adamson final icaf research paper jieddo

AY 2006-2007

AN ASYMMETRIC THREAT INVOKES STRATEGIC LEADER INITIATIVE:

T HE JOINT IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE DEFEAT ORGANIZATION

RESEARCH PAPER

DR. JOHN BOKEL

WILLIAM G. ADAMSON, COL, USASEMINAR 7

(DR. GREG FOSTER, PRIMARY FACULTY ADVISOR)

The Industrial College of the Armed ForcesNational Defense University

Fort McNair, Washington, D.C. 20319-5062

Asymmetric Threat…JIEDDO

AN ASYMMETRIC THREAT INVOKES STRATEGIC LEADER INITIATIVE: THE JOINT IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE DEFEAT ORGANIZATION

Abstract

This study evaluates the effect of an asymmetric threat, the Improvised Explosive Device (IED), on strategic leader initiative during the “Long War”. The Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) was established by the Department of Defense (DOD) to “defeat (IED) as weapons of strategic influence”. DOD’s military response, by itself, lacks sufficiency and JIEDDO’s success remains elusive. The hostile use of IEDs worldwide persists, and will likely continue, without a national mandate dictating greater interagency (IA) involvement. This paper suggests a more committed IA constituency will lead to better collective performance, potentially resulting in success. The observations of the former operations officer of JIEDDO offers a portfolio of lessons to enable organizational effectiveness when responding to anomalous conditions.

COL W. G. Adamson, USAIndustrial College of the Armed Forces

National Defense UniversityDr. John Bokel

2007

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An Asymmetric, Strategic Form of Fires

“Explosives are the safest weapon for the Mujahideen. Using explosives allows us to escape enemy personnel and to avoid being arrested. In addition, explosives strike the enemy with sheer terror and fright.”

- (Al Qaeda statement quoted from “Encyclopedia Jihad, Version 4”)

The United States (US) currently engages an adversary cloaked in an ancient

ideology in a war it failed to fully envision. The prevalent global threat comes from

autonomously networked, non-state actors, like Al Qaeda, motivated by ideology,

mistrust of the West, and disapproval of international governance. The strategy of hostile

forces presents evolving asymmetries confronting the will of the American public as the

“center of gravity” to democratic ideology. Assassinations, kidnappings, beheadings,

suicide attacks, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) represent the tactics employed

in a “global insurgency”. (Barno, 2006) This paper relates a chronological account of the

DOD response to one of these tactics, the IED, by recounting the formation of the Joint

IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO).

DOD’s military response to the IED threat, by itself, is inadequate, and JIEDDO’s

mission “to defeat IEDs as weapons of strategic influence” remains elusive because of

insufficient interagency (IA) support. National tunnel-vision with the war in Iraq restricts

JIEDDO’s capacity to broaden the national effort on the Global War on Terror (GWOT).

The terrorist and insurgent use of IEDs worldwide persists, and will likely continue,

absent a national mandate dictating greater IA involvement.

A more committed IA constituency will greatly benefit the IED effort. Greater IA

contributions to a national IED effort, particularly among the intelligence community

(IC) and law enforcement agencies could result in better collective performance,

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potentially achieving success. Current IA participation in the IED effort is a testimony to

the entrepreneurial leadership at JIEDDO. Organizational theory addresses the

difficulties of synchronizing complex organizational endeavors when functions are not

viewed as essential.

Organizational theory suggests that organizations are created in order to accomplish certain missions….Organizations favor policies that will increase the importance of their organization, fight for capabilities that they view as essential to their essence, seek to protect those capabilities viewed as essential, and demonstrate comparative indifference to functions not viewed as essential. (Nagl, 2002, pp. 4-5)

Because DOD’s preoccupation with Iraq and Afghanistan centralizes JIEDDO

support properly on the Combatant Commander the IED effort reflects an imbalanced

military-centric approach. As a result of counterinsurgency experience, military

commanders learned and the DOD adapted its institutional response to the hostile use of

the IED. The military’s learning curve outpaces other government agencies in regards to

the IED response. Meanwhile, the hierarchical, ad hoc IA process lacks a comprehensive

strategy for defeating the global IED threat because it is not viewed as essential to their

collective or unilateral missions. Lieutenant Colonel Tucker Mansager’s experience in

Afghanistan led him to state of the IA, “…coordination has been haphazard and ad hoc,

particularly at lower levels. Action is required; the system will not improve by itself.”

(Mansager, p. 80)

A modest prototype effort expanding the scope of IA involvement on the IED

problem could validate integration concepts and processes for a subsequent broader IA

reform effort. Divergent IA authority, tribal-like organizational cultures, and

bureaucratic reluctance inhibits full or comprehensive participation in the IED effort.

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The same could be said of the four military Services during the formative stages of

DOD’s IED response. However, existing law, the Goldwater-Nichols Act, dictating a

Joint Service organizational structure and joint warfare concept enabled the military to

overcome inadvertent friction and Service biases. The release of the Iraq Study Group

report November 2006, recommended a Goldwater-Nichols model for training and

conducting joint operations across IA boundaries. (Iraq Study Group [ISG], 2006) The

Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) recommended government reform

of the IA process along the line of Goldwater-Nichols. The notion of building operational

capacity within the IA that approaches the capability of DOD’s joint organizational

concept underpins the recommendations in the Beyond Goldwater-Nichols study by

CSIS. (Murdock, C & Flournoy, M, 2005, p. 8)

The IED threat required a rapid response, invoking initiative on the part of

strategic leaders and organizational adaptation. An account of the strategic adjustments,

organizational initiatives, and processes enacted during the creation of JIEDDO

illustrates senior leader initiative. Highlighting organizational “best practices” allows

development of a portfolio of lessons observed. A review of the scope of the IED

problem provides operational context for the subsequent development of lessons

observed.

Scope of the IED Problem

The havoc caused by the use of IEDs began in the first few months following the

end of major combat in Iraq. Initially, IEDs did not concern military forces. Following

the end of major combat, loosely coordinated direct fire engagements constituted the

major form of enemy attack in Iraq. The overwhelming firepower and accuracy of US

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and Coalition military forces in direct fire engagements caused rapid adjustment of

enemy tactics. Indirect fire attacks, primarily from mortars and rockets, quickly became

the enemy’s desired form of contact, targeting forward operating bases (FOBs) and Iraqi

government facilities. As US counter-battery fires became more effective, a new tactic

emerged as the preferred enemy form of fire, the Improvised Explosive Device, or IED.

The term, IED, entered the popular lexicon of the US military during what was originally

planned as the stabilization and reconstruction phase of the Iraq War.

Numerous definitions exist for the IED. Simply stated, a bomb-maker modifies

the characteristics of munitions, explosives, or substances with explosive properties in a

homemade fashion, creating an IED. (Global Security.Org/military/intro/ied.html) IEDs

can be constructed and delivered to their targets in many different ways. Used for

hundreds of years, recent examples of IED attacks range from the truck bombing of the

Marine Corps barracks in Beirut in 1983, to the ship-borne attack against the USS Cole in

1999. The successful aerial IED attacks on September 11, 2001 produced a Presidential

response with an intense focus on homeland security resulting in the reorganization of 22

federal agencies under the Department of Homeland Security. However, as the US opted

to expand the GWOT into Iraq the most pervasive form of IED became the roadside

bomb and car bomb.

Few experiences compare with the helplessness felt by those involved in an IED

attack. The experience is searing. An IED attack has many of the attributes of a sniper

ambush. There’s no emotional build-up prior to an attack, such as: the anxiety prior to an

assault, the sound of preparatory artillery fire, or the rumble of a tank formation en route

to a meeting engagement with enemy armor. IEDs are weapons of surprise. An IED

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victim vaults from relative calm to chaos in the blink of an eye. The IED strikes

unexpectedly like the piercing crack of a sniper rifle. The blast from an IED has

indiscriminate, constituent effect. No attacker is readily apparent. This relative

anonymity offers advantage to hostile forces. The combination of these ingredients:

helplessness, surprise, calm before chaos, indiscriminate effect, collateral damage, and

anonymity of the attacker contribute to tactical anxiety. Personal involvement with IED

attacks begins with the response to a scene of a suspected IED and often moves onto

casualty evacuation. Later, personal involvement extends to discussions with victims,

patients convalescing and coping with daily rehabilitation from wounds. The sense of

urgency felt on the battlefield or in the amputee wards enters living rooms via nightly

news coverage. Images of IED attacks invoke strategic influence over the public, a

public otherwise physically dislocated from combat. The strategic power of the IED

comes from a non-kinetic source, information.

America’s adversaries operate in and exploit the information environment. Blast

effects from IEDs are sensational on film, indiscriminate in the collateral damage they

cause, create a climate of fear in the public, and have a psychological impact on military

forces. IEDs present a new and asymmetric form of fires with a tactical effect much like

artillery; however, the kinetic effect produces psychological anxiety as well as strategic

influence. IEDs become “weapons of strategic influence” because images of IED attacks

impact the psyche of the American public through daily news broadcasts. Hostile forces

count on “sound bite” deep analysis from the media and the American electorate, seeking

to overcome the US technological and military advantage with this asymmetric form of

fires. The resultant draining effect exhausts national will and commitment. Oscar Wilde

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once said, “In America the President reigns for four years, and journalism governs for

ever and ever. (Wilde 1881/Torricelli 2001, p. 177) The adversaries of the US in the

GWOT exploit this reality well. Curtailing the informational power exploited by global

insurgents through images of IED attacks calls for a wider application of all elements of

national power, not exclusively military force.

In operational terms, IEDs presents an asymmetric threat to Coalition Forces for

two reasons: first, they represent a new method of attack that conventional capabilities

were unprepared to address, and second, the IED was something not fully understood.

(Skelton, 2004) Hostile forces do not develop innovative technologies through

conventional research and development (R&D) programs. Attackers employ decades old

insurgent techniques with available Industrial Age weapons. In short, terrorist and

insurgents modify commercially available equipment and adapt tactics at a rate that

bureaucratic, hierarchical organizations cannot keep pace with. Are IEDs, as some

suggest, just a symptom of the general problem of insurgency and or terrorism? One

cannot consider terrorism and insurgency without considering the IED. The following

quote from an Al-Qaeda document highlights this terrorist organization’s reliance on the

IED.

“Al-Qaeda doctrine acknowledges ‘that the production of different types of bombs and explosives must be mastered,’ but adds this is not difficult because ‘the ways to do this are available and explained in many places … people with experience …[are] many in number in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere’." (http://www.jamestown.org/news_details.php?news_id=169)

Commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as leaders in the Pentagon,

confronted by the rising insurgency which challenged security and stability in the region

adjusted operational tactics. GEN Richard Cody, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army,

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http://www.jamestown.org/news_details.php?news_id=169


recognized “the IED is the poor man’s cruise missile.” (Lovelace & Votel, 2005, p. 34)

IED components are readily available, inexpensive, have relatively simple construction,

and offer easy delivery to a target area. Proliferation in the use of IEDs by hostile forces

continue. Given the widespread, de-centralized nature, and asymmetry of the IED

problem, US forces have had difficulty progressing from a reactive operational mode.

Moreover, the malignancy carried by the IED spans all levels of war.

The terrorist and insurgent use of IEDs resulted in a response from the tactical to

strategic level of war. The initial response in theater followed a technically oriented

approach rather than a holistic strategy. Initially, commanders categorized the IEDs as a

problem for either an Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Team, or Engineers, vice a

new form of fires for ground commanders to address. (Votel, personal communication,

October 7, 2006)

360 Degree Warfare and the IED Phenomenon

Gaining an appreciation of the early tactical and operational impact of the IED

provides greater awareness of the scope of change required by the IED. Terms common

to maneuver warfare such as: meeting engagement, screen, delay, and movement-to-

contact, pale in significance to a new lexicon associated with “360 Degree Warfare”. The

concept of a front, or line of battle, vanished.

Currently, the primary offensive component of terrorism and insurgency in Iraq

and Afghanistan manifests itself through the use of the IED. IED attacks target convoys

just as frequently as “front line” units. These logistics convoys become combat

formations known as Combat Logistics Patrols (CLPs). A prevalent tactic once known as

the “presence patrol” from the US experience in Bosnia and Kosovo become Combat

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Reconnaissance Patrols (CRP). Reconnaissance missions increasingly focused on route

clearance. Assessing routes for out-of-place garbage bags, animal carcasses, piles of

rocks, and broken concrete curbing indicative of IED camouflage techniques becomes

daily routine. Soldiers and Marines developed skilled vehicle-mounted scanning

techniques as they looked for the tell-tale lone wire crossing a street linked to an IED

initiator. The appearance of new graffiti in a neighborhood becomes an important

indicator of potential IED activity. The dominant form of maneuver for US forces

operating outside of FOBs become CLPs, CRPs, and route clearance patrols.

Primarily for force protection, US forces implemented a policy of living and

operating out of FOBs. Initially viewed as liberators and then occupiers by the Iraqi

people, US forces adopted an “unsuccessful counterinsurgency operational practice” by

moving into FOBs. As noted in the final draft of a jointly issued Marine Corps and Army

manual, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency, separation and isolation from the population

involved in an insurgency historically leads to poor rapport and ineffective results. (FM

3-24/FMFM 3-24, 2006) US forces looked more like foreign occupiers than liberators.

The shared terrain linking the populace, insurgents, and US forces became the roads and

access points to US facilities. By choosing the time and place for employing IEDs

against troop movements, insurgents seized the initiative on these common routes. The

vast majority of IED attacks occurred within a short distance of the FOBs. Regaining the

initiative became the logical next step for US forces. Regaining the initiative optimally

comes from precise, preemptive targeting of the human activities that enable IED

manufacture. However, identification of an enemy capable of blending into the

environment, one that can hide in plain sight, complicated the problem. Doctrine,

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training, and a lack of counterinsurgency experience set the conditions for a

misconception of how to best approach the IED phenomenon.

Doctrinally in maneuver warfare, ground commanders own battle-space called an

area of operations (AO). Ground commanders initially viewed IEDs as obstacles on

supply routes or as a means of attacking patrols in their AOs. The preferred option for

commanders remains obstacle avoidance, but if that is not possible, they pursue obstacle

reduction or elimination. Decades of training taught commanders that eliminating

obstacles quickly preserves freedom of maneuver and decreases the likelihood of

preplanned attack by the enemy. When the option to avoid the obstacle eluded maneuver

commanders, they typically used their assigned combat engineers. The comfort level and

trust developed through years of doctrinally based training between maneuver forces and

combat engineers expedited decisions to clear routes rather than secure and hold

suspected IED sites for detailed exploitation and neutralization of IEDs. But a route,

once cleared, without constant surveillance and subsequent interdiction becomes easily

reseeded with IEDs. The required surveillance and interdiction rarely occurred rendering

many route clearance missions ineffective. Rapid removal of the IED threat by ballistic

or explosive techniques common to engineers did nothing for forensics or technical

exploitation of the device thereby negating options to capture the emplacer or bomb-

maker.

Ascertaining those responsible for IEDs becomes a primary concern and the IED

threat varied greatly from region to region. Sunni and Shii’a conflict, foreign terrorists,

anti-Iraqi forces (AIF), former regime elements (FRE), organized criminal gangs, or the

Taliban in Afghanistan, all these groups employed IEDs for their own purposes, with

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varying degrees of sophistication, and with different tactics. Deciphering this confusing

array of threat groups at times presented a complex and haphazard picture of the IED

threat for Coalition Forces. Technical analysis from EOD forces coupled with a spirit for

law enforcement investigation supportive of Host Nation judiciary and criminal law

became vital components to the IED effort. Few maneuver commanders had experience

operating with EOD forces to engender the critical cohesion and interoperability essential

for success. Due to limited availability of EOD forces in peacetime, maneuver and EOD

forces had not trained together and were forced to learn in combat.

EOD forces train for the unique and dangerous mission of rendering safe

explosive devices permitting detailed exploitation of devices. Across the Joint Service

employment of EOD forces varied. Air Force EOD assets typically operate only on

airfields for UXO removal. Navy EOD forces are employed in more of a SOF role with

specialization in underwater and littoral operations. Marines EOD forces offer habitual

support to Regimental Combat Teams in a direct support mission. Finally, Army EOD

forces, traditionally aligned in a combat service support role, typically perform UXO

neutralization on training and firing ranges.

Practicing highly specialized EOD skills in peacetime normally restricts

maneuver training for EOD forces. In all but rare combined arms training exercises,

Army EOD detachments trained unilaterally on demolition or firing ranges with range

safety controls constraining the participation of other ground forces. However, the IED

use in combat surfaced both a maneuver and doctrinal dilemma for ground forces.

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The Counter Explosive Exploitation Cell (CEXC)

In Iraq, the Corps initially maintained central control of EOD detachments

limiting any habitual association with ground forces. EOD detachments rotated around

the country spending about ten days at a time with maneuver brigades. The EOD

battalion headquarters remained in Baghdad under Corps control. The insurgents

developed an understanding of US tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) by

observing US responses to IEDs. As the IED threat grew, EOD technicians became

principal targets for insurgents and terrorists. Casualties and fatalities among EOD forces

as well as damage to their robotic interrogation equipment became a threatening concern,

particularly with IED first responders. In an attempt to share IED trends and technical

information, EOD forces developed a technical exploitation process unique to

themselves.

This new technical exploitation capability, an ad hoc organization became known

as the Counter Explosive Exploitation Cell (CEXC). The CEXC served as a

consolidation point for discovered or neutralized IEDs where detailed technical analysis

developed trends, technical information, and unique bomb-maker signatures. A

regionally-based IED threat emerged from this analysis. Sophistication of an IED relates

directly to the talent of the bomb-maker. The techniques employed varied in part due to

insurgent and terrorist access to specific munitions, explosives, detonators, and design

expertise. The desire for increased technical and biometric forensics from IEDs raised

command interest. The command emphasis shifted and interdicting the chain of activities

enabling IED use became a primary concern. The value of the skills brought to the

battlefield by EOD forces increased markedly. There were not enough EOD forces in

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theater for every maneuver brigade, however. Amending EOD force allocation took time

but eventually request for forces (RFFs) as well as Army force structure changes creating

more EOD capability and other initiatives discussed later in this paper corrected the

problem. Simultaneously, evacuation of IED components bearing unique characteristics

generated IA and international interest for more detailed exploitation.

Supplemental support became available through agreements with Coalition and

IA partners. The involvement of the IA in the CEXC represented the first IA

participation in what would become DOD’s Joint IED Defeat strategy. The universally

positive recognition of the CEXC eventually required long-term support. Because of the

Navy’s role as joint proponent for EOD forces, Joint Service support for the CEXC fell to

the US Navy for oversight but the early funds came from the IED Task Force. Manning

the CEXC demanded even more from already under-allocated, critically required US

EOD forces.

The preceding depiction represents a doctrinal as well as training challenge, a

novel organizational initiative, and a force allocation shortfall resulting specifically from

the insurgent use of IEDs. The military institution acknowledged this early lesson by

making adjustments in theater. However, overcoming the effect of the IED in this regard

took valuable time and forces suffered more IED casualties in the interim.

Simultaneously, as IED use gradually increased, completion of the first year of the war in

Iraq coincided with major troop rotations.

Commanders adapted, learning new lessons while fighting this insurgency, but

they needed help. Unit commanders spontaneously identified unexpected capability

requirements which compelled development of new approaches and equipment.

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Acknowledging rising casualties from IED use, the Army, with 70% of the combat forces

in Iraq and Afghanistan, responded early with an ad hoc task force.

The Department of the Army Responds

In October 2003, Lieutenant General Richard Cody, then the G3 of the Army,

responded to increasingly dangerous IED attacks against ground forces by creating an

Army IED Task Force. LTG Cody chose, COL(P) Joe Votel, USA, Deputy Director for

Information Operations in the Army G3 to lead the Task Force. The Task Force initially

focused on information sharing and dissemination. Votel primarily deployed contractors,

former, elite Special Operation Force (SOF) personnel coupled with a small hand-picked

cadre of officers to the battlefield to assess the situation and make creative

recommendations on adjustments to tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) employed

by operating forces. (Votel, personal communication, October 7, 2006) The Army,

preoccupied with conventional warfare and tactics in its preparation for the war, needed

to learn and innovate rapidly. Because of SOF specific training and experience, former

SOF personnel proved critical to assessing the problem. (Schoomaker, 2005)

The Army IED Task Force deployed its first field detachment to Iraq in December

2003. In April 2004, an additional team followed to Iraq, and another to Afghanistan. A

desire for a permanent organizational solution for asymmetric threats matured with a new

concept from the Army called the Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG).

The Army Asymmetric Warfare Group

Several months after the formation of the JIEDDTF, an Army initiative for

formation of a new permanent organization for asymmetric warfare surfaced. The AWG

is a U.S. Army Special Mission Unit (SMU) with the mission of providing Army and

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Joint commanders decisive advantages to counter existing and future asymmetric threats.

The Army envisioned building this capability from across the Army with the initial

planning done by the Army IED Task Force. The concept transitioned the forward

deployed operational component along with the training functions of the JIEDDTF to the

AWG. The remnant of the JIEDDTF would provide support to the JIPT. However, the

OSD decision establishing the JIEDDTF altered the original plan. Subsequent legal

issues slowed the formation of the AWG, not the least of which was the need to get

Congress to change law allowing its formation. Overcoming these hurdles took time but

the AWG continued close support to the Joint IED Defeat effort. (Lovelace and Votel,

2005) In the meantime, the JIEDDTF continued to provide tactical advice to deployed

forces through its field teams, and assisted commanders in pre-deployment training

through its Training and Advisory Teams (TAT).

In order to provide counter-IED training and advisory support; collect lessons

learned, TTPs, and disseminate best practices the personnel on the field teams embedded

with units at brigade-level and below. The field teams afford a direct tactical to strategic

linkage to all JIEDDTF resources: National assets, priority, and fixes for technical

intelligence and forensics exploitation linkage through the national intelligence

community. After a 90 to120 day rotation, deployed field team personnel rotate back to

CONUS to serve on the TAT. In this way the TAT inform, influence, and support

commanders in their pre-employment training. Some of these functions have since been

transferred to the AWG. (Allyn, personal communication, October 17, 2006) The

JIEDDTF, through the TAT, provided relevant, current lessons learned through advisors

possessing recent regional operational experience. The activation of the AWG finally

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occurred formally in January 2005. The collaboration between the JIEDDTF and the

AWG continued, however, DOD recognized the JIEDDTF as the Department’s single

point of contact for IED matters. The Pentagon-generated Task Force drew initial

skepticism, especially from Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)-7, resulting in several

challenges.

Coordination challenges between the various levels of command complicated the

effort, such as the lack of a corresponding organization at CENTCOM or in theater.

Multiple counter-IED efforts did exist but no clear leader synchronized the effort.

Throughout the spring of 2004, the first round of major troop rotations took place

changing all the military leadership in country.

Rotation of Forces Heightens the IED Threat

The change-over of leadership and personnel experienced with the rising

insurgency met with a corresponding marked increase in overall enemy activity in the

spring and summer of 2004. Maintaining operational continuity and priority of effort

between changeovers along with problems tracking numerous materiel requirements

generated from theater created difficult challenges. As the first units departed the combat

theater, knowledge about requirements generated months earlier left with them.

Equipment arrived unexpectedly, many times with an ill-defined concept of operation

(CONOP) for employment, and came with little to no support. This multi-faceted

problem went beyond simply tracking requests for equipment. Training newly arrived

units on unfamiliar equipment proved problematic. Stuck fielding new equipment and

capabilities while in contact with the enemy, arriving unit commanders grew frustrated.

The complexity and tactics of IEDs evolved throughout this period as well.

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At first, roadside IEDs constructed with hard-wired initiation systems and

rudimentary detonators persisted. The abundant supply of military grade munitions

throughout Iraq afforded insurgents and terrorists a virtually unlimited supply of materiel.

Suicide car bombings became daily events. The enemy raised the stakes in the counter-

IED fight and collateral damage to civilians did not constrain them.

The indiscriminate attacks against Iraqi infrastructure, security forces, and

civilians increased, demonstrating the relative impotence of the nascent Iraqi government.

The terrorist weapon of choice became the IED. The media relentlessly broadcasted the

effects of IED attacks serving the terrorists’ purpose. The early IED challenge brought

opportunities to overcome institutional obstacles as well.

The early IED response by DOD highlighted a lack of conceptual unity among the

interagency (IA) and the Services. Over time, new agreements and organizational

adaptation enabled consensus for complementary joint approaches and comprehensive

rules while working through the IED problem. Conversely, complaints common from

combat commanders questioned an apparent lack of national involvement in the war.

The sense of commitment shown by the “Greatest Generation” of World War II

(WWII) appeared absent to some commanders. GEN John Abizaid, the commander of

Central Command (CENTCOM), built on the WWII theme and called for a “Manhattan-

like Project” for the IED threat. Returnees from the war seemed inclined to think like

Winston Churchill, speaking to President Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 1941, “Give us

the tools and we will finish the job.” A call for a nationwide IED effort commenced

when, in June 2004, GEN Abizaid wrote a P4 letter [personal for] to Secretary of

Defense Donald Rumsfeld, asking for his help in mobilizing the nation.

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Getting a Manhattan-like Project Started

Because he foresaw the IED threat as a potential threat to success in Iraq, GEN

Abizaid wanted a Manhattan-like project, referring to the atomic bomb program in

WWII. Debate over whether he achieved his desired effect continues. Whether GEN

Abizaid spoke metaphorically or not, the IED problem got the Department’s attention.

The strategic response to the IED required DOD to amend internal biases and

institutional rhythms. During July 2004, the Department grappled with organizing itself

to assist CENTCOM. The Army felt the IED effort needed an Executive Agent and they

volunteered. The Army IED Task Force developed a briefing outlining the Army

position. The deliberations by the Service Chiefs and Secretaries during the briefing

surfaced cultural differences among the Services. The discussion exposed divergent

Service values on the IED response. As an example, Air Force Secretary James G. Roche

disagreed with the establishment of a DOD task force under Army leadership. He

thought the Air Force could provide a solution to the IED threat and defeat it in about six

months. (Votel, personal communication, October 7, 2006) Apparently, the belief of

some senior leaders was that DOD could deal with the IED problem with a somewhat

discreet approach, not requiring IA participation. The outcome of the deliberations on

the Army proposal produced a Joint Integrated Process Team, or JIPT, for IED Defeat on

July 12, 2004.

A one paragraph memorandum issued by Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz

authorized the establishment of the JIPT. As a result of the Deputy Secretary’s decision,

the Army IED Task Force became a Joint Task Force and formed the nucleus of the DOD

effort. The Army led the JIPT assigning its Director of Operations in the G3, MG Fred

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Robinson, as lead for the JIPT. BG Votel maintained the position as director of the Joint

IED Defeat Task Force (JIEDDTF). The combination of these two organizations, the

JIPT and JIEDDTF, synchronized the department-wide IED effort.

The primary focus of the JIPT became assessing technology and deliberating on

resource decisions for Joint IED Defeat. The JIPT consisted of 13 primary members at

the O7/SES level from each of the Services and select Office of the Secretary of Defense

(OSD) offices. The JIEDDTF performed support functions for the JIPT, coordinated

operational IED Defeat efforts, and produced IED threat intelligence assessments. The

formation of joint task forces (JTFs), like the JIEDDTF, epitomized how Pentagon

bureaucracy responds to irregular challenges.

JTFs can buy time for an institutional assessment of the need for longer-term

DOD change. However, several bureaucratic deficiencies surfaced from building the

JIEDDTF in this fashion. The Services supplied personnel filling the temporary positions

in the JIEDDTF with multi-disciplined expertise. One of the benefits of staffing the

JIEDDTF this way became the linkage people brought to their parent organizations.

Conversely, the ad hoc staff lacked continuity of operations.

Personnel vacancies caused atrophy in parent organizations further retarding

bureaucratic efficiency. In the case of active duty personnel, some managers expected

personnel to function in both their parent organization as well as the JIEDDTF. The

ensuing tug-of-war between management, coupled with split loyalty on the part of the

employee, and increased work demands, affected efficiency in both organizations. Due

to the Title X role, the four Services took different approaches when they filled the

JIEDDTF temporary billets due to Service specific regulations.

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In the case of the Air Force, personnel served a 120-day term with the JIEDDTF.

The other services typically used a six-month rotation. Service specific personnel

processes took months before filling these positions. Reservists called to active duty

filled many positions in the JIEDDTF. Disruption in operational continuity resulted from

this form of military manning and caused a recurring learning curve for new personnel. It

left a void of knowledge in how the JIEDDTF operated and resulted in a lack of sustained

experience on the nature of the problem. Over time, tour extensions for a core group of

selected personnel provided limited continuity and an ability to operate at the highest

levels of the institution.

Developing Shared Approaches for Joint IED Defeat

The JIEDDTF routinely answered questions from Congress and other US

government agencies on the IED threat and provided assessments and updates on

counter-measures. The resulting media coverage shed public light on the JIEDDTF. As

the single point of contact for the DOD, many coalition partners viewed the JIEDDTF as

a valuable point of contact with the US government. International partners regularly

contacted the JIEDDTF for assistance in an effort to coordinate actions on counter-IED.

Well over two dozen countries engaged the JIEDDTF in meaningful dialogue on the IED

threat. Most of these exchanges came with requests for training, intelligence sharing, or

equipment solutions. Many nations explored the possibility of shared R&D of

technologies to defeat or counter the IED. The Department of State and several federal

law enforcement agencies seemingly possessed a vested interest in international requests

for IED response coordination. Viewed by a growing international constituency as a

valued point of contact for the United States government, DOD should have acquired a

21


broad mandate for coordinating international agreements. The coordination with

coalition members reminds one of Churchill’s comments, “There is only one thing worse

than fighting with allies – and that is fighting without them.” (Skelton, 2004, p. 102)

The JIEDDTF entered into bi-lateral agreements with several coalition partners.

Ultimately, the closest US partners embedded officers on the JIEDDTF as organic

members of the task force. In this way, the JIEDDTF provided mutual national benefit in

the realm of intelligence sharing, technology and training. The United Kingdom

followed by Australia and Canada provided the early international members to the task

force, enabling near transparent collaboration of national efforts. The international

influence of embedded officers contributed to the development of a more refined Joint

IED Defeat strategy.

The Joint IED Defeat Approach

The JIEDDTF developed a holistic approach for IED Defeat, organizing sub-IPTs

around the five tenets of assured mobility espoused by the Army Engineer School:

predict, prevent, detect, neutralize, and mitigate. These tenets formed the paradigm of a

multi-faceted approach which also encompassed: threat specific intelligence, integrated

technology, focused training, TTPs, doctrine development, and information sharing. The

US Army, through its Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), worked closely with

the JIEDDTF developing a new doctrinal manual for IED Defeat, FMI 3-34.114. The

Engineer School led a team from the Army schools along with the TRADOC Futures

Center. The doctrine writers from TRADOC completed the new interim field manual in

an unprecedented six months. Even with this significant doctrinal effort from the

22


institutional schools, the main effort shifted noticeably toward technology in the hope of

a quick answer to the IED problem.

A belief at the highest levels in the Department, echoed by commanders within

CENTCOM, pressed for a technological solution to the IED threat. The predisposition

for a technological solution hindered DOD’s early strategy toward a more comprehensive

IA approach centered on intelligence driven operations. The JIEDDTF posture was not

risk averse. The initial direction received from GEN Abizaid in August 2004: identified

the most promising solutions, even if they had only a “51% chance” of being effective,

and test them forward in theater. To be fair, the early effort became a quest for

immediate solutions which could save lives. Combat developers from across the Services

got the message. GEN Abizaid wanted the bleeding stopped quickly.

GEN Abizaid aggressively sought to test potential solutions in the combat theater

but by doing so, he inadvertently surfaced some friction and bias which at times

complicated the effort. (Votel, personal communication, September 27, 2006) Stated

simply, most deployed commanders were not enamored with the concept of testing

unknown capabilities while engaged in a daily life and death struggle with the enemy.

Identifying the right level of command for coordinating IED issues concerned GEN

Abizaid but he did not slow the effort while waiting for a perfect solution. Concurrently,

the Services pursued various initiatives as IED casualties increased.

The early Service efforts concentrated on techniques and materiel solutions for

mitigation of blast effects from IEDs. Budget obligations of literally billions of dollars,

primarily from the Army, fielded up-armored High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled

Vehicles (HMMWVs), paid for developments of add-on armor solutions for lightly

23


armored vehicles, and adequate personal body armor for Soldiers and Marines. Avoiding

duplication of Service efforts remained a critical policy for the JIEDDTF. The JIEDDTF

looked for promising solutions that required additional funding to reach higher readiness

levels for field tests and operational assessment. (Boston Globe, 2006)

In August 2004, Secretary Wolfowitz directed a National Laboratory Challenge,

an effort soliciting new ideas and more promising technology. Secretary Wolfowitz

called for the development of innovative solutions from the best minds in the nation. He

emphasized rapid fielding of solutions to the IED problem, but he did not ignore longer

term science and technology (S&T) and R&D efforts. Over 300 attendees from all the

Nation’s laboratories and leading defense firms embarked on multiple paths to find

solutions to this threat. Representatives from several IA technical offices participated.

These representatives showed interest in DOD’s call for assistance but no coordination

resulted from the IA at the conference. Two months later a similar conference held for

industry garnered 500 attendees.

The Joint Baseline Assessment

Simultaneous to this outreach to the labs and industry, the JIEDDTF scoured the

DOD-wide inventory of programs for technologies that might apply to the IED Defeat

effort. This effort did not represent completely unplowed ground however. After the

attacks on September 11, 2001 the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Acquisition,

Technology and Logistics (OSD-ATL) formed its own task force, the Combating

Terrorism Technology Task Force (CTTTF). Led by Mr. Ben Riley, the CTTTF looked

into technology approaches to disrupt and defeat terrorism. Much of the early work in

IED Defeat resulted because of the partnership with the CTTTF. COL Lamont Woody,

24


USA, of the JIEDDTF led a review team that assessed nearly 300 programs. Known as

the joint baseline assessment, this review and assessment effort categorized and

prioritized initiatives. The team led by Woody split the initiatives among the five tenets

for further evaluation by the sub-IPTs. The effort consumed a large portion of the

JIEDDTF and succeeded in identifying the ideas and equipment most ready for field

deployment.

The initiatives deemed the most ready, termed the “low-hanging fruit”, received

priority. Quickly assessing these initiatives gained immediate importance in the JIPT

process. As an example, the first solutions approved involve detection and neutralization

efforts. A well trained dog proved the best solution for quick explosive detection, and

one that could rapidly deploy to theater. The first effort led to the fielding of 12

additional dog teams to Iraq. Robotics for explosive exploitation and neutralization

surfaced as another promising capability. High demand EOD units identified the

requirement for additional robots for unmanned stand-off for device interrogation. The

JIPT provided funding for additional robots in sufficient quantity to double the number

deployed with EOD forces as well as expanding availability of depot replacements in

theater. However, the purpose of this study is not to focus on the merits of individual

solutions approved by the JIPT, but to review the emerging processes.

Rapid Approval Process

What developed in the JIPT approval process for IED Defeat solutions indicated

an atypical culture shift from the Pentagon norm. The JIEDDTF broke established

procedure. The default setting for any bureaucracy sustains processes developed to

normalize the organization. The JIEDDTF, charged to innovate and move fast, operated

25


on the fringes of the existing bureaucratic system. Since the JIEDDTF operated at the

direction of the Deputy Secretary it attracted great attention and scrutiny. This kind of

entrepreneurial discretion proved critical to rapid decisions.

The initial process gave the JIPT authority to approve single initiatives up to a

threshold of $10 million with the Deputy Secretary reserving approval for solutions

exceeding $10 million [later adjusted to $25 million, See Figure 1]. To advise him, the

Deputy established a Senior Resource Steering Group (SRSG) which closely paralleled

the Joint Readiness Oversight Council (JROC) structure, however the SRSG exclusively

approved Joint IED Defeat proposals. In most cases, there were no contentious issues, so

initiatives received approval electronically without physically forming the SRSG. Even

this high level approval process met with inadvertent institutional friction.

The new process for rapid funding of IED Defeat initiatives met with some

reluctance from the Office of the Secretary of Defense-Comptroller (OSD-C). (Votel,

personal communication, October 7, 2006) The capabilities and materiel solutions for the

IED effort did not fit neatly within standard Planning, Programming, Budget, and

Execution (PPBE) cycles. Because Congressional supplemental funding known as the

Iraq Freedom Fund (IFF) paid for the war effort, the OSD-C prepared all DOD

submissions for Congressional review for this supplemental funding (See Figure 1). The

JIEDDTF operated without an organizational budget, relying on the Army for operating

funds while the IFF provided money for the IED Defeat effort. The JIPT decisions

passed through the Services for their concurrence and the OSD-Comptroller for action en

route to Congress.

26


OMBOMBCongressional

Committee Chairs*

Congressional Committee

Chairs*OSD(C) IFFOSD(C) IFF

Execution OSD(C) and

Services

Execution OSD(C) and

Services

* 5 Days Notification

> $25M Project

< $25M Project

Joint IED Defeat Resource Process

Standard: Approval to Funding w/ Svc - 13 days

Joint IED DefeatIPT

DEPSECDEF

SRSG

DIRECTORJoint IED Defeat TF

Resource Board

Resource Board

AppropriationsFunding Coordination

Joint Systems Integration Board

(O6 / GS15)

> $25M Project

Field ForcesServicesAgenciesAcademiaInternationalIndustryCTTTF

New IdeaNew Idea

Predict (NRL)Prevent (OSD SOLIC)Detect (OSD AT&L)Neutralize (Navy)Mitigate (Army)

Joint Sub-IPTJoint Sub-IPT

Figure 1, Joint IED Defeat Resource Process (JIEDDTF 101 Brief)

Even with the Deputy Secretary’s emphasis, the approval process proved painful,

extremely deliberate, lacking the sense of urgency intended, although faster than the

typical DOD approval process. The JIEDDTF advertised a process that could take as few

as 13 days for funding approval from Congress. Occasionally it actually met the 13 day

target, but in reality a 30-day norm typified the processing time required for distributing

funds to the Service designated as lead for a specific IED Defeat solution. The manner in

which ideas and requirements came to the JIEDDTF complicated the JIPT process.

The four military Services filled requirements for fighting forces based on

requests from field commanders. Commander requests come in the form of Operational

Needs Statements (ONS) for the Army, Critical Mission Needs Statements (CMNS) for

27


the Air Force, and Urgent Universal Needs for the Marine Corps and Navy. For some

reason agreement for one “requirement” term proved too elusive for the Services. The

requirement process did not lend itself well to the Combatant Command (COCOM)

commander’s priorities. Instead, requirements moved through the disparate Service

approval and programming processes based on Title X funding requirements.

Attempting to overcome this war-fighting deficiency, in mid-2005 the Joint Staff

instituted another process called the Joint Universal Operational Need Statement, or

JUONS as depicted in Figure 2. CENTCOM insisted that all IED Defeat requirements

come to them as JUONS for validation and prioritization by the COCOM prior to the

individual Services.

The Army process illustrates the initial validation sequence. Validation of

requirements occurs at various levels of field command until they get to the Pentagon.

The Department of the Army (DA) staff, typically from the Deputy Chief of Staff, G3,

reviewed and revalidated all requirements. DA validated requirements pass to the

programmers in the G8, and they assessed the need for reprogramming to pay for a

requirement. So, even though a field commander may have a valid war-fighting

requirement, there’s a chance funds are not available. When the Army, or any Service,

rejected a request, it would come to the JIPT for consideration. There was a general

verbal understanding that the JIPT would only consider requirements with joint counter-

IED applicability, meaning no single service initiatives.

28


1. Requirements are validated at various levels of command until they get to the Pentagon where they are validated again by the Services, typically by in the Deputy Chief of Staff, 3.

2. JUONS for IED requirements would flow thru CENTCOM for approval and priority

3. These validated requirements are passed to the programmers, the Service N8, G8, etc…for reprogramming actions.

4. Field commander may a validated requirement, but there’s a chance it won’t make the funding cut line.

5. When rejected by a Service request would come to the JIPT for consideration.

Service-specificONS, UNS or MNS

Requirements or newCapability validatedby field commands

Validated/ApprovedRequirements passed

To programming channel

Service Requirements

Validated by operationschannels in Pentagon

JUONS for IEDRequirement

PrioritizedBy CENTCOM

JIPT takes action to assess,refine CONOP and fund

IED initiatives

Service rejects IEDInitiative for funding5

4

3

2

1

Figure 2, Requirements Approval Process

All the Services had a stake in this process since the IFF paid for the war effort.

Congress sent the action to the Office of Management and Budget and then it made its

way back to OSD. Since the Deputy Secretary gave priority to Joint IED Defeat

initiatives, he allocated the funds before Service requests received their “cut” by OSD.

When these appropriated funds got to the JIEDDTF, it generally worked through the

Army Budget Office facilitating fund distribution to pre-designated Services for

subsequent fund obligation.

Over time BG Votel recognized the JIEDDTF had become a cash cow with the

secondary effect of stifling Service initiative to fund their solutions. (Votel, personal

29


communication, October 7, 2006) The JIEDDTF issued a Broad Agency Announcement

(BAA) through the program management of the Technical Support Working Group

(TSWG) soliciting industry solutions for 17 identified capability gaps. Industry

responded with 851 submissions. The Joint Rapid Acquisition Council (JRAC) provided

needed assistance in prioritizing resource decisions from across the Department. Led by

Dr. Bob Buhrkuhl from OSD ATL, the JRAC took special interest in the Joint IED

Defeat effort and assisted with the funding process. The JIEDDTF sub-IPTs vetted these

851 submissions down to some 30 initiatives for follow-on development and funding

through the JIPT. Over the course of the first year, $1.2 billion worth of obligations paid

for over 70 initiatives. In the second year, budget obligations eclipsed $3.5 billion. With

money comes the expectation that equipment could rapidly materialize in theater. The

Army’s Rapid Equipping Force assisted the JIEDDTF to quickly field needed capabilities

and equipment.

The Army’s Rapid Equipping Force (REF)

During the first year, at the direction of the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, now

GEN Richard Cody, the REF provided direct support (DS) to the JIEDDTF. The REF’s

novel acquisition and contracting capability greatly enhanced JIEDDTF operations. The

JIEDDTF was more than simply a supply warehouse filling requests from the field,

though that was a priority in the first year. It also found innovative ways to address

capability gaps and then deploy the capability to theater. In layman’s terms, these

capabilities were needed to offset perceived or real mismatches against the threat. At

times, commanders need capability that may not exist. The REF searched commercial

30


off the shelf (COTS) and government off the shelf (GOTS) inventories for equipment that

provided immediate impact for units in combat. This effort involved S&T, R&D, and

adjustment to the conduct of operations. Integrating new solutions into existing

platforms many times fell to the JIEDDTF Technology Integration Team collocated with

the REF. While much of the equipment the REF purchased offered enhancements over

existing equipment, some unique capabilities also materialized. An illustration of the

working relationship between the JIEDDTF and the REF clarifies the process of fielding

capabilities in theater. One such example, the Dazzler, procured by the REF in a COTS

purchase provided an unusual and much sought capability.

Suicide car bombers using vehicle borne IEDs (VBIED) routinely patrolled

commonly used routes for passing US formations. The terrorist employed a tactic

targeting US formations by driving into the vehicle column and then detonated the

VBIED. The initial counter-action by US forces became firing warning shots in front of

suspect vehicles. The technique of firing warning shots at vehicles eventually became a

command issue in Iraq, and subsequent policy prohibited the practice. The hand-held

Dazzler offered a non-lethal means of mitigating the VBIED threat by essentially

crystallizing the windshield turning it white, rendering no visibility for the vehicle

operator. Typically, the driver was so stunned they veered off course thwarting the

attack. In most cases the Servicemen that employed new systems, like the Dazzler,

hadn’t trained with the equipment so they refined CONOPs for employing newly fielded

equipment in combat.

31


Lack of training complicated the JIEDDTF’s and the REF’s task. The IED effort

generated public interest and scrutiny from industry. Congressional constituents,

particularly from industry, were not shy about letting their Congressman know that, if

given a little money for development, they had “the solution” to the IED problem. The

national lab and industry challenges directed by Secretary Wolfowitz generated even

more Congressional interest and inquiries. A change of leadership occurred during this

surge of public interest in the IED effort with Secretary Wolfowitz’s departure from

DOD.

32


The Joint IED Defeat Directive

Gordon England replaced Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz in June 2005. Mr.

England closely followed the IED effort while in his previous position as the Secretary of

the Navy. Prior to assuming his position in OSD, he directed the Office of Naval

Research to initiate an R&D effort for IED Defeat. With Secretary England’s arrival

came a renewed commitment to the JIEDDTF.

The JIEDDTF presented an overview briefing to Secretary England and he

immediately asked how he could help. In the demanding first year, the JIEDDTF and

JIPT experienced instances where established institutional processes inhibited operational

need. JIEDDTF members felt the one paragraph memorandum establishing the JIPT and

the JIEDDTF left too much to the imagination. The single paragraph did not provide the

clarity of scope and responsibility the Pentagon bureaucracy needed.

The Joint IED Defeat effort required an authoritative directive for developing

conceptual unity across the Services and within OSD. Previously, the JIEDDTF

developed a charter for the JIPT and approached Secretary England with the idea of

authorizing a DOD directive for Joint IED Defeat. The JIPT charter became the blueprint

for the development of DOD Directive 2000.19. The OSD staff toiled with a select group

from the JIEDDTF for four days before the wording met Secretary England’s intent. In

the accompanying cover letter to the directive, Secretary England stated, “We will not

have a business-as-usual approach … defeating IEDs is one of the highest priorities for

the Department of Defense.” (DODD 2000.19, June 2005)

33


Senior Leaders Underwrite Risk

Senior DOD leadership underwrote risk during the development of the Joint IED

effort. Numerous business processes ranging from acquisition, budgeting, R&D, testing,

and training underwent modification enabling the Joint IED Defeat process. Of course,

some of the processes developed by the JIEDDTF made people uncomfortable. The

bureaucracy typical of Pentagon actions recoiled. Much like Secretary Rumsfeld decried

early in his tenure with his “Anchor Chain” memos, the Department’s biggest

impediment seemed to be its own bureaucracy. (Rumsfeld, May 1, 2001, “a six-page

SECRET memo entitled, ‘Illustrative New 21st Century Institutions and Approaches’.”)

Secretary England’s personal involvement underscores one of the vital elements of

JIEDDTF success. In one early memo from Secretary England authorizing the funding of

a sensitive IED initiative he wrote across the top, “No staffing – No hierarchy [italics

added].” BG Votel believed the Deputy Secretary wanted to reinforce with the Services

and OSD staff the personal emphasis he placed on IED specific actions and he didn’t

appreciate Service hierarchy slowing the approval process.

Senior leader involvement and risk tolerance proved an important ingredient to

enabling organizational innovation and the capacity to work around standard process and

procedures. The notion that, “Only organizational self-awareness can change

organizational culture,” prompted the type of response DOD leaders enacted responding

to the IED threat. (Nagl, 2002, p. 221) Faced with Pentagon bureaucratic friction and

cumbersome DOD policy, Secretary England demanded improved processing speed for

IED actions instilling a sense of urgency normally found on the battlefield. The directive

fostered institutional continuity for Joint IED Defeat.

34


DOD Directive 2000.19 provided authorization for several important

improvements to JIPT and JIEDDTF operational procedures. First, the JIEDDTF

Director now reported directly to Secretary England. Previously, all actions went through

the Army, Vice Chief of Staff, GEN Cody. The Director’s role as single point of contact

for DOD allowed growth of an intimate relationship for Joint IED Defeat at the highest

levels in the Department. The Director’s recurring updates to the Deputy Secretary also

forged a strong tie with the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Vice

Chairman added Joint IED Defeat to his personal portfolio of interest. Acknowledging

the stature of the Director at this level allowed development of a peer relationship with

the Service Chiefs. Secondly, the approval authority for initiatives moved to the

JIEDDTF Director, vice the JIPT, improving independence and decision speed. The JIPT

now served as an advisory board to the Director and a forum for the Services and

principal OSD offices to voice their opinions. The approval threshold for the JIEDDTF

IED Defeat initiatives increased to $25 million vice the previous $10 million. Finally,

and most significantly to the JIEDDTF, it instructed the Services to fully staff the

JIEDDTF with the “best and brightest” personnel. A Joint Manning Document (JMD)

provided authorization of the permanent positions. For administrative purposes the Army

continued as Executive Agent, but in a somewhat unprecedented decision, the JIEDDTF

became an OSD, Joint Task Force under the Deputy Secretary. (DODD 2000.19, June

2005) The DOD directive itself galvanized the effort. The institution readily accepted

the authority inherent in a directive signed by the Deputy Secretary lending credence to

the position of the JIEDDTF director as well as the entire Joint IED Defeat effort.

35


OSD institutionalized Joint IED Defeat with the new directive but it did so

without following established procedure. Correcting this shortfall became the job of the

Joint Staff, J8. The J8 coordinated with the JIEDDTF on an Initial Capabilities

Document (ICD) for Joint IED Defeat for over a year. Choosing the term Joint IED

Defeat vice counter-IED for describing the DOD effort signaled a need for an offensive

component to the strategy.

Time to Modify the Strategic Approach

The term “counter” connotes a defensive, reactionary mode of operation. The

term did not convey the holistic strategy required to defeat the terrorist use of IEDs. The

initial IED approach designed by the JIEDDTF used the five tenets of assured mobility

for the purpose of organizing the initial baseline assessment of IED Defeat solutions.

The sub-IPTs categorized, assessed, and refined initiatives by using the five tenets. But

by now the JIPT had harvested all readily available technological solutions, the low-

hanging fruit. Taking a device-centric approach to neutralize or mitigate the effects of

the IED does not stem the use of the IED. Improving intelligence and preemptive

targeting of the human chain-of-activities enabling the use of IEDs took greater

importance.

Many acknowledged the need for an offensive, human-centric component but no

mention of greater involvement with the intelligence community (IC) or IA surfaced at

this time. Although seemingly intuitive that technology alone could not deliver a “silver

bullet” solution, the JIPT efforts delivered predominately technological solutions.

Another lesson emerged with the recognition that technology alone may not offer a

panacea, a more comprehensive approach developed. Evolving the Joint IED Defeat

36


strategy became a priority ultimately codified in the updated directive as well as a new

CENTCOM Counter-IED Campaign Plan.

Figure 3, The Strategic Approach (JIEDDTF 101 Brief)

Some members of the JIEDDTF worked with CENTCOM on a Counter-IED

Campaign Plan. CENTCOM choose three lines of operations to describe the effort. The

JIEDDTF adopted a modified version of these lines of operation. The JIEDDTF

restructured its strategic approach along three lines of operation: Defeat the IED System,

[later rephrased as Attack the Network to emphasize an offensive component] (Allyn,

personal communication, October 17, 2006) Defeat the Device, and Train the Force. A

Joint Common Operational Picture (JCOP) and Joint Common Intelligence Picture (JCIP)

informed all three of these lines of operation. [See Figure 3] The new approach

recognized an integrated application of synchronized techniques delivered comprehensive

Common Operating Picture

Train the Force

Defeat the IED System

Defeat the IED Device

“…prevent the emplacement of the IED by attacking enemy vulnerabilities at multiple points in the IED system.”

“…defeat the device once it is

emplaced...”

“…facilitate the establishment and

growth of Coalition and partner nation counter-

IED capability.”

37


success. As the JIEDDTF adopted this strategy, it began treading on the turf of many

organizations involved in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency.

Other organizations and task forces for terrorism and insurgency existed prior to

the JIEDDTF. The OSD-ATL task force, the CTTTF, mentioned earlier took a

technology-centric approach to counterterrorism. The collaboration between the CTTTF

and JIEDDTF mitigated any duplication of effort and the close partnership overseen at

OSD level alleviated any issues with authority. However, other efforts were not as

closely associated with the JIEDDTF.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms

(ATF) similarly delved into terrorism. The National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC)

responded to the Army as a center of excellence for irregular warfare. The previously

mentioned Army AWG treaded on very similar ground but in close collaboration with the

JIEDDTF. The intelligence community (IC) also actively pursued initiatives closely

aligned with some aspects of the Joint IED Defeat effort but not collaboratively with

DOD. This partially listing offers a brief perspective of the perception that developed as

the JIEDDTF expanded its three lines of operation to defeat the IED enabling activities

offensively.

Adopting these three lines of operation necessitated a predictive and offensive

approach in order to Defeat the IED System. The JIEDDTF recognized that being

reactive gave the advantage to the enemy. BG Votel initiated development of a

preemptive, human-centric component to his strategic approach.

The desire for preemption required red teaming. The design of a red teaming

capability for the IED Defeat effort assembled cultural experts, scientists, seasoned

38


operators, intelligence professionals, and explosives experts designed to provide insights

into enemy innovation and reaction to coalition IED Defeat initiatives. In order to get

ahead of the enemy, the JIEDDTF had to develop the next generation of capability before

the enemy demonstrated his counter-measure to current capability.

Strategic to Tactical Unity of Effort

In May 2005, CENTCOM created a Counter-IED Task Force from a portion of its

staff. Previously, GEN Abizaid employed the JIEDDTF as one of his own JTFs. The

JIEDDTF delivered regular updates to the CENTCOM commander but had no

corresponding organization for staff coordination within CENTCOM. GEN Abizaid’s

sponsorship with the national, strategic-level organization was vital to the early success

of the JIEDDTF. Managing the tactical to strategic effort was difficult from the

Pentagon, and this counterpart organization improved coordination with CENTCOM and

units in theater. As the CENTCOM Counter-IED Task Force formed they pursued

contacts with the IA representatives in the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) resident

at CENTCOM. Action officers at CENTCOM attempted facilitation of greater IA

support by arranging a meeting between a high-level ATF director and BG Votel in

Washington D.C. but at the last minute, the ATF pulled out of the meeting. Due to

resource constraints, the ATF could not support greater involvement with DOD’s IED

effort.

Completion of both the Joint IED Defeat ICD and the CENTCOM Counter-IED

Campaign Plan occurred well into the DOD effort. Much like the challenges the

Coalition experienced with preparing to win and then sustain the peace in Iraq, the

asymmetry presented by the IED was not considered before the war. Clearly, the effort

39


took more time and resources than envisioned by the Service Chiefs and Secretaries the

previous summer. With a broader strategic approach for the IED effort underway, this

became an opportune time for soliciting greater IA participation but the AO-level attempt

back-fired. Preparations for a longer, more comprehensive DOD commitment to the IED

effort commenced just as the name of the “the ideological struggle of the 21st Century,”

changed from the Global War on Terror to the Long War. (Bush, 8/31/06) Renaming the

GWOT as the Long War, recognized terrorism as a tactic used in war, not war itself. The

Long War, or “ideological war”, implies a global insurgency as suggested by LTG David

Barno in an article quoted earlier in this paper. (Barno, 2006) Waging a global

counterinsurgency implies greater synchronization of all elements of national power,

inclusive of the IA, necessitating a long-term, unifying strategy for Joint IED Defeat.

40


Preparing for the Long War

Up until this time, BG Votel operated with a small staff. Innovating rapid

solutions and adjusting TTPs prioritized the JIEDDTF effort. He felt he could not grow

the organization rapidly enough to deal with the demands that evolving challenges

dictated. In hindsight, the JIEDDTF looked at too many things, according to BG Votel,

and a reduced scope of following a technology road map would have been preferable.

(Votel, personal communication, October 7, 2006) But by this time, senior leaders in the

Department acknowledged the IED menace would become part of the Long War.

Instilling a sense of urgency into an S&T culture accustomed to operating on

much longer time constants challenged the JIEDDTF. (Keesee, personnel

communication, November 17, 2006) The Office of Naval Research (ONR) began a

R&D effort for IED Defeat following instructions from Secretary England. Coordinating

the Join Laboratory Board (JLB) effort also concerned the JIEDDTF. Dr. Starnes Walker

of ONR collaborated with the JIEDDTF during the establishment of the JLB. JIEDDTF

gave the JLB primary focus of prioritizing, funding, and planning a long-term S&T effort

for promising emergent technological approaches discovered by academics and

laboratories. The time horizon for this effort was five to ten years. Walker, the chief

scientist for ONR, felt the Joint IED Defeat focus should be the entire human chain-of-

activities, or “kill chain.” (Boston Globe, June 25, 2006) The many disparate DOD

programs, laboratory efforts, and industry initiatives needed an expedited process for test

and evaluation.

41


Synchronizing the Test Effort

Each of the Services approached testing in their own way, and JIEDDO needed

systems developed where everyone worked together. The JIEDDTF needed a test

coordinator. BG Votel called on the assistance of the Army once again. MG Jim Myles

the commander of the Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) led a new Joint Test

Board for IED Defeat. A fairly loose confederation of the various test entities across the

Department, one of the tasks for this board was scheduling and prioritizing IED Defeat

initiatives for testing primarily at the Yuma Proving Ground facility.

The Joint Test Board proved an extremely important effort, especially during the

testing, and fielding of electronic countermeasures (ECM) coined (CREW) in IED Defeat

terminology for, Counter-IED Radio Controlled Electronic Warfare. Enemy employment

of radio controlled initiation systems increased markedly especially in Iraq. At times as

many as 70% of the IEDs consisted of RC initiators in specific regions of Iraq. The

enemy need for increased stand-off distance, coupled with the commercial availability of

RC components explained this surge. CREW emerged as more than a billion dollar

business by itself.

The fielding of CREW marked a paradigm shift for conventional ground forces.

Formerly only personal security detachments for high value individuals, Special

Operating Forces (SOF), and EOD response teams operated with ground-based ECM. Of

course, the Air Force and the Navy employed ECM for years, principally in airborne and

maritime operations.

Now, in an effort to prevent IED detonations, hundreds of ground combat units

were equipped with highly sensitive CREW systems. Literally thousands of CREW

42


systems were fielded, programmed, and then upgraded or reprogrammed during combat

operations due to the transitory nature of the IED threat. Accomplishing CREW fielding

without an established management structure and with very minimal pre-deployment

training proved another challenge. The US Navy stepped forward offering experienced

electronic warfare personnel which offered time for maturing the Army’s capability with

CREW. Those closest to the CREW effort claimed CREW fielding proved the largest

technological challenge for DOD in the war, on a scale last experienced in WWII.

In the minds of commanders and units preparing for deployment, the technology

and fielding challenge associated with CREW paled in importance to an even bigger

concern for them, ensuring tactical lessons and new TTPs were validated and provided to

the Services for pre-deployment training. Were these observations, lessons learned, and

best practices finding their way into doctrinal manuals, training standards, and

commanders’ pre-deployment training plans early enough to make a difference in saving

the lives of Soldiers and Marines? The answer surfaced through collaboration between

the JIEDDTF and Joint Forces Command (JFCOM).

Improving the Joint Training-base

The JIEDDTF needed a way to standardize emerging TTPs across the joint force.

Coaching units with tactical advice and providing training suggestions appeared the best

thing the early Army IED TF did for tactical units. The understaffed joint task force

regularly sought assistance from others. BG Votel thought soliciting support from

JFCOM could benefit the IED training effort.

The first foray to Norfolk, Virginia, happened in December 2004. The JIEDDTF

spoke about its approach and requirements to about 70 individuals, including three flag

43


officers led by the J3. It took several months before JFCOM fully engaged in the effort

but when they did there was an immediate impact. In August 2005, a large contingent

from JFCOM led by BG Tony Cucolo the Director of the Joint Center for Operational

Analysis (JCOA), attended a CENTCOM C-IED Conference and volunteered JFCOM for

some critical actions.

The JFCOM staff formed an IED Cell of their own under BG Don Broome, the

J5, and BG Cucolo’s staff at JCOA developed a framework for an operational analysis

effort on Joint IED Defeat. Up until the work of JFCOM, no joint doctrine, no joint

training regulations, really nothing of a formal, doctrinal nature on Joint IED Defeat

existed. JFCOM rectified this shortfall and assisted in capturing joint tactical lessons

learned, something outside of their charter but something desperately needed. The

JIEDDTF provided funding for a JFCOM prototype effort known as, Knowledge and

Information Fusion Exchange (KnIFE). The concept included building a responsive staff

of analysts and doctrine writers for inquiries on IED related questions. This staff drafted

joint lessons learned and posted them on a new website allowing 24/7 access and

collaboration. JFCOM’s collaboration also prompted the Chairman’s, Joint Chiefs of

Staff (CJCS) interest in the training needs of the Services for Joint IED Defeat.

During late summer of 2005, GEN Richard Myers, the CJCS, instructed LTG Ray

Odierno, Assistant to the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, to conduct a joint training needs

assessment for the IED threat. Over the course of several weeks, he received briefings,

traveled to training sites, and talked to commanders, Soldiers and Marines. Following

LTG Odierno’s assessment a joint working group developed a proposal for a Joint Center

of Excellence (JCOE) for Joint IED Defeat. LTG Odierno championed the need for the

44


JCOE before the Service Chiefs at a JCS Tank briefing outlining its critical roles,

functions, and essential manning requirements. (Allyn, personal communication,

October 17, 2006) The goal of the JCOE became training preparation of joint forces for

fighting with well developed TTPs, excellent, current situational awareness, and the right

equipment solutions. Selection of a facility location proved a key Service issue

deliberated at the JCS Tank briefing.

The final choice of a training location was the Army National Training Center

(NTC) at Fort Irwin, now concurrently designated as the Joint Center of Excellence for

IED Defeat. The Army already modified its training regimen at the NTC and the Joint

Readiness Training Center for units bound for Iraq (OIF) or Afghanistan (OEF). Pre-

deployment exercises, called MREs, or Mission Rehearsal Exercises, for OIF and OEF

required currency for training to the threats in these two theaters. The Commanding

General of the NTC serves concurrently as the Director of the JCOE for the JIEDDTF

and receives additional staff and funding support for this new effort. He oversees the

efforts of all four Services at locations determined by the Services.

The Marines use 29 Palms Marine Base, the Air Force Lackland Air Force Base,

and the Navy its Indianhead facility in Maryland. Each Service was assigned functional

specialties based on Service core competencies to develop concepts of operation

(CONOPs) and TTPs. The JCOE would lead efforts to integrate CONOPs and TTPs for

full spectrum operations in collective, combined arms scenarios. Once trainers validated

new CONOPs, leaders required training to recognize threat warning signs and modify

their training approaches to this new environment. (Meigs, 2003)

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Approval of the JCOE concept occurred in November 2005 and simultaneously

the Service Chiefs recommended elevating the Director of the JIEDDTF to a three or

four-star flag officer. The deliberations at the JCS Tank briefing acknowledged complete

Joint Service acceptance for Joint IED Defeat. Service posturing experienced the

previous summer over budget impacts from the IED effort become immaterial. Service

values for Joint IED Defeat coalesced with this decision. The senior leaders of the

military, the Joint Chiefs, submitted a consensus recommendation to Secretary Rumsfeld

for final approval.

Approval of a Permanent JIEDDTF

In November 2005, Secretary Rumsfeld approved the upgrade of the director

position and gave the Services two weeks to recommend a new flag officer as the

JIEDDTF director. Rumsfeld and the Service Chiefs wanted a “more senior

commander’s operational perspective” for the Joint IED Defeat effort. Secretary

Rumsfeld expected the effort, “to encompass the manner in which our forces operate,

their tactics, and their procedures.” (DOD News Release, December 5, 2005)

Additionally, Rumsfeld instructed OSD and the Joint Staff to assess the need for a

permanent organization.

In essence, the JIEDDTF bought time for an institutional determination if a

permanent capability for the IED threat proved necessary. (Keesee, personal

communication, 17 November 2006) With permanent recognition of the Joint IED

Defeat Organization, DOD Directive 2000.19 required updating. Significant

organizational and procedural lessons emerged during the update of the directive.

Consensus by the senior military leaders in each Service and the Chairman allowed

46


organizational innovation because they all viewed it in the best interest of their Services

and the long-term interests of the institution. (Nagl, 2002) By creating a permanent

organization, DOD shifted primacy for synchronizing and funding the IED effort to the

Director. Secretary Rumsfeld agreed with the Service Chiefs expanding the IED joint

training effort with the JCOE. He also approved a more senior leader, one with a broader

operational perspective on a par with the Service Chiefs for the JIEDDO Director.

On 12 December 2005, General Montgomery C. Meigs (USA, Ret.), assumed his

new role as the Director for the JIEDDTF. GEN Meigs is the former Commander of US

Army Europe and 7th Army, and the Louis A. Bantle Professor at the Maxwell School of

Syracuse University. GEN Meigs drew regularly on his experience as commander of the

NATO peacekeeping force in Bosnia, a constant reference point for him. By mid-January

2006, the Joint Staff and OSD recommendation for a permanent organization received

approval from Secretary Rumsfeld, completing the history of the JIEDDTF as depicted in

Figure 4.

GEN Meigs brought with him two individuals that served previously with him

while on active duty. They proved critical to implementing Meigs’ concepts for his new

organization. Mr. Maxie McFarland, the Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence at the Army

Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) served as special advisor to GEN Meigs,

his immediate task, increasing the intelligence capability of the JIEDDO. Mr. Steve

Kirin, MITRE Corporation, reviewed and refined the operational assessment approach for

the organization. Concurrent with the update to the directive, GEN Meigs conducted a

mission analysis from December 2005 to about March 2006.

47


Figure 4, JIEDDTF transition to JIEDDO Timeline

JIEDDO Mission Statement“Focus (lead, advocate, coordinate) all Department of Defense actions in support of Combatant Commanders' and their respective Joint Task Forces' efforts to defeat Improvised Explosive Devices as weapons of strategic influence.”

JIEDDO’s mission requires coordination and collaboration between the

COCOMs. Terrorist organizations constitute global enterprises with recruiting,

financing, supplying, and training of the IED network spanning the geographic

COCOMs. JIEDDO must foster permanent linkages into a broad, consistent IA

constituency in order to synchronize support for the COCOMs. Given the magnitude of

JIEDDO’s mission, assessing common measures of effectiveness became a priority for

the organization as well as the commanders it supports.

Army IED TF formedOct ‘03

P4 letter for Manhattan

ProjectJune ‘04

Afghan Field Team deploys

April ‘04

Iraq Field Team deploysDec ‘03

Joint IPT formed July ‘04

DODD 2000.19 June ‘05

BAA issued thru TSWG

Feb ‘05

JCS TankApproves JCOE

Nov ‘05

GEN Meigsappointed Director

Dec ‘05

SECDEFApproves mission

Permanent JIEDDO

est. Jan ‘06

DODD 2000.19E

Jan ‘06

48


Growing Pains for JIEDDO

Getting an Operational Assessment Effort off the Ground

Prior to GEN Meigs’ arrival, the JIEDDTF designed an operational assessment

architecture for measuring the effectiveness of fielded Joint IED Defeat initiatives. BG

Votel recognized that, “We didn’t develop metrics and an OA effort to gauge progress

and drive the effort.” (Votel, personal communication, October 7, 2006) At the urging

of the Vice Chairman, ADM Ed Giambastiani, BG Votel directed a small group to come

up with a plan.

The early Operational Assessment (OA) approach involved Joint Forces

Command (JFCOM) and several Federally Funded Research and Development

Companies (FFRDCs) that each contributed to the effort. According to the professionals

from the FFRDCs, unprecedented as it was for them to work together like this, they also

recognized none of them could do this alone. It was also clear that the JIEDDTF staff

needed outside help for something of this magnitude. The JIEDDTF needed to determine

if it was making a difference. It needed a feedback loop into institutional subject matter

experts.

BG Votel and ADM (R) Dennis Blair of the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA)

conducted a decision brief on the OA strategy to ADM Giambastiani who endorsed it and

told them to get GEN Abizaid’s approval. A week later ADM Blair and BG Votel

briefed GEN Abizaid. The result of that briefing: CENTCOM wanted OA started almost

immediately. Before commencing, however, GEN Abizaid wanted concurrence from

GEN George Casey, the commanding general of Multi-National Force Iraq (MNF-I). On

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December 27, 2005, a small team met with GEN Casey in the Pentagon. GEN Casey

neither approved nor disapproved the OA plan. Instead he asked GEN Meigs to “come to

the theater for two weeks and feel my pain and then make recommendations” in theater

before beginning an effort of this magnitude. GEN Casey didn’t want any more outside

help from a lot of “50-pound brains”. Meigs observed from his research on WWII

subsurface warfare, there needed to be an intimate relationship linking scientists with

military operators to uncover potential technological solutions. (Meigs, 1990) GEN

Meigs left for theater the next week with a small team.

Meigs traveled to Iraq and Afghanistan and met with commanders and their staffs.

He took Mr. McFarland and Mr. Kirin with him to assist in his theater assessment. GEN

Meigs also imparted his initial guidance to the JIEDDO field team leaders.

At the same time GEN Meigs traveled around CENTCOM’s theater, at the

direction of the senior intelligence officials in DOD, a five-man joint team of Marines

and Army traveled to Iraq. The team conducted an assessment of the tactical-to-strategic

intelligence linkages for the Joint IED Defeat effort. The week prior to this trip, GEN

Meigs and Mr. McFarland discussed their ideas for expanding the intelligence effort for

IED Defeat. Their concept included building capability at the brigade and regiment level

in the following areas: a law enforcement intelligence capability, adding investigative

skills forward for site exploitation, expanding technical IED exploitation and adding

cryptologic support teams at the tactical level.

GEN Meigs’ concept met resistance from both the Army and USMC intelligence

chiefs. The team’s purpose was providing DOD decision-makers with an accurate

depiction of actions at the brigade combat team or regimental combat team (BCT/RCT)

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level to defeat insurgent and terrorist use of IEDs and recommending task-organization of

teams of individuals and or capabilities for deployment to an Army brigade or Marine

regiment. Meigs argued that the experience of senior law enforcement professionals,

working closely with brigade and division staffs, would greatly improve units ability to

target the nexus of criminal, corrupt former intelligence service operatives, and

paramilitary forces that provided the foundation of the IED networks. They also would

be able to provide special training in areas in which conventional forces were weak, like

sensitive site exploitation and development of the evidentiary materials needed to convict

terrorists in Iraqi courts.

The Army G2, LTG Jeffrey Kimmons, suggested the Army lead the survey team.

The JIEDDO provided a seasoned operator with IED experience and the USMC provided

both intelligence and IED expertise to the team. (McFarland, personal communication,

October 24, 2006) All five members were carefully chosen because of previous combat

experience in Iraq. General consensus from OIF returnees revealed that the intelligence

community could do much more for tactical war-fighters confronted by the IED.

The month long survey traveled throughout Iraq visiting 13 Forward Operating

Bases encompassing 35 different units from the Corps staff down to squad level. The in-

country portion of the survey culminated with a report to GEN Meigs while he was still

in theater. LTG Pete Chiarelli, the commanding general of Multi-National Corps Iraq

(MNC-I), and GEN Meigs discussed the findings of the report with GEN Casey. The

survey team’s principle finding was that Soldiers and Marines wanted better

understanding of the IED threat in their specific employment region. Soldiers were

hungry for better intelligence and at times felt unsure of what they would encounter.

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Another recurring theme emerged relating to enemy agility with IEDs which led one

commander to say, “What works today will not work tomorrow simply because it worked

today.” (Kirin, personal communication, November 17, 2006)

Many observations of the IED survey team coincided with what GEN Meigs and

his team of McFarland and Kirin discovered. GEN Casey approved four areas for

operational assessment including: assessment of pre-deployment training, identification

of best practices, CREW effectiveness, and he directed study on what he termed, “leap-

frog the threat”, implying a red team effort to predict what the enemy would try next.

(Kirin, personal communication, November 17, 2006) While the survey team

observations remain classified, the report confirmed many of GEN Meigs’ previous

thoughts; he used this report to get his point across with leaders in the Pentagon and the

intelligence community. With the report finalized, the survey team briefed the

intelligence and operations leadership in the Pentagon. These leaders generally accepted

the findings and agreed adjustments were necessary.

However, the nature of Pentagon bureaucracy often stifles innovation by agreeing

with a proposal and then not acting on it. (McFarland, personal communication, October

24, 2006) The default setting for the institution is to sustain its norm. The institution,

designed for the Cold War, performs remarkably for what it was designed to do. But,

institutional biases inherent in DOD culture restrict agility and responsiveness when

confronted with unexpected challenges.

This impression of Pentagon bureaucracy isn’t prophetic. For the past several

years, DOD leaders led by Secretary Rumsfeld recognized transformation as necessary to

overcome cultural biases and preclude bureaucratic incoherence. It took a leader with the

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seniority of a four-star general to push ideas through the Pentagon. GEN Meigs had the

vision, leadership, and importantly, the trusted relationships with senior leaders in the

Pentagon to accomplish the work. The IED effort required entrepreneurial freedom and a

degree of independence from bureaucratic norms. Since the institution accepted GEN

Meigs, he could work on the fringes of Service hierarchies. While the DOD leadership

embraced GEN Meigs, an internal Pentagon report written for CENTCOM critical of the

Joint IED Defeat campaign, stated the JIEDDO effort was “poorly focused” and overly

reliant on large defense contractors providing Cold War technical solutions. The report

claimed the JIEDDO approach neglected the human terrain. (The Project on Government

Oversight, 2006)

“The Americans may have all the wristwatches, but we have all the time.” – Taliban

leader (Barno, 2006)

GEN Meigs and GEN Abizaid both felt the long-term answer to the IED problem

required the Iraqi people to deal with the insurgency. (Meigs, September 8, 2006). GEN

Abizaid stated that technical solutions and devices coming out of the Pentagon would not

stop the bombings, only people could stop the bombings, indicating only the Iraqi people

would eventually solve the IED problem. (The Boston Globe, June 25, 2006) Comments

written by LTG Chiarelli’s in his article published in Military Review demonstrate the

subtleties of fighting an insurgency.

“[A] task force could win engagements by killing or capturing an insurgent emplacing an improvised explosive device, and it could win battles by targeting, disrupting, and killing off insurgent cells. But it could only win the campaign if the local populace revealed insurgent and terrorist cells and, accordingly, denied sanctuary.” (Chiarelli & Michaelis, Jul/Aug 2005)

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The codependent relationship between hostile IED use in the broader context of

combating insurgency and terrorism resulted in JIEDDO supporting a wide range of

training and education initiatives for the military institution. Although not as widely

known, possibly because the initiatives did not involve big defense contractors and large

funding commitments, both JIEDDTF and JIEDDO supported initiatives in

counterinsurgency. Returning commanders and JIEDDTF field team personnel learned

the importance of cultural understanding and language training. Taught the advantages

of high-technology, commanders witnessed its limitations as well. A recurring theme

emerged from Soldiers and Marines, they needed more detailed information on

community leaders, individuals, tribes, political parties, past attack areas, social gathering

places, etc. for the areas where they lived and fought. GEN Casey could only effect rapid

capability formation in Iraq and the leaders deploying to his command desperately

needed counterinsurgency training. To prepare newly deployed commanders for the

intellectual rigors of their duties in counterinsurgency, GEN Casey created a

Counterinsurgency Academy in Taji, Iraq. JIEDDO contributed a portion of the

instruction and funding for the academy. Providing targeting support for identification of

bomb-makers and the enabling activities that support IED use: financing, recruiting,

supply, targeting, etc… required improved intelligence on bomb-makers’ customers as

well as their innocent victims. (McFate, 2005)

Familiarity with the Iraqi judicial process provides a valuable example of how

cultural understanding impacted the early IED effort. Investigative skills proved vital

when prosecuting cases against alleged IED attackers. Investigation skills such as:

preserving a crime scene, evidence collection and processing, witness questioning, and

54


developing community crime trends, common among law enforcement professionals,

support the Iraqi government’s enforcement of the rule of law. The Iraqi judicial system,

historically a confession-based process, was at times uncomfortable with scientifically

obtained evidence. Both the JIEDDTF and JIEDDO, invested in biometric technology,

metal detection scanners, surveillance equipment, and explosive residue detectors for the

purpose of obtaining evidence against suspected IED attackers. Convincing Iraqi courts

using American evidentiary standards becomes difficult when prosecuting IED cases,

especially involving individuals accused of enabling IED attacks, such as: financiers,

suppliers, recruiters, and bomb-makers. In all but cases involving individuals that

actually handled explosives where physical explosive residue implicated an attacker, the

cases proved difficult to close, absent the required evidence. Demonstrating the science

behind the equipment eased the concerns of judges and improved acceptance of some

technologies. Judges preferred certain evidence gathering techniques over others. Based

on feedback from deployed commanders, JIEDDO adjusted equipment purchases to

judicial preferences. Understanding the nuances of Iraqi society with this sort of cultural

awareness required institutional reform.

The Services adjusted education and training across the force as a prerequisite

for success in the Long War. (McFarland, 2005) In 2004, JIEDDTF contracted cultural

anthropologists and social scientists developing a pilot effort called the Cultural

Preparation of the Environment (CPE). Military training and education on cultural issues

provided knowledge in only the broadest terms, so this initiative closed a significant

institutional gap potentially providing information to current commanders and their

successors. It provided clear recognition of the linkage between counterinsurgency

55


success and success against the IED. Units needed new organizational approaches to

enhance investigative skills.

Weapons Intelligence Teams

The JIEDDO provided funding and training oversight to the development of

Weapons Intelligence Teams (WITs) for brigade-level incident investigation and site

exploitation. WITs followed an example used by the United Kingdom. Implementation

of the WIT concept offset the constrained availability of EOD forces. JIEDDTF hoped

WITs could help span this void and initiated a modest prototype effort. The Army

mobilized a reserve component military intelligence battalion, assigned it a completely

new mission, and retrained the battalion’s personnel while forming the WITs.

The National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) developed and sponsored the

initiative and received JIEDDTF funding for the first phase of the effort, when six of

these WITs deployed to Iraq. The concept provided a crime scene investigation (CSI)

capability at IED post-blast sites or uncovered weapons and ammunition caches. Pairing

the skills of intelligence analysts and law enforcement professionals with EOD

technicians afforded intensive investigative capacity.

The JIEDDO expanded the program based on the success of the pilot effort

approved previously by the JIEDDTF. All maneuver brigades eventually received a WIT

team in Iraq. After JIEDDO efforts soliciting support from federal law enforcement

agencies failed, JIEDDO provided funding for private contractors to supplement brigade

investigation capability with former law enforcement professionals. Additionally, with

WITs habitually aligned with specific maneuver brigades, ground commanders now

turned to an organic resource for detailed analysis. JIEDDO also provided law

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enforcement criminologists to its field teams bolstering on-site investigation skills and

providing feedback to brigade commanders. The WITs, universally accepted by

maneuver commanders, proved a valuable organizational initiative which the military

institution evaluated for permanent inclusion into the force structure.

The combined capability of the CEXC and the WITs improved technical

exploitation and the forensics analysis capacity of Coalition Forces. Trends in the

construction of IEDs, identification of employment patterns and emergent technologies

were now possible at forward locations. Additionally, the JIEDDTF and JIEDDO

provided oversight and funding for enhanced forensics exploitation in the US by

partnering with the FBI. Gathering the IED components and transporting them to the

TEDAC followed after initial exploitation by the WITs and CEXCs. High priority IED

components were sent to the FBI’s Terrorist Explosive Device Analysis Center

(TEDAC). The influx of IEDs from Iraq quickly exceeded the capacity of TEDAC.

JIEDDO provided additional funds for increasing the staff of the TEDAC and JIEDDO

oversight insured proper scheduling for priority exploitation and analysis. At the

TEDAC, components underwent detailed analysis to enable gathering of biometric

evidence. Existing international criminal databases occasionally confirmed suspected

terrorists. This evidence proved useful for decisions on detainee releases and criminal

cases in Iraqi courts. Although designed with a common vision, the two theaters

employed this technical exploitation capability in different ways.

Organizational Approaches CJTF-76 and MNC-I

While there are significant differences in the nature of the IED threat between

Iraq and Afghanistan, it is natural as well as valuable to compare the situation,

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approaches, and solutions in both countries. In terms of magnitude, a typical day of IED

activity in Iraq represented a month of IED attacks in Afghanistan.

In Afghanistan the command embraced the JIEDDTF field team. The JIEDDTF

field team formed the nucleus of a counter-IED task force for CJTF-76 called Task Force

Paladin. The Commander of Combined Joint Task Force 76 (CJTF-76), MG Ben

Freakley, selected the JIEDDO field team leader, COL Chuck Waggoner, who served

concurrently as the TF Paladin commander. Waggoner’s purview included all forces and

capabilities related to countering the IED. Source documents for TF Paladin complicated

the staffing of the organization because the requests and authorizations came in a

piecemeal fashion. The harsh terrain and remote widely dispersed locations of forces

necessitated forward positioning of counter IED assets, collocated with maneuver units.

TF Paladin focused its support on the brigade combat teams at their forward locations in

a dynamic, tailored fashion. (Allyn, personal communication, October 17, 2006)

Waggoner distributed his CEXC personnel as members of the regional counter IED teams

for responsive IED exploitation. While CJTF-76 created a task force offering a dual

mission for the JIEDDO Afghanistan field team, the magnitude of the IED threat in Iraq

required a different approach. GEN Meigs left Afghanistan having witnessed a

significantly different threat environment than what he would see in Iraq.

In Iraq, XVIII Airborne Corps turned over authority to LTG Pete Chiarelli and his

V Corps forming the new MNC in Iraq during January 2006. The Corps leadership

formed a counter-IED task force of its own, called Task Force Troy. Approval of the task

force concept and source documents occurred with XVIII Corps, but TF Troy was just

forming at the time of GEN Meigs’ visit.

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TF Troy, more typical of a hierarchical organization, followed a support brigade

model and centralized its CEXC in Baghdad. (Allyn, personal communication, October

17, 2006) The British had a corresponding CEXC cell in Basra. The approach in Iraq

used the JIEDDO field team in an advisory role to MNC-I and not at all in the same

fashion as GEN Meigs saw in Afghanistan. He naturally questioned why and offered his

views and assistance to both LTG Chiarelli and GEN Casey.

Challenges with theater integration of emergent requirements resulted in

institutional friction over the previous months, not the least of which was CREW

fielding. GEN Meigs thought now that DOD created a permanent organization for IED

Defeat the JIEDDO should take a larger but behind the scenes role, especially with the

fielding of CREW. The new organization, as well as deployed operational commanders,

had yet to define and understand the role, authorities, and scope of mission of the

JIEDDO.

The rapid growth of the Joint IED Defeat effort coupled with the increased

authority entrusted to GEN Meigs and the JIEDDO through the DOD directive required

interpretation among forward deployed commanders. Explaining roles and

responsibilities for JIEDDO seemed prudent. The JIEDDO provides support to the

combatant commanders by performing the following key tasks:

Manage, resource, and focus the strategic to tactical IED Defeat effort for

Department of Defense by supporting the Combatant Commanders in their

operational and tactical efforts,

Provide the appropriate influence across the Services and coordinated with the

COMCENT,

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Provide oversight for the Joint CREW Fielding Office (JCFO) and CREW

fielding in support of Navy effort to man electronic warfare officer (EWO)

positions and all other EW efforts,

Provide the strategic linkage and reach-back capability for forward elements

for technical and forensics exploitation for the long war,

Serve as the "gatekeeper and sponsor" for all IED Defeat technology entering

theater,

Coordinate CREW strategy and resources that support MNC-I and CJTF-76.

Mission Analysis Complete

GEN Meigs previous writings about asymmetric threats, Slide Rules and

Submarines and Unorthodox Thoughts on Asymmetric Warfare prepared him for his new

role. “The ability to deploy a new weapon without the enemy’s knowledge offers an

opportunity to attack him from a dimension he does not perceive…Asymmetries in

capability accelerate the killing.” (Meigs, 1990, p. 214) He also commented, “The

combination of asymmetry and the terrorists’ ability continually to devise idiosyncratic

approaches presents our real challenge.” (Meigs, 2003, p. 4) These writings form the

blueprint for his approach to the IED problem. GEN Meigs concluded that there is a

need to combine the ingenuity of scientists and rigorous operational analysis with savvy

military leaders to develop innovative but pragmatic solutions to unique problems of

operational art. (Meigs, 1990)

Where the JIEDDTF focused on innovation and speed to get solutions in theater

rapidly, GEN Meigs recalibrated the JIEDDO effort to develop turnkey solutions, still

rapidly but with a more complete package at something better than the previous 51%

60


solution. (McFarland, personal communication, October 24, 2006) GEN Meigs heard the

complaints of commanders about the challenges they experienced with equipment

fielding, training soldiers to use it, and developing CONOPs on the fly. GEN Meigs

pushed for improved integration and interoperability of IED Defeat initiatives. He guided

JIEDDO using an investment banking strategy providing venture capital for promising

technologies. He thought investment money for R&D was “the bread and butter of our

effort”. (Meigs, personnel communication, December 11, 2006) The first 90 days of

GEN Meigs tenure at the helm of JIEDDO concluded with a presentation to the President

explaining DOD’s Joint IED Defeat strategy.

Brief to the POTUS

By March 2006, JIEDDO hit the radar screen of President George W. Bush. On

Saturday, 11 March, GEN Meigs accompanied Secretary Rumsfeld to the White House

for a classified briefing to President Bush. BG Votel and a small team, a few months

earlier, presented a classified intelligence update to Vice President Cheney, but the

meeting with the President led to something significantly different.

The President included the work JIEDDO was doing on the IED threat as part of a

speech citing it as a vital part of his focus on the Global War on Terror. The brief

outlined what Bush called the nation’s plan to defeat the threat of IEDs. The plan had

three components: Targeting, Training, and Technology.

The President also addressed a factor needing more attention. Iraqis were the

principle victims of IED attacks and this form of terror attack could erode their

confidence in the future of a free Iraq. Tips from Iraqis provided critical intelligence to

target terrorists and bomb-makers. What the President failed to do, undoubtedly because

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of his preoccupation with IED casualties in Iraq, was order comprehensive, long-term

interagency support. Expanding DOD’s mandate as lead agency for the Joint IED Defeat

mission and authorizing formal IA agreements never occurred. Pursuing the global

aspect of the JIEDDO mission seems futile without a comprehensive IA strategy.

DOD Directive 2000.19 promoted institutional continuity and unity of effort for

DOD’s Joint IED Defeat campaign. A Presidential Directive could similarly enable

greater IA acceptance and involvement with the JIEDDO effort. The ad hoc, hierarchical

nature of the IA process created unnecessary impediments to the effort. GEN Meigs’

subsequent pursuit of increased intelligence support for JIEDDO relied on more support

from the IC. Following the President’s speech emphasizing the IED threat, JIEDDO

assembled a small group of outside senior thinkers for charting a new course for the

organization.

JIEDDO Brainstorming: It’s not just the speed you travel but the route you take to your

objective that leads to success.

At an offsite conference in April 2006, GEN Meigs’ advised his team to, “Use

ambiguity in the IED Defeat Directive as an opportunity to apply organizational

strengths. We are not here to solve today’s problem. We are here to decide how to

preempt tomorrow’s problem.” (Meigs, personal communication, April 7, 2006)

One of the out-of-the-box thinkers that frequently works with DOD organizations,

Bran Ferren said, “We, [meaning DOD], tend to spend more time looking for answers

than asking the right questions.” (Ferren, personal communication, April 7, 2006) The

group outlined six challenges: complexity management, educating the audience on the

nature of the problem, acquisition, technology transfer and system engineering, drive

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necessary R&D effort by coordinating what’s being done, and outreach interface

(branding, image, salesmanship). Three temporal regimes framed the challenges: current,

emerging and future. GEN Meigs settled on three operating principles for his strategy:

Take a long, broad view

Develop a good organization with trust and talent

Shape the battle

GEN Meigs’ idea of preemption nested well with the Bush doctrine of preemption

outlined in the National Security Strategy issued in March 2006, but necessitated an

expansion in the JIEDDO staff. With preemption comes a corresponding requirement for

greater intelligence capability in the JIEDDO. The JIEDDO built new capability to

predict threats so commanders were not forced to be reactive. JIEDDO proactively

shaped its future capacity rather than changing reactively. Meigs recognized that while

JIEDDO strove to become the preeminent organization for addressing the IED threat but

the organization’s intelligence staff appeared inadequate. The organization required

access to a network of intelligence organizations and needed greater depth of experience

as well as physically greater capacity for analysis. (McFarland, personal communication,

October 24, 2006) JIEDDO felt a larger IA convergence could bridge the gap and focus

on the global strategic problem of IEDs.

Eliminating the IED threat required collaboration and orchestration of the IA

process and international effort. (Mendelsohn, 2005) The envisioned JIEDDO

organizational structure enhanced the capacity for synchronizing a more comprehensive

approach than previously possible. How and why did the JIEDDO grow the way it did?

The internally generated growth from GEN Meigs’ desired expansion of the intelligence

63


and OA capacity represented only part of the reason behind the organization’s growth. A

retrospective examination of organizational stressors and past successes and failures of

the JIEDDTF answers many of these questions.

Self-awareness of previous external demands beckoned the need for

organizational growth. As a small, manageable sized JTF for BG Votel, the JIEDDTF

experienced recurring requirements from Congress, the media, and senior DOD

leadership. This shifted BG Votel’s primary effort, and an inordinate amount of his time,

to strategic communication. Preparing him for these sessions consumed the small staff

detracting from the amount of support it provided deployed commanders. Industry

inquiries and follow-up on research or test developments on initiatives under JIPT

consideration consumed a significant portion of the JIEDDTF technical and support staff.

The internal environment within Pentagon bureaucracy necessitated greater depth of

experience and knowledge of business processes. Institutional, Pentagon-centric

expertise was significantly different than the SOF-based, tactically-focused training

advice originally envisioned when the Army initiated the task force. Cold War founded

R&D, acquisition, procurement, and contracting policies and processes formed

cumbersome barriers to rapid fielding of IED solutions. Finding work-around

alternatives required greater expertise in DOD institutional processes. Demands on the

nimble JIEDDTF outpaced its ability to sustain the effort. The decision for a permanent

DOD IED effort resulted in significant organizational growth.

The organization grew from a temporary, ad hoc task force of less than 20

personnel working in the basement of the Pentagon to a 365-person jointly-manned,

permanent organization with senior professionals at the helm. JIEDDO grew in more

64


ways than just size. A significant increase in talent and experience accompanied the

growth of the JIEDDO. The Army IED Task Force began with a lone general officer and

a single mobilized National Guard colonel guiding it. The JIEDDO transformation

included four Senior Executive Service (SES) civilian positions, one a former four-star

general, and two brigadiers, one the Deputy Director for Operations and one with a dual

mission at the JCOE and the NTC. Also, the staff expanded with a dozen or so colonels

and very experienced civilian contractors, most of them recently retired colonels. It took

nearly ten months however for completion of all the requirements for manning through

the DOD personnel system. Anticipating an influx of new personnel over the next

several months, GEN Meigs wanted an internally focused organizational strategy written

based on the results of the brainstorming discussion.

GEN Meigs wanted a short, to the point, strategy document, akin to the

commander’s intent. This document shaped the organizational culture for JIEDDO.

Much of the writing took inspiration from Chinese philosopher, Sun Tzu, emphasizing

the new emphasis on intelligence and operational assessment following the notion, “If

ignorant of your enemy and yourself, you are certain in every battle to be in peril.” (Sun

Tzu, 450BC/1963, p. 84) There was extensive editing by JIEDDO’s leadership along the

way. GEN Meigs previous writing best capture his thoughts as noted below.

“Defeating these new threats requires us to restructure our decision systems for operations and to reorganize our structures for intelligence requirements, collection, and fusion. It requires hybrid teams of out-of-the-box thinkers, scientists, and military professionals working under pressure together. It relies on matching agency expertise and access to the operational setting as a matter of national mandate.” (Meigs, 2003, p. 18)

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The quote above represents both the driving challenge and the opportunity

JIEDDO balances daily in regards to the IED effort. Although he did not know it at the

time he wrote it, GEN Meigs’ comments about relying on “matching agency expertise

and access” applies particularly well to the needs of the Joint IED Defeat strategy. The

typical hierarchical, ad hoc IA process does not provide operational continuity or

consistent IA staff representation. How does one grow an organization of the type

described by Meigs and keep a fresh, agile mind-set while engaging in the IA processes

and systems inherent in big government bureaucracy? The answer seemed to grow the

capability of JIEDDO, specifically its capacity for robust intelligence and operational

assessment while enabling IA connectivity with IA liaisons. More capacity in these two

areas proved vital to GEN Meigs for accomplishing JIEDDO’s basic concept vision as an

organization. JIEDDO now strove for integrated application of many techniques in its

drive toward success. It was this organizational self-awareness, conceptualized during

the brainstorming session that permitted a cultural transition for JIEDDO. (Builder, 1989)

JIEDDO’s threat specific intelligence focus enabled development of integrated

operational capabilities in support of the COCOM commanders. JIEDDO refined the

methodology for measuring operational effect of IED solutions and the organization.

The OA strategy previously conceived required modification. The initial OA

concept relied heavily on FFRDCs. Kirin realized keeping the FFRDCs current with IED

specific data had become problematic. The FFRDC’s could not provide full-time, in-

house personnel to JIEDDO, limiting the effectiveness of the original approach. Kirin

assessed a demand of one man-year of effort to monitor and synchronize four man-years

of support from JIEDDO’s external partners. While contracts for outside support from

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the FFRDCs and others occurred, JIEDDO planned for significant increases in the

organic OA staff as well. (Kirin, personal communication, November 17, 2006)

Initially, until the assignment of full permanent staff, JIEDDO hired contractors

for critical skill positions, broadening the effort and bringing in more expertise. JIEDDO

reached out for key individuals with whom GEN Meigs had worked with in past

assignments. McFarland had a good understanding of what the general wanted.

Developing enhanced threat specific intelligence support was McFarland’s initial task.

However, threat specific intelligence accounted for much more than the IED as simply a

device. The threat constituted the network of activities that enabled IED use. In essence

the IED network accounts for the global insurgency, but JIEDDO concentrated primarily

on CENTCOM’s region. McFarland created recurring senior level forums throughout the

IC for IED specific intelligence issues. He also developed a network of IA liaisons

working at JIEDDO. “The enemy innovates on a global scale so we have to deal with

them globally.” (McFarland, personal communication, October 24, 2006) McFarland’s

personal effort and the work of JIEDDO required the IA and international community to

address the threat comprehensively.

“The essence of interagency coordination is the effective integration of multiple

agencies with their diverse perspectives and agendas.” (Joint Publication [JP] 3-08

volume 1, 2006, p. I-7) The JIEDDO’s encouraging strides with IA liaisons remained

somewhat personality driven, dependent on agency politics, coercive diplomacy, and

goodwill. Rather, the IED effort calls for a formal IA agreement that defines agency

responsibilities, assigns milestones, and establishes agency accountability for specific

objectives. Formal agreements permit a structured, collaborative IA enterprise capable of

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producing desired strategic effects in support of the geographic COCOMs. JIEDDO also

improved its support to the COCOMs offering assistance in tracking high value

individuals (HVIs), trend and pattern analysis, informing materiel development, and

strategic attack. JIEDDO built a new capability within its organization addressing the

concerns and desires uncovered by commanders over the previous two years. The

Counter-IED Operational Integration Center (COIC) enhanced JIEDDO’s ability for

direct support (DS) to forward deployed commanders.

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Moving Forward

Counter-IED Operational Integration Center

The COIC represents JIEDDO’s attempt at synchronizing a team of relevant IA

players working on problems identified by combat commanders. “Due to the diverse

interests of individual agencies, previous attempts at interagency coordination failed for

lack of national-level perspective, a staff for continuity, and adequate appreciation of the

need for an institutionalized coordination process.” (JP 3-08 volume 1, p. II-2) The

COIC facility offers a networked work environment capable of fusing operational,

intelligence, and embedded IA teams for improved support to combat maneuver

commanders. This operations and intelligence fusion center, interconnected to the

combat theater, provides access to real-time data and analysis. The digitized network

permits horizontal linkages allowing action officers (AOs) to collaboratively swarm on

problems and develop cross-agency solutions in direct response to field commanders’

support requests.

The design of the COIC, as depicted in Figure 5, involved developing a systems

integration lab (Sims lab) to test-drive new materiel and CONOP initiatives using real

data from theater for modeling and simulation (M&S), and to develop new analytical

tools. An operations lab monitored real-time events in theater using state of the art

technology and provided a venue for predeployment battle staff training. An IA

intelligence collection and analysis cell informed the simulation process and materiel

developers as well as reach back DS to commanders in theater. (McFarland, personal

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communication, October 24, 2006) Personnel in the operations lab refined CONOPs,

developed ideas for employment with

InnovationSpeed

JIEDDTF

IntegrationInteroperability

JIEDDO

Modeling & Simulation

Real Time Data

SystemIntegration

Lab

OPS Lab

Red Team

Directed StudiesORSA

KPPsMOEMOP

IDGaps & Seams

JCOECONOPs

Trai

ning

Improve direct support (DS)

to Warfighters

Figure 5, Capability transition from temporary JIEDDTF to permanent JIEDDO (Discussion Mr. Maxie McFarland & COL Bill Adamson, 24 OCT 2006)

units in theater and in pre-deployment training at the JCOE. A dedicated Red Team

portrayed the enemy perspective on likely action or reaction to new initiatives and

informed developers of potential gaps and seams in the initiative for future modifications

or spiral development. Once an integrated and interoperable system was tested and

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refined in the Sims Lab, key performance parameters (KPP), measures of effectiveness

(MOE), and measures of performance (MOP) could be written. The initiative could be

deployed and then assessed under operational conditions. Assessments by personnel in

theater would be analyzed by Operations, Research and Systems, Analysis (ORSA)

personnel to provide a coherent way to assess progress.

Staying Ahead of Emerging Threats

JIEDDO’s strategic relevance will increase if it can predict emergent threats and

exploit solutions which permit preemption. As the COIC Red Team matures, it may

serve the purpose of preemption. However, the scope of JIEDDO’s current charter

restricts its mission to improvised explosive threats. Broadening JIEDDO’s effort may

prove prudent in the near future. “Just as our adversaries will continuously change tactics

and approaches to seek our weaknesses, so must we be able to counter them through

continuous adaptation. If we do not, we risk the mistakes of the past.” (Skelton, 2004,

p.128) However, the rate of technological change makes prediction even harder in the

future.

Had predictive intelligence analysis forecast the prevalent use of IEDs as a tactic

in the GWOT, military forces would not be in the predicament experienced in Iraq and

Afghanistan. If the IED effort had started as a truly preemptive response, the lead agency

would properly belong within the intelligence community (IC). Internal reform and

mission overload in the IC cripples its capacity for additional effort. Michelle Flournoy,

an analyst at the CSIS, claimed that, “The US operational capacity rests almost entirely in

the Department of Defense.” (Flournoy and Murdock, p.8) Evolution of the IED threat

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compels DOD to seek greater support from the IA. Unfortunately, military forces

engaged in combat do not have the luxury of waiting for a perfect approach.

In retrospect, the conditions which led to the formation of the JIEDDO reveal a

strategic flaw in pursuing a military-centric approach. Much of the international

constituency the US must rely on in future conflicts has grown weary of US dominated

military responses. Additionally, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of 2006

concedes that the US military does not conceive of future military operations without

assistance from international and IA partners. The consequences of the IA resisting a

broader role against emerging IED threats reflects a continuation of unsatisfactory

performance and an incomplete strategy capable of delivering only military-centric

solutions.

The hostile use of IEDs by global insurgents necessitates a response properly

cultivated by intelligence and law enforcement agencies. These agencies require strong

linkages into international partners aligned under DOD for specific operations like, OIF

and OEF. The following line of reasoning develops a proposal for enhancing the IED

effort, improving operational performance against the IED threat.

As previously described, DOD responded to the IED threat initially in a reactive,

defensive mode relying primarily on technology to decrease casualties in Iraq. By

establishing JIEDDO, DOD entrusted the organization as a “change agent” for the IED

effort. The necessity for greater intelligence support for offensive operations resulted in a

recalibration of the JIEDDO main effort. Intelligence driven operations attacking IED

support networks in CENTCOM became the main effort. Concurrently, the internal

realignment of the IC under the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the

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consolidation of 22 federal agencies under DHS resulted in significant agency turbulence

preventing optimal support. Understandably, agency reform and organizational

turbulence curbed willingness by the IA to provide support combating IEDs. By default,

the predominant response to the IED threat comes from the military institution. Other

government agencies participated cautiously in the IED effort launched by DOD.

Because the IFF paid for the IED effort and CENTCOM casualties rose because of IEDs,

JIEDDO pursued a CENTCOM-centric strategy. The US government must underwrite

entrepreneurial risk and institute a coherent IA process that supports the operational need

resulting from the hostile use of IEDs.

The dynamic Joint IED Defeat strategy requires even greater IC involvement.

However, decision by committee or taking a team vote rarely optimizes organizational

performance. Teams build franchises around key players. The US government needs an

IA team of players with long-term focus and commitment, not sporadic involvement.

The team needs 100% commitment from everyone for optimal performance. Preferably,

an Executive Branch decision selecting a lead agency fosters agency-wide, laser-like

concentration on the hostile use of IEDs. This lead agency must do more than

coordinate meetings and forums for information exchange. The lead agency requires

regulatory authority over a consolidated IA team.

JIEDDO’s mission for DOD affords a unique position as coordinator of the

strategic IED effort. DOD invested the resources, developed business processes,

identified key leadership, and allocated the personnel in JIEDDO for a broad mission.

JIEDDO established linkages into the IA and across the COCOMs. The geographic

COCOMs execute the global IED strategy for DOD with JIEDDO in support. Regional

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COCOM areas of responsibility (AOR) preclude a global focus for the geographic

COCOMs. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) becomes the global partner for all

geographic COCOM’s. DOD’s planned expansion of SOF affords an opportunity for

greater collaboration on the IED threat. SOCOM’s current counterterrorist mission as

part of the GWOT compels stronger links between the JIEDDO and SOCOM. SOCOM’s

worldwide mission fosters global operational continuity and offers adequate military

force for preemptive offensive missions against insurgent sanctuaries. SOF missions of

this type require approval in consultation with the geographic COCOMs.

In combat operations like OIF and OEF, DOD through its COCOMs, leads the

operational response. The COCOMs, along with the Department of State (DOS), should

persuade like-minded global partners for support, using an international element of power

to deny global insurgents sanctuary in the relatively ungoverned areas of sovereign

territory. Taking preventive and preemptive offensive measures developed in concert

with international partners supports the global main effort.

Much of the work on counterterrorism accomplished by other agencies and

countries complements JIEDDO’s existing effort, easing concerns about greater

collaboration. Developing intelligence on terrorist networks proved difficult because of

a lack of human intelligence assets. Technical and biometric forensics from IEDs proved

a force multiplier that enabled precise targeting of insurgent networks and provided

valuable evidence, increasing the probability of convictions in criminal courts. Threat

specific IED intelligence developed by IA teams in the COIC represents a preliminary

step in what should become an on-going, robust collaborative effort. The DNI, linked to

DOD through JIEDDO, SOCOM, and the geographic COCOMs, properly continues the

74


intelligence focus against IED networks abroad. Domestically, DHS and the Department

of Justice (DOJ) assume the main effort in an enforcement role detaining suspects based

on intelligence from overseas sources fostered by DNI as well as their own domestically

obtained intelligence. Collectively, an interconnected IA team engages in a more

enduring offensive approach against the global IED threat in the Long War than

accomplished solely by JIEDDO. In the Long War, the IED threat constantly evolves,

and JIEDDO must first finish the task at hand in CENTCOM.

JIEDDO’s wartime support to CENTCOM remains unwavering, but as discussed,

realizing success against hostile IED use depends on the IA and SOCOM accepting

greater roles. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of 2006 concedes that the US

military does not conceive of future military operations without assistance from

international and IA partners. (Flournoy, 2006, pp.77-79) DOD’s strategy must permit

iterative recalibrations as JIEDDO welcomes focused IA involvement into a more

extensive Joint IED Defeat enterprise. Assigning focused responsibilities, milestones,

and objectives to every collaborating agency enables concurrent multi-agency discovery

of global terrorists and insurgents reliant on IEDs.

The JIEDDO is well structured eventually to assume an even broader role in the

Long War. The tunnel-vision the military has with Iraq and Afghanistan restricts the

current focus of JIEDDO’s effort. Hostile elements in those theaters of war remain

elusive, adaptive, and committed to the use of IEDs. Achieving success against the

global IED threat depends on greater assistance from SOCOM and the IA.

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What Have We Learned?

“It is through change that we find purpose.” - Heraclitus

The IED persists as a weapon of indiscriminate destruction with constituent

effect. The enemy proved to be quick learning and innovative, changing TTPs in

response to the success of DOD efforts to counter and defeat the hostile use of IEDs. The

enemy campaign evolved from employment of individual, simply constructed IEDs to

multiple IEDs in combined-arms ambushes. Hostile elements use increasingly more

sophisticated devices, killing first-responders, and indiscriminately targeting civilians

using suicide VBIEDs. The JIEDDO priority remains CENTCOM-centric, focused

predominately on the nation’s malaise on Iraq.

In CENTCOM, the combined efforts of JIEDDO and the COCOM are not

producing the effects desired. The definition of success in the CENTCOM Counter-IED

Campaign remains as elusive as victory in Iraq. Violence in all of its dimensions

increased during the formation of JIEDDO evidenced by the rising sectarian-based

insurgency in Iraq. The early technology-centric IED effort produced limited benefits for

war-fighting commanders but did force the enemy to double the number of attacks to

produce the same amount of casualties. (Allyn, personnel communication, January 25,

2007) Even with all the investments in detection technology, an observant human eye

detects the vast majority of IEDs. (Kirin, personal communication, November 17, 2006)

IED casualties remain about the same in spite of a four-fold increase in IED use in Iraq.

Casualty rates per IED attack are down indicating that the cumulative effort of training,

better protective equipment, and improved intelligence had a positive effect.

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Initially viewed as a tactical challenge for combat units, the terrorist and insurgent

use of the IED demanded institutional change. Commanders in the combat zone

reconsidered the nature of 360 Degree Warfare and the impact of the IED to their

operations. The early focus of the Army IED Task Force, formed in 2003, reduced

combat casualties through the dissemination of effective tactics and promising technical

solutions. The TAT, along with the partnership JIEDDO nurtured with the AWG,

provided relevant, current lessons learned through advisors possessing recent regional

operational experience. The initial OSD response, dominated by the quest for a

technological solution to save lives, evolved into a more comprehensive approach. The

military institution repeatedly demonstrated its resilience, learning and adapting to the

IED threat. Some suggest that updates to doctrine or writing new doctrine serves as an

organizational metric of learning and adaptation. (Nagl, 2002) One must conclude that

the work of JIEDDO with JFCOM, the JCOE, and TRADOC captured the doctrinal

essence of the IED threat explaining concepts and training approaches to prevail.

Important modifications to standard bureaucratic decision systems in the Pentagon,

CENTCOM, and at war-fighting headquarters enhanced the DOD’s institutional response

to the asymmetric challenge brought by the IED. DOD established the JIEDDO to

“defeat IEDs as weapons of strategic influence”. During the establishment of JIEDDO,

institutional decisions resulted in adjustments to DOD business processes ranging from:

acquisition, test, R&D, training, intelligence, and operations.

While evidence of both, institutional friction and some Service prejudice surfaced

during the establishment of JIEDDO, there was also cooperation due to operational need.

The Joint Service consensus approving the expansion and permanency of JIEDDO along

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with the creation of its subordinate joint training center, the JCOE, signaled long-term

institutional adjustments were expected. Allocating JIEDDO an organizational budget

coupled with Joint Service manning mitigated inter-service rivalries, biases, and

prejudice. This paper gathered emerging lessons from the evolution of the Joint IED

Defeat effort as it expanded during the Long War.

Table 1, JIEDDO Lessons Observed

Strengths• Strategic-level leader initiative &

commitment• Senior leaders underwrite risk• High threshhold funding authority• Investment Banking strategy

providing venture capital for technology development

• Coalition embeds and collaboration• Adaptive joint testing process • Technology review & assessment• Joint Service and IA LNOs

representation • Entrepreneurial acquisition &

fielding process• CREW development and fielding• US Navy assistance with EWOs• JFCOM collaboration and doctrinal

updates• Contractor manning for JIEDDO

growth• Targeting support to combat units• Weapons Intel Teams at brigade

level• Rapid “best practice” dissemination

and TRADOC doctrinal FM• Formation of JCOE for IED Defeat• Strategic-to-tactical linkages • TAT and ATAT program with

multi-service reach into both the active and reserve component

• Field Teams that embed with tactical units as advisors

Challenges• Personnel regulations for manning a

JTF• Maintaining continuity and

expertise midst personnel rotations• Building a technology path or

roadmap • Institutional biases• Innovation and speed affected by

bureaucratic time constants • Joint Service consensus building• IA autonomy degraded unity of

effort• Responsive CONOP development

and new equipment training for forward deployed units

• Creating counterpart organizations at various levels of command

• Institutionalizing change in structure, equipment, and the training base

• Synchronizing DOTLMPF midst rapid change

• Sustaining organizational agility midst a large bureaucracy

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Military leaders often must translate lessons learned from past conflicts into applications

for innovative training, tactics, and technology. (Meigs, 1990) [See Table 1]

Prudence compels institutions to learn from the past in order to better prepare for

the future. The Services created new organizations, mobilized and realigned units, and

developed a joint training center specifically for the IED threat. Updates to the curricula

of military schools and training institutions occurred, an indication of organizational

learning and adaptation. (Nagl, 2002) JIEDDO support to the MNF-I Counterinsurgency

Academy helped prepare newly deployed commanders for the intellectual rigors of

counterinsurgency. Incorporating embedded international members and IA liaisons laid

the foundation for closer collaboration with these vital partners. A holistic strategy

reliant on intelligence driven targeting support was offered to maneuver units. This

strategy enabled attacks against the entire IED network through a new facility, the COIC,

serving in Direct Support of deployed commanders. The JIEDDO marshaled limited IA

support through its entrepreneurial leadership and personal relationships built with

counterpart leaders in the IC. While integration of IA liaisons occurred at the COIC, the

IED response developed by DOD lacked comprehensive IA commitment. The inclusion

of contracted, experienced law enforcement professionals on brigade and division staffs

improved the ability of units to target the nexus criminal, corrupt former regime

intelligence services, and paramilitary forces that constitute the operational capacity of

IED networks. Even with changes to the military, the time horizons of the DOD

procurement and acquisition cycle were not agile or responsive enough to stay ahead of

asymmetric threats with materiel or technical solutions alone. Venture capital provided

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by JIEDDO for R&D investments on promising materiel solutions became the “bread and

butter” of the JIEDDO technological effort.

By their nature, asymmetric challenges require entrepreneurial freedom and a

degree of independence from cyclic DOD programming and budget norms. By

underwriting entrepreneurial risk, senior DOD leaders, such as: the Deputy Secretary, the

Vice Chairman JCS, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, the CENTCOM commander,

and the commanding generals of MNF-I, MNC-I, and CJTF-76, all instilled the JIEDDO

leadership with the drive needed for implementing change while JIEDDO built trusted

relationships among senior leaders in government. Personal involvement of strategic-

level leaders enabled JIEDDO’s rapid impact on the use of IEDs. A stronger partnership

between JIEDDO, SOCOM, and the geographic COCOMs advances the effort against the

IED threat. However, the IED problem, like the insurgency in Iraq, requires more than

simply a military solution.

Because of the military’s deep involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan with

counterinsurgency, DOD quickly adapted institutionally, outpacing the rest of the IA. A

permanent IA constituency would greatly benefit the Joint IED Defeat effort. Differing

priorities and mission focus among the various IA partners reconfirms that agencies’

divergent core missions contribute to lack of cohesion against a complex threat. DOD’s

ability to learn quickly and create solutions to the IED threat will assist IA partners when

participating in “nation building” or stability and reconstruction operations with DOD.

During these kinds of operations, IED use will likely proliferate.

Effective attack of IED networks requires coordinated IA approaches with clear,

common objectives adopted in collaboration with IA partners. Victory over the prolific

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threat posed by the hostile use of IEDs will take the combined synergy of international

and interagency partnering. It is paramount for agencies to inculcate DOD’s lessons and

develop a joint IA doctrine, modeled after the Goldwater-Nichols Act that enforces

consensus approaches and subordinates IA autonomy to operational need. (Meigs, 2003,

p. 18) Greater agency participation working collaboratively with DOD as the lead

agency constitutes the IA team needed for accomplishing the global aspect of the

JIEDDO mission. Congressional legislation mandating IA reform may be uncomfortable

for some agencies, but there couldn’t be anything more central for success against the

global IED threat.

81


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