actorness in interregionalism...called triad regions, the leading regions in the world economy,...

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ACTORNESS IN INTERREGIONALISM

Heiner Hänggi University of St.Gallen [[email protected]]

Paper prepared for the Workshop No. 14 “Theorizing Regional Integration and Inter-

Regional Relations”, ECPR Joint Sessions, Helsinki, Finland, 7-12 May 2007

1. INTRODUCTION1

Interregionalism is not an entirely new phenomenon in international politics. However,

since the early 1990s, the number of institutionalised relations between international

regions has entered a remarkable period of growth. At present, almost all international

regions and subregions engage in some sort of region-to-region relations. Why is this so?

As Söderbaum and Van Langenhove rightly suggest, a “rather uncontroversial

proposition is that regionalism will give rise to interregionalism” (2005: 378). Indeed,

chronologically, the proliferation of interregional relations is closely linked to the new

wave of regionalism – labelled “new regionalism” (Palmer 1991) against the backdrop of

the experience in the Asia-Pacific.2 With the emergence of new regionalism, regional

organisations and other “regional actors” began to develop or expand their own external

relations. Although some regional organisations such as the European Union (EU) and

the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) developed regular group-to-group

relations as early as the 1970s, the number and intensity of interregional dialogues

1 The author is indebted to Fairlie Jensen for preparing a literature review on the concept of actorness on

which section 2 is largely based. In sections 3 and 4, this paper draws heavily on the author’s earlier study

on “Interregionalism as a multifaceted phenomenon: In search of a typology” (Hänggi 2006).

2 For a comparison of “old” and “new” regionalism see Yamamoto (1996) and Dosch (2003).


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increased markedly in the 1990s. In addition, with the so-called transregional forums new

forms of interregional cooperation emerged which, in the case of the Asia Pacific

Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), even developed

some albeit very limited degree of actorness. Some authors, in analogy to the new

regionalism, therefore also speak of a “new” interregionalism of which ASEM is

considered to be a kind of prototype (Bersick 1999; Steiner 2000; Maull 2001a; Hänggi

2006). The most elaborate and intensive interregional relations developed between the so-

called Triad regions, the leading regions in the world economy, namely North America,

Europe and East Asia, with the latter comprising Northeast and Southeast Asia (Roloff

2001).3 In the meantime, more such forums have emerged, linking the Triad with non-

Triadic regions and connecting regions at the periphery of the Triad with each other

(Hänggi/Roloff/Rüland 2006).

During the Cold War period, at the time of old interregionalism, interregional relations

were also global in scope, but resulted from different factors. Under the conditions of

systemic bipolarity, interregional relations were largely confined to the European

Community’s (EC) so-called “group-to-group dialogues” with other regional

organisations or groups of states. These dialogue relationships had gradually evolved

since the 1970s to cover almost all the regions by the end of the 1980s (Regelsberger

1990). Some authors have considered the long-standing dialogue partnership between the

EC and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as the model of

interregional cooperation (Lukas 1989; Mols 1990). Given the fact the EC was the most

advanced regional organisation in terms of integration and due to the absence of

interregional relations among the EC’s partner organisations, the interregional network of 3 The concept of the Triad has its roots in the trilateral relationship between the USA, the EC/EU and

Japan, the three powers of the capitalist world economy during the cold war period. The concept underwent

an expansion to embrace the Triad regions (North America, Western Europe and East Asia) as a

consequence of several factors such as the end of the Cold War, the appearance of ‘new regionalism’ and

the emergence of East Asia as the third centre of the world economy; and it was further strengthened by the

establishment of interregional relations among the Triad regions in the 1990s. By the mid-1990s, the new

Triad concept had become a major feature in the discourse about the emerging international order in

general and about Asia-Europe relations in particular. See Hänggi (1999), pp. 57-62.


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the Cold War period appeared like a “hub and spokes system”4 gravitating around

Brussels. The EC’s dominant position in old interregionalism made it more than just a

model of regional cooperation, which influenced other regions by means of “extra-

regional echoing” (Zimmerling 1991). The Community actively used interregional

cooperation mechanisms as an instrument for promoting intraregional cooperation among

partner countries in other regions as well as a means to position itself in the international

arena as an actor in its own right. The practice of group-to-group dialogues helped the

Community to strengthen internal cohesion and develop an international presence as a

“civilian power” (Nutall 1990: 156; Maull 1990/91). In short, the earlier interregional

relations – old interregionalism – were a novel and specific mode of international

cooperation developed and dominated by the most advanced regional organisation which,

at the time, was cautiously emerging as a new kind of international actor within the

narrow framework of systemic bipolarity. Though a novel approach and one of global

scope, old interregionalism was closely linked to the emergence of the EC and thus of

rather limited relevance for the international system (Regelsberger 1990: 14).

New interregionalism tends to have a much greater impact on the international system.

The rapid growth of the network of interregional relationships in the past decade and the

gradual integration of almost all countries to a greater or lesser extent into this network

seem to make new interregionalism a lasting feature of the international system or – as

some authors suggest – a building block in an emerging multi-layered system of global

governance (Rüland 2001). Though the EC – in the meantime, the European Union (EU)

– is still a, if not the, major actor in the expanding network of new interregionalism, the

number of interregional relations beyond the “hub” of the past has been growing rapidly.

ASEAN – the EU’s first group-to-group dialogue partner – and regional organisations in

Latin America have been the primary movers behind this development. Furthermore, new

interregionalism has produced new types and forms of interregional relations, such as

APEC which often transcend interregionalism properly speaking and may be viewed as

regionalism of a higher order. That said, one must admit that the paradigmatic case of old 4 This term was coined in the context of the United States’ system of bilateral military alliances in the Asia

Pacific region.


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interregionalism – the EC’s group-to-group dialogues – had already taken a variety of

forms5 and still accounts for the greatest number of interregional linkages in the age of

new interregionalism. Given the number and variety of actors involved, however, new

interregionalism reflects the problem of actorness even more than did old

interregionalism which was largely based on regional organisations as “regional actors”.

If actorness is defined as “a measure of the autonomous unit’s capacity to behave actively

and deliberately in relation to other actors in the international system” (Sjöstedt 1977:

16), then new interregionalism with its variety of forms and “regional actors” provides a

considerable challenge to our understanding of actors and actorness in international

relations.

Traditional (“realist”) approaches to International Relations (IR) have focused almost

exclusively upon the role of states as actors. In international law, too, states remain pre-

eminent subjects and hence primary actors. However, pluralist (“liberal”) approaches to

IR have led to a broadening of the scope of analysis to include a range of non-state actors

such as international organisations. While the scheme developed by Keohane and Nye

(1973: 380) which distinguishes between governmental, intergovernmental and non-

governmental actors still has many wide ranging uses as a tool of categorisation, it does

not – or no longer – grasp the full variety of actors in international relations.

Intergovernmental organisations have been supplemented by supranational organisations

or hybrid intergovernmental-supranational entities such as the EU as well as by

international institutions below formal organisations but still exhibiting some – albeit

very modest – capacity to act. In addition to that, nongovernmental organisations now

cover a broad range of transnational actors and are supplemented by other non-

governmental actors such as transnational companies and non-state armed actors

including guerrillas, criminal and terrorist groups (Willetts 2005). Regions, however, are

not seen as actors unless the former are represented by formal regional organisations.

5 The EC represented the most advanced model of a “group” or a regional organisation, whereas the partner

“groups” ranged from regional associations deliberately organized to play an international role (e.g.

ASEAN, the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC]) to rather “imagined” groups, which were loosely tied

together often for the sole purpose of dealing with the EC [e.g. ACP group] (Regelsberger 1990: 14).


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This pluralist yet narrow understanding of international actors ignores to a great extent

the existence and the role of actorness in the expanding network of new interregionalism.

As Schmitter and Malamud (2007) note, interregional relations tend to differ from

conventional international rerlations in respect to the nature of actors “which cannot be

taken for granted”; consequently, “their very existence becomes a problematic issue” (4).

Social constructivist approaches to IR offer a way out of this analytical dilemma and have

proven useful to attempts to conceptualize actorness of “new” international actors such as

the EU. That constructivists see structure and agency as mutually constitutive is key to

this. Thus, intersubjective systemic structures provide distinct patterns of opportunity and

constraint for actors to act whereas actors’ actions have consequences, both intended and

unintended, for structures. Within this cyclical process of construction and

reconstruction, according to Bretherton and Vogler (1999: 29), only actors have causal

powers although actorness – or the capacity to act – is a function both of external

opportunities and internal capabilities. Consequently, actorness is largely context-specific

and may change over time and across issue area.

The perception of international actors as being socially constructed enables us to grasp

the full variety of international actors and, in particular, to address the nature of actorness

in interregionalism which, according to Söderbaum and Van Langenhove (2005), in the

most general sense, “signifies the condition or process whereby two regions interact as

regions“ (257). The purpose of this paper is not to theorise on interregional relations but

rather to categorize the bewildering variety of interregional relations drawing on the

concept of actorness which essentially is still at the pre-theoretical stage. In other words,

the paper’s aim is not to explain but rather to define actorness in order to make it useful

for the theroetical analysis of interregionalism. The paper begins with a review of the

actorness concept, a concept that has primarily been developed to explain the

development of the EU as an international actor sui generis. Given this focus on the EU,

however, actorness in regions other than Europe have proven harder to fit within this

framework. For that reason, actorness is defined here in a more generic way reflecting a

social constructivist understanding of agency. In its empirical part, the paper will use the

review of external relations of regional organisations as a point of departure for


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addressing, in the next section, the full picture of interregionalism as relations between

“regional actors”. It concludes that interregionalism, new interregionalism in particular,

requires an understanding of actorness that acknowledges the capacity of regions to act as

regions in their relations with other regions even if they are not constituted as formal

regional organisations.

2. ACTORNESS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

“The term actor is used abundantly in innumerable studies concerning international

relations, but it is rarely defined” (Sjöstedt 1977: 5). Gunnar Sjöstedt made this

observation in the introduction to his landmark theory of actor capability in 1977 and

thirty years later the remark appears to have lost little of its validity. The concept of

actorness has suffered from a certain theoretical underdevelopment despite its intuitive

appeal in an era of ever increasing international relations. Sjöstedt defines an

international actor as an entitiy which has autonomy, which is based on two basic

conditions – that it is “discernible from its environment” and that it enjoys a “minimal

degree of internal cohesion” (15). However, autonomy is a necessary, but not a sufficient,

requirement for actorness. Apart from authonomy, an international actors needs to

possess the structural prerquisities for actor capability – “a measure of the autonomous

unit’s capacity to behave actively and deliberately in relation to other actors in the

international system” (16). Structural prerequisites for actor behaviour include

elementary qualities such as the ability to set goals and achieve them; decision-making

and monitoring facilities; and, means of performing actions. Sjöstedt’s analysis was

designed to explain the external role of the European Community however his model was

also designed to inform on the role of international actors in general. The end of the Cold

War, the development of the EU and the growing importance of regional actors typified

in the phenomenon of new regionalism brought these questions to the fore once more.

Allen and Smith (1990) in one of earlier and more influential accounts of the nature of

actorness, conceptualised the role of an actor as “presence” to explain the emerging


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influence of the EC as a non-state institution given the inadequacy of existing theories of

state-based actors. Presence in its original permutation thus referred to the active role that

the early EC could take in certain issue areas and the consequent influence of this action

on the expectations and actions of other actors; it was thus differential across policy

areas. Presence in this first guise is thus, in the main, a similar concept to Hill’s

subjective expectations or to presence as Bretherton and Vogler later use the term. Some

years later Allen and Smith (1998) revisited their concept to develop it further and adapt

it to the context of the post-Cold War and an evolving EU. In this guise, they felt that a

dimension of purpose was missing from the original conception of presence. In view of

developing an explanation of such purpose they developed the twin notions of “makings

one’s presence felt” and “taking responsibility”. Under the banner of “making one’s

presence felt”, a series of questions are generated about the institutional effectiveness of

an actor and thus the capacity to act becomes an important conceptual driver. It is broken

down into three modes: (1) learning capacity understood as the ability to adapt on the

basis of information in the short or long term; (2) carrying capacity as the ability to

generate coherent decisions across different areas even under difficult conditions; and (3),

mobilisation capacity in reference to the deployment of appropriate resources as needed.

Further to the idea of capacity, the notion of “taking responsibility” is also developed in

so far as it refers to issues of leadership which in turn pose the question of (1) credibility,

(2) legitimacy and (3) reliability; there is also a proactive connotation, which implies a

certain collective will to be enacted (47, 54-8).

Jupille and Caporaso (1998) pick up where Allen and Smith left off in an effort to

problematise and develop the analytical aspects of actorness beyond the account of

presence previously offered. Rejecting both the view of the EU as a system of sovereign

states whose interests converge and are institutionalised, as well as that of the EU as a

newly born post-state polity, they instead see the EU as a still evolving post-modern

polity, neither completely intergovernmental nor supranational, with varying qualities of

actorness across time and policy areas. Taking a more overtly generalisable approach to

an analysis of the actorness of non-state entities in the international system, they stipulate

that criteria for assessing actorness need to be “observable, continuously variable, and


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abstract from any institutional structure” (214), thus they identify four analytically useful

criteria of actorness: recognition, authority, autonomy, and cohesion. Recognition is a

quasi-legal concept referring to external recognition by third parties of an either de jure

or de facto kind; it is the minimum criteria for identifying an entity as an actor and a unit

of analysis. It is cumulative, based on the acceptance and expectations of interlocutors in

a process of socially constructed identity. This allows a certain analytical flexibility in

tracing the transformation of an actor on the international stage as it provides both for the

progressive making and un-making of actors and identities (215-6). Related to this is the

second quality of authority which refers to the legal competence of an actor vested in the

powers, which have been delegated to it, in the case of the EU, by nation states (216-7).

Autonomy is at a minimum, distinctiveness from other actors and especially states, and in

its maximal connotation implied independence. Distinctiveness in this context refers

explicitly to institutional separateness and the ability to affect expectations, despite a

certain degree of cross-over with domestic institutions; in a certain sense, autonomy

refers to the potential for causal significance if not actual causal affectivity. The ability to

set goals and make decisions as a matter of autonomy is also included under this concept

(217-8).6 This has the effect of making the definition rather maximal as to cross the

threshold into actorness, an entity must not only be capable of making cohesive and

coherent decisions but also possess the latitude of action to make them. This stands in

contrast to other definitions which make these qualities into either-or elements, thus it

may be possible for an entity to possess a degree of autonomy but this need not

necessarily entail a decision-making mechanism with the same degree of robustness. In

order to differentiate between the difference that the EU makes by its mere existence and

that which it aims to make, Jupille and Caporaso develop a four-pronged concept of

cohesiveness covering the cohesion of (1) values or goals, (2) procedures, (3) tactics and

(4) output. In this aspect, they differ from Bretherton and Vogler for example, who make

shared values a basic element of their definition; Jupille and Caporaso consider that

6 This is a point of difference in this definition compared with others, since autonomy is sometimes set out

as a separate, fundamental element necessary to any analysis of actorness (Sjöstedt 1977, for example),

while decision-making and policy cohesiveness is often included within the qualities of actor capability

(Bretherton and Vogler 1999; Hill 1993).


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“substantive agreement on values and goals” is too maximal a concept to be useful in this

context since it implies such a rare coincidence of interests (218-20).

Among the most theoretically comprehensive contributions to the study of “actorness”,

was the explanation of the European Union’s growing influence by Bretherton and

Vogler (1999). Bretherton and Vogler consider that in the search to assign roles to the

EU, theorists have tended to conflate the capacity to act with the qualities of a state,

which in turn overdetermines the definition of actorness and reduces it to the behavioural

components of stateness (32). Thus Sjöstedt’s complex schema of actor capability is in

general too behavioural for their tastes, yet their emphasis on the intersubjective

construction of structures which determine opportunities for external action through the

perceptions of external actors has led them to place more weight on the variable of

capacity for external action than Sjöstedt did. Their account revolves around the three key

axes of presence, opportunity, and capability. Presence describes the nexus that exists

between internal developments and their effect on external perceptions and expectations

of an actor, in this case the EU. Accordingly, presence is a precondition for actorness

and, in consequence, presence denotes latent actorness (33). Opportunity refers to factors

in the external environment which enable or constrain purposive action; it is defined as

the interaction between events and the ideological climate which combine to influence

policy. Capability is the concept at the centre of this definition of actorness as it is broken

down into five constituent components which form the key requirements for actorness.

These are (1) a shared commitment to a set of overarching values and principles; (2) the

ability to identify policy priorities and to formulate consistent and coherent policies; (3)

the ability to negotiate effectively with third parties; (4) access to policy instruments; and

finally, (5) legitimate decision-making processes (37-42).

Hill (1993/1998) approaches the same questions of actor capability but from a novel

perspective by positing a capabilities-expectations gap. In this way he is obliged to

present a theory of what constitutes the EU’s actorness but is more usefully able to

respond to the question of why the EU has not become a stronger actor. His goal is to

conceptualise the internal and external factors which influence the EU, its agency and


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structure, and finally how it is socially constructed; thus although Hill’s theory does not

recycle the jargon of actorness developed by other authors, it certainly aims to explain the

nature of this non-state entity in the international system. Finally, Hill deploys the twin

concepts of expectations and capabilities to conceptualise a gap which may exist between

what an actor can accomplish and what may be expected. Capabilities, for Hill, include

the regular instruments of foreign policy (military, diplomatic, economic etc.) but also the

wide range of resources that underwrites them such as population, human resources,

wealth etc. To these attributes is added the capacity to take decisions in a collective way

which will thus be comprehensively implemented. These qualities can be possessed in

varying degrees and can also vary over time. The other half of the equation is the

expectations of constituents both internal and external to the entity itself, in Hill’s

example the EU. Such expectations can run the gamut of possible demands which may be

made on an actor, from moral to political to economic, from action to inaction. Like

capabilities, expectations are variable across time and issue area as well as constituency

(1998: 23).

Ultimately, the struggle to define actorness takes place against the conceptual template of

the EU as an international actor sui generis. In consequence, if applied to other world

regions, the concept of actorness risks to overlook “regional actors” in interregional

relations because these actors are not visible if the criteria proposed by the scholars

studying EU actorness are applied. Only very few attempts have been made to date to

apply the actorness concept to actors in non-European regions. Among them Doidge’s

(2004) study on ASEAN-EU interregionalism stands out, however, this draws heavily

upon Sjoestedt (1977) and other EU-focused studies to develop a framework of analysis.

Accordingly, actorness has three main components: action triggers (goals, interests,

principles); policy structures and processes which involves the capacity to take decisions

in relation to action triggers; and performance structures which includes all those

structures and resources necessary for actual performance of a given task once the

decision has been taken (51). For Doidge, only regional intergovernmental or

supranational organisations qualify as “regional actors” (61), leaving out of analytical

reach all those regional entities which engage in region-to-region relations without


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having achieved the degree of actorness of a regional organisation – be it weak (as in the

case of ASEAN) or rather developed (as in the case of the EU). However, the surge in

interregionalism suggests that numerous regional actors are “out there” even if they do

not qualify according to the actorness criteria develped in exisiting body of scholarly

work on the subject matter.

For that reason, actorness is defined here in a more generic way reflecting a social

constructivist understanding of agency. As a point of departure, and in concordance with

most authoritative works on actorness, “presence” is considered as a necessary but not

sufficient precondition for actorness (Allen and Smith 1990/1998; Bretherton and Vogler

1999). Following Bretherton and Vogler’s key statement that, “[to] a significant extent,

actorness is constructed through the interplay of internal political factors and the

perceptions of outsiders” (1999: 1), in this paper actorness is understood as being

characterized by an internal dimension (determining agency) and an external dimension

(reflecting the structure). Accordingly, the internal dimension addresses the question how

an actor constructs itself vis-à-vis the world, and the external dimension whether and how

the world in turn constructs a given actor, for example, by way of recognition.7 Actorness

links the two dimensions in the sense as it describes the external dimension of common

action by a region – in our study, the region’s external relations as a region with other

regions. Such “inter-regional” relations reflect both, the internal capacity of the regions

involved to act collectively (even if this only reflects the lowest common denominator

among the member states) and the external recognition of the regions as interregional

(and thus international) actors.

3. EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND BEYOND

As interregionalism refers to structured interactions between regions, it may help to look

at what type of “regional actors” represent regions in interregional relations and to

7 For a similar definition drawing on Bretherton and Vogler (1999) see Larsen (2002).


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classify interregional relations according to the types of “regional actors” involved. Given

the history of interregionalism, it makes sense to use the external relations of regional

organisations as a point of departure because the latter are the major actors

institutionalising relations between regions. Regional organisations – understood here as

intergovernmental (and, as appropriate, supranational) organisations – exhibit two basic

forms of external relations: relations with third states and those with other regional

organisations. In addition to these two categories, regional organisations are also, either

directly as a group or indirectly by way of some or all or of their member states, involved

in interregional mechanisms of a wider and more diffuse nature, which are closely

associated with the phenomenon of new interregionalism and are often referred to as

transregional arrangements (Rüland 1999a, 2001b, 2002a; Köllner 2000; Yeo 2000;

Gilson 2002). Thus, from an interregional perspective, three forms of external relations of

regional organisations may be discerned:

• relations with regional organisations in other regions;

• relations with third states in other regions;

• direct or indirect involvement in other interregional mechanisms.

As Table 1 shows, the EU and ASEAN have developed the most impressive networks of

relations with other regional organisations and third states in other regions. Both of them

are, either directly or indirectly, involved in most of the interregional mechanisms of a

wider and more diffuse nature, too. In other words, ASEAN and the EU are the major

actors and often the shaping factors of all three forms of external relations of regional

organisations. In this context it may not come as a complete surprise that the long-

standing ASEAN-EU relationship is widely considered as the model of interregional

relations - despite the fact that this relationship has come under heavy pressure in the

1990s and is still awaiting a successful reinvigoration (Rüland 2001a). Apart from the EU

and ASEAN, regional organisations in Latin America – namely the Andean Community

(CAN), Mercado Comun del Sur (MERCOSUR) and the overarching Rio Group –

embarked on the development of a network of external relations. In most cases, this


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process started by way of a partnership with the EC/EU and/or ASEAN, which both still

seem to be the most attractive dialogue partners for other regional organisations or third

states in other regions – hence their role as nodal points in the evolving web of

interregionalism.

The interregional network of the leading proponent of old interregionalism, the EC, has

its roots in the early 1970s and developed steadily until the end of the 1980s. Throughout

this period, there was an emphasis on relationships with other groups of states, and this

reflects the Community’s traditional “group-to-group” approach (Edwards/Regelsberger

1990). In the 1990s, the EU’s interregional network expanded principally through the

establishment of relations with third states and participation in other interregional

mechanisms. ASEAN’s external relations during the period of old interregionalism were

limited to a number of dialogue partnerships with third states. At the time, ASEAN was

involved in only one group-to-group relationship – that which was established with the

EC. This changed with the emergence of new interregionalism: In the 1990s, ASEAN’s

interregional network mainly grew through the establishment of group-to-group

relationships and participation in other interregional mechanisms.

Almost all other regional organisations were latecomers in the sense that they only began

to engage in interregional activities within the context of new interregionalism – using

the full range of relationships: relations with third states and with other groups as well as

participation in other interregional mechanisms. Despite the emergence of new actors

engaging in interregional networking, the EU and ASEAN remained the leading actors of

new interregionalism. What distinguishes the EU from other regional organisations is the

fact that its interregional relationships exhibit a much higher level of institutionalisation

than those initiated by ASEAN and its kind. This is characteristic of the rather high level

of regional integration and thus actorness achieved by the EU, which is unmatched by

any other regional organisation.

What conclusions can be drawn from this preliminary empirical stocktaking with a view

to developing a typology of interregionalism? First, regional organisations’ external


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relations with counterparts in other regions – so-called “group-to-group”-relations –

constitute the “ideal type” of interregional relations – or “pure interregionalism” (Faust

2006: 155), which originates in old interregionalism, but continues to be a basic feature

of new interregionalism. Secondly, regional organisations’ external relations with third

states in other regions are to be considered as a borderline case of interregionalism. The

examples mentioned earlier, namely ASEAN’s dialogue partnerships with its major

trading and security partners were hardly reflective of any interregionalist rationale.8

However, such relationships began to spread beyond ASEAN’s specific practice of

external relations – “dialogue partnerships” – during the course of the 1990s under the

conditions of new interregionalism. Thirdly, regional organisations have often been the

major proponents, or at least components, of other interregional mechanisms, which in

most cases, are associated with the emergence of new interregionalism. This category

exhibits a wide array of types and forms, some of them being structured in a similar way

to relations between two regional organisations, and others coming closer to regionalism

rather than interregionalism. Consequently, this category needs to be further

differentiated.

Table 1: External Relations of Regional Organisations [TO BE UPDATED] Regional organization

Relations with third states Relations with other groups Involvement in other inter-regional mechanisms*

ASEAN ASEAN-Japan (1973) ASEAN-Australia (1974) ASEAN-New Zealand (1975)ASEAN-USA (1977) ASEAN-Canada (1977) ASEAN-South Korea (1991)ASEAN-China (1991/96) ASEAN-Russia (1991/96) ASEAN-India (1993/95) ASEAN-Pakistan (1997)

ASEAN-EU (1972/78/80) ASEAN/AFTA-CER (1995) ASEAN-ECO (1995) ASEAN-EFTA (1996) ASEAN-MERCOSUR (1996) ASEAN-SADC (1996) ASEAN-CAN (2000) ASEAN-GCC ASEAN-Rio Group ASEAN-SAARC

ASEM (1996) APEC (1989) ARF (1993) FEALAC (2001) IOR-ARC (1997)

8 Starting in the 1970s, ASEAN established a system of structured dialogues with its major economic

partners in the developed world. The system was institutionalised in 1979 through the annual Post

Ministerial Conferences (PMC), which were (and still are) held after the annual ASEAN Ministerial

Meeting (AMM).


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CAN CAN-EU (1980/83/92/96) CAN-SICA (1997) CAN-MERCOSUR (1998) CAN-APEC (1999) CAN-CARICOM (1999) CAN-ASEAN (2000)

EU-LAC (1996) Summit of the Americas (1994)

CARICOM CARICOM-Japan (1995) CER

CER-ASEAN/AFTA (1995) CER-MERCOSUR (1999)

APEC (1989) FEALAC (2001)

COE COE-Canada (1996) COE-Japan (1996) COE-USA (1996) COE-Mexico (1999)

ECOWAS

ECOWAS-EU (2000) ECOWAS-MERCOSUR (2001)

Africa-Europe (2000) EU-ACP (1975)

EU EU-Canada (1976/90/96) EU-China (1978/85/98) EU-USA (1991/95/98) EU-Japan (1991) EU-Chile (1996) EU-South Korea (1996) EU-Mexico (1997/2000) EU-India (2000) EU-Indonesia (2000)

EU-ASEAN (1972/78/80) EU-CAN (1980/83/92/96) EU-SICA, San José Dialogue (1983/96) EU-SADC (1986) EU-Rio Group (1987) EU-GCC (1988) EU-MERCOSUR+2 (1992/95/98) EU-SAARC (1994/96) EU-ECOWAS (2000)

EU-ACP (1975) ARF (1993) Euromed (1995) ASEM (1996) EU-LAC (1999) Africa-Europe (2000)

EFTA EFTA-Canada (1998) EFTA-Mexico (1999) EFTA-South Africa (1999)

EFTA-ASEAN (1996) EFTA-GCC (2000) EFTA-MERCOSUR (2000)

GCC

GCC-EU (1988) GCC-EFTA (2000) GCC-ASEAN GCC-Rio Group

IOR-ARC (1997)

MERCOSUR MERCOSUR-USA (1991) MERCOSUR-Canada (1998)

MERCOSUR-EU (1995) MERCOSUR-ASEAN (1996) MERCOSUR-CAN (1998) MERCOSUR-CER (1999) MERCOSUR-ECOWAS (2001)

EU-LAC (1999) Summit of the Americas (1994) FEALC (1999/2001)

OSCE OSCE-Japan (1992) OSCE-South Korea (1994) OSCE-Thailand (2000)

SAARC SAARC-EU (1994/96) SAARC-ASEAN

[ARF (1993)] IOR-ARC (1997)

SADC SADC-ASEAN (1996) SADC-EU

IOR-ARC (1997) Africa-Europe Summit (2000)

Rio Group** Rio Group-China (1990) Rio Group-Canada Rio Group-Japan Rio Group-Russia

Rio Group-EU (1987) Rio Group-ASEAN Rio Group-GCC

APEC (1989) EU-LAC (1999) FEALAC (1999/2001)

* Either as a group or through all or some of its member states ** Special case: A regional group rather than a regional organization, yet possesses its own external relations


16

Indeed, the context of new interregionalism, a number of interregional mechanisms came

into being which were based on regional actors other than regional organisations. From

an actorness perspective, three different types of such relationships can be discerned:

• relationships between a regional organisation (represented as such and/or by its

member states) and a more or less coordinated group of states in another world region

(e.g. ASEM);

• relationships between two more or less coordinated groups of states in two different

regions which may encompass two or more subregions (e.g. Forum for East Asia

Latin America Cooperation [FEALAC]); and,

• relationships among states, groups of states and regional organisations from two or

more regions and subregions (e.g. APEC).

One basic difference exists between the former two categories and the latter one: The

former two are characterized by the fact that, despite recurrent and often vast differences

in terms of institutionalization, two groups of states represent two different regions. In

most cases, regional groups may take a variety of forms such as “Asia” (initially

composed of seven ASEAN member states and their three Northeast Asian dialogue

partners) in ASEM, “Latin America” (composed of the member states of the Rio Group

and the Caribbean Community) in EU-Latin America Cooperation (EU-LAC), or

“Africa” (composed of the member states of the former Organisation of African Union

[OAU] plus Morocco) at the Cairo summit. These groups constitute regions, which are,

indeed, “socially constructed and, hence, politically contested” (Katzenstein 1996: 133).

In contrast to regional organisations, these groups have in essence been formed for the

sole purpose of engaging in a specific interregional relationship. They may, however,

develop a life of their own beyond the relevant interregional relationship. A good point in

case is the East Asian regional entity, initially known as “Asia-10,” which had been

“constructed” in the context of ASEM but was later on used as a stepping stone for East

Asian regionalism in the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) format – a phenomenon, which could


17

be called “regionalism through interregionalism” (Hänggi 1998; 2003; Gilson 2002). The

emergence of such regional entities for the sole purpose of interregional interaction may,

to a large extent, be explained by the sharp asymmetry in terms of actorness in all those

cases where the EU is a counterpart of a regional group of states. In face of the well

established coordination machinery of the EU, the states from the partner regions are

almost forced to engage in some sort of regional coordination in order to deal with the

EU and its member states. However, in the case of FEALAC, two loose regional groups

were formed for interregional interaction even without such pressure emanating from a

much stronger regional actor such as the EU.

The latter category – relationships among states, groups of states, and regional

organisations from two or more regions and subregions – differs from the two other ones

in so far as the member states are not grouped together in two entities, each representing

one of the two core region, but constitute component parts of an overarching entity

encompassing states from two or more regions and subregions. APEC is a good point in

case: It includes, amongst others, all or almost all member states of the North American

Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Relations

Agreement (CER), ASEAN, and “Asia-10,” thereby providing some sort of an

interregional link between North America and the Asia-Pacific. The (sub-)regional

entities just mentioned do, however, not interact as cohesive groups within APEC; there

are no region-based coordination mechanisms as in ASEM or FEALAC. APEC was

conceptualized as a regional endeavour rather than an interregional one but, at the same

time, it triggered off the process of new interregionalism within the Triad (Hänggi 1999;

2003). This makes it rather difficult to conceive APEC and its kind as interregional

endeavours, and helps to explain the search for alternative terms and concepts such as

“megaregionalism” (Yamamoto 1996), “transregionalism” (Aggarwal 1998a; Rüland

1999a), “transcontinentalism” (Roloff 2001), “inter-continentalism” (Hilpold 1996) or

“pan-regionalism” (Gilson 2002a: 97, 177). Thus, relationships among states, groups of

states, and regional organisations from two or more regions have to be considered as

borderline cases of interregionalism – in the same way as regional organisations’ external

relations with third states in other regions.


18

4. INTERREGIONALISM AS RELATIONS BETWEEN “REGIONAL ACTORS”

Against this background, a typology of interregionalism can be set up, which covers the

broad spectrum of all9 empirical cases of institutionalised interregional relations (to be

precise: all those international relationships which are, in one way or another, labelled by

scholars and policy-makers as “interregional”). As the initial step, the subject matter is

approached from the two ends of the spectrum – from the borderline cases, which may be

considered as interregional or not depending on the specific context. Accordingly,

regional organisations’ external relations with third states in other regions and

relationships among states, groups of states and regional organisations from two or more

regions are viewed as interregional relations in the wider sense, whereas all types and

forms of interregionalism that fall in-between are considered as interregional relations in

the narrower sense (see Table 2). This definition of interregional relationships takes into

account the broad context of new interregionalism as well as the wide use of the term in

policy and academic discourses. Indeed, two out of three basic relationships within the

Triad fall into the category of borderline cases: despite their importance in the

interregional network, neither APEC nor EU-U.S. relations would pass for interregional

if the term were solely applied in its narrower sense.

At the “lower” end of the spectrum, we find relations between regional organisations and

third states in other regions as borderline cases of interregionalism – or: interregional

relations in the wider sense. These relationships may serve as a substitute for group-to-

group relations because one of the two participating regions is void of a regional

organisation or a regional group of states that is able to act as a counterpart – in other

words: that lack actorness as understood here. This holds particularly true for

relationships where regions and subregions are involved, which are dominated by great

powers such as North America, Northeast Asia, and South Asia. Given the fact that these 9 As this paper represents work in progress, "all" has to be understood in relative terms, i.e. all

institutionalised interregional relationships that the author was able to track down and to find sufficient

information about, based on an extensive web-based research.


19

relationships constitute an essential component part of relations between two regions,

they may be called quasi-interregional: they play a similar role as interregional relations

in the narrower sense.

Table 2: Regional Actors in Interregional Relations Type Regional actor A Regional actor B Form of interregionalism 1 Regional organisation Third country Quasi-interregional

relations 2

Regional organisation Regional organisation

3

Regional organisation Regional group

4 Regional group Regional group

Interregional relations (in the narrower sense)

5

Group of states from more than two core regions Megaregional relations

Interregional relations (in the wider sense)

At the “upper” end of the spectrum, we find relationships among states, groups of states,

and regional organisations from two or more regions as borderline cases - or again:

interregional relations in the wider sense. These relationships may have been formed as

“regional” arrangements encompassing two or more component (sub-)regions from

different continents; they nevertheless serve de facto as overarching links between at least

two (sub-)regions. This holds particularly true for the transpacific APEC forum, which,

though initially conceived as a Western Pacific grouping in response to the emerging free

trade arrangement in North America, built a transpacific bridge between East

Asia/Australasia and North America, which was later expanded to connect additional

Pacific Rim countries. Given the fact that institutions such as APEC play an interregional

role regardless of their conception as regional arrangements of a higher order, they may

be called megaregional: they constitute very large regions, or megaregions linking two or

more component regions.

Interregional relations in the narrow sense, which fall in-between the two above-

mentioned categories, refer to relationships between two more or less coordinated groups

from different regions. As previously mentioned, these groups may exhibit degrees of

institutionalization which differ greatly given the variety of actors involved: ranging from


20

highly integrated regional organisations such as the EU, to poorly institutionalised

regional organisations such as ASEAN, down to loosely tied groups of states, which may

have only been “constructed” for specific interregional interaction. Three types can be

discerned:

• Relationships between two regional organisations. Such relationships link two regions

represented exclusively by the member states of two regional organisations. They are

the paradigm of old interregionalism and still represent the most widespread form of

new interregionalism.

• Relationships between a regional organisation and a regional group of states. Such

relationships link two regions through two very different types of actors: a regional

organisation on the one hand, and the more or less coordinated group of states on the

other. 10

• Relationships between two regional groups of states. Such relationships link two

regions through two loosely tied groups of states, which each represent a region at

least in the context of a specific interregional relationship. The regions represented

may be “constructed” or even “imagined” (Holland 2006), and the groups of states

are formed, initially at least, for the sole purpose of specific interregional interaction.

In sum, interregionalism in the narrower sense recognises two types of “regional actors”

– regional organisations and regional groups of states – whereas interregionalism in the

broader sense also includes key states of a region and “imagined” regional entities in the

framework of a broader – megaregional -arrangement.

The typology developed above allows us to embark on an empirical stocktaking of

interregionalism, which is defined as institutionalised relations between international

regions. The results presented in the following section are unavoidably far from

10 The regional organisation may be represented in a given interregional arrangement in its own right or by

some or all of its member states. This holds particularly true for the representation of the EU in

interregional arrangements such as ASEM, EU-LAC and the Cairo summit process.


21

complete. Interregionalism is still undergoing rapid growth, and each round of new

research generates new types and forms. Moreover, every typology creates its own

difficulties by reducing the complexity of the “real world.” Consequently, a number of

classifications may be contested on the basis of deeper analysis. Moreover, the adoption

of a broad definition of interregionalism, which allows for borderline cases to be

accommodated, makes establishing delimitations even more difficult.11 Notwithstanding

this, the typology proposed above generates a number of insights, which may facilitate

comparative research on interregionalism.

As previously stated, the earlier examples of relationships between regional organisations

and third states in other regions hardly reflected any interregional rationale. This

particularly applies to ASEAN’s early dialogue partnership system. That said, during the

course of the 1990s, relationships between regional organisations and third states in other

regions rapidly increased in number and became an important feature of new

interregionalism (see Table 3). This development was led by the EU and ASEAN, which

both already had a tradition of external relations with third states. Yet, other regional

organisations also began to establish similar relationships, and this was particularly true

of organisations in Europe such as the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), the

Council of Europe and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

Among the partner states of regional organisations figure sizeable powers (of varying

strengths) in the Triad regions: the United States, Canada, and Mexico in North America;

China, Japan, and South Korea in East Asia. Relations between the EU and United States

constitute the fundamental triadic link between North America and Europe, whereas the

EU’s relations with China and Japan are important elements of the triadic link between

Europe and (East) Asia.

11 There are a number of international institutions, which include states and groups of states from different

regions but are not considered as “interregional” relationships in this paper. This applies to groupings based

on a specific functional as opposed to (inter-)regional rationale such as the Agency of Francophone

Countries, the Commonwealth, the Franco-African summit, the Iberian American summit, etc.


22

Table 3: Quasi-Interregional Relations (Type 1) [TO BE UPDATED] Year of inception

Regional Organization

Third Country*

Regions covered Framework

1973 ASEAN Japan SEA – NEA ASEAN Dialogue Partnership 1974 ASEAN Australia SEA – Australasia ASEAN Dialogue Partnership 1975 ASEAN New Zealand SEA – Australasia ASEAN Dialogue Partnership 1976/90/96 EU Canada Europe – North America EU’s Bilateral External Relations 1977 ASEAN USA SEA – North America ASEAN Dialogue Partnership 1977 ASEAN Canada SEA – North America ASEAN Dialogue Partnership 1978/85/98 EU China Europe – NEA EU’s Bilateral External Relations 1990 Rio Group China Latin America – NEAa Rio Group Dialogue Relationship 1991/95/98 EU USA Europe – North America EU’s Bilateral External Relations 1991 EU Japan Europe – NEA EU’s Bilateral External Relations 1991 ASEAN South Korea SEA – NEA ASEAN Dialogue Partnership 1991/96 ASEAN China SEA – NEA ASEAN Dialogue Partnership 1991/96 ASEAN Russia SEA – “Eurasia” ASEAN Dialogue Partnership 1992 OSCE Japan Euro-Atlantic – NEA OSCE Partner for Cooperation 1993/95 ASEAN India SEA – South Asia ASEAN Dialogue Partnership 1994 OSCE South Korea Euro-Atlantic – NEA OSCE Partner for Cooperation 1995 CARICOM Japan Caribbean – NEA Japan-CARICOM Cooperation 1996 COE Canada Europe – North America COE Observers 1996 COE Japan Europe – NEA COE Observers 1996 COE USA Europe – North America COE Observers 1996 EU Chile Europe – Latin America EU’s Bilateral External Relations 1996 (1989) EU South Korea Europe – NEA EU’s Bilateral External Relations 1997/2000 EU Mexico Europe – Latin America EU’s Bilateral External Relations 1997 ASEAN Pakistan SEA – South Asia Sectoral Dialogue Partnership 1998 EFTA Canada Europe – North America EFTA Third Country Relations 1998 EFTA Canada Europe – North America EFTA Third Country Relations 1998 MERCOSUR Canada South – North America 1999 EFTA South Africa Europe – Africa EFTA Third Country Relations 1999 COE Mexico Europe – North America COE Observers 2000 (1988) EU India Europe – South Asia EU’s Bilateral External Relations 2000 EU Indonesia Europe – SEA EU’s Bilateral External Relations 2000 OSCE Thailand Euro-Atlantic – SEA OSCE Partner for Cooperation n.a. Rio Group* Canada Latin / North America Rio Group Dialogue Relationship n.a. Rio Group* Japan Latin America – NEA Rio Group Dialogue Relationship n.a. Rio Group* Japan Latin America – NEA Rio Group Dialogue Relationship n.a. Pacific Island

Forum Canada, China, France, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines, South Korea, United Kingdom, USA

Pacific Island Forum Dialogue Partnership

* Special case of a regional group which possesses its own external relations (e.g. Rio Group) The EU and ASEAN again transpire to be the leaders in numbers when it comes to

relationships between regional organisations (see Table 4). The former has been the

pacemaker of such relationships in the times of old interregionalism by means of its

longstanding “group-to-group” dialogue approach (Edwards/Regelsberger 1990) and

continued to be the privileged partner of all those regional organisations, which


23

developed such relationships during the course of the 1990s. In quantitative terms,

ASEAN has established itself as the second “hub” after the EU in the network of

relations between regional organisations. In qualitative terms however, the EU still

dominates the “hub” because the “spokes” linked to that “hub” are more institutionalised

than others; they always include a political element such as dialogue on human rights and

democracy and are often based on framework cooperation agreements.

Table 4: Relations between Two Regional Organisations (Type 2) [TO BE UPDATED] Year of inception

Regional Organization Regional Organization Regions covered

1978/80 EU (25) ASEAN (10) Europe – Southeast Asia 1980/83/92/96 EU (25) CAN (5) Europe – Latin (South) America 1983/96 EU (25) SICA (7) Europe – Latin (Central) America 1986 EU (25) SADC (13) Europe – (Southern) Africa 1987 EU (25) Rio Group* (19) Europe – Latin America 1988 EU (25) GCC (7) Europe – Middle East 1992/95/98 EU (25) MERCOSUR (4) + 2 Europe – Latin (South) America 1994 EU (25) SAARC (7) Europe – South Asia 1995 ASEAN/AFTA (10) CER (2) Southeast Asia – Australasia 1995 ASEAN (10) ECO (10) Southeast Asia – Middle East 1996 ASEAN (10) EFTA (4) Southeast Asia – Europe 1996 ASEAN (10) MERCOSUR (4) Southeast Asia – Latin (South) America 1996 ASEAN (10) SADC (13) Southeast Asia – (Southern) Africa 1997 CAN (5) SICA (7) South America – Central America 1998 CAN (5) MERCOSUR (4) South America – South America 1999 CAN (5) CARICOM (15) South America – Caribbean 1999 CER (2) MERCOSUR (4) Australasia – Latin (South) America 2000 ASEAN (10) CAN (5) Southeast Asia – Latin (South) America 2000 EFTA (4) GCC (7) Europe – Middle East 2000 EFTA (4) MERCOSUR (4) Europe – Latin (South) America 2000 EU (25) ECOWAS (15) Europe – (Western) Africa 2001 ECOWAS (15) MERCOSUR (4) Europe – Latin (South) America n.a. EU (25) Pacific Island Forum* (16) Europe – Australasia n.a. ASEAN (10) GCC (7) Southeast Asia – Middle East n.a. ASEAN (10) SAARC (7) Southeast Asia – South Asia n.a. ASEAN (10) Rio Group* (19) Southeast Asia – Latin America n.a. GCC (7) Rio Group* (19) Middle East – Latin America () indicates number of member states * Special case: A regional group rather than a regional organization, yet possesses its own external relations It is worth noting that the two “hubs” –EU and ASEAN – are also important building

blocs of relations among Triad regions: the EU almost exclusively represents “Europe” in

its relations with East Asia and the United States, whereas ASEAN has been a driving


24

force in the establishment of ASEM and plays a prominent role in the structure of APEC.

Though relationships between regional organisations have been the most widespread type

in the period of old interregionalism, they are also an important feature of new

interregionalism.

Table 5: Relations between a Regional Organisation and a Regional Group (Type 3) [TO BE UPDATED] Year of inception

Inter-regional Arrangement

Regional Organization

Regional Group Regions covered

Characteristics

1975 EU-ACP EU (25) ACP* (79) = 48 African, 16 Caribbean and 15 Pacific countries

Europe Africa, Latin America, Australasia

Component regional organizations: ECOWAS, SADC, CARICOM, Pacific Island Forum Component inter-regional linkages: EU-ECOWAS, EU-SADC, EU-Pacific Island Forum

1996 ASEM EU (25) "ASEM-Asia" (13) = ASEAN-10, China, Japan, South Korea

Europe East Asia

Component regional organizations: EU, ASEAN Component inter-regional linkages: EU-ASEAN

1999 EU-LAC (Rio Summit)

EU (25) "LAC" (33) = Rio Group-18, CARICOM-15

Europe Latin America

Component regional organizations: EU, CAN, CARICOM, MERCOSUR, SICA Component inter-regional linkages: EU-CAN, EU-MERCOSUR, EU-Rio Group, EU-SICA

2000 Africa – Europe (Cairo Summit)

EU (25) "Africa" (54) = OAU-53, Morocco

Europe Africa

Component regional organizations: EU, ECOWAS, OAU, SADC Component inter-regional linkages: EU-ECOWAS, EU-SADC

() indicates number of member states * Special case: A combination of three sub-regional groups rather than a single regional group

On the other hand, relationships between a regional organisation and a regional group

(see Table 5), appear much more as a consequence of new interregionalism. Most of them

were formed during the 1990s, and their creation is closely linked to the emergence of the

EU as a shaping actor of new interregionalism. Indeed, the EU’s current network of

interregional relations with (East) Asia, Africa, and Latin America is characterized by

overarching relationships of this type, i.e. ASEM in the case of Asia, EU-LAC in the case


25

of Latin America, and the Cairo process in the case of Africa. Similar arrangements have,

however, also existed in the earlier period of the EC’s “group-to-group” dialogue, when

most of the EC’s dialogue partners were groups of states rather than regional

organisations (Regelsberger 1990). This still applies to the EU-Africa-Caribbean-Pacific

(EU-ACP) relationship, which has its roots in old interregionalism.

Relationships between two “loose” regional groups certainly are a consequence of new

interregionalism, though the empirical basis for this statement is rather weak given the

fact that there is only one case available (see Table 6). The fact that this type did not

occur during the period of old interregionalism must not come as a surprise given the

dominant position of the EC as an interregional actor for that period of time. However,

the fact that this type of interregionalism occurred at all is rather remarkable in view of

the alternative options available: The East Asian, Australasian, and Latin American states

which participate in FEALAC could also have grouped together in an APEC-like manner

because there was no pressure to adjust to the overwhelming institutional capacity of the

EU (as in the case of ASEM and EU-LAC). Nevertheless, the relationship between East

Asia and Latin America was structured along the lines of the interregional ASEM model

(type 3) rather than the megaregional APEC model (type 5).

Table 6: Relations between Two Regional Groups (Type 4) [TO BE UPDATED] Year of inception

Inter-regional Forum

Regional Group

Regional Group Regions covered

1999/2001 FEALAC (former: EALAF)

"East Asia" (15) = ASEAN+3 (ASEAN-10, China, Japan, Korea) plus CER-2 (Australia, New Zealand)

"Latin America" (15) = CAN-5, MERCOSUR-4, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, El Salvador, Mexico, Panama

East Asia & Australasia, Latin America

Component regional organizations: ASEAN, CAN, CER, MERCOSUR Component inter-regional linkages: ASEAN-MERCOSUR, ASEAN-Rio Group, CER-MERCOSUR

() indicates number of member states Interregional-like relationships among states, groups of states, and regional organisations

from two or more regions have emerged not only, but primarily in the wake of new


26

interregionalism (see Table 7). APEC can be considered as the paradigmatic case of this

category: its creation paved the way for transpacific economic megaregionalism and set

the stage for the emergence of new interregionalism.

Table 7: Megaregional Relationships (Type 5) [TO BE UPDATED] Year of inception

Arrangement Member states Characteristics

1975/1995 CSCE/OSCE* (55) 2 North American countries 48 European countries 5 Central Asian countries

Component regional organizations: EU Component inter-regional linkages: EU-USA, EU-Canada

1989 APEC (21) 12 East Asian 3 North American, 2 South American 3 Australasian 1 European country (Russia)

Component regional organizations: ASEAN, CER, NAFTA Component inter-regional linkages: ASEAN-CER

1993 ARF (23) 15 East Asian countries 3 Australasian countries 2 North American countries 1 South Asian country (India) 2 European (EU and Russia)

Component regional organizations: ASEAN, EU Component inter-regional linkages: ASEAN-EU

1994/98/01 Summit of the Americas [FTAA] (34)

3 North American 7 Central American 14 Caribbean 10 South American

Component regional organizations: CAN, Caricom, MERCOSUR, NAFTA, SICA Component inter-regional linkages: CAN-Caricom, CAN-SICA, CAN-MERCOSUR

1995 (1975)

Euromed** (35)

17 European countries 4 African countries 5 Middle Eastern countries (and the Palestinian Authority)

Component regional organizations: EU Component inter-regional linkages: none

1997 IOR-ARC (18)

7 African, 4 Middle East 3 South Asia 4 Southeast Asian, 1 Australasian

Component regional organizations: none Component inter-regional linkages: none

1997 EAPC (46) 2 North American countries 39 European countries 5 Central Asian countries

Component regional organizations: EU Component inter-regional linkages: EU-USA, EU-Canada

() indicates number of member states * "Organization" but of a mega-regional nature ** "Med" is a borderline case of an "imagined" regional group which, however, does not (yet) act as a group Megaregional arrangements with interregional features tend to be dominated by a

hegemon: India in the case of the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional

Cooperation (IOR-ARC) and the United States in most of the other cases examined here.


27

The hegemon may use such megaregional arrangements for anti-regionalist purposes.

APEC is a good point in case: it served the United States, inter alia, as a device to

prevent the establishment of an East Asian regional group (Maull 2001b). The same may

apply to the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) project, which could serve the

United States as a device for diluting subregional arrangements in Latin America (Schirm

2006).

Finally, one has to emphasize that the empirical stocktaking based on a heuristic typology

can only reflect a given moment in time. The interregional network is continuously

developing, and the process is open-ended. This includes the possibility that interregional

relationships change over time – in other words: they can shift from one category to

another. Take ASEM as an example: enlargement of its membership beyond EU member

states and the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) format would most likely render it rather

FEALAC-like (type 4) or even APEC-like (type 5). Take APEC as another example: it

would move closer to type 4 of interregional relationships should East Asian states start

using the emerging APT format as a coordination mechanism within APEC.12

5. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it can be said that the emergence of new interregionalism has resulted in

the rapid growth of interregional arrangements, which take all kinds of forms, ranging

from quasi-interregional to pure interregional and up to megaregional relationships. The

new interregionalism which first emerged in a triadic context covers all five types of

interregional relationships that are discussed in this chapter, whereas old interregionalism

was basically characterized by relationships between regional organisations (type 2),

namely in the form of the EC’s group-to-group dialogue. Yet, other forms of

12 It is significant that at their third summit meeting in November 1999, the East Asian leaders agreed “to

intensify coordination and cooperation in various international and regional forums such as the UN, WTO,

APEC, ASEM and the ARF…” (emphasis added). Joint Statement on East Asian Cooperation, Manila: 28

November 1999, para. 7.


28

interregional relationships, namely types 1, 3 and 5, were also practiced during the period

of old interregionalism. Thus, the development of new interregionalism with all its

variety has been based on the proliferation of regions developing some, albeit very

modest actorness – more often than not for the sole purpose of engagement in a specific

interregional relationship. Consequently, in order to capture actorness in interregionalism,

one has to refrain from using the elaborate concepts and definitions developed in order to

describe and explain the EU as international or global actor but rather to use more generic

criteria – reflecting a social constructivist understanding – to define actorness in

interregionalism. Viewed from this perspective, the actorness of the EU in

interregionalism stands out and does not find a match in any other part of the world. At

the same time, this permits us to acknowledge and categorize the bewildering variety of

actorness in interregionalism. This, however, this does not enable us to measure the

degree regional actors’s actorness, not to say to explain why we find a high or low degree

of actorness or both in a given interregional relationship.


29

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actorness in interregionalism...called triad regions, the leading regions in the world economy,...

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