ratifying the Energy Charter (practically depriving western companies’ entrance into the Russian energy market), and to two recent unkind gestures of high-level Russian representatives who publicly entertained the idea of redirecting Russian supplies to North America and China30. In a similar vein, Polish defense minister Radosław Sikorski commented on the planned Northern Pipeline between Poland and Germany through the Northern Sea in an unusually harsh tone: “Poland has a particular sensitivity to corridors and deals above our head. That was the Molotov-Ribbentrop tradition. We don’t want any repetition of that.”31

The other approach suggests that “the fear of Russia is exaggerated and there is no evidence of a malicious political intent in recent Russian energy decisions.”32 I subscribe to this second approach. Russia makes no secret of wanting to use its energy potential for its domestic and international rise. As the Russian official Energy Strategy reads: “Russia owns significant energy resources . . . that is the base for economic

25 Borut Grgic, “Russian Energy Strategy: Risk Assessment for Europe,” ISS Occasional Paper, no. 4 (2006). 26 Luke Harding, “Russia Is Blackmailing Europe over Energy, Says Cheney,” Guardian online, May 5, 2006. http://www.guardian.co.uk/russia/article/0,,1768066,00.html. 27 Victor Yasmann, “Russia: Moscow Gets Tough with the EU,” RFE/RL feature article, June 5, 2006. 28 Keith C. Smith, “Security Implications of Russian Energy Policies,” CEPS Policy Brief, no. 90/January 2006. 29 Citation from Michael Emerson, director of CEPS in Ahto Lobjakas, EU. “The Energy Dilemma – with or without Russia,” RFE/RL feature article, March 22, 2006. 30 Aleksei Miller, head of Gazprom warned EU ambassadors in Moscow, in “Gazprom smotrit na Zapad,” Nezavisimaia gazeta, June 7, 2006. 31 Ian Traynor, “Poland Recalls Hitler-Stalin Pact Amid Fears over Pipeline,” Guardian online, May 1, 2006. http://www.guardian.co.uk/eu/story/0,,1765054,00.html. 32 Citation from Julia Montanaro-Jankovski, in Lobjakas, “EU.”

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development, and an instrument of domestic and foreign policy. The role of the country in the international energy markets defines, to a large extent, its geopolitical influence.”33 In my opinion, one can hardly find any wrong in these statements. They are standard, modern statements—that could be in any other similar documents of any other country—representing the national interests of Russia. The main question is whether Russian energy policy has been used for direct political purposes, or for blackmail against Europe and Central Europe. No, there has been no such case when Russia would have used this instrument in Europe. And, yes there have been cases when it used it for direct political influence, but exclusively within the CIS space, and only vis-à-vis such countries that wanted to enjoy the preferential low prices and were willing to accept special political relations with Moscow (Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova). In my opinion, the Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute was overwhelmingly misinterpreted by politicians, and misrepresented in the media. Although the Russian steps against Ukraine did not lack a certain political element (the timing before the March parliamentary elections) and spectacular moves (the well-publicized stop of supply), the whole issue, in its essence, was a local business dispute over the price and the Ukrainian practices of reexport for extra profit. Russia did not decrease its delivery to Europe (including Central Europe), and had no intention of blackmailing Europe. On the contrary, it is in Russia’s best interest to maintain stable energy relations with Europe. Russia can hardly find alternative markets without immense investments that would put into question the whole endeavor.

In addition, recently, there have been high-level signals of the fundamental change in Russia’s energy policy towards the CIS countries. First, President Putin declared at the annual meeting of Russian ambassadors that “I think it is time to switch to principles accepted in world economy and trade based on rational calculations.”34 Aleksei Miller, head of Russia’s state-owned gas monopoly Gazprom, announced at a general shareholders’ meeting in Moscow on June 30 that Gazprom intends to abide by the same conditions in its relations with CIS states as

33 “Energeticheskaia strategiia Rossii na period do 2020 goda,” August 28, 2003. http://www.mte.gov.ru/files/103/1354.strategy.pdf. 34 Kseniia Fokina, “Programma pragmatikov,” www.strana.ru, June 27, 2006.


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with Europe.35 Conclusion In sum, the evidence shows that the last decade and a half has not produced any specific Russian foreign policy doctrine towards Central Europe. Over the analyzed period, the Russian approach went through the phases of limitation-democratic neglect-rediscovered interest-geoeconomic activism. The rediscovery is evident, but it has to be added immediately that this rediscovery is contextual. Central Europe is rediscovered and interpreted for Russia almost exclusively in the European context, and not on its own.

Bugajski’s critique of Russia is basically wrong for one simple reason: he analyzes Russian policy towards Eastern Europe—meaning the European post-Soviet states, the Baltic states, Central Europe, and the Balkans—as one united policy towards these very different subregions. But he is unintentionally right on one point. With the ongoing political changes and Russia’s gas policies in European post-Soviet states, this part of the world is becoming increasingly closer to Central Europe, constituting another challenge for Russia in the medium term.

35 RFE/RL Newsline, vol. 10, no. 121, Part 1, July 3, 2006.

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Russia’s Security Challenges Mark N. KATZ Statements made by Russian officials, scholars, and commentators suggest that Moscow faces (or thinks it faces) three principal external security challenges: the West (especially the US), the Muslim world, and China. The challenge that each of these poses to Russian security, though, is different from that posed by the other two. This article will explore how Moscow sees each of these three challenges as well as how the Putin administration has responded to them each. It will then discuss the dilemmas that these three challenges as a group pose for Russia.

How Moscow sees and responds to security challenges, however, is not just a function of the nature of external actors, but also of Russia’s own strengths and weaknesses. Something must first be said, then, about what Russia is and has become under Putin in order to understand the nature of the security challenges posed to it by the West, the Muslim world, and China. Russia’s Strengths and Weaknesses in the Putin Era What are the strengths and weaknesses of Russia in relation to its external challenges?

Russia has a sizable population. This, however, is not just aging, but shrinking, thus making it difficult to maintain its large military establishment vis-à-vis all the security challenges Moscow faces.1

1 On Russia’s population crisis, see Fred Weir, “A Second Baby? Russia’s Mothers Aren’t Persuaded,” Christian Science Monitor, May 19, 2006.

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Russia is a very large country, but it is sparsely populated in Siberia, making it potentially vulnerable to its highly populous neighbor, China.

Over 10 percent of Russia’s population is Muslim. While many Russian Muslims are Russified, some—both in Chechnya and elsewhere—have become attracted to Islamic radicalism, thus making Russia potentially vulnerable to their receiving support from the broader Muslim world.2

Russia is extremely rich in petroleum and other natural resources, but has a poorly developed economy otherwise, potentially making it more difficult for Russia to defend its resource endowment against outsiders (especially those undertaking rapid military modernization).

Russia has a sizable military, but its inability to repress even an internal rebellion in tiny Chechnya casts grave doubt on Moscow’s ability to project force anywhere beyond its borders. (Russia, of course, maintains a sizable nuclear arsenal, but the devastating retaliation it would receive make it unlikely that Moscow will launch a nuclear attack against any other state possessing nuclear weapons, or against any other state closely allied to one that does.)

Russia under Putin seeks to act and be acknowledged as a great power, but its many debilitating internal problems limit the extent to which it can do so even in neighboring states, especially where societies are unhappy with Russian efforts to dominate them, thus making Russia appear weak both abroad and at home.

Russia under Putin has an increasingly authoritarian regime, yet Russian society is far more interconnected with the outside world than it was during the Soviet era,3 potentially (though not necessarily) making

2 Ravil’ Gaynutdin, head of the Russian Council of Muftis, saw the unwillingness of local authorities in Russia to allow for the construction of mosques as being responsible for the rise of the radicalism of young Muslims in Russia: “If no Muslim educational center is opened with the state’s assistance where moderate Islam is taught, the [Islamic] education is conducted by no-one knows who or how.” “State Support of Islam to Keep Young Russian Muslims from Radicalism—Mufti,” Center TV, Moscow, May 30, 2006 (translation by BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union, May 30, 2006). 3 “Obviously, the authorities cannot help but be concerned that the Internet, which, according to figures from the Public Opinion Foundation, is used by 18 million Russian citizens, is becoming not only an alternative source of information for the public, but also a center of growing opposition activity.” Sergei Varshavchik, “Resistance on the Web,” Nezavisimaia gazeta, June 3, 2005 (English translation in The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press [hereinafter referred to as CDPSP] 57, no. 22: 14).

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the democratic, prosperous West an attractive model for important elements in Russian society.

All these strengths and weaknesses contribute to how Moscow defines and responds to external security challenges. The Western Challenge Many in the West do not see it as posing any sort of challenge to Russia. America, Europe, and Japan (either singly or in combination) have absolutely no intention of militarily intervening in Russia. Moscow, though, not only sees the West (especially the US) as a security challenge, but as the most important one Russia faces.4

Just by its very existence, a prosperous, democratic West serves to undermine the legitimacy of a resource-rich but undemocratic Russia where so many people are poor.5 Some might think that while this was true during the Soviet era, anti-Western sentiment in Russia has grown so strong since then that it is no longer so. However, the Putin administration’s crackdown on Western NGOs and the Russian organizations that they support indicates that the Kremlin remains deeply worried about the prospect of a Western-backed democratic opposition growing strong in Russia.6 4 In his 2006 address to the Federal Assembly, President Putin referred, apparently to the United States, as a wolf: “We see, after all, what is going on in the world. The wolf knows who to eat, as the saying goes. It knows who to eat and is not about to listen to anyone, it seems.” Vladimir Putin, “Annual Address to the Federal Assembly,” May 10, 2006, http://kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2006/05/10/1823_type70029type82912_105566.shtml#. 5 Although the Russian government acknowledges that 20 percent of the population lives in poverty, a Levada Center poll showed that 40 percent of the Russian population considers itself to be poor. Dar’ia Guseva, “A Rich Imagination,” Vremia novostei, June 22, 2005 (CDPSP 57, no. 25: 6). A poll by the Public Opinion Foundation confirmed this, indicating that 41 percent of Russian citizens consider themselves to be poor. Elena Iakovleva, “Russia: Project or Maelstrom?” Rossiiskaia gazeta, August 11, 2005 (CDPSP 57, no. 32: 10). 6 The authors of a Kommersant article identified this as being Putin’s main concern about Western NGOs: “The president’s inflexibility on this matter is directly connected with the subject of a possible ‘color revolution’ in Russia, something that the Kremlin still regards as a major political threat. According to Kommersant’s information, the question of countering the ‘color threat’ has been discussed many times during the past year at the president’s traditional Saturday conferences with members of the Security Council, and noncommercial organizations have been identified as the main channels by which the

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Of more immediate concern both to the Kremlin and much of the Russian public is the expansion of Western influence into countries where Moscow not only used to be influential, but still wants to be. Most of the former Warsaw Pact states of Eastern Europe and the three former Soviet Baltic republics are now members of both NATO and the EU. Two other former Soviet republics—Georgia and Ukraine—have to some extent come under Western influence. Others still might follow.

Moscow sees this expansion of Western influence into Eastern Europe and certain former Soviet republics as aggressive moves to limit and weaken Russia. Russians never seem to acknowledge that governments and public opinion in these countries have themselves actively sought to join the West. Their motives include not only the desire for higher living standards, democratization, and the rule of law, but also a continued fear of Russia in these countries—which Moscow’s bullying reaction to their increased cooperation with the West only increases.

Nor does there appear to be any appreciation in Moscow of the possibility that it might actually be in Russia’s best interest that countries on its border come under Western influence since this means that they are more likely to become stable and prosperous, and hence, not a threat to Russia. By contrast, unstable, impoverished neighbors—even if they are within the Russian sphere of influence—can present problems for Russia that Moscow cannot deal with on its own.

But Moscow does not see things this way. It fears democratization encroaching on its borders because it fears democratization in Russia itself—and all this would do to destroy the existing power structure there. Further, Moscow reacts viscerally to the rise of Western influence on its borders, even though this could actually be beneficial to Russia, because this threatens Russia’s core self-image as a great power. Thus, Russia sees the West as a very serious threat. The Muslim Challenge The Muslim world represents both an opportunity and a challenge for Moscow. The existence of several anti-American governments there has ‘color contagion’ is spread.” Dmitrii Kamyshev et al., “Vladimir Putin Reserves the Funding of Nongovernmental Organizations for Himself,” Kommersant, November 25, 2005 (CDPSP 57, no. 47: 3).


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given Moscow ample opportunity to ally or otherwise cooperate with them. On the other hand, elements within the Muslim world have in the past provided support to Chechen and other Muslim opposition groups within Russia7—some of whom seek to establish “caliphates” in Central Asia, the North Caucasus, and perhaps other Muslim regions of the Russian Federation. Further, this support could increase enormously, thus complicating and perhaps even dooming Russia’s already difficult and costly attempts to suppress Chechen and other Muslim opposition groups in Russia and Central Asia.

This radical Islamic threat to Russia, however, does not emanate from the Muslim world as a whole, but primarily from Sunni fundamentalist forces and their supporters. Russia, of course, is not the only country eager to contain and suppress Sunni fundamentalism. Not only do all other governments in the non-Muslim world oppose this (albeit some far more vigorously than others), but virtually all governments in the Muslim world do as well. Even governments as anti-American as Arab nationalist Syria and Shia fundamentalist Iran are fearful of the rise of Sunni fundamentalism, since they would also be targets of it. Indeed, the Muslim governments that Moscow is most worried about are two pro-American ones, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, where there is widespread support for Sunni fundamentalism both within their publics and even elements of their regimes8 (something that the US and many other governments are also worried about).

Moscow has responded to the challenge of the Muslim world actually or potentially assisting Moscow’s Muslim opponents in Russia and the former Soviet Union in several ways. In addition to attempting to militarily suppress the Chechen rebellion, these include:

7 “Russian estimates of the total level of external support for Chechen rebel groups range from $10 million to $200 million per year and focus on Saudi Arabia (and the opium trade in Afghanistan) as the principal sources of the money; State Department officials admit privately that $100 million may have flowed into Chechnya from 1999 to 2003.” Geoffrey Kemp and Paul Saunders, “America, Russia, and the Greater Middle East: Challenges and Opportunities,” Nixon Center, Washington, DC, November 2003, http://www.nixoncenter .org/publications/monographs/US_Russia_ME.pdf. 8 Mark N. Katz, “Saudi-Russian Relations Since 9/11,” Problems of Post-Communism 51, no. 2 (2004): 3–5; Mark N. Katz, “Less-Than-Great Expectations: The Pakistani-Russian Rapprochement,” Current History 104, no. 680 (2005): 137–141.

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• Working with Russified Muslims in Russia and the former USSR in order to suppress Muslim secessionists and radicals;

• Cooperating with the US and other non-Muslim governments (including Israel) in the “War on Terror” so that they will see Russia’s struggle with the Chechens as a legitimate part of it;

• Currying favor with Muslim governments and publics so that they will not support the Chechen rebels or make an issue of how Russia treats its Muslims;9

• Expressing sympathy for the Palestinian cause—even for Sunni fundamentalist Hamas 10 —so that Muslims focus their anger on American support for Israel and overlook what Russia does in Chechnya and elsewhere in the former USSR.

Except for the attempt to defeat the Chechen rebels, these efforts

have met with considerable success. Western and other non-Muslim governments are certainly not doing anything to help the Chechen rebels, and have even muted their criticism of Russian human rights violations in Chechnya (although Moscow is indignant about what little criticism it does receive from the West about this). Nor are there any Muslim governments that are overtly helping the Chechens or Islamic oppositionists elsewhere in the former USSR. The only government in the Muslim world that was doing so overtly—the Taliban—was ousted by the American-led (and Russian-backed) post-9/11 intervention in Afghanistan. Some outside assistance to the Chechens and others is still getting through, but not enough to allow them victory. Nor have the Chechen rebels

9 In his speech at the 2003 Organization of the Islamic Conference summit in Malaysia, Putin offered reassuring words on this score: “I would like to tell you that in the case of Russia, attempts to stir up anti-Islamic feeling in our country have met with complete and total failure.” Gennadii Kochuk, “Dialogue with Islam,” Trud, October 17, 2003 (CDPSP 55, no. 41: 17). 10 Much to the annoyance of American, Israeli, and European officials, senior Russian officials received a Hamas delegation in Moscow in March 2006. Although Hamas refused the three main conditions of the “Quartet” (US, EU, UN, and Russia) for working with it, Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov declared, “We are satisfied with the talks.” Elena Shesternina, “Mardi Gras Hamasquerade,” Izvestiia, March 6, 2006 (CDPSP 58, no. 10: 15–16).


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become a cause celebre within the Muslim world as the Afghan mujahideen were in the 1980s when Moscow was fighting against them.

The Putin administration, thus, has dealt quite successfully with the Muslim challenge to Russia’s security so far, even if this success is probably due less to its own efforts and more to Russian interests regarding Sunni fundamentalism coinciding with those of so many other governments (both Muslim and non-Muslim). Yet despite the success of Moscow’s strategy so far, there are two potential problems that could arise that this strategy would be hard-pressed to deal with.

First, even the best of ties between Moscow and all Muslim governments has not prevented the alienation and radicalization of some Muslims inside parts of Russia, especially the North Caucasus. The harsh measures undertaken by Russian security services to combat Islamic extremism may actually serve to foster it.11 Although the Russians cannot seem to admit it even to themselves, their own hostility toward their Muslim and other foreign population12 may be a far more important stimulus to Islamic radicalism inside Russia than is outside support for it.13 Neither the Russian government nor Russian society, however, appears willing or able to ameliorate this.14 11 For example: “Muslims in Kabardino-Balkaria are split into two groups—those who trust the official clergy, and ‘young people,’ led by unofficial ‘emir’ Mussa Mukozhev. In an interview . . . he said he has attracted believers who feel aggrieved by the government and who have joined his network of 40 Islamic congregations. The total number of ‘aggrieved’ believers is close to 10,000. Understandably, most of their complaints are directed at the police. ‘We have been completely deprived of our constitutional rights and civil liberties,’ Mukozhev said. ‘We’re finding it very difficult now to keep young people from taking counteractions. The authorities’ policy cannot be described as reasonable—‘provocative’ would be a better word.’” Milrad Azizovich Fatullaev, “‘Building Bridges’ with Armored Personnel Carriers,” Nezavisimaia gazeta, February 2, 2005 (CDPSP 57, no. 5: 5). See also: Andrei Riskin, “Wahhabis Are Gaining the Upper Hand in Southern Russia,” Nezavisimaia gazeta, February 4, 2005 (CDPSP 57, no. 5: 6). 12 According to Russia’s Center for the Study of Xenophobia and Extremism, 51–53 percent of Russians support “the idea that ‘Russia is for ethnic Russians.’” Viktor Khamraev, “Russian Nationalist Thugs,” Kommersant, December 7, 2005 (CDPSP 57, no. 45: 1). 13 Geidar Dzhemal’, the chairman of the Islamic Committee of Russia, warned of this possibility after the November 4, 2005 march by Russian nationalists in Moscow, especially “if the authorities encourage such demonstrations.” Aleksandr Bogomolov et al., “French Lessons,” Novye Izvestiia, November 10, 2005 (CDPSP 57, no. 45:5). 14 For example: An official of the Russian Council of Muftis reported that a group of 8–10 Russian “skinheads” entered a mosque in Moscow province and injured about ten

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Second, excellent relations between Russia and governments in the Muslim world will not prevent the latter from succumbing to, or being co-opted by, Sunni Islamic fundamentalists. Should they ever take over another country or otherwise become stronger than they are now, these Sunni Islamic fundamentalists might well decide to help their brethren inside Russia and the former USSR—especially since the Chechens and others are likely to flock to them for support. And, of course, Sunni fundamentalists in the Muslim world could become seized by this issue even if they are not in power. In June 2006, the Mujahideen Shura Council in Iraq seized four Russian diplomats in Baghdad and threatened to kill them unless Russian forces withdrew from Chechnya within 48 hours.15

In addition, if a Muslim (or any other) threat to Russia does indeed arise, it is highly unlikely that any existing Muslim government that Moscow has good relations with now is going to be willing or able to help Russia deal with it. Most are not strong enough to do much for Russia. Those that could would probably not want to incur the ire of the Sunni fundamentalists through supporting non-Muslims against fellow Muslims.

Although Moscow currently seems rather successful in containing the challenge to Russia presented by the Muslim world, it will be extremely difficult for Moscow to deal with any increased Muslim challenge (internal, external, or both). The Chinese Challenge The rise of China affects virtually every other country in the world, but most especially those that neighbor it. Moscow has an important reason to

worshippers including the imam on October 14, 2005. The Moscow Province Chief Internal Affairs Administration, however “denies that the prayer house was attacked.” “Skinheads’ Herd Instinct,” Nezavisimaia gazeta, October 17, 2005 (CDPSP 57, no. 42:7).

Also: According to a study released by Lyubov’ Kezina, the head of the Moscow Education Department, “78 percent of young Muscovites are in favor of using force to resolve ethnic conflicts.” Ekaterina Blinova, “Juvenile Babel,” Nezavisimaia gazeta, November 22, 2005 (CDPSP 57, no. 47: 12). 15 When Moscow refused to comply, the Mujahideen Shura Council in Iraq announced the execution of the four Russian diplomats “in revenge for our brothers everywhere with whose blood the Russians’ hands have been stained.” For more on this episode, see Mark N. Katz, “Russian Hostages in Iraq,” United Press International, June 24, 2006.


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be concerned about China: the Russian territory bordering it is sparsely populated. Furthermore, large numbers of Chinese citizens have been crossing the border to settle in Siberia—something that many Russians in the region have become nervous about.16 Siberia also possesses petroleum and other natural resources that a rapidly modernizing China increasingly wants access to.

In the past, Beijing has asserted territorial claims to a significant portion of Siberia. Almost all of these claims have been settled,17 but if a more powerful China ever in the future decided to revive its claim to any of this territory, Russia would face an extremely difficult challenge. The Chinese military appears to be undergoing modernization at a far more rapid rate than the Russian military—in part because China is the largest customer for Russian weaponry. As time goes on, the Russian-Chinese conventional force balance is steadily shifting in Beijing’s favor. Russia, of course, continues to possess a large nuclear arsenal—as does China. But would the Kremlin really be willing to risk Moscow in order to save Vladivostok or any other Russian city near the Sino-Russian border? The answer to this question may not be clear to the Kremlin even now, and will be much less so in the future when China has become more powerful.

The Chinese challenge to Russia, of course, has not reached this point by any means. Some Russian observers, though, have expressed fear about China’s future intentions toward Russia.18 Yet China and Russia also have several important common interests, including opposition to American “hegemony,” democratization, and Sunni fundamentalism. They also have a growing trade relationship that is important to both.

16 For example: “Rodina’s leader, Dmitry Rogozin, has previously accused China of plotting to take over Siberia, if not by force then by demography, and he has called for new laws ‘to restore Russia’s control over its borders’—specifically to stem the inflow of Chinese migrants, nearly half a million of whom already live in Russia. Russians should be encouraged to move to border areas, he has said, to counter the Chinese ‘threat to Mother Russia.’” Owen Mathews and Anna Nemtsova, “Fear and Loathing in Siberia,” Newsweek, March 27, 2006. 17 Vladimir Skosyrev, “Brothers Forever II: Fifty Years Later,” Vremya MN, July 17, 2001 (CDPSP 53, no. 29: 1–2). 18 For example: “Is this growing [Chinese] power dangerous for Russia? Yes, because everyone realizes that we could potentially have a ‘disagreement over the land question’—in effect, a ‘peaceful absorption’ of Siberia by China. And in general, having a neighbor that is 10 times stronger than you are is a rather dubious pleasure.” Leonid Radzikovskii, “The US + Russia = ?” Rossiiskaia gazeta, February 22, 2005 (CDPSP 57, no. 8: 4).

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Moscow’s response to the Chinese challenge has so far involved a mixture of bandwagoning with it and balancing against it. On the one hand, Moscow bandwagoned with China through signing the Treaty of Friendship with Beijing in 2001, working with China through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to reduce America’s post-9/11 presence in Central Asia, and participating in joint military exercises that were widely seen to have both anti-Taiwanese and anti-American overtones.19 On the other hand, Moscow has balanced against China through repeatedly calling for a strategic partnership with India as well as China (despite the important differences between these two), and selling more advanced weapons to India than to China.20

The Putin administration’s conflicting approaches toward China can best be seen by contrasting Moscow’s arms export and petroleum export policies toward it. China is the biggest customer for Russian weapons.21 By contrast, the Putin administration has been hesitant about building an oil pipeline from Siberia to China as Beijing has long hoped for.22 The result is that Moscow is providing Beijing with the means (i.e., arms) to threaten Russia while also giving it some incentive to do so by denying Beijing as much Siberian oil as China wishes to buy.

Fortunately for Moscow, Beijing is preoccupied with Taiwan, the US, Japan, and even domestic unrest. But if China ever decided to take measures that Russia found threatening, Moscow could find fending it off to be extremely difficult—if not impossible.

19 Victor Mallet, “Heed the Warnings of a New Cold War in Asia,” Financial Times, March 28, 2006. 20 According to the noted Russian military analyst Dmitrii Trenin, “Moscow realizes that the steady weakening of Russia relative to China can be offset, in a way that does not provoke China, through a ‘triangle of friendship’ involving India.” How this will “not provoke China,” however, is unclear. Nikolai Khorunzhii, “Three-way Exercises Are Next,” Izvestiia, October 18, 2005 (CDPSP 57, no. 42: 14–15).

On how Russia sells more sophisticated weapons to India than it does to China, see Viktor Litovkin, “Nonequilateral Triangle,” Vremia MN, December 3, 2002 (CDPSP 54, no. 49: 5–6). 21 “Russian Military Industrial Complex Is on the Brink of Collapse,” The Russian Business Monitor, June 17, 2005. 22 Eric Watkins, “Putin Coy in China,” Oil & Gas Journal 104, no. 12:29.


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Dealing with Three Security Challenges Simultaneously The challenges Russia faces from the West, the Muslim world, and China are very different from one another. China represents a traditional geopolitical challenge. The Muslim world could do much more than it is doing now to inspire and support Islamic opposition inside Russia and some other former Soviet republics. The West poses a threat to Russian influence in neighboring states as well as to the authoritarian order within Russia.

Russia, of course, can—and does—respond to each of these security challenges through pursuing policies aimed at reducing them. The problem for Moscow, though, is that it faces these three challenges simultaneously. Russian success in reducing any one of these challenges may thus result in increasing the threat Moscow faces from one or even both of the others. If, for example, Russia succeeds in pushing America out of Central Asia as it is now trying to do, Moscow will not be in a stronger position to deal with continued Islamic threats to the ex-communist regimes of this region. Nor will Moscow be in a stronger position to resist any Chinese attempt to increase Beijing’s influence there.

If it faced just one of these three security challenges, a sensible policy for rich but weak Russia would be to seek one or more powerful allies against it. But both because of Russia’s nature (specifically, its dearly held notion of itself as a great power) and of the three-fold challenge that Moscow faces, Russia has not done this. Nor does it seem likely to do so in the future.

No matter how good Moscow’s relations with existing Muslim governments are, these would be neither willing nor able to do anything meaningful to help defend Russia against the West or China. Even those Muslim governments that have sought Russia’s help against their opponents (including the US) are not powerful enough to help Russia against its opponents (especially the US).

Russia could ally with China against America and the West. Indeed, several Russian leaders and observers have suggested this. Moscow and Beijing clearly do not object to each other’s systems of government. Yet even though it has important differences with the West, Beijing is not willing to ally with Moscow against America, Japan, or Europe. China’s trade relationships with all three are more important than its trade

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relationship with Russia. Beijing does not wish to jeopardize these for the sake of an alliance with Moscow. Even if China’s relations with the West deteriorated markedly and it was willing to ally with Russia against it, how could Russia then protect itself against China? An alliance with the West—especially the US—is the most obvious answer. But this, of course, would probably mean the end of any alliance with China.

Russia could also ally with the West against threats both from the Muslim world and from China. But the Kremlin is loathe to do this because of the increased pressure for internal reform in Russia that this would lead to. While such an alliance might benefit Russia as a whole, it would not benefit Russia’s authoritarian regime—and so will not come about.

There are other possibilities besides these. During the contentious lead-up to the American-led intervention in Iraq in 2002–2003, Putin hoped to split the West by allying with France and Germany against the US and the UK. Yet despite their differences with Washington, Europeans are hardly willing to trade an alliance with the US for one with Russia—which Europeans tend to regard either as a problem or as a threat.

A Russia fearful of China could ally with Japan, which also has reason to fear Beijing. But Moscow is not willing to return the four Kuriles that it seized from Japan at the end of World War II as would be necessary for this to occur.

Finally, there are a number of smaller countries in the ex-communist and the developing worlds that are already allied with Russia to a greater or lesser degree. These include the Central Asian republics, Armenia, Belarus, Iran, Syria, and even Venezuela. These, however, are more interested in receiving help from Russia than in helping Russia, and are not particularly useful against a serious threat emanating from any of the security challenges Moscow faces.

What this means, then, is that Russia must face its security threats largely on its own. This is partly because Moscow does not trust those few that are powerful enough to help it (the West and China), and partly because other governments are generally unwilling or unable to help Russia against any serious security threat it faces. Fortunately for Moscow, it is highly unlikely that any two, much less all three, of the areas presenting security challenges to it will (or even can) ally with each other against Russia. Indeed, Western-Muslim, Western-Chinese, Muslim-Chinese, or Western-Muslim-Chinese alliances against Russia all seem


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inconceivable. Russia benefits from the fact that the rivalries among these three groups (especially those between the West and the Muslim world and between the West and China) are so great that they focus more on each other than they do on Russia.

The persistence of rivalries among the West, the Muslim world, and China, however, does not guarantee that Russia will not face a serious security challenge or be able to deal with it effectively. Indeed, should a serious security challenge to Russia arise from any one of these three, Moscow cannot depend on the rivalries among them to lead either of the others to ally with Moscow against that challenge. As was argued earlier, the Muslim world is too weak and divided to assist Russia either against the West or China. China can do little to help Russia stem either a rising democratic or Islamic tide in Russia. The West has its hands full dealing with Islamic radicals outside the former USSR and might not be able to do much to help Russia if Islamic opposition grew stronger there. Nor would the West be eager to intervene on behalf of an authoritarian Russia in any dispute or confrontation it might have with a nuclear-armed China.

Due to Russia’s suspicion of any potential ally that could help it against any serious threat to it that might emerge, Moscow may end up facing that threat largely on its own—something that will make dealing with its security challenges all the more challenging for a Russia burdened with so many weaknesses.

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Russia’s Choice of Alliance: Balancing or Bandwagoning? KO Sangtu Introduction During the post-Cold War era, Russia’s foreign policy has undergone numerous changes. Initially, Russia’s foreign policy, under Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, promoted a pro-Western approach; Kozyrev advocated close cooperation with the West, expecting Western assistance in Russia’s transition to democracy and its development of a market economy. In addition, Russia hoped the West would treat Russia as an equal partner in the international arena. However, to Russia’s disappointment, the West’s support fell short of Russia’s expectations. Against this backdrop, political opponents criticized Russia’s foreign policy as “romantic.”

The Yeltsin administration subsequently altered its foreign policy course drastically, launching its so-called Eurasianism policy. Eurasianism did not call for avoiding confrontation with the United States if such confrontation was inevitable. Evgenii Primakov’s appointment as foreign minister in January 1996 represented clear evidence of the Russian foreign policy shift. The transition in presidential political power in Russia—from Yeltsin to Putin—also created a new turning point.

Vladimir Putin embarked on a path of multivectorial diplomacy. He visited more countries in the first year of his presidency than Boris Yeltsin did during his entire two-term presidency. Even the “axis of evil” countries could be considered potential friends of Russia. For example, Putin visited North Korea for a summit meeting with Kim Jong-il,

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becoming the first Russian leader ever to visit North Korea. Thus, in just a few years after the end of the Cold War, Russian foreign policy had transitioned from a pro-Western approach, to Eurasianism, and finally to a multivectorial approach.

Yet many analysts expected Russia to seek vigorous cooperation with China after the end of the Cold War in an effort to counter the United States’ geopolitical superiority. In fact, Robert Donaldson argues that the 2001 Good Neighborly Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between Russia and China meets the requirement of an alliance because the treaty involves cooperative responses to threats to the security of both parties. Similar to the US-Korea and US-Japan security treaties, this Russo-Chinese treaty includes provisions of mutual consultation in cases of military threat from outside. Donaldson asserts that Russia intends to enter into a quasi-alliance with China, pointing to the brisk arms sales between the two states as evidence.1

However, Richard Weitz disagrees. He argues that the two strongest countries—Russia and China—failed to form an anti-American alliance despite having both the capacity and the incentives to counterbalance the United States’ power. Weitz admits that Russia has improved its relations with China to such an extent that it has helped arm a neighboring and once-hostile rising power, but he believes that this recent normalization has still not reached the level of joint effort required to counterbalance the United States, pointing to the fact that economic and societal contacts between Russia and China are extremely low compared to their military collaboration.2

Such conduct in the arena of foreign affairs suggests that Russia is continuing to vacillate between its aspiration to keep the United States’ global ambitions in check and the state of reality that requires it to bandwagon with the United States.3 Further evidence of this vacillating

1 Robert H. Donaldson, “The Arms Trade in Russian-Chinese Relations: Identity, Domestic Politics, and Geopolitical Positioning” International Studies Quarterly 47, no. 4 (2003): 709–732. 2 Richard Weitz, “Why Russia and China Have Not Formed an Anti-American Alliance” Naval War College Review 56, no. 4:39. 3 Ariel Cohen, “Yankees in the Heartland: US Policy in Central Asia,” in Eurasia in Balance: The US and the Regional Power Shift, ed. Ariel Cohen (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), 85.

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tendency is found in Putin’s policy in the post-September 11 foreign policy arena. Following the terrorist attacks, Putin demonstrated his readiness to support the United States’ position in the war against global terrorism. Moscow expected United States’ backing for its ongoing Chechen war in exchange for its policy of renewed friendship with Washington. Thus, the main question of this article relates to Russia’s attitude toward the United States. The article will attempt to determine whether Russia seeks to strengthen its relationship with the world’s only remaining superpower or instead ally with China to balance the unilateral position of the United States. Conditions Affecting the Alliance Decision Many contending theories have tried to explain the causes of alliance formation and continuation. Realists concentrate on the function of alliance as a mechanism for aggregating capabilities, particularly in terms of military strength. A military threat usually provides an impetus—albeit a temporary one—for military alliances; however, once the common threat disappears, the alliance usually becomes fragile.4 Although power is an important part of the equation in balancing benefits and losses through an alliance, it is not the only element to consider. James Morrow provides a variety of other relevant explanations for the alliance decision, asserting that nations consider not only enhanced security, but also those values—such as ideology, economic ideals, and material gains—that are regarded as the basis of a nation’s survival and power.5

When confronted by a significant external threat, states may either “balance” or “bandwagon.” Balancing is defined as allying with others against the prevailing threat, whereas bandwagoning refers to aligning with the source of danger. According to Walt, balancing behavior is much more common than bandwagoning, which is—in principle—dangerous because it rewards the belligerent behavior of great powers. Strong powers

4 Karl W. Deutsch, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957), 156. 5 James D. Morrow, “Alliances: Why Write Them Down?” Annual Review of Political Science 3, no. 1 (2000): 63.

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are more inclined to use force if they assume that others will be unlikely to balance against them.6 Several factors may affect the propensity for states to select their course between balancing and bandwagoning. Walt presents hypothetical conditions favoring balancing or bandwagoning, identifying three factors affecting the decision: the dimensions of threat, the availability of allies, and the security climate.

First, the weaker the state, the more likely it is to bandwagon rather than balance. Weak states can do little to affect the outcome and are likely to side with a hegemonic state. In contrast, strong states can turn a losing coalition into a winning one; thus, they can afford to promote a balancing strategy. Second, states will have little choice but to bandwagon when would-be allies are limited in number or unavailable altogether. On the other hand, they will mobilize resources against their foes when they are confident that allied assistance will be available. Finally, states more readily decide to follow a policy of balancing during times of peace because a false choice of an alliance partner will not necessarily be fatal to the nation’s survival. However, in wartime, statesmen tend to be extremely cautious regarding such decisions—even going as far as to defect from the losing side when an opportune moment presents itself.7

Based on this theoretical elaboration, this article will examine the conditions that Russia faces in establishing its foreign policy toward the United States. First, the discussion will examine Russia’s capability under Putin to address the United States’ dominance in international politics. Second, the discussion will scrutinize whether China can be a reliable strategic partner to Russia. Finally, it will examine the security climate of the post-Cold War era. Shift in Power Equation between Russia and the United States From a military perspective, the United States enjoys its dominant position in the international power distribution. It spent $455.3 billion for the military sector in 2004, equivalent to 47 percent of global military

6 Stephen M. Walt, “Alliances: Balancing and Bandwagoning,” in International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues, 6th ed., eds. Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis (New York: Longman, 2003), 111. 7 Walt, “Alliances,” 112-113.


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spending, which suggests that the United States nearly possesses the minimum power required to vanquish the entire rest of the world. Moreover, the United States’ ties with powerful allies, such as NATO, Japan, and South Korea, further compound this military clout.8

In light of this dominating power, Putin sought to reduce the power disparity between the United States and Russia through economic development, preferring a more independent and self-reliant approach. The Putin administration has consistently emphasized trade, not aid, by focusing on creating opportunities for Russian producers in international markets rather than obtaining outside support for unviable domestic industries. He has—for the first time in the post-Soviet period—begun to repay Russia’s foreign debt on schedule.9

During his presidency, Putin has relied on Russia’s traditional strengths—namely, oil, natural gas, pipelines, and arms—as the core of his national development strategy. Oil has been the driving force behind the rapid growth of the Russian economy, which reached a rate of 7.1 percent in 2004—a record among G8 countries. The trade surplus increased from $59.8 billion in 2003 to $87 billion in 2004, which led to a steady budget surplus. Putin established the Stabilization Fund in the budget to accrue the windfall profit from the increasing world oil prices; the fund reached $76.6 billion in November 2006, enabling the Russian government to pay off the bulk of its foreign debt.10 Thus, the Kremlin seems to be on the brink of attaining the first part of Putin’s inaugural goal: enhancing Russia’s power and prestige and regaining influence in the former Soviet republics.

The high economic growth under Putin has benefited from high energy prices, and Moscow has taken advantage of the security instability in the Middle East and OPEC’s escalating price policy to increase Russia’s share of the global oil market. As a result, Russia has been welcomed as a reliable global energy supplier in various regions, including the United States, the Caspian Sea region, Northeast Asia, and Western Europe.

8 SIPRI Yearbook 2005: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, appendix 8A. 9 The Economist, November 29, 2001. 10 RIA Novosti, November 1, 2006.

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Russia emerged as an important energy supplier to the United States particularly after September 11. Prior to the attacks, the United States imported the majority of its oil—51 percent—from the Middle East, but only one percent from Russia.11 After the attacks, the United States sought to lower its dependence on the Middle East. At the 2002 Moscow summit talks, Putin and Bush declared that Russia would ensure timely and reliable energy supply for the global economy.12

Putin has also demonstrated a shift in the Russian position on the development of the Caspian Sea energy resources. Previously, Moscow had insisted that the Caspian Sea energy sources must be developed with the agreement of all littoral states—or not at all. However, Putin has relaxed such requirements. Furthermore, Russia has also softened its opposition to the United States-sponsored pipeline project, which will transport oil from the Caspian Sea to the Black Sea.

Moreover, the Putin administration has identified Northeast Asia as an emerging market for Russian energy. China, Japan, and Korea need to diversify their energy imports to guarantee the steady development of their dynamic economies. Although Japanese companies have started to develop Sakhalin natural gas reserves that would meet the demand of the northern region of Japan, Russia’s energy reserves in Siberia would surely meet such needs more effectively. The greatest energy project in East Asia is the pipeline being constructed to connect Siberia and Northeast Asian countries. In fact, both China and Japan have demonstrated energy diplomacy toward Russia as they compete for a Russian decision favorable to their interests.

Finally, Moscow has attempted to increase its gas exports to Western European customers. Russia supplies enough natural gas to cover a third of Western Europe’s total demand. These gas exports are motivated not only by profits, but also by the belief that the greater Europe’s dependence is on Russian gas, the more Russia will be accepted as an integral part of the continent.

The economic boom under Putin has led to the revitalization of the Russian defense sector. As Table 1 indicates, the growth rates in military expenditures have been rapidly increasing, and the total amount almost

11 Knight Ridder/Tribune Business News, May 24, 2002. 12 Itar-Tass News Wire, May 24, 2002.


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doubled from 1999 to 2004. This development presents a striking contrast to the fate of its defense industry, which suffered the greatest damage during the reform period. Between 1990 and 1996, overall production of the defense industry was reduced by 53 percent.13

Such investment in the defense industry led to an increase in Russian arms exports. As Table 2 indicates, exports have nearly doubled, from $3.7 billion in 1999 to $6.2 billion in 2004. China has become Russia’s main client, accounting for 40 percent of the total weapons exported from Russia from 1999 to 2004. Table 1. Russian military expenditures

Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004At constant (2003) US$m 10,400 14,100 15,700 17,400 18,500 19,300As a percentage of GDP 3.4 3.7 4.1 4.3 4.3 3.9

Source: SIPRI military expenditure database 2006. Table 2. Weapons exported from Russia (in US$m, at constant [1990] prices)

Recipient 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total % China 1,378 1,694 2,917 2,379 1,961 2,161 12,490 40.70 India 873 422 679 1,514 2,340 1,694 7,522 24.51 Iran 244 323 352 319 423 261 1,922 6.27

Algeria 133 226 365 84 143 246 1,197 3.90 Vietnam 144 72 121 7 240 584 1.90 Others 985 1,352 1,132 1,127 782 1,594 6,972 22.72 Total 3,757 4,017 5,517 5,544 5,656 6,196 30,687 100.00

Source: SIPRI military expenditure database 2006.

13 Nodari Simonia, “Economic Interests and Political Power in Post-Soviet Russia,” in Contemporary Russian Politics: A Reader, ed. Archie Brown (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 272.

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Toward a Eurasian Alliance between Russia and China After the September 11, 2001 attacks, the United States discovered the strategic importance of Central Asia, which could help provide critical air access and base rights to the United States-led operations in Afghanistan as well as a launch pad for the war against Iraq. The United States wanted to use former Soviet military facilities, but it did not want to give the impression that it was thrusting itself into the sphere of Russian influence. Thus, the United States consulted with Russia twice—in October 2001 and again in April 2002—about its involvement in the area.14

Russia assisted the United States in the war in Afghanistan more than any of the US NATO allies. Russia not only consented to the United States military being stationed in its own backyard, it also provided the United States and NATO troops with the information the Soviet army had gathered from its decade-long war in Afghanistan. In fact, Putin tried to use the war against terrorism to improve Moscow’s deteriorated relationship with the Bush administration. He was keen to equate the United States’ war on terrorism with his own country’s campaign in Chechnya, which had been criticized by the White House on the grounds of human rights violations.15

Once Russia gave tacit consent to the United States military presence in Central Asia, Uzbekistan emerged as a principal strategic partner to the United States, receiving steeply increased aid from Washington. In the supplemental 2002 United States aid budget, Uzbekistan was allotted $155 million, despite receiving merely $83.5 million prior to September 11, 2001.16 Such expansion of United States’ influence in Central Asia made both Russia and China concerned regarding United States hegemony in the region. Both countries shared a need to check the United States’ enhanced position.

These efforts soon found strong resonance within the region. Shocked by the color revolutions—which some asserted were backed by United States’ interests—the authoritarian regimes in Central Asia leaned

14 Cohen, “Yankees in the Heartland,” 73. 15 Timothy J. Colton and Michael McFaul, “America’s Real Russian Allies,” Foreign Affairs 80, no. 6:46. 16 Cohen, “Yankees in the Heartland,” 74.


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back toward Moscow, which perceived the erupting democratization in the region as both a challenge and a threat.17 The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) became the main vehicle for promoting confidence building among Russia, China, and Central Asian countries. Terrorism and separatism have subsequently become the most important issues for the organization. In October 2002, China and Kyrgyzstan conducted the first bilateral antiterror exercise within the SCO framework, marking the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s first maneuvers with another country’s military. The Chinese military also transferred small arms, ammunition, and other military equipment to Kyrgyz security forces. Russia deployed its warplanes at Kant air base in Kyrgyzstan, while the United States troops were forced to leave Uzbekistan. Thus, as SCO member countries rid themselves of the United States military presence and Chinese leaders began to favor a preeminent security role for Russia in Central Asia—as a hedge against the growth of radical Islamic and American influences—Russia has successfully improved its strategic position in the region.18

In terms of Russia’s attitude toward the United States, Russia changed its cooperative policy into one of deterrence, which was possible because of its ability to rely on Chinese support. This Russo-Chinese relationship had been further strengthened by the two countries’ military technology cooperation. Russia’s arms sales to China have constituted the most salient dimension of the growing security cooperation between the two countries. Since signing an agreement for military-technical cooperation in December 1992, China has purchased more weapons from Russia than from all other countries combined.19

Such extensive arms sales are not unprecedented. After achieving a high rate of economic growth in the wake of reform politics during the 1980s, China started to purchase arms on the world market. However, the Chinese regime’s brutal repression of the democracy movement in 1989 caused Western countries to place an embargo on arms sales to China.

17 Hannes Adomeit, “ Rückkehr auf die Weltbühne: Moskaus Ambitionen sind größer als sein politisches Gewicht,”Internationale Politik 61, no. 7 (2006): 11. 18 Robert M. Cutler, “The Shattering of the Sino-Russian Entente over the Shape of Central Asia?” Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, November 21, 2001. 19 United States Department of Defense, Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China (Washington, DC, 2002), 40.

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However, the rapprochement between China and Russia coincided with the Western sanctions; thus, Russia remained the only supplier ready to help China advance its military modernization. The willingness to transfer sophisticated weapons technology to an emerging neighboring power that had long been an antagonist demonstrated that Russia had fewer strategic concerns about arms trade harming Russia’s geopolitical position.

The increasing confidence building with China lessened the concerns in Russia. In fact, Russia and China signed the Sino-Russian Good Neighborly Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in July 2001. Although the treaty is not a traditional alliance, it fills a legal vacuum that has lasted for decades—since the abrogation of the mutual defense agreement between Moscow and Beijing. Confrontational Cooperation between Great Powers in the Post-Cold War Era The end of the Cold War put an end to the antagonistic rivalry between the Western and Soviet blocs. The security structure in the post-Cold War era became increasingly complex as the question was no longer simply a determination of allies and enemies. As a result, countries must consider their decisions more carefully. For example, China has a strategic partnership with both the United States and Russia. In addition, the United States prefers unilateral solutions to international problems, a policy that has been criticized by Russia, China, and even European countries.

During the past decade, Sino-Russian joint statements have criticized various American policies. The two governments have issued numerous joint communiqués in which they have denounced various Washington policies and called for a multipolar rather than unipolar world. Both China and Russia have also jointly sponsored resolutions in the United Nations opposing the abrogation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Most recently, they urged the United States and its allies not to intervene militarily in Iraq without the United Nations’ approval.

The collapse of the former Soviet Union has also resulted in Europe and the United States drifting apart as Europe has become increasingly critical of the United States. Europeans took the end of the Cold War as an opportunity to reduce military spending; the average European defense budget eventually fell below two percent of the GDP—unlike the United


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States’ defense spending, which remains above three percent.20 Along with the transition in power, a widening perception gap has become evident in the past decade; the case of the war in Iraq provided striking evidence for this, as the United States and its European allies have maintained different perceptions of threat.

The United States has placed great importance on so-called rogue states and, accordingly, on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Washington also possesses the military might to remove such threats. As a strong country, it may resort to force more quickly and be less patient with diplomacy. Meanwhile, most Europeans have taken a calmer view of the risks posed by the rogue states and have learned to live side by side with the “axis of evil” states—supported by their history in dealing with both Hitler and Stalin. Europeans have historically faced a different security environment from Americans, who live in a seemingly secure environment shielded by two oceans. For Europeans, security challenges include ethnic conflict, migration, organized crime, poverty, and environmental degradation resulting from failed states.

Yet the biggest tension surfaced in the relationship between Russia and the United States, for whom the concept of strategic partnership does not even meet the definition of rhetoric. The Jackson-Vanick Amendment, issued in 1974 to limit trade with the Soviet Union due to Jewish emigration issues, has not yet been annulled by Washington. In other words, this relic of the Cold War era demonstratively remains effective. Furthermore, Republican senator John McCain called for a boycott of the G8 summit in St. Petersburg in his speech at the Munich security conference in February 2006. He asserted that Russian politics had deviated from the path to democratization and taken up the incorrect path to authoritarianism. A few months later, Vice President Dick Cheney blamed Russia for stopping gas delivery to the Ukraine in comments he made at the summit meeting involving countries from the Northern Sea and Caspian Sea areas. He further clarified that Russia must not use oil and gas as instruments of political pressure.21

20 Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (New York: Random House, 2004), 25. 21 Adomeit, “ Rückkehr auf die Weltbühne,” 8.

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Meanwhile, for the majority of the political elite in Russia, the former Soviet republics—save the Baltic countries—are regarded as a sphere of influence. Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov revealed his perception that Russia was a dominant power in Eurasia at a 2004 Washington press conference. Even liberalist Anatolii Chubais, who was the architect of shock therapy during the Russian market reform, came up with the idea of a “liberal empire in Eurasia.”22

Today, US-Russian relations are often described as a “Cold Peace” or “renewed Cold War.” It is evident that a close relationship similar to the one between the United States and the United Kingdom will not be realized in the near future. Russia will be neither an ally nor an enemy of the United States. 23 In the contemporary international environment, Russia can stand against the United States without fear of becoming involved in a war because today’s international order is based on a spirit of peaceful cooperation. Conclusion As mentioned earlier, three factors affect the decision to balance or bandwagon—namely, the capability for deterrence, the availability of allies for balancing, and the international security climate. Russia’s growing confidence in its economic strength is, as Putin argues, crucial for recovering its superpower status as Russia needs enormous financial backing for military modernization. The Russian economy continues to grow rapidly, providing funding for the military sector—an area long neglected during Yeltsin’s presidency. Thus, the renewed aspiration for a superpower role in the international arena is moving closer to materialization.

Second, the contemporary world power structure is characterized by a unipolarity. The United States accounts for almost half of the world’s military expenditure. In addition, it maintains military alliances with major powers. In this power constellation, it is nearly impossible for Russia alone to seek to balance the United States’ power unless another

22 Cohen, “Yankees in the Heartland,” 84. 23 Nikolas K. Gvosdev and Dimitri K. Simes, “Rejecting Russia?” The National Interest no. 80 (Summer 2005): 5–8.


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major power supports Russia’s attempts. Relations between Russia and China have strengthened, especially as military technical cooperation between the two has reached a level of military alliance. Thus, Russia seems to be seeking to alter the unilateral structure of the international order with the help of China.

Finally, the international security environment was peacefully transformed after the end of the Cold War. The acute, ongoing confrontation between the East and West abruptly faded. Strategic choices as to whether to establish an alliance no longer decide national survival, and the danger of military conflict among major powers has decreased. Moreover, the international confrontation line has blurred. European allies often oppose the United States’ military interventions in international conflicts. Although Russia initially supported the United States in the Afghanistan war, subsequent Russo-US relations have deteriorated as the United States’ influence increased in Central Asia. Russia has changed its strategy into one focused on balancing the United States’ power in the region. Russia can freely take a confrontational position against the United States because such attitudes rarely lead to a military showdown. Thus, the international security environment is so favorable that Russia can freely choose between balancing and bandwagoning.

Russia initiated and soon abandoned its bandwagoning attitude toward the United States shortly after the September 11, 2001 attacks. It now seems to be neither an ally nor an enemy of the United States. The convergence of Russia and China in their strategic position will impact on the international security structure, as both Russia and China clearly aspire to be superpowers in the long run. This constellation promotes Russia’s policy of confronting the United States and cooperating with China for the time being.

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Primakov Redux? Russia and the “Strategic Triangles” in Asia IWASHITA Akihiro Introduction The idea that Russia is now seeking to maintain its interests to the maximum in any region is an accepted reality. And for Russia to do this, it seems it has increasingly employed the tactics of a “balance” foreign policy. Firstly, Russia, in an era of globalization, has encouraged the formation of bilateral and multilateral coalitions “against a superpower” and, secondly, has been cautiously shifting its foreign weight from one great neighbor to another in order to deter a stronger power, which could threaten its security. In a sense, Russia’s “balance” policy should be considered according to two different dimensions.

In an Asian context, the duality of the “balance” policy is mostly illustrated in the Russian approach vis-à-vis China, India and Japan. In the first dimension, Russia relies on China and India to form a “strategic triangle” to lessen the influence of the US on the region. In the second dimension, not wanting to play second fiddle to China or allow China to “expand” in the Russian Far East, Russia is said to have enhanced its “traditional friendship” with India while maintaining cordial relations with Japan. On energy projects such as the construction of an oil and gas pipeline in Siberia and the Far East, the so-called “China-Japan rivalry” has become tediously commonplace, allowing Russia to maximize its interests.

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Generally speaking, the two dimensions hardly function together in sync. Often, they interact with each other; when Russo-Chinese relations deteriorate, or either Russo-US or Sino-US relations improve, the “coalition against a superpower” does not serve well, while the “deterrence to a neighboring power” functions. However, as Russo-Chinese relations have stabilized and developed, the former has been emphasized.

Evgenii Primakov, the former Russian foreign minister and premier, is well known for his revitalization of a “balance” foreign policy. (To be exact, the “balance” policy was partly begun at the end of 1992, which was followed by then Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev’s call for the withdrawal of the “Atlantic” position in 1994.) He accelerated the so-called “Eurasian” orientation of Russia’s foreign policy, which, Russia envisioned, would encourage its Eurasian neighbors not to overly rely on the West, revitalizing Russo-Chinese and Russo-Indian interactions. Meanwhile, he also cautiously confirmed alignment within the region, e.g., adjusting the “balance” between North and South Korea, while bringing the “Japan card” into play.1

The two dimensions of the “balance” policy were also recognized in Russia’s foreign policy approach toward Asia. In April 1996, when President Boris Yeltsin advocated a “Russo-Chinese strategic partnership” on Primakov’s suggestion, the declaration was naturally understood to be a “counterbalance” to the US. After that, Russia and China repeatedly made joint statements favoring a “multipolar world,” while sometimes denouncing “unipolar domination.” On the other hand, Russia also sought to develop relationships with other countries, not just China. Russia also tried to make a similar “partnership” with both India and Japan, with the former succeeding and the latter failing because of Japan’s stubbornness over the “northern territories” issue. At the beginning stage of the “balance” policy, it was next to impossible for Russia to rely on China. The border dispute along the Amur, Ussuri and other rivers and Chinese migration problems in the Far East fanned anti-Chinese sentiment among

1 On Russia’s “balance” foreign policy both in the West and in the East, including the Primakov era, Robert H. Donaldson and Joseph L. Nogee, The Foreign Policy of Russia: Changing Systems, Enduring Interests, 3rd ed. (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2005); Concerning Japan, observe Primakov’s vigorous, active approach toward Japan, including certain plans to resolve the border issue, from the end of 1996 to 1998.

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Russian foreign policy elites. Similarly, in the 1990s, Chinese specialists strongly doubted whether Russo-Chinese relations could be improved.

A more nuanced “balance” policy indicated a sudden change in 1998. When Primakov visited Delhi in December 1998, he emphasized the possibility of building a triangle based on the “strategic partnerships” of Russia, China and India,2 supposedly as a “counterbalance” vis-à-vis the US. Although his slogan was catchy, both China and India immediately rejected the proposal.

Eight years have since passed. The situation has been changing dramatically. In the summer of 2005, Russia and China jointly conducted a military exercise as a likely performance “against a superpower.” Both Russia and China take pride in knowing that their relations are at their most developed in history.3 Russia and India have also reemphasized their “strategic partnership” many times. The first dimension of the “balance” policy seems to have overcome the second. Is there a possibility of the “strategic triangle” making sense in Asia? Will Primakov’s intelligence prove to be successful in the long run?4

2 Agence France Presse, December 21, 1998. 3 BBC Monitoring, May 30, 2006. 4 The topic of “Primakov redux” is recently the focus of many specialists, e.g., the last national convention on the AAASS held in Salt Lake City (USA) organized a panel on it. On other analyses, Julie M. Rahm, “Russia, China, India: A New Strategic Triangle for a New Cold War?” Parameters, 31, no. 4 (Winter, 2001/2002); Mary Burdman, “Potential for ‘Strategic Triangle’ Cooperation Grows,” Executive Intelligence Review, 29, no. 47 (December 6, 2002); Matthew Oresman, “Fear Not the Russia-China-India Strategic Triangle,” In the National Interest, 1 no. 16/17 (December 25, 2002–January 1, 2003); Vladimir S. Myasnikov, “The Strategic Triangle of Russia, China, and India: the Eurasian Aspect,” Executive Intelligence Review, 30 no. 13 (April 4, 2003); Sergei Blagov, “Russia-China-India: An Axis of Denials,” Asia Times July 3, 2003,; Harsh V. Pant, “The Moscow-Beijing-Delhi ‘Strategic Triangles’,” Security Dialogue, 35, no. 3 (September 2004); Nivedita Das Kundu. “Russia-India-China: Prospects for Trilateral Cooperation,” Aleksanteri Papers, 3 (2004); Joseph Ferguson, “US-Russia Relations: Further Strategic Disconnect,” Comparative Connections: A Quarterly E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations, http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/cpc/cpc_jul05/cpc_jul05e.pdf; Stephen Blank, “Primakov’s Russia/India/China Triangle Nears Realization,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, 2, no. 79 (April 22, 2005): Some seek to find a future perspective on the triangle partly to “counterbalance” the US and partly to stabilize and develop a region that the triangle could influence. Others deny the importance and function of the triangle because of the lack of coincidence or the divergence of real interests among Russia, China and India. Basically, most analyses share a similar character. However: 1) the “balance” factor is overestimated in the triangle with no or slight consideration for border or bilateral factors; 2) the

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The aim of my article is to shed some light on the truth behind “Primakov redux.” In the first section, I will discuss in detail the behind-the-scenes story of Sino-Russia relations developing as a main axis of the “strategic partnership” based on Primakov intelligence. Although some analysts emphasize the factor of “balance” with the US in the foreign policy process, the dynamics of the Sino-Russian “partnership,” which is heavily influenced by border management, have been the driving force in a bilateral context, particularly after the Cold War. The logic of the process is conveniently termed “border politics” in the article in contrast to a “balance” factor. I will illustrate how border politics have played a role that goes beyond any “balance” factor in Sino-Russian relations.

In the second section, I shift my attention to South Asia. An axis of Russo-Indian relations should here be basically reviewed from the standpoint of “balance” policy. However, the presence of China and Pakistan has made border politics a factor in the region. Regional relations have had a complicated history even during the Cold War, and even bilateral relations between Russia and India, which lack a shared border, seem to be influenced by other regional powers and the US. The story begins with a short overview of the Cold War and Russo-Pakistan relations.

In the third section, I conceptualize a theory from phenomena observed in the first and second section. I categorize these state-to-state relations into two lines: that of “border politics” and that of “free hand.”5 I put each line on triangles within certain quadrangles around Eurasia. Although the diagrams are abstract representations of reality, the salutary lesson of “Primakov redux” should be informative.

Russia-China-India triangle is examined in a quadrangle including the US without deliberate reviewing of other triangles on Eurasia, relating to Pakistan or Japan. They are inclined to touch on current affairs in the interaction in the short term but are short on structural analysis regarding relations between the states concerned in Eurasia. 5 For these conceptions, see the last section in this article: Eurasian Triangles Reviewed.

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The Upturn of Border Politics: The Russo-Chinese Partnership Sino-Russian Relations in the 1990s The first test of Russia’s “balance” policy was its Chinese relations. Can these relations be evaluated from a “balance” point of view? Did Russia make a “strategic partnership” with China in order to offset US influence in the region?

For a better appreciation and understanding of Russo-Chinese relations, let us look back to the 1990s. During that time, Russia and China “officially” enjoyed good relations under the slogan of “constructive partnership,” declared in September 1994. They exchanged high-ranking officials and various delegations and missions as a sign of their “constructive partnership.” However, Russo-Chinese relations were in crisis mode over border issues. In particular, Chinese “migration” and border demarcation were the most pressing issues of the time.6

It is well known that 1992 was a significant year both for Russia and China. The newly born Russia was rushing toward “regime transition” and adopted new economic policies, particularly “border openness” and “liberalization,” in order to introduce a market economy. The Chinese leadership, while astonished by the sudden decline of the father state of socialism, considered the breakup of the Soviet Union as not only a crisis for China’s regime but as a golden opportunity for Chinese businesses. In the spring of 1992, Deng Xiaoping, in his now famous “Southern Speech,” emphasized the importance of economic improvements over other socialist values. Then, cities in the northern frontier close to the Russian Far East were declared open gates by the central government to encourage “reform and openness.” At the time, a notable increase in the number of people flowing across border points between Russia and China was clearly discernible. Many citizens on both sides seized the opportunity to do business on the other side of the border on a non-visa basis, which has allowed Russian and Chinese citizens to visit each other’s countries free of charge since 1988.

From 1992 onward, many Chinese “business” persons started to use the non-visa basis to earn money in the Russian Far East and Siberia. This 6 On the details of the negotiations, see IWASHITA Akihiro, A 4,000 Kilometer Journey along the Sino-Russian Border, Slavic Eurasian Studies 3 (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, 2004), 10–31.

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had a drastic impact on the Russian people. There is a striking demographic gap between the roughly seven million in the Russian Far East and more than 100 million in the Chinese North East. In addition, while many Russians left the Russian Far East, where living conditions had continually spiraled downward since the breakup of the of the country’s previous economic system, the infiltration of Chinese goods and peoples into the vacuum created by the collapse of the Soviet Union was noticeably on the rise. Statistics suggest a mutual economic “supplement” between Russia and China, but the extremely negative reaction to the Chinese presence in Russia’s Far East market was a cause of great concern during this time.

This idea that the Chinese might rush to retake their previous land because of Russia’s weakness reached panic proportions just after 1994, when the Russian government initiated a series of visa controls against the entry of Chinese citizens, and conducted a number of police operations to weed out “illegal” Chinese residents following the requests of some local bodies on the Russian side of the border. In 1996, a sort of quasi-prophet, Tamara Globa, spread the word that a war with China was imminent. Some residents rushed to question military officials about a would-be Russo-Chinese war. The rumor of an outbreak of war between Russia and China spread like wildfire throughout Russia, despite denials to the contrary by the Russian authorities. This is the story of the Sino-Russian border area around the time that Moscow and Beijing declared their “constructive partnership” in 1994. The Birth of a “Strategic Partnership”: Making Sense of a “Balance” Foreign Policy? Against this backdrop, the 1991 eastern border agreement7 that had been reached between the Soviet Union and China had taken on a special meaning. The fact that many islands on the Amur and Ussuri Rivers and some portions of land in the Primor’e Krai were about to be transferred to China was leaked to the press and sensationalized.

The Primor’e Krai assumed an assertive position among the border regions. Disputed territories were not concentrated on the islands found on rivers such as Damanskii Island, the famous Soviet-Chinese battlefield of 7 See, Sbornik rossisko–kitaiskikh dogovorov, 1949–1999 (Мoscow: Terra Sport, 1999), 117–125.

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1969. The “Chinese threat” was seriously becoming a matter of real concern. Not only the Primor’e Krai but also other border regions in Russia followed suit, although the degree of complaint and criticism against China were obviously differentiated.

As a result, most of the border demarcation works covering the Amur and Ussuri Rivers had to be delayed until the end of 1996. Russia had to finish all the works on the 1991 agreement by the end of 1997 because a deadline was legally imposed by the Russian parliament. If the works had not been finished by that time, the 1991 agreement would have been invalid and the Russo-Chinese border would have turned to lawlessness. Foreign Minister Primakov and his aids repeatedly appealed to the public that the Russian government was obliged to accelerate the works to guarantee the agreement.8 These were the realities on the ground in 1996, when Russia and China declared their “strategic partnership.”

At the beginning of 1996, President Yeltsin signed an order for the acceleration of border demarcation works. Then, the Primor’e governor protested against pressure from Moscow that the Primor’e transfer the disputed lands to China. Because of this protest, the Russian government was forced to halt the demarcation works in the Primor’e.

Behind these political maneuvers, Moscow tried to complete its negotiations over other demarcation works on some islands downstream of the Amur River in the Jewish Autonomous Oblast. A deal was clinched in April 1996 just before Yeltsin’s departure for China. On the way to Beijing, Yeltsin was suddenly hit with a good idea. He urged his aide to propose to the Chinese the new term of “strategic partnership” in place of

“constructive partnership.” The Chinese side hesitated in accepting it at first because, they felt, it implied “alliance” against others, and were concerned how emerging China-Russian relations would appear to the West. Finally, China agreed to accept the expression. According to a Chinese source, it is true that Yeltsin suddenly proposed it but Primakov suggested the idea beforehand when he was inaugurated chief of the Russian intelligence service.

Nevertheless, the actual meaning of “strategic partnership” was too vague both for Russia and China, and attempts to come up with a suitable definition remained elusive. The only content that all parties agreed on was that it should never mean “against a third party” or “alliance.” They 8 Interfax, April 5, 1996; April 18, 1996; Tikhookeanskaia Zvezda, Mаrch 8, 1997.

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repeated that these were a new type of relations in the post-Cold War era, but nobody was able to provide the persuasive details.9 Multilateral “Strategic Partnership” Fashioned As Primakov expected, the “strategic partnership” has been advocated year by year. Russia and China soon discovered that the “strategic partnership” could be effective and repeatedly inserted common declarations and statements, which implicitly criticized the foreign policy of the US. Neither challenges over the border nor the background of the “partnership” are fully understood. However, a simple interpretation from the point of view of a “balance” policy was beyond the behind-the-scene facts, as I have illustrated above.

The “strategic partnership” was at last accepted by China. China decided to advocate it as a “new type of international relations” and declared a “strategic partnership” with the US in 1997. The term “partnership,” which was rarely used except in certain cases as with Russia and Brazil, has been applied and modified for France, the UK, Japan, Turkey and South Africa. 1996 was the opening year both for “strategic” and “partnership” in China. In turn, Russia also rushed to declare a “strategic partnership,” particularly with India, the EU and CIS countries.10

This important phenomenon was that “partnership” applied not only to bilateral relations, but also to multilateral relations. Just after the Russo-Chinese declaration on the “strategic partnership,” a correspondent for a Russian military newspaper, Krasnaia Gazeta, commented that the relationship could be widened or multilateralized, i.e., with India.11 The Shanghai Five, a predecessor of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, was organized in the same year. It appeared to be a model of multilateral “partnership.” It should be noted that the Shanghai Five was created as a coordinate body for the security and stability of the former Soviet-Chinese border. And since 1996, China has also accelerated a multilateral approach

9 Innumerable interviews with Russian and Chinese colleagues in Moscow, Vladivostok, Beijing, Shanghai and Harbin since 1993. Some uncited sources in the article are provided by them. 10 With Japan, the “creative partnership” was declared in 1998. Japan cautiously downplayed the term “strategic” because of its own “territorial issue” vis-à-vis Russia. 11 Krasnaia Gazeta, April 30, 1996.

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to its foreign policy toward Asia and has emphasized the importance of diplomacy with neighboring countries as one of its major orientations.12

Following the tide of creating multilateral “partnerships,” Primakov, then premier, made his now famous speech calling for the formation of a “strategic triangle” between Russia, China and India during a visit to Delhi in 1998. Negative reactions immediately followed from both China and India. First, both of them worried that a sudden spread of a “strategic partnership” multivectored among the three giants in Eurasia would naturally be interpreted as a cause for alarm among surrounding countries and the US. Second, China did not take Russia’s goodwill very seriously in 1998 and neither did India need serious cooperation with Russia compared with the US. Most importantly, China and India recognized that relations were far from the stage of “partnership.” One Indian specialist laughed at the possibility of a “strategic triangle” because India had for some time maintained a “non-strategic partnership” with China.13 Russo-Chinese Relations Elevated Despite the declaration and reputation of the “strategic partnership” between Russia and China established in 1996, relations developed at snail’s pace. The promise to boost trade ties between the two countries to the $20 billion level by 2000 was not realized. Border negotiations were deadlocked over a a couple of remaining disputed points: Heixiazi Island near Khaborovsk and Abagaitui Island on the Argun River. The 1991 agreement, excluding the two points above, was juristically reconfirmed in 1999. In September 1999, when Russian sinologists began to emphasize a would-be “strategic triangle” between Russia, China and India during a symposium session held at the Institute of the Far East in Moscow, a correspondent from a Chinese newspaper did not take their reports very seriously, and a Russian diplomat criticized the idea for its impracticality. 14 A prestigious Chinese academic journal on Russia

12 See Evan S. Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s New Diplomacy,” Foreign Affairs (November/December 2003); TAKAGI Seiichiro, “Chugoku to Minami Ajia” [China and South Asia], Minami Ajia no Anzenhosho [South Asian Security] (Japan Institute of Foreign Affairs, 2005). 13 Interviews and dialogues with Indian colleagues in Delhi since 2001. 14 This was heard from discussions during a symposium held at the Institute of Far Eastern Studies in Moscow in September, 1999. See, Kitai na puti modernizatsii i reform; tezicy dokladov X mezhdunarodnoi nauchnoi konferentsii “Kitai, kitaiskaia tsivilizatsiia i mir:

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mentioned that Russo-Chinese relations are on a second axis that is easily influenced by Russo-US and Sino-US relations. The better the latter becomes, the worse the former becomes, and vice versa.15

Just after his inauguration, Russian President Vladimir Putin was eager to visit to Europe in early 2000. He welcomed US President Bill Clinton in Moscow in early June, while waiting until July to visit Beijing. The joint statement published there on missile defense unveiled a different approach between Russia and China.16 China was afraid that the new Russian president was overly pro-western at China’s expense. Even when President Putin paid his first visit to India in October 2000, a high-ranking Chinese correspondent suggested in an internal report that this trip may have been held to counter China as a part of Russia’s “balance” foreign policy.

Emerging problems in relations were, however, worked out through bilateral cooperation, particularly over the border region, which kicked off

istoriia, sovremennost’, perspektivy” (Moscow, 22–24 September, 1999), T. 1–2 (Moscow, 1999). Bilateral interaction at the researcher level between Russia and China has continued and expanded since then. A force driving Russian toward trilateral cooperation including India is stirred up by the Institute of Far Eastern Studies. See Kitaĭ v XXI veke: shansy, vyzovy i perspektivy: tezisy dokladov XI Mezhdunarodnoĭ nauchnoĭ konferentsii “Kitai, kitaiskaia tsivilizatsiia I mir: istoriia, sovremennost’, perspektivy” (Моskva 27–29 sentiabria 2000 g.) (Мoscow, 2001); Rossiia-Kitai-Indiia: novye vyzovy i ugrozy XXI vek, Problemy Dal’nego Vostoka, 6 (2001); S. V. Uianaev ed. Vzaimodeistvie Rossii, Indii i Kitaia v XXI veke: problemy, perspektivy, napravleniia (Мoscow: Institut Dal’nego vostoka, Rossiiskaia akademiia nauk, 2004), vol. 1–2. 15 Dongou Zhongya yanjiu, 2000, no. 1, 86–87. 16 Take the example of the Russo-Chinese summit in July, 2000, as an illustration. We understand that Russia and China advanced their “Strategic Partnership” at the same time and collaborated to fiercely criticize the NMD and TMD sponsored by the US. We should, however, note the differences between the Russian and the Chinese texts on the issue of the Joint Declaration on Anti-Ballistic Missiles: 1) Both China and Russia strongly “oppose” the TMD in Chinese, while they only “protest” against it in Russian. 2) The TMD that they both criticize is “closed” and “one that could destabilize the region.” 3) It suggests that an “open” TMD, including China and North Korea, might be acceptable from Russia’s point of view. Russia could negotiate with the US to stop the NMD in proposing an “open” TMD not only in Europe but also in East Asia as a substitute for it. China could use the Chinese version of the Declaration to pointedly emphasize to the West the strong will of China and Russia against the TMD. This is the art of diplomacy, where both sides do not necessarily come to close the real gap between them concerning a key issue in the international field although they do display a strong will to show their “common” stance to the world.

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during the later years of the Yeltsin period. Successful enforcement of the 1991 agreement, strict management of Chinese migration, joint control of the border regime and other border cooperation had a positive effect in stabilizing the border region. It was undoubtedly shown that border cooperation had moved forward, regardless of any divergence of opinion or disputes between governments. Then, Putin urged the conclusion of a “neighborly friendship and cooperation” treaty, which Jiang Zemin had proposed to Yeltsin earlier, in order to solidify the basis of Russo-Chinese relations. On the eve of signing of the treaty in July 2001, it was reported that Putin, wanting to bring the border dispute to an end, repeatedly argued for a compromise on the remaining border disputes, although it was unrealized.

After both of them successfully completed the treaty and played up the “partnership,” new challenges emerged in the aftermath of “9/11.” Russia and China immediately responded to US President George W. Bush’s call for a “united front” against “international terrorism.” If the Chinese view on the Sino-Russian axis mentioned above were true,

Russo-Chinese relations had again hit another stumbling block. In fact, bilateral relations were neither disturbed nor worsened. In

addition to border stability and cooperation, economic relations gradually developed: $8 billion in 2000, $17.7 billion in 2001, and $11.0 billion in 2002. Russian arms sales to China were also progressive, with the sale of A–50 AWACS going through in November 2000, while deals over an upgraded SU–27K jetfighter and six submarines were finalized (the total amount is said to have been around $1.5 billion). It went beyond the estimated arms sales of $1 billion, at that time. Since 2000, energy issues have been at the top of their agenda. China’s urgent demand for oil and gas made possible the close cooperation over the construction of a pipeline through Siberia and the Far East. The move was put forward during a Mikhail Kasiianov-Zhu Rongji meeting in September 2001. The Russo-Chinese treaty provided the full basis for further cooperation, and was not influenced by outside factors.

President Putin, just after his meeting with Jiang Zemin in June 2002, praised Russo-Chinese relations: “The recent improvement in Russo-US relations never ignores Russo-Chinese relations, and the latter reaches a higher level than the former because of the existence of the friendship

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treaty.” 17 Nevertheless, problems soon emerged between Russia and China: China’s unfriendly attitude toward Russia’s entry into the WTO (China countering it with a demand that Russia lift its “barrier” policy against “Chinese migration” as a condition for Chinese support), problems over Russia’s “dumping” of Russian exports, such as steel and chemical fertilizer, and Khabarovsk’s severe reaction and propaganda over the Heixiazi Island issue. By the end of 2002, Putin was describing Russo-Chinese relations as “friendly but businesslike.”18 Breakthrough: The New “Partnership” In March 2003, Hu Jingtao was selected as the new president of China. For his first trip abroad, he chose Russia. To say that Russia and China were somewhat irritated by Bush’s unilateral approach would be an understatement; the presence of the US army in Central Asia for an undetermined period of time, and the US invasion and its subsequent occupation of Iraq being the most obvious irritants. Nevertheless, Russia and China did not closely coordinate against the US-UK “collation” on Iraq. Russia leaned upon a French initiative to soften the UN resolution on sanctions against Iraq. China cautiously watched the process but did not make its position clear at first.19

For the most part, rapid economic interactions between the two countries started in 2003. In 2003, the trade volume hit $15.6 billion (up $4.6 billion from 2002) which, if the negative effects of the SARS epidemic on the economy in May of that year are considered, is a tremendous achievement. It reached $21.2 billion in 2004 and $25.2 billion in 2005. Meanwhile, some twenty-four SU–30 jetfighters (at a cost of almost $1 billion) were sold in 2003, while the total amount of arms sales reached $2 billion. Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov visited Beijing and concluded the sale of six S–300 missiles. Nevertheless, when economic issues were internationalized, the Russo-Chinese “partnership” remained “businesslike.” Problems related to the proposed Siberian pipeline illustrate the realities of Russo-Chinese relations. Despite repeated Chinese calls for a route to go through China, Russia did not

17 RFE/RL Newsline, June 3, 2002. 18 RFE/RL Newsline, December 2, 2002. 19 For more on China’s approach toward the Iraq War, see Willy Lam, “China’s Reaction to America’s Iraq Imbroglio,” China Brief, 4, no. 8 (April 15, 2004).

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finalize it, and in September 2003 put its final decision on hold. Instead, Russia emphasized the importance of a direct route to the Pacific Ocean.20 A drastic push for better “relations” was brought about by the border arrangement. In October 2004, Russian President Putin and Chinese President Hu Jintao declared that Russia and China had successfully resolved the remaining border dispute by cutting each disputed island, Heixiazi and Abagaitui Islands, in half. The two presidents were proud of the results and declared it a “win-win” compromise. They also strongly suggested that it could potentially be applied as a model to other border disputes around the globe.21 The present condition of Russo-Chinese relations would not have been possible without defusing and resolving the border issue first, with little chance of bilateral cooperation in the vital areas of energy and arm sales. Who would have imagined an oil and gas pipeline crossing over the Amur River or a joint military exercise prior to the border dispute being resolved? With regional stability enhanced, mutual trust between the two countries has grown. As shown in this article, basic challenges to Russo-Chinese relations originated mostly from border disputes. The better the situation of the border, the better the relations. Lessons gained from Russo-Chinese relations suggest that they have not been a secondary axis, and have been affected little by the US. It is a considerably independent variable, basically controlled by bilateral factors, and has been particularly modified by border politics in the aftermath of the Cold War. Balance Policy Resurgent: The Russia-India Partnership South Asia as a Place for Primakov Intelligence India’s position on Russian foreign policy sounds different from China’s. India is far from Russia and has no shared border. Russia and India are rarely antagonistic toward each other, and are able to cooperate when there is a strong need to do so. In this sense, India seems to offer a perfect opportunity for Russia’s “balance” foreign policy. Reviewing post-Cold

20 RFE/RL Newsline, September 26, 2002. 21 On the final arrangement of the border negotiation on the remaining issue, see Iwashita Akihiro, “An Inquiry for New Thinking on the Border Dispute: Backgrounds of ‘Historic Success’ for the Sino-Russian Negotiations,” in Crossroads in Northeast Asia, ed. Iwashita Akihiro, Slavic Eurasian Studies 6, vol.1 (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, 2005).

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War Russian foreign policy toward India, close attention should be paid to the two Soviet periods of “balance” policy before and after the Russo-Chinese military conflict of 1969.

The first period began with India achieving independence from British rule in 1946. Combatting US influence was Russia’s top priority at the time. Russia never supported India unilaterally and balanced its position between India and Pakistan to maintain its interests against the US. In the 1950s when Pakistan joined the SEATO and the Baghdad Pact under the auspices of the US, The Soviet Union sought to weaken US influence in South Asia. Nikita Khrushchev supported India’s position on Kashmir (that it belonged to India), which brought India closer to the Soviet Union, and then proposed to offer Pakistan economic aid and atomic technology for peaceful use in order to make a rapprochement with Pakistan. In the 1960s, the Soviet Union revised its complete support for India on the Kashmir issue (Russia now believing that it should be negotiated between the parties concerned, while still backing India’s position) and signed a barter trade agreement with Pakistan. In 1965, Pakistan’s president visited Moscow and Premier Aleksei Kosygin, as a show of goodwill, organized the “Tashkent meeting” to mediate between the belligerents India and Pakistan. 22 China’s active influence was

22 We easily see certain amounts of studies on Russo-Indian relations with most of them focused on the “balance” between the US and Russia over South Asia in the first period of the Cold War. Even after Chinese presence increased in the region, the tendency to view things through the lens of a “balance” policy within the Russia-China-India-Pakistan quadrangle remains strong. See William J. Barnds, India, Pakistan, and the Great Powers (New York: Praeger, 1972); Robert H. Donaldson, Soviet Policy toward India: Ideology and Strategy (Cambridge: Mass., 1974); Richard B. Remnek, Soviet Scholars and Soviet Foreign Policy: A Case Study in Soviet Policy towards India (Durham: N.C.: Carolina Academic Press, 1975); Bhabani Sen Gupta, “Soviet-Asian Relations in the 1970s and Beyond: An Interperceptional study,” Russian Review, 37, no. 2; Stephen Clarkson, The Soviet Theory of Development: India and the Third World in Marxist-Leninist Scholarship (London: Macmillan, 1979); Rajan Menon, India and Soviet Union: A Case Study of Inter-nation Influence (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms International, 1979); Robert C. Horn, Soviet-Indian Relations: Issues and Influence (New York: Praeger, 1982); Hafeez Malik, Soviet-American Relations with Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1987); V. D. Chopra, ed., Studies in Indo-Soviet Relations (New Delhi: Patriot Publishers, 1986); S. Nihal Singh, The Yogi and the Bear: Story of Indo-Soviet Relations (London: Mansell Publishing, 1986); Peter Duncan, The Soviet Union and India (London: Routledge, 1988); Sanjay Gaikwad, Dynamics of Indo-Soviet Relations: the Era of Indira Gandhi (New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications, 1990).

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growing in the region. China’s geopolitical position toward South Asia is different from Russia’s. China has a shared border with Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. China and India had serious disputes over the border and the status of Tibet.23 In the mid-1950s, China and India sought a policy of “good neighborliness” over the border to achieve a “balance” against the US, but it did not last long. War erupted on the border. The Soviet Union did not fully side with China, and this later proved to be one of the reasons that Soviet-Chinese relations deteriorated. Why did the Soviet Union not fully support China? It is true that the Soviet Union was tired of Chinese aggression against the US, exemplified by Mao Tsedong’s assertion about a possible nuclear war against the US. The underlying reason was that South Asia was, for the Soviet Union, a space for “balancing” vis-à-vis the US. The Soviet Union seemed not to realize that Sino-Indian border antagonism could exceed the centripetal force between India and China against the US. The dissymmetry of India’s positioning between Russia and China should have been considered.

After the border clash between the Soviet Union and China in 1969, the meaning of a South Asian space for the Soviet Union shifted to another dimension of the “balance” policy: “deterrence of a neighboring power.” The Soviet Union was inclined to rely on India to deter China, while China and Pakistan strengthened the axis in reaction. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the US strongly assisted Pakistan while India went out of its way not to criticize Soviet action. In South Asia, Soviet-Indian relations functioned as a balance against the China-Pakistan axis backed by the US. South Asia was the perfect place to test Primakov’s maxim. Back from Inertia to Balance In the late Gorbachev era, Perestroika foreign policy, which assigned higher priority to the US, Europe and China, did not pay much attention to India. However, Mikhail Gorbachev visited India twice in 1986 and 1988 and played up their “traditional friendship” to others. In particular, the former was famous for the “Delhi Declaration.” However, the declaration, entitled “For Principles of Non-Nuclear and Non-Violence in the World,” obviously followed a Gorbachev initiative on the “disarmament of nuclear 23 For details on the conflict, see Neville Maxwell, India’s China War (London: Cape, 1970).

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weapons” and a “new world order” on the basis of the “New Thinking.” The declaration was provocative to the US and was closely related to the unsuccessful Reykjavik summit with US President Ronald Regan in October 1986. On the other hand, India had concerns over Gorbachev’s Vladivostok speech in which he urged Russia to “reconcile” with China and put forth his idea of building a comprehensive security regime in Asia.24

At the time, the Soviet priority in Asia was with China and the war in Afghanistan. After 1989, when Gorbachev withdrew the Soviet army from Afghanistan and paid a historic visit to Beijing, India was low on the Soviet Union’s foreign policy priority list. In this context, its relations with Pakistan had a chance of improving, but Pakistan overestimated the “Delhi Declaration” as a sign of close partnership between the Soviet Union and India. Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze’s visit to Islamabad did little to improve Soviet-Pakistan relations. Gorbachev next turned his attention to improving its ties with Japan. India officially kept its position as best partner in South Asia for the Soviet Union, but economic relations were downsized. In fact, bilateral trade had waned to somewhere between the $3 billion and $4 billion level, similar to its bilateral trade with China, but below that with Japan. Soviet-India relations were nominal at best and a de facto vacuum at worst. Neither the Soviet Union nor India showed much interest in improving their relations.

Following the birth of the new Russia, the early foreign policy of Russia was more pro-Western than Gorbachev’s, but it did not necessarily ignore its Asian “far neighbors”: Gennady Burbulis visited in May and Ruslan Khasbulatov visited in August 1992. At the end of 1992, Foreign Minister Kozyrev, departing from Russia’s pro-Western policy, naturally reminded his fellow Russians of India’s importance. He tried to redefine Russo-Indian relations in the post-Cold War period.25 President Yeltsin visited Delhi and signed a friendship and cooperation treaty, as well as certain agreements such as rescheduling of Indian debt and military cooperation, including rocket technology transfer.

24 For details on Gorbachev’s memorial on India, see Мikhail Gorbachev, Zhizn’ i Reformy, 2 vols. (Moscow: Hovosti, 1995) 25 See Аndrei Кozyrev, Preobrazhenie (Мoscow: Mezhdunapodnye Otnosheniia, 1995), 247–249.

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It is, however, apparent that the new treaty was a step back from the previous one: the new treaty omitted the word “peace” and the clause

“mutual consultant in crisis.” Military cooperation was also suspended. President Yeltsin suspended the transfer of technology to India, accepting US concerns regarding the situation. Their economic relations faltered as well: less than one billion dollars from 1992 to 1994, and not exceeding more than $2 billion since 1995. In contrast, India’s new open economic policy was given a warm welcome by the US, and India enjoyed a sort of honeymoon with the US because of the keen attention paid to Asia by the Clinton administration, which came to a halt following the exposure of India’s nuclear capabilities in May 1998. Russo-Indian relations are the only variable subordinate to US-Indian relations or to US-Russian relations. The better the latter becomes, the worse the former becomes, and vice versa.26

Following the deterioration of US-Russian relations in 1994, Russia began to urgently retreat from the prolonged inertia of Russo-Indian relations. Russia did not hesitate to sell its most sophisticated weapons to India; big deals concerning the sale of MIG–29, Su30–MKI, S–300 and submarines were quickly and satisfactory arranged. Energy cooperation including the construction of an atomic station and space exploitation facility was advanced. India’s traditional dependence on Soviet weapons in the Cold War and Indian tactics of maintaining its distance from the US caused India to move toward accepting a Russian proposal. After the US imposed an economic embargo on India after India’s nuclear experiment in 1998, Russia only verbally criticized India and did not participate in the embargo. With Russia seeming to be a good “card” for Indian interests, Primakov visited Delhi and disclosed the idea of a “strategic triangle.” India considered its relations with the US extremely important and vital to its interests, and much to Russia’s dismay, maintained a cool attitude toward Russia.27

26 For Russia’s “indifference” to India, see Frederic Grare, “India, China, Russia and the for Global Power Status: Strategic Partnership or Strategic Competition,” in India, China, Russia: Intricacies of an Asian Triangle, ed. Gilles Boquerat and Frederic Grare (New Delhi: India Research Press, 2004), 58. 27 See YOSHIDA Osamu, “Indo to Kyusoren: Kokusai Kankei no Renzokusei to Soui” [India and the ex-Soviet Union: Continuity and Difference in International Relations] in Roshia Gaikou no Genzai [Russian Foreign Policy Today] (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, 2004): 106–118.

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Here, it is important to note the new dynamics of Russo-Indian relations that emerged in the mid-1990s. An independent Central Asia became a contributing factor to the dynamics in their relations. Although India and Russia have no shared border, the area between the two countries had begun to transform, which had an effect on Russo-Indian relations. Since the early 1990s, India has been concerned about the stability of Central Asia because of the ruling Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the civil war in Tajikistan that had the potential to adversely affect the Kashmir issue. The disputed region of Kashmir controlled by Pakistan shares a border with both China and Afghanistan. Border politics in this context are analyzed with the presence of Pakistan in the region. Pakistan in Border Politics While the differences between the Russian approach to India and the Indian approach to Russia were apparent, Pakistan kept a close eye on Russia. To insure its own security against India, Pakistan sought to “balance” the great powers in the region. Undoubtedly, the major actors are the US, China and Russia. Although the US has been Pakistan’s most important partner, US support of Pakistan has been contingent on Pakistan’s ability to contain or conduct war against such “big enemies” as the Soviet Union in the Cold War era or the Taliban and al Qaeda in the “post-9/11” era. US concerns about Pakistan’s Islamic statehood and political instability, e.g., repeated military coups, also need to be factored in. In contrast to the political regime of Pakistan, which leaves little to be desired or emulated, the US admires Indian democracy. The better US-Indian relations, the worse US-Pakistan relations.

Concerning the Soviet Union, Pak-Soviet relations were relatively good in the 1960s, but after Russo-Chinese military conflicts and the third Pak-Indian war, they deteriorated (although it should be noted that Premier Zulfikar Ali Bhutto did visit Moscow in 1974, so relations were not completely frozen). The decisive halt to relations happened after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Pakistan was now a de facto “enemy” of the Soviet Union.

After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Soviet-Chinese reconciliation changed the basis of Soviet-Pak relations. But Gorbachev’s “indifference” (particularly on Pakistan) to South Asia and the collapse of the Soviet Union lessened the chances of drastic improvement.

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Although the new Russia attempted to develop relations with Pakistan in late 1992 and early 1993, President Yeltsin proclaimed that Russia was not prepared to provide military assistance to Pakistan. Pakistan was disappointed over Russia’s lack of interest in developing ties. Foreign Minister Kozyrev’s visit to Islamabad in April 1994 did little to improve relations. Moscow expressed a cool attitude toward Premier Benazir Bhutto who was eager to visit Russia in December 1994. Russo-Pak relations did not move forward.28

Compared to the slow pace of developing Russo-Pak relations, Pakistan’s approach to Central Asia was rapid and dynamic. In particular, Pak-Uzbek and Pak-Turkmen relations went ahead with top leaders and high-ranking officials making mutual and repeated visits, with Premier Nawaz Sharif visiting Tashkent in March 1992 and President Islam Karimov visiting Islamabad in August 1992. (He visited Delhi in January 1993). President Saparmurat Niiazov visited Islamabad in August 1994 and March 1995, while Benazir Bhutto visited in October 1994. Relations with Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan soon followed. (If the civil war in Tajikistan had not occurred, Pakistani relations with Tajikistan could have been more advanced in the mid-1990s.)29

Pakistan’s approach to Central Asia was different from that of India’s;

it focused on and was active in neighboring countries that have a shared border with Afghanistan. The Taliban regime created in Afghanistan pushed Pakistan to show its goodwill in support of the security and integrity of the Central Asian countries.

The Taliban’s highjacking of an Iliushin aircraft in August 1995 pushed Russo-Pakistan relations forward. Russia worked closely with Pakistan, while requesting the release of Russian hostages, with which Pakistan readily complied. When the situation in Afghanistan deteriorated in the summer of 1997, Foreign Minister Gohar Ayub Kahn visited Moscow and agreed with Primakov to build pragmatic relations for resolving regional issues, and exchanged views on the affairs of 28 On general trends of Soviet/Russo-Pak relations, see Khaled M. Sheikh, Foreign Policy of Pakistan, 2nd ed. (Lahore, 2004); Imran Shanzad, Foreign Policy of Major Powers (Lahore, 2001) and Journals of Strategic Studies (The Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad). 29 On details of Central Asian-Pak relations, see Railia М. Мukimdzhanova, Strany Tsentralinoi Azii: Аziatskii Vektor Vneshnei Politiki (Мoscow: Nauchnaia Kniga, 2005), 86–101.

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Afghanistan and the Tajikistan peace process. In March 1998, Deputy Chair of the Upper House Vasilii Likhachev, and Deputy Foreign Minister Grigorii Karasin visited Islamabad to emphasize the importance of the Russo-Pak partnership. Even after the exposure of Pakistan’s nuclear program in May 1998 following the revelations of India’s nuclear program, Russia’s criticism remained only verbal. Russia recognized the need to collaborate with Pakistan for regional stability. It is also worth noting that Pakistan played a major role during the Tajikistan peace process. In the summer of 1999, Pakistan and Iran were invited to the “6+2” conference in Tashkent that came about mainly through Russian initiatives.

Russo-Pak relations seemed to enter a new era, but General Pervez Musharrav coup put a stop to that in October. Russia again doubted that Pakistan could be a reliable partner. In January, the Russian Foreign Ministry blamed Pakistan for promoting “international terrorism,” including in Chechnya. President Putin, nevertheless, tried a “balance” policy to show Russian influence over South Asia. In September 2000, however, Pakistan, in turn, expressed its distrust of Russia to Sergei Iastrzhembskii, Putin’s presidential envoy to Islamabad. In Pakistan’s eyes, the Russo-Indian “honeymoon” played up by Putin’s visit in October 2000 was interpreted as a revival of Russia’s one-sided reliance on India. It seemed that Putin hoped to trumpet his “successful diplomacy” and the Russian presence in South Asia like the successful trip to Pyongyang on the way to a G7 summit in Okinawa, Japan, in 2000.30 However, the realities around South Asia (as well as the Korean Peninsula) are often beyond Russia’s diplomatic ability, and Putin’s similar attempt to mediate an Indo-Pak confrontation (after “12.13” of 2001 in Delhi) was also snubbed by both India and Pakistan, which accepted the US initiative for dialogue later.

In the context of border politics influencing Pakistan’s foreign policy, it is natural that Pakistan was eager to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as a way to improve regional stability and development. Pakistan was the first country to apply for observer status, which was rejected following strong objections by Tajikistan who expressed serious concerns over Pakistan’s backing of the Taliban in Afghanistan and by Russia who was fearful of arousing Indian concerns about the SCO.

30 Нovoe vremia, 2000, 41, 18–19.

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The events of “9/11” changed the regional alignment of Central Asia. All of the parties concerned joined the US call to unite against “international terrorism.” Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan welcomed the presence of the US military and Russia accepted it. Pakistan withdrew its support of the Taliban regime and joined the US coalition. India also supported the mission. After the Afghanistan war, interaction in the region was encouraged and widened to include South Asia with a new regional order emerging.

Dissymmetry of the regional axis in South Asia is also accounted here. For India, relations with Russia and Central Asia do not necessarily seem to be related to its direct interests, and Central Asia itself sounds like the kind of place for India’s “balance” foreign policy, while for Pakistan, the Central Asia region sounds decisive in the security and stability of its shared border with Afghanistan. India has recently been looking to demonstrate its commitment to Central Asia and has shown interest in the SCO, while maintaining a cooler stance toward the SCO than Pakistan. For Russia, as far as the outer border of the former Soviet Union is concerned, namely the Tajikistan and Uzbekistan border vis-à-vis Afghanistan, border politics could also influence Russo-Pak relations. In this scenario, Russo-Pak relations sound different from Russo-Indian relations, with Russia enjoying a “balance” policy regarding the latter. The small triangle of Russo-India-Pakistan is similar to the big Russo-China-India triangle from the viewpoint that each consists of a dissymmetric axis, i.e., border politics and a balance policy, as I briefly mentioned in the Introduction. I now direct my attention toward conceptualizing a hypothesis to explain the above phenomena. Eurasian Triangles Reviewed: Border and Balance For a theoretical wrap up, we can draw three models consisting of two lines: a border axis (unbroken line) and a free axis (dotted line). My hypothesis is that a border axis is independent and stronger than a free axis. A free axis presents the possibility of a free hand for the actor, but it would be influenced by the border axis within the triangle and other axes or factors outside the triangle.

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Figure 1: Basic Models on Triangles

Free Axis Border Axis

Type I X, Y and Z axes are even and can enjoy a free hand within the triangle for their own interests. In Type II, the border axis Y-Z has gravity. X can enjoy a balance approach toward Y and Z. If a zero-sum game is in play, the Y-Z axis is down in the interests of X, and the Y-Z axis is up, against the interests of X. In short, X attempts to keep the Y-Z axis down for its own benefit, while Y and Z tend to improve the Y-Z axis (defusing border problems and turning border regions into peaceful and prosperous areas) for their individual benefit. Type III border politics heavily regulate the triangle. The Y-Z axis has more freedom than the other two axes. When either the X-Y or the X-Z axis is down, the Y-Z axis is up. If both axes on X are down, this might encourage Y and Z to form “allied” relations. Then, X would be out, rushing to seek a stronger actor out of the triangle. The important point is that the triangle’s stability and development depends on the X-Y and the X-Z axes, not on the Y-Z axis. Type III is much more difficult to manage compared with Types I and II.

From Type IV, we can infer that all axes on the three actors are border axes. But in fact, we do not need this type to analyze regions. Rather, we should prepare one more line, this time illustrated by a semi-dotted line to indicate a semi-free (or semi-border) axis. In the case where two countries have a shared but short border, the situation changes. Although relations could be influenced by border politics to a certain extent while enjoying the balance game, border politics play less of a decisive role in determining the direction of relations.

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Quadrangles on South Asia Now we use three types of triangle (I, II and III) with three lines (border, free and semi-free axes). Put a quadrangle on South Asia and break it down into triangles as follows.

Figure 2: Quadrangle A: Soviet Union (Russia)-US-India-Pakistan

Cold War Post-Cold War

Free Axis Border Axis

Semi-Free/Border Axis

If you draw the Soviet-US-India and Soviet-US-Pakistan triangles, you will notice that they are Type I. Now draw the Soviet-India-Pakistan and US-India-Pakistan triangles. They are Type II. As I mentioned above, within Type II, Actor X can enjoy a free hand against Y and Z. The Soviet Union and the US should be put in X. In short, the quadrangle has a full basis that functions as a “balance” policy. Some US specialists as well as Russian and South Asian specialists mostly prefer to analyze the region from the point of view of a “balance” policy. Quadrangle A coincides with these researchers’ tastes.31

In the post-Cold War era, considering the amalgam of Central Asia and the emerging Pakistan border area, the Russian and Pakistan axis is being gradually influenced by border politics (as shown in the previous 31 See note 22 above.

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section). I will explain nuances of the Russo-Pak border transformation in the region a little later.

When we put another quadrangle on South Asia, including China, the situation changes completely.

Figure 3: Quadrangle B: Russia-China-India-Pakistan

Quadrangle B has complicated axes. If you break down the triangles into a figure, you can see that there are two Type IIs and two Type IIIs.

(1) Type II (2) Type III (3) Type II

(4) Type III

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Russia-Pakistan-India Triangle (1) and Russia-China-Pakistan Triangle (3) are semi-Type IIs. Russia and Pakistan have a relative advantage in each triangle in achieving a “balance” policy. In the absence of another heavy factor, it suggests that Russia and Pakistan have a chance to develop relations. In turn, China and India face challenges within Triangles (2) and (4). For instance, if China has problems with Russia and India, China could accede to the other power (such as Pakistan at the regional level or the US at the global level) outside of the triangle. If India has problems with China and Pakistan, India should accede to a great power (Russia or the US). In another option, both countries are obliged to defuse border issues and stabilize relations with their neighbors. This is a condition for the triangle to function smoothly.

The challenges of “the Russo-China-India triangle” are also easily seen. For the triangle to function properly, both the Russia-China axis and the China-India axis need to be strengthened, and the Russia-Indian free line must be supported by some special reasons such as forming an “alliance” against China. As the China factor that brought Russia and India together diminished, both Russia and India, now having a free hand in relations to realize their own benefits, should have encouraged other bases to develop relations further. Then, both actors would naturally watch the actor out of the triangle. The US should be invited into the quadrangle to review the regional dynamics. Quadrangles on Eurasia The Russia-US-China-India quadrangle goes beyond South Asia. It covers Eurasia as a whole:

Figure 4: Quadrangle C: Russia-US-China-India

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At a glance, the quadrangle is strongly influence by China. Here is the breakdown:

(1) Type III (2) Type II (3) Type I

(4) Type II

The US advantage within the triangles is apparent. The US can enjoy a “balance” policy toward both Russia-China (2) and China-India (4). On the other hand, China, Russia and India are inherently conditioned to improve border relations with their neighbors for their own interests to deter the US “balance” game. In Particular, China, double locked by the border axis, has a strong motivation to stabilize the border vis-à-vis the US approach. In turn, as the Russo-China axis or the China-India axis improve, it could diminish the US free hand. In this context, “Primakov redux” could be served by China’s goodwill. In the Cold War, as mentioned earlier, China was pressed by both Russia and India over the border and then rushed out of the triangle to invite the US at the expense of its two neighbors. But now, with the upsurge of border politics in the region, China could have more of a “free” hand vis-à-vis the US. However, India does not necessarily look to be following the path set out by China. Figure (3) shows India’s even position in the Russia-US-India triangle. This structure might not push India toward the “Primakov redux” as was the case with China. As for the realities of the Russia-China-India triangle,

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as Russia-China relations reach a historic high (suggesting that little room remains for improvement) and Russia-India relations develop smoothly (albeit not very dynamically), the possibility of the “Primakov redux” mainly depends on China-Indian border politics.

For a comparative analysis of the quadrangle and its implications for Russian foreign policy, we refer to the quadrangle on Northeast Asia, which includes Japan.

Figure 5: Quadrangle D: Russia-US-China-Japan

(1) Type II (2) Type I (3) Type II

(4) Type I

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Japan is basically in an advantageous position vis-à-vis China and Russia in the triangle. But the US factor determinately controls Japan’s foreign policy. Japan could not fully enjoy the advantage after World War II. In the post-Cold War period, Japan has had relatively free access to Russia. However, the balance approach toward the Russia-China axis does not seem to work well as illustrated by the pipeline route issue from Siberia to China or the Pacific Coast. It is a good illustration of border politics influencing a balance policy. Border stability and development gives both Russia and China an incentive to enhance the interests of each other vis-à-vis not only Japan but also the US.32 Conclusion: Beyond the Balance Game Considering the structural relations of the triangles within quadrangles, the Primakov expectation on the Russo-China-India framework could be realized by having lessened the influence of the US balance approach toward the region. However, as Russia and China improve their “strategic partnership” to levels not seen before, little room remains to maneuver against the US unless they push their relations forward as in the “alliance” of the 1950s. In addition to this, Russo-Indian relations also act as the main channel for the triangle because the axis is easily influenced by the “balance” policy in the region. At last, the future of the triangle deeply depends on China’s will to improve its ties with India (particularly on the issue of border politics) and partly on India’s endeavor to keep its interests away from the US regarding the “balance.” It does not seem that Russia will play a leading role in the triangle. If recent positive tides of the triangle continue, it will undoubtedly be moved forward mostly by a China-India rapprochement. In this sense, the “Primakov redux” has the fate of always being betrayed. If Russia tries to encourage the triangle artificially or overly commit to a “balance” game against the US, Russian 32 As Japan has a semi-balance line vis-à-vis Russia and China, the parties concerned (Japan and Russia, Japan and China) seem to lack the will to resolve the border issue. If border politics played a decisive role in building relations, negotiations over the problem would have been conducted more seriously and thoroughly. For more on the topic, see IWASHITA Akihiro, “Opyt Rossiisko-kitaiskikh pogranichnykh peregovorov: primenim li on k territorial’nomu voprosu mezhdu Rossiei i Iaponiei?” in ed. IWASHITA Akihiro and Dmitrii Krivtsov, Vzgliad vne ramok starykh problem: opyt rossiisko-kitaiskogo pogranichnogo sotrudnichestva (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, 2005).

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foreign policy will realize meager results with Russia losing face in the region as it recently did in South Asia.

On the one hand, the dissymmetry of the triangles in the region should be considered by Russian foreign policy makers before airing the “romantic” slogan of “balance” policy.

On the other hand, border politics vis-à-vis a neighboring country can potentially offset a “balance” game played up by certain actors with a free hand. Stimulating the function of a non-revitalized triangle within the quadrangle on Eurasia could serve Russia’s interests more effectively. In this sense, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, starting from border cooperation, provides an opportune test for Russian foreign policy on border politics. As cooperation on the border develops in Eurasia, the role of a “balance” policy, particularly employed by the US, will diminish. It could be of some direct benefit to Russian interests. China, surrounded by many neighboring countries and naturally restrained by border politics, maintains its status at the top of the organ.

As for some of the implications of this analysis, Russia now has a chance to develop a new Eurasian alignment by pouring resources into unseen axes, which have the potential to develop border cooperation. The most notable axis is Russo-Pak relations. As seen in the previous section, the Russia-Pakistan axis has a free hand (particularly shown in the triangle including the US). Border politics on the India-Pakistan and China-India axes have long deterred such relations but they have moved forward to some extent despite difficulties. In addition, Russo-Pak relations have the potential to develop border interaction through transformed “buffer” regions such as Afghanistan and Central Asia. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization could promote the Russia-Pakistan axis more intimately. When the axis works well, Russia enjoys dual benefit in border politics and in a “balance” policy vis-à-vis others.

Another alternative for Russia seems to be Japan. Closely observing the triangles in the region, border politics basically regulate the Russia-China axis. It is true that the axis functions more heavily than the China-Japan axis or the Russia-Japan axis. However, in turn, it could offer breathing space to normalize and develop both China-Japan and Russia-Japan border politics. For Russia, with the border politics vis-à-vis Japan improved, it could create a new dynamism to push the politics forward toward the China-Japan axis. Then, a space where balance politics rarely function would develop and expand. It could contribute to

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the interests of not only Russia but also most of the parties concerned in the region.

Border politics are the main driving force creating a new order within Eurasia. For Russian foreign policy, an initiative beyond a balance policy would be more appropriate than stubbornly adhering to the slogan of “Primakov redux.”

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India-Russia Relations and the Strategic Environment in Eurasia Nirmala JOSHI In the changing dynamics of international politics set in motion by the end of the Cold War and the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991, there were paradigm shifts in the nature of relations among countries. India and the Russian Federation, however, were soon able to find a new basis for reestablishing their close and friendly relations. Within a span of nine years, Indo-Russian relations have evolved into a strategic partnership. This implies a qualitative higher level of relationship reflecting mutual trust and confidence. Generally, it has been observed that whenever the geopolitical and strategic interests of two countries coincide, the ensuing relationship between them is often warm, close and friendly. The crux of Indo-Russian relations also lies in the compatibility of their vital interests at the regional level—Central Asia, the center of Eurasia. It was this compatibility of geopolitical and strategic interests that augured well for Indo-Soviet ties in the past, although the context was different, and augurs well now for Indo-Russian ties.

The regional scenario, however, has been undergoing swift changes. Eurasia has been attracting world attention. Several factors explain this shift in focus towards Eurasia. With oil politics and energy security occupying the center stage of international politics, the abundant natural resources of Eurasia including energy sources has drawn a lot of external attention. The scramble to control these vital resources, the efforts to provide alternate transport routes and corridors to most of the landlocked

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countries of the region, and the propagation of “forced” democracy in the post-Soviet space are various dimensions of the competition that has emerged among major powers. It is primarily between the West, particularly the US, on the one hand and Russia in partnership with China on the other hand competing for control and influence in Eurasia. What has complicated the competition is the emergence of Afghanistan as the hub of international terrorism and religious extremism under the Taliban. While the Taliban have been defeated, the danger of terrorism and extremism continues in the region. Reports suggest that several extremist groups have reemerged and that Iraq is gradually emerging as a center for terrorist activity. Thus, the regional scenario has been in a state of constant flux. For Indo-Russian relations, the regional context presents not only new challenges to their relationship, but new opportunities as well. In order to analyze India’s relations with Russia, an examination of the strategic environment in Eurasia is necessary. Strategic Environment in Eurasia In the post-Cold War era, one of the distinctive features to emerge was that security could no longer be interpreted in narrow terms or exclusively military terms. New challenges have arisen. These are primarily religious extremism, terrorism and aggressive nationalism. These new sources of non-traditional threat pose a serious challenge to the integrity and sovereignty particularly of multiethnic states and pluralist societies. Both India and Russia are multiethnic and pluralist societies. These non-traditional sources of threat manifested themselves in the most prominent manner in India’s neighborhood. India was already battling against extremism and terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir, and the appearance of these forces in its neighborhood exacerbated the situation. A noteworthy development that coincided was the unexpected emergence of the Central Asian states as independent entities. This widened India’s sphere of geopolitical and strategic interest. Even in the past, the Central Asian region was important for India, but Indian concerns were taken care of by friendly Indo-Soviet ties. In the changed context of 1991, India began to look upon the five states of Central Asia as part of its “extended neighborhood.” Since the majority of the people of Central Asia are Muslim, they began to attract attention, and Indian interest lay primarily

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in seeing that the secular orientation of the Central Asian states remain intact.

However, Indian concerns arose when the government of President Mohammad Najibullah was overthrown by the forces of religious extremism led by Burhanuddin Rabbani. The success of the Mujahideens in 1992 was the first victory of religious extremism, and this was the beginning of Afghanistan’s emergence as the hub of extremism and terrorism. India’s view that Afghan developments could cast their shadow over the newly independent states of Central Asia was not unfounded. Mosques, madrassahs and theological schools sprang up, and religious practices were being observed with great fervor. The beginning of the civil war in Tajikistan in 1992 signaled a new phase in the growth of religious extremism. The devastating civil war in Tajikistan lasted for five years (1992–1997). The opposition sought refuge in Afghanistan. Here, all help and cooperation was extended by the Rabbani government in terms of safe sanctuary, training, and financial support. Importantly, the religious leaders and others gained vast experience in the political and military struggles.

From an Indian perspective, the most worrisome aspect was Pakistan’s activities in Afghanistan, and its increasing interest in Central Asia. Initially, Pakistan pursued a religious agenda in Central Asia in order to acquire “strategic depth.” Pakistan’s objective was not simply to bring the states of Central Asia within the fold of Islam, but it also wanted to emerge as a bridge between Central Asia and the rest of the world, in short, to create a strategic integrated region with religious orientation. India’s unease about Pakistan’s activities in Central Asia was put to rest when the leaders of Central Asia adopted a stringent attitude towards extremism, and in fact took strong measures to curb all such activities. With the rise of the Taliban and its avowal to spread its ideology to Central Asia, Indian concerns increased phenomenally. In Indian thinking, “The September 1996 offensive of the Taliban that overthrew the Rabbani government and captured Kabul was believed to have been part of Pakistan’s larger game plan to extend her influence in Central Asia.”1 The Kargil War of 1999 is an eloquent testimony to the fact that extremism and cross-border terrorism was escalating. Indian concerns were heightened because the newly independent states of Central Asia were 1 Ministry of Defense, Government of India, Annual Report, 1995–1996.

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weak. They had to build up polities as well as to have armed forces. Until that time, they were dependent on Russia for their security requirements. Had the forces of religious extremism and terrorism succeeded in the region, the geopolitics of Eurasia would probably have undergone a fundamental change.

Indian vulnerabilities vis-à-vis the non-traditional threats received full support and understanding from Russia. In fact, Russia too was facing similar challenges in Chechnya. Russian interests lay in insulating Central Asia from the divisive tendencies emanating from Afghanistan. As aptly stated by Georgii Kunadze, the then Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, “Russia has a specific geopolitical interest in Central Asia, which is to prevent the explosive charge of Islamic extremism from penetrating into the country.” 2 Hence, protection of the southern periphery of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) came to have strategic significance for Russia. Indian and Russian interests lay in ensuring the stability and security of the Central Asian region. The existing regimes should not in their view be overthrown by forces of extremism. It must be pointed out that, at that juncture, the problem was region specific and that the military presence of a Russian led peacekeeping force on the Tajik-Afghan border was able to protect and safeguard the region. Given its friendly ties with Russia, India favored Russia being the sole guarantor of security and stability in the region.

The military presence of the international coalition forces led by the US in the wake of the events of 9/11, by terrorists fundamentally altered the geopolitical situation in the Central Asian region. The fight against terrorism that had so far had a regional dimension now came to occupy the center stage of international politics. The Taliban has been defeated, but the Saudi fugitive Osama bin Laden remains elusive. The al Qaeda terrorist network has been largely destroyed, but reports suggest that they have reemerged and are now operating from Iraq as well. The war against terror is continuing. It is possible that the war could be a protracted one, which means the military presence of the coalition forces in Afghanistan and elsewhere could also be long drawn. Whether the military presence of

2 Vera Kuznetsova, “The Foreign Ministry’s Policy: Between Fatal Inevitability and Probability; interview with the deputy minister of foreign affairs, Georgii Kunadze,” Nezavisimaia gazeta, July 29, 1993 (English translation in The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press [hereafter referred to as CDPSP] 45, no. 30: 10–12).


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the coalition forces has a hidden agenda as Russia and China believe is difficult to say. But there is no doubt that competition to control the resources of Eurasia and reduce Russian influence has acquired a new edge especially after the US-led military intervention in Iraq in 2003. This aspect will be discussed later in the article.

Besides, in the wake of 9/11, there was a change in all five Central Asian states. All the states not only supported the campaign against terrorism, but willingly offered military and base facilities to the forces. American troops were stationed at Khanabad or the K–2 air base in Uzbekistan, and the Friendship Bridge that connects it with northern Afghanistan was also made available. Due to deterioration in their relations, Uzbekistan asked the US to vacate the military base. In November 2005, the remaining American troops departed from Uzbekistan. Kyrgyzstan had opened its Manas air base to the US. In Tajikistan are stationed coalition forces from France and the UK. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have also offered logistical help to the coalition forces. Several factors account for the willing cooperation on the part of the Central Asian states. Firstly, the sense of vulnerability of the Central Asian states increased especially after the Taliban came to power. Perhaps it was felt that the existing security arrangement under the Collective Security Treaty (CST) was inadequate. As a perceptive Uzbek observer said, “ . . . the majority of the public regards the American military presence as a gift from Allah.” The reasoning behind this attitude is primitively simple. “Russia has no money to protect us. Protecting themselves is something people here aren’t used to.” 3 Besides, the economic assistance that these countries would receive would be helpful. Importantly, it would give the Central Asian states the necessary space for maneuverability vis-à-vis Russia.

India has supported the military presence of international coalition forces and welcomed the defeat of the Taliban. Despite five years of continuous campaigning against extremism and terrorism, the terrorist infrastructure has not been completely uprooted. Several outlawed groups have reappeared, for example, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan now operates as the Islamic Movement of Turkestan. The recent blast in Mumbai (July 2006) is a poignant reminder of the inhuman activities of the jihad groups. A related issue that is becoming more pronounced in 3 CDPSP 53, no. 42: 17.

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recent times is the flourishing trade in narcotics, and the enhanced activities of organized crime. These negative tendencies sustain extremism and terrorism. The instability in Afghanistan helps to perpetuate such activities.

Another complicating factor from the Indian perspective is that the competition among major powers in its area of strategic interest is becoming strident. US-Russian competition became evident at the Budapest Summit in 1994. Russian hopes of being accepted as an equal partner by the West were in vain. An era of “Cold Peace,” as described by Russian president Boris Yeltsin, was beginning. According to Dmitri Trenin, “There was an over-abundance of optimism on both sides.”4 There were inherent limitations in Russia being accepted as an equal partner by the West. Two factors in this context are important. One was the decision of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to expand eastwards, in the direction of Russia’s periphery. The decision to invite countries of the former socialist bloc was perceived in Russia highly negatively. Second, the issue of energy security acquired a new urgency. The opening line of the Joint Statement on the New US-Russian Energy Dialogue of May 2002, “Successful development of the global economy depends on timely and reliable energy delivery,” succinctly highlighted the strategic importance of this resource.5 The energy resources in Eurasia, particularly in the Caspian Sea basin, drew considerable external attention. The American approach was spelt out by the then deputy secretary of state Strobe Talbott who said that the countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia should be independent, prosperous and secure. This would widen the area of stability in a strategically vital region that borders China, Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan.6

On the other hand, Russia considered the post Soviet space as its zone of special interest. Russia has deep and vital interests at stake in the

4 Carl Conetta, “NATO Expansion: Costs and Implications” (presentation to the International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global Responsibility, The Project on Defense Alternatives, The Commonwealth Institute, Cambridge, MA USA, July 23, 1998), www.comw.org/pda/nato699.html. 5 Bush-Putin Joint Statement on New US-Russian Energy Dialogue, May 24, 2002. Issued by the International Information Programs of the US Department of State. 6 Strobe Talbott, speech delivered at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, School of Advanced International Studies, John Hopkins University, September 1997, Strategic Digest (New Delhi).


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region. In the words of former Russian foreign minister Igor Ivanov, “The situation in the former Soviet Union was vitally important to Russia’s economy, defense and security and to the rights of Russian citizens outside Russia.”7 These conflicting interests triggered the competition often interpreted as the “great game.” This is indeed a debatable point. The following report in The Times of Central Asia has probably put the entire question into the right perspective. “The new Great Game is all about oil and gas. The imperial soldiers and spies of a bygone era have given way to engineers and deal makers as the states jockey for the lucrative business of building pipelines to tap the vast resources of the landlocked region.”8

This competitive aspect paved the way for cooperation after the events of 9/11. Russia gave tacit approval to the Central Asian states to grant military base facilities to the coalition forces. It was understood that this military presence was specifically for fighting the war on terror. Russia felt that the cooperative aspect would help in intensifying US-Russian interaction in various fields, especially in the economic sphere. The situation began to change after the US military intervention in Iraq without UN approval. Many in Russia felt that the West, particularly the US, was pursuing a hidden agenda, one of controlling the resources of the region, and limiting and, if possible, eliminating Russian influence. According to Russian general Leonid Ivashov, now vice-president of the Academy of Geopolitical Problems, “Russia faced a political paradox at the turn of the century. By supporting the US-led struggle against international terrorism, Russia has also complicated its position in the CIS countries.” In his view, the Central Asian leaders have made a mistake by inviting US-led coalition forces.9 Since 2003, Russia has been making determined efforts to restore its influence in Central Asia. The thrust of its policy is economic, military and political. The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) comprising of Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan has emerged as a proactive military grouping in the region. The CSTO has a base in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and the Russian military presence is

7 The Times of Central Asia (Bishkek), February 5, 2004. 8 The Times of Central Asia., January 3, 2002. 9 Leonid Ivashov, “Russian General Comments on Topical Geo-Political Issues,” Daily Review (RIA Novosti, Moscow), January 22, 2002.

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substantial. In fact, it is a projection of power rather than meeting the security challenges of the region. While military presence is necessary, the targets are nevertheless on the ground and are dispersed.

But what has accentuated the present phase of the competition is the Western support of the “color revolution.” In the view of Evgenii Primakov, former prime minister of Russia, “various US foundations and diplomats were involved quite openly in the so-called color revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia. This fact cannot but worry us.”10 There is a widespread perception that events of March 2005 in Kyrgyzstan and the Andijan events of May 2005 had an external hand. Whether this is true or not is a moot point, but the fact is that all the Central Asian countries turned to Russia for help. It greatly facilitated Russia’s restoration of its influence in the region. Consequently, in July 2005 at the summit meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Astana, the US was asked to announce a time frame for the withdrawal of its forces from Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.

A new factor in this competition is the role of China. The Chinese have geopolitical interests in Central Asia. Their concern is that China’s borders with the three Central Asian states—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan—remain peaceful. The Chinese concern is largely for its Uyghur minority located in Xinjiang. China has established close and strategic ties with Russia. Both countries realize that a collective or a multilateral approach is necessary in order to protect their interests. In this regard, Russian and Chinese views concur on many issues of regional and international politics. China is highly circumspect about the Western military presence at Manas in Kyrgyzstan. The Manas air base is 200 kilometers from the Chinese border. The SCO, a Chinese initiative, is emerging as a proactive and leading regional grouping in the region. Another dimension that has emerged in China’s policy towards Central Asia is its quest to ensure energy security. China has intensified its interaction with Kazakhstan, an energy-rich country, and has concluded several agreements in this regard. China’s aspiration is also to play a role in Caspian Sea politics. This dimension could assume significance in the future. China is also highly circumspect about a possible color revolution

10 Evgeny Primakov, “Russia and the U.S. in Need of Trust and Cooperation,” Russia in Global Affairs (Moscow) 4, no. 1 (2006): 136.


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affecting the Uyghurs in the Xinjiang region. As it is, they are restive, non-Han Chinese Muslims of Jurik stock.

Despite these setbacks and the concerted efforts of Russia and China to meet the challenge of the competition, the US is not likely to withdraw from the region. Its latest thinking indicates that the US would encourage and promote greater links between the region (Central Asia) and South Asia, in which India could play a leading role. This is possible by exporting energy southward, and by transporting corridors and an electric grid connecting hydropower with South Asia. However, enhanced interaction with South Asia may not eliminate Russian influence, but could perhaps limit Chinese activity.

The strategic environment is undoubtedly in a state of flux. The competition to control resources and influence would continue to dominate US-Russian involvement in Eurasia. But this competition would be low key, for both sides are likely not to allow the situation to escalate to the point of hostility. From the Indian perspective, it acts as a restraint on its aspiration to play an effective role in Central Asia. Given the past historical and cultural affinity and its present image as a reliable partner, India would have to make serious efforts to establish its presence in the region. However, two important developments in this context are worth mentioning. One is that China has shown keenness to engage with India. India’s interaction with China encompasses various fields. Recently, a top official of the People’s Liberation Army said that India and China were moving in the direction of sustaining peace and stability in their neighborhood and not just on their frontiers. “We have a long history and share a lot of common ground,” he said. Secondly, there is a marked improvement in India’s relations with the US. This is partly because of India’s rising international profile and partly because the South Asian focus on US foreign policy has acquired a new dimension. The US would like India to play a leading and substantial role in the region. All these developments have put new strains on Indo-Russian relations. But in the view of the author, the core of Indo-Russian relations have not been disturbed in a major way. The regional context has undergone a change with Russia placing greater emphasis on a multilateral approach, and, to an extent, it has diluted the regional basis; nevertheless, within the changed context, new areas of cooperation do exist. We now turn to them.

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Indo-Russian Relations and the Regional Context After the breakup of the Soviet Union, there was uncertainty about the future of India’s relations with the Russian Federation. Indian concern was whether the special relations it enjoyed would undergo a change or not. Immediately after the breakup of the Soviet Union, there was a debate even in Russia about its future policy towards South Asia. There was a view that Russian policy should be equidistant, in which both India and Pakistan enjoyed the same emphasis. Hence, in the early years, Russian policy towards India was one of benign neglect. This phase soon gave way, and in January 1993, during President Yeltsin’s visit to India, the earlier treaty was replaced by a new one: The Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. However, it was with Prime Minister Narasimha Rao’s visit to Russia in June 1994 that Indo-Russian ties were put on a firm foundation. “The Moscow Declaration on the Protection of Interests of Pluralist States” signed by India and Russia has become the bedrock of the relations. The Declaration drew attention not only to the nature of the challenges faced by the two countries, but also focused attention on the source from which this threat emanated for both. It also reiterated support of the signatories for each other’s territorial integrity. This is highly important given the fact that India and Russia were battling with these challenges in Kashmir and Chechnya, respectively. In the changed context, it was the space that lay between India and Russia that acquired significance. Once again, it was the commonality of their geopolitical interests that paved the way for the relationship to become strong and stable. Later, India and Russia backed opposition to the Taliban that had crystallized into the Northern Alliance. On the issue of religious extremism and terrorism, India and Russia share many commonalities: the source of tension, funding, training, etc. India and Russia wanted a secular Central Asia working towards a democratic setup. From this perspective, stability and security were important. Instability hampers growth and helps in sustaining extremism and terrorism to an extent. Consequently, India and Russia have established institutional linkages to strengthen this aspect. To date, this commonality has not diminished. Russia views India as a major regional power whose involvement in international politics would make a positive contribution.


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From Russia’s vantage point, the unfolding developments in Europe, Eurasia, and the energy security issue were reminiscent of the Cold War mindset. Its response was the propagation of the idea of a multipolar world. In this regard, a historic agreement with China on a “Multipolar World and the Formation of a New World Order” was signed in Moscow in April 1997. This was the beginning of a partnership with China. A multipolar world is an order that is just and fair and democratic in which all nations are considered as equals and more importantly, enjoy equal security. It is a world order in which there is no place for hegemony. In this order, the UN would occupy a position of centrality. On its part, India upheld that the world order was not a unipolar one, as new centers of power and influence were emerging. While acknowledging the need for a multipolar world, the Indian approach was not in terms of blocs, but the need to maintain a balanced and stable world order. Since a unipolar world could lead to instability, there was a need for a balancing force.

Among the other initiatives taken by Russia is the idea of an India-Russia-China strategic triangle, coming together in the interests of the challenges faced by them in the region. During Primakov’s visit to India in December 1998, he proposed at an informal level that India-Russia-China should come together and form a strategic triangle in the interests of peace and stability in the region. The initial response of India was one of caution that could be explained by the fact that a strategic triangle implied common perceptions and convergence of interests vis-à-vis a common threat. Similarly, China expressed no opinion on this idea. One of the impacts of the events of 9/11 has been that China has developed a positive attitude towards the idea of trilateral cooperation. Possibly, the renewal of Pakistani-American cooperation could have had an impact on Chinese strategic thinking. It was perhaps with the idea of furthering the cause of trilateral cooperation that President Vladimir Putin embarked on his Asian tour by visiting China and later India in December 2002. In a TV interview, Primakov said, “It is shared interest in maintaining security and stability in Central Asia and Afghanistan that may give flesh and blood to the idea of a Moscow-Beijing-Delhi triangle.”11 The foreign ministers of the three countries have been meeting on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly to discuss issues of common concern at the global and regional level. Issues such as energy security, trade and enhancing 11 The Hindu (New Delhi), December 9, 2002.

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contacts have been discussed. In May 2005, the foreign ministers of the three countries had their first full-fledged meeting.

As mentioned before, the turn of the century saw fundamental changes in the region. The Western military presence in Afghanistan and Central Asia radically altered the geopolitical landscape. With the passage of time, Russia was convinced that a multilateral approach was best suited to the evolving situation. Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov in an interview said that multilateral approaches are the best solutions to global problems and regional conflicts.12 With increasing focus on multilateral approaches, a regional grouping that has come into prominence is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Prior to the formation of the SCO in June 2001, it was known as the Shanghai Five with a limited agenda of maintaining peace and stability on the border and promoting a good neighborly attitude in the region. The Shanghai Five felt the need to transform itself into a regional grouping as the security problems in Central Asia became complicated and a collective approach was necessary. The SCO’s agenda expanded to include security and economic issues.

The essence of the SCO lay in peace and good neighborly ties among the countries. The primary concern of China, an active participant of SCO, was the security of its periphery and its Xinjiang region. A declaration by the heads of the member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (June 7, 2002) stated that the SCO has been established with a view to strengthening mutual trust, friendship and good neighborliness.13 The objectives of the SCO were combating religious extremism, separatism, and terrorism, and, at the economic level, it meant energizing economic links. In August 2003, the first multilateral anti-terrorism military exercise was held within the framework of the SCO.

At the wider political level, the SCO has expressed its views on issues of international significance. For instance, a statement issued at the end of the St. Petersburg Summit in 2002 reiterated support for the One-China Policy and the principle that “Taiwan is an inalienable part of China.”14 Similarly, in a clear reference to the US-led war in Iraq, it was stated at the Moscow Summit in 2003 that “we have a common stance.

12 The Hindu, October 11, 2004. 13 Jyotsna Bakshi, Russia–China Relations Relevance for India (New Delhi: Shipra, 2004), 303–309. 14 The Times of Central Asia (Bishkek), June 13, 2002, http://www.times.kg.


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There is no alternative to the UN as a universal organization in an international system.”15

Although the SCO has emerged as a proactive and dynamic regional grouping, it nevertheless faces certain challenges. A great deal depends on the nature of Russia-China relations, the two most powerful players in SCO. In the opinion of the author, differences among them cannot be discounted. Similarly as the Russian and Central Asian societies evolve towards democracy and openness, albeit slowly, would their perception of SCO also undergo a change? Moreover, the SCO faces a challenge from the CSTO, of which Russia is an active member. The CSTO also espouses similar objectives. For the present, it seems that the SCO is not likely to expand its membership. Currently, there are India, Iran, Mongolia and Pakistan as countries with observer status in the SCO. India could play an effective role in the grouping. Firstly, India has a rich experience in multilateral diplomacy. After all, it was the founder of the Non-Aligned Movement. India has also been a member of G–77, South-South Cooperation, etc. Secondly, Indian experience in combating extremism, terrorism and separatism could be useful. Indian membership would certainly make it broad based, and given India’s rising profile, would certainly lend weight to the SCO. It appears that for China, the SCO is a tool to engage with Central Asia for the foreseeable future ensuring its core objective of maintaining peace, stability and good neighborliness on its common borders.

The CSTO, a Russian initiative, is also emerging as an active grouping, although its focus appears to be on military and vigorous defense cooperation among the member states. The CSTO is not likely to open its membership to states other than those of the post-Soviet space.

As mentioned, this emphasis on multilateralism has to an extent diluted the regional context of Indo-Russian relations, especially when India is not a full member of these regional groupings. India’s role is stymied in this situation. New areas of cooperation have nevertheless emerged. One area is joint cooperation in Central Asia. India and Russia stand to benefit by increasing their involvement in Central Asia. The systemic transformation in these countries is still incomplete. India-Russia cooperation in broadening the basis of the Central Asian states’ economy

15 “China Russia, Central Asian Nations Strengthen Ties (May 29, 2003),” CDI Russia Weekly, no. 259 (2003), www.cdi.org/russia.

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is probable in the spheres of textiles or textile machinery, light industry, and agriculture in the use of new farming techniques. In addition, Central Asia’s industrial base shows that light and food industries are common to all. This is followed by machine building, metal processing and ferrous metallurgy. Indian experience in operating a Soviet type of industrial infrastructure could be useful. At another level, Indian managerial skills can be matched with Russian expertise in upgrading, modernizing and building new enterprises in the medium- and small-scale sector. Indian and Russian cooperation in the energy sector as well as the defense industries located in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan could be accelerated. India has already invested nearly $2.7 billion in the Sakhalin project on natural gas. Indian cooperation in building the export pipeline infrastructure holds significant promise.

Secondly, India-Russia cooperation in the developmental activities of Central Asia can be accelerated if they can provide the landlocked countries access to the outside world. In this regard, the North-South Corridor connecting St. Petersburg with Mumbai is the best option. The corridor, a combination of sea, rail, and road routes was planned in 2000 with Russia, Iran, and India agreeing to this ambitious project. Russia has already constructed a container terminal at Ol’ia and Makhachkala on the Caspian Sea. On July 1, 2003, Kazakhstan also joined the North-South Corridor, and one branch of the corridor now goes to Aktau on the Kazakh side of the Caspian Sea. From the Russian side, it is much easier and cheaper to provide this Eurasian region with goods from India than from Europe. Although the North-South Corridor is operational, it is not functioning up to the desired capacity. Difficulties need to be resolved.

In order to open the Siberian part of Russia, it is necessary to give this isolated region access to the outside world. This is possible if one branch of the Trans-Siberian (transsib) Railway from Omsk Oblast could be connected to Aktau in Kazakhstan. Such a proposition is not too difficult because Aktau is connected by a rail and road network. Kazakhstan, on the issue of a transport corridor, would certainly like to widen its options. Hence, it could be India-Iran-Kazakhstan and Russia (Omsk Oblast). It could give this region an outlet to the south. A whole new vista for Indian goods could open up not only in Central Asia but in Siberia as well. Landlocked Siberia would also be able to interact with Southeast Asia, Africa, etc. Importantly, the opening of the Siberian region via the North-South Corridor would facilitate Indian labor to go to


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the region. In Siberia, there is a shortage of labor. Indian labor is known to be efficient and hence could play an important part in the development of Siberia.

The question is how to ensure the smooth functioning of this corridor when the North-South Corridor is operating below capacity. One option could be to have sub-regional cooperation among Russia, Kazakhstan, Iran, and India. If sub-regional cooperation takes off, many of the problems related to the transport corridor could be sorted out. A joint coordination committee could be set up comprising of members belonging to the four countries. The committee could oversee and address problems such as the harmonization of trans-shipment rules, custom duties, tariffs, etc., and ensure the smooth functioning of the corridor in the interests of all concerned. The physical infrastructure and development that would occur in the process could act as a tool for development and strengthen cooperation. Bilateral Context While regional input has played an important role in Indo-Russian relations, the bilateral context is equally substantial. At the political level, both India and Russia have steadfastly supported each other on issues of crucial importance. Russia’s position on the Kashmir issue is very close to India’s position. Taking note of President Pervez Musharraf’s speech of January 12, 2002, a joint statement issued at the end of Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov’s visit to India (February 3–4, 2002) said, “Pakistan’s commitment can only be judged by the concrete action Pakistan takes on ground.”16 In other words, Russia showed complete understanding of India’s position on cross-border terrorism and its reluctance to engage in a dialogue with Pakistan at that time, while on the Chechen issue, India expressed support for the steps taken by Russia to protect its territorial integrity and constitutional order in the rebellious Chechen Republic.17 On the question of terrorism and the need to initiate countermeasures, India and Russia had similar views. At an international forum, India and Russia have vigorously championed the need to combat this menace with a greater sense of urgency. The two countries have often reiterated their 16 Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, Annual Report, 2001–2002, 53. 17 Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 53.

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deep commitment to fighting religious extremism and terrorism. Several institutional linkages have been established to facilitate exchange and sharing of information and advancing the common interests in the best possible way.

The congruence of views between India and Russia had a favorable impact on defense cooperation. This cooperation was put on a firm footing with the landmark Sukhoi deal signed in late 1996. The salutary features of Indo-Russian defense cooperation were its long-term-basis transfer of technology, modernization of existing equipment, and access to the latest equipment, weaponry, etc. in the Russian arsenal. In fact, defense cooperation had gone beyond the main “buyer-seller” syndrome and had moved to the plane of joint design, research, and production. Recently, the chief of the Indian Armed Forces was in Russia to assure the Russians that enhanced interaction with the United States would not lead to a drift towards that country on the question of defense cooperation.

Even on the nuclear issue, Russia showed considerable understanding of the Indian position when the Pokhran-II blasts took place in 1998. Initially, there was disquiet in Russia over the blasts, but later, Russia did not go public in criticizing India. Importantly, it did not impose sanctions. In fact, in June 1998, an agreement for the construction of two 1000-MW reactors at Kundankulam was signed during the visit of the Russian minister for atomic energy, Evgenii Adamov. Conclusion It can be said with some degree of certainty that Indo-Russian ties will not witness any drastic fluctuations. As long as core interests continue to coincide, such a possibility is ruled out. Moreover, there is no direct clash of interests to anticipate such an eventuality. The above-mentioned new areas of cooperation would further strengthen the relationship. Above all, however, political will is required.

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Pakistan’s Evolving Relations with China, Russia, and Central Asia Fazal-ur-RAHMAN Since the events of 9/11, Pakistan has adopted a proactive and pragmatic approach in its foreign relations that helped the country to stage a diplomatic comeback at regional and global levels. Pakistan has been able to effectively transform the post-9/11 challenges into opportunities and as a result has become a frontline state in international efforts in the fight against terrorism. The international community has duly acknowledged Pakistan’s contribution in the war against terrorism and its endeavors to create a stable regional environment by initiating processes to improve its relations with India and Afghanistan. Following the end of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and a change in Pakistan’s Afghan policy, a major hindrance in improving relations with Russia and the Central Asian states has been removed and there are strong signs of improvement in bilateral relations. With China, Pakistan is moving extensively into economic cooperation, which has been a missing dimension in their comprehensive bilateral relations. To improve relations with all the countries of the neighboring regions in a mutually beneficial manner is one of the core objectives of Pakistan’s foreign policy. Pakistan-China Relations Pakistan’s relations with China have always been the most important of its relationships with other countries. It is based on trust, respect, and mutual benefit. Over the past 55 years, since the two countries established their diplomatic relations, this relationship has evolved in a manner to serve the

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interests of both countries. To understand the evolution of this relationship from a correct perspective, it is important to have a brief overview of the relationship between the two countries. The early phase Pakistan was the first Islamic country and third noncommunist state to accord recognition to the People’s Republic of China. Although Pakistan established diplomatic relations with China in 1951, the actual consolidation of relations started in the early 1960s, when Pakistan changed its previous stance and supported China’s seating in the UN in 1961. In the 1962 Sino-Indian border war, the US rushed military assistance to India, which Pakistan, being an allay of the West, considered detrimental to its security concerns and moved out of the Western orbit (SEATO and CENTO). At that point in time, a commonality of interests seemed to be emerging between Pakistan and China. It was the shared sense of an evolving geostrategic environment in which the two countries amicably negotiated and signed an agreement on the demarcation of their common border in March 1963. In the following years, Pakistan on its part sincerely helped China to end the isolation that both the superpowers wished to impose on China, by signing an air-transport agreement and trade agreement and helping China maintain contact with a number of countries, especially the Islamic world. Similarly, China played a commendable role in its support of Pakistan in achieving a ceasefire in the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war by issuing stern warnings to India. Following the war, China, also in an attempt to compensate for war losses, supported Pakistan with military equipment including tanks and aircraft. In the 1960s, Pakistan-China relations evolved on firm foundations of mutual trust and confidence.

In the early 1970s, Pakistan played an important role in facilitating secret communications between the US and China that resulted in Henry Kissinger’s secret visit to China followed by President Richard Nixon’s historic visit. Sino-US normalization of relations was perceived in Indian strategic thinking as the emergence of a US-Pakistan-China strategic triangle, which prompted India to sign a treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union. It could be termed as a kind of a security treaty because Article IX of the treaty stipulated that in “the event of either party being subject to an attack or threat thereof, the high contracting parties shall immediately enter into mutual consultations in

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order to remove such threat and to take appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and security of their countries.” 1 This development introduced a new dimension to the region, especially if seen in the context of the Cold War, and also created more space for further consolidation of Pak-China relations. The other development, which had profoundly influenced Sino-Pak relations, was the Indo-Pakistan war in 1971, followed by the Chinese military and economic assistance to Pakistan. Later, on the issue of Bangladesh’s application for membership to the UN, China, on Pakistan’s request, exercised its veto power for the first time to stall the move, which helped Pakistan to secure in a bargain the release of its POWs and the return of troops to their prewar positions. The Indian nuclear explosion of 1974 introduced a new dimension to the strategic balance in the region and gave fresh impetus to expanding Pak-China defense cooperation. Between 1971 and 1978, China assisted Pakistan in building two defense-related mega projects, first, the Heavy Rebuild Factory for T–59 tanks, and second, the F–6 Aircraft Rebuild Factory. Chinese intent to make Pakistan self-reliant in the production of a conventional weapons system, without attaching any political strings to its assistance, cultivated deep-rooted respect and goodwill for China in Pakistan.

The end of the 1970s witnessed international developments of immense consequences that continued to impact on the entire region throughout the following decades and even today. These were the Iranian Islamic Revolution in February 1979, the declared hostility of the new Iranian leadership towards the US, and in the later part of the year, the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union. Invasion of Afghanistan created a situation of two hostile fronts for Pakistan—India and Afghanistan—threatening peace and stability in the region. At this crucial juncture, China stood firmly by Pakistan and condemned the invasion of Afghanistan as a “hegemonic action” that posed a threat to peace and stability not only for the region but for the entire world. Pakistan and China had a shared perspective and developed coordinated strategies to deal with the Afghan situation. China provided covertly, in the following years, military supplies worth $200 million annually to the Afghan

1 S. M. Burke and Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: an Historical Analysis, 2nd ed. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1990).

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resistance groups, and extended political support to Pakistan at all international fora.

Throughout the 1980s, Pakistan-China relations continued to develop into a comprehensive relationship. While China improved its relations with India towards the end of the the 1980s, Pakistan did not feel that China’s improving relations with India were at the cost of China’s relations with Pakistan. Although there was a visible shift in the Chinese stance on Kashmir, Pakistani policy makers believed that China’s improved relations with India would act as a restraining factor on Indian belligerency towards Pakistan. Pakistan always supported China on all issues important to Chinese national interests such as sovereignty over Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Tibet and issues relating to human rights and democracy. China always appreciated and counted on Pakistan’s strong support as a trusted friend over all these issues at international fora.

Following the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1988–1989, the regional strategic dynamics changed once again. The US, after having achieved its strategic interest of rolling back communist aggression, claimed victory over the former Soviet Union and abandoned Afghanistan. Pakistan’s support was no longer required by the US, so it came under US sanctions for secretly developing nuclear weapons; an issue to which the US turned a blind eye for a decade during the Afghan War. Throughout the 1990s, Pakistan remained under US sanctions and China was the primary source of Pakistan’s military hardware procurements. During this period, Pakistan-China defense-related cooperation also substantially increased. China’s support for Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programs became a constant irritant in Sino-US and Sino-Indian relations, especially the issue of supply of M-11 missiles and 500 ring magnets to an “unsafeguarded” nuclear facility. China, on its part, despite tremendous US pressure to cut off high-technology links with Pakistan, remained steadfast in its commitment to strengthen Pakistan’s defense capability.2 2 Under a 1986 agreement on nuclear cooperation for peaceful purposes, China had started work, since 1993, on a 300-MW nuclear power plant at Chashma in Pakistan. During his visit to the US in November 1997, Chinese president Jiang Zemin withstood American pressure and stated that China would not compromise on its commitments to Pakistan regarding the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, The Nation, November 2, 1997.


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The current phase In May 1998, Indian nuclear tests destabilized the strategic balance in South Asia. As a prelude to these tests, the Indian defense minister and prime minister described China as a long-term security threat. While commenting on the Indian assertion, the official Chinese media reported that “India’s explosions have sabotaged the fragile trust built up with Beijing over the past decade.” Following the Indian nuclear tests, Sino-Indian relations suffered a severe setback. Deterioration in Sino-Indian relations reinforced Pakistan’s importance in China’s South Asia policy. Pakistan and China held high-level consultations on the situation in South Asia. China expressed its understanding of Pakistan’s compulsion to go nuclear. It gave Pakistan the confidence to reestablish the strategic balance in South Asia by conducting its own nuclear tests. The depth of Pakistan-China relations was reflected from the fact that it was after Pakistan had acquired demonstrable nuclear weapons capability that the Chinese leadership gave assurance to the visiting US president Bill Clinton in June 1998 of cooperating with the US on the issue of nuclear proliferation.

In 1999, during the Kargil conflict between the two nuclear states, India and Pakistan, China adhered to a strict neutral position. China was concerned over the possibility of escalation of the conflict, and asked both countries to defuse tensions. The Chinese position of neutrality was duly acknowledged by India, and provided both countries with an opportunity to mend their fences and once again improve their bilateral relations. Pakistan also had a complete understanding of China’s interest to improve bilateral relations with India, especially in the context of evolving Indo-US strategic partnership.

After the events of 9/11, Pakistan and China consulted each other on the unfolding situation in the region. On September 18, 2001, a special envoy of the then Chinese president, Jiang Zemin, arrived in Islamabad to meet General Pervez Musharraf and other officials and discussed the situation emerging as a consequence of the 9/11 attacks. Pakistan’s decision to side with the US and to provide use of its airspace and base facilities had initially raised some concerns in Chinese policy-making circles. However, the exchange of high-level visits clarified the Pakistani position that under no circumstances would Pakistan allow its cooperation with the US to undermine Chinese strategic interests.

During the India-Pakistan military standoff in 2001–2002, China continued with its position of neutrality and played an important role in

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defusing tensions between India and Pakistan through telephone diplomacy. Since India escalated the tensions, despite Pakistan’s repeated requests for negotiation, China’s role to pacify the situation was considered more favorably by the Pakistani authorities and people. The Chinese leadership stated that “it is in the interests of both countries and the expectation of the international community for both Pakistan and India to maintain the utmost restraint and safeguard the peace and stability of South Asia.” China’s proactive diplomacy to engage the US and India in the volatile South Asian situation was received well in Pakistan and indeed helped to ease tensions. There was complete understanding between Pakistan and China, and the Chinese leadership appreciated Musharraf government’s policies on antiterrorism and peaceful resolution of contentious issues with India.

President Musharraf, in his December 2001 visit to China, explicitly expressed support of the Chinese campaign against Muslim separatists in Xinjiang. He urged the Chinese Muslims to be very patriotic and to work for the betterment of their country. He declared that Pakistan would extend full support to China to fight against East Turkestan terrorist forces.3 This was the first time that a Pakistani leader went public in support of Chinese policies to curtail Muslim separatists in Xinjiang. In view of Chinese concerns that there is a link between the separatist forces in Xinjiang and the jihad organizations in Pakistan and Afghanistan, Pakistan has also institutionalized antiterrorism dialogue with China and the two sides have agreed to share intelligence on terrorism. In December 2003, the Pakistan Army in a military operation near the Pak-Afghan border killed Hahsan Mahsum, the leader of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, while extraditing a number of alleged terrorists to China. In recent years, antiterrorism-related cooperation between the two countries has constantly been expanding. On August 6, 2004, China and Pakistan conducted their first joint antiterrorism military exercise named “Friendship 2004,” in Xinjiang. In April 2005, during Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to Islamabad, the two sides signed a treaty of friendship, cooperation and good neighborly relations as well as an agreement on combating terrorism, separatism and extremism. The comprehensive antiterrorism cooperation from Pakistan has effectively removed the

3 Dawn, December 22 and 23, 2001.


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apprehensions of the Chinese side, holding in regard the support of the Uighur Muslim separatists from some of Pakistan’s religious groups.

Pakistan-China defense-related cooperation has always been the most important component of their overall bilateral relations. The tradition of high-level exchange of visits for consultations between the armed forces of the two countries has provided sustenance to the bilateral relations, as the institution of the armed forces plays a special role in political decision making in both countries. In recent years, a mechanism of defense and security consultation has been institutionalized between the two countries. Since March 2002, three rounds of consultations have taken place. In order to enhance military-to-military cooperation, China and Pakistan, in October 2003, conducted a joint maritime search-and-rescue exercise near Shanghai. That was the first time for the navy of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to conduct an exercise with a foreign country. Similarly, in November 2005, during their visit to Pakistan, Chinese naval ships conducted a second joint maritime search-and-rescue exercise with the Pakistan Navy. That was again the first time for the PLA Navy to conduct a joint exercise in waters abroad. Pakistan and China share a common interest in the security of the sea lanes of communication, and both support a multilateral framework for guarding energy and trade sea routes.

Defense production-related cooperation has also expanded in recent years between the two countries. Pakistan and China have jointly developed JF–17 Thunder—a multi-role fighter aircraft. Pakistan and China finalized a deal in April 2005, under which China Dockyard in Shanghai will build four F–22P frigates for the Pakistan Navy and transfer the technology as well. Cooperation on other ongoing defense projects is continuing to the satisfaction of both.

At the political level, Pakistan and China have unanimity of views on issues like the war on terrorism, Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Iranian nuclear program. Both countries wish to strengthen the authority of the UN and oppose unilateralism and concepts such as “coalition of the willing” or “concert of democracies” outside the UN ambit to deal with international security issues. Current Trends in Pakistan-China Relations In the last fifty-five years, Pakistan and China have developed exemplary cordial and cooperative relations in the political and defense fields. However, the two countries remained unable to forge a matching

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relationship at the economic front until recently. Since the late 1990s, both countries realized the missing economic dimension in their evolving strategic relationship. The two countries acknowledged the fact that in order to sustain a comprehensive cooperative relationship, substantive economic cooperation, matching the level of political and strategic cooperation, was absolutely necessary. Enhanced economic cooperation would not only complete the comprehensiveness of bilateral relations but also help in achieving peace development and stability in the region. In the last few years, through frequent interaction between the leadership of the two countries, the two sides have been able to determine a vision for the direction of their bilateral economic relations.

Pakistan-China economic relations at present can be termed as evolving and getting stronger day by day. Bilateral trade is surging, investment is increasing, and the number of development projects and joint ventures is also increasing. In the past, China has made valuable contributions to Pakistan’s economic development, particularly the development of infrastructure and setting up of basic industries. Currently, Pakistan and China are cooperating closely in the development of the Gwadar deep seaport,4 which when it becomes operational will enhance economic activity in Pakistan and provide important access to the sea for China’s rapidly developing western regions, Afghanistan, and the Central Asian states. At present, a number of important projects such as the upgrading of Karakorum Highway (which links Pakistan with China), Thar Coal Mining, upgrading of Pakistan Railways, and Power Generation Projects—both nuclear and nonnuclear—are some examples of this expanding economic cooperation. Besides this, the two sides have signed a large number of agreements on economic cooperation. Both countries are emphasizing expansion of the the role and engagement between the private sectors of the two countries, with the patronage of the respective states, in undertaking initiatives on economic cooperation. From this perspective, Chinese support for Pakistan in the economic sphere is “integral to Pakistan’s development.”

4 During the then Chinese premier Zhu Rongji’s 2001 visit, the two sides agreed to undertake the construction of the Gwadar deep seaport. In March 2002, construction work started, and the first phase of the port was completed in April 2005. Phase-two work is under progress. Gwadar is very close to the Iranian port city of Bander Abbas.


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Trade between the two countries has been registering a pattern of constant growth: $1.4 billion in 2001, to 3 billion in 2004, 4.25 billion in 2005, and the estimated trade volume in 2006 is at $5 billion. 5 Traditionally, the balance of trade has been in favor of China. However, the two countries now are taking measures to enhance Pakistan’s exports to China.6 Pakistan and China signed a preferential trade arrangement (PTA) in November 2003, which has been operational since January 1, 2004. Also, the two countries have instituted a joint study group to negotiate a free trade agreement (FTA) and have simultaneously negotiated an early harvest Program (EHP), which has been operational since January 1, 2006. It is expected that the FTA will become operational before the end of 2007.

In recent years, Pakistan has witnessed a steady growth in Chinese investment. However, the scale of Chinese investment in Pakistan is still small. According to Pakistan’s Board of Investment, out of the total Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) of 1,524 million dollars that came into Pakistan in July 2004–June 2005, the Chinese share was only $443,763. Pakistan is very keen that besides goods, China should export capital to Pakistan. While Pakistan seeks Chinese investment, the Chinese government also encourages its public and private sector to actively take part in projects based in Pakistan. According to some estimates, “China’s public and private sector has undertaken over two hundred and fifty projects of different size in Pakistan. At present, over sixty Chinese companies have already established permanent offices in Pakistan.”7 The size of Chinese business in Pakistan is growing. The potential for growth of Pak-China economic relations is enormous, provided the process remains on track and certain enabling conditions for future growth are successfully created. 5 Fazal-ur-Rahman, “Pak-China Economic Relations: Constraints and Opportunities,” Strategic Studies 26, no. 2, Summer 2006, http://www.issi.org.pk/journal.html. 6 Pakistan’s trade deficit with China is primarily because China is competing in almost all the major sectors of Pakistan’s potential export areas, which ironically happened to be very limited. Secondly, Pakistani business community remained content with their established export destinations, i.e., the US and Western Europe, and hardly made serious efforts either to diversify the export base or to explore other areas and regions for enhancing the volume of their exports. This mental fixation with the Western markets and a noninnovative export approach has constantly undermined Pakistan’s export potential. 7 Mehmood-Ul-Hassan Khan, “New Heights of Pak-China Ties,” http://usa.mediamonitors .net/content/view/full/227754.

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The overall geostrategic environment for regional cooperation is also gradually becoming more favorable. Pakistan’s entry into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as an observer and China’s entry into the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) as an observer would allow Pakistan-China bilateral economic relations to grow from a regional perspective. Also, there is a convergence of economic interests at the strategic level, especially in areas of energy security and communication networks. China has opened up its western region adjacent to Pakistan for trade and investment in order to reduce the economic disparity between its developed coastal regions and other underdeveloped areas. Once developed, this region would be a hub for economic activity between China, Central Asia, and South Asia. Pakistan’s intent to become a “corridor for trade and energy” for western China and Central Asia by linking Gwadar through upgraded Karakorum Highway with these areas entails promising prospects.

To sum up, I would like to say that Pakistan-China relations are based on solid foundations of trust and mutuality of interests. These will not be influenced by changes in the regional or international situation. Economic cooperation has taken center stage, while defense- and security-related cooperation has assumed new dimensions. People-to-people contact is increasing at all levels of the two civil societies. All these indicators point to the fact that Pakistan-China relations will remain on the track of constant growth in all areas of mutual benefit. Relations with Russia Pakistan-Russia relations are undergoing a process of normalization, which presently is moving at a slow pace and will take some time to reach a stage when the relationship can be termed completely normal. Although the frequency of high-level meetings between the leaders and officials of the two countries has increased, substantive improvement in relations at the operational level is still awaited. The intent of both countries to improve relations is gradually becoming more evident. Pakistan seems to be more enthusiastic in improving relations with Russia in comparative terms. There are solid reasons for this relationship to grow in the future. Among them is the changing geostrategic landscape of this region that provides the rationale for Russia to improve its relations with the region’s


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large and medium-sized powers. For Russia, the benefits of improving bilateral relations with Pakistan are well defined, especially in the context of a regional framework for antiterrorism cooperation as well as Pakistan’s interest in buying Russian weapons systems and expanding economic interaction. Pakistan stands to gain by improving its relations with Russia in terms of having alternative options such as, for its security needs, technology transfer in the scientific and research fields, access to the Russian market for its exports, and strengthening relations with its Central Asian neighbors—which are difficult to develop beyond a certain level without having improved relations with Russia first.

What are the impediments to improving Russia-Pakistan relations? In fact, Pakistan’s relations with Russia (former Soviet Union) are marred by the Cold War legacy. The two countries happened to be in opposing camps during the Cold War years. In the 1960s and 1970s, Russia’s patronage of Pakistan’s archrival India and Pakistan’s special relationship with China further constrained the possibility of normalization of relations between the two countries. The situation further deteriorated when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and Pakistan became a frontline state in the US proxy war against the Soviet Union. After the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and the collapse of their client communist regime of Najibullah, Russia continued to support the anti-Taliban non-Pushtun militias, commonly known as the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. So, even after the end of the Cold War and dismemberment of the Soviet Union, Pakistan’s strategic interests continued to remain in conflict with Russian interests. Before the events of 9/11, Russia actively supported all US-sponsored resolutions at the UN, condemning and imposing sanctions on the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Pakistan was one of the three countries, besides Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which had accorded recognition to the Taliban regime. So, the mistrust and suspicion of each other continued to exist until Pakistan, following the events of 9/11, pragmatically changed its policy on Afghanistan by denouncing its support of the Taliban.

Pakistan, post 9/11, emerged as a crucial member of the international coalition formed by the US against terrorism. Whatever success the antiterrorism coalition has achieved in Afghanistan to dismantle the Taliban regime and destroy the al Qaeda network would have not been possible without the active support and help of Pakistan. The largest number of wanted terrorists—over six hundred—sent to Guantanamo Bay

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have been apprehended by Pakistan or with its support. It was after Pakistan’s antiterrorism role was fully acknowledged by the international community that Pakistan and Russia began to find common ground for engagement. The other factor that encouraged improvement in Pak-Russia relations was the beginning of a Pak-India composite dialogue process. To some extent, evolving Indo-US strategic partnership has also influenced setting in of the process of normalization of relations between Pakistan and Russia. As India is interested in buying arms from the US and its allies, it would reduce the Indian arms market share for Russia. So obviously, Russia seeks new markets for its arms export, and it would create a commonality of interests between Russia and Pakistan. However, the legacy of Indo-Russian relations would continue to influence Moscow’s decision on that count in the near term.

A perceptional gap between Pakistan and Russia still exists on the issues of terrorism and nuclear proliferation. Russia considers that in transnational networks of religious extremists and terrorists, which are involved in destabilizing the Russian territories of Chechnya, Daghestan, and parts of Central Asia, Afghanistan- and Pakistan-based groups are involved, directly or indirectly. Pakistan, while acknowledging the existence of the problem of extremism and terrorism in the country, does not see extremism spilling over into Central Asia or the Russian Federation from its territory and refers to the indigenous nature of the problem. In fact, as a result of the Pakistan government’s policies to rein in religious extremism and build a forward-looking moderate society, the forces of extremism are becoming increasingly weaker in the country. The weakening process of extremism, along with strengthening antiterrorism cooperation with Russia, will hopefully have a positive impact on bridging the perceptional gap between the two countries. Pakistan’s nuclear proliferation control is yet another issue between the two countries. While Pakistan’s position is clear, which is that it is as responsible a state as Russia on this count, Russian leadership remains apprehensive that nuclear materials could fall into the hands of terrorists. This apprehension is more rhetorical than realistic. Post-1998, Pakistan has been able to establish effective institutions such as the National Command Authority and has also introduced stringent laws on the export of sensitive materials and technologies.

An important event in the context of Pak-Russia relations was the Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf’s visit to Moscow at the invitation


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of President Putin in February 2003. It was the first visit by a Pakistani leader in the last thirty-three years. Although this visit did not have much impact on the overall context of the two countries’ relationship, as an icebreaker, it did initiate a process of high-level dialogue, which would hopefully help deepen mutual understanding. President Musharraf’s visit was followed by the Russian foreign minister Igor Ivanov’s visit to Islamabad in June 2003. Pakistan’s foreign minister Khursheed Mahmood Kasuri visited Moscow in 2004, and Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz, in October 2005, to attend the SCO meeting. During the visit, Prime Minister Shaukar Aziz also met, on the sidelines, with his Russian counterpart Mikhail Fradkov to discuss bilateral relations.

Russia’s becoming an observer at the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in June 2005 and Pakistan’s gaining observer status at the SCO was no coincidence, but apparently both countries accommodated each other in their pursuits. President Musharraf, when he met with President Putin at the June 2006 SCO summit in Shanghai, thanked President Putin for supporting Pakistan in obtaining observer status in the SCO and sought Russia’s support to become a full member. Reciprocating, President Putin thanked President Musharraf for Pakistan’s support for Russia gaining observer status at the OIC. Both presidents expressed satisfaction with the good diplomatic and political ties and agreed on the need to boost ties in the trade, commercial, and economic field.8

What are the areas, other than antiterrorism, where Pakistan and Russia can have meaningful cooperation to improve bilateral relations? According to President Musharraf, “It is in both Pakistan and Russia’s interests to broaden their ties, but this needs to be done bilaterally and not with an Indocentric approach. I think that while bilateral relations are good and we have political and diplomatic understanding between our countries, we have to translate it into economic and trade relations.”9 He identifies two prospective areas for economic engagement: one, textiles, which is the largest export commodity of Pakistan, and two, the oil and

8 “Musharraf Hopeful of Pakistan Becoming a Full SCO Member,” Pakistan Times, June 20, 2006. 9 “Pakistan-Turkey Joint Commission Meets: Terrorists Using Drug Money, Says Turkey,” Daily Times, June 7, 2006.

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gas sector—exploration and pipelines—in which Russia has the requisite expertise and interest as well.

On the trade side, Pakistan has extended complete support to Russia to be part of the WTO; however, this is on condition that Moscow signs an FTA with Islamabad. Pakistan’s cabinet has allowed the Ministry of Commerce to start negotiations with Russia to explore the possibility of signing an FTA. Pakistan is seeking market access for leather, surgical instruments, sporting goods, and textiles. Russia has also agreed to return $108 million to Pakistani exporters who had exported articles to the USSR before its disintegration. Trade between the two countries is showing signs of expansion, though the balance is in favor of Russia. In 2004–2005, the bilateral trade volume reached $320 million from $134.24 in 2003–2004 and $100 million in 2002. Around 90 percent of Pakistan’s exports to Russia were textile items. Since few Pakistani businesses have direct contact with Russian entrepreneurs, several other countries are reexporting Pakistani textile products to Russia. According to experts on textile business, Pakistan can increase its export to Russia up to $500 million from the current twenty million if Pakistan can trade directly with Russia.10

In the energy sector, good prospects for Pak-Russia cooperation are emerging. In October 2005 during his visit, the Gazprom chairman, Aleksei Miller, held separate meetings with President Musharraf and Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz in Islamabad. The government of Pakistan signed a MoU with Gazprom for cooperation in the oil and gas sector. Cooperation under the MoU includes research and development of gas fields, development and operation of underground gas storage systems, oil and gas exploration and production, development and research to explore Pakistan’s untapped potential, especially in offshore areas, besides assisting Pakistan in conversion of diesel vehicles to CNG. In addition, Gazprom would provide training facilities to Pakistan’s oil and gas sector personnel in Russia. The chairman of Gazprom also expressed interest in purchasing Pakistan’s Oil and Gas Development Company Limited (OGDC) and Pakistan Petroleum Limited (PPL), besides developing the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline project.11

10 Muhammad Farooq Afzal, “Pak-Russia Relations Past, Present and Future,” Business Recorder, June 12, 2006. 11 Azhar Durrani, “Pak-Russia ties improving,” Business Recorder, June 12, 2006.


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The Russian consortium of oil and gas companies five-member delegation, headed by Aleksandr Bornov, visited Pakistan in April 2006 and expressed keen interest in the cross-border pipeline, LNG, oil, and gas exploration and upgrading of oilfields. The two sides discussed prospects of investment in Pakistan’s oil and gas sector. Bornov said that they would mobilize a reasonable number of drilling and exploratory rigs, logging equipment, unitary pipeline construction machinery, and high-caliber professionals to Pakistan shortly.12 There are some other Russian oil and gas companies that have concluded MoUs with Pakistan’s private sector oil and gas companies for local contract bidding.

Similarly, the chairman of the Board of Directors of Magnitogorsk, Iron and Steel Works of Russia, Viktor Rashnikov, has committed to investing $2 billion over a period of five years for the upgrading and modernization of Pakistan Steel. If the current commitments from the Russian side are materialized, it is expected that during next two to four years, Russian investment of four to six billion dollars will come into Pakistan.13 Economic interests would certainly facilitate improvement in the political climate between the two countries.

Pakistan attaches great importance to its relations with Russia and would like to further develop these in all areas of mutual interest. Admission of Russia as an observer in the OIC and Pakistan’s admission to the SCO as an observer has provided additional fora for the two countries to develop understanding and cooperation. Russia has extended conditional support of Pakistan’s full membership of the SCO, only if India also joins at the same time. So far, India has not applied for official membership and does not appear to be doing so in the near future. Pakistan strongly feels that Russia’s relations with India should not be a constraining factor in developing cordial relations with Pakistan. The two countries have common interests in promoting peace and stability in South Asia, Afghanistan, and Central Asia, besides containing and eradicating the menace of terrorism. The two countries have very similar views on the situation in the Middle East and on the nuclear issue of Iran. Pakistan and Russia need to shed the baggage of history and move forward under new circumstances, which provide numerous opportunities in mutually beneficial cooperation. However, this may not be possible unless

12. Durrani, “Pak-Russia ties improving.” 13 Durrani, “Pak-Russia ties improving.”

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concerted efforts are made by both countries to develop a deeper understanding of each other, correcting misperceptions, removing misgivings, and developing respect for each other’s legitimate interests in the regional context.

Relations with Central Asia After a political stalemate for more than a decade, Pakistan’s relations with Central Asia have recently started warming up once again. At the time the Central Asian republics gained their independence, Pakistan expressed overenthusiasm for establishing closer links with these states, without fully realizing the complexity and diversity of the region, where each republic has had differing perspectives and divergent national interests. A high-level Pakistani delegation led by the then minister of state for economic affairs, Sardar Asif Ahmed Ali, visited Russia and the Central Asian republics between November 24 and December 15, 1991. This was the first high-level contact between Pakistan and Central Asia. Also, Pakistan was among the first states to recognize all independent Central Asian states on December 19, 1991. On that occasion, the then secretary general of foreign affairs, Akram Zaki, said, “recognition of the Central Asian states would open new vistas of bilateral cooperation with these states with whom Pakistan had close ties of history, faith, and culture.”14 Pakistan extended $10 million in credit to each Central Asian state; however, this amount was increased to $30 million for Uzbekistan. Also as a goodwill gesture, consignments of five thousand tons of rice were sent to Russia and all Central Asian states, besides $100,000 worth of medicines for each Central Asian state.15 In 1991–1993, there was frequent two-way high-level exchange of visits. Although there was an emotive side to Pakistan’s policy posturing, the primary thrust of Pakistan’s foreign policy remained economic and commercial. The Economic Cooperation Organization framework created in 1985 (formerly known as the Regional Cooperation for Development, RCD, a regional cooperation organization including Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey) was reinvigorated to admit six Central Asian states and Afghanistan in 1992. 14 Dawn, December 21, 1991. 15 Saifullah Joyo, “Pakistan and Central Asia: Past, Present and Future,” South Asian Studies 20, no. 2, (July, 2005).


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This organization had ambitious plans for regional cooperation, but these could not be effectively implemented due to the lack of resources and political consensus.

While Pakistan’s engagement with all Central Asian states increased, cooperation with Uzbekistan took center stage. A large number of agreements on economic cooperation, trade joint ventures, scientific and cultural cooperation, education, tourism etc. was signed between the two countries. Agreements to import hydelpower from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan were also signed in 1992. To institutionalize cooperation, Pakistan established joint economic commissions with all the newly independent states. Under a special technical assistance Program initiated in 1992–1993, Pakistan provided fully funded training facilities to the Central Asian states, ranging from English language instruction, banking, accounting, insurance, and postal service to diplomacy. These programs continued uninterrupted, notwithstanding the political problems between the states.

The civil war in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s support of the Pushtoon ethnic faction against Tajik and Uzbek ethnic groups, especially after the emergence of the Taliban in 1994, adversely affected the development of bilateral relations. When the Taliban established its government in Kabul in 1996 and Pakistan accorded recognition to that regime, it severely impacted Pakistan’s relations with the Central Asian states, especially with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, which have borders with Afghanistan. The Islamist insurgent groups opposing the regimes in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan reportedly had direct connections with al Qaeda and the Taliban and received military training in Afghanistan. This state of affairs posed a direct challenge to the security and stability of some of the Central Asian states. For Pakistan, it was not possible to extract itself from Afghanistan due to its own national security compulsions. As a result, the gulf between Pakistan and the Central Asian states enlarged enormously.

The 9/11 attacks changed the entire scenario when the US sought Pakistan’s assistance to destroy the al Qaeda network in Afghanistan. Pakistan agreed to support the US-led effort against al Qaeda and distanced itself from the Taliban regime. The new situation once again provided Pakistan with an opportunity to improve relations with the Central Asian states. However, the misgivings created during the Taliban era regarding Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan and Central Asia will take some time to completely disappear.

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Another factor that will continue to affect Pakistan’s relations with Central Asia and Russia is the presence of foreign (Arab, Chechen, and Central Asian) elements in the tribal areas of Pakistan, who fled from Afghanistan when attacked by US forces. Although Pakistan has conducted military operations since 2004 to clear the areas of these miscreants, it is difficult to seal the border to stop future infiltration from Afghanistan. Pakistan has proposed to fence and mine the border to stop illegal crossings, but the Afghan government is opposed to the idea.

At present, Pakistan has taken the proactive diplomatic initiative to improve bilateral relations with all Central Asian states. Pakistan at the same time is also using the route of multilateralism to expand its engagement with its regional neighbors, especially through the framework of the SCO. The basic policy objectives of Pakistan in Central Asia have not changed. These are the economic and commercial interests, besides creating political goodwill for further consolidation of relations. Pakistan is keen to use its strategic geographic location to serve as a trade and energy corridor for the western regions of China, Afghanistan, and Central Asia. Necessary infrastructure for this purpose is being developed, like the Gwadar deep seaport and upgrading of Karakorum Highway. China has agreed to give Pakistan $350 million in aid to upgrade the highway. The quadrilateral trade and transit agreement, which was signed between Pakistan, China, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, has been operational since 2004. It can also be extended to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan as well.

In the energy sector, it is hoped that the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) gas pipeline project will soon materialize. The Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (TAP) oil and gas pipeline is another project under consideration. The chairman of the All China Federation of Commerce and Industry, Hu Deping, told President Musharraf during his 2006 Shanghai visit that they were preparing to set up an oil refinery with a capacity of ten million tons a year near Gwadar at a cost of $4.5 billion. The facility would refine Chinese imports of crude oil from the Gulf countries into petroleum products, which would then be transported through the energy corridor to western China.16

16 Kaleem Omar, “Energy Corridor could Become an Economic Bonanza for Pakistan,” Business and Finance Review, June 19, 2006, http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/jun2006-weekly/busrev-19-06-2006/index.html#1.


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President Musharraf, while addressing the SCO summit in Shanghai in June 2006, highlighted Pakistan’s potential to contribute to the SCO framework by stating that “in geopolitical, geostrategic, and geoeconomic terms, Pakistan is most suitably positioned not only to promote but also to play a key role in all interests espoused in the SCO charter. Pakistan provides the natural link between the SCO states to connect the Eurasian heartland with the Arabian Sea and South Asia. We offer critical overland routes and connectivity for mutually beneficial trade and energy transactions intraregionally and interregionally . . . We have a vision to develop Pakistan as a hub of economic activity linking the neighboring regions through our railways, highways, and ports, thus serving as a trade and energy corridor.”17

Pakistan’s efforts to reengage Central Asia are slowly showing signs of progress. The Uzbek president, Islam Karimov, in May 2006, made his first official trip to Pakistan in fourteen years. The thrust of the nine agreements signed during his visit was on trade and economic cooperation, though one agreement was on countering terrorism. Also, Pakistan and Tajikistan are negotiating the routing of power transmission lines from Tajikistan to Pakistan.

In summing up, while efforts are being made by Pakistan in the right direction, to improve its bilateral relations with all Central Asian states and to achieve a substantive level of engagement in Central Asia, improvement in Pak-Russia and Pakistan-India relations is equally important. In the absence of good working relations with Russia and India, given the level of influence they have in Central Asia, Pakistan would continue to confront problems in terms of expanding its engagement in Central Asia.

17 “President Musharraf’s Address at SCO Summit,” http://www.presidentofpakistan .gov.pk/FilesSpeeches/ForeignVisits/6152006103647PMAddress_SCO_Summit.pdf.

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Eurasia and South Asia in Their Global Context YOSHIDA Osamu South Asia is surrounded by high ranges on its north and west, deep forests in its east, and by sea to its south. Beyond the Himalayas to the north was the Chinese Empire extending its suzerainty to Tibet and the Himalayan kingdoms. In the northwest were the Hindu Kush and the Khyber Pass through which traders and sometimes conquerors from Central Asia flooded into the region. These natural barriers did not block trade relations across the frontiers, but they were formidable enough to separate the political system of South Asia from its adjoining areas, although the northwest connection had more potential to affect the fate of the region.

South Asia’s isolation from the rest of Asia was reinforced by British colonial rule. When the British left South Asia in 1947, there was good scope before the people of the region to restore its deprived relations with its north, northwest, and west, which were at that time represented by the modern states of the Soviet Union and China. It is true that in the course of time the newly emerged states of India and Pakistan developed intimate relations with the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China respectively, but those relations were rather a natural outcome of their main foreign policy concerns: How they were placed in the US-centered international system.

With the end of the Cold War, and with the new developments after the 9/11 attacks that made Afghanistan, the neighboring country to South Asia, a focal point of military operations against “terrorism,” India and Pakistan are now maintaining delicate but cooperative relations with the

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United States. The presence of the American military in Afghanistan functions as a guarantor for India and Pakistan not to fight with each other.1 Deepening economic and technological interdependence between the United States and India also brought a new dimension to India’s strategic calculation, and has helped India secure the status of the regional dominant power. However, having the second- and the third-largest Muslim populations in the world, Pakistan and India may have difficulties maintaining their current relations with the United States, which carries some anti-Islam outlook in its “counterterror” operations.

This article sets out to study South Asia has for projecting the new foreign relations its geographical north and west. I will first look at the postcolonial history of South Asian foreign relations to consider how the opportunity created at the end of British colonial rule for restoring the ancient links in the contemporary context was lost. Then, the characteristics of strategic alliances between India and the Soviet Union and between Pakistan and China will be analyzed to show their secondary or reactive nature, and thus the limit of South Asia expanding its relations to its north and west. And lastly, I will explore the paths that two South Asian powers may take at present and in the future, keeping in mind such newly emerged factors as American unilateralism and some alternatives to it such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Post-colonial Setting The end of the Cold War had the potential to change the strategic setting of South Asia with a view to expanding its scope toward Central Asia. Pakistan hoped for a better arrangement for its western border with Afghanistan whose government was then controlled by the Taliban, a Pakistani creation. India could not hope very much for any improvement in its fate in this part of Asia, as its ally, the Soviet Union, was replaced by

1 There are unextinguishable arguments that some forms of US military presence remain in Pakistan even after the most critical phases of Operation Enduring Freedom had ended. See, for example, Rahimullah Yusufzai, “Militants’ Commander Warns of Wana Fallout,” News International (Internet Edition), August 1, 2004. The official position is that “the Pakistani government has taken such a strong position that US military personnel will not enter Pakistan.” Gordon Corera, “US ‘Impatience’ in Bin Laden Hunt,” BBC News, June 20, 2005.

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smaller Muslim states in Central Asia, all of which, however, opposed the Taliban.

Geographically, South Asia is open to its north and west. This location is a region rich in culture and tradition, but was vulnerable to invasion through the Khyber Pass. The British colonizers were obsessed by the fear that someone, including the Russians, might come and threaten their precious jewel from across the Himalayas or the Hindu Kush. They did their best to defend colonial India by placing buffer states on the north and by extending the border westward through three wars with the Afghans. By doing so, British imperialists not only united the whole Indian subcontinent for the first time in its long history, but also separated this region from the rest of Asia.

The end of colonial rule in 1947 brought some hope to reshape Asian relations. Thus, delegates from eight countries within the Soviet Central Asia were invited to Delhi to participate in the Asian Relations Conference that Jawaharlal Nehru had convened shortly before the partitioned independence of India and Pakistan was achieved. But the new situation caused by the denial of Marshal Plan assistance to the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc caused them to be preoccupied with their own economic reconstruction so that they were economically more integrated with each other to the point of constituting the socialist economic system. Consequently, very little effort was made to vitalize the relations with newly emerged noncommunist countries outside their system.

The death of Stalin and the subsequent end of the Korean War changed the tide, and official economic assistance relations between India and the Soviet Union began. These donor-recipient relations were, however, totally different from the relations Nehru had envisaged between India and other Asian nations, including those in Soviet Central Asia, when he convened the Asian Relations Conference nearly a decade before to depict the resurgence of Asia. But this became the rule that had regulated bilateral relations between India and the Soviet Union until the latter collapsed in 1991.

It is ironic that the most vocal critic of Cold War antagonism and advocate of nonalignment saw this opportunity of improving relations with the Soviet Union from the viewpoint of the Cold War. And it is quite accidental that India’s encounter with the socialist superpower was timed when the United States decided to provide military assistance to Pakistan on the premise that a threat existed in the Cold War context. India thought

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that the weapons provided would be directed not against the Soviet Union but against India. Naturally, this development put India in a position to repudiate the reasoning of the US. The agreement on the five principles of peaceful coexistence with China at the expense of the earlier stand of India that had recognized the internal autonomy of the Tibetans was the first of this kind. By criticizing the Cold War strategy of the United States, India was itself entangled in a similar thinking of power balance. Better relations with the Soviet Union or with Yugoslavia were considered in the same vein, although the former had more to offer with its technology- and capital-providing capacity and the latter with nonalignment in the later years.

India’s antipathy against the Cold War in its early years, however, took the outlook of Asia-ness as the more militarization of the Cold War in Asia developed with SEATO being formed to include Pakistan. The idea of holding a conference of Asian and African nations proposed by the Indonesian prime minister was received skeptically at first, but Nehru had a change of heart and began to see it positively. The conference held in 1955 at Bandung, Indonesia, was for India to introduce China to the comity of nations in Asia as well as for many of the newly independent countries to have the first opportunity to participate in an international forum.

This conference had the potential to promote relations among Asian nations in more concrete terms. While Pakistan took this opportunity to start friendly relations with China, which culminated in a border agreement between the two countries in 1963, it is difficult to discern India’s willingness to deepen the connection with its Asian friends through this conference. India’s indifference to the actual issues in Asia can be explained by its preoccupation with the Cold War being brought to Asia. Nehru insisted that conflicts in Asia would never develop into wars unless the Western powers intervened in the process on the pretext of the Cold War. Consequently, he attempted to prove that Cold War thinking was irrelevant to Asia. His five principles, or the ten principles agreed upon in Bandung, were to advertise the way Asians would respect others’ choices in a social system that Westerners would not tolerate and would fight the Cold War for. But he failed to recognize the difference not in the domestic systems but in the various interests among Asian nations, and thus failed to find a way to settle the conflicts that arose from the Cold War.


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Nehru’s “world of our own creation” collapsed when Chinese troops crossed the border along the Himalayas to push back their Indian counterparts who had marched forward to realize effective control over the territories India had claimed. But this incident did not considerably change India’s way of looking at Asia as the Americans and British came forward with military assistance to help India, which rather reinforced the tendency for Indians to see the issue in the Cold War context. India continued to look to the “Super Powers” and their European allies.

Pakistanis looked more at reality in their search for allies against the threat they felt from India, which was understood not to have accommodated itself to the partition of British India. Afghanistan’s rejection of recognizing its common border with Pakistan also constituted a security problem. These threats from both sides of West Pakistan were derived from its colonial legacy so that a negotiated settlement of the problems was inherently difficult as they were deeply entangled with the existence of Pakistan itself. Thus, it decided to approach the matter by strengthening its military preparedness and attempted to obtain assistance first from Britain and then from the United States. In this process, they emphasized their capacity to contribute to the global Cold War against the Communists.

On the other hand, Pakistan’s relations with China steadily developed after their first encounter at the head-of-government level in Bandung. Perhaps their agreement in 1958 to construct the Karakorum Highway across the Karakorum Range was the first step toward restoring the old links in the contemporary context by connecting South and Central Asia. But Sino-Pak relations gradually changed their character as China’s relations with India deteriorated. They demonstrated their success in temporarily demarcating the unsettled border between Kashmir and Tibet at Siachen Glacier in the spirit of good neighborly relations in 1963 where the line of actual control after the first Indo-Pak War ended without any clear indications about the belonging of the area extending from that point. Thus, restraining India’s maneuverability in foreign relations came to be the main concern for them with a small hole possibly leading to the new dimension of South and Central Asian relations.

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Diagonal Development of Relations between South and Central Asia India’s failure to settle the border problems with China actually brought the Cold War into the region. The United States came and provided India with American arms. Americans saw the border war between India and China as an integral part of communist aggression, and John F. Kennedy was determined to project another Asian giant as an alternative to the Chinese example of the Asian development path. India was looming large in US foreign policy and occupied a central place in its new development assistance to fill the “economic gap” that might otherwise result in security holes for communist infiltration.

Pakistan was not comfortable with this development and lodged a protest against the military build-up of its enemy by a formal ally. At the same time, Pakistan moved closer to China as the enemy’s enemy, at which the United States showed its displeasure. The Second Indo-Pak War and its ceasefire process revealed that Pakistan could not have hoped for US help in the event of war with India. The Soviet Union emerged as the only possible mediator between India and Pakistan and invited the two heads of government to the capital of a Soviet Central Asian Republic, Tashkent, for peace talks.

American preoccupation with the Vietnam War in the second half of the 1960s kept the United States away from either India or Pakistan. India’s ill feeling against American pressure for its economic reform made it escape to the world of second-class goods production and trade, i.e., the socialist economic system that the Soviet Union and its East European subordinates maintained at the time.2 Pakistan was also approached by the Soviet Union but when forced to choose between the latter and China in 1969, Pakistan decided to go with its old friend, to which suggestions

2 India from the late 1960s tried to reduce the volume of imports from the West to save its foreign exchange reserve. This policy victimized India’s technological development to the extent that its economy became autarchic and that its products had a hard time finding markets outside India except for those of its political allies like Eastern Bloc countries and nonaligned nations. See YOSHIDA Osamu, “Indira Ganji seiken no jiritsu-ka senryaku to In-So kinmitsu-ka no haikei” [Indira Gandhi Regime’s Strategy for Self-reliance and Underlying Factors toward a Closer Indo-Soviet Relationship], Kokusai seiji [International Relations], no. 127 (2001): 33–49.


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from the new US government under Richard Nixon for Pakistan to mediate its normalization process with China contributed considerably.3

Thus, India’s border conflicts with its northern neighbor as well as its rejection of a US-sponsored economic integration made the distant Soviet Union its ally, while Pakistan looked to China as a more reliable partner in its antagonism against India, even if cordial relations with the Soviet Union might have changed the conflictual setting between Pakistan and Afghanistan. This dually diagonal relationship prevented the two countries from developing regional connections as they were blocked on their north by hostile states except for the narrow pass through Karakorum that was opened up in 1978.

Paradoxical enough was the pivotal position that the United States occupied in this situation. Although the United States kept itself away from most political issues in South Asia from toward the end of the 1960s,4 the US stance along with its economic and technological potential to affect the fate of the South Asian states made India and Pakistan compete with each other to persuade the Americans: India wanted them to recognize its dominant position in the region and to treat India as it was, while Pakistan attempted to take every opportunity to impress on the Americans its strategic importance for them. No decisive tilt in the balance between Indo-Soviet and Pak-China alliances created this situation, but decisive action from the United States, whatever a distant possibility it might be, did.

It seems unusual that such a regionally dominant power like India was so obsessed by the mere possibility of a superpower changing the regional balance, but assistance given to one of the regional powers without any commitment made by the US to regional stability was the largest problem for India. Failing to set clear strategic objectives for South Asia, an indecisive United States had always been an additional factor which either of the two contenders in this region might happen to benefit from. 3 See Golam W. Choudhury, “Reflections on Sino-Pakistan Relations,” Pacific Community 7, no.2 (1976): 262-265. 4 The US “Tilt Policy” in 1971 was exceptional in outlook but in reality, there was no concerted effort within the US government to help Pakistan suppress the Bangladeshi rebels supported by India. See Christopher Van Hollen, “The Tilt Policy Revisited: Nixon-Kissinger Geopolitics and South Asia,” Asian Survey 20, no. 4 (1980): 339–361.

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The End of the Cold War and a New Dimension for South Asia The end of the Cold War brought a new situation to South Asia. The US presidential waiver to exempt the application of the Pressler Amendment to Pakistan was not extended in 1990, the year following Soviet completion of troop withdrawal from Afghanistan, and assistance from the United States had been withdrawn since then as Pakistan was officially suspected of developing nuclear weapons. But the setback suffered by India also looked great as the Soviet Union disappeared and a succeeding Russia did not give India the same strategic importance as its predecessor had done, while Pakistan could continuously expect China’s support in its strategic setting.

The Gulf War, however, created a new context, and the subsequent economic crisis of India forced it to make its economic policy more adjustable to globalization. After accepting conditions of the IMF’s structural adjustment loan, India’s balance of payment position was quickly recovered through rapidly increased foreign investment. India’s economic power now received the attention it deserved in accordance with its size. In the international market, India loomed large in the calculation of world exporters of goods and capital. Thus, the Clinton administration was about to make a visit to South Asia to strengthen US relations with the region when India and Pakistan tested their nuclear devices, which further delayed the US return to South Asia.

On the other hand, India and China have been slowly but steadily normalizing their bilateral relations since Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to China in 1988. China even supplied nuclear fuels to India’s US-constructed Tharapur Power Station from 1993 to 1998 after the restricted period was over.5 Sino-Indian trade relations soon caught up with those between

5 Tharapur Nuclear Power Station was constructed by the US under the bilateral agreement of 1963 that stipulated that the nuclear fuel would be supplied only by the US for the first thirty years. However, the fuel supply was interrupted from around 1976 when congressional criticism against India’s first nuclear test in 1971 gained momentum during the presidential elections. US Congress further passed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act in 1978 that prohibits the export of nuclear items to those countries without full-scope safeguard including India. Thus, the US, despite its bilateral legal obligation to supply nuclear fuel to India, attempted to renegotiate the terms with India in vain. The strained bilateral relations ended only in 1982 when the two countries agreed that France would replace the US to supply the fuel. France did this until 1993 when the period for which the


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India and Russia in 1997–1998. In 2004–2005, China became India’s third-largest trade partner next only to the US and the UAE. India imported most from China (excluding Hong Kong), and more than five times as much as from Russia.

The deepening trade relations between India and China jumped up from the turn of the century. The nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in 1998 and their serious armed conflicts in the following year in the Kargil district of Kashmir may have slowed down the pace. The Kargil crisis was taken up seriously as it might have triggered a nuclear war. Thus, US president Bill Clinton intervened and strongly requested Pakistani prime minister Nawaz Sharif to withdraw his troops. China did not support

Source: Reserve Bank of India, Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy, 2005.

bilateral agreement had provided concluded, and China came into the picture to offer nuclear fuel at this juncture. It did it until 1998 when India conducted the second nuclear explosions. China’s motivation to supply nuclear fuel to India is understood as being from its commercial rather than strategic interests. See Nucleonics Week 42, no. 5 (2001), 339–361.

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Pakistan’s stand in the Kargil crisis as it had done in 1965 or in 1971. The crisis may have been viewed by the Chinese as Pakistan’s adventurism with nuclear capability at its hands and not as something it could be sided with. The Kargil crisis may prove to be the turning point in China’s relations with South Asia.6

While the United States’ capacity to influence the course of events in South Asia was extremely limited due to the economic sanctions of its own imposition on India and Pakistan against their nuclear tests in 1998, China held the first security dialogue with India in 2000 without deteriorating its relations with Pakistan. Lacking an effective American presence in this part of the world, China now embarked on the creation of a new Eurasian setting. 9/11 and After The 9/11 attacks in 2001 brought the United States back to South Asia, this time with more willingness to commit itself to the region. New US president George W. Bush quickly lifted the economic sanctions on India and Pakistan for their support extended to his “war against terrorism.” India’s alliance with the US for this war was in line with its own problems as long as Bush’s war did not go beyond the war against the Taliban regime of Afghanistan, as it had also posed a threat to India’s Kashmir. Pakistan had, on the other hand, many difficulties in deciding to fight against the Taliban that had been created by Pakistani intelligence during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. But it did so and even let its own territory be used by Americans and other multinational forces as a base to attack Taliban-controlled Afghanistan.

Although it was controversial whether Afghanistan was a proper target of retaliation against the 9/11 attacks, lack of diplomatic recognition given to the Taliban regime by the international community except for three states including Pakistan created the circumstances in which the American appeal was easily accepted, and concerted military operations

6 See Bahukutumbi Raman, “The India-China-Pakistan-US Quadrangle,” South Asia Analysis Group, paper no. 1334, April 12, 2005, http://www.saag.org/papers14/ paper1334.html; Imtiaz Gul, “Changing face of China-Pakistan ties,” Aljazeera.Net, October 9, 2003, http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/B0F09C03-F107-4078-854D -033701D45879.htm.


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were realized with most of the major countries involved. India, Pakistan, China, Russia, and the Central Asian republics were all on the American side.

Pakistan’s territory proved to be the most important to attack Afghanistan, but this did not necessarily mean that Pakistan had gained another chance to become a close ally of the United States in the latter’s global strategy. The record of Islamization in Pakistan since Zia-ur-Haq’s regime as a part of its efforts to assist Islamic fighters against Soviet troops in Afghanistan cast doubt on its readiness to fight with the Americans, although this process itself had been under strong American influence. The attack on the Indian parliament in December 2001 by those identified as Pakistan-based militants put Pakistan further under pressure to convince its allies of its sincerity, which on its part intensified anti-American sentiments in the domestic politics of Pakistan. This development made Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf, who ousted Nawaz Sharif in coup soon after the latter accepted Clinton’s demand to withdraw Pakistani troops from Kargil, assume a more secular-oriented outlook.

India exploited all these to impress upon the Americans that its long history as a secular democratic state would prove that it was a more reliable ally in the war against terrorism than Pakistan. This exceptionally pro-American posture was not domestically stable, and it decided not to officially support the second American war that was directed against Iraq two years later, so that India kept the option open as to whether to remain with the Americans or to be with its critics in Eurasia.

Meanwhile, India’s relations with Russia and China were further improved. Russians found in India an outlet for their nuclear and other sophisticated technologies that might stimulate American suppliers’ appetites to enter the Indian market for India’s advantage. Sino-Indian relations were put on a more pragmatic basis through the visit to China by Indian prime minister Atal Behari Vajpayee in June 2003 or one month after the end of the main battles of the Iraq war. The two countries agreed to expand their border trade and explore a political framework to settle the boundary problems.7

7 “Declarations on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation between the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China,” Ministry of External Affairs India, 2003, http://meaindia.nic.in/declarestatement/2003/06/23jd01.htm.

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With the steady development of India’s relationship with China and Russia, strained Indo-Pak relations were slowly improved. When the National Democratic Alliance government led by the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party was defeated in the 2004 general elections, the United Progressive Alliance of the Indian National Congress and various regional parties in India made a breakthrough in the confidence building with Pakistan on various issues including nuclear capabilities and Kashmir. They also reached an agreement to construct a pipeline for natural gas from Iran through Pakistan to India. Indo-Pakistani bilateral relations showed clear signs of improvement.

Thus, all the four actors formerly confronted diagonally were coming closer for the first time, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s decision in 2005 to grant observer status to India and Pakistan along with Iran and Mongolia was to be viewed as a natural outcome of this development of quadrangle understanding. The SCO has the potential for Pakistan to put its relations with Central Asian countries, which had been strained due to the former’s support of the Taliban regime, on a more amicable footing.

However, as their listing up of Iran, the supposed next target of America’s war against terrorism, as a state to be granted observer status indicates, the SCO’s increased self-definition as a group to offer an alternative, if not critical, approach to the problems of destabilized international community distinct from American unilateralism may pose some embarrassment to its South Asian observers. India may be particularly sensitive to the American reaction as it is now experiencing a first-ever real honeymoon with the United States.

India long hoped for recognition as a dominant power in the region by the United States and, after the second nuclear explosion in 1998, for the commercial purchase of nuclear technologies from the US as a sign of approval to recognize the nuclear power status of India. President Bush’s first visit to South Asia in March 2006 finalized the nuclear deal with India so that a special relationship between the two was formally established. This, together with the strong US military presence in the region as a result of the Afghan war, offered an ideal setting for India to act as a dominant regional power. In other words, at the very juncture of four regional powers finally coming together to anticipate more constructive cooperation to pacify the regional conflicts, the United States


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intervened in the process by telling India that it would be treated as a Britain or Japan in South Asia.

It will be appropriate to understand the reasoning behind the Indian government’s decision not to send its prime or foreign minister8 to the 2006 SCO meeting in Shanghai in this context. After all, as far as Indians feel that the threat to their security comes from across the border on their west, the best way to keep security in the short run is to control the flow at its origin. In the past, more often than not, Americans expected India to do the reverse or to behave like a bigger brother by showing more generous attitude to Pakistan without their own commitment to the business. But now, they have come to see the problem as their own so that they have their presence in the region to control the situation, which will be the most effective and economical for Indian security. And this does not include any necessity on the part of India to improve and strengthen its bilateral relations with Pakistan.

It is of course too early to say that India chose to go with the Americans, but such a long history of an American shadow over the events in South Asia might have clouded Indian eyes when they believed that that shadow might be cast in India’s favor.

South Asia’s discovery of Eurasia has just started, and countries in this region have not yet gotten used to this new reality. Therefore, it is understandable that they tend to look to the old master of the Cold War years for stability and regional status, rather than to settle the problems by

8 India’s foreign minister, Natwar Singh, was dismissed on November 7, 2005 after eight months of dual diplomacy by him and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on India’s relations with Iran. Natwar Singh, a former professional diplomat who is regarded to be close to former prime minister Indira Gandhi, represented advocates of a nonaligned policy and supported Iranian claims of independent nuclear development. His dismissal was the result of a timely announcement by the UN committee headed by the former chairman of the US Federal Reserve Board, Paul Volcker, to inquire about corruption relating to the UN’s Oil for Food Program for Iraq, that he was among the “noncontractual beneficiaries.” Volcker’s report provided an opportunity for Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to end the dual diplomacy with his foreign minister on Iran and to deepen India’s global partnership with the US including the issue of nuclear proliferation in relation to Iran under his leadership. Manmohan Singh retained the External Affairs portfolio himself until October, 2006, which caused India’s very small presence at the 2006 SCO meeting in June as Manmohan avoided attending. For Natwar’s disposition, see Raman, “The US does not like Natwar Singh,” Rediff.com, November 7, 2005, http://www.rediff.com/ news/2005/nov/07raman.htm.

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themselves. But it is this hegemonic influence that has locked them up in this particular region since their attainment of independence.

The SCO and other Eurasian frameworks offer the potential of a completely different kind of interdependent network. Furthermore, American unilateralism may not last long, and there is a possibility of a US return to the multilateral approach of the Clinton years. South Asians should see the issue from a much longer perspective and with the prospect of playing a leading role in international relations in the future.

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Contributors

Martha Brill OLCOTT is senior associate with the Russian and Eurasian Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, D.C., USA. She is the author of Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise (2002) and Central Asia’s Second Chance (2005). Farkhod TOLIPOV is associate professor at the Department of Political Science, the National University of Uzbekistan. He is the author of The Grand Strategy of Uzbekistan (2005, in Russian). His articles include “Multilateralism, Bilateralism and Unilateralism in Fighting Terrorism in the SCO Area” (2006). SUN Zhuangzhi is deputy director of the Center for Shanghai Cooperation Organization Study, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. He is author of numerous books and articles, among them Central Asian Security and Afghanistan (2003, in Chinese) and “New and Old Regionalism: The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Sino-Central Asian Relations” (2004). YUASA Takeshi is senior research fellow of the National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan. He is the author of “Security in Central Eurasia: The Impact of U.S. Engagement” (2003), and “The China Factor in the Changing Security Environment of Central Asia” (2007). Tatiana ZAKAURTSEVA is director of the Center of G8 and Trans-Atlantic Studies at the Institute for Contemporary International Studies of the Diplomatic Academy, Russia. Her books include Essays on the History of the Foreign Ministry of Russia (2002, in Russian) and Contemporary Pacific Policies of Russia and the USA: A Comparative Study (2007, in Russian).

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László PÓTI is senior research fellow at the Center for Strategic and Defence Studies, National Defence University, Hungary. His articles include “The Hungarian-Ukrainian-Russian Triangle: Not Like Rubik’s Cube” (2000) and “Putin’s European Policy” (2002). Mark N. KATZ is professor of Government and Politics at George Mason University, USA. He is the author of “Putin, Ahmadinejad and the Iranian Nuclear Crisis,” Middle East Policy (2006), and “The Putin-Chavez Partnership,” Problems of Post-Communism (2006). KO Sangtu is associate professor of Area Studies at Yonsei University, Korea. He is the author of Conflict Management in the Post-Cold War Era: Preventive Diplomacy and PKO (2005) and Strategic Partnership in a Unipolar System: The Sino-Russian Relationship (2006). IWASHITA Akihiro is professor at the Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, Japan. He is the author of A 4,000 Kilometer Journey Along the Sino-Russian Border (2004) and “Russia and South Asia: Power Balance and Border Dynamism” (2007). Nirmala JOSHI is director of the India-Central Asia Foundation, India. She is author and editor of numerous books and articles, among them Central Asia: The Great Game Replayed (2003) and “An Appraisal of China’s Policy Towards Central Asia” (2006). Fazal-ur-RAHMAN is director of the Institute of Strategic Studies’ newly established China Study Centre, Pakistan. His articles include “Asia Cooperation Dialogue: Importance of Building Networks in Asia” (2005) and “Pak-China Economic Relations: Constraints and Opportunities” (2006). YOSHIDA Osamu is professor of Hiroshima University, Japan. His articles include “India and the Former Soviet Union / Russia” (2004, in Japanese) and “Kashmir and Indo-Pak/Sino-India Border Problems” (2006, in Japanese).

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Index Afghanistan, 4, 6–8, 10–11, 16, 19, 24–25,

30–32, 52, 75–76, 80–81, 89, 99, 102, 107, 139–140, 156, 161, 179–180, 182–185, 193, 196, 197–200, 205–206, 211, 213–214, 216–218, 221–222, 225–228, 231–232, 235, 237–238, 240–241

air base Kant, 7, 11, 157, 199, 202 Manas, 199, 202

alliance, 6, 25–27, 32, 67, 72, 83, 93–94, 98–99, 104, 110, 117, 146, 149–152, 158, 160–161, 171, 189, 192, 204, 221, 232, 237, 240, 242

al Qaeda, 10, 182, 198, 221, 227 Amur River, 166, 170–171, 177 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC),

70–71, 97–98 Asia-Pacific region, 66–68, 83, 94, 95, 97, 104 Association of Southeast Asian Nations

(ASEAN), 73, 76–77, 83 ASEAN+3, 73 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), 71, 98

Atlanticism, 71, 115, 121, 166 balance of power, 3, 5, 8, 9, 24, 26, 33, 46, 82,

87, 89, 91, 96, 99, 106, 109, 111, 115, 143–144, 150–152, 160, 165–170, 172–174, 177–179, 182–184, 185–187, 189–190, 192–194, 205, 213, 215, 219, 224, 234, 237–238

Bol’shoi Ussuriiskii Island (Bear Island, Heixiazi), 173, 176–177

border agreement May, 1991 (Sino-Soviet), 170–171, 173, 175 October, 2004 (Sino-Russian), 177

Caspian Sea (region), 14–15, 24, 107, 153–154, 159, 200, 202, 208

Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO), 27–29, 32–33, 78

Chechnya, 88, 105, 109, 111, 136, 139–140, 142, 156, 184, 198, 204, 222

Cold War, 52, 66, 76, 89, 92, 101, 159–160, 168, 178, 181–182, 187, 190, 205, 213, 221, 233–236, 243

post- (the end of/ after), 25, 29, 66–68, 74, 76, 111, 113, 118, 149–150, 152, 158, 161, 168, 172, 177, 180, 187, 192, 195–196, 221, 231–232, 238

Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), 12, 28, 201, 207

color revolution(s), 5, 9, 18, 34, 39, 88, 92, 94, 99, 137, 156, 202

Damanskii Island (Zhenbao Island), 170 Eurasian Economic Community (EEC), 26–29,

32–33, 82, 93 Eurasianism, 65–66, 115, 117, 149–150, 166 European Union (EU), 5, 20, 35, 74, 93, 110,

113, 116–118, 121, 127, 130–131, 138, 172 Gazprom, 11, 14–15, 129, 132, 224 G8, 20, 67, 70, 110–111, 153, 159 Great Game, 3, 21, 25–26, 36, 40, 201 hegemony, 11, 46, 89, 91, 96, 102–103, 143,

152, 156, 205, 213, 244 Iran, 3–4, 9–10, 14, 17, 19–20, 31, 58, 90–91,

93, 99–10, 104, 139, 146, 155, 184, 200, 207–209, 213, 217–218, 224–226, 228, 242–243

Iraq, 4, 6, 8, 11, 89–90, 98–102, 108, 142, 146, 156, 158–159, 176, 196, 198–199, 201, 206, 217, 241, 243

jihad, 199, 216 Karakorum, 218, 220, 228, 235, 237 Kargil, 197, 215, 239–241 Kashmir, 178, 182, 196, 204, 209, 214, 235,

239–240, 242 migration (immigration, immigrant), 89, 96,

INDEX

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106–107, 159, 166, 169, 175–176 Missile Defense (MD), 157, 162–163, 177,

182–183 Mongol, 58, 99, 207, 242 mujahideen, 141–142, 197 multilateral, 16, 30, 48, 50, 52–53, 56, 58–59,

62, 65–69, 71–75, 77, 79, 81, 83, 88, 116, 165, 172–173, 202–203, 206–207, 217, 228, 244

multipolar, 91, 94, 96–97, 101, 108, 114, 116, 158, 205

9/11, 11, 25, 75, 80, 99, 105, 139–140, 144, 151, 154, 156, 161, 175, 182, 185, 198–199, 201, 205, 211, 215, 221, 227, 231, 240

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 4, 6, 8, 32, 71, 74, 89, 92–93, 98–99, 104–106, 113, 116, 118, 121–122, 125, 130–131, 138, 153, 156, 159–160, 200, 204

North Korea, 90–91, 95, 97, 149–150, 174 Northern Territories (South Kurile), 95, 146,

166 Organization for Security and Cooperation in

Europe (OSCE), 6, 7, 9, 32, 60 partnership, 6, 8, 10, 12–14, 32, 57, 77, 81,

91–92, 96–97, 100–102, 104, 106, 108, 117, 144, 158–159, 166–177, 180–181, 184, 192, 195–196, 205, 215, 222, 243

People’s Liberation Army (PLA), 217 pipeline, 9–11, 14–20, 51–52, 126–127, 129,

131, 144, 153–154, 165, 175–177, 192, 201, 208, 224–225, 228

Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), 7, 11, 16–17, 26, 29–32, 42, 48, 55–61, 63, 78, 82, 98–100, 144, 157, 172, 184–185, 193, 202, 206–207, 220, 223, 225, 228–229, 232, 242–244

Silk Road, 42, 46–47, 50–52, 65, 71, 74, 76–77 Sino-Russian Treaty of Good-neighborliness,

Friendship and Cooperation of 2001, 144, 150, 158, 175

six-party talks, 97 South Asian Association of Regional

Cooperation (SAARC), 220 South China Sea, 95 Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO),

178, 212, 234 Taiwan, 45, 95, 144, 206, 214 Taliban, 76, 140, 182–185, 196–199, 204, 211,

221, 227, 232–233, 240, 242 triangle relations, 32, 165, 168, 181, 185–193

Russia-China-India, 144, 165, 167, 173, 181, 185, 190–192, 205

Russia-China-Pakistan, 189 Russia-India-Pakistan, 185, 187, 189 US-China-Pakistan, 212 US-India-Pakistan, 187 US-Russia-India, 187, 190 US-Russia-Pakistan, 187

unilateral, 30, 93, 103, 151, 158, 161, 176, 178, 217, 232, 242, 244

unipolar, 91, 111, 158, 160, 166, 205 United Nations (UN), 7, 46, 75, 88, 96, 98, 100,

110, 140, 176, 201, 205, 207, 212–213, 217, 221, 243

Security Coucil (UNSC), 60 Ussuri River, 166, 170–171 Uyghur, 16, 62, 202–203, 217 War on Terror, 11, 24, 140 weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 109–110 Xinjiang, 52, 202–203, 206, 216

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