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Adaptive Aid in Haiti?

How aid organizations learn and adapt in fragile states

KirstenBrouse

ThesissubmittedtotheFacultyofGraduateandPostdoctoralStudiesinpartialfulfillmentoftherequirementsforamastersdegreeinGlobalStudiesand

InternationalDevelopment

SchoolofInternationalDevelopmentandGlobalStudiesFacultyofSocialSciencesUniversityofOttawa

©KirstenBrouse,Ottawa,Canada,2016

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TableofContents

Acknowledgements..........................................................................................................................ivAbstract.................................................................................................................................................v

CHAPTER1:Introduction....................................................................................................................1Definitions............................................................................................................................................4

CHAPTER2:LiteratureReview.........................................................................................................6FragileStates:ContextandContextSensitivity.......................................................................6KnowledgeManagementandLeaninginAidOrganizations............................................10ThreeGenerationsofKnowledgeManagement................................................................................10TacitversusExplicitKnowledge..............................................................................................................11SingleversusDoubleLoopLearning......................................................................................................12Barriersfromtheliterature.......................................................................................................................13

TheoriesofOrganizationalChangeandAdaptation...........................................................14CHAPTER3:ResearchQuestionsandFramework..................................................................17ResearchQuestion..........................................................................................................................17BuildingtheMOCAFramework–Factorsthatimpacteffectiveness.............................18MarketOrientation(M):KnowledgeProducingBehaviours......................................................18OrganizationalLearning(O):KnowledgeQuestioningValues...................................................20ComplexityAbsorption(C):ConsistencywithQualitiesofComplexAdaptiveSystems.21AdaptiveCapacity(A):PropensityforContinuous,IntentionalAdaptation........................23

CHAPTER4:Methodology................................................................................................................24StudyLocationandContext.........................................................................................................24Mixedmethodapproach:MechanicsoftheMethodology.................................................25Survey..................................................................................................................................................................26Semi-StructuredInterviews......................................................................................................................30

ScopeandLimitations...................................................................................................................32EthicalConsiderations..................................................................................................................33

CHAPTER5:Findings.........................................................................................................................34TestingAssumptions:TheabilitytolearnandadaptiscriticaltoorganizationaleffectivenessinHaiti.....................................................................................................................................35

AnsweringtheResearchQuestion:TowhatextentdoorganizationsemployMOCApractices?...........................................................................................................................................36Organizationsvariedinthenumberoflearningandadaptationpracticestheyemployed............................................................................................................................................................36Marketorientationandorganizationallearningpracticesweremorecommonlyemployedthancomplexityabsorptionandadaptivecapacitypractices...............................37DevelopmentorganizationsemployedmoreMOCApracticesthanhumanitarianassistanceorganizations.............................................................................................................................40

AnsweringtheResearchQuestion:WhataretheenablersandbarrierstolearningandadaptationinHaiti?...............................................................................................................42ProjectLevelEnablers...................................................................................................................42Qualityandcompetenciesofprojectstaff...........................................................................................42WorkingRelationshipswithBeneficiaries..........................................................................................44InformalPersonalKnowledge..................................................................................................................44Authorityforprojectstafftoadapt.........................................................................................................45

ProjectLevelBarriers...................................................................................................................46

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Challengeswithhiring..................................................................................................................................46Lackoftimeandspaceforstafftoreflect............................................................................................47Project-focusedstructuresandcultures..............................................................................................47Lackofinformation.......................................................................................................................................48

Organization-levelEnablers........................................................................................................50Corporatelearningfunctions....................................................................................................................50Monitoringandevaluation.........................................................................................................................51Informalsharingandlearningopportunities....................................................................................52

Organization-levelBarriers........................................................................................................52Barrierstousingmonitoringandevaluationdataforlearning.................................................52Focusonaccountabilitytothefunder...................................................................................................54Project-basedsilosandcycles..................................................................................................................55Culturalbarrierstolearning......................................................................................................................56Organizationslackfeedbackloops.........................................................................................................57

Sector-levelEnablers.....................................................................................................................58Informalnetworksandinformationsharing......................................................................................58Individualcontributionstosectorlevellearning.............................................................................59

Sector-levelBarriers......................................................................................................................60Challengesapplyingsector-levelknowledge.....................................................................................60TheMedia..........................................................................................................................................................61Riskaversionandthenegativeconsequencesoffailure...............................................................61OtherBarriers..................................................................................................................................................64

CHAPTER6:AnalysisandDiscussion...........................................................................................65InterpretingtheMOCAframework...........................................................................................65ContributionsofadaptivecapacityandcomplexityabsorptiontotheMOCAframework.........................................................................................................................................66Complexityabsorption.................................................................................................................................66Adaptivecapacity...........................................................................................................................................67

HowMOCAwasemployedbyorganizationsinHaiti..........................................................69Implicationsofproject-levelenablersandbarriers...........................................................73Implicationsoforganization-levelenablersandbarriers................................................76Implicationsofsector-levelenablersandbarriers.............................................................81Impactoffragilityonlearningandadaptationpractices..................................................83

CHAPTER7:RecommendationsandConclusions....................................................................84Summary............................................................................................................................................84Contribution.....................................................................................................................................86RecommendationsforOrganizations......................................................................................881.WholeOrganizationCommitment......................................................................................................892.IdentifyOpportunitiesforIncrementalImprovement..............................................................903.FocusonSocialDynamics......................................................................................................................90

Futureresearch...............................................................................................................................92Conclusion.........................................................................................................................................93

AppendixA:FullMOCASurveyFindings.....................................................................................95AppendixB:InterviewQuestions................................................................................................105References 107

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Acknowledgements

Thankstoeachofyou–interviewees,surveyrespondents,researchers,professors,mototaxidrivers,fellowhostelguests,friends,andfamily–whotooktimetoshareyourthoughtsandreflectionswithmeinthecourseofthisresearch.Manyofyoufoundtimetotalktomeaboutorganizationsandmanagementpractices,evenwhenthesethingsseemedinconsequentialtoyou.Thankyou.Itrulyappreciateit.

Thankstootomysupervisor–Dr.Marie-EveDesrosiers–foryourconsistentpatience,encouragement,andinsightasInavigatedslowlythroughtheresearchandwritingprocess.

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Abstract

Ifweunderstanddevelopmentasanemergentpropertyofacomplexsystem,theneffectivedevelopmentassistanceneedstoadaptandevolvein-context.Thisthesisexploreshowlearningandadaptationpracticesmighthelpaidorganizationsapplycomplexitythinkingtoimprovetheireffectiveness.Basedonanewframeworkoforganizationalpractices,thisstudyusesamixedmethodsapproachtoassesstheextenttowhich12smallandmediuminternationalaidorganizationsinHaitilearnandadapt.

Thestudysupportstheassumptionthatlearningandadaptationcontributetoeffectiveness,andfindsthatorganizationsvarysignificantlyintheirlearningandadaptationpractices.Itfindsthatdevelopmentorganizationsemploymorelearningpracticesthanhumanitarianassistanceorganizations,andthatorganizationsaregenerallybetteratcollectinginformationandadoptinglearningattitudes,thantheyareatestablishingthestructuresandprocessestheyneedtobetrulyadaptive.Theresearchalsofindsthatthebarriersthatmakelearningandadaptationmoredifficultfororganizationsarelargelystructuralandrelatedtoaidsystemdynamics,whileorganizationsbenefitfromenablersthatarelargelyattributedtoindividualagency.

Thisthesisarguesfortheimportantrolethataidorganizationscan,andmustplayinmakingaidmoreeffective–attheproject,organization,andaidsystemlevels.However,theaidsystemitselfdoesnotencouragelearning.Internationalaidorganizationswillthereforeneedtoactivelyengageinlearningiftheyaretoplayaneffectiveroleindevelopment,andbeameaningfulpartofthesystem-levelaideffectivenessdialogue.

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CHAPTER 1: Introduction

Thereisanimportantdiscussiontakingplaceinuniversities,intheboardroomsandlunchroomsofaid

organizations,amongstdonors,andintheday-to-daydiscussionsofaidrecipientseverywhere:Howcan

aidbebetter,smarter,moreeffective?Thisquestionhasbeenparticularlypertinentinfragilestates,

whereincreasedcomplexitymakesitespeciallychallengingtoachieveresults.Fragilestatespresenta

mixoftechnicalandsocialproblems,wrappedinhighlypoliticized,rapidlychangingcontexts.deWeijer,

whostudieseffectivenessandcomplexityinAfghanistan,arguesthatoneofthemostcriticalfailuresof

internationaldevelopmentisthefailuretodifferentiatebetweenproblemsthathavetechnicalsolutions,

andthosethataresocially-based,andthereforecomplex,requiringadifferentkindofapproach(de

Weijer,2012,p.2).Thisdifferentkindofapproachisatthecoreofthisresearch.Ihavestartedwiththe

assumptionthataideffectiveness,inthefaceofcomplexity,requirescontinualadaptation,iteration,

experimentation,andaboveall,learning.Fundamentally,thisthesisquestionswhetherornot

organizationsinHaitiaresetuptodeliveraidinawaythatisconsistentwiththisunderstandingofaid

effectivenessinfragilestates.Itlooksattheextenttowhich12smallandmedium-sizedaid

organizationsinHaitilearnandadapt,andthedynamicsthathelp,andhinder,theirabilitytodoso.

Inthepastdecadewehaveappliedcomplexitythinkingtodevelopment–andtofragilestates–ina

numberofways,anditseemsinterestinthisareaisonlygrowing.Theinternationaldiscourseonaid

effectivenesshasappliedcomplexitythinkingtoacertaindegree,throughtheirfocusoncontext-

sensitivity.TheParisDeclarationonAidEffectiveness,theDevelopmentAssistanceCommittee(DAC)

PrinciplesforInternationalEngagementinFragileStates,andtheInternationalDialogueon

PeacebuildingandStatebuildingallrecognizetheinherentcomplexityofpeacebuildingandstatebuilding

andtrytoaccountforitthroughtheiremphasisoncontext-specificinterventions.Buildingmorestrongly

oncomplexitytheory,BenRamalingam’sbookAidontheEdgeofChaosfocusesontheimportanceof

systemsthinkingindevelopmentandpositionsaid’sroleassupportingtheevolutionofsolutions:

Complexitythinkingimpliesthattheroleof‘aid’indevelopmentandhumanitarianassistancewouldshiftfrom‘externalpush’–fillinggapsinapredictableandlinearfashion–to‘internalcatalyst.’Catalyticaidwouldnotcreatedevelopment,butitwouldidentify,expand,andsustainthespaceforchange(2013,p.361).

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OwenBarder’sworkonsocialimpactbonds,andotherpracticalapplications,isanotherexampleof

complexitythinkingbecomingmoreembeddedinhowwethinkaboutdevelopment.Hepublisheda

videolecturein2012,titled“DevelopmentandComplexity,”basedontheworkofEric

BeinhockerandTimHarford,whichhasbecomeverypopularwithdevelopmentpractitioners.The

conclusionofhispresentationisthatdevelopmentitselfisanemergentpropertyofacomplexadaptive

system(Barder,2012,para.3).

Thisviewofdevelopment–asanemergentproperty–seemstoresonatestronglyacrossthefield.There

arelikelyanumberofreasonsforthis.Maybecomplexitythinkingprovidesasatisfyingexplanationfor

whyitissodifficultforaidprojectstoachieveresults.Ormaybecomplexitymoreaccuratelyreflectsthe

unpredictableconnectionbetweencauseandeffectthanthelogicmodels,whicharestillprevalent

acrossdevelopmentwork.Whateverthereason,complexitythinkinghasbecomepopularenoughthata

numberofauthorshavecommentedonthefactthatitisfashionablethesedaystorefertocomplexity

theoriesatconferencesevenifthesereferencesarenotalwaysaccurateorappropriate(deWeijer,

March2012,para.11).Stillothershaveidentifiedtheapplicationofcomplexitytheorytodevelopment

asacriticalareaofresearchandexploration–thebeginningofsomethingthatcouldhaveasignificant

impactonhowwedodevelopmentwork(UKCDS,2015).Thisthesisbuildsonthebroaderinterestinthe

applicationofcomplexitytodevelopment,andlookstoapplyideasfoundinthecomplexityliteraturein

oneparticularareaofinquiry:howaidorganizationslearnandadapt.

Ihavelookedatorganizationsinparticularbecauseorganizationsmattertoaideffectiveness.Theyare

theentitiestaskedwithdoingthiswork–iteratingsolutions,orcreatingtheconditionsinwhich

developmentcanemerge.Ultimatelythesystemholdsthemresponsiblefordeliveringdevelopment

results,evenasourunderstandingofwhatitmeanstodeliverdevelopmentresultsischanging.Weare

transitioningawayfromaparadigminwhichthesolutionmatteredmost,towardsaparadigminwhich

theprocessofdevelopingandcontinuallyadaptingsolutionsiswhatmatters.Aswemakethistransition,

theactorsthemselves–boththeorganizations,andthepeoplewithinthoseorganizations–matter

morethantheyeverhave.

Inthesamewayaswerecognizethecomplexsystemthatgivesrisetodevelopment,thisresearchalso

recognizesthatorganizationsthemselvesarecomplexentitiesthatsimultaneouslyshapeandareshaped

bytheenvironmentsinwhichtheywork.Theycannotbetreatedassimpleimplementationmechanisms

inthedevelopmentmachine–butrathertheyneedtobeconsideredandstudied,asacriticalpartofthe

complexsystemthatstrivestoevolvetowardspositivedevelopmentoutcomes.

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Aswestudytheseactorsinthedevelopmentsystem,itiscriticaltorememberthatthetaskof

organizationallearningisfundamentallyhard.FormerWorldBankexpert,ElliotBergsetsthesceneinhis

papertitled“Whyaren’taidorganizationsbetterlearners”whenhestatedthat:

Organizationallearningintheaidbusinessisenormouslydifficult,farmoresothanformostotherorganizations.Feworganizationshavetodealwithexternalenvironmentssocomplexandsodynamic,withsomuchsuspicionorhostilityintheirpoliticalenvironments,withsomanyanti-learningelementsintheirorganizationalcultures(2000,p.11).

Inthefaceofthissignificantchallenge,itisimportanttobetterunderstandthedynamicsthatenableaid

organizationstobegoodlearner/adaptorsifwewanttomakeaidmoreeffective.Weneedto

understandtheinitialconditionsthathelpshapepositiveoutcomes–thesystemsandculturesthat

enabletrustingrelationshipsandadaptiveprojects,andtheprocessesandstructuresthathelp

organizationsberesilientandeffectiveincomplexenvironments.

Bothpractitionersandacademicsrecognizethatfragilestatesposeuniquestrategicandoperational

challenges,andthatthereiscurrentlylimitedresearchaimedatunderstandinghoworganizationscanbe

effectivewithintheseenvironments(Baranyi&Desrosiers,2012,p.451-452;Campbell,2008,p.28;de

Weijer,2012,p.1;DiCaprio,2013).Furthermore,theliteratureoncomplexity-informedapproachesto

developmentisalsoinitsinfancyandthereislimitedacademicworkdoneontheroleofaid

organizationsinthisfieldaswell.Ramalingamidentifiesthisgapintheliteraturespecifically,statingthat:

“despitethefundamentalroleofagenciesinthedeliveryofaid,thereareveryfewexamplesofempirical

workonorganizationalissues”(2013,p.75).However,theorganizationalliteraturehasleveraged

complexitythinkingtomaketheconnectionbetweeneffectiveness,andlearningandadaptation

practicesfordecades.Thisthesisthereforebringstogetherpracticesfrombothdisciplinestoformthe

MOCAframework1–atoolformeasuringtheextenttowhichlearningandadaptationpracticesare

appliedbyorganizationsworkinginHaiti.Thisthesisaimstodrawconclusionsaboutorganizations

operatinginfragilestatesmoregenerally,usingasampleof12organizationsinHaiti.

Specificallythisthesisaimstoanswerthefollowingquestions:

1. TowhatextentdoorganizationsinfragilestatesemployMOCAlearningandadaptationpractices?

2. WhataretheenablersandbarriersthatinfluencetheextenttowhichorganizationsemployMOCApractices?

1MOCA:MarketOrientation,OrganizationalLearning,ComplexityAbsorption,andAdaptiveCapacity.

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TheMOCAframeworkdevelopedinthisthesispresentsoneapproachtoapplyingcomplexitythinkingto

organizationalbehaviour.Thisresearchfocusesonorganizationsbasedontheideathatadaptive

structures,processes,andculturesofaidorganizationswillfundamentallyenablelearningand

adaptationwithinaidworkitself.

Definitions

Forthepurposeofthisresearch,Iusethefollowingdefinitions.

Organizationallearningandadaptation

ElliotBergpresentsadefinitionoforganizationallearningthatIwilladoptforthisthesis.Bergopenly

acknowledgestheimpossibilityofsuitablydefiningorganizationallearningoradaptation,butprovidesa

helpfulconceptualmodel:

Thenotionof“organizationallearning”isfullofambiguities.Organizationsdonotlearn,individualsdo.…Despiteitsambiguitiesitisconvenienttousetheterm“organizationallearning”asshorthandfortheprocessbywhichorganizationsobtainanduseknowledgetoadaptoldpolicies,programsandstrategies,ortoinnovatemorebroadly(2000,p.1).

Inthisthesis,IuseacombinationoffourfactorstocreateaframeworkofwhatImeanbyorganizational

learningandadaptation:marketorientation,organizationallearning,complexityabsorption,and

adaptivecapacity.TogethertheyformalearningandadaptationframeworkthatIwillrefertoasMOCA.

ThesefourfactorsrepresentthemostrelevantthinkingandresearchIcouldfindthatidentifyspecific

organizationalpracticesthatpositivelyimpactorganizationaleffectiveness.Theyareeachdrawnfroma

differentpartoftheorganizational,marketing,andadaptationresearchandtheyallcontainimportant

contributionstoamorecomprehensiveunderstandingofhoworganizationscanbeeffectiveina

complexenvironment.InthisresearchIbringthesefourfactorstogetherforthefirsttimeinorderto

developacomplexity-informedframeworkofpracticestohelpexploretheextenttowhichorganizations

infragilestatesareabletoworktowardsdevelopmentresults.

Inmoredetail,thefactorsthatmakeuptheMOCAframeworkare:

1. MarketOrientation(M)Marketorientationcanbeunderstood,atahighlevel,asusingdatafromanorganization’sstakeholders(customers,donors,beneficiaries,etc)tochangeorganizationalbehaviourtobettermeetstakeholderneeds.Therearemultipledefinitionsformarketorientationavailableinthe

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literature,howeverthisresearchusesthefollowingasitsprimary:“Marketorientationistheorganization-widegenerationofmarketintelligencepertainingtocurrentandfuturecustomerneeds,disseminationoftheintelligenceacrossdepartments,andorganization-wideresponsivenesstoit”(Kohli&Jaworski,1990,p.3).

2. OrganizationalLearning(O)Organizationallearningfocusesonanorganization’sabilitytolearnfromitsactionsandpastexperiences.ThedefinitionthatIuseforthisresearchcomesfromCampbell:“Organizationallearningisidentifying,andactingtocorrect,misalignmentbetweenanorganization’saimsandtheoutcomesofitsactivitiesinrelationtothoseaims”(2008,p.21).

3. ComplexityAbsorption(C)Complexityabsorptionisdefinedasoneoftwopossiblereactionsthatorganizationscanhavetooperatinginacomplexenvironment:organizationscaneithermaketheirinternalsystemsmorecomplex(complexityabsorptionresponse),ortheycanseektosimplifytheirinternalsystems(complexityreductionresponse).Ashmoset.al.definecomplexityabsorptionas“pursuingmanagerialstrategiesthatreinforcethenatureoftheorganizationasacomplexadaptivesystem”(2000,p.578).Bythis,theyspecificallymeanthatorganizationsincreasethecomplexityof:goals,strategy,interactionswithintheorganizationsandorganizationalstructure.

4. AdaptiveCapacity(A)Adaptivecapacityisageneraltermthathasbeenusedtodefinemanydifferentconceptsinthepast.ThisresearchusesaspecificdefinitionfromStaberandSydowwhounderstandadaptivecapacityastheabilityofanorganizationtobecontinuallyadaptivetoon-going,unpredictablechange.Theyfocusonthreestructuraldimensionstoadaptivecapacity,whichIuseinthisresearch:multiplexity,redundancy,andloosecoupling(2002).

IndevelopingtheMOCAframework,Iscannedtheliteratureforframeworksandtheoriesthat

empirically,ortheoretically,linkedspecificorganizationallearningandadaptationpracticesto

effectiveness.ThesefourliteraturesweretheonlyfourIfoundthatmadethisconnection.2

Learningandadaptationpractice

InthisresearchIdefinelearningandadaptationpracticeasanorganizationalbehaviororsystemthatis

definedintheMOCAliteratureaspositivelycontributingtoorganizationaleffectiveness.Theterm

“learningandadaptationpractice”willreferspecificallytopracticesthathavebeenpreviouslytestedor

theorizedintheliteratureonmarketorientation,organizationallearning,adaptivecapacity,or

complexityabsorption.

2Additionalresearchintotheknowledgemanagementand“learningorganizations”practitionerliteraturemayrevealadditionalpracticesthathavebeentheoreticallylinkedtoorganizationaleffectivenessorperformance.Atahighlevel,theMOCAframeworkcapturesmanyofthepracticesidentifiedintheseliteratures,howevertheywerenotextensivelyexploredaspartofthisresearchbecausetheyarelessdevelopedinacademicwork,andlessrigorouslyconnectedtoperformance.

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OrganizationalEffectiveness

Thisresearchwillnotseektomeasureordefineorganizationaleffectivenessbeyondthegeneral

assertionthataidorganizationsaremoreeffectivewhentheyareabletoachievegreaterresultsfortheir

beneficiaries.Theideaoforganizationaleffectivenessisevenlesswelldefinedintheliteraturethan

organizationallearning.A2009reviewoftheliteratureidentifiedthat:“of213papersidentifiedas

includingaperformancevariable,207differentmeasuresofperformancewereused”(Richard,

Devinney,Yip&Johnson,2009,p.719).Becauseofthislackofconsensus,thisstudydoesnotseekto

measureeffectivenessdirectly;insteaditreliesonthedefinitionsoforganizationaleffectivenessthat

havebeenwrappedintotheworkalreadydoneonmarketorientation,organizationallearning,adaptive

capacity,andcomplexityabsorption.

Thefollowingchapterexpandsontheseconceptsasitoutlinestheliteraturesoncontextandcontext

sensitivityinfragilestates,knowledgemanagementandlearninginaidorganizations,andtheoriesof

organizationalchangeandadaptation.

CHAPTER 2: Literature Review

Theliteraturethatinformsthisresearchcomesfromthreedifferentareasofstudy:fragilestates,

knowledgemanagementandlearningindevelopment,andorganizationalchangetheory.Withinthe

fieldoffragilestatesresearch,Iamparticularlyconcernedwiththeliteratureoncontextandcontext-

sensitivity,aswellasthecontemporaryinternationaleffortstoimproveeffectivenessinfragilestates.I

reviewtheknowledgemanagementandlearningliteratureasithasbeenappliedinaidorganizations

andidentifyhowthisworkrelatestotheMOCAframeworkthatIuseinthisresearch.Withinthe

organizationalchangeliterature,thisreviewfocusesontheorganizationaladaptationliterature

informedbycomplexitythinking,fromwhichIexaminepracticesthathaveapositiveimpacton

organizationaleffectiveness.

Fragile States: Context and Context Sensitivity

Todate,significantacademicfocusonfragilestateshasbeenonstudyingandmeasuringeffectivenessat

thedonorandstatelevelsandthechallengesassociatedwithstatebuilding,peacebuilding,post-conflict

reconstructionanddevelopmentinfragilestates(Barakat,Evans,&Zyck,2012;Booth,2012;Desrosiers

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&Muringa,2012;Egnell,2010;Feeny&deSilva,2012;Green&Kohl,2007;Kaplan,2008;Manning&

Trzeciak-Duval,2010;Paris&Sisk,2007).Inparallel,thereisarobustcriticalliteraturethatchallenges

theliberalimperialisticechoesoftheInternationalDialogueonFragileStates.Itquestionswhetheran

externally-ledpeacebuildingandstatebuildingenterprisecan,orshouldtryto,bringlasting,authentic

peaceanddevelopmentinfragilecontexts.Inotherwords,cantheInternationalDialogueapproach

effectivelygrowlocalsolutions,orisitanotherwesternimport,doomedtobepoorlyadapted,and

forgotten(Chandler,2006;Duffield,2006;Richmond,2013;Donais,2009).

Whilethesehigher-leveldebatestrytodeterminewhatroleinternationaldonorandaidorganizations

shouldplayinfragilestates,weknowverylittleabouthowtheseorganizationsactuallyoperate.The

fragilestateliteraturecontainsverylittleworkoneffectivenessattheorganizationallevel,orhowaid

effectivenessprinciplesmightbeoperationalized.Thisgapintheacademicliteratureisproblematic

becausemanyofthehigh-levelpoliciesandprinciplesforaideffectivenessdiscussedbytheinternational

communityhavedirectimplicationsfororganizationaloperations.Thediscourseoftentalksabout

“contextsensitivity,”andoccasionally“organizationallearning,”neitherofwhichfullyaccountsfor

organizationallearningandadaptationasitisdefinedthroughMOCA.TheMOCAframeworktakesa

broaderview,andexploresthemechanismsandpracticesthroughwhichorganizationscanbesensitive

totheircontexts,includinghoworganizationalstructurescanenablelearningandadaptation.

Nonetheless,contextandcontextsensitivityareimportantunderlyingconceptsthatareconsistentwith

theMOCAframeworkandarethereforeaddressedaspartofthisliteraturereview.Aswecontinueto

explorethebestroleforinternationalaidorganizationsinaneffective,big-picture,aidsystem,itis

importantthatwealsounderstandthemicrorealitiesofaidorganizations.Abetterunderstandingof

organization-leveldynamicsmayhelpdeterminewhattheseactorsare,orarenot,wellsuitedto

contribute.

Thisliteraturereviewlooksspecificallyatthelimitedacademicworkthathasbeendonetodateonthe

implementationofcontextsensitivityinfragilestates.SincetheDACprincipleswerereleasedin2007,

someauthorshaveexaminedthedegreetowhichtheDACprinciples,specificallythefirstDACprinciple

oncontext,havebeen(ornotbeen)appliedinspecificcountriessuchasBurundi,theOccupied

PalestinianTerritories,andHaiti(Desrosiers&Muringa,2012a;DiCaprio,2013;Ibrahim&Beaudet,

2012).Otherscholarshavetakenaprescriptiveapproachbydevelopingcontextindicatorsthatcorrelate

todifferenttypesofconflictrisks,andconsequentlysuggestparticulartypesofresponsefrom

statebuildingagenciesortheinternationalcommunity(Colletta&Muggah,2009).Whilethisapproach

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mayprovideimportantdatafororganizationstouseaspartofcontext-baseddecision-making,this

tendencytowardsdevelopingachecklisttooltoaiddecision-makingcouldactuallybedetrimentalto

learningandadaptationifitdirectsattentionawayfromthestructuresandprocessesthatareneededto

collectandusecontext-basedinformationinacontinuousandtimelymanner.Itmayalsoencourage

decisionmakerstodivorcethemselvesfromthetrulycomplexnatureoftheirenvironment,andthehard

decisionsthataccompanyit.

Regardlessofhowlittleweknowabouthowtobecontext-sensitive,anumberofinternational

agreementsandprinciplesonaideffectivenessfromthepasteightyearshavereferencedcontext

sensitivityinsomeway.TheParisDeclarationonAidEffectivenessemphasizestheneedto“adaptand

applyaidtodifferingcountrysituations”(OECD,2005/2008,p.2).TheDACprinciplesforgood

engagementinfragilestates,putsalargeemphasisoncontextwithitsfirstprinciple:“Takecontextasa

startingpoint”(TheInternationalDialogueonPeacebuildingandStatebuilding,2012).TheNewDealfor

FragileStates,promotescontextsensitivitythroughcountry-specificfragilityassessments,countryplans,

andcontext-specificcompacts(agreementsbetweendonorsandfragilestategovernments).Whilethe

emphasisoncontextinthesehigh-levelagreementsandprinciplesishelpfulandnecessary,itisonlythe

startingpointforimplementingacontext-basedapproachthatistrulyadaptive.Policystatementsalone

dolittletohelporganizationsunderstandhowtooperationalizethisfocusoncontext,orcontext-

sensitivity,whichisanimportantpartofthepuzzle.

Analyticaltoolslikethefragilityassessmentthatcontributesto“onecountry,oneplan”intheNewDeal

forFragileStates,andthePeaceandConflictImpactAssessment(PCIA)toolareimportantfirststeps

towardscontextsensitivity.Whilestronganalysisisanimportantpartofhavingthebestinformationto

startmakingchoicesinchallengingenvironments,therearelimitationsofanytoolinfindingssolutions

tocomplexproblems.Whiletheperiodicalin-depthcontextanalysisrepresentedbythePCIAtoolisan

importantcomponentofestablishingandmaintainingcontextsensitivity,itisnotenough.Ifwe

understandcontextasfluidandconstantlychanging,thenitbecomesimportantfororganizationstobe

abletobemoreintimatelyconnectedtotheircontext–toknowhowthecontextischangingandbeable

toadapttoitonanon-goingbasis.Todothis,organizationsrequiresystemsforcollectinginformation

aboutcontext,andprocessesforintegratingthisinformationintoorganizationaldecisionsandactions,

notonlyasaplanningtool,butalsoasawayofdoingbusiness.Integratingcontextsensitivityintohow

aidiscarriedoutrequiresanawarenessofhowallpartsofthesystemsupportordetractfromthisaim–

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thestructures,processes,attitudesandindividualactions–thathelporhinderongoingcontext-

informedadaptation.

Todate,thisdynamic,systems-basedviewofcontexthasnotbeenwidelyadoptedinthefragilestate

literature–whichtendstoremaineithertheoreticaloranalytical.However,practitionershavemade

someadvancementtowardsbetterunderstandingcontextsensitivity,someofwhicharebeginningto

thinkofcontextasdynamic.

TheConflictSensitivityConsortium–noteconflict,notcontext–fundedbyDFID,isperhapsthemost

organizedandextensiveexampleofpractitionerswhoareexploringhoworganizationscanincorporate

oneelementofcontextintotheiroperations.Thisgroupof37thinktanksanddevelopment

organizationsworkingonconflictsensitivitytakeabroadviewofconflictsensitivityandincludethe

designandimplementationofconflictsensitivepoliciesandprograms,aswellasorganizationallearning

systemsthatenableconflictsensitivityasapartofon-goingorganizationalpractice.Inthisway,the

Consortium’sapproachtoconflictsensitivityissimilartohowthisresearchapproachesorganizational

learningandadaptation.However,thereisakeydifference.Whiletheconsortiumfocusesonconflict

sensitivity“mainstreaming”–thatisbuildingconflictsensitivitythinkingintoexistingorganizational

processes–Iarguethatlearningandadaptationpracticesneedtogofurtherandbroaderthan

mainstreaming,tore-definehoworganizationsarestructuredandhowtheyinteractwiththeircontext

day-to-day,iftheyaretobeeffectiveinfragilestates.

FraukedeWeijerreflectedthisconcernovermainstreamingandtheneedforamorefundamentalshift

inmentalityinablogpostinSeptember2012:

Foranewapproachtofragilitytoemerge,thepolicymakingandoperationalsystemsinuseindevelopmentcooperationneedtoundergofundamentalchange.Thisgoesbeyondusingthelanguageofcomplexitytheoryinpolicydocuments,whichhasbecomeincreasinglyfashionable,buthasnotyetmanagedtochangetheunderlyingmentalmodel.Itmeansgoingbeyondamentalityinwhichexpertsknowthesolutions.Itmeanshumility.And,mostimportantly,itmeansputting‘learningsystems’atthecenterofdevelopmentpolicy(March2012,para.11).

Thisresearchwillstartwiththeideathatorganizationsaremoreeffectivewhentheyareresponsiveto

theircontext–andconsiderhoworganizationalmanagementpractices,learningmechanismsand

organizationalstructurescanhelpachievenecessaryresponsivenessandadaptability.

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Knowledge Management and Leaning in Aid Organizations

In1996,thenewpresidentoftheWorldBank,JamesWolfensohn,madehisfirstannualmeeting

address,whichintroducedtheconceptoftheWorldBankas“KnowledgeBank.”Sincethen,thefieldof

internationaldevelopmenthaspaidcloserattentiontohowlearninghappens,andhowknowledgegets

movedaround.

TheworkthathasstemmedfromthisannouncementhasmostcommonlybeenfocusedonKnowledge

Management,whichhaslargelybeendefinedandpracticedascapturingandsharinginformationand

lessonslearned.WhilecapturingandsharinginformationisanimportantpartofMOCA,itisonlyone

partofwhatMOCAsuggestsisneededforlearningtohaveapositiveimpactoneffectiveness.Thereare

anumberofimportantdebatesandconceptsthatshapeourunderstandingofhowaidorganizations

manageinformationandknowledge,andhowtheyusethoseassetstogetbetterandsmarterat

achievingresults.Thefollowingsectionoutlinessomeofthem:threegenerationsofknowledge

management;tacitversusexplicitknowledge;andsingleanddoublelooplearning.Thissectionthen

identifiesbarrierstolearninginaidorganizationsthathavealreadybeenidentifiedbytheliterature.

ThreeGenerationsofKnowledgeManagementThroughtheworkofpractitionersanddevelopmentthinktanks,thewaythatwethinkaboutknowledge

managementandlearninginaidorganizationshasevolvedovertimetoincorporatemoreofthe

conceptsthatareincludedintheMOCAframework.LeBorgneandCummingsreferenceametareview

ofknowledgemanagementliteratureinwhichFergusonet.alidentifiedthreegenerationsofknowledge

management:

Firstgeneration:knowledgeshouldsupportstrategicdecision-making(takinglessonsfromthepast)anditisseenasacommoditythatcanbestored.Theapproachesfollowingthisfocusoncapturingknowledge,withaheavyfocusonITsystemsandoninformationmanagement.

Secondgeneration:knowledgesupportsvaluecreationthroughouttheorganisation(notjustmanagement).Knowledgeisnotseenasacommodityanymorebutratherasavalue-creatingresourcethathelpsimprovepractice.Heavyemphasisisputonhumanrelationsandknowledgesharingturningtacitintoexplicitknowledge.Intra-organisationalcommunitiesofpracticeandbestpracticesareflourishing.HumanResourceshavearoletoplay.

Thirdgeneration:knowledgeassuchdoesnotmatterasmuchasitsco-creationtojointlyadaptittothecontext(whichisleading).Knowledgesharinggoesoutsideoftheorganisationtoembraceawidersetofactors,andcreatemeaningtogetherinamoreparticipatoryway.Keyapproachesandtoolsusedinthisgenerationarestorytelling(tocreatemeaning)andinter-organisationalcommunitiesofpractice(LeBorgne&Cummings,2009,p.42).

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Thirdgenerationknowledgemanagementisanimportantstartingpointforthisresearch–it

incorporatestheimportanceofcontextsensitivityandseesknowledgeasinherentlybasedincontext,

whilealsoemphasizingknowledgeassomethingthatexistswithin,andisusedby,theindividualsthat

makeuptheorganization.TheMOCAframeworkbuildsonthisconcepttoidentifyorganizational

practicesthatenablethistypeofknowledgetobecreatedandusedthroughmarketorientationand

organizationallearningindicators.However,thirdgenerationknowledgemanagementdoesnotfully

capturethestructurallearningandadaptationpracticesthatarerepresentedintheMOCAframework

throughadaptivecapacityandcomplexityabsorption.Thisevolution–fromfirstgenerationknowledge

management,throughsecondtothirdgeneration–demonstratesthecoredebateinthisfield.Towhat

extentisknowledgematerial–acommoditytobecaptured,transferred,andapplied?Andtowhat

extentisknowledgeintangible–somethingthatexistsonlyinthemindsofpeople,thatiscontinually

shapedandreinventedthroughhumaninteractionandmeaningmaking.Thisdebateisfurtherreflected

inthedistinctionbetweentacitandexplicitknowledge.

TacitversusExplicitKnowledgeAnimportantdistinctionthatismadeintheknowledgemanagementliteratureisthedifference

betweentacitandexplicitknowledge:

Tacitknowledgeisunconsciousandintuitive;itallowsexpertstomakedecisionswithoutreferringtorulesorprinciples(e.g.knowinghowtoperformmedicaloperations,knowinghowtonetworkataconference);Explicitknowledgeisclearlyarticulatedandaccessibletoanyonewhoreads,hearsorlooksatit(e.g.atrainingguideonusingasoftwarepackageortheconclusionsofapolicybriefingpaper);(Ramalingam,2005,p.4).Thefollowingquotehelpstofurtherdevelopthetwoideasanddifferentiatebetweenthem.

“ThereisareasonwhyWesternobserverstendnottoaddresstheissueoforganizationalknowledgecreation.Theytakeforgrantedaviewoftheorganizationasamachinefor“informationprocessing.”ThisviewisdeeplyingrainedinthetraditionsofWesternmanagement,fromFrederickTaylortoHerbertSimon.Anditisaviewofknowledgeasnecessarily“explicit”–somethingformalandsystematic.…Japanesecompanieshaveaverydifferentunderstandingofknowledge.Theyrecognizethattheknowledgeexpressedinwordsandnumbersrepresentsonlythetipoftheiceberg.Theyviewknowledgeasbeingprimarily“tacit”–somethingnoteasilyvisibleandexpressible.Tacitknowledgeishighlypersonalandhardtoformalize,makingitdifficulttocommunicateortosharewithothers(Nonaka&Takeuchi,1995,p.8,asquotedbyChoo,2003).

Thejourneyoftheknowledgemanagementfieldhasbeentoshiftfromapurelyexplicitunderstanding

toknowledge,toacceptthegreatercomplexityoftacitknowledge.

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Animportantseriesofresearchpaperswerepublishedin2004thatfurtherexploredthemeansbywhich

aidorganizationscouldbetterenabletacitknowledge.Thisgroupofauthors3developedaperspectiveon

learningandchangethatfocusedontheindividualandtheprocessof“reflectionandreflexivity,leading

tothereframingofknowledgeandunderstanding,andimprovedactionsandoutcomes.”Theyfeltthat:

Theimplicationsofthistypeoflearningforanorganizationarethuslesstodowithknowledgemanagementsystemsandprocesses,andmoreconcernedwithdevelopingnewtoolsfordialogueandholisticanalysis,andattitudesandskillsforworkingcollaboratively(Pasteur,2004,p.6).

SingleversusDoubleLoopLearningTacitversusexplicitknowledgeisadebateaboutwhatitisthatwearemovingaroundwhenwetalk

aboutknowledgemanagementorlearning.Otherauthorshavefocusedonthehowofaidorganization

learningandadaptation.Thedominant“how”modelissingleanddoublelooplearning,which

understandslearningasfeedbackloopsthatexistatdifferentlevelsofabstraction.

Singlelooplearningreferstoday-to-dayimprovementsinoperationsaswellastheabilityto

continuouslyadapttoachangingenvironment.CampbellquotesaUNofficialtodescribehowsingle

looplearningappliestopeacebuildingoperations:

“Thistypeoforganizationallearningisnotbasedonlearningdiscrete,concrete‘rulesofthegame,’becausethegameisconstantlychanging.WhentheUNlearnsontheground,itacquirestheabilitytoadapttothechangingcontextsofcivilwars–theorganizationengageswithitsenvironmentandinventsmechanismstounderstandit”(Campbell,2008,p.22).

Doublelooplearning,ontheotherhand,isaboutaskingthebiggerquestions.CampbellquotesArgyrisin

explainingthatdouble-looplearning“occurswhenindividualswithinanorganizationopenlyand

honestlyexaminetheunderlyingassumptionsandbehavioursthatmayhavecausedgapsbetweenthe

intendedandactualoutcomeoftheorganization’sactions”(Campbell,2008,p.22).

Singleanddoublelooplearningishelpfulinprovidingaframeworkwithinwhichwecanstarttotease

outthecomplexinteractionsbetweenvariouslevelsofabstractionthatcontributetoorganizational

learningandadaptation.Likeallmodels,thisdistinctionisasimplification,andshouldbeheldlightlyas

weseektounderstandlearningdynamicswithincomplexadaptivesystems.

3TheOrganizationalLearningPartnership–asmallgroupofresearchersthatexploredlearningandchangeinthreedevelopmentagencies:ActionAid,DFIDandSIDA.

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BarriersfromtheliteratureTheliteratureconsistentlyreflectshowchallengingitisforaidorganizationstolearn,andpastresearch

hasfoundsignificantbarrierstoimplementingknowledgeandlearningstrategies.

Anumberofreasonshavebeengivenwhylearningwouldbedifferent,ormoredifficult,intheaidsector:aidagenciessuffernopenaltyfornotlearning;aidworktakesplaceinmessy,volatileandcomplexenvironmentsandisthereforeanintrinsicallyriskyenterprise;aidworkisaboutinfluencingpowerrelationshipswhichismorecomplexthansellingproductsandservices;andtheroleofaidprojects,particularlythoseofNGOs,istobeexperimentalorinnovative.Noneoftheseargumentshoweverstandsupasaconvincingexcusefornotlearning,tothecontrary,theyseemtoemphasizelearningasanecessityandapriority(VanBrabant,1997,p.2).

Inrecognitionoftheimportanceofthesebarriers,thisstudywillspecificallylookintotheenablersand

barriersthatorganizationinHaitifacetolearningandadaption.Inpreparationforthisresearch,belowis

alistofexamplesofsomeofthebarriersthattheexistingliteraturehasidentified:

• Shortcomingsinformalevaluations(Berg,2000)• Slowhorizontalandverticalinformationflows(Berg,2000;Ostromet.al,2002;Krohwinkel-

Karlsson,2007)• Blueprinting(applyingmodelsusedinthepastincontextwheretheyareinappropriate)(Berg,

2000)• Notenoughfocusorvalueonprojectsupervision(toomuchfocusonplanningandappraisal)

(Berg,2000)• Toomuchweightonanalyticshortcomingsandnotenoughfocusonmattersofprocess(neglect

ofownership,limitsoflocalcapacity)(Berg,2000)• Internalpowersystems(politicalenvironment,incentivestructure,divisionoflabour)not

conducivetolearningfrommistakes(Berg,2000;Ostromet.al,2002;Krohwinkel-Karlsson,2007)

• Valuingnewprojectgenerationandvolumeofspendingoverresults(Berg,2000)• CostofITinfrastructureforsharinginformation(Ramalingam,2005)• Challengesofagreeingonsuccesscriteriawhendevelopmentcanbeambiguous,membershave

diverginginterests,andpowerisunequallydistributed(Ostromet.al,2002;Krohwinkel-Karlsson,2007)

• Rapidrotationofstaff,lackingmechanismsforpost-fieldknowledgetransfer,temporarystaff(Ostromet.al,2002;Krohwinkel-Karlsson,2007;Berg,2000)

• Lackoftimeandspaceforreflectionandimplementingnewideas(Ramalingam,2005;Krohwinkel-Karlsson,2007;Pasteur,2004).

Inher2004literaturereview,Pasteuridentifieswhatmaybethemostrelevantbarrierforthisthesis.

Shelaysouttheworkofanumberofauthorswhoarguethatthedominanceofpositivismin

developmentpracticeleadstoorganizationsthatarestructuredandsocializedinwaysthatmake

learningandreflectiondifficult(2004).Sheidentifiesanumberofauthorswhohavecalledfora

paradigmshiftthatwillbeneededforaidorganizationstobecomelearningorganizations–tomove

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fromcentralizedcontrol,mechanisticthinkingandhighlevelsofspecialization,towardsorganizations

thataremoreopenandexperimentalist,holisticandpragmatic(Pasteur,2004,p.18).

Thisthesisdrawsfromthirdgenerationknowledgemanagementthinkingwhileincorporatingelements

ofthis“newparadigm”thatPasteurandothershavereferredto.Currentinitiativesthatadvance“new

paradigm”learningmodelsindevelopment,tendtobehighlyappliedandprocess-specific.Forexample,

ProblemDrivenIterativeAdaptationisanappliedmodelforevolvingsolutionsincontext.Socialimpact

bondsandcash-on-deliveryaidrepresentseffortstochangetheincentivesinthesystemtodrive

intrinsiclearningbehaviours.Theseinitiativesprovideimportantinsightsintowaysthatorganizations

canimprovelearningpractices,buttheirapplicationtodateislimited.

Theories of Organizational Change and Adaptation

Therearethreecriticaldebatesintheorganizationalchangeliteraturethatinformthisresearch’s

assumptionsonadaptation–Doorganizationschange?Howdoorganizationschange?Andwhat

mechanismscauseorganizationstochange?Thefirstdebatefocusedonwhetherorganizationscan

change,orwhethertheorganizationallandscapeevolvesbynaturalselection(firmfailure).Thiswas

debatedinthe1970sand1980s,withthemajorityofthefieldsidingwiththeorganizations-are-capable-

of-changecamp,mostfamouslydefendedbyChildin1972andChildandKieserin1981(Demers,2007,

p2).Theoilcrisisofthe1970sledorganizationalscholarstothinkcriticallyabouthoworganizations

change–whetherbyslowincrements(evolutionarygradualism)orlargetransformations,oftenbrought

onbyexternalshocks(Allaire&Firsirotu,1985;Miller&Friesen,1984;Tushman&Romanelli,1985,

citedbyDemers,2007).Attheendofthe1980s,changeas“transformation”waspopular,but

simultaneouslyaviewofchangeasaprocessbegantobeexploredintheliteraturestartingwith

Pettigrewin1985.Asscholarsrecognizedthattheeconomicturbulencewasbecomingincreasingly

normal,changeasaprocessbecamethedominantunderstanding.Thisgrouparguedthatitwas

importanttostudy“thedynamicsofchanging,ratherthanthespecificchangeepisodes”themselves

(Demers,2007,p115).Thisisconsistentwithvariousorganizationalchangetheoriesincludingevolution,

learning,emergence,structuration,translation,andimprovisation.Liketheseauthorsfromthe1970s,

thisresearchwillfocusonthe“dynamicofchanging,”andwillfurtherevolvethatconcepttounderstand

notonlythedynamicsofchangingperiodically,butalsothedynamicsofcontinualorganizational

adaptation.

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Withinthisperspectiveofchange,thedebateshiftedtowhichdynamicsinsideorganizationsarethe

mechanismsofchange–naturalevolutionorsocialdynamics.Thenaturalevolutionscholarsadheretoa

realistepistemologyandarebasedinnaturalsciencesandmathematics.Theyincludebehavioral

learning,theevolutionaryandcomplexityperspectives,amongstothers,andfocusonstructureand

environmentalfactorsasimportantdeterminantsoforganizationalchange.Thisgrouptendsto

understandchangeassomethingthathappensbecauseitisnecessaryfortheorganizationtoremain

competitiveorrespondtotheneedsofitsbeneficiaries.Thesocialdynamicsscholarstendtocomefrom

thesocialsciencesandhumanities,andtakeradicalandpostmodernapproachestoorganizational

change.Theyunderstandinterpretation,humanagencyanditssocialcontextasthecentralfactorin

organizationalchange(Demers,2007,p116-120).

InthisresearchIdrawonfactorsthathavetheirrootsinboththenaturalevolutionandsocialdynamics

branchesoftheliteratureinordertoconsiderboththestructuralandenvironmentalelements,aswell

asthesocialandhumanelementsoforganizationallearningandadaptation.Thisblendingisconsistent

withmuchoftheorganizationalliteraturefromthelate1990sandearly2000s,whichdrawsonthese

twoperspectivesandrecognizesthatbothinfluencesshouldbeconsideredinacomprehensive

understandingoforganizationalchange(Jones,1999;Pettigrew1985;WeaverandGioia,1994citedin

Demers,2007,p117).

Complexitytheoryisasub-fieldofthenaturalevolutionperspectiveoforganizationalchange.Itis

importantinorganizationalchangetheorybecauseitrepresentsashiftinthinkingfromorganizationsas

equilibrium-seeking,linearentities,toorganizationsasnon-linear,dynamicsystemsthatare

unpredictableandcanfunctionoutofequilibrium.Ichosetofocusoncomplexitytheorybecauseitmost

closelyreflectsthenatureoforganizationsascomplexadaptivesystems,andspecificallytherealityfaced

byorganizationsinfragilestates.

Iamnotthefirsttoapplycomplexitytheoriestothedevelopmentcontext.Infactthereisalonglistof

authorswhohaveexploredthisintersection.4Themajordebateinthisfieldcurrentlyseemstobehow

besttoapplycomplexitytheorytointernationaldevelopmentandaid.Whereisitmosthelpful?Inwhat

4TheOverseasDevelopmentInstitutehasalistofworkingpapersoncomplexityanddevelopment;BenRamalingam’sbookAidontheEdgeofChaos;FaulkedeWeijer’sworkonhowcomplexitytheoriescanbeappliedtofragilestates;MattAndrews,LantPritchett,MichaelWoolcockhaveusedcomplexitytheorytolookathowproblem-driveniterativeadaptationcanhelpescapecapabilitytrapsinfragilestates;andOwenBarderamongstothers,hasbuiltfromthesetheoriesintotherealmsofsocialimpactbondsandotherpracticalapplications.

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wayscanunderstandingdevelopmentasanemergentpropertyhelpussavelivesormaketheworld

better?Whileeveryoneseemstoagreethatitisinteresting,noteveryoneseemsconvincedthatthis

theoreticalconstructcanactuallycontributetomakingaidmoreeffective(Barder,2014).Weareonly

nowatthebeginningofexploringanypracticalbenefitthataidmightgainfromthistheoretical

perspective.Thisthesissuggeststhatapplyingacomplexitylenstoorganizationallearningand

adaptationwillbringforthnewinsightsthatcouldultimatelymakeaidmoreeffective.

Therearetwomaintheoriesofchangewithincomplexitytheory–chaostheoryandcomplexadaptive

systems(CAS)theory.Chaostheorysuggeststhat,leftalone,organizationsasgroupsofinteracting

individuals,wouldexhibitchaoticandhighlyvariedbehavior–theywouldhaveahighdimensionality

(lotsoffreedomtohavehighlyvariedbehavior).Byapplyingvariousstructures,whichcouldinclude

mechanismssuchasacommonvision,performancemanagement,operatingprocedures,or

organizationalculture,thisdimensionalityisreduced(thereislessvariationofbehaviorduetolower

degreesoffreedom).Howeverthebehaviorofthesystemremainschaoticwithintheadjusted

dimensionality.Thismeansthatsmallchanges,forexamplethedecisionofoneindividual,canstillbe

amplifiedtoproducelargeeffects,forexamplealargespikeinrevenue,orthelossofamajorpartner.In

complexitylanguage,thisdisproportionalitybetweenthesizeoftheactionandthesizeoftheimpactis

describedasnon-linearity,makingorganizationsnon-linearentities(Demers,2007,p155-157).

ComplexAdaptiveSystems(CAS)theorytakesaslightlydifferent,althoughnotincompatibleview.

Insteadofunderstandingorganizationalbehavioraschaoticwithinagivenbound,CASemphasizesthe

self-organizingnatureofalargegroupofinteractingindividualsandfocusesonhowsmallactionscan

abruptlyproduceunforeseenmacro-levelchanges–oranewemergentorder.Thisistrueatanylevelof

analysis–actionsbyindividualgroupmemberscreatetheemergentrealityofateam,actionsbyteams

createtheemergentorderofanorganization,andactionsbyindividualorganizationscreatethe

emergentorderofanetworkorabroadersystem.AnimportantelementofthistheoryisthatCASare

opentotheirenvironmentandconstantlyinatwo-wayrelationshipwithit–influencingthesystemsof

whichtheyareapart,whilebeinginfluencedbythem.Thetrickfororganizationsistobeableto

continuouslyinteractinthisdynamicenvironmentwhileachievingsetobjectives.Thishasbeencalled

operating“attheedgeofchaos”orself-organizedcriticality.Itisatthis“edge,”theoristssuggest,that

organizationsaremorecompetitivebecause“occasionallyonesmallchangecantriggeralargechangein

outcome,butmostsmallchangesproduceonlysmalleffects,”whichallowsorganizationstolearnand

adaptreadilywhilemaintainingthedegreeoforderrequiredtobuildofflessonsandexistingsuccess

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(Demers,2007,p160).ThemainauthorstodevelopCAStheoryintheorganizationalliteratureare

Anderson(1999),BrownandEisenhardt(1997)andStacey(1995).

Byapplyingbothchaostheoryandcomplexityadaptivesystemstheory,thistheoreticalframework

allowsustoconsidertheeffectofsystemdynamics,aswellashowthesedynamicsshape,andare

shapedbyindividualagency.

CHAPTER 3: Research Questions and Framework

Research Question

Thisstudyexploresthefollowingresearchquestions:

1. TowhatextentdoorganizationsinfragilestatesemployMOCAlearningandadaptationpractices?

2. WhataretheenablersandbarriersthatinfluencetheextenttowhichorganizationsemployMOCApractices?

Fundamentally,thisresearchtriestounderstandtheextenttowhichorganizationsinHaitiaresetupto

actinawaythatisconsistentwithacomplexity-basedviewofdevelopment,andaiddelivery.Todothis,

Iassumethatorganizationsneedtobegoodatlearningandadapting.Inordertomeasuretheextentto

whichorganizationslearnandadapt,Ifirstneededtofindaframeworkofpractices,behaviours,and

Assumptionsaboutorganizationsfromtheliterature

Basedonthisliterature,thisresearchwillassumethat:

• Organizationsarecapableofintentionalchange,butthatchangeisdifficult.• Withincomplexenvironments,organizationsaremoreeffectivewhentheyunderstandchange

andadaptationasacontinuousandongoingprocess,asopposedtoaperiodicreactiontoshiftsintheexternalenvironment.

• Initialconditionshaveanimportantimpactonoutcomes.Inotherwords,thesystemswithinwhichorganizationsexist,andthestructuresthatcharacterizeorganizationsthemselves,mattertoeffectiveness.

• Organizationsarecomplexadaptivesystemsandthereforeactionsbyindividualsorgroupscanhavedisproportionatelylargeimpactsonoutcomes.

• Assystems,organizationsareopentotheirenvironments–theysimultaneouslyconstructandareconstructedbytheirenvironment.

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valuesthatareconsistentwithacomplexity-informedviewoforganizationallearningandadaptation,

againstwhichIcouldmeasureactualorganizationalbehaviour.Aftersearchingtheliterature,Ifound

thatnosuchframeworkexists.Instead,Ifoundanumberofliteraturesandtheoriesthatarticulate

differentpartsofabiggerpicture;IbroughttogetherthesepartstocreatetheMOCAframework.

Building the MOCA Framework – Factors that impact effectiveness

Inparalleltothetheoreticalliteraturethataddresseshoworganizationschangeandadapttherearea

seriesofpracticalbodiesofworkthatreflectthistheoreticalbackground,andmyownassumptions

aboutorganizations.Inscanningtheacademicliterature,Ilookedforbodiesofworkthatarticulated

organizationalpractices,andthatconnectthesepracticestoeffectiveness.Marketorientationand

organizationallearningwerethetwoclearchoices.Theyarewelldevelopedbodiesofwork,withclear

indicators,cleartheoreticalandempiricalconnectionstoeffectiveness,andtheyhavebeensuccessfully

appliedinthedevelopmentcontext.

However,marketorientationandorganizationallearningdidnotfullyaccountformyunderstandingof

organizationsascomplexadaptivesystems.Theylackedthetheoreticalunderpinningthatwouldallow

metoexplore,andbetterunderstand,howorganizationalstructureandstrategyrelatetoeffectiveness.

Forthis,Isoughtoutcomplexity-informedtheoriesoforganizationallearningandadaptation,andfound

complexityabsorptionandadaptivecapacity.TheseweretheonlytwobodiesofworkIcouldfindthat

appliedacomplexitylenstoorganizations,andconnectedlearningandadaptationpracticeswith

effectivenessorperformance.

Asaresult,theMOCAframeworkincludeselementsofmarketorientation(M),organizationallearning

(O),complexityabsorption(C),andadaptivecapacity(A).Specificpractices,behaviours,andvalueshave

beenselectedfromeachoftheseliteraturesforinclusionintheMOCAframework,inandeffortto

capturetheuniquecontributionsofeach,whilebuildingamorecomprehensiveandcomplexity-

informedframeworkoforganizationallearningandadaptation.Thefollowingsectionsoutlinethebasic

conceptswithineachofthefourliteratures,andidentifythepractices,behavioursandvaluesfromeach

thathavebeenincludedintheMOCAframework.

MarketOrientation(M):KnowledgeProducingBehavioursThebasicpremiseofmarketorientationisthatorganizationsaremoreeffectivewhentheyarefocused

ontheirstakeholders–orinthecaseofmostbusinesses–theircustomers.Marketorientationis

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theorizedtohaveapositiveimpactoneffectivenessbycausingtheorganizationtomoreaccurately

reflecttheneedsofitscustomersorstakeholders,therebycreatingsuperiorvalueandmakingitmore

competitive(Slater&Narver,1994,p.22).Theideaofmarketorientationhasgainedtractionoverthe

years,andcontinuestoberelevanttodaybecauseithasconsistentlybeenshowntohaveapositive

impactonperformance(Boehm,Vigoda-Gadot,&Segev,2011;Deshpandé&Farley,2004;Gainer&

Padanyi,2005;Modi,2012a;Slater&Narver,2000).Inthelate1990stheconceptwaspickedupby

scholarsinthenot-for-profitsectorandwasstudiedwithsimilarresults.5

Thecontemporaryconceptofmarketorientationcomesoutofthebusinessandmarketingliteratureof

the1990s,andtwoteamsofauthorsaremostoftencited:JaworskiandKohli,andSlaterandNarver.

JaworskiandKohli(1990)focusedonintelligencegeneration,intelligencedissemination,and

responsiveness,assumingthathumanactorsinsideorganizationsarerationalandpredictable(Lafferty&

Hult,2001).SlaterandNarver(1990)focusedoncustomerorientation,competitororientationandinter-

functionalcoordination,arguingtheimportanceofthebeliefsandbehavioursofindividualsand

organizationsasawhole.Inadaptingexistingmarketorientationscalesformypurposesinthisresearch,

IdrewmostheavilyfromModi’sversionoftheSlater-Narverscale(2012),andhisconceptsof

BeneficiaryOrientationandInterfunctionalCoordination,withlessemphasisonPeerOrientation.I

excludedModi’sconceptofFunderOrientationcompletely.Whileitisobviousthatorganizationsare

moreeffectivewhentheycanconsistentlysecurefunding,thiswasnotthefocusofmyresearch.The

conceptofmarketorientationisusefulformyresearchbecauseitmakesthecasethattheabilityto

continuouslyadaptbasedonfeedbackfromthemarket(ortheoperationalcontext)ispositivelylinked

toorganizationalperformance.Additionally,itemploysawell-developedsetofmeasurementtoolsthat

havealreadybeenadaptedtomultiplefields.Whilemarketorientationwasoriginallydevelopedina

corporatecontext,ithasbeensuccessfullyadaptedandtestedforusewithbothfor-profitandnot-for-

profitorganizationsindevelopmentcontextsandthereappeartobenoincompatibilitieswhenusingit

toprovideinsighttolearningandadaptationpracticesfororganizationsinfragilestates.

5PratikModiprovidesanextensivelistofstudiesthatshowedthatmarketorientationimprovesperformanceofdifferenttypesofnot-for-profitorganizationssuchas:Universities,Publicserviceorganizations,Charities,Culturalorganizations,andHospitals(Modi,2012b,p.447).

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OrganizationalLearning(O):KnowledgeQuestioningValuesLikemarketorientation,organizationallearninghasbeenfoundtohaveapositiveimpacton

organizationalperformanceinboththefor-profitandnot-for-profitsectors(Baker&Sinkula,1999a;

Campbell,2008;Mahmoud&Yusif,2012;McElroy,2000;Md.Sometal.,2011).Themainargument

behindthisconceptisthatorganizationsaremoreeffectivewhentheyhaveprocessesandculturesthat

supportthecontinuousassessmentandactivequestioningoftheorganization’soperationsandits

underlyingassumptionsabouthowtoachieveresults.Organizationallearningisverycloselyrelatedto

marketorientation,althoughtendstofocusmoreonthevaluesandbehavioursofindividuals(Baker&

Sinkula,1999a).Sinkulamakesthedistinctionthat“marketorientationisreflectedbyknowledge-

producingbehaviors.Learningorientationisreflectedbyasetofknowledge-questioningvalues”(Baker

&Sinkula,1999a,p.413).6Organizationallearningisusefulinthisresearchbecauseitprovidesinsight

intothecultureandvaluesofanorganization–thepeopledimension.Additionally,itprovidesasetof

organizationalpracticesandindicatorsofknowledgedevelopmentanddisseminationthathavebeen

demonstratedtocontributepositivelytoorganizationalperformance,andwhichmayenrichthe

indicatorsassociatedwithmarketorientation.

IndevelopingtheMOCAscale,Idrewmostheavilyon:

• Sinkulaetal’s(1997)conceptsofInformationCollection;InformationDissemination;CommitmenttoLearning;SharedVision;OpenMindedness;andMarketingProgramDynamism.

• Jerez-Gomezetal’s(2005)conceptsofKnowledgetransferandIntegration;OpennessandExperimentation;SystemsPerspective;andManagerialCommitment.

• MahmoudandYusif’s(2012)conceptsofKnowledgeSharing,andSharedVision

Gaps

Theliteratureonmarketorientationandorganizationallearningdefinepracticesthathaveapositive

impactonorganizationaleffectiveness,however,theyaresilentontwoimportantareasofanalysisthat

arecriticalforaidorganizationstobecomplexity-enabledactorsthatcancontributetoresultsin

complexenvironments:

1. Organizationalstructure.Marketorientationandorganizationallearningarenotwellsuitedtoquestionorexamineorganizationalstructure.Complexityabsorptionprovidesspecifictheories

6Thereisasignificantgroupofauthorslookingattheintersectionofmarketorientation,organizationallearningandperformance,allofwhomhavefoundthatthetwofactorspositivelyimpacteachother,andorganizationalperformance(Baker&Sinkula,1999b;Mahmoud&Yusif,2012;Slater&Narver,1995;WilliamEBaker&JamesMSinkula,1999).

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aboutthewaythatorganizationalstructureimpactseffectivenessandisthereforeausefulcontributiontotheframework.Adaptivecapacityintroducesthreeconceptsrelatingtoorganizationalstructureintotheanalysis:multiplexity,redundancyandloosecoupling.Eachofthesestructuralcharacteristicsenablesorganizationstobecontinuallyadaptivetochangingcontextsandberesilienttoanylargeunexpectedchanges.Adaptivecapacityisthereforealsoimportanttoincludeinthisresearch.

2. OrganizationalStrategy.Marketorientationandorganizationallearningdonotaddressthecomplexityassociatedwithorganizations’goals,objectivesandstrategies.Organizationallearning,specificallydouble-looplearning,providesonetoolforanalyzingorganizationalstrategy,however,organizationsmustalsoconsiderhowtheycanchoosetheirgoalsandstrategiestobestenablethemtothriveincomplexenvironments.Complexityabsorptionprovidesaframeworkforthisanalysis,andwillthereforebeanimportantpartofunderstandinglearningandadaptationinfragilestates.

ComplexityAbsorption(C):ConsistencywithQualitiesofComplexAdaptiveSystems“Whenorganizationsarrangethemselvesinwaysthatareconsistentwiththequalitiesofcomplexadaptivesystems,successfulco-evolutionandself-organizingismorelikely”(AshmosandDuchon,2000,p.578).

Complexityabsorptionislesswelldevelopedintheliteraturethanmarket-orientationandorganizational

learning.Thisliteratureisgroundedincomplexitytheoryandlooksatthewaythatorganizations

respondtocomplexenvironments,specificallyhoworganizationsstructurethemselvesandtheirinternal

processes,inrelationtotheirenvironments.Scholarsinthisfield7identifytwopossibleorganizational

responsestocomplexenvironments—acomplexityabsorptionresponseoracomplexityreduction

response.Acomplexityreductionresponseischaracterizedbyorganizationsthattrytosimplifytheir

internalenvironmenttocopewithacomplexexternalenvironment(e.g.focusingononekeyobjective

insteadofmany,increasingthenumberofrulesandoperatingprocedures,concentratingdecision-

makingabilities).Itisgenerallyseenasriskadversebehaviorthatusesrulesandcentralizationasways

toreduceambiguity.

Ontheotherhand,complexityabsorptionisrepresentedbyorganizationsthattrytoorganize

themselvesdynamicallyinthefaceofcomplexexternalenvironments(Lengnick-Hall&Beck,2005).This

7TheseideashadtheiroriginsinAshby’s“requisitevariety”in1954(1958),butwerereallydevelopedthroughMaxBoisot’sworkinthe1990s(1999)andbuiltonbyJohnChild(1999),AshmosandDuchon(2000)andothers.

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mightincludeincreasingthenumberofdifferentstrategiesthatanorganizationemploystoachievea

statedobjective,increasingthenumberofcross-functionalworkinggroups,usingmatrixmanagement

modelsordecentralizingdecision-makingpower.Thistypeofbehaviormightbeaccompaniedby

languagelike“let’smakedecisionsasclosetotheactionaspossible”or“inordertosurviveweneedto

encourageexperimentation.”Whilethismayappearcounter-intuitivetosome,thistypeofbehavioris

beingincreasinglyrepresentedintheleadershipliteratureasimportantinstinctsforleadersto

internalizetobesuccessfulincomplexenvironments(Olmedo,2012).

Complexityabsorptionsuccessfullylinkscomplexity-informedstructuralmanagementapproachesto

organizationaleffectiveness,makingitanimportantcontributortotheMOCAframework.Atleasttwo

studiesofhealthcareorganizationsfoundthatthoseorganizationsthatchooseacomplexityabsorption

approachoutperformorganizationswithcomplexityreductionresponsesincomplexenvironments

(Ashmos,Duchon,&Jr,2000;Walters&Bhuian,2004).

IndevelopingtheMOCAscale,IdrewfromAshmos’conceptsofInteractionComplexity,Goal

Complexity,StrategicComplexity,andStructuralComplexity(Formalization).Additionally,Iused

indicatorsfromWildenetal’sconceptofStructuralComplexity.

• Interactionalcomplexityreferstothedegreetowhichdifferentgroupsofpeopleareinvolvedinstrategicdecision-makingprocesses.Complexityabsorptionarguesthatwhenagreaterdiversityofpeopleareinvolvedindecision-making,thedecisionstendtobetterreflectanorganization’scomplexenvironment,althoughareoftenmoredifficulttomake.

• Goalcomplexityreferstothedegreetowhichanorganizationfocusesonmultipleandsometimesdiversegoals.TheintentionofGoalComplexityistoprovidetheorganizationwithoptionsshouldtheenvironmentchangedrastically–itreducesthetendencyfororganizationstopursueonehighrisk/highrewardgoal.Inthenot-for-profitsectorthismightbeusefulincaseswhereamajorfundershiftstheirfundingpriorities,forexample.

• Strategiccomplexityreferstothedegreetowhichanorganizationpursuesadiversityofstrategiestoachieveanygivengoal.Inthefor-profitworldthismightincludehavingmultipledevelopmentteamsworkinginparalleltodeveloponeproduct.Inthepursuitofsocialgood,multiplestrategiescouldhelp“hedgetheorganization’sbets”intermsofwhichstrategyendsuphavingthegreatestimpactinanygivenenvironment,andmultiplestrategiescouldalsoservetore-enforceeachothercreatingabetterendresult.

• Structuralcomplexityreferstotheautonomyofindividualsandgroupswithinanorganizationtomakedecisionsandre-configurethemselvesasneededtomeetthedemandsoftheirwork.Structurallycomplexorganizationsarerelativelydecentralizedandlessformalized.

Theliteratureoncomplexityabsorption,althoughlimited,isusefulbecauseitbringtheconceptsof

complexitytheorytogetherwithorganizationaltheoryinawaythatallowsustodefineaseriesof

organizationalpractices.Bycombiningthesepracticeswiththepracticesthathavebeendefinedinthe

23

marketorientationandorganizationallearningliterature,Iwasabletodevelopamoreinclusive

frameworkoflearningandadaptationindicators.

AdaptiveCapacity(A):PropensityforContinuous,IntentionalAdaptationTheterm‘adaptivecapacity’hasbeenusedtorepresentmultiplevariationsonacoreconceptinfieldsas

diverseasclimatechange,populationbiology,anddisasterpreparedness.Inthisresearch,Iuseadaptive

capacitytoexplorehoworganizationsareabletocontinuallyadaptinordertosurviveandachievetheir

objectivesinachangingenvironment.IuseStaberandSydow’sdefinitionofadaptivecapacity,which

introducesaseriesofstructuralandcomplexitybasedorganizationalpractices.

StaberandSydowfocusonthreestructuraldimensionstoadaptivecapacity:multiplexity,redundancy,

andloosecoupling.Multiplexityrefersto“thenumberanddiversityofrelationsbetweenactorsin

organizationsorinter-organizationalnetworks”(Staber&Sydow,2002,p.414).Thisperspectiveassumes

thathavingagreatervarietyandnumberofconnectionsimprovesanorganization’sabilitytotransfer

informationindiverseways,whichallowsittobeversatileincomplexenvironments.Essentially

suggestingthatorganizationsthatengageoftenandfluidlyacrossdepartments,functionalgroupsand

levelsarebetterabletoknowwhatisgoingonandmakedecisionstoadaptappropriately.Redundancy

canbegenerallyunderstoodasextra,free,orduplicatedresources.Traditionally,redundancyhasbeen

seenasanegative–awasteoforganizationalresources–andhasthereforebeenminimizedin

efficiency-seekingorganizationalmodels.However,multiplescholarstheorizethatredundancyof

resources,informationandtaskscanallbecriticalforanorganizationtoexperimentandinnovate,as

wellastomaketheorganizationresilientinthefaceofvolatileandunpredictablechanges.Ifdone

properly,redundancyshouldimprovetheoverallefficiencybywhichanorganizationisabletoachieve

itsstatedobjectivesinrapidlychangingenvironments.Finally,loosecouplingmeans“thevariousunits

andactivities[withinanorganization]arerelativelyindependentandcanadjusttochangingdemandsin

differentwaysandatvaryingrates”(Staber&Sydow,2002,p.417).Whilethishasbeenshowntoleadto

inefficiencyinrelativelystableenvironmentalconditions,ittendstoimproveeffectivenessinconditions

ofextremeuncertainty,suchasthoseoftenfoundinfragilestates(Staber&Sydow,2002,p.418).The

diversitythatisallowedtoflourishinorganizationswithlooselycoupled,orweakties,tendstomake

themhighlyadaptive.

IndevelopingtheMOCAscale,IdrewspecificallyonindicatorsfromStaber’sconceptsofredundancy

andloosecoupling.Staber’sconceptofmultiplexityisalreadywellcoveredbyotherindicatorsfromthe

marketorientationandorganizationallearningliteratures.

24

Adaptivecapacityisusefulinthisresearchbecauseitprovidesaverydifferentconceptofhowstructures

andpracticescanimpactanorganization’sabilitytoadapt,specificallyincaseswheretheenvironmentis

highlyvolatile.Additionallyitre-enforcesthenotionthatlearningandadaptationisnotonlysomething

thatorganizations“do”butmustbebuiltintothewaythatorganizationsconductthemselvesonaday-

to-daybasis.Finally,itchallengesthedogmaticnotionthatcoordinationandstandardizationarealways

goodandalwaysleadstogreatereffectivenessinorganizations.Giventhatfragilestatescanbeextreme

environments,itisimportanttodeconstructtheassumptionsthatwecarryoverfromorganizational

practicesbasedinmorestablecontexts.Thesefourfactors–marketorientation,organizationallearning,

complexityabsorptionandadaptivecapacity–formMOCA,thebasisofthisresearch.Thepracticesthat

makeupthisframeworkhavebeendemonstratedindividuallytohaveapositiveimpacton

organizationaleffectivenesswithintheexistingliterature.Ibringtogetherpractices,behavioursand

valuesfromeachoftheminthisresearchtobeabletolookmoreholisticallyathoworganizationslearn

andadaptinfragilestates,tomeasureexistingmanagementpracticesagainstthisframework,andto

understandtheenablersandbarrierstoapplyingMOCAlearningandadaptationpracticesinfragile

states.

CHAPTER 4: Methodology

Thisresearchwasconductedasanexploratorystudyonhowaidorganizationslearnandadaptinfragile

states.IbroughttogetherdifferentpartsoftheliteraturetocreatetheMOCAframework–andthen

usedbothqualitativeandquantitativetoolstomeasureorganizationsagainsttheframeworkand

identifybarriersandenablersthatorganizationsfacetoemployingthesepractices.

Study Location and Context

Iconductedanexploratorystudytodeterminetheprevalenceoflearningandadaptationpracticesinaid

organizationsinHaiti,basedontheassumptionthatfindingsmaybetransferabletoorganizations

workinginotherfragilecontexts.

Haitiwaschosenasthelocationforthisstudybecauseitexhibitsalloftheclassiccharacteristicsofa

fragilestate–itisweakeconomically,socially,andpoliticallydespitereceivingsignificantdevelopment

assistanceoverthepastsixdecades.Haitiscoreshighonmostfragilityratingsandhasbeenthefocusof

manyhumanitariananddevelopmentinterventions(Carment&Samy,2011).Haitiwasalsochosenfor

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practicalreasons:therearealargenumberandrangeoforganizationsoperatingonthegroundinHaiti,

includinglargeinternationaldonororganizations,aswellasthefullspectrumofNGOs,fromlarge

internationalaidorganizationstomediumandsmallscaleNGOs,bothforeignanddomestic.This

breadthoforganizationalactivitymadeHaitianappropriatecandidateforthisprojectbecauseithada

sufficientnumberoforganizationsthatfittheselectioncriteriaforthisproject:smallandmediumsized

aidorganizations.

Thisstudyassumesthatthedynamicsthatshapethelearningandadaptationpractices,enablersand

barriersfacedbyinternationalaidorganizationsinHaiti,willbesimilartothedynamicsfacedby

internationalaidorganizationsoperatinginotherfragilecontexts.Inotherwords,thatthesystem

conditionsinHaiti,arecloseenoughtothesystemconditionsinAfghanistan,theDemocraticRepublicof

theCongo,orSomalia,asitisrelevanttoaidorganizationmanagementpractices–andmorespecifically

tohowaidorganizationslearnandadapt.Thisassumptionsuggeststhatthefindingsofthisresearch

shouldbegeneralizabletointernationalaidorganizationsinotherfragilestatecontexts.

Mixed method approach: Mechanics of the Methodology

Amixedmethodapproachwastakeninordertobeabletoquantifyorganizationalpracticesacrossa

broadsampleoforganizations,whilealsobeingabletouseinterviewstounderstandtherealitiesofa

feworganizationsingreaterdepth.SADEV(SwedishDevelopmentAgency)conductedareviewof

knowledgeandlearningliteratureandmethodsin2007,andconfirmedthatamixedmethodsapproach

ispreferredinthisfield(Krohwinkel-Karlsson,2007,p.9).

Iusedasurveythataskedrespondentstoanswerlikert-scalequestionsabouttheirorganization’s

learningandadaptationpracticesinrelationtotheMOCAscale(afulllistofsurveyquestionsare

availableinAppendixA).Icoupledthiswithsemi-structuredinterviewsthatexploredtheenablersand

barrierstolearning,adaptationandeffectivenessmoregenerally(interviewquestionsavailablein

AppendixB).ThemixedmethodsapproachwasespeciallyimportantbecausetheMOCAframeworkis

new.Mostoftheseindicatorshavenotbeenusedwithorganizationsworkinginfragilestatesandit

wouldhavebeenverydifficulttointerpretsurveydatawithoutanyqualitativecontext.Semi-structured

interviewsprovidedthecontextIneededforthisinterpretation.

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Survey

MOCAScaleDevelopment

IdevelopedtheMOCAscalebasedonexistingsurveyquestionsfromthemarketorientation,

organizationallearning,andcomplexityabsorptionliterature,aswellasnewquestionsbasedonthe

adaptivecapacityliterature.OncetheMOCAscalewasdeveloped,Itestedthescalebypilotingthe

surveywiththreeindividualsinOttawawhoarefamiliarwithoperationalrealitiesofnot-for-profit

organization,toensureclarityandrelevanceofthequestions.ThevalidityandreliabilityoftheMOCA

scalewasnottestedaspartofthisresearch.Instead,IreliedonthevalidityofthescalesfromwhichI

drewtheMOCApractices,aswellasqualitativecross-referencing.

SurveyDataCollection

Isurveyedindividualsemployedby12smallandmediumsizedaidorganizationsinHaiti,whichincluded

humanitarianassistanceorganizations,capacitybuildingorganizations,and“other”8organizations.9

Recruitmentwasdonebye-mailinitially.IusedonlinedirectoriesandInternetsearchestofinde-mail

addressesforcountrydirectorsandotherseniorleaderswithinaidorganizations.Thisapproachyielded

veryfewresponses.Asasecondaryapproach,IreliedoncontactsthatImetinHaiti,snowballsampling,

andin-personmeetingswithstaffatorganizations’headquarters,andphoneinquiriestoeventually

obtainsufficientsurveydata.Thisnecessaryadjustmenttotheresearchdesignmayhaveintroducedan

elementofselectionbias.Thisbiasdoesnotappeartobesignificant,howeverifitdidhaveanimpact,it

wouldresultinparticipatingorganizationshavingbetterlearningandadaptationpracticesthanthe

average.

OnceIwasconnectedwithakeycontactwithinanorganization(generallyaseniorleader),thiscontact

wasaskedtodistributeane-maillettertostaffthatcontainedlinkstotheonlinesurveyandan

informationletterthatprovidedthedetailsofthestudy,includingthevoluntaryandconfidentialnature

ofparticipation.Employeeswereabletoconnecttotheonlinesurveydirectlyandtheirsupervisorsand

colleagueswerenotmadeawareoftheirparticipation,orlackthereof.

8“Other”organizationsconsistentofonefinancialservicesorganization,anadvocacyandhumanrightsfocusedorganizations,andascholarshipandeducation-focusedorganization.9Iappliedthesecategoriesbasedonthemajoractivitiesconductedbyeachorganization,andthecategoriesdonotnecessarilycaptureallofthenuancesofhoweachorganizationoperates.Forexample,someprimarilyhumanitarianassistanceorganizationsprovidecapacitybuildingsupport,andsomeprimarilycapacitybuildingorganizationsleadhumanitarianassistance-typeprojects.

27

Ielectedtoexcludelargeorganizations,suchasmajorcountrydonoragencies,theUN,andtheHaitian

government,fromthisstudybecausetheirlearningandadaptationsystemsarelikelymorecomplicated

andwouldrequiresignificantlymoretimetofullyassess.Additionally,itwouldhavebeendifficultto

gainaccesstothenumberofindividualsrequiredtohaveacomprehensiveperspectiveofsuchlarge

organizations.Originallythisresearchwasopentoincludingfor-profitorganizationswithstatedsocial

objectives(socialenterprises),howevernofor-profitorganizationswereavailabletoparticipateinthe

study.Theparticipatingorganizationswereallnot-for-profits,andmorespecifically,aidorganizationsof

differenttypes,makingthisresearchmorenarrowlyfocusedoninternationalaidorganizationsworking

inHaiti.

Fifty-sevenrespondentsfrom12organizationscompletedtheonlinesurvey.10Themajorityof

respondentsweremanagersofstafforfunctions(23)orseniorleaders(15).Anadditional9survey

respondentswerefront-linestaff,and10respondentsself-selectedas“other.”Thelargemajorityof

surveyrespondentshadbeenwiththeirorganizationsforbetween1and3years(38),withonly13

havingbeenwiththeiremployersmorethan3years,and6havingbeenthereforlessthan1year.

Table1:RespondentsbyPositionNumberofRespondents

Position

15 Seniorleader/executive23 Manager(ofstafforfunction)

9 Front-linestaff

10 Other57 TOTAL

10Thesurveywascollectedthroughanonlinesurveyplatform.Althoughallorganizationswereofferedtheoptiontohaveemployeescompletethesurveyonpaper,ineitherFrenchorEnglish,nonetookadvantageofthepaperoption,preferringtohaveemployeescompletethesurveyonline.AqualifiedprofessionaltranslatortranslatedthesurveyfromEnglishtoFrench.

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Table2:RespondentsbyTimewithOrganizationNumberofRespondents

TimewithOrganizations

3 Morethan10years

3 7-10years7 4-6years

38 1-3years

6 Under1year57 TOTAL

Surveyswerecollectedfromaminimumofthreerespondentsineachorganizationtoensuremultiple

perspectiveswereincludedintheorganization’soverallscore.Thisapproachmadeitpossibletoinclude

perspectivesfromdifferentlevelsandroleswithintheorganization,andreducedtheimpactthatthe

viewsofasingleindividualmighthaveontheresults.Incaseswererespondentsdidnotindicatetheir

organization,orwheretherewerefewerthanthreerespondentsfromoneorganization,thedatawas

notincludedinthestudy.Incompletesurveyswereincluded,providedrespondentsanswereda

minimumofonethirdofsurveyquestions.Thenumberofrespondentsbyorganizationcanbefoundin

thefollowingtable.Thissamplesizeissufficienttoprovideabaselineunderstandingofpracticesusedby

aidorganizationsinHaiti.

Table3:NumberofSurveys(completeandincomplete)byOrganizationOrganization

CodeNumberofResponses SurveyStatus

Complete Incomplete

C 5 5 0

E 3 2 1

H1 3 3 0

H2 8 5 3

H3 3 3 0

H4 4 4 0

M 6 5 1

O 3 3 0

P 3 3 0

S 7 5 2

T1 8 7 1

T2 4 4 0

TOTAL 5711 49 8

1114othersurveyresponseswerenotincludedinthedataeitherbecausetherespondentansweredfewerthan1/3ofthequestions,becausetheydidnotindicatewhichorganizationtheywerefrom,orbecauseIwasnotabletocollecttheminimumofthreevalidsurveyresponsesfromtheirorganization.

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AnalysisofSurveydata

Oncethesurveyswerecollected,Ianalyzedthedatatoanswertheresearchquestions.First,Icalculated

averagescoresbyquestionandbyorganization(i.e.foreachsurveyquestion,Ifoundtheaveragescore

foreachofthe12organizations).Usingtheseorganizationalaveragescores,Ideterminedwhetheror

noteachorganization“employed”eachpractice.Detailsofhow“employed”wasdefinedforeach

questionisincludedinthefootnotesofAppendixA.

ThisanalysisallowedmetoquantifyhowmanyMOCApracticeseachofthe12organizations

“employed.”ItalsoallowedmetoseetrendsbyMOCApractice–foreachMOCApracticeIwasableto

determinehowmanyofthe12organizationswerebehavinginthatway.Ichosenottogroupindicators

togethertoformsecondarylevelmodels.12ThiswaspartiallyduetothefactthatIdidnottestthe

validityorreliabilityoftheMOCAscale,andthereforecouldnotstatisticallyverifymorecomplicated

modeldevelopment.

Asecondstepintheanalysiswastoidentifytrendsbyorganizationtype.Iassessedthemajoractivities

conductedbyeachorganizationinthestudyandassignedthemtoacategory–humanitarianassistance,

capacitybuilding,orother.Ithenidentifiedtrendsandusedtheinterviewdatatotheorizeexplanations.

Theoriginalresearchdesignwastocollectsurveydatafirst,andusetheresultstohelpshapethe

interviewquestions.However,inpracticeIwasunabletocollectasignificantsampleofsurveyresponses

beforearrivinginHaiti,andthereforeIcollectedqualitativeandquantitativedatainparallel.This

necessarymodificationtothemethodologymayhavechangedthecontentofthedatacollected,

becausetheinterviewquestionsremainedmoregeneral,ratherthanbeingmademorespecificin

responsetothesurveydata.

12IhadoriginallyanticipatedanalyzingMOCApracticesbygroupingthemintocategories,howeverIoptedtoconsidereachMOCApracticeindividually.TherewassignificantvariationinscoresacrossMOCApracticesthatwouldhavebeenincludedinacategorymakingitdifficulttorationalizegroupingindicatorstogether.Additionally,acomplexity-basedtheoreticalframeworkarguesagainstanaggregatedanalysisoftheseindicators,andrathersuggeststhateachcouldhavedisproportionateimpactonthesystemasawhole,andthereforeshouldbeconsideredseparately.

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Semi-StructuredInterviews

DevelopmentofInterviewQuestions

Thesemi-structuredinterviewquestionsweredeveloptopurposefullybebroadenoughthat

intervieweescouldspeaktothemajorenablersandbarriersthattheyandtheirorganizationsfaceto

learningandadaptation,withoutnecessarilybeingconfinedtothepracticesoutlinedintheMOCA

framework.WhiletheMOCAscaledrewonexistingknowledgeintheliteratureaboutlearningand

adaptationpracticesthatcontributetoeffectiveness,Iwascurioustounderstandthefactorsthataid

practitionersperceivedtoreallymakeadifferenceintheirorganizations.

Twenty-twointerviewswereconductedaspartofthisresearch–17ofwhichweredonewithemployees

ofthreeoftheorganizationsincludedinthesurvey;theremaining5wereconductedwithotherkey

informantswhobroughtadditionalperspectivestotheresearch.Ofthe22interviews,17were

conductedinHaiti,and5wereconductedinOttawaattheheadquartersoforganizationsincludedinthe

study.

Table4:InterviewCodesandNumbersofIntervieweesbyOrganization InterviewCode #ofinterviewees

CapacityBuildingOrganization1 CB1 3CapacityBuildingOrganization2 CB2 5

HumanitarianAssistanceOrganization1 HA1 9Funder Funder 1

BackgroundInterview1(Researcherandsubjectmatterexpert) BG1 1

BackgroundInterview2(Ex-employeeofacapacitybuildingorganization) BG2 1

BackgroundInterview3(Researcherandevaluationconsultant) BG3 1

BackgroundInterview4(Employeeofahumanitarianassistanceorganization)

HA2 1

TOTAL 22

Inadditiontothesurveyandinterviews,evaluationreportsandtemplateswerecollectedfrom

individualsemployedbytwoofthethreeorganizationsinterviewed.Theywerereviewedaspartofthe

researchasathirdreferencepointinformingmyconclusions,althoughthisdocumentreviewwasnot

comprehensiveenoughtocontributemeaningfullytomyfindings.

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InterviewDataCollection

OriginallyIhadintendedtoconductinterviewsafterthesurveydatawascollectedandtointerviewat

leastoneorganizationthathadadoptedveryfewMOCApractices,atleastoneorganizationthathad

adoptedsomeMOCApractices,andatleastoneorganizationthathadadoptedmanyMOCApractices.

However,duetothefactthatsurveysandinterviewsweredoneinparallel,Iwasnotabletobe

intentionalaboutthisselection.Theorganizationswithwhichtheinterviewswereconductedendedup

beingreasonablywellspreadoutacrossthespectrumoforganizationsthatrespondedtothesurvey–

5th,7thand12thoverallbytotalMOCAscore.Thefactthatthisdistributionisweightedtowardsthe

bottomhalfofsurveyrespondingorganizations,meansthattheinterviewfindingsmaybesomewhat

skewedtowardstherealitiesoforganizationsthatscoredlowerontheMOCAscale.13

Iinterviewedmoreindividualswithinthehumanitarianassistanceorganization,becauseitwas

significantlybiggerthanthetwocapacitybuildingorganizations.WherepossibleIinterviewedthe

managerresponsibleforlearningandadaptationpractices,althoughthiswasonlypossiblefortwoout

ofthethreeorganizations.

InterviewDataAnalysis

Interviewswereaudiorecordedandtranscribed.InterviewsthatweredoneinFrenchweretranslated

duringthetranscriptionprocess.Thetranscribedinterviewsweretaggedandsortedintothemesto

identifykeytrends.Theinterviewdatawasthenusedtoreinforce,challengeandinterpretsurveydata

totheextentpossible.Inmanyinstances,thesurveyssuggestedwheretolook(i.e.thedatasuggested

practiceswheretheremaybebarriersandenablerspresent),buttheinterviewdatawasneededtobe

abletoexplainmorefullywhatthosebarriersmightbe,andiforhowtheymightbeovercome.Usingthe

quantitativeandqualitativedataincombinationhasprovenessentialtobeingabletomorefully

understandorganizationaldynamics.

13Theimportanceoforganizationtypewasdeterminedafterthedatawascollected,andthereforeIwasnotintentionalaboutensuringadiversityoforganizationtypesintheinterviews.Iendedupwithonehumanitarianassistanceorganization,twocapacitybuildingorganizations,andno“other”organizationsincludedintheinterviews.Thiswasunfortunate,asthe“other”categoryprovedtobesomeofthehigherperformingorganizationintermsoftotalMOCAscore.Withoutanyinterviewdataitisdifficulttohypothesizeasthewhythismightbethecase.

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Scope and Limitations

Thesubstantialpotentialforscope-creep,andthechallengesofprojectdefinitionarewellknowninthe

organizationallearningliterature.Itishardtoimagineorganizationalprocessesorindividualbehaviours

thatarenotinsomewayrelatedtotheabilityoftheorganizationtolearnandadapt.Asanexploratory

studyIhaveallowedthefindingsandanalysistoextendfromtheprojectlevel,totheorganization

corporatelevel,andouttothesectorlevel.Asasnapshot,thisstudydoesnotexplorethecorporate

knowledgemanagementstrategiesoftheseorganizationsindetail.Instead,thisstudyreflectswhatI

heardaboutproject-level,organization-levelandsector-leveldynamicsfromtheperspectiveoffront-line

staff,fieldmanagers,andcorporatelearningadvisors.Thisstudydoesnotincludeasubstantial

documentreview,observationaltime,orconsiderationofpastorprojectedlearningandadaptation

performance–ratheritprovidesapoint-in-timepictureoforganizationalpractices,asdescribedand

ratedbytheemployeesof12organizations.

Thisresearchdoesnotconsiderthelearningandadaptationneedsorperspectivesofsouthernpartner

organizations,manyofwhicharethebeneficiariesoftheorganizationsincludedinthisstudy.Hovland

highlightedthisgapasamajorinadequacyoftheexistingliterature,andthisthesisdoesnothelpfillthis

gap,butdoesfurthersupporttheimportanceofmoreresearchinthisarea(Hovland,2003,p15).

RelationshipbetweenMOCApracticesandorganizationaleffectiveness

ThisresearchdoesnotmakeanydefinitiveclaimsregardingtheimpactofMOCApracticeson

organizationaleffectiveness.Instead,itreliesonthestrongconnectionthathasalreadybeenmadein

theliteraturebetweenMOCApracticesandorganizationaleffectiveness.Theresearchisalsopredicated

onabroaderrecognitionthatcontextsensitivityandadaptabilityarekeytoachievingresultstocomplex

socialproblems.

ValidatingtheMOCAscale

ThisresearchdoesnotverifythereliabilityorvalidityoftheMOCAscaleindepth.Therigorrequiredto

verifythereliabilityandvalidityofanewmeasurementscaleisbeyondthescopeofthismastersthesis.

However,theMOCAscaleislargelybasedonthreesurveysthathavebeenpreviouslytestedand

validatedintheliterature,whichlendstoitsreliability.Additionally,themixedmethodapproachallows

thesurveydatatobecheckedbyqualitativedata,furtheringthereliabilityofthestudy’sconclusions.

LimitationsoftheSurvey

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TheMOCAsurveyprovidesausefulhigh-levelsnapshotoforganizationalpractices,howeversome

indicatorsaredifficulttointerpret.Infutureresearchitwouldbehelpfultoclarifytheintendedlevel

thateachquestionisaimedat.Forexample,considertheMOCApractice“operationsarebasedonclient

needs.”Arespondentcouldreadthequestionatdifferentlevelsofabstraction.Theycouldbethinking

abouttheextenttowhichtheday-to-dayoperationoftheirhousingprojectisbasedonclientneeds(we

identifypeoplewhoneedhousesthemost,anddeliver).Or,theycouldbethinkingattheorganizational

strategylevel(weidentifiedhousingasthegreatestneedinthearea,andsowecreatedaprojectto

addressthisneed).Itwouldbehelpfulinfuturestudiestomakethesequestionsmorespecifictothe

levelofanalysis,soastobeabletobemorespecificwhendrawingconclusions.Asurveymayormaynot

bethebesttoolforthismoredetailedlevelofanalysis.

LimitationoftheInterviews

Thefactthatinterviewswereonlyconductedwithemployeesfromtwoofthethreetypesof

organizationwasalimitation.Infutureresearch,itwouldbehelpfulforinterviewstobeconductedwith

employeesfromabroadercrosssectionoforganizations(e.g.twocapacitybuildingorganizations,two

humanitarianassistanceorganizations,andtwo“other”organizations),toprovideanaccurateand

nuancedpictureacrossallorganizationtypes.Similarly,greaterattentionshouldbepaidtoensuringthat

intervieweesareselectedbasedontheirrolesandpositionswithintheorganization.Therandomnessby

whichintervieweesweredistributedthroughouttheirorganizationsprovedtobealimitation,asthere

weregapsinunderstandingspecificorganizationalprocesses.

Ethical Considerations

Becausethisstudyinvolvedhumanparticipants,itreceivedethicsapprovalbeforeanyresearchactivity

wasundertaken.Allparticipantswereadultsabletoprovideinformedconsent,andallsurveysand

interviewswerecapturedanonymously.Theresearcherwillkeepalldemographicdatasecure.This

thesiswillbesharedwithparticipatingorganizationsasanelectronicPDFdocumentafterithasbeen

defendedandapprovedbytheUniversityofOttawa.

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CHAPTER 5: Findings

Thisresearchwasinitiallydesignedtouseamixedmethodsapproachsothattheinterviewscouldhelp

explainandinterprettheresultsoftheMOCAsurvey.InsteadIfoundthatintervieweesonlymentioned

about30%ofthepracticesintheMOCAframework.Unexpectedly,theinterviewsrevealedmoremicro

(humandynamics)andmacro(systemdynamics)atplaythatfundamentallyshapeorganizational

learningandadaptationbehaviour.

Asaresult,thefindingspresentedinthischapterstartwithinterestingtrendsinthesurveydata,and

quicklyshifttowardsthebroadertrendsrevealedintheinterviewdata.Thefollowingtableprovidesa

summaryofkeyfindings,astheyrelatetotheresearchquestions.

Table5:SummaryofFindingsQuestion/Assumption Finding

Assumption:Learningandadaptationcontributestoorganizationaleffectiveness

IntervieweesagreedthattheabilitytolearnandadaptiscriticaltoorganizationaleffectivenessinHaiti.

Question:TowhatextentdoorganizationsemployMOCApractices?

Organizationsshowedsignificantvariationintheirlearningandadaptationpractices.Marketorientationandorganizationallearningpracticesweremorecommonlyemployedthanadaptivecapacityandcomplexityabsorptionpractices.DevelopmentorganizationsemployedmoreMOCApracticesthanhumanitarianassistanceorganizations.

Question:Whataretheenablersandbarrierstolearningandadaptation?

Project

Level

Enablers:• Thequalityandcompetenciesofproject

staff• Relationshipswithbeneficiaries• Informal,personalknowledge• Authorityofprojectstafftoadapt

Barriers:• Challengeswithhiring• Lackoftimeandspaceforstafftoreflect• Project-focusedstructuresandcultures• Lackofinformation

OrganizationLevel

Enablers:• Corporatelearningfunctions• Monitoringandevaluation• Informalsharingandlearningopportunities

Barriers:• Barrierstousingmonitoringandevaluation

dataforlearning

35

Question/Assumption Finding• Focusonaccountabilitytothefunder• Project-basedsilosandcycles• Culturalbarrierstolearning• Lackoffeedbackloops

SectorLevel

Enablers:• Informalnetworksandinformationsharing• Individualcontributionstosectorlevel

learningBarriers:

• Challengesapplyingsector-levelknowledge• Themedia• Riskaversionandthenegative

consequencesoffailure• Otherbarriers

TestingAssumptions:TheabilitytolearnandadaptiscriticaltoorganizationaleffectivenessinHaitiIntervieweesacrossallorganizationsconsistentlytalkedabouthoweffectivenessinHaitiisdependent

upondevelopingcontext-appropriateprojectsthatcontinuallyapplynewlearnings,andareableto

adapt.ThisfindingsupportsthemajorassumptionthatunderliestheMOCAframework,andreinforces

therelevanceofthisresearch.Thefollowingquotesrepresentsentimentssharedbymanyinterviewees:

Weneedtohaveavisionthatisopenenoughtobeabletolearn,withoutinsistingonrealitiesthataredifferentthanHaiti's.HereinPetionvillewecanhavecontextx…evenifitworkedinPetionvilleitmightnotworkinDelmas,andwhatworkedinDelmasmightnotworkinPortauPrince,andwhatworkedinPortauPrincemightnotworkinSt.Marc....thatiswhyweneedtobeabletogivetimetolearnaboutthenewrealitiesandfromtheselearningstoseehowwecanadapt.–CB1

Youhavetobereadytoquestionthings…BecausewhenwearrivefromCanada,wecomefromaplacewhereitworkslikethis,buthereitworksdifferently.Hereyouhavetobereadytoputthesethingsintoquestion,totakethebasicprinciplesandmakethemapply.Andfindwaystohavethemacceptedbyyourpartner.Thatiseffectiveness.–CB2

Themostimportantisthatyouadapttothelocalcontext-thatyoumatchyourimplementationtothelocalcapacity.–HA1

IsitimportanttobeadaptiveinHaiti?Ofcourse.Youdevelop5-yearprograms,butyoudon'tknowwhatwillhappenalongtheway.…thefundswegetarebasedonassumptions-itmightbethattheassumptionsarewrong.It’snotthatwearestupid;it’sjustthatwecouldn'tknow.Orinsomecasesmaybewewerestupidandweshouldhaveknown,andsometimesmayberealityhasn'tdevelopedthewayyouthoughtitwould.–HA1

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Therestofthefindingsinthischapteranswertheresearchquestionsmoredirectly–exploringhow

organizationsinHaitilearnandadapt,andtheenablersandbarriersthattheyfacetogettingbetterand

smarteratwhattheydo.

Answering the Research Question: To what extent do organizations employ MOCA practices?

Organizationsvariedinthenumberoflearningandadaptationpracticestheyemployed.Thesurveyrevealedthatthe12organizationsrangedfromemploying86%to45%oftheMOCA

practices.AfulllistofsurveyquestionsanddetailedresultscanbefoundinAppendixA.

Ofthe12organizations:

• 4organizationsemployedmanypractices(between31and36of42practices);• 5organizationsemployedsomepractices(between25and29of42practices);and• 3organizationsemployedfewpractices(between19and21of42practices).

Table6:NumberofLearningandAdaptationPracticesEmployedbyOrganizations

OrgCode

Total#(of42)

%practicesemployed(of42)

H3 36 86%H4 36 86%T1 33 79%S 31 74%

P 29 69%H1 28 67%E 26 62%T2 26 62%O 25 60%M 21 50%H2 20 48%C 19 45%

Inadditiontothe42practicescapturedinthetableabove,thesurveymeasured“operational

complexity”asaseparateorganizationalpractice.Todothis,itaskedrespondentstoindicatethe

importanceofanumberoforganizationalstrategies(6)andgoals(9).Organizationsvariedsignificantly

onthismeasurement.Respondentsfromoneorganizationratedallbutonestrategyorgoaltobe

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“important”(93%),whilerespondentsfromanotherorganizationidentifiedonlythreeoffifteen

organizationalstrategiesandgoalsas“important”(20%).DetailedresultsareavailableinAppendixA.

MarketorientationandorganizationallearningpracticesweremorecommonlyemployedthancomplexityabsorptionandadaptivecapacitypracticesThenumberoforganizationsthatemployedeachMOCApracticevariedsignificantlybypractice.Some

practiceswereuniversallyemployed,whileotherswereemployedbyveryfeworganizations.For

example,“conductsclientresearch”wasthemostemployedpractice–employedbyall12organizations

withanoverallaveragescoreof6.30ona7-pointscale.“Easeofhiring,”ontheotherhand,was

employedbyonlyoneorganization,withanoverallaveragescoreof3.57ona7-pointscale.Thefulllist

ofthesepractices,theirrankings,andasummaryofthesurveydataareavailableinAppendixA.

Across42learningandadaptationpractices:• 4practiceswereuniversallyemployed(employedinall12organizations);• 13practiceswereemployedbyalargemajorityoforganizations(10or11outof12

organizations);• 11practiceswereemployedbyasmallmajorityoforganizations(7to9of12organizations);• 10practiceswereemployedbyaminorityoforganizations(4to6of12organizations);and• 4practiceswereemployedbyveryfeworganizations(1or2of12organizations).

TheconsistencywithwhichorganizationsemployedMOCApracticesdependedsomewhatonwhichpart

oftheframeworkthepracticewasdrawnfrom.Overall,organizationswereconsistentlystrongon

marketorientationpractices–practicesfocusedongeneratingknowledgeabouttheirclientsand

context.Threeoutoffourofthe“universallyemployed”practicesweremarketorientationpractices.

Organizationsweresimilarlystrongonorganizationallearningpractices–practicesfocusedon

knowledgequestioningvalues–althoughtherewereimportantexceptionsinthiscategory(i.e.relatively

feworganizationsemployedthefollowingpractices:employeesawareofvision;lessonssharedformally;

investsinprofessionaldevelopment;rewardsinnovation).Organizationswereconsistentlylessstrongon

practicesassociatedwiththetwocomplexity-informedpartsoftheMOCAframework–complexity

absorptionandadaptivecapacity.

ThefollowingtablesshowtheMOCApractices,brokenupintothefourliteraturesfromwhichtheywere

drawn.Thecolourcodingmakesiteasytoseethatmarketorientationandorganizationallearninghavea

significantportionofthe“green”practices(practicesemployedby10ormoreorganizations),while

complexityabsorptionandadaptivecapacityhaveagreatershareof“orangepractices”(practices

employedby7-9organizations)and“redpractices”(practicesemployedby6orfewerorganizations).

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Table7:MarketOrientation(KnowledgeGeneratingBehaviours)

SurveyQuestion AverageScore#orgs

employedConductsclientresearch 6.30 12Operationsbasedonclientneeds 6.20 12Considerseffectsofchangingcontextonorganization 6.04 12Employeeshavecontactwithclients 6.06 11Workscloselywithpartnerorganizations 5.70 10Collaborationacrossorganization 5.20 8

Table8:OrganizationalLearning(KnowledgeQuestioningValues)

SurveyQuestion AverageScore #orgsemployed

Opentoemployeecontribution 6.05 12

Opentooutsideideas 5.99 11

Employeescommittedtoorganization’sgoals 5.85 11

Practicescontinualimprovement 5.85 11

Leadershipemphasizesknowledgesharing 5.66 11

Leadershipvalueslearning 5.93 10

Employeesrecognizechangingcontext 5.36 10

Makesstrategic,programandoperationalchangesregularly 4.63 1014

Employeesawareofhowtheycontribute 5.58 9

Employeesawareofobjectives 5.44 8

Captureslessonsfromunsuccessfulinitiatives 5.44 8

Lessonssharedinformally 5.24 7

Employeesawareofvision 5.21 6

Lessonssharedformally 4.66 6

Investsinprofessionaldevelopment 4.57 4

Rewardsinnovation 4.46 4

14Employ=anythingover3.99,asaveragedacrossthreequestionsonfrequencyoforganizationalchanges.

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Table9:ComplexityAbsorption(Consistencywiththequalitiesofcomplexadaptivesystems)


Considersfront-linestaffexperienceindecisionmaking 5.52 10Iscontinuallyadaptive 5.26 10StrategicComplexity 5.51 815GoalComplexity 5.35 816Practicesinclusivedecisionmaking 5.01 8Freedominmanagementstyle 4.71 8EaseofApprovals 4.48 8Employeeshavefreedomtomakedecisions 4.80 6Includesemployeesearlyindecisionmaking 4.73 6Focusongettingthingsdone,insteadoffollowingformalprocedures17 3.69 3

Focusoncontext-appropriatepractices,insteadofinsistingonprovenpractices 4.03 2

Table10:AdaptiveCapacity(Characteristicsthatenablecontinuousadaptation)


Employeesworkacrossprojects 6.10 11Abletotakeadvantageofnewopportunities 5.64 10

Sharesinformation 5.49 9Organizationisde-coupled18 5.19 7

Employeescanbeusedflexibly 5.16 7

Employeeshavespaceandtimeforexperimentation 4.64 6

Toleratesmistakes 4.87 5

Speedofcooperationwithinorganization 4.07 4

Speedofinformationsharingwithinorganization 3.88 4

Easeoffiring 3.53 2

Easeofhiring 3.57 1

15Numberoforganizationsthatconsideredoverhalfoflistedstrategiestobeimportant.16Numberoforganizationsthatconsideredoverhalfoflistedgoalstobeimportant.17Whiletheorysuggeststhatfocusonformalproceduremaynothelporganizationsbeadaptive–thefocusonformalprocedureinfragilestatecontextwasrelatedtominimizingcorruption,andthereforemayneedtobeinterpreteddifferently.18Thisfindingmaybeimpactedbyorganizationsize(organizationsneedtobebigenoughtohavedifferentpartsthatoperatedifferently.)

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DevelopmentorganizationsemployedmoreMOCApracticesthanhumanitarianassistanceorganizationsOrganizationtypewascorrelatedwiththenumberoflearningandadaptationpracticesanorganization

employed.Sizemaybeaco-variableinthisfinding,butthiscouldnotbeconfirmedbytheresearch.

Table2demonstratesthathumanitarianassistanceorganizationsemployedfewerMOCApracticesthan

capacitybuildingorganizationand“other”organizations–whichtogetherrepresentdevelopment

focusedorganizations.Thenotableexceptiontothisrulewasonehumanitarianassistanceorganization

thatwasconsiderablysmallerthantheotherhumanitarianassistanceorganizations.Theinterview

findingsalignwiththesurveydataonthispoint,highlightingthedifferencesbetweencapacitybuilding

andhumanitarianassistanceorganizationsintheirrelationshipswithbeneficiaries,theirfunding

structures,andtheirinternalworkingcultures.EachofthesefactorscouldimpactpracticesontheMOCA

scale.

Table11:MOCAPracticesandOrganizationType

OrgCode

Total#practicesemployed

(of42)

#ofstrat/goals

identifiedasimportant(of15)

TypeofOrg19

SizeofOrg(in

Haiti)20

H4 36 14 Other SmallH3 36 12 HumanitarianAssistance SmallT1 33 12 CapacityBuilding MediumS 31 13 Other MediumP 29 10 CapacityBuilding SmallH1 28 12 Other SmallT2 26 10 CapacityBuilding MediumE 26 6 CapacityBuilding SmallO 25 10 CapacityBuilding SmallM 21 7 HumanitarianAssistance MediumH2 20 5 HumanitarianAssistance MediumC 19 3 HumanitarianAssistance Medium

19Typecategoriesrepresentanorganization’sdominantactivity–recognizingthatmanyhumanitarianassistanceorganizationsdosomecapacitybuildingandviceversa.20Sizehasbeenestimatedbasedonavailableinformationandconversationsinthefield.Notallnumbershavebeenconfirmedwiththeorganizations.

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Table11alsohighlightsthestrongcorrelationthatwasfoundbetweenthenumberofMOCApractices

employed,andthenumberofstrategiesandgoalsthatemployeesidentifiedtobeimportanttothe

organization.

DifferenttypesoforganizationsalsotendedtoemploydifferentMOCApractices.Thetablesbelow

highlightthedifferencesbetweencapacitybuildingorganizationsandhumanitarianassistance

organizations.Thesetwogroupshavebeenhighlightedbecausetheyarethetypesoforganizationsthat

havebeenincludedintheinterviews.Thecoloursindicatetheorganizationtypewiththehighest

(green),themiddle(orange),andthelowest(red)averagescores.Whilethedatahasbeenorganizedby

differencebetweencapacitybuildingorganizationsandhumanitarianassistanceorganizations,itis

interestingtonotethatdevelopmentorganizationsinthe“other”categorytendtoscorebestoverall.

Table12:Practicesonwhichcapacitybuildingorganizationsscoreatleast0.5higherthanhumanitarianassistanceorganizations(7pointscale)

CB HA OtherDifference(CB-HA)

Easeoffiring 3.59 2.65 4.62 0.94Practicescontinualimprovement 6.04 5.20 6.39 0.84Opentooutsideideas 6.19 5.40 6.44 0.79Leadershipemphasizesknowledgesharing 5.87 5.08 6.07 0.78Opentoemployeecontribution 6.17 5.45 6.64 0.71Employeeshavefreedomtomakedecisions 4.95 4.35 5.14 0.60Lessonssharedformally 4.70 4.12 5.31 0.58Considersfront-linestaffexperienceindecisionmaking 5.64 5.14 5.84 0.50

Table13:Practicesonwhichcapacitybuildingorganizationsscoreatleast0.1lowerthanhumanitarianassistanceorganizations(7pointscale)

CB HA Other

Difference(CB–HA)

Employeeshavecontactwithclients 5.87 6.18 6.21 -0.31Employeesawareofobjectives 5.10 5.41 6.07 -0.31Rewardsinnovation 4.21 4.45 4.90 -0.24Toleratesmistakes 4.95 5.14 4.38 -0.19

Organizationisde-coupled 5.20 5.38 4.93 -0.18Lessonssharedinformally 5.35 5.50 4.71 -0.15Employeesawareofhowtheycontribute 5.28 5.40 6.33 -0.12Employeesawareofvision 4.83 4.94 6.19 -0.11

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Answering the Research Question: What are the enablers and barriers to learning and adaptation in Haiti?

Learningiscomplex.Thewayinwhichindividualsgatherandprocessinformation,andturnitinto

knowledgeis,initself,complex.Thewayinwhichgroupsofindividualsorganizethemselvesto

collectivelylearn,isexponentiallymorecomplex.TherewereanumberofwaysthatIcouldhave

organizedthisdatatotrytocapturethiscomplexity.Ihaveelectedtopresentfindingsatdifferentlevels

withinanintegratedsystem:theproject-level,theorganizationallevel,andthesectorlevel.Individuals,

andorganizationsexhibitdifferentbehavioursateachoftheselevels,andalsofacedifferentenablers

andbarriers.Thelimitationofthisapproachisthatitischallengingtocapturetheissuesthatoccurat

theinterfacebetweendifferentlevels.Additionally,therearesomeenablersandbarriersthatapplyat

multiplelevels,andwhileIhavetriedtoreducerepetitionwherepossible,somerepetitionwas

necessary.

Individualsemployedbythreeorganizationswereinterviewedinthisresearch:twodevelopment

organizationsthatfocusoncapacitybuildingastheirmaintactic(referredtoas“capacitybuilding”

organizations);andonehumanitarianassistanceorganization.Asaresult,theinterviewdatadoesnot

reflecttherealityofthe“other”developmentorganizationsthatwereincludedinthesurvey.

Project Level Enablers

Intervieweesagreedthatanorganization’sabilitytobecontext-sensitiveandtolearnandadaptatthe

project-levelislargelybasedintwoorganizationalassets:thecultural-competencyandqualityofproject

staff,andtheworkingrelationshipswithbeneficiaries.21Theresearchalsofoundthatmostlearningat

theproject-levelisinformal,andthatprojectstafffeelthattheyhavetheauthoritytobeflexibleandto

adaptasneeded–bothofwhichwereconsideredenablers.

QualityandcompetenciesofprojectstaffTherewereanumberofreasonswhyintervieweesfelttheculturalcompetencyandqualityofproject

staff,matters.Theyfeltthatitisimportantforprojectstaffbeabletocommunicateeffectivelywith

beneficiaries.Thismeansspeakingthelanguage(inHaiti:Creole,butFrenchataminimum),

21Capacitybuildingorganizationstendtocallbeneficiaries“partners”toreflectthewayinwhichtheyworktogether.HereIhaveusedtheterm“beneficiaries”throughoutthedocumenttosimplifythelanguage,whilerecognizingthatthisdoesnotaccuratelyreflectthelanguageusedbymostintervieweesfromcapacitybuildingorganizations.

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understandingculturalnuancesandcustoms,andbeingabletobuildrelationshipsofprofessional

confidenceovertime.Formanyinterviewees,thissuggestedapreferenceforlocalprojectstaffwhereat

allpossible.Thefollowingquotesarerepresentativeofcommonintervieweeresponses:

WhatweneedistounderstandtheHaitianculture….Tounderstandthecultureyoumustalsounderstandthelanguage-Creole,French.…Youneedtohavecompetenciesandknowledgeincertainareas,butinadditionyoumustunderstandHaitians:Howtheycommunicate,howtheydothings,howtheyreacttoxory,difficulties,howtheyact,too.It'simportant.Withthat-ifyouunderstandallthat,youcantalktothemmoreeasilyandarebetterabletohelpthemwiththeirorganizationalstructureandstrengthening.–CB1

Whatcanhelpanorganizationtoadapt?Ithinkthat…theknowledgeofthecontextwellbeforetheimplementationoftheprojectisanimportantfactor.Ithinkalsotherecruitmentoflocalqualifiedhumanresourcesisanotherfactorthatcanhelpwithadaptability.–CB2

Theabilityofstafftomeaningfullycommunicatewithbeneficiarieswasfoundtobeespeciallyimportant

becauserelationshipsprovedtobetheprimarymeansofaccessinginformationaboutcontext.Day-to-

daycontextualinformationwasgatheredthroughnetworksofindividualsandpartners.Anumberof

intervieweesspecificallycommentedthatthequalityoftherelationshipshadasignificantimpactonthe

qualityoftheinformationaprojectstaffmembermightbeabletoaccess.

Ifyou’vecreatedagoodrelationshipwithpeopletheywillgiveyoutheinformation.Ifyouhaveaprofessionalrelationshiptheywillgiveyouapartoftheinformation.Therearemanymanyfiltersontheinformationtheywillgiveyou.…Theyseeusasaforeignorganizationandwhatwedon’tknowdoesn’tconcernthem.Theyoperateonaneedtoknowbasis.Andwedon’tneedtoknow.–CB2

I,formyself,amverycurious.It’salsopartofmyjob.Ineedtoknowwhat'shappeningaroundme.Collectingthatinformationisveryimportant.It’salotofdiscussion.It'sveryinformal.-HA1

Thewillingnessandabilityoftheprojectstafftobecommitted,flexibleandcreativewasalsohighlighted

asacriticalcontributortoorganizationaleffectiveness,asreflectedinthefollowingquotes.

Ithinkitdependsalotonthepersonalitiesandtheirownpersonalavailabilityandcommitmenttotheprojectandbeingabletosay,“okayIwon’tgotothebeachthisweekendandI’llbetraveling...Tryingtofindasolutiontothatproblem.”Ithinkit’salsoaboutthecommitmentofthepeopleworkingintheoffice,whichisnotsomethingveryeasytodocument.ButIwouldsayit’sabigpartofit.–CB2

SomethingelseapartfromflexibilityIwouldsaycreativity.Becauseweplanandthenitdoesn’tworkandthenwehavetoplanagainandthenitdoesn'tworkandthenwehavetoplanagainandagainandthensomethingworks.Soit’salwaysbeingabletoreinventandtrytofindnewwaysofdoingstuff.–CB2

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Inadditiontoqualityoftheprojectstaff,intervieweescommentedthatitisalsoimportantforstaffto

stayaroundlongenoughtobuildandmaintaintheserelationships(i.e.beinHaitiformorethan1-2

yearsatatime).

WorkingRelationshipswithBeneficiariesIntervieweesfrombothtypesoforganizationsemphasizedtheimportanceofrelationshipswith

beneficiaries.ThemarketorientationfindingsfromtheMOCAsurveysuggestthatmostorganizations

arestronginthisarea.Practiceslikeclientresearch,andthedegreetowhichoperationswerebasedon

clientneeds,werethemostcommonlyemployedMOCApractices,while“employeeshavecontactwith

clients”and“workscloselywithpartnerorganizations”werealsoemployedbyalargemajorityof

organizationsinthesurvey(AppendixA).

Ingeneral,capacitybuildingorganizationsappearedtoleveragebeneficiaryrelationshipsforlearning

moreeffectivelythanthehumanitarianassistanceorganization.Intervieweesfromthecapacitybuilding

organizationssawrelationshipswithpartners/beneficiariesasacentralmechanismforproject-level

learningandadaptationandfeltthattheserelationshipswerebeingwellleveraged.Bothofthecapacity

buildingorganizationsincludedintheinterviewsworkedwithbeneficiaryorganizationstoplanprojects,

andhadformalmechanismsforbeneficiaryfeedback.Oneorganizationhadlearningdayswherethey

would“taketheproblemsidentifiedbyparticipants,hearsolutionsfromthem,andtakethatinternally

andmeettolookathowtheproblemcanbesolvedtechnically”(CB1).Theothercapacitybuilding

organizationhadincludedtheirmajorbeneficiaryasavotingmemberontheprojectgovernance

committee,withresponsibilityforevaluatingtheproject,andwithadirectrelationshipwiththefunder.

Humanitarianassistanceorganizationsfacegreaterchallengesinmeaningfullyreachingoutto

beneficiariesdirectly.Whilesurveyrespondentsfromhumanitarianassistanceorganizationsweremore

likelytohavedirectcontactwithclients,intervieweesinthehumanitarianassistanceorganization

indicatedthatobtainingmeaningfulfeedbackfrombeneficiarieswasdifficult.Someeffortshadbeen

undertakentostrengthen“accountabilitytobeneficiaries,”butthatthiswasnotyetaneffective

feedbackmechanismfortheorganization.

InformalPersonalKnowledgeAsidefromformalizeddialoguesessionswithpartners,learningandadaptationwasfoundtobelargely

informalattheprojectlevel.Intervieweesoftenspokeoftryingsomethingoneway,hittingroadblocks,

andthenneedingtotrysomethingelse.Understandably,intervieweeshadahardtimeanswering

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questionsabouthowlearninghappensatthislevel,largelybecausethistypeoflearningisnot

necessarilyconscious–andinfact,oneintervieweequotedbelowdidnotevenconsiderit“learning.”It

seemstobemoreintuitive:thenaturalprocessbywhichindividualsweretryingtoachieveaspecific

resultinacomplexenvironment.Wecanrefertothisasthe“justdoit”attitude.Thisissimilartowhat

theliteraturecalls“tacit”learning.Thistypeofthinkingisevidentinthefollowingquotesthatreflectthe

attitudesofmanyinterviewees.

Thereisn’tnecessarilyaformalmechanismforcapturinglearning,butifsomethingdidn’twork,wedon’tdoitagain.–CB1

Wedidn’tnecessarilygotoCIDAtosaywhatwasn’tworking,butweasindividualswelearnednottoreproducethat.Ourteamthatstayedthesameknowsthethingsthatweshouldn’treproduce....Sothisispersonallearning,morethancorporate.–CB2

Idon'tthinkwelearnalotbecauseit’sallonaday-to-daybasis.Everyoneisjustdoingtheirwork.Weshareinformationwitheachother-thingsthatwe'redoing,thingsthatcouldhavegonebetter,andthingsthatwentwell.Andwehopethatwepickuponthat:“Youwenttothatcommunityandyoutriedthisanditdidn’tgowell-somaybewhenIgothereI'lltrysomethingdifferent.”–HA1

AuthorityforprojectstafftoadaptWhiletherewereanumberofbarriersthatlimittheextenttowhichprojectstaffadapt,authoritytodo

sowasnotoneofthem.Intervieweesfrombothcapacitybuildingandhumanitarianassistance

organizationsfeltthattheyhavethepermissiontoadaptasneededtobeeffectiveinHaiti.Whetheror

notthisflexibilityisexercisedseemtodependmoreonorganizationalcultureandindividualchoice,asis

reflectedinthefollowingquotesthatprovideagoodrepresentationofsentimentsacrossallthree

organizationsinterviewed.

Ofcourse,ifIwanttospend25milliondollarsonhealth,IhavetoputtogetheraproposalwithwhatIwanttodo,andithastobeconvincing,butIhavefoundthatIamveryluckyallthewayupthelinetotheverytopwiththepeopleI'mworkingwith.IfthereisanythingthatIseeasanopportunity,Ihaveneverexperiencedthatthey'vesaidno-ofcourseIhavetobeconvincing.–HA1

Eachprogrammanager…hasadifferentcapacitytoacceptriskandtoaccepttheflexibility...BecauseIhavecolleaguesthatareknownforapprovingexpendituresforbuyingapen.…Iamtheoppositeofthis.Ithinkwedohavealotofflexibility.Ithinkallinternationalorganizationshavealotofflexibilityandalotofthetimetherealbarrierisindividualswhodon’tfeelcomfortablewithrisk.–CB2

Itisrelativelyeasytomakechangestoprojects,butyoucan'tdoitalone.Youneedtoworkwithfunderstogetagreementonanychanges.–CB1

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Afewintervieweesdidqualifythislevelofflexibility,acknowledgingthatthereisplentyofflexibilityat

theoperationallevel,butthatflexibilityissomewhatlimitedatthestrategiclevelwithinaprojectcycle.

Thismaybetruebothtechnicallyandpractically.Onefunderspecificallyidentifiedthescopedefinedin

thememorandumtotheMinisterastheparameterswithinwhichflexibilitycanexist.Aprojectmanager

commentedthatonceyouestablishyourbaselinemeasurementsyougenerallywanttostaywithin

thoseparameterssothatyouareabletocompareattheendoftheproject.

Project Level Barriers

Thedatarevealedfourmajorbarrierstolearningandadaptationattheprojectlevel:challengeshiring

therightpeople;lackoftimeandspaceforstafftoreflect;project-focusedstructuresandcultures;and

lackofinformationaboutwhatisandisnotworking.IntervieweesdidnotdiscusstheotherMOCA

practicesthatwereuncommoninthesurvey(toleratemistakes,investinprofessionaldevelopment,

rewardinnovation),andthereforebarriersrelatedtothesepracticescouldnotbedetermined.

ChallengeswithhiringEmployinghighquality,competentstaffwasidentifiedascriticaltoeffectiveness,andyetmany

organizationshadahardtimehiringtherightpeople.Overall,easeofhiringandfiringwerethetwoleast

commonlyemployedMOCApractices(AppendixA).Intervieweesfromthehumanitarianassistance

organizationreinforcedthesurveyfindings,bysuggestingthathiringtherightpeoplewasasignificant

challengeforthem–bothintermsofrecruitmentandbeingabletonavigatelengthyinternalhiring

processes.Whileintervieweesfromthecapacitybuildingorganizationsdidnotaddresshiringandfiring

directly,bothorganizationsappearedtohaverecruitedandretainedstrong,qualifiedHaitianstaff(as

suggestedbytheindividualsinterviewedandthelengthoftimetheyhadbeenwiththeorganization).

However,eventheseorganizationsindicatedthathiringtherightstaffisdifficultintheirsurvey

responses.

Inadditiontothehiringchallengesthatwereidentifiedbyanumberofforeignstaff,oneHaitianstaff

madeanobservationthatIincludehereasaunique,butimportantperspective:

Thereisaprejudicethatwecomewith;NGOscomewithprejudice.Theythinkthattherearemanycompetenciesthatdon'texistinHaiti-weneedtohavepeoplecomeheretoimprovethecompetenciesofHaitians.Iknowthattherearelotsofchallengesinfindingqualified,trainedstaffwhoarecapableofhavinggoodmanagementoffunds…butstillweneedtohaveanopennessthatpermitsHaitianstohavethecapacitytodothesethings.–CB2

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LackoftimeandspaceforstafftoreflectThemostcommonbarrieridentifiedbyintervieweeswasnothavingthetime,spaceandsupportto

reflectandtolearn.Thisfindingwasmostcommonwithintervieweesfromthehumanitarian

organization,althoughatleastoneintervieweefromeachofthetwocapacitybuildingorganizationsalso

mentionedthattimeandspaceforlearningwascriticalandcouldbeachallenge.

Intervieweesdescribedaninterplayoffactorsattheprojectlevelthatresultedinprojectstaffnothaving

thetime,spaceorabilitytolearnandadapt.Thesefactorsweretheproject-focusedstructuresand

cultures,andlackofinformation.

Project-focusedstructuresandculturesMostaidorganizationsmanageanumberoftime-boundprojectswithspecificdeliverablesandbudgets

across1-3yeartimelines.Thisstructureappearstocreateunrealisticexpectationsthatmadeproject

implementationoverlyhectic,leavinglittletimeorspaceforreflection,asiscapturedbythefollowing

representativequotes.

Wearealltoocaughtupinourday-to-dayworkandoperationbecauseofthehighintensityofourworkhere.Nothingevergoesasplanned,sothatintensityishigh.You'realreadyquitehappyhereifyou'vemanagedtoachievecertainthingsonadailybasis.SoIthinkthatalthoughthereisn'talackofwillingness,butalackofenergytoallocatetimetothelearningelements.Tobeabletocollectdataonpossiblewaystochangethings.Youreallyneedaspecialistwhoisdedicatedtothatonafull-timebasis.–HA1

Ifyouwanttobeadaptiveandcreative,youneedtohavethespacetodothat.AndIthinktheonlywayyoucreatethatspaceistohavebetterplanning.…Programsthataresupposedtobeimplementedin3yearsmighttake4yearsinreality.Soalreadyyoudon'thavespacetobecreative.–HA1

Projectsherehavebeensloweddownbecausewehavetwoopposingfactionsandwehavetonavigatebetweenthetwoandstayneutral.It’snoteasy….thecomplexityofrelationshipsheremeanwehavetonavigatequietlyandstrategically.It’spossiblebutitslowsthingsdown…SosometimesifwethinkoftherhythminCanada–thingshappenmuchfaster–buthereyouhavetotakethetimeandmakesurethatthingsaredonerightbecausethereissomuchtoconsider.–CB2

Accordingtoanumberofinterviewees,whenthestructuresandculturesoftheorganizationdonot

activelycreatethespaceforbeneficiary-focusedlearning,itcanbeeasytofallintoapatternofdoing

onlywhatisrequiredtomeettheprojectmanagementdemands.Thisisfurtherexpandedoninthe

followingsectionsthatexploreorganization-levelbarriers.

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Inthehumanitarianassistanceorganization,themanagementstructureandculturewerevery

bureaucratic,whichpresentedchallengesaroundinformationflowandtimelinessofdecision-making–

bothimportanttolearningandadaptation.

WeliketopretendinFrenchorganizationsthatwe'rebetteroffbecausewe'reverystructuredandwehavealltheseschemesandeverythingisdetailed.It’slikethearmy.Butattheendofthedaythereissuchahugeprobleminthecommunication-you'reloosinginformationateverylevel.It’sahugeproblem.Thereissomuchinformationthatislostateachlevelthatthepeopleatthebottomofthefoodchaindon'tgetaccesstoinformationthatcouldhelpthemandtheotherwayaround.-HA1

LackofinformationIftheinformationisinadequateorismissing,we’redrivinginthefog.Howdoyoufeeldrivinginthefogwithnoheadlightsandnocompass?It’sveryrisky.–HA1

Intervieweeshadmixedresponseswhenaskediftheyhadtheinformationtheyneededinordertoknow

whatwas,andwhatwasnotworkingintheirprojects.Participantsfromonecapacitybuilding

organizationfeltthattheydidknowwhatwasandwasnotworking.Theirmini-evaluationsessionswith

partnersevery3-6months,combinedwithexternalevaluations,andthirdpartyreportsprovidedthem

withalltheinformationtheyneeded.Intervieweesfromtheothercapacitybuildingorganizationwere

moreambivalent.Theyfeltthatinformalinformationfromobservingandinteractingwithbeneficiaries

washelpful,andhittingormissingmajorprojecttargetshelpedthemtrackwhatwasandwasnot

working.However,anumberofintervieweesfromthisorganizationindicatedthatcollectingmore

formalinformationaboutwhatwasandwasnotworkingwasextremelydifficultinthecontext,

preventingthemfromhavingmoreconcretefeedbackloops.Finally,intervieweesfromthehumanitarian

assistanceorganizationconsistentlyindicatedthattheydidnothavetheinformationtheyneededto

knowwhatwasorwasnotworking.Whilelearningadvisorssuggestedthatthisisimprovingwithbetter

monitoringandevaluationframeworks,theyrecognizedthatitisnotyetastrongsystem.Oneofthe

intervieweesfromthehumanitarianassistanceorganizationidentifiedamajorprojectwherethe

organizationhadinvestedindatacollectiontomonitorprogrameffectiveness,butthiswasnotthe

norm.

Whatwasclearacrossorganizationswasthatveryfewintervieweeshadharddata,orformalevidenceto

supporttheirintuitivesenseofwhatwasandwhatwasnotworkingattheprojectlevel.

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Thereseemedtobeanumberofreasonsforthis.First,thistypeofinformationcollectionanduseisnot

anexpectationattheprojectlevel,fromeitherfundersoraidorganizations.Asaresult,project

managersarerarelytrainedorsupportedtodoit.Whileprojectmanagersoftenhavetraininginresults

basedmanagementandhowtocompletereportsfordonors,theyhavelimitedknowledgeorskillsabout

howtocollectoruseinformationthatmighthelpthemmakebetterchoicesinthefield.Thisisfurther

indicatedbythefactthatnoneoftheproject-levelstaffinterviewedtalkedaboutusingmonitoringand

evaluationdata(orresultsbasedmanagementindicators)forlearningordecision-makinginthefield.

Mostofthereflectionsonthesedynamicscamefromlearningandknowledgeadvisorswhoworkwith

projectmanagersontheseissues:

Idon’tthinkwehave[goodinformationonwhatisandisn’tworking].Wegetlotsofopinions,butaretheytested?Didwedooperationalresearch?Doweknowwhatthebarriersare…?Haitiisasimpleexample:wehadfivethousandwaterfilterstohandout,wehandedoutthreethousand,andIgototwomeetingsandpeoplesaytome,“Thosearebreaking.”SoIsaidtothedelegate,“Whatdoweknowaboutthat?Isittenthathavebroken,fifty,onehundred?–HA1

Thepeoplearemeasuringthings,buttheyarenotmindfulorskilledenoughtosay,“Okaywecanmoveawayfromthisindicatorwewerethinkingofthreeyearsagoduringtheplanningstage,andnowwecanaddsomething.”Sothat’sthewaywearehelpingthem.Sothat’swhyIsaythatweseeresultsbeingachieved.Wearelearningonhowtomeasurethosechangesinabetterway.–HA1

Itdependsonwhatpeoplethinktheyneedtoknow.WhenIlookatourindicators…thingslikenumberofjobscreated,changeinregulation…weneverhaveenoughinformation.Itisalwaysverydifficult,andinstateslikeHaitithatinformationisnotavailable….Ifthatisthewayyouwanttomanage,thanIthinkitisveryfrustrating.…[Youneed]asystemtoaskquestionstotherightpeopleandthentomakeaninformeddecisionwiththat[information]asaproxy.Inthatsense,yes,IcanhavetheinformationIneedtoworkontheprogram.Iwoulduseannualorbi-annualmeetingswithagroupofstakeholdersandsay:“thisiswhereIthinkweare.Doyouagree?Tellmewhereyouthinkweareandwhereyouthinkweneedtogonext.Andhowdoesthatfitinthebigpictureoftheproject?”-CB2

Theotherchallengewithcollectingtangibleevidencewasthatitisnotalwayscleartointervieweeshow

onemightrigorouslycollectinformationtosupportproject-leveldecisionsforthetypeofworkthat

manyorganizationsareengagedin–especiallyaroundcapacitybuildingandpolicychange.Thisreflects

thecomplexnatureoftheproblemsthatmanyoftheseorganizationsaretryingtosolve.

It'snoteasytosayyouhavealltheinformationtomakegooddecisions.Informationisn’tformalhere.Therearemanyflowsofinformation.Evenifwefollowaformalprocesstogetinformationaboutcontext,ortocontextualizeourworkheretomakecertaindecisions,sometimesyouhavetodeviate.Youmightwanttotrytobeobjectiveaboutsomeinformationbutyouendupsidetracked.Thereismisinformationthattakesyoufromtheotherside.Youhavetogofindmultipletypesofinformationtovalidatethesituation.–CB1

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Themonitoringandevaluationplan[forthisproject]istotallyweird...whatIreallywanttogetoutoftheprojectisapolicychangeonthegovernmentsideandhavetheminturn,informglobalpolicyinourfield.That'snotsomethingyou'regoingtogetinaprojectcycle…Sotheonlythingyoucanreallyputis,“wewantyoutohaveasign-offonthisdocumentbyxperson.”It’skindofaweirdindicator-youcan'treallypostthatontheInternet-whoisgoingtounderstandwhythatisimportant?Wheninreality,itwillhelpawholetonofpeopleindirectly.–HA2

[Inordertounderstandprojectprogress],Ihavetoevaluateyourknowledge.Ok,butIcannotmakeyoupassanexam.Youareapartner…Becausewe’redoingcapacitybuilding-we’redoingtraining.Ifyouaretalkingaboutmoney,aboutfigures,itismucheasiertoquantify.Butwecan’tjustquantifytheknowledge/competenciesofpeople,wehavetoqualifyit.Sosometimesthisisharder.–CB2

Whileday-to-daylearningandadaptationdidnotappeartobeinformedbyrigorousdatacollectionat

theprojectlevel,afewintervieweesfromdifferentorganizationsindicatedthattheydoleveragelessons

frommajorprojectevaluationstoinformtheirpracticeon1-3yearcycles.

Organization-level Enablers

WhenIrefertoorganization-levellearning,Iamreferringtothewayinwhichorganizationscollect,

aggregateanduseinformationfromtheprojectlevelorelsewhere,toimprovetheorganization’sability

toeffectivelyservebeneficiaries.Thatcouldbethroughdeliveringbetterprojectsinthefuture,changing

theirinternalprocesses,orengagingdifferentlywithotherorganizations.Thisalignswiththedouble-

looplearningdefinedintheliteraturereview.Throughtheinterviews,therewerefourthingsthat

seemedtoenablelearningattheorganization-level:corporatelearningfunctions;monitoringand

evaluationframeworks;andinformalinformationsharingandlearningopportunities.

CorporatelearningfunctionsAlloftheorganizationsinterviewedhadinvestedinavariationofacorporatelearningfunction,

employingadvisorswithsomeresponsibilityforknowledgemanagementorlearning.22Theadvisorsthat

wereinterviewedhaddifferentmandatesandconducteddifferentactivities–largelyareflectionofthe

verydifferentsizeoftheirorganizations.Thefollowingquotesshowthevariationsinmandatesacross

thedifferentlearningfunctionsinterviewed:

22Interviewswereconductedwiththeknowledgemanagement/learningfunctionoftwooutofthreeoftheorganizationsincludingintheinterviews.Thethirdorganizationhadaheadquartersstaffpersoninchargeofevaluationsandmonitoring,whichlikelyplaysthisroletosomeextent.Unfortunatelyaninterviewwasnotconducted.

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ThewayIlookatknowledgemanagement….First,isjusttohelpdefinewhatitissothatpeoplespeakthesamelanguagebecauseyoutalktodifferentpeopletheyhavedifferentunderstandings.Mostpeoplethinkit’seitherdocumentproductionorthingslikethat,andthereisnovalueaddedthere...Somyworkistryingtodefinemethodologies,tools,dotrainingwithourpartnersoverseas,withourstaff,tohelpthemgettowardsomekindofcommonframework...–CB2

Ourunit’smandateistoprovideadvisorysupport,totheplanning,thedesign,conceptualizationofourprogramming,thequality,themonitoring,qualityassurance,accountability,andthenthelastpieceisaroundlearnings.Soensuringthatwearebecoming,tothebestofourabilities,alearningorganizationthatisabletodrawonlessonsandbestpracticesfromparticularprojectsandapplythosetoourbroaderstrategicplanning,orourprogramming….–HA1

Theactivitiesoftheselearningfunctionsvaried,andincluded:producingandpublishingcasestudies;

hostinglearningwebinarsandevents;providingmonitoringandevaluationsupport;andinfluencing

projectplanningtovaryingextents.Insomeinstanceslearningadvisorsalsoplayedaroleindeveloping

mentalmodels–orpolicydocuments–tobeusedbyimplementersintheorganization.Whileone

organizationhadadvisorsthatwerespecifictothematicprogrammingareas(health,disasterrisk

reduction,etc.),thesmallerorganizationhadidentifiedtwocrosscuttingpriorityareasinwhichtoinvest

learningresources.

Bothlearninggroupswererelativelynew–havingbeencreatedinthepast10years–andboth

expressedbeinginastateofchange,astheycontinuetoevolvetheirroleinprojectsandthe

organizationmoregenerally.

MonitoringandevaluationLearningadvisorsspokeenthusiasticallyaboutthetremendouspotentialthatperformance

measurementframeworks(partofabroadermonitoringandevaluationframework)andotherdonor

accountabilitytools,holdforenablinglearningandadaptation.However,noneofthelearningadvisors

interviewedappearedtoconsistentlyusemonitoringdatatomakeorganizationaloperationalor

strategicdecisions.Asnotedintheproject-levelsection,monitoringdatawasnotreferencedasa

learningtoolbyfieldstaff,either.Thismaysimplyreflectthefactthatthesetoolshaverecentlybecome

morerigorous,andthatorganizationsaretakingtimetobeabletofullyleveragethemforlearning.One

intervieweeinthehumanitarianassistanceorganizationsuggestedthis,asisindicatedbythefollowing

quote:

Theaccountabilityfeedbackloopwithourdonorsisbecomingmuchmorerigorous….nowwe’rehavingtorationalizeourapproachbasedonalogicmodelthatshowsthelogicoftheintervention.We’rehavingtocomeupwithaperformancemanagementframeworkthatshowshowwewilldemonstratesuccessnotjustthatthere'sbeenanoutput,butatrealimpactlevel,evenin

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emergencies.Sothat’sashift.Thatdoesaddalevelofaccountabilityatleastbacktoourdonor.–HA1

Intervieweesfromtwodifferentorganizationstalkedaboutusingevaluationsforlearningatthe

organizationallevel.Thehumanitarianassistanceorganizationhadrecentlyimplementedasystemby

whichtheseniormanagementteamisrequiredtofollowuponrecommendationsmadeinprogram

evaluations.Anotherintervieweetalkedaboutusinglessonsfromanevaluationtoinformaprojectplan

thatwasrespondingtoanewdisaster.Evaluationdatawasalsousedtodevelopameta-evaluationby

oneinterviewee,whothenbuiltthefindingsintoapolicyframeworkfortheorganization.

InformalsharingandlearningopportunitiesWhileinformallearningappearedtobelessprevalentandimportantattheorganizationlevel,two

intervieweesreferredtoretreatsandconferenceswithorganizationstaff,ororganizationstaffand

beneficiariesthatwereusedtodiscussdouble-looplearningquestions.Oneintervieweefoundthe

processusedbytheirorganizationtobehighlyworthwhile–anopportunitytojointlyreflectonthe

biggerpictureofwhatisworkingandnotworking.Anotherintervieweefeltthattheprocesshadlimited

valuetotheirorganization,duetolimitedstaffengagementandpoorleadership.

Organization-level Barriers

Whilecorporatelearningfunctionsandotherenablers,representimportanteffortsbyaidorganizations

toincorporatelearningattheorganizationlevel,thereareanumberofbarriersthatmakethistask

exceedinglydifficult.Thisresearchfoundthatsomeofthesebarriersinclude:barrierstousing

monitoringandevaluationdataforlearning;afocusonaccountabilitytofunders;project-basedsilos;

culturalbarrierstolearning;andlackoffeedbackloops.

BarrierstousingmonitoringandevaluationdataforlearningAsdiscussedunderenablers,monitoringandevaluationframeworkspresentahugeopportunityfor

learningattheorganizationallevel.Beingabletotrackwhatisworkingandnotworkingacrossmultiple

projectscouldtheoreticallyprovidegreaterinsightthanthesameinformationfromoneprojectalone.

However,therewerebarriersthatmadethistypeoflearningdifficult.Capturingqualitydatawasitselfa

challenge(aswasdiscussedattheprojectlevel).Advisorsalsofounditchallengingtosecurebuy-infrom

field-levelstafftoconsistentlycollectformalmonitoringdatainawaythatwouldbeusefulatthe

organizationallevel.

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Partofthischallengemaybethedegreeofinfluencethatlearningadvisorshavewithintheir

organizations.Advisorsinthehumanitarianassistanceorganizationfoundtheirinfluencetobehighly

dependentontherelationshipstheywereabletobuildwithindividualprojectmanagers.Ifproject

managerswerenotinterestedincollectingmonitoringdata,hearingaboutpastlessons,ortakingadvice,

theysimplydidnothaveto.Similarly,oneintervieweementionedthattheknowledgemanagement

functionwithinthecapacitybuildingorganizationwasalsoreliantontheconnectionsandcredibilityof

theindividualstaffpersonassignedtothefile.

Gettingbuy-inmaybemademorechallengingbythelackofclearvisionandsharedunderstandingofthe

role,importance,andstrategicpotentialoflearningandadaptation.Intervieweesidentifiedthefactthat

learningandadaptationwasrarelystrategicordeliberate,whichsuggeststhatitislikelyalsonot

communicatedasastrategicpriorityfortheorganization.

“You’reassumingthatstrategiesarenecessarilydeliberate?Becausemyfirstthingwouldbethatmostorganizationsarenotdeliberateatwhatevertheydo.They‘rereactive.”-CB2

…Idon’tthinkthat6yearsagowecouldhavebeentalkingaboutthatmuchevidenceofanorganizationthathadanyinterestinbecominganorganizationthatlearnsorimprovesthroughlearning….[whileit’sgettingbetter,]Idon'tthinkit’syetatapointwherewe’redoingitsystematicallyorstrategically.–HA1

SoIthinklearningisprobablyunderstoodtobeindividualbased,Idon’tknowthatorganizationallearningisunderstoodtobesystematicorthatitcanbesystematizedandbebetterimprovedthroughcertaindecisions,structures,orprocess.–HA1

Thereareadditionalchallengesassociatedwithmakinguseofevaluationdata.Oneinterviewee

commentedonthefactthatthereisaperceptionthataskingforsufficientfundstoconductuseful

evaluationscontributestooverheadandisnotwellperceived.However,hetoldthestoryofhowhehad

recentlylobbiedfor,andsecured,newevaluationfunding,whichincludedmoneytoconvenealearning

conferenceaspartoftheevaluationprocess.

Onceevaluationfundingisadequate,itcanstillbechallengingtocoordinatedatainawaythatensures

comparability,orthatenablesorganization-levellearningfrommultipleprojects.Thefollowingquote

demonstrateshowlearninginvestmentsrequiresbothfunding,andorganizationalcommitmenttobe

successfulattheorganizationallevel.

It’shardevenforinformationmanagement-dataanalysis-ifit’snotadirectiveofseniormanagementtohaveaprogrammaticapproachwhereyoucancompareacrossprojectresults,thenitbecomesverydifficult.Soifyoudon'thavestandardizedindicatorsacrossprojectsthenyou’re

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comparingapplestooranges.Sothedecisiontohavecomparableresultswouldbewithourseniormanagementandthentheyhaven’tfelttheneedforthat.–HA1

Oneofthereasonsthatthislevelofcommitmentmaybedifficulttoachieve,isthatorganizationsare

primarilydrivenbyaneedtosustainthemselves,whichmeanstheyaremostfocusedonmeetingfunder

requirementsasisfurtherexploredbelow.

FocusonaccountabilitytothefunderThere’snoapplauseforlearning.That’sadonorproblem.There’sthatlackofdonorresponsetolearning.–BG1

Thisresearchfoundthatorganizationalbehaviourisdrivenprimarilybytheneedtosustainfunding.The

ideathatfundingdrivesorganizations’behaviourisnotnew.However,itisreinforcedbythisresearch,

anditisanimportantstartingpoint.Thesurveyaskedrespondentstoratefifteenorganizational

strategiesandgoalsontheirlevelofimportancetotheorganization.Inadditiontoprovidinginformation

aboutoperationalcomplexity,theresultsofthesequestionsshedlightontheincentivesandpressures

thatshapeorganizationalbehaviour.Themostimportantstrategyorgoalforallorganizationswas

“increasefinancialsustainabilityoftheorganization.”Thehighest-rankingstrategyorgoalthatfocused

onbeneficiarieswasfifthonthelist.FullresultsareavailableinAppendixA.

Topfiveorganizationalstrategies/goalsbyimportanceacross12organizations

1. Increasefinancialsustainabilityoftheorganization2. Logistics:Managingmaterialsandmovingproductsorservices3. Operatingefficiently4. Increasethetotalamountofmoneycomingintotheorganization5. Enhancethequalityofexistingprograms,services,orproducts.

Theseresultsre-enforcethataccessingfunding,andensuringthesustainabilityoftheorganizationisthe

mostimportantgoalforaidorganizations.Whilethismaynotbesurprising,itisimportantforusto

considertheimplicationsthatthishasonorganizationalbehaviour.

Fundersappeartoaffectthelearningandadaptationbehaviourofaidorganizationsbycreatingastrong

focusonaccountability.Themajorityoforganizationaleffortthatwentintomeasuringprogressand

reflectingonresultswaswithinthecontextofprojectorprogramevaluation.Evaluationswerelargely

focusedonensuringaccountabilityofhowfundswerespent,andverifyinginformationprovidedtothe

funders.Theyweregenerallynotaimedatorganizationallearningorhelpingorganizationsbecomemore

effectiveatdeliveringdevelopmentresults,evenifsomelearningisdrawnfromevaluations.Thisaffects

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thetypeofinformationthatiscollectedaswellasthewaythatinformationiscollected.Thefollowing

quotesarerepresentativeofcommentsheardacrossmultipleorganizations,althoughnotall

intervieweesreflectedonthesedynamics.

Partnershaveincentivetohighlightsuccessandthatiswhywehaveexternalevaluations….Evaluationsdetermineifprojectreportsareaccurateandcomplete.Theylookatresultsandauditsandcomeupwithrecommendations.Evaluationsoftentakeplaceattheendofaproject,howevermonitoringisongoing...Myfocusinmonitoringisonmaintainingscope,deadlinesandensuringthattheprojectfallswithintheagreement.Eventuallythiswillincludemonitoringagainsttheprojectworkplan.–Funder23

Iseethat,moreoften,organizationsdevelopfunctioncontrolsratherthansystemsthattrackachievementofresultsandevaluationoftheresults.Forme,it’ssomethingthat’sbecomingmoreandmorenegativeandpeoplejustifyitbecauseourfundershavedecidedthatishowitneedstobe…Peopleneedtoputmoreemphasisonachievingtheresultsratherthanthewayinwhichyouachieveresultsandmanageprojects.–CB2

Theproblemwiththereportsisthat,thecultureisthatit’sarequirement:“yougivemeyourmoney,this[report]isyourreceipt.”Weneedtomoveawayfromthatculturewherethedonoristhe#1reasonyouneedareport....Isayweneedtore-rankthis.#1istheprojectteam-usasaninstitution.Weneedtoknowwhat’shappeningwithourprojectsbeforethedonor.–HA1

Oneintervieweesuggestedthatdonorsarefocusedonaccountability,basedontheirownsetof

feedbackloopsandincentivesystems,whicharequiteremovedfromtheoutcomesthatthewhole

systemissupposedtobeworkingtowards:improvedresultsforbeneficiaries.

Atthe[majordonororganization],disbursementistheonlynumberanyonecaresabout.It’sreallysad.Donors-that'salltheycareabout.It’sweirdbecausethe[organization]doesprideitselfon"learning"-findingthelessonslearned,hostingconferences,sharinglessons,etc…Butwhattheyaremeasuredagainstisreallyperverse.–HA2

Project-basedsilosandcyclesIntervieweesfromtwoofthethreeorganizationsinterviewedidentifiedproject-basedsilosasabarrier

toorganizationallearningandadaptation.Forbothoftheseorganizations,theworkinHaitirepresented

oneofmanyprojectsthattheorganizationwasundertaking,andbothfounditchallengingtocreate

opportunitiesforcross-projectlearning.Thisdynamiconceagainreflectsachallengeofproject-based

funding.Withinoneofthecapacitybuildingorganizationsthatwasgenerallyhigh-performinginits

learningbehaviours,oneintervieweecommentedthat:

23Quoteformulatedbasedonwrittennotesfromaninterviewthatcouldnotberecorded.

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We’resointoourdepartmentallevel-we’resointoourownprogramthat,Ihavetoadmit…Idon’tevenreallyknowwhat’shappeningintheotherprograms.ImeanIknowifit’stheendofaprogram,thebeginningofaprogram,thethematicthey’reworkingon,butImeanIhaveverylittleknowledgeofwhatexactlythey’reworkingon.Soit’sverydifficulttomaketheconnectionsandforexampletosharetheknowledge…ifI’mworkingonsomething,maybeitcouldbeusedbysomeoneelsebutIdon’treallyknow.AndIhavetoadmitwedon’treallytakethetimetodisseminatethatmuch.We’resomuchintoourownlittleboxes.–CB2

Projectstructuresandcyclesdonotactivelycreatespacetoaskdouble-looplearningquestions.Similar

totheproject-level,intervieweesidentifiedchallengearoundcreatingtimeandspacetoreflectonthe

bigquestionsthatimpacttheeffectivenessoftheorganization.Onewayinwhichthistypeoflearning

canhappenattheorganizationlevel,iswhenprojectstaffandheadquartersstaffwhocrossproject

boundaries,connecttoshareexperiencesandaskreflectonthebiggerquestionstogether.Thistypeof

spacefororganization-wide,doublelooplearningdidnotseemtobepresentinanyoftheorganizations

interviewed.Thefollowingquotessupportthefactthattheredoesnotseemtobemuchopportunityfor

cross-projectdiscussionandlearning,howeverthesearenotnecessarilyrepresentative.

Wedon’treallygetachance.It’salwaysthesamething.It’sambitious,we’reintoourdailystuffsodowehaveenoughtimetoreflectonwhatwe’redoing…We’retryingtocarveoutsometimewhenwe’redoingworkplanningfortheyearorstufflikethat.We’retryingtothinkaboutorevenpreparingthereportswhenwe’retryingtoevaluatewhatwe’vebeendoingandifit’sworking.Butdowespendenoughtimeonaskingthosequestions?Idon’tthinkso.–CB2

WhenIthinkaboutsomeprojectshere-constructionforexample.Someofmycolleagues-theoneswhowerehereonthegroundwillalltellyouthattheshelterprogramwastheworst,thebiggestdisasterever,hereinHaiti.IfyougotoOttawatheywilltellyouthattheshelterprogramwasahugesuccess.Andthat'shuge.Andthat'sinthesameorganization.–HA1

CulturalbarrierstolearningOneintervieweefromthehumanitarianassistanceorganizationidentifiedanumberofcultural

challengesthatmightgetinthewayofalearningmindsetfornorthernNGOsdoingworkinHaiti.While

thequotesbelowwerefromasingleemployee,anadditionalkeyinformantechoedmanyofthesame

issues.Itshouldbenotedthatthehumanitarianassistanceorganizationincludedintheinterviews

scoredlowestoverallofall12organizationontheMOCAscale.Thisincludedworstinclassonthe

questions:“Employeescanexpresstheiropinionsandmakesuggestionsaboutnewwaysforcarryingout

tasks,”and“Wecontinuallyassessthequalityofourprogramsandservices,andlookforwaysto

improvethem.”Thesefindingssuggestthatthisparticularhumanitarianassistanceorganizationmay

facespecificculturalchallengesthatmaynotbegeneralizabletotherestofthesector.Theinterviewee

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feltthattheorganizationlackedtheabilitytoreflectonitsactions,whichwasattributedpartiallytothe

organizationarrivinginHaitiwithtoomuchmoney,andanarrogancethatcomeswithsavinglives:

Youdon'tevenhavethetimetostop-you'realreadymovingontosomethingelse.Andyou'redealingwithadisaster-comingbacktothehumanitariansector-it’sadifferentapproachbecauseyoudon'thavetothinkcriticallyaboutwhetheryou'rereallydoingsomethingthebestway,efficiently.We'resavinglives!Whocanblameus-we'rebusysavinglives.–HA1

Thesameintervieweereflectedoninstitutionalracismasabarriertolearning:

TwoyearsaftertheearthquaketherewasaconsensusinHaiti...thatorganizationsfailedintheirmandatesaftertheearthquake.Andanop-edcameoutintheGlobeandMailandwewerewaitingtoread:"Wehavefailed,butwewilllearnfromthat."Notonlywastherenothingrelatedto[learning]-buttherewasmassiveinstitutionalracism."Well-it'sHaiti.OfcourseinHaitiit’snotgoingtowork."Andthat,Ifindverydifficulttodigest.Ithinkit’sagreatcop-outthatwe'regivingourselves.We'regivingawayourresponsibility.Maybethishappensinotherfragilestatestoo.Thereisanexercisethatwedon'tdobecauseofthat.–HA1

OrganizationslackfeedbackloopsBut,whywouldwechange?Youchangebecauseyou'reforcedtochange.Idon'tthinkwe'reforcedtochange.–HA1

Organizationalincentivescanbedifficulttoreflectonbecausetheyarenotalwaysobvious.Afew

intervieweeswereabletospeaktoorganizationalincentivesanddrivers,butitwasnotsurprisingthat

manydidnot.Toaddressthischallenge,Idrawoninterviewswithanumberofkeyinformantsfrom

outsidetheorganizationsstudied,allofwhomworkcloselywithaidorganizationsinHaiti.

Learningandadaptationfeedbackloops(i.e.consequencesfortheorganizationthathappenasaresult

oftheiractions)thatmightdriveorganizationstoimproveservicestobeneficiarieswereweak.Accessing

fundingwasnotdirectlyconnectedtoperformanceforanyoftheorganizationsinterviewed.For

organizationsthatattractandusepublicdonations(includingthehumanitarianassistanceorganization

includedintheinterviews),thisseemsparticularlytrue:

Areweanadaptiveorganization?…Ithinkthere’sarealchallengearoundnonprofitsinthehumanitariansectorintermsofwhatdrivesnotjustaccountabilitybutwhatdriveslearning.Whatdriversarethereforustobecomemoreeffectiveormoreefficientatwhatwedo?–HA1

OneofthethingsIfindfascinatingaboutthesector-don'tknowifit’sthedevelopmentsectororjustthehumanitariansector-butthereisaverypoorcapacityforlearningfromourlessons.Tolookbackandseeifwe'vemadeamistake.Isthatbecausewe'realwayslookingforthenextdisaster?Andeverythingisemergencyspecific?Orisitbecausewehaveaproblemwithaccountability-especiallywithprivatemoney.Imean,wehadoneprojectthatwasCIDAfunded,butwe’renotsetuptodothattypeofexercisebecauseattheendofthedaynooneisreallywatching.Andit’sus,andit’ssomanyorganizations,becauseI'vebeentalkingwithlotsofpeopleanditalwayscomesbacktothis.–HA1

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Whilethepublic(thosegivingdonations),andthemedia(asthepublic’sinvestigativeagency)might

theoreticallyplaysomerollinholdingorganizationsaccountable,theydonotappeartodrivemeaningful

learning.Theseobservationsweremadebyintervieweesfromthehumanitarianassistanceorganization

andkeyinformants.

Comparedtoatypicalbusinessmodel,we’renotsusceptibletothesamedriversandpush-pullfactorsofeffectivenessandefficiency.TheCanadianpublicgivestocharityandwhattheyreceivebackisthefeelingthatthey’vecontributedtosomething,andbasicallytheirappetiteisforthosepicturesandnumbersandnotnecessarilymorein-depthinformation.Soit’saprettypooraccountabilityfeedbackloop.–HA1

Ourbigfeedbackloopisthemedia,probably.AndIdothinkit’simportanttolistentothemedia.Alotoftimetheydotellyoutherightthings-andalotoftimestheydon’t.…Theyraiseaflagandthenyouhavetogolookatwhatisthere.That'sreallytheonlyfeedbackloop.That'swhat'spushingthe[majorfunders],that'swhatispushingtheUSgovernment.USAIDisonlyreactingtocongress,whichisonlyreactingtowhattheirconstituentsaresaying.–HA2

…Therentalsubsidyideaitcamefromtheneedtoefficientlyaddressthedisplacementsituationwithatoolthatwouldreachamaximumnumberofrecipients….Sowiththepressureofthemedia-alotdependingonthemedia–andthat[pressure]tricklingdowntothedonors.-BG

Thetwocapacitybuildingorganizationsinterviewedreflectedapartialexceptiontothisdynamic.They

exhibitedastrongaccountabilitytotheirbeneficiaries–mostlybychoice–andfeltthattheywere

extremelyresponsivetothem.Thisfeedbackloop,however,hasagreaterimpactattheprojectlevel

thanitdoesattheorganizationlevel.

Sector-level Enablers

BecausetheMOCAframeworkandinterviewquestionsfocusedontheprojectandorganizationallevel,

thereislimiteddataaboutsector-levellearning.However,anumberofintervieweescommentedon

sector-leveldynamicsthatenablelearning,andtheyhavebeencapturedhereasanimportantpartof

thelearningpicture.Themajorsectorlevelenablerswereinformalnetworksandinformationsharing

andindividualcontributionstosector-levellearning.

InformalnetworksandinformationsharingWhenintervieweestalkedaboutlearningatthesectorlevel,theytendedtotalkaboutinformation

sharingopportunities,specificallythe“sectorclusters”setupinHaiti.Thesetendedtobemonthly

meetingsbetweenexpertsworkinginthesamesectors(e.g.housing,waterandsanitation,disasterrisk

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management,health,etc.)whereoneormoreorganizationswouldpresenttheresultsofaparticular

initiative,sharelessonsandanswerquestions.Theseclustermeetingsareopportunitiesforindividuals

workinginthesectortomeetandgettoknowoneanotherandshareexperiences.Similarly,therewere

anumberofinformal“drink”nights–wherelargelyforeignstafffromdifferentaidorganizationsmet

sociallytoestablishinformalnetworksandswapstories.

Whileafewintervieweesmentionedtheseclustersasanexampleofsector-levellearning,noone

identifiedanydirectconnectionbetweentheseinformation-sharingopportunitiesandanychangesor

actionstakenattheorganizationallevel.Afewintervieweesspecificallyidentifiedthefactthat

informationsharingalonedoesnothavesignificantimpactonorganizationalbehaviour.Theone

exceptionwasakeyinformantwhotalkedaboutatight-knithousingcluster,conveneddirectlyafterthe

earthquakewhosharedvaluableinformationasthesectorsoughtoutviablehousingoptions.

Informationwasalsoshared,tosomeextent,inhardcopy.Twooftheorganizationsinterviewed

mentionedmakinguseofoutsidestudiesfromotherorganizationstoinformprogrampolicyandproject

planning.Oneorganizationinterviewedpublishesevaluationsonapublicwebsiteforusebyothers.

IndividualcontributionstosectorlevellearningSector-levellearningappearstobelargelydependentonorganizations,andindividualsactinginways

thatarenotincentivizedbytheaidsystem,sometimestakingonpersonalandorganizationalriskinthe

process.ThesedisincentivesarefurtherexploredunderSector-levelBarriers.

Asanexample,oneofthecapacitybuildingorganizationhadconsciouslydecidednottorespondto

fundingenvelopes,butinstead,toseekfundingbasedonwhattheylearnaboutlocalneeds.Inthisway,

theorganizationtookontheriskofbeingmoreselectiveaboutfunding,butwasabletodistance

themselvesfromthetrapofworkingonfunder-drivenprioritiesthatdonotnecessarilyreflecttheirbest

knowledgeofthecontext.Anotherorganizationfoundawaytodriveapoliticallysensitiveprojectthat

mightnototherwisehavegainedtraction,usingtheirreputationandpositioningtoallowthemtotake

ontheorganizationalriskassociatedwiththeproject.

Moreoften,organizationsasawholearenotwellpositionedtotaketheserisks.Instead,itisindividuals

–eitherinside,oroutsideoforganizations–thatcanintroduceideasandapproachesthatpushwhole

sectorsforward.Thesestorieswerenotcommon,butseemedtoreflectthebestofwhatinterviewees

andkeyinformantsthinkispossibleinthesector:

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…Therearealwaysacouplepeoplewhoareoutinfront.Thosetendnottobepeoplewhoarelinkedtoanorganization,almostbydefinition.Ifyouarethatmuchofavisionary-organizationscan'tholdontoyouortheydon'twanttoholdontoyoubecauseyou'realittlebitofaliability.Almostbydefinitionthepeoplewhoarereallypushingthoseideasattheverybeginningarenottheinstitutionalones.That'swhatI'veseen-peoplenotorganizations.–HA2

Sometimes,it’sjustbasedonindividuals.Youhaveindividualswhoreallycareandyouhaveindividualswhoareheretoadvancetheircareer.…I’veseenafewpeoplewhoarereallycommittedtothesituationandtryingtodosomethingdifferent.Andthoseseemtobetheoneswhopushedalotofthechange.–BG1

Beingabletoaffectthistypeofchangeappearstorequireaveryspecificskillset.Afterprobing,one

intervieweeidentifiedthemechanismsbywhichtheyhaveobservedthistypeofsector-influencetaking

place:

Allthesepeoplearestrategic-youstartbuildingupyournetworksinallthedifferentcamps.Yougetstrategicaboutworkingwithinthegovernmentandfindsomepeoplewhoaresympathetic…andfindpeoplewhoaresympatheticinthedonorcommunityandfindpeoplewhoaresympatheticonthegroundandacademicsandthatsortofthing.Andwhenyougetallthoseactors-enoughofanetworktogether–youcanpushitforward.You'reforcingtheconversationtohappenattherighttimewiththerightpeopleintheroom.–HA2

Sector-level Barriers

Thisresearchfoundanumberofdynamicswithintheaidsystemthatcanactivelydiscouragesector-level

learning.Whileintervieweesrarelyrecognizedorcommenteddirectlyonthefactthattheirorganization

facesdisincentivestosector-levellearningandadaptation,thestoriesthattheytoldoftenhintedat

thesedynamics,whichincluded:challengesapplyingsector-levelknowledge;themedia;riskaversion

andthenegativeconsequencesoffailure;andotherbarriers.

Challengesapplyingsector-levelknowledgeOrganizationscanbeputinatoughplacewhentheyhavetochoosebetweenlearningandapplyingtheir

bestknowledge,andmeetingdisbursementtargetsorotheroperationalgoals.Thereappearedtobeno

incentivefororganizationstomodifytheirbehavioursbasedonsector-levelknowledge,especiallyin

instanceswheretheyseeatrade-offbetweenaccesstofundingandlearningfrompastmistakesinthe

sector.Thisdynamicwaswell-illustratedbyonekeyinformantwhotalkedaboutthewaythattherental

subsidymodelisbeingappliedinthePhilippines:

Ithinkthattherecouldbestrongerlinksbetweentheresearchcommunity,organizations,anddonorstoreallyholdpeopleaccountable.Notnecessarilyforthetoolasitwasrolledout,butforaddressingthedeficiencies.AndagainIgobacktothisissuewiththePhilippineswhereIfindit

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absolutelypreposterousthat,withknowingthattherearesomanyissueswith[rentalsubsidies]herethatyouwouldjustgoandimplementitsomewhereelse.Ijustfindthisaverypoorreflectionofthesystemasitexiststodayasonethat’sreallydrivenbyabusinessmentalityratherthanasocialchange,socialjustice,humanitarianissue.–BG

Asimilardynamicwasreflectedbyaprogrammanagerwhotalkedabouthavingmeasuredtheimpactof

businessloansonimprovingtheeffectivenessofrentalsubsidies.Eventhoughtheorganizationknew

thattheadditionofbusinessloansmadetheprogramsignificantlymoreeffective,theHaitian

governmentaskedthemtoprovideonlyrentalsubsidiessothattheywouldbeabletofocusallavailable

fundsonemptyingthecamps–asignificantpoliticalwinforthegovernment.Inaccordancewithaid

effectivenessprinciples,theorganizationfollowedthegovernment’slead,providingonlyrentalsubsidies

despitetheirknowledgethatitwaslesseffective.

TheMediaThemediaappearstohaveanimportantinfluenceatthesectorlevel,althoughitdoesnotseemwell

suitedtoencouragingnuancedadaptationorlearning.Twointervieweesimpliedthatifaparticular

solutiongetsenough“badpress,”itcouldhaveanimpactonthedegreetowhichfunderswillfundthe

solution,andtherefore,theextenttowhichorganizationsareinterestedinusingthesolution.InHaiti,

thisappearstohavebeenthecaseforrentalsubsidies.Thisinfluencecanchangepractices(i.e.there

maybefewerrentalsubsidies)butitdoesnotnecessarydrivelearning.Infact,thewayinwhichmedia

operatesappearstomakesitdifficultforanyorganizationtoadaptoriteratesolutionstobemore

effectiveifithasbeenpaintedascontroversial.Thisdynamicisexpandedoninthenextsection.

RiskaversionandthenegativeconsequencesoffailureSector-levellearningismadedifficultbythewayinwhichthemediaanddonorsrespondtofailure.This

researchfoundthatinsomecases,potentialnegativeconsequences–harmtoreputationalcapital

throughbadmediacoverage,orlossoffunding–ledorganizationstobehaveinwaysthatnegatively

impactlearning.Mostofthestoriesbelowweredrawnfromhumanitarianassistanceorganizations,

howeverakeyinformantfromacapacitybuildingorganizationspokeofasimilardynamicthatimpacted

herwork,suggestingthesedisincentivesmayexistacrossthesectoreveniftheywerenotalwaysevident

fromtheinterviewsconductedwithcapacitybuildingorganizationsinthisstudy.

Organizationsarehesitanttoshareinformation,especiallyaroundwhatisnotworking.Inoneinstance,a

capacitybuildingintervieweewasextremelyhesitanttoshareanevaluationreportwithmebecauseit

identifiedsomechallengesthataprojectfacedinapreviousphase.Theorganizationendedupsharing

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theevaluationaftersomediscussionandassuranceofconfidentiality.Inthecaseofoneorganization,

thisextendedtothepointwheretheorganizationwashesitanttoevenmeasurewhatwasorwasnot

workingwhentheopportunitywaspresentedtothem.Akeyinformantfromacapacitybuilding

organizationnotincludedinthestudyprovidedastoryofhowherorganizationdiscouragedherfrom

conductinganimpactassessment:

…Thissurveywaspotentiallyharmfultotheorganizationbecauseitcouldshowthatwehadnoimpactoranegativeimpact.Itcouldtotallyshowthat.Wekindoffoundamiddleground–weagreedthatwewouldn’ttalktoanyonetoomuch–thefunders,thepartners–beforewehadtheresults.Thatwasdifficultbecauseweneededotherpeople’scooperation….butIthinkitwasanimportantsafeguardanywayfortheorganization….Sotheresultsmightnotgetpublishediftheyarenotgoodfortheorganization.–BG2(aboutacapacitybuildingorganization)

Buildingonthisdynamic,therewasageneralsensethatorganizationstendtosharesuccesseswhen

theygettogetheratclustermeetings,andtheytendtoignorefailures.Thisfearofowningfailuremaybe

heightenedinhighlypoliticizedcontexts,likeHaiti.Onekeyinformantfeltthatorganizationswould

requireprotectionfromfundersanddonorstobeabletobecandidwitheachother.

Howcouldtheycoordinatebetter?That’saverygoodquestion.Isupposetobereleasedfromdonorandmediascrutinytobeabletohavethatspacewhereyoucouldsay“yes,therearethingsthatdidn’tworkandweneedtocomeupwithareflectiontoseewhathappenedandwhyandnotonlyhowcouldwehavedoneitbetterbutwhataresomeoftheredflagsorwarningsforanyoneelsewhowantstoimplementthisinanothercountry.”Butit’sjustthatit’ssuchasensitivethingandnoonereallywantstobepinnedupastheposterchildforfailingHaiti’spopulationandit’saveryverypoliticizedresponse,intermsoftheglobalaidsituation.–BG1

Twodifferentkeyinformantsspokeofsituationsinwhichfearofnegativeconsequencesledto

organizationsactivelyseekingpositiveexternalevaluations,oractivelydiscouragingnegativeexternal

feedback.

Ohyeah.ThisissomethingthatIthinkit’sabigobstacletoorganizationallearningisthefactthatdonorsgivethemmoneytodoanexternalevaluation….Itcanbeanexternalcompanybutthatcompanyisalwaysgoingtobecontractedbytheorganizationsoiftheycomeupwithstuff…evenattherelationshiplevel,youknow:“Ihireyou,I’vegivenyouajob,you’renotgoingtotrytopissmeoff.”-BG1

…Iwastoldwhenwestartednottobetoohard,tolearntobepositive.…Nomatterwhat,it'sabattle.Anytimeyou’retellingpeoplesomethingthattheydon’twanttohear.Andtheyalwaysgiveyouachancetochangeit.Theygiveitbacktoyouandtheysay“well,thissoundslikeyouropinion…yousureyoudon’twanttosoftenthat.”ButIalwaysdoasurvey,eveniftheydon’taskmeto,sothatIhavethedata.–BG3

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Thesesector-leveldynamicsultimatelyaffectlearningattheorganizationallevel.Insomeinstancesthey

maygoasfarastodiscouragestafffromexpressingideasthatmaybecontroversial,evenifthey

representimportantknowledgeorlearning.Thefollowingquotesdemonstratethisdynamicaccordingto

oneinterviewee:

Thereisonewomaninparticular…shewastheonlyonewhosaw[theproblem]-orrather,…shewastheonlywhowasseniorenoughandhadtheballsenoughtosaysomethingandstartpushingit,andknowthatshewasn'tgoingtogetfiredliketherestofus.–HA2

ThisisneversomethingthattheWorldBankcoulddo.NoNGOcouldreallynormallydoit.We'rerespectedenoughofanorganization,andwe'renottoopolitical…wecannavigatethisgroundalittlebit.…In2012,thesewerenotthingsthatwerebeingdiscussed-andeveryoneknewthatweshouldbediscussingitifwewantedtoberealistic,buteveryonewastooafraidtobringitup.–HA2

Inadditiontotheimpactithasonindividuals,italsoaffectsthetypesofprojectsthatorganizationswill

pursue,ortrytopersuadefunderstofund.Thefollowingquotesarefromthereflectionsofone

intervieweeonthistopic:

Ithink,internallyourownself-interestinbeingsustainableforourselvesandemployees,allthesepeoplewhomakeupthisbigengine…Ithinkitplaysoutindecisionsthatwemakeasanorganization,ourlevelofriskinwherewemightwork,wherewemightpush[ourfunder]towork.–HA1

There’salotofpressureandaskforinnovation,butatthesametimeyouseealotofgroupsfollowingthelinebecausethat’swhatgetsfunded.…Ifeelafeararoundgoingtoooffconformity,goingtoooffthetrack,becauseyoudon’twanttobeseenasanoutlier.Youwanttobeseenasexcelling,butyoudon’tnecessarilywanttobeseenasanoutlier.–HA1

Overallthesedynamicscreateanenvironmentthatisdangerousforlearning,becausetryingsomething

newbecomesrisky,asisreflectedbytwodifferentintervieweesfromthehumanitarianassistance

organizationinterviewed:

Thesearethingsthathaven'tbeentriedbefore.Veryinnovative,veryriskyforourreputationbecausethemediacomplainssomuch.Theysendsomeoneinfor2-3daysandtheyneedtocomebackfromthecampswithastoryandtheseguysdon'thavetimetounderstandwhywedocertainthings.Soeverytimewedosomethingnewit’sariskbecausewedon'tknowifit'sgoingtoworkornot.–HA1

Results,pressure,funding,beingmeasuredonwhatyoucando,havingasuccess.Ifyoulookatoverthelastfortyyearsandallofthelessonslearnedandallofthethingswekeeprepeating,themistakeswekeepmaking.…Isitreasonabletoexpectthatthey’regoingtoadaptinanenvironmentthatrequiresmoreandmoreconformitytoexist,fortheorganizationtosustainitself?–HA1

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Overall,thesepiecesofinformationpaintaconcerningpictureofthebarriersthattheaidsectorfacesto

learning.Thisresearchsuggeststhatthereareinstancesinwhichmediaandfunder-relateddynamics

haveledorganizationsto:avoidmeasuringimpact;notsharelessonsfromfailures;activelydiscourage

negativefeedbackduringevaluationsandexternalassessments;discouragecontroversialideas;and

viewnewinitiativesas“risky.”Thisresearchcouldnotdeterminewhetherthesenegativeconsequences

wereallrealorifsomeofthemwereperceived,buttheirthreatappearstohavehadrealimpacton

organizationalbehaviour.

OtherBarriersIntervieweesraisedafewotherdynamicsthatcanposebarrierstosector-levellearning.One

intervieweereflectedonthefactthatorganizationslargelyworkwithintheirownsetofincentivesand

systems–focusedattheprojectlevel,andmostlyfocusedongainingandsustainingfunding–andthatit

isnotwithinanyoneorganization’smandatetopayattentiontothebiggerpicture.Inotherwords:

sector-levellearningandadaptingisnotanyone’sjob.

Twointervieweesfromdifferentorganizationsidentifiedthechallengeposedbythelongfeedbackloops

thatoftenexistwithininternationaldevelopmentcontexts.Theimpactsofaidorganizations’actionscan

bedelayed3,10,or20years,makingthelearningfeedbacklooplongerandmoredifficulttotrack.

Additionally,thewaythatthesectorisorganized(e.g.developmentorganizationsasseparatefrom

humanitarianassistanceorganizations)createssilosthatmakessector-levellearningevenmore

challengingacrossthesetimelines.Intervieweesmentionedthisspecificallyinreferencetothefactthat

actionsduringthedisasterresponsephasecanoftenhavehugeimplicationsthreetofiveyearslater(e.g.

locationofcampscanchangethesocialgeographyandinfrastructureneedsofacityforever).Whenthe

impactsoftheseactionsaretrulyfelt–whenthis“learning”istakingplace–theindividualswhomade

thedisaster-situationdecisionshavelongmovedontothenextcrisis.Thisreflectionisnotnew–thisisa

well-knownchallengeindisasteranddevelopmentcontexts–andyet,theimplicationsthatthisdynamic

hasontheabilityofthesectortogetbetterandsmarterovertimeremainsimportant.

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CHAPTER 6: Analysis and Discussion

Thischapterwillhighlightthemostimportantimplicationsandcontributionsofthefindings.Thefirst

partwillconsiderwhatthesefindingstellusabouttheMOCAframeworkitself;thesecondpartwilllook

athowMOCAwas(andwasnot)employedbyorganizationsinHaitiandwhatthattellsusaboutthe

stateoforganizationallearning.Thelatterpartofthischapterwilllookattheimplicationsofthe

enablersandbarriersthatimpactpositivelearningandadaptationpracticesforaidorganizationinHaiti.

Manyofthefindingsofthisresearchechoreflectionsontheaidsystemandhowindividualsactwithin

thissystem,fromBerg(2000),Ramalingam(2005),Pasteur(2004)andothers.However,theMOCA

surveyresultscontributenewquantitativedataandthetheoreticalframeworkbringsanewperspective

tosomeofwhatwealreadyknow,whilehighlightingsomenewfindings.Togetherthesurveyand

interviewfindingsprovideausefulsnapshotofthebehavioursofinternationalaidorganizationsata

point-in-timeinHaiti.

Interpreting the MOCA framework

Themarketorientationandorganizationallearningliteratures,fromwhichmanyoftheMOCApractices

weredrawn,useweightedframeworksthatsuggestequalattributionofeachpracticetoperformance

(oreffectiveness).Thiscontradictshowmytheoreticalframework,andmyfindings,suggestweshould

vieworganizationallearningandadaptation.

Non-linearitysuggeststhatsmallchangesinthesystemcanhavedisproportionateimpactsontheresult.

InotherwordsaveryhighorverylowscoreonasingleMOCApracticecouldhaveadisproportionately

bigimpactontheabilityoftheorganizationtolearnandadapt.Ifweunderstandorganizationstobe

complex,adaptivesystems,itisthereforeimportanttorecognizethattheMOCAframeworkisnota

checklist.Itcannotbeunderstoodasaseriesofbehavioursthatcumulativelycreateorganizational

learning,adaptation,oreffectiveness.Instead,theMOCAframeworkneedstobeunderstoodasa

compilationoforganizationalpractices,behavioursandvaluesthatarebothcontributorstoand

indicatorsofapositivelearningandadaptationenvironment.Itisthecomplexinteractionbetweenthese

factorsthatcreateconditionsunderwhichorganizationstendtobemoreeffective.

Giventhisunderstandingoftheorganizationalreality,theframeworkwillneverbeabletoprovidea

recipeforwhatorganizationsshoulddotoensurelearning,adaptation,oreffectiveness.However,the

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MOCAframeworkcanserveasamenuofpracticesthathavebeenshowntohavesomeconnectionto

performance.Thiscouldbeausefulstartingpointfororganizationstodesignalearningandadaptation

environmentthatwillbestsupporttheiruniqueorganizationtobecomemoreeffective.

Contributions of adaptive capacity and complexity absorption to the MOCA framework

Whilemarketorientationandorganizationallearninghadpreviouslybeenappliedinthecontextofaid

organizations,adaptivecapacityandcomplexityabsorptionhadnot.Thissectionreflectsontheextent

towhichtheseconstructswerehelpfulinbetterunderstandinghowaidorganizationlearnandadaptin

Haiti,andwhethertheyareusefulcontributionstotheframework.

ComplexityabsorptionBasedontheinsightsgleanedfromthecomplexityabsorptionpartsofthesurveyresultsandtheadded

depththisconceptbroughttotheinterviews,complexityabsorptionseemstobeausefultoolfor

understandingorganizationallearning,adaptationandeffectiveness.Asdescribedintheliterature

review,complexityabsorptionaccountsfortheextenttowhichorganizationsenablecomplex

interactionsinsidetheorganization,tobeabletodealwithcomplexenvironmentsoutsideofthe

organization.24Thisisespeciallyapplicableattheorganizationalstrategylevel.Eventhoughtheresearch

didnotfindanyorganizationsthatareintentionallyapplyingthisthinkingintheiroperations,having

complexityabsorptionaspartoftheMOCAframeworkhighlightssomewaysinwhichorganizationsare

employingpracticesthatareconsistentwiththistheory,andhighlightsotherwaysinwhich

organizationscouldleveragethesestrategiestopotentiallybemoreeffectiveincomplexenvironments.

Considerthefollowingexample.Ifanorganizationistryingtoachieveaspecificoutcome–reducing

maternaldeaths,forexample–complexityabsorptionmightsuggestamoreresilientstrategyfor

achievingthisoutcome.Thisresearchfoundthatorganizationstendtofocusonasingleproject,witha

specificobjective,intendedtoachieveanoutcome(e.g.increasingthenumberofdoctorsinruralareas,

willleadtofewermaternaldeaths).Complexityabsorptionsuggeststhatorganizationsmightbebetter

offpursuingmultipleobjectivesatonceinanefforttoachieveasingleoutcome(e.g.increasingthe

numberofdoctors,conductingeducationcampaigns,andpayingmotherstogivebirthinhospitals).The

24IntheMOCAsurvey,thispartoftheliteraturewasrepresentedbyquestionsaboutwhoisinvolvedindecision-making,thedegreeofformalizationinprocessesandmanagementstyles,andthenumberofstrategiesandgoalsthatanorganizationprioritizes.

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theorysuggeststhatbytryingmultipleapproachesitismorelikelythatsomethingwillwork,orthatthe

multipleapproachescouldinteractincomplexandunpredictableways,creatinganenvironmentin

whichtheoutcomeismorelikelytobeachieved.

Basedontheinterviews,itseemsthatorganizationsrarelyhavetheoptiontobuildmultipleapproaches

intotheirprograms.Forexample,oneorganizationwasfocusedonsettingupataxationsystemina

regionofHaiti.Theprojectwasadmittedlyhighrisk–eitherthetaxsystemwouldwork,andtheproject

wouldbesuccessful,orthesystemwouldfailandsowouldtheproject.Complexityabsorptionthinking

mightsuggestthattheorganizationalsoundertakesimultaneousprojectsthathavetheirownobjectives,

butincreasethelikelihoodofataxsystembeingsuccessful–maybeademocracyeducationand

promotioncampaigninthearea,oralocaleconomicdevelopmentinitiativethatbuildsconsensusand

goodwillamongthebusinesscommunity.Ofcourse,formanyorganizationsitisastretchtosecure

fundingforonemajorinitiative,letaloneaportfolioofinitiativesgearedatthesameoutcome.Itmight

thereforerequireabroadershiftinthinkingacrossfundersandthesectoratlargeforthistypeof

strategytobeimplemented.

Interestingly,organizationsdoseemtoincorporatecomplexityabsorptionintheirpursuitoffunding.

Withtheexceptionofoneorganizationthatwasfocusedonasinglefunder,organizationsappearto

diversifyfundingsourcesasasurvivalmechanism.Oneintervieweereportedherorganizationgoinginto

acompletelydifferentfieldaftertheearthquaketoleveragethefundingthatwasavailable,while

keepingthelong-termvisionoftheorganizationinmind.Inthecontextofprojectwork,however,where

theoutcomeistoachieveresultsforbeneficiaries,Ifoundthattheexternalpressuresthatseemtodrive

resilientbehavioursaroundfundingarenotpresent.Thissuggeststhatiforganizationsaregoingto

realizethebenefitsofthesecomplexity-informed,resiliencegeneratingbehaviours,theywillneedtodo

sointentionally.Complexityabsorptiontheoryprovidesausefulstartingplacefororganizationstothink

abouthowtheymightbuildgreaterresilienceintothewaytheygoaboutprojectwork.

AdaptivecapacityLikecomplexityabsorption,adaptivecapacityisausefulandnecessaryadditiontoourmodelsof

organizationallearning,adaptationandeffectiveness.Itfocusesonthestructuresandrelationships

insidetheorganizationandspecificallyintroducestheideasofmultiplexity,redundancyandloose

coupling,theorizingthatthesethreedynamicshelpanorganizationbebetterabletoadapttochangesin

theexternalenvironment.Multiplexity–“thenumberanddiversityofrelationsbetweenactorsin

organizationsornetworks”(Staber&Sydow,2002,p.414)–isahelpfulconcept,butitislargelyreflected

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bypracticesalreadyfoundwithintheorganizationallearningliterature.Themajor,newcontributionof

adaptivecapacityisthenotionofredundancy.Theorganizationsinthisstudyappearedtohavevery

littleredundancyinresources.Thedatashowedthatprojectstendedtobeover-ambitious,puttingstaff

inapositiontotrytodeliverprojectsonunrealistictimelines,givingthemlittletimetoreflectorlearn.

Additionally,thenatureofprojectfundingmeantthatresourceswerehiredonaproject-by-project

basis,withclearresponsibilitiesanddeliverableswithinthecontextoftheproject,butlimited

connectiontolong-termeffectiveness.Thiscombinationledtoorganizationshavingverylimited“slack

resources”withwhichtotrynewthingsorbeabletoadjustprioritieswithinoracrossprojects.

Thislackofredundancyisparticularlyinterestingtoexamineinthecontextoftheaccountabilityfocus

thatwasubiquitousacrossorganizations.Itiseasytounderstandthatafunderwouldwanttosee

resourcesfullydeployedonaprojecttofeelcomfortablethattheyaregettinggoodvaluefortheir

money.However,theadaptivecapacitytheorysuggeststhatincomplexenvironments,organizations

mayactuallybemoreeffective(i.e.bringmorevalueformoney)whentheyhavesomeslack,providedit

isusedwisely.Thistypeofthinkingforcesustochallengeournotionsofaccountabilityand

organizationaleffectiveness,andarguesthatefficiencyisactuallyachievedthroughredundancy–both

intermsoftimeoff,aswellasslackresourcestobeabletomovepeoplearoundtodifferentprojects

andenableexperimentation.

Adaptivecapacityalsointroducestheconceptofloosecoupling–therelativeautonomyofonepartof

anorganizationtoadaptindependentlyofthewhole.Thismaybeespeciallyimportantforlarger

organizationswithdifferent“parts”thatarebigenoughtoadaptontheirown.Forsmallerorganizations,

theconceptofloosecouplingmaypointtoarelated,butdifferentchallenge.Smallerorganizationsmay

beabletoadaptquickly,buttheirresourcesonlyallowthemtoexploreonedirectionatatime.

Theoretically,thebenefitofalooselycoupled,largeorganizationisthatitcouldexploremultiple

solutionsorapproachessimultaneously,beingabletotestwhatworksandwhatdoesnot,without

riskingthehealthofthewholeorganization.Toanextent,allorganizationsinterviewedappliedthis

conceptinsofarastheyhaddecentralizedtheirdecisionmakingtohavemajordecisionsmadeby

managersinHaiti–allowingtheprojecttoberelativelyautonomous,andlooselycoupledwiththeother

projectsrunbythebiggeraidorganization.

Thebenefitsorrisksassociatedwithsizeoforganizationcontinuestobeaquestioninthisstudy,aswell

asforotherauthorslookingatlearninginaidorganizations.Itistemptingtoconcludethatsmaller

organizationsmustbebetterlearnersbecausetheytendtodobetteronanumberofpracticesthatare

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associatedwithstronglearningoutcomes-includingspeedofcollaborationandsharedvision.Thiswas

certainlytrueinmysurveydata,andothershavefoundsimilarresults(Ramalingam,2005,p.36).

However,loosecouplingsuggeststhattheremaybeadvantagesfororganizationsthatarebigenoughto

beabletoexperimentastheyevolvetheirwaytowardsmoreeffectivesolutions–providedtheyhave

thecoordinatingmechanismstoadequatelyleveragethesedisparateparts.

Itshouldbenotedthatthedecentralizationofdecision-making,redundancyofresources,and

disconnectionoffunctionscanseemcounter-intuitivetomuchofwhatthefragilestateliterature

discussesasimportantaroundcoordinationandpolicycoherence.Adaptivecapacitypointstothefact

thatflexibilityandcontrolarenotmutuallyexclusive,andthatfindingthethresholdofjustenough,but

nottoomuchcoordinationiskey.

Atthesectorlevel,wehaveanumberofaidorganizationsthatarenotwellconnected.Itseemsthat

decentralizationistakentoarelativeextremewithoutnecessarilyusingthediversityofapproaches,

redundancyofresource,orthedisconnectionofdifferentorganizationsstrategically.Whilethismaybe

understandable,especiallyindisastersituations–thisleadstoanaidsectorwithmorechaosthan

control.OneintervieweerecountedtheexperienceofshowingupinaHaitiantowntobuildahospital

onlytofindoutthattheJapanesehadalreadybegunconstruction.

Withinorganizations,theinterviewdatasuggeststhatwetendtoleantheotherdirection–weplacea

significantfocusoncontrol,withlimitedredundancy,whichmeansweendupwithlessdiversity,

experimentation,andchaosthanmightbeidealforworkingwithcomplexproblems.Whileitisnot

alwaysclearhowthisbalanceisbestoperationalizedinorganizationsorsectors,adaptivecapacity

providesthetheoreticalbasistogetusaskingtherightquestions.

Overall,bothcomplexityabsorptionandadaptivecapacitystrengthenexistingideasfoundinthemarket

orientationandorganizationallearningliteratures,andintroducenewconceptsthatresonatewiththe

experiencesofmanyintervieweesinthestudy,andaddnewdimensionstotheexistingmentalmodels.

How MOCA was employed by organizations in Haiti

Thissecondpartofthechapterwillanalyzeanddiscussthefollowingfindings,whichillustratetheextent

towhichorganizationsinHaitiemployedMOCApractices,andsomeoftheimportanttrendsinthe

surveydata.

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ThevariationintheextenttowhichMOCApracticeswereemployedbyorganizationsisencouraging.

Whilethelowerscoresdemonstratethatsomeorganizationsarestillalongwayfromrecognizingthe

benefitsofhighperformancelearning,itsuggeststhatitispossiblefororganizationstoemploypositive

learningbehaviourswithintheexistingaidsystem.Inotherwords–someorganizationswereableto

employthesepractices,soothersshouldalsobeabletodosoaswell.AtthebeginningofthisresearchI

wascuriousaboutwhetherorganizationalagencyorsystemdynamicshavethegreatestimpacton

behaviour.Thisresearchsupportsthenotionthatbothareveryimportant:Whilethesystemlevel

dynamicsturnedouttoshapeindividualandorganizationalbehaviourinimportantways,thevariationin

scoresbetweenorganizationsoperatingwithinthissamesystem,justifiesanemphasisontheagencyof

theseactors.

Atthehighestlevel,myfindingsshowthatorganizationsweregenerallysuccessfulatemployingmarket

orientationandorganizationallearningpracticesinHaiti,whichisconsistentwithwhatothershave

found.StudiesbyauthorslikeModi(2012)andMahmoud&Yusif(2012)showthatmanyaid

organizationshavebeensuccessfulatemployingthesepracticesinothercontexts.25Thestrongscores

onmarketorientationandorganizationallearningindicatorsacrossorganizations–specificallythose

indicatorsrelatedtolearningattitudes–couldsuggestthatthesignificantworkonlearningintheaid

sectoroverthepast10to15yearshashadsomepositiveimpact.Attheveryleast,theawarenessand

positiveattitudestowardslearning,asdemonstratedbyindicatorslike“leadershipvalueslearning”

(employedby10of12organizations)and“leadershipemphasizesknowledgesharing”(employedby11

of12organizations)suggestthatattitudesaresupportiveoflearningwork.

Organizationsemployedfewpracticesfromcomplexityabsorptionandadaptivecapacity.Therearea

numberofpossiblereasonsforthisdichotomybetweenthebetter-establishedliteraturesandthe

25Wecannotusefullycomparethisdatatootherstudiesduetoinconsistencyinmeasurementtools,whichmakesitdifficulttodetermineiforganizationsareshowingprogressovertime.

SummaryofFindings:

• Organizationsemployedbetween45%and86%ofMOCApractices.• Organizationsvariedsignificantlyonoperationalcomplexity:rangingfrom20%to93%of

goalsandstrategiesdeemedtobeimportant.• Marketorientationandorganizationallearningpracticesweremorecommonlyemployed

thanadaptivecapacityandcomplexityabsorptionpractices.• HumanitarianassistanceorganizationsconsistentlyemployedfewerMOCApracticesthan

developmentorganizations(capacitybuildingand“other”).

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complexity-informedliteratures.Itispossiblethattheseresultssimplyreflectthefactthatmarket

orientationandorganizationallearningarewell-developedliteraturesthathavebeendiscussedinthe

developmentcontextformanyyears,whilecomplexitytheoryisarelativelynewconceptthatisearlyin

itsapplicationinthedevelopmentfield.Anotherpossibilityisthatadaptivecapacityandcomplexity

absorptionaremoredifficulttoemploy.Whilemanyofthemarketorientationandorganizational

learningpracticescanbeachievedbytweakingexistingprocessesandapproaches–someofthe

adaptivecapacityandcomplexityabsorptionpracticesrequiremoresignificantstrategic-levelshifts.Or

perhaps,someadaptivecapacityandcomplexityabsorptionpracticespresentspecificchallengesin

fragilestatecontexts.Forexample,whenaskedtoratetheirorganizationonaspectrumbetween“focus

ongettingthingsdone”and“focusonfollowingformalprocedures,”organizationstendedtofocuson

formalprocedures.Complexityabsorptiontheorywouldinterpretthishighdegreeofformalizationas

havinganegativeimpactoneffectiveness,becauseitwouldlimittheabilityofindividualstoadaptto

changingcontextsasneeded.However,intheinterviews,formalprocedureswereidentifiedasbeing

absolutelycriticaltoorganizationaleffectivenessinHaititoguardagainstcorruptionandrent-seeking

behaviours.Itmaybethat,insomeinstances,formalizationisactuallytheresultofcontext-appropriate

adaptation,andnotnecessarilyabarrier.

Essentially,thefindingssuggestthataidorganizationsinHaitiareemployingsomeimportantandhelpful

learningandadaptationbehaviours–specificallythosethatrelatetocollectinginformationandvaluing

learning.However,organizationsarenotyet“complexity-enabled”–theyarenotconsistentlyemploying

complexity-basedlearningandadaptationpractices.Thisisespeciallyproblematicaswemoveintoa

paradigminwhichtheroleofaidorganizationsislessaboutimplementingsolutionsinalinear,top-

downway,andmoreaboutsupportingthedevelopmentofsolutionstocomplexproblems.Complexity-

informedlearningandadaptationpracticescouldhelporganizationsbemoreeffectiveasenablersof

changeincomplex,rapidlychangingenvironments.

Inadditiontothetrendsinwhichpracticeswereemployed,thefindingsalsoshowtrendsinwhich

organizationstendtoemploythem.Morespecifically,humanitarianassistanceorganizationstendedto

employfewerMOCApracticesthandevelopment-focusedorganizations(bothcapacitybuildingand

“other”).Thereareanumberofpossibleexplanationsforwhythiscorrelationmightexist.One

possibilityisthatdifferenttypesoforganizationstendtobeofdifferentsizes,andsizecouldimpact

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learningbehaviours.26However,sizedoesnotseemtobeaplausibleexplanationforthepracticeson

whichthegreatestdifferencewasobserved.Anotherpossibleexplanationisthattherelationshipsthat

differenttypesoforganizationshavewiththeirbeneficiariesshapeslearningbehaviours.Humanitarian

assistanceorganizationstendtofocusonimplementation,whilecapacitybuildingorganizationsare

bettercharacterizedasenablers.Thesedifferentmodalitiesshapebehaviours.Forexample,the

necessarilyiterativenatureofcapacitybuildingworkmightexplainwhycapacitybuildingorganizations

weremorelikelyto“practicecontinualimprovement.”Tofurthercomplicatetheanalysis,humanitarian

assistanceorganizationstendtoattractmorepublicdonationsthancapacitybuildingorganizations–

specificallyinpost-disastersituations.Foratleastoneofthehumanitarianassistanceorganizationsin

thisstudy,thismeantlimitedoversightonhowthemoneywasspent.Itisdifficulttodeterminehowlack

ofdonoraccountabilitymightimpactMOCApractices.Itlikelyimpactshowmonitoringandevaluation

activitiesareprioritized,buttheextenttowhichthisdynamicimpactslearningattitudesacrossthe

organizationisunknown.

AllofthesefactorslikelycontributetothedifferenceinMOCAscoresbetweenhumanitarianassistance

anddevelopmentorganizations.However,organizationalcultureseemstobethemostviable

explanationformanyofthepracticesonwhichthegreatestdifferencewasrecorded,including:

• Opennesstooutsideideas;• Leadershipemphasizesknowledgesharing;• Opennesstoemployeecontributions;• Employeeshavefreedomtomakedecisions;and• Considersfront-linestaffexperienceindecision-making.

Intervieweesthemselveshypothesizedthatthemilitarybackgroundofmanyhumanitarianassistance

organizations,andaculturethatemphasizeslogisticsandoperationscouldcontributetoaculturein

whichlearningismoredifficult.Thefindingsofthe2002ALNAPAnnualReview,whichlookedatbarriers

tolearninginthehumanitariansector,isinlinewiththisculturaltheory.Itidentifiedthepotential

emotionalimplicationoflearninginthiscontext:“whereacceptingresponsibilityforamistakealso

meanstakingresponsibilityforfailingtosavehumanlives”(Krohwinkel-Karlsson,2007,p.16).

Whileitisdifficulttopinpointwhythetypeoforganizationmatterstolearning,knowingthatthereisa

differencebetweentypesoforganizations,ishelpful.Itmayinformthedesignoffuturestudiestoeither

26Humanitarianassistanceorganizationstendedtobebiggerthandevelopmentorganizations,whichmightexplainthedifferenceinMOCAscores.

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lookatonetypeoforganizationortoaccountforthedifferencesbetweenorganizationsinresearch

design.

Practically,itisworthconsideringwhetherthedifferenceinlearningcapacitybetweenorganization

typescouldimpacthoweffectivetheyareincomplexenvironments.Thisthesisisnotenoughto

concludethathumanitarianassistanceorganizationsarenecessarilyworselearnersthancapacity

building,orotherdevelopmentorganizations.Ifanything,thisthesisshowsthatatremendousamount

candependonthechoicesmadebytheorganization,andtheagencyofindividualswithinorganizations.

However,theconsistencywithwhichhumanitarianassistanceorganizationswerefoundtoscorelower

thandevelopmentorganizationonMOCApracticesmakesitworthexploringthepotentialimplications

ofhumanitarianassistanceorganizationsbeingworselearner/adaptors.

Implications of project-level enablers and barriers

Themostinterestingpartsoftheprojectlevelfindingsarethatlearningislargelyinformalandtacit(held

byindividuals),andthatprojectstaffgenerallythinkthisissufficientforthemtobeeffective.The

followingsectionexplorestheimplicationsofthesefindings,startingwiththeimplicationsthishasfor

humanresourcemanagementinaidorganizations,andthenexploringtheimplicationsforaid

organizationlearningandeffectivenessmorebroadly.

Inanumberofways,thefindingsindicatethatpeopleareimportanttolearningandadaptationatthe

projectlevel.Throughtheirwillingnessandabilitytocommunicate,tobuildtrustingrelationships,to

collectinformationthroughnetworks,totakeinitiativeandrisks,tointernalizeandactonnew

information,tobecommitted,creativeandflexible–thepeoplewhomakeupaidorganizationshavea

hugeimpactontheorganization’sday-to-dayeffectiveness.Fororganizations,thismeansthathuman

resourcemanagementisalsoveryimportanttoeffectiveness.

SummaryofFindings

• Thefactorsthatenabledlearningandadaptationattheprojectlevelwhere:Qualityandcompetenciesofprojectstaff;Workingrelationshipswithbeneficiaries;Informallearningandadaptation;Flexibilityofprojectstafftoadapt.

• Thebarrierstolearningandadaptationattheprojectlevelwhere:Challengeswithhiring;Lackoftimeandspaceforstafftoreflect;Project-focusedstructuresandcultures;Lackofinformation.

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ThefindingssuggestatleastthreewaysinwhichHRpoliciesandpracticesdirectlyimpacttheabilityof

organizationstolearnandadapt.Thefirstisrecruitment.Intervieweesemphasizedthattheabilityof

individualstohavemeaningfulrelationshipswithbeneficiariescontributestolearningandeffectiveness

moredirectly.Thisreinforcesthefactthatlanguageandculturalcompetenciesshouldbeincorporated

intorecruitmentrequirements.Thesurveydatashowedhowchallengingthisis;theabilitytohireand

firewerethetwolowestscoringMOCApracticesinthesurvey,andyetfindingtherightpeopleappears

tohaveoneofthebiggestpossiblepositiveimpacts.ThesecondwayinwhichHRimpactslearning,is

throughthetypesofemploymentthatisoffered(contractorpermanent),andcontractlength.Notonly

doshortcontractwindowsmakestafflesseffectiveduetolackofnetworksandrelationships,butwhen

employeesleave,theorganizationquicklylosesanytacitknowledgethatthatindividualmayhavegained

throughtheirwork.Becausesomuchproject-levelknowledgeisstoredintheheadsandintuitionsof

staff–organizationsneedtoconsiderwhattheyareloosingwhenstaffcyclethroughshort-term

contracts.Whileprojectcyclesmakelong-termemploymentmoredifficult,Ispokeinformallywithtwo

keyinformantswhowereemployedbyorganizationsthathadfoundawayhavepermanentfieldstaff

positions,withtheintentionofkeepingthemasorganizationalassetsoverthelong-term.Finally,the

factthatmostproject-levelknowledgeispredominantlytacitmightsuggesttheneedfororganizations

tobecomemorestrategicinhowtheymanagepeople–theirtacitknowledgeresources.While

knowledgemanagementstrategiesgenerallyassumethattacitknowledgeneedstobetranslatedto

explicitknowledgeforittobeusefullyappliedbytheorganization,thechallengesofmakingtacit

knowledgeexplicitwarrantsanexplorationofalternateapproaches.Forexample,theremaybean

argumentforbettermanagingtacitknowledgebymovingpeoplearoundinsideorganizations.Imaginea

libraryofappliedknowledgeresourcesthatcouldbeleveragedbysecondingstaffmemberswithspecific

experiencestoprojectsforperiodsoftime.Thisresearchaddstopastworkthathighlightsthestrategic

importanceofhumanresourcesinaidorganizations(PeopleinAid,2013).27

Theemphasisontacitknowledgeattheprojectlevelhasimplicationsforthequalityoforganizational

learning.Informal,day-to-daylearningisclearlyimportanttoprojectsuccess,andlikelyneedstobe

bettersupported.However,formalizedmeasurementofoutcomes–datathattellsuswhatisandisnot

working–playsanimportantroleinlearningandadaptationaswell,andthisislargelymissingatthe

projectlevel.Thenextparagraphswilllookfirstathowtobetterleverageinformalknowledge,andthen

athowmoreformaldatacouldplayarole.

27ItshouldbenotedthatHRisastrategicpriorityforatleastafewoftheorganizationsinthestudy.

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Projectstaffhavegoodreasonsforplacinghighvalueontheinformalknowledgethattheycollectand

useintheirday-to-daywork.Thistacitknowledgeisbasedinaspecificcontext;itisaboutshiftingpower

relationships,navigatingbuy-in,anddeterminingtheacceptabilityofsolutionstokeypeople.This

informationiscriticaltogettinganythingdone.Whilesomeofthisinformationiscapturedformallyin

reports,mostofitiseverchanging,highlyspecificanddifficulttotransfer.Thistacitknowledgeisheldin

thebrainsandintuitionofindividualstaffdoingthework–aswasreflectedbythe“justdoit”learning

referredtointhefindings.Infragilestatecontextsthatarefastmoving,whereimpactishardto

measure,andwherethedefinitionofsuccesscanbehighlypolitical–thistypeofinformallearning

seemsexceptionallywellfit-for-purpose.

Ifthistypeoflearningissocritical,weshouldconsiderthewaysinwhichtacit,project-levelknowledge

canbebetterleveraged.Thefactthatstaffdonothavetimeandspacetoreflectandlearnhighlightsan

importantopportunity.Pasteur(2004)arguesthattimeforreflectionallowsindividualsandgroupsto

moreeffectivelyturninformationintoknowledge.Whiletheinformationwillstaytacit(internalizedand

difficulttocapture),itwillbecomemoreuseful.Oneofthethingsthatorganizationscandois

intentionallycreatespaceandopportunitiesforfieldstafftoreflectontheirpersonalexperiencesto

maximizetheirabilitytousewhattheyknow.Similarly,organizationscanenablegroupreflectionto

furtherleveragetacitknowledgeheldbyindividuals.The“learningsessions”employedbyone

organization–inwhichtheyhostedregularday-longretreatswiththeirpartners–isanexampleofhow

organizationscanusereflectionanddialoguetomakebetteruseofindividualandcollectivetacit

knowledge.Theprocessservesasanexperientialfeedbacklooptoguidetheprojectdirection,while

simultaneouslyaligningandupdatingtheunderstandingandbehavioursofeveryoneinvolved.

Theemphasisoninformallyheldknowledge,bringsnewimportancetotheMOCAframework,because

adaptivecapacityandcomplexityabsorptionbothaccountforwaysofmanagingtacitknowledgeasan

alterativetotryingtomaketacitknowledgeexplicit.Loosecoupling,strategiccomplexity,and

redundancyareallstructuralconceptsthatenablesinteractionandcreatestheenvironmentinwhich

learningandadaptationcanhappen,thatareconsistentwiththeinformalrealitythatseemstomakeup

muchoftheexistinglearningbehaviourgoingoninsideaidorganizations.AsStaberandSydowsuggest,

“multiplexitycreatesacapacityfortheevolutionofa‘sharedorganizationalmind’,becauseinformation

canspreadthroughoutthesystemandcanbeaccessedfromavarietyofpointsofview”(2002,p.414).

Evenifinformalknowledgedominatestheprojectlevel,thefactthatprojectmanagersdidnotgenerally

haveanyobjectiveevidencetosupporttheirday-to-dayworksuggeststhatthereisuntappedpotential

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formoresystematic,formalizedknowledgegeneration.Thereareanumberofreasonsthatexplicit

knowledge–observable,measurablefact–isimportant.First,thenumberanddiversityofprojects

underwayatanygiventimerepresentshugepotentialforsystematic,explicitknowledgegenerationand

itisawastenottotakeadvantageoftheopportunity.Second,whileinformalknowledgeisimportant,it

islimitedinthescopeofitsapplication.Itisverydifficulttousetacitknowledgetoobjectivelycompare

differentapproachesoranswerbiggerquestionsaboutwhateffectiveaidlookslike.Concrete

measurementsanddatamakeextrapolationeasier.Third,thereisalimittowhatwecan“know”

throughinformalinformation.TheworkofDanielKahnemanandothersonheuristicsprovestousthat,

overallweareincrediblypoorintuitivestatisticians,andthathavingobjectivemeasurementstoinform

humanintelligenceiscriticaltoobtaininganaccuratereflectionofreality.Monitoringourimpactin

formalwayscouldprovidethecheckandbalancefeedbackneededtohelpindividualsmakebetterday-

to-daydecisions,andorganizationmakebetterlong-terminvestments.

Discoveringthemechanismsbywhichorganizationscanintegratemoreformalmeasurementtoolsinto

theprojectlevelisachallenge.Thefindingsreflectthatitisnoteasy,eitherlogistically,orintermsof

buy-inwithprojectmanagers,todothiswork.Thenextsectionreflectsonthechallengesassociated

withleveragingaccountability-basedmonitoringandevaluationsystemsforlearning.

Implications of organization-level enablers and barriers

Ofallthechallengesassociatedwithlearningandadaptationforaidorganizations,organizationlevel

barriersmightbethemostcomplexanddifficulttoovercome.Thissectionwillexploretheimplications

ofthesechallengesinfourparts:monitoringandevaluation;informallearningandbreakingsilos;the

corporatelearningfunction;andthelackoflearningfeedbackloops.

SummaryofFindings

• Thefactorsthatenabledlearningandadaptationattheorganizationlevelwhere:Corporatelearningfunctions;MonitoringandEvaluation;Informalsharingandlearningopportunities.

• Thebarrierstolearningandadaptationattheorganizationlevelwhere:Barrierstousingmonitoringandevaluationdataforlearning;Focusonaccountabilitytothefunder;Project-basedsilosandcycles;Culturalbarrierstolearning;Organizationslackoffeedbackloops.

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Monitoringandevaluationsystemsappeartobethebestvehicleforthemoreformalpartofknowledge

generationattheorganizationlevel.Thefindingsshowthatcorporate-leveladvisorsplaceheavy

emphasisonthesesystems,buttheywerealmostnevermentionedbyproject-levelstaff–eitherfront-

linestafforfieldmanagers–whendiscussinglearning.Thisdisconnectsuggeststhatitisworthbetter

understandingthechallengesandbarrierstobeingabletousemonitoringandevaluationaslearning

tools.Aswaspartiallydescribedattheproject-level,thefindingsshowedfivemajorbarriers:

1) Itischallengingtocollectusefulmonitoringdataoncomplexsocialproblems;2) Projectstaffoftendonothavethetime,spaceorskilltocollectusefulmonitoringdata;3) Projectstaffhavelittleincentivetodothiswork,andlearningadvisorshavelittleinfluence

beyondtheirpersonalrelationshipswithprojectstafftoenticethemtoinvesttimeindatacollection;

4) Thelackoforganization-widevisionandstrategicpriorityonusingmonitoringdataforlearningmakesithardtogetbuy-in;

5) Itisdifficult(bothtechnicallyandpolitically)toachieveconsistencyofindicators,whichmakesitdifficulttocomparedataacrossprojects.

Whileonecouldimaginestrategiesforaddressingeachofthesechallengesseparately,theoverlying

culturethatdepictsmonitoringandevaluationasafunder-drivenactivitymakesanyprogressevenmore

difficult.Itseemslogicalthatifprojectstaffdonotseethevalueofmonitoringactivitiestotheirwork,

theyarelikelytodotheminimumtomeetfunderrequirements.Thisoftenmeansdependingheavilyon

endlineassessmentsandexternalevaluations.However,eventhelimiteddatathatwascollectedfor

fundersdidnotseemtobeconsistentlyappliedforlearningpurposesintheprojectcontext.Thelearning

advisormodelmayservetofurtherreinforcethisdisconnect,asitsuggeststhatlearningissomeone

else’sjob–somethingthatsomeonepestersyouaboutwhileyouarebusywithyourcore

responsibilities(e.g.savinglives,buildingcapacity,etc).

Thisraisesthepossibilityofworkingwithprojectstafftochangethewaytheyseemonitoring–to

demonstrateconcretevalueofmonitoringeffortswithintheprojectcontext.Giventhechallenges,it

maybehelpfultoformalizeknowledgegenerationinwaysthatarehighlytargeted–startingsmalland

scalingup.Whereverpossible,theseeffortsshouldsupportproject-leveldecisionsmaking,andcome

withfundingandorganizational-levelsupport.Additionaldatacollectionwilllikelynotbeapriorityfor

projectmanagerswhofeelthattheyareabletomanagetheirprojectswithoutthistypeofdata,anddo

nothavethetime,spaceandknowledgetodothiswell.Overtime,theremaybesomemonitoringand

evaluationapproachesthatarebetterintegratedwithprojectmanagement,whichcouldmakethem

easiertoimplementattheprojectlevel.Forexample,outcomemappingisamonitoringprocessthatis

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basedinanongoingconversationwithpartners,andcouldpotentiallyintegratemoreeasilywithproject

managementandday-to-daydecision-making,thanresultsbasedmanagementorotherframeworks.

Monitoringandevaluationprovidestheopportunitytostrengthenformalknowledgedevelopment.In

paralleltotheseefforts,thereseemstobesignificantpotentialtoimprovetheuseofinformal

knowledgethroughbetterconnectionsacrossprojectsilosinaidorganizations.Whilethefindings

showedoccasionaleffortstobringpeopletogetherinretreatsandconferencesettings,onlyonethe

organizationsinterviewedindicatedstructuresthatintentionallycreatethisday-to-dayflowof

information.

Establishingstructures,processesandculturesthatsupportconsistentinformationflowisanecessary

partofcomplexity-informedlearningpractices.Partofthisflow,iscreatingopportunitiesforthe

organizationtograpplewiththeevolvingmeaningofinformation–orhowwecollectivelyconceptualize

whatweknow.Thisprocessofreflectionallowsfortacitinformationtobebetterleveragedandisthe

basisofthe“sharedorganizationalmind.”Thiswholesystemsphilosophyoflearningandadaptation

requiresabitoffaith–itisnotasvisibleasdatabasesfullof“lessonslearned”orbiginvestmentsin

learningconferences.Itismeetings,andlistening,andthemessinessoftryingtounderstandhow

differentexperiencesmakesensewithinanemergingpictureofasharedvision,andcommonreality.It

requiresthatwevaluetheknowledgeandunderstandingthatisbuiltupinthemindsandintuitionsof

individualswithinorganizations–evenifitisdifficulttocaptureonpaper.Enablingthistypeoflearning

–thisnurturingofthesharedorganizationalmind,requiresadifferentsetofskillsthanthoseneededby

traditionalknowledgemanagers.AsPasteurpointsout:

Theimplicationsofthistypeoflearningforanorganizationarethuslesstodowithknowledgemanagementsystemsandprocesses,andmoreconcernedwithdevelopingnewtoolsfordialogueandholisticanalysis,andattitudesandskillsforworkingcollaboratively(2004,p.6).

Thefindingsfromthisresearchsuggestthatitisinmixingtwoelements–strongdataonwhatisworking

andnotworkingacrossmultipleprojects,alongwithstrongdialoguetocontinuallyupdateashared

understandingofthework–thatcouldpresentrealopportunityfororganizationstoleveragelearning

foreffectiveness.

Ifweunderstandbothexplicit(orformal)andtacit(orinformal)knowledgetobeimportant,itprovides

aninterestinglensthroughwhichtoconsidertheroleofthecorporatelearningadvisor.Thefactthatall

oftheorganizationsinterviewedhadinvestedinsomeformoforganization-levellearningadvisor

indicatesaconsistentinterestinlearning.Thisispositive.However,regardlessofintention,thelearning

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functionsobservedwithinthecourseofthisresearchwereimplementedwithinsignificantsystem

constraints,whichmadetheresultsoftheirworkfeelsomewhatsuperficial–ashadowofthepromises

madebytheknowledgemanagementandlearningliteratures.

Theroleoflearningadvisorshasshiftedovertheyears,andseemstobefacingabitofanidentitycrisis.

Accordingtooneinterviewee,thetraditionalknowledgemanagerrolewasfocusedondocument

creationandpassingaroundlessonslearned.28Organizationsweretryingtoconverttacitknowledgeinto

explicitknowledgethroughcasestudies,webinars,andotherinformationsharingstrategies,butthese

strategiesaloneseemtohavelimitedimpact.Oneintervieweeevencommentingthathefeltthese

contributedlimited“valueadd.”Fromconversationswithlearningadvisorsintwoofthethree

organizationsinterviewed,itseemsthescopeandpurposeofthenewlearningadvisorisstillinthe

processofbeingdefined.Thisanalysishasidentifiedanumberofpotentialrolesfortheseadvisorsthat

rangefromafocusonexplicitknowledgegeneration(monitoringandevaluationfocus),tofacilitating

bettercrosssharinganddiscussionoftacitknowledge(thedevelopmentofasharedorganizational

mind).Whateverthescopeofcorporatelearningadvisors,thisresearchsuggeststheimportanceof

embeddinglearningasastrategicpriorityforeveryoneintheorganization.Alone,learningadvisorswill

havelimitedimpact.

Buildingonthetechnicalandproceduralchallengesassociatedwithgeneratingandleveraging

knowledgeinaidorganizations,thefindingsalsopointtosystempressures–incentivesystems–that

impactorganization-levellearningbehaviour.Thefindingsshowthataidorganizationslackselection

pressurethatwouldtieimprovementtosurvival.Thismeansthatanyefforttolearnoradapttomake

aidmoreeffectiveisdrivenbyinternalinitiative;itisnotincentivizedfromtheoutside.Aswemodel

learning,wecanthereforenotassumethatcontinuousimprovementisagivenforaidorganizations.In

otherwords,thenaturalevolutiontheoryoforganizationalchangeislessapplicableinthisinstance.

Unlikeinthecorporatesector,performanceisnotmaximizedasanaturalby-productofoperations.In

fact,thefindingsshowedtheopposite–thataidorganizationsseemtobeabletocontinuetoexistand

attractfundseveniftheyarenotabletoconcretelydemonstrateresults.

Thislackofsurvivalimperativeisproblematicbecauseitmakeslearninganice-to-doinvestment.Itis

understandablewhenindividualsandorganizationsfocusfirstonwhatmustgetdonebeforetheyfocus

onthenice-to-dos,andthisrealityisreflectedbytheprioritythatorganizationsplaceonproject

28Thisissupportedbytheknowledgemanagementconferenceonindicators(Mansfield,etal.,2013)

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implementationandaccountabilitytodonorsoverinvestmentingettingbetteratservingbeneficiaries.If

wewantaidorganizationstolearn,adapt,andbecomemoreeffective,wethereforeneedtolookto

othermechanismstoencouragethesebehaviours.Optionsincludechangingthesystemtofindlevers

thatpushorganizationstobecomemoreeffective,orsupporttheindividualsandorganizationsthatare

investinginlearning,despitethelackofincentiveforthemtodoso.BelowIwillbrieflyexplorebothof

theseoptions.

Themostobvioussystemleveristhefunders.Theoretically,funderscouldleveragetheirinfluenceover

organizationstobetterdrivelearningbehaviour.However,itwouldlikelybeverydifficultforfundersto

forcegenuinelearningthroughadministrativerequirements.Thefunderfeedbackloopisnotoriousfor

driving“box-checking”behaviours,whichisnotlikelytobehelpful.Additionally,greaterconsequences

forfailingtoachieveresultscouldincreaseriskadversenessandfurtherdisincentivizeopenlearning

environments.Instead,fundersmaybebetterpositionedtoplayaroleincreatingspacefor

organizationstodrivetheirownlearning.Forexample,fundersmaybeabletoencourageorganizations

tobetterleverageevaluationprocessesforlearningbysupportingdifferentformatsforevaluations.

Beneficiariesmightbetheidealsystemlever,howeverthisresearchonlyfoundoneinstanceinwhich

beneficiariesprovidedfeedbackaboutorganization-leveloperations.Thepowerdifferentialbetween

beneficiariesandaidorganizationsmightmakeabeneficiaryfeedbackloopdifficulttomeaningfully

operationalize.

Innovativeworkonmechanismslikesocialimpactbondsandcashondeliveryaidtrytoaddressthis

system-basedchallengebyattachingorganizationalsurvivaltoachievingresults.Byflippingtheprimary

organizationaldriverfromdonoraccountabilitytoachievingobjectiveresults,thesenewfunding

systemsalloworganizationstofocusonlearningandadaptation.Thisisanexcitingpossibility,however

theircurrentapplicationislimitedtoafewareasinwhichitisrelativelyeasytotrackresultsobjectively–

andforwhichthereisclearfinancialreturnthatwarrantspublicinvestment.Furtherworkinthisarea

couldrevealotherwaystobendthesystemtoprioritizelearning.

Animportantfindingofthisresearchisthatthemechanismbywhichthesystemconstrainslearningis

notnecessarilybylimitingauthoritytomakechangestoprojects.Infact,allintervieweesfelttheywere

allowedtomakeanychangesthatwereneededwithintheirproject,tomakeitmoreeffective.The

constraintsweremuchmoredirectlyrelatedtotime,thepriorityplacedonlearningfunctions,andthe

extenttowhichindividualswerewillingtogoaboveandbeyondwhatwasrequiredofthemtoseek

moreeffectivesolutions.Thealternativetochangingsystemdriversistocontinuetheslowanddifficult

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processofchangingbehaviourwithinthesystem.Thisresearchfoundthataidstaffweregenerally

interestedingettingbetterandsmarteratwhattheydo,andsotargetedandconsistenteffortsbyaid

organizationstoadvancethelearningagendahaspotentialtocontinuemakingslowprogress.

Implications of sector-level enablers and barriers

Sector-levellearningmattersbecausemostoftheproblemsthataidorganizationsaretryingtoaddress

arecomplex,socialproblemsthatcannotbeaddressedbyoneorganizationalone.Asoneinterviewee

reflected:

It’snotsomethingthatoneorganizationcouldeverdo–it’ssuchacomplexissue…thereisnooneorganizationthatcouldanswertheproblem.Youhavetoworktogether,butthereisnoincentivetoworktogether.Soitreallytakestheseindividualsbeingwillingtoworkacrossinstitutions.–HA2

Toalargeextent,thedynamicsatthesectorlevelreflectthedynamicsattheorganizationlevel,withthe

addedcomplicationofgreaterpublicscrutinyandcompetitionforfunding.Thissectionexploresthe

implicationsofthesefindings.

Justlikeattheorganizationlevel,thereisarecognitionthatsector-levellearningisimportant,whichis

reflectedbytheinvestmentinlearningclusters,andotherinformationsharingopportunitiesinHaiti.

Eventhoughthedirectimpactofclustersonorganizationalbehaviourisquestionable,theyrepresentan

opportunityfortacitknowledgesharingandestablishingcross-organizationalconnectionsthatincrease

themultiplexityofthesectoroverall.Similarly,thecommitmenttopublishevaluationsonline–madeby

oneorganization–demonstratesanefforttoopenupinformationflowsandsupportsector-level

learning.However,intheseexamplesofinformationsharingandexchange,itisuncleartowhatextent

organizationsareopenaboutwhatdidnotwork.TheoneclustermeetingthatIattendedwasan

opportunityforanorganizationtodiscussamajorprojectsuccess.Thelimitednumberofpublically

availableevaluationsthatIreviewedwerelargelypositive,andfocusedonwhatwasachievedoverthe

courseoftheproject.Iftheseopportunitiesforexchangeareusedprimarilytopromotesuccesses,it

SummaryofFindings

• Thefactorsthatenabledlearningandadaptationatthesectorlevelwhere:Informalnetworksandinformationsharing;themedia;andIndividualcontributions.

• Thebarrierstolearningandadaptationatthesectorlevelwhere:Challengesapplyingsector-levelknowledge;Riskaversionandthenegativeconsequencesoffailure;andotherbarriers.

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mightactuallydiscouragelearningbyperpetuatingasectorculturethatdiscouragesfailureandfurther

entrenchestheriskadversenessthatwasevidentinthefindings.

Thefindingsaroundriskaversenesssuggestthattherearerealdisincentivesfororganizationand

individualstoactivelypursuelearningactivities,likemeasuringandtrackingprogress,andidentifying

andlearningfromfailure.Whilethesearelargelysector-leveldynamics,theyhaveanimpactatthe

organization-levellearningaswell.Ifanorganizationdoesnotwanttoadmitfailurepublically,itis

probablylessopentoadmittingfailurewithintheorganizationalranksaswell.

Thesectorlevelpresentstheopportunityfororganizationstocollaboratestrategicallytoleveragethe

diversityofprojectsthatexistacrossorganizationsasparallelexperiments.Iffiveorganizationsareeach

implementingrentalsubsidiesslightlydifferently,thereisanopportunitytomeasuretheresultsofeach

anddrawconclusionsaboutthemosteffectiveapproach.Thistypeofanalysisisdifficultforone

organizationtodoalone–certainlyinatimelymanner.Itwasuncleartowhatextentclusterswereable

torealizethebenefitsofthistypeofapproach,butifitwashappening,itwasnotmentionedby

interviewees.Ofcourse,thepracticalitiesofsuchanundertakingaredaunting.Organizationsinthis

studyfounditnearlyimpossibletocoordinatedatacollectionacrossmultipleprojectsinthesame

organizationforusefulcomparison.Theimplementationofsuchasystemacrossprojectsindifferent

organizationswouldrequireevengreaterorganizationalcommitmentandsharedbeliefinthecollective

benefit.

Itisalsoimportanttonotethat,evenwhenclearlearningisgeneratedandpublicizedatthesectorlevel

–forexample,inthecaseofrentalsubsidies–intervieweesindicatedthatthereisnoexternal

mechanismtoholdorganizationsaccountableforapplyingtheselessons.Thislackofaccountabilityfor

applyingwhatweknowultimatelyhasanegativeimpactonbeneficiaries.Italsosuggeststhatwhenwe

studyorganizationallearning,weneedtogobeyondassessinganorganization’scapacitytoidentify

lessons,andaccountfortheextenttowhichitcanholditselfaccountableforapplyingtheselessonsinits

ownwork.Withnoobviouswaytorequireorganizationstomakethesechanges,itseemsthatthis

translationofsector-levellessonsintopracticescanonlybedonethroughconsciouschoicesmadeby

individualswithinorganizations.

Attheorganizationlevelthereisalackofincentiveforlearningbehaviour;atthesectorlevelthereare

realdisincentives.Thesedisincentivesmakesectorlearningevenmoredependentonindividualsacting

againstthepressures,andtakingriskstomovethesectorforward.Thefactthatwecanobserve

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examplesofsector-levellearninghappeningmaymeanthatthesystemalonedoesnotdictate

outcomes;individualagencyhasanimportantroletoplayintheextenttowhichlearningisprioritized.

Thisdisconnectbetweensystemforcesandindividualbehaviourraisesinterestingquestionsaboutwhat

driveslearningbehaviours:underwhatconditionsdoindividualsgoaboveandbeyondtomakeaidmore

effectivefortheirbeneficiaries,despitetheforcesthatpushthemnotto?Withinthestructuraldynamics

thatdisincentivizedlearning,canorganizationscreatelearningculturesthatcounteracttheseforces?

Aswasdiscussedattheorganizationallevel,theremightbesomewaysinwhichthesedisincentivescan

beminimized(e.g.throughshiftingfunderrelationships,providingincentivesforcooperation,etc.)but

thisseemsunlikelytohaveasignificantimpact.Instead,organizationsmayneedtofindwaystoleverage

cultureandstructurestoprotectthemselvesfromthedisincentivesinthesystem,andenableindividuals

toengageinlearning,anyway.

Impact of fragility on learning and adaptation practices

Everythingthathappenshereisacaricature.Youseealltheflawsofeverything-blownoutofproportion.Moremoney,moreorganizations,biggerneed,smallerspace,weakerstate-everything.–HA1

Thisresearchdidnotexplicitlyseektodeterminewhetherfragilecontextsrequiredifferentlearning

approaches,howeverthefindingsofthisresearchdosuggestsomeinsightsthatmightbegintoanswer

thisquestion.

First,itisimportanttonotethat,whenasked,Intervieweesdidnotfeelthatthe“fragilestate”natureof

Haitichangedhowtheorganizationneededtooperate.Intervieweesgenerallynotedthatbecauseeach

countrycontextisunique–includingeachfragilestate–eachcountryrequiresasimilar,context-based

approach.Thefollowingquotesarerepresentativeofthegeneralsentimentofintervieweesonthe

subject.

…Myfirstthoughtwouldbeeachcontextisdifferent.Andatthesametimebecauseeachcontextisdifferent,eachcontextneedstobeapproachedsimilarly.Idon’tthinkthere'safundamentaldifferenceinworkinginHaitinoworworkinginCambodia.–CB2

Youneedprogramobjectives,developyourprogram,seewhatsupportsyouneedinordertobeabletoimplementyourprogram.Inordertodowhatyouwanttodo,youneedtofigureoutwhatpeopleyouneed,whatcapabilitiesyouneed,buildtheprofiles,andthentellthepeoplewhattheyneedtodo.Thengivethemamanualtotellthemhowtheycandowhattheyneedtodo.Ofcourse

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thiscanlookdifferentindifferentsituations,butinprinciplethisisnotrocketsciencehowtorunanorganization.It’snotbecausethisisahumanitarianorganizationthatthemanagementprincipleswouldbedifferent.–HA1

However,intervieweesdididentifyanumberofdynamicsthattheyfeltwereunique,orespecially

important,inHaiti,manyofwhicharedirectlyrelatedtodefinitionsofstatefragility.Interviewees

identifiedthehyper-politicizednatureofHaiti;theattitudetowardsoutsiders;theimportanceofcultural

normsinrelationshipbuilding;ahistoryofdependencythatcarriesoverintorelationshipstoday;the

potentialforcorruption;thelackofclarityonlegalissues;andthechallenginggeography,asfactorsthat

arespecifictoHaitithatimpacthowtheyneedtooperate.

WhilenoneofthesedynamicsalonenecessarilymeanthatthelearningenvironmentinHaitiisdifferent

thanitwouldbeinotherplaces,someofthesedynamicsdirectlyrelatetothebarriersfoundatthe

project,organization,andsectorlevels.

Forexample,theimportanceofculturalnormsandbuildingrelationshipsinHaitiimpactswhatittakesto

beeffectiveattheprojectlevel.ThehighlypoliticizednatureofHaiti(andlikelyotherfragilestates),

introducesadditionalfearofperceivedfailure,andbarrierstosuggestingpoliticallycontroversialideas.

Whileintervieweesdidnotfeelthatlearningandadaptationwasdifferentinfragilestateswhenasked

directly,theirreflectionsandcommentsabouttheparticularitiesofworkinginHaitimaysuggest

otherwise.

CHAPTER 7: Recommendations and Conclusions

Thissectionwillsummarizethemajorfindingsandcontributionsofthisresearchandconnectittothe

broadervisionofaideffectiveness.Italsoprovidesrecommendationsforconsiderationbyorganizations

seekingtobecomebetterlearner/adaptors.

Summary

ThisthesissetouttocaptureasnapshotofhowinternationalaidorganizationslearnandadaptinHaiti

ataparticularmomentintime.Itusedasurveyandinterviewstounderstandtheextenttowhichaid

organizationsemployasetofpractices,drawnfromfourlearningliteraturesthatshowapositive

correlationwitheffectiveness(theMOCAframework).TheMOCAscalethatwasusedinthesurveywas

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notvalidatedaspartofthisresearch,butdrawsheavilyonthreesurveytoolsthathavebeenpreviously

validatedintheliterature.ThroughthisresearchIdiscoveredmoreaboutwhatenableslearningfor

theseorganizations,andthebarriersthatmakelearningandadaptationmoredifficult.

Atthehighestlevel,thisstudyfoundthataidorganizationsinHaitiarebestatcollectinginformationand

developingknowledgeabouttheirbeneficiaries(marketorientation).Theyarereasonablyableto

questionandreflectonthatknowledge(organizationallearning).Generally,theyarepooratorganizing

theirpeopleandtheirworkinawaythatbalancesstructureandchaostomaximizeeffectiveness,and

pooratstrategicallyusingtheirexperiencestoiterativelylearnandimprove(adaptivecapacityand

complexityabsorption).

Capacitybuilding,andotherdevelopment-focusedorganizationswerebetterlearner/adaptorsthan

humanitarianassistanceorganizationsoverall.Howeverorganizationsshowedsignificantvariationin

practiceswithineachofthesecategoriessuggestingthatallorganizationshavespace,andagency,to

improve.

Thisresearchfoundthatthemajorbarrierstolearningandadaptationwerelargelybasedinsystem

dynamicsandstructuralbarriers,whiletheenablerswerelargelybasedinindividualagencyandhuman

dynamics.

Enablersincludedinformallearningattheprojectlevel,enabledbystaff’srelationships.Individualsalso

droveorganizationandsector-levelinitiativesthatactivelyadvancedeffectivenessofaidinterventions.

Corporatelearningfunctionswerefoundtoenablelearning,buthadvariedabilitytoinfluence

operations.Sector-levelclustermeetingswerefoundtoenableinformationsharing,buthave

undeterminedimpactonotherelementsoflearningandadaptation.

MajorbarrierstolearningandadaptationincludedHR–difficultyhiringtherightpeople(staffthatcan

drivelearningandeffectiveness),andfiringthewrongpeople.Stafflackedtime,spaceandsupportfor

reflection,whichtheysawasrelatedtoproject-focusedstructuresandcultures,andlackofevidenceon

whatisandisnotworking.Importantly,stafffelttheydidhavethenecessaryauthoritytomakechanges

toprojects.Organizationswerefocusedonprojectdeliveryandaccountability,andlackedexternal

pressuretobecomemoreeffective.Furthermore,organizationsfaceddisincentivestocontributeto

sector-levellearning;barriersincludedtheneedtofocusonareasoffunderinterest,todemonstrate

success,andtoprotectreputationalcapitalintheeyesofmediaandpublic.

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Thisprojectwasbasedinatheoreticalframeworkthatrecognizedbothnaturalevolutionandsocial

dynamicsasimportantinfluencersoforganizationalchange.Thesefindingssuggestthat,whileboth

forcesarerealandneedtobeconsidered,socialdynamicsseemtohaveagreaterimpactonhowaid

organizationschange–howtheylearnandadapt.Becausetheaidorganizationsinthisstudywerenot

driventochangebyselectionpressurethatwouldleadtonaturalevolution(i.e.nothinginthesystem

penalizedthemforineffectiveness),theaidorganizationsinthisstudywerelargelyreliantonsocial

dynamicstospurchange.Interestingly,thereseemtobemanyinstanceswheresocialdynamicshave

beeneffectiveatpushingtowardsbetterlearningandadaptationpractices.Howeverthecontinuednon-

compulsorynatureofthisworkmakesprogressslowanddifficult.

Contribution

Therearethreeareasinwhichthisresearchprovideshelpfulcontributionstotheexistingliterature,and

toourunderstandingofaideffectiveness.First,thesefindingsprovidenewdata–bothquantitativeand

qualitativeinsights–intotheoperationalrealitiesofaidorganizationsoperatinginfragilestate

environments.Aswecontinuetofocusonhowaidcanbeeffectiveinfragilecontexts,itishelpfultobe

groundedindataabouthowworkiscarriedout.Whileanumberofthefindingsofthisstudyhadalready

beenobserved,thisresearchconfirmedthatmanyofthebarriersandenablersthathavebeen

previouslydiscussed,remaintrueforaidorganizationinHaitiin2014.

Second,thisresearchdevelopedandtestedanewframeworkoflearningandadaptationpracticesthat

bringtogetherdisparatepartsoftheliteraturetobuildamorecomprehensivepictureofhowweshould

thinkaboutorganizationallearningandadaptationinaidorganizations.TheMOCAframeworkisbetter

alignedwiththenew“complexity-informed”paradigmthatisemergingininternationaldevelopment,in

whichaidorganizationsareincreasinglyexpectedtoplayacatalyticroleinsupportinglocalactorsto

evolvecontext-appropriatesolutions.Theinterviewfindingssuggestthatcomplexityabsorptionand

adaptivecapacityareusefulinseeingandunderstandrealitiesfacedbyaidorganizations,including

structuralandstrategicbarriersandenablersthatimpacteffectiveness.TheMOCAframeworkcouldbe

furthertested,modified,andbuiltuponinthefuture.

Third,thisresearchraisesquestionsabouttheimpactoffragility–orhighlycomplexityoperating

environments–onhowaidorganizationsneedtooperatetobeeffective.Whileintervieweesdidnot

attributehowtheyworktoHaiti’sfragility,thefindingsshowbothmicro(e.g.theimportanceof

individualinteractions)andmacro(e.g.heightenedriskaversion),whichseemamplifieddueto

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conditionsassociatedwithfragility.Iflearningandadaptationareevenmoreimportantinvolatile

conditions,buttheconditionsassociatedwithfragilitymakelearningmoredifficult,itmaybeworth

investingadditionaleffortsinunderstandinghowaidorganizationscanbecomebetterlearner/adaptors

infragileconditions.

Finally,thisresearchhelpstoraiseaflagofconcernaroundthefactthathumanitarianassistance

organizations,asacategory,lagbehindotherdevelopmentorganizationsintheirlearningand

adaptationpractices.Whilewecannotconcludewhythisisthecase,thisfindinghasimplicationsfor

howhumanitarianassistanceorganizationsthinkabouttheirowneffectiveness,andhowfundersthink

aboutselectingorganizationstosupporttheevolutionofsolutionstocomplexproblemsandfragile

states.

Overall,thesefindingsshowthattheaidsystemdoesnotdriveorganizationstolearn,toadapt,orto

becomemoreeffective.Currently,werelyonindividualsandorganizationsmakingtheconsciouschoice

topursuelearningstrategiesforlittlereasonotherthanbecauseitistherightthingtodo,andoftenin

thefaceofsignificantchallenges–bothpracticalandpolitical.Toimprovethecapacityofthesectorto

learnandadapttowardsgreateraideffectiveness,weessentiallyhavetwooptions.Wecan

fundamentallychangetheaidsystemtocreateconditionsinwhichnaturalevolutioncanexist.Where

thereisselectionpressurethatdrivesaidorganizationstolearnandadapttowardseffectiveness–an

avenuecurrentlybeingexploredthroughsocialimpactbondsandcashondeliveryaid.Or,wecanaccept

thatlearningwillneedtocontinuetobedrivenbysocialdynamics,andsupporttheinspiredindividuals

andorganizationsthatareactivelyshoulderingtheresponsibilityofcontinuallyimprovingtheirabilityto

servebeneficiaries.

Withsomanyaidinitiativestakingplacearoundtheglobe,thereisnoneedtochoose.Itisessentialthat

wecontinuetopursuebothoptions–findingthesystemhacksthatmakethepursuitofeffectivenessa

mustdoforaidorganizations,whilechangingthecultureoftheaidsystemtoencouragethelearning

behaviours–ofbothindividualsandorganizations–thatultimatelymakeaidmoreeffective.

Regardlessofhowwegetthere–whetherbychangingthesystemorbyindividualinitiatives,orboth–

internationalaidorganizationswillneedtobestronglearner/adaptorsiftheyaregoingtoplaya

constructiveroleinsupportingsystem-levelaideffectiveness.TheNewDealforFragileStatescallsona

diversityofactorstotakepartintheworkofpeacebuildingandstatebuilding,usinganumberof

national-leveltoolsandprocessestosupportcollaborationandjointlearning.Ifinternationalaid

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organizationsaregoingtobeacredibleactoratthesystem-level,theywillneedtodemonstrate

competenceandcommitmenttolearningintheirprojects,andwithintheirownorganizations.

Donaishighlightstheparadoxofachievinglocalownershipofstatebuildingandpeacebuildingefforts,

throughinternationalpressurelikethepressureexertedthroughtheNewDealprocessesandstructures

(2009).Herecognizesthatlocalownershipisessential,andthatinternationalengagementlikelyneedsto

bepartofthesolution,butthatappropriateinternationalengagementwillrequirea‘delicatebalancing

act.’Thisresearchhelpsquestionwhetherornotinternationalaidorganizationscanplayaconstructive

roleinachievingDonais’delicatebalancingact.

Internationalaidorganizationsarenotnaturallearner/adaptors,andtheyareathighriskofactingin

theirownbestinterest.Thesesystem-drivencharacteristicsmakeinternationalaidorganizationsrisky

partnersinpeacebuildingandstatebuildingworkthatrequires,amongstotherthings,highlevelsof

trust.Withoutlong-standing,hard-earnedcredibilityatthelocallevel,theparticipationofinternational

aidorganizationsmayactuallyerodelocalownershipanddrivecynicism.

However,thisresearchre-emphasizestheimportanceofthelocal,theinformal,andtheslow-growing,

trust-basedrelationshipsthatareessentialtotheworkofmanyinternationalaidorganizationsinHaiti.

Attheirbest,aidorganizationshavelong-standingrelationshipswithlocalplayers,aswellasknowledge

ofthenationalandinternationalaideffectivenessdialogue.Ifaidorganizationscanexcelatlearningand

adaptingwiththeirlocalpartners,someNGOsmayinfact,bewellpositionedtohelpfindDonais’

delicatebalancebetweenlocalownershipandinternationalinitiativesliketheNewDeal.Iftheyareto

besuccessfulatthisworkofsupportinglocalpartnersintheslowprocessofevolvingnational-level

solutions,theywillneedtobeexceptionallearner/adaptorsthemselves.Forthat,mostofthe

organizationsinthisstudyhavesignificantworktodo.

Recommendations for Organizations

“Wecandesignourinstitutionsandsocietiestobebetterorworseevolvers.”(Ramalingam,2013,p.234)

Thisresearchprovidesasnapshotoforganizationsintheircurrentstate,astheytrytobeeffectivein

Haiti–theircurrentlearningandadaptationcapabilities,andtheenablersandbarriersthattheyface.

ThetheoriesthatinformtheMOCAframeworkpresentapotentialfuturestate:avisionforwhat

organizationallearningbehaviourscouldlooklike.Thissectionwillstartfromthecurrentrealityand

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identifyareasofpossibleinvestmentthatcouldhelpaidorganizationsadvancetheirabilitytobestrong

learners/adaptors.Itisworthre-emphasizingthatmeaningful,effective,learningandadaptationcannot

beachievedasachecklist–insteadthecapabilityneedstobeevolvedinthecontextofaspecific

organization–muchlikethedevelopmentsolutionstheseorganizationsseektoimplement.As

organizationsiterativelyexploretheiruniqueapproach,theycandoanumberofthingstocreatean

environmentinwhichlearningandadaptationaremorelikelytoemerge.

1.WholeOrganizationCommitmentRecognizingthatoneortwoindividualsinanorganizationcannotmeaningfullyachieveorganizational

learningandadaptation,thefollowingthreerecommendationsemphasizetheimportanceofawhole

organizationalcommitmenttolearningandadaptation.

1.1 RecognizethatlearningwillneedtobeinternallydrivenThisresearchsuggeststhattherearenotlikelytobeanyexternaldriversthatwillforceorganizationstobecomemoreeffective.Itwillneedtocomefrominside.Thisrequiresconsistent,renewedcommitmentbyorganizationstofindwaysofencouragingdesiredbehavioursthroughstructures,processesandcultures.

1.2Makelearninganorganizationalpriority

Becausetherearenoexternaldriversthatincentivizelearning,ismaybemorechallengingfororganizationstomakelearningandadaptationapriority.Evenso,thisorganizationalcommitmentisessentialtomakinganyprogress.Becauseorganizationallearningisextremelydifficultforaidorganizations,progresswillonlybemadeifitisseenasapriority.Simplyput,initiativesthatarelikelytohaveanimpact(e.g.leveragingstructuresandstrategiesforlearning;providingstaffmoretimeforreflection;designingHRpoliciesforlearning)requireaconsciousshifttowardsthinkingaboutlearningasanorganizationalstrategy.Thiswillonlybeachievedwiththebuy-inoftheorganization,andappropriatepriority.

1.2 TakeanorganizationalsystemsviewMakinglearningapriorityisespeciallyimportantbecausethemostsignificantchangesthataidorganizationsneedtomake,areattheorganizationallevel.Thisresearchsuggestedthataidorganizationsalreadycollectinformationandvaluelearning.Theyarenotyetabletodesignstructuresorstrategiestoimprovetheirabilitytolearnandadapt.Aidorganizationsneedtomovebeyondsharingbestpracticesanddocumentinglessonslearned,andstartthinkingabouthowtheycanleveragestructureandstrategytodeveloplearningapproachesthatconsiderthewholeorganizationalsystem.Examplesoforganization-levellearningstrategiesmightinclude:

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• Facilitateinformalflowsofinformationandideas.Setupworkstructuresthatcrossprojects.Movestaffaroundprojectstobuildtheirknowledgeandcapacity.Convenestaffregularlytoadvancecollectivethinkingaroundthebigquestionsthatguideorganizations’work.

• Incorporatealearningandadaptationlensintoyourbusinessdevelopmentstrategy.Byusingalearninglens,businessdevelopmentcouldhelporganizationsidentifyandpursueprojectstointentionallylearnthatwhichwillhelpthembecomemoreeffective.

• Considerlearningorresearchpartnerships.Thediversityofprojectsbeingundertakensimultaneouslyinsimilarcontextsbymultipleorganizationsprovidesanopportunitytoinvestinuseful,appliedlearning.Thiscouldbeamplifiedthroughresearch-focusedpartnerships.Sector-levelinitiativesliketheNewDealmaypresentopportunitiesforinternationalaidorganizationstoengagemoreformallyinsector-levellearningthatcouldhelpdriveorganizationallearningandadaptation.

2.IdentifyOpportunitiesforIncrementalImprovementWhileawholeorganizationapproachwilllikelybenecessaryfororganizationstoseelong-term

sustainedbenefitsfromalearningandadaptationstrategy,thisapproachdoesnotnecessarilymean

makingmassivecapitalinvestments.Thefollowingtworecommendationssuggestanincremental

approachtoleveragewhatisalreadybeingdoneandmanagechangestrategically.

2.1Makethebestpossibleuseofexistinglearningassetsandprojects

Manyorganizationsalreadyhaverequirementsthatleadthemtoinvestindifferentlearningelements.Itmaybehelpfulfororganizationstoconsiderthewaysinwhichexistingevaluations,monitoringandreportingrequirementsandcross-projectmeetingscouldbebetterleveragedtodrivebroaderlearning.Thisapproachcouldprovidesome“quickwins”thathelpthewholeorganizationseethebenefitofalearningapproach.Iforganizationskeepaskingthemselves:“howcanweleveragewhatwearealreadydoingtomakeusbetterandsmarteratwhatwedo,”theymaydiscovernumerouswaysthatsmallincrementalinvestmentscouldresultinsignificantadvancementsintheirlearningandadaptationcapacity.

2.2Investinmonitoringandevaluationapproachesthatbringvalueattheproject-level

Thisresearchfoundthatoneofthebarrierstoorganizationallearningisgettingthebuy-inofprojectstaffwhoarebusyanddonotalwaysseethevalueinmonitoringdata.Iforganizationsfocusonmonitoringapproachesthatsupportproject-leveldecision-making,andaretrulyusefultoprojectstaff,theymayfinditeasiertosecurethiscriticalbuy-in.Thespecificapproachmightlookdifferentfororganizationsengagedindifferenttypesofwork.

3.FocusonSocialDynamicsThisresearchsuggeststhattherearefewpressuresthatwouldcauseaidorganizationstonaturally

evolvetowardsgreatereffectiveness.Thissuggeststhat,largely,organizationsdependoninspired,

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engaged,intelligentindividualstodrivelearning,adaptationandeffectiveness–bothattheprojectlevel

andtheorganizationlevel.Assuch,aidorganizationsarewell-servedbyfocusingonsocialdynamics–

andspecificallycreatingtheconditionsinwhichindividualsandgroupscanexhibitthelearningand

adaptationbehavioursthatwillmaketheorganizationmoreeffective.

3.1FocusonHumanResourcesThisresearchshowsthat,especiallyattheprojectlevel,individuals’culturalcompetenciesmatter.Organizationscanfocusonhiringpeoplewhoareabletobuildtherelationshipsthatwillhelptheirorganizationbeadaptive,andwhohavetheskillsandjudgmentneededtousebothinformalandformalinformationindecisionsmaking.

OrganizationscanalsoconsiderhowHRpolicies(e.g.contracttypes,lengths,compensation),impacttheextenttowhichstaffengageinlearningandadaptationbehaviours.

3.2Facilitateindividualandgroupreflection

Staffidentifiedtimeandspaceasamajorbarriertolearning.Organizationsmayfindthatlearningisimprovedsimplybycreatingthetimeandspace(theredundancyofresources)forprojectstafftoconsiderthefutureoftheirprojectbasedontheirownexperiences.

Similarly,organizationsmaywanttoinvestintheorganizationalroutinesandprocessesthatfacilitategroupstosharetheseexperiencesandcreatemeaningtogether.Thisisthebasisofdeveloping“mentalmodels,”orsharedconceptualizationsofthework.Forsomeorganizations,thesementalmodelsmayhelpmaintainalignmentasateamlearnsandadaptswithinacontextthatiscontinuouslychanging.

3.2Protectandrewardindividualswhoexhibitlearningbehaviours

Organizationsarehighlydependentonindividualsgoingoutoftheirwaytoimprovethepracticeofaid.Organizationscanhelpbyprotectingandrewardingindividualswhoexperiment,measureresults,adapt,anddrivealearningagenda.Iforganizationscancreateconditionsinwhichlearningbehavioursarevalued–wherethesebehavioursareseentobelessofapersonalrisk–theymaybeabletoencouragemorelearningeffortfromtheindividualswhoseactionscreatetheemergentrealityoftheorganization.Withouttheirindividualactions,organizationallearningcannothappen.

Perhapsmostimportantly,organizationsneedtotakealearningapproachtolearning.Thereisno

prescriptionfortheperfectlearningandadaptationapproach.Rather,learningitselfrequirescontinuous

adaptationandimprovement.Aslearningandadaptationcontinuestogainahigherprofileintheaid

industry,organizationsmaybeabletogarnersomereputationalbenefitfrominvestinginlearningand

adaptationinitiatives.Asorganizationsimplementlearningstrategies,theymaybenefitfrombeingable

toarticulatehowanintentionallearningandadaptationstrategymakesthemamoreeffectiveaid

organization.

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Future research

Thebroadnatureofthisstudyhasprovidedampleopportunitytoidentifyareasoffutureresearch.In

ordertoadvancetheabilityofaidorganizationstoleveragelearningandadaptationtowardsgreateraid

effectiveness,itwouldbehelpfultohavemoreknowledgeinthefollowingareas.

First,itwouldbehelpfultobetterunderstandknowledgetranslation,especiallywithinacomplexity-

basedtheoreticalframework.Inwhatwayscanaidorganizationsbesttranslateproject-levelknowledge

tobeappliedinotherplacesandtimes?Howcanwebalancetheneedforcontext-specificitywiththe

opportunitytolearnfromwhathasalreadybeendone?Thedualneedtobecontext-sensitive,andto

buildonbestexistingknowledgeseemstorequiremoreartthanscienceandcouldbesupportedwith

additionalresearch.Inrelationtothischallenge,itmightbehelpfultolookmorecloselyathownew

processes–innovationsinsocialtechnology–likeProblemDrivenIterativeAdaptation(PDIA)mightbe

operationalizedbydevelopmentandhumanitarianassistanceorganizationsinfragilestates.DoesPDIA

improvelearning,adaptationandeffectivenessinfragilecontexts?

Therearetwootherchallengesfacingaidorganizationsthatareaboutbalance:thatartoffindingthe

middleground,ormaybeeventheedgeofchaos.Thefirstisfindingthebalancebetweenmultiplexity

(interactionalcomplexity)andefficiencyinaproject-basedenvironment.Howcanorganizations

maximizeday-to-dayofficeefficiencies(i.e.notspendalldayinmeetings),whilealsoensuringthe

interactionandalignmentacrosstheorganizationthatwillsupportlearning?Thisresearchprovided

evidencethatorganizationsaregenerallytoofarinonedirection–theytendtoworkinprojectsilosand

spendlimitedtimesharinginformationorreflectingtogetherontheirshareddirection.Thetheory

suggeststhatmoreinteractionwouldimprovelearning,butloosecouplingremainsimportantsothat

projectscancontinuetoadaptbasedontheirowncontexts.Additionalresearchintohowtofindthis

balanceandwhat–practically—thiscouldlooklikewouldbehelpful.

Theotherbalancinggameisaroundformalization.ItwasclearthatmanyorganizationsinHaitifelta

strongdrivetoformalizeinternalfinancialprocessestomanagetherisksassociatedwithmovingmoney

aroundinHaiti.Itwouldbehelpfultobetterunderstandwhenhighdegreesofformalityaremore

effective,andhowcanthisbemixedwithcomplexity-basedapproachesthatsuggestabenefitofgreater

opennessandflexibility.

Thethirdareaforfurtherresearchwouldbetobetterunderstandthedifferentlearningdynamics

betweenhumanitarianassistanceanddevelopmentorganizations.Dohumanitarianassistanceand

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developmentorganizationshavethesamelearningneeds?Inwhatwaysshouldtheirlearning

approachesbethesameordifferent?Dotheyrequiredifferentapproachestolearningtomaximizetheir

effectivenessattheirdifferenttypesofwork?

Fourth,itwouldbehelpfultounderstandhowdifferentHRapproachesmightimpacteffectiveness.Do

HRapproaches(e.g.longer-termcontracts,moreprofessionaldevelopment,career-management

approaches,andintentionaldevelopmentoflocalresources)helpcapitalizeontheimportanceof

relationshipsthatwasemphasizedinthisresearch,tomakeaidorganizationsmoreeffectiveinfragile

states?Whilesomeworkhasbeendoneinthisarea,thereismoretounderstand–specificallyinhowit

canbeusefullyappliedbyaidorganizations.

Fifth,itislikelyworthinvestigatingthesystem-baseddisincentivestosector-levellearninginmore

detail.Itwasunclearinthisresearchtheextenttowhichthosedisincentiveswererealorperceived.

Therewassomeevidencetosuggestthattherisktoindividualsinengaginginlearningbehaviours

dependedonthecultureoftheorganization–itmaybethatsomeorganizationsaremoresusceptibleto

systembasedpressureslikereputationalriskintheeyesofthemediaandthepublic.Additionalresearch

couldhelpclarifytowhatextentthesesystem-baseddisincentivesarerealandhowseverethe

consequencesreallyare.

Finally,itmightbeparticularlyenlighteningtolearnfromaidorganizationsthatareworkingwithin

differentaid-fundingsystems(e.g.socialimpactbonds,cashondeliveryaid).Thepremiseofthese

alternatefundingsystemsistochangetheincentivesystemfororganizations;essentiallycreating

naturalevolutionpressurethatshoulddrivelearningandadaptation.Itwouldbeveryinterestingto

determineifindividualsandorganizationsworkinginthesesystemsexhibitdifferentlearning

behaviours.How?Whatcanthattellusabouthowotherorganizationsmightbeabletobecomemore

effective?

Conclusion

Learningrepresentspotential:potentialforindividualstogetwiser;fororganizationstogetbetterat

whattheydo;andforwholesectorstobecomemoreeffective.Basedonthisstudy,theaidsectorhasa

longwaytogobeforeitmaximizesitspotentialforlearning.Itcontinuestofaceanumberofsignificant

difficultiesinembeddinglearninginaidwork.Theadditionofcomplexity-informedapproachestohow

wethinkaboutlearningandadaptationcouldbringaidorganizationstoanewlevelofcontinuous

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improvement,moreeffectivelyconvertinggoodintentionsintothedevelopmentoutcomesthatareso

neededbypeoplearoundtheworld.Butrecognizingthispotentialwillrequireconsiderable,sustained

commitmentfromaidorganizationsforwhichlearningisnotanimperative,inasystemthatdrivesa

narrowfocusonthenextproject.

Evenundertheseconditions,individualshavedemonstratedthattheirown,intrinsicdrivetogetbetter–

whetherthatisdrivenbyadesiretoserveothers,orsimplytobegoodatwhattheydo–canbea

powerfulforcefororganizationallearning.Totheextentthataidorganizationsareabletoempowerand

nurturethisintrinsicdrive,andminimizeforcesthatextinguishit,theymaybeabletocreatethe

conditionsinwhichincreasinglyeffectiveaidcanevolve.

Findingawaytobringlearningandadaptationtothecentreofhowaidisorganizedanddeliveredwillbe

essentialforaideffectivenessinthecomingyears.Ifinternationalaidorganizationsareabletobestrong

learner/adaptors,theymaybeabletoplayanimportantroleinthebroaderaideffectivenessdialoguein

fragilestates.Ifnot,thestructuraldynamicsthatpushinternationalaidorganizationstoactintheirown

bestinterestcouldmaketheirinvolvementcounterproductivetothelocallyownedstatebuildingand

peacebuildingsolutionsthataresobadlyneeded.

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Appendix A: Full MOCA Survey Findings

EmployedbyALLorganizations

Rank29 MOCAPractice SurveyQuestion#orgsthatemployed30

Averageagreementscore31

ResponseCount32

(Agree/Neutral/Disagree)

Grade(NGO

sector)33

1. Conductsclient

research

Ourorganizationconductsresearchonourclients'

needs.

12 6.30

A

2.

Operationsbasedonclient

needs

Ouroperationsaredesignedbasedontheinformationwehaveaboutour

clients.

12 6.20

A

3.

Opentoemployee

contribution

Employeescanexpresstheir

opinionsandmakesuggestionsaboutnewwaysfor

carryingouttasks.

12 6.05

A

4.

Considerseffectsofchanging

contextonorg

Weconsidertheeffectsthatchangesinouroperatingenvironmentmay

haveonourorganization.

12 6.04

A

29Practicesaresortedfirstbynumberoforganizationsthatemployedthepractice,andthenbyextenttowhichthepracticewasemployedoverall(asmeasuredbytheaverageagreementscore)30Anorganizationwasdeemedtohave“employed”apracticeiftheaveragerespondentwas5orover.31Averageagreementscoretakeseachorganization’saveragerespondentscoreforthatpracticeandaveragesthescoresacrossall12organizationtoprovideaweightedaveragescore.32Scale1-7(stronglydisagreetostronglyagree).Top:7&6;Mid:5&4;Bottom:3,2&133Gradingscale:A+(6.5–7);A(6.0–6.4);B+(5.8–5.9);B(5.6–5.7);C+(5.4–5.5);C(5.2–5.3);D(5.0–5.1);F(<5).

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EmployedbyLARGEMAJORITYoforganizations

Rank MOCAPractice SurveyQuestion#orgsthat

employed

Averageagreement

score

ResponseCount


Grade(NGOsector)

5. Employeesworkacrossprojects

Peopleinourorganizationoftenworkonmultipletasksorprojectsatonce.

11 6.10

A

6. Employeeshave

contactwithclients

Ouremployeeshavepersonalcontactwith

clients.11 6.06

A

7. Opentooutside

ideas

Ideasprovidedbyexternalsources(advisors,clients,etc.)areconsideredtobeusefulforthisorganization.

11 5.99

B+

8.

Employeescommittedto

organization’sgoals

Employeesarecommittedtothegoalsofthis

organization.11 5.85

B+

9. Practicescontinual

improvement

Wecontinuallyassessthequalityofourprogramsandservices,andlookforways

toimprovethem.

11 5.85

B+

10. Leadershipemphasizes

knowledgesharing

Seniorleadersrepeatedlyemphasizetheimportanceofknowledgesharinginthis

organization.

11 5.66

B

11. Leadershipvalues

learning

Managersagreethatourorganization'sabilitytolearniscriticaltoour

success.

10 5.93

B+

12. Workscloselywith

partnerorganizations

Ourorganizationworkscloselywithpartner

organizations.10 5.70

B

13. Abletotake

advantageofnewopportunities

Ourorganizationisabletotakeadvantageofnew

opportunitiesastheyarise.10 5.64

B

14. Considersfront-linestaffexperienceindecisionmaking

Theexperienceoffront-linestaffisconsideredintheorganization'sdecision-

makingprocess.

10 5.52

C+

97


employed

Averageagreement

score

ResponseCount


Grade(NGOsector)

15. Employeesrecognizechangingcontext

Employeesrecognizethatouroperatingenvironment

isconstantlyshifting.10 5.36

C

EmployedbySMALLMAJORITYoforganizations


employed

Averageagreement

score

ResponseCount


Grade(NGOsector)

16. Employeesaware

ofhowtheycontribute

Employeesareawareofhowtheycontributetoachievingtheorganization'sobjectives.

9 5.58

B+

17. Shares

informationInformationissharedinour

organization. 9 5.49

C+

18. Employeesaware

ofobjectives

Employeesareawareofthisorganization’sshort-term

objectives.8 5.44

C+

19. Captureslessonsfromunsuccessful

initiatives

Unsuccessfulinitiativesareanalyzedandthelessonsare

documented.8 5.44

C+

20. Practicesinclusivedecisionmaking

Majordecisionsaremadewiththeinputofalargenumberof

people.8 5.01

D

21. Lessonssharedinformally

Ourorganizationshareslessonsinformallythroughconversationsamongststaff.

7 5.24

C

22. Collaboration

acrossorganization

Thereisgoodcollaborationbetweendifferentpartsofthe

organization.7 5.20

C

98


employed

Averageagreement

score

ResponseCount


Grade(NGOsector)

23. Organizationisde-coupled34

Differentpartsofourorganizationareableto

changeandadaptrelativelyindependentlyofotherpartsof

theorganization.

7 5.19

D

24. Employeescanbe

usedflexibly

Jobdescriptions,projects,andworkingteaminour

organizationareflexibleandconstantlyshifting.

7 5.16

D

EmployedbyMINORITYoforganizations


employed

Averageagreement

score

ResponseCount


Grade(NGOsector)

25. Employeesawareof

vision

Employeesareawareofourorganization'slong-

termvision.6 5.21

C

26. Employeeshavefreedomtomake

decisions

Individualshavesignificantfreedomtomakedecisionsrelatedtotheirworkand

workobjectives.

6 4.80

F

27. Includesemployeesearlyindecision

making

Whenemployeesareinvolvedindecision-

making,theyareinvolvedearlyintheprocess.

6 4.73

F

28. Lessonsshared

formally

Ourorganizationhasformalmechanismsforsharinglessonsbetween

employees.

6 4.66

F

29. Employeeshavespaceandtimeforexperimentation

Employeesinourorganizationhavetimeandspacetoexperimentin

theirwork.

6 4.64

F

34Thismightendupbeingverysizerelated(organizationsneedtobebigenoughtohavedifferentpartsthatoperatedifferently.)

99


employed

Averageagreement

score

ResponseCount


Grade(NGOsector)

30. ToleratesmistakesOurorganizationtolerates

mistakes. 5 4.87

F

31. Investsin

professionaldevelopment

Employeesoftenengageinprofessionaldevelopment

thatbringsnewinformationintothe

organization.

4 4.57

F

32. RewardsinnovationInthisorganization,

innovativeideasthatworkarerewarded.

4 4.46

F

EmployedbyVERYFEWorganizations

RankMOCAPractice

SurveyQuestion#orgsthatemployed

Averageagreement

score

ResponseCount(Agree/Neutral/

Disagree)

Grade(NGOsector)

33. Easeoffiring

Itiseasyforourorganizationtolayoffindividualswhoarenotabletohelptheorganization

achieveitsobjectives.

2 3.53

F

34. Easeofhiring

Itiseasyforourorganizationtohiretherightpeople. 1 3.57

F

100

NegativelyFramedQuestions

MOCAPractice

(positiveframing)

SurveyQuestion

(negativeframing)

#orgsthatemployed35


ResponseCount

Easeofapprovals [Approvalprocessesareburdensomeinourorganization.] 8 4.48

Speedofcooperationwithin

organization

[Individualswithintheorganizationaregenerallyslowtorespondtorequestsfromotherpartsoftheorganization.]

4 4.07

Speedofinformationsharingwithinorganization

[Whenonegroupfindsoutsomethingimportantaboutclients,itisslowto

sharetheinformationwithotherpartsoftheorganization.]

4 3.88

35Apracticewasdeemed“employed”whenrespondentsfromthatorganization,onaverage,“disagreed”withanegativestatement,asdemonstratedbyanaveragescorebelow4.00onascalefrom1(stronglydisagree)to7(stronglyagree),with4being“neutral.”36Agreementscoreshavebeencalculatedfrominversedscores(reversedonthe1-7scale)toaccountforthenegativeframingofthequestion.Thisallowsthemtobemorecomparabletotheotherquestions.

101

MOCAPractice SurveyQuestion #orgsthatemployed37


ResponseCount

Dyn

amism

Makeschangesregularly

Onascalefrom1(“never”)to7(“veryfrequently”),howoftendoesyourorganization:changestrategicpriorities;changeprogramsandservices;changeoperationalstrategies?

39

1040 4.63

Iscontinuallyadaptive

1=Ourorganizationundergoeslargetransformationsperiodicallytocatchuptochangesinourenvironment.

7=Ourorganizationadaptscontinuouslytokeepupwithchangesinourenvironment.

10 5.26

DegreeofFormalization

Freedominmanagement

style

1=Stronginsistenceonauniformmanagerialstylethroughouttheorganization.

7=Managers’operatingstylesareallowedtorangefreelyfromtheveryformaltotheveryinformal.

8 4.71

Focusongettingthings

done41

1=Strongemphasisongettingemployeestofollowformalprocedures.

7=Strongemphasisongettingthingsdoneevenifthismeansdisregardingformalprocedures.

3 3.69

Focusoncontext-

appropriatepractices

1=Astrongemphasisonfollowingprovenpracticesdespitechangesintheoperatingenvironment.

7=Astrongemphasisonadaptingfreelytochangingcircumstanceswithouttoomuchconcernforpastpractice.

2 4.03

37Employ=anythingover4.5,exceptfor“makeschangesregularly.”38Agreementscoreshavebeencalculatedfrominversedscores(reversedonthe1-7scale)toaccountforthenegativeframingofthequestion.Thisallowsthemtobemorecomparabletotheotherquestions.39Graphicshowsresponsecountsaveragedacrossthreequestions40Employ=anythingover3.9941TheresultsofthisquestionlikelyindicateafalseassumptionintheMOCAframework.InterviewresultsindicatethatformalproceduresareespeciallyimportantinHaitiinordertoprotectagainstcorruption.

102

OperationalComplexity(strategiccomplexityandgoalcomplexity)

Rank42

SurveyQuestion

Indicateona7pointscaletheimportancethatyourorganizationplacesoneachofthefollowing

activities/goals:

#orgsthat

identifiedpractice

as“important”43

Importancescore44

ResponseCount

1. Increasefinancialsustainabilityofthe

organization 12 6.26

2. Logistics:Managingmaterialsandmoving

productsorservices 12 5.82

3. Operatingefficiently 11 5.85

4. Increasethetotalamountofmoneycoming

intotheorganization 11 5.84

5. Enhancethequalityofexistingprograms,

services,orproducts. 11 5.81

6. Researchonclientneeds 10 5.66

7. Enhancethereputationoftheorganization 9 5.82

8. Partnershipsandnetworks 9 5.72

9. Bemoreinnovativewithproducts,programs

orservices 9 5.32

42Strategiesandgoalsarerankedfirstbynumberoforganizationsthatidentifiedthestrategyorgoalasapriority,andsecondbythetotal“importancescore”averagedacrossorganizations.43Important=averageorganizationalscoreof5orover.44Importancescoreshavebeencalculatedbyaveragingtheaveragerespondentratingfromeachofthe12organizationsinthestudy.

103

Rank42

SurveyQuestion

Indicateona7pointscaletheimportancethatyourorganizationplacesoneachofthefollowing

activities/goals:

#orgsthat

identifiedpractice

as“important”43

Importancescore44

ResponseCount

10. Developmentofnewproducts,programsor

services 8 5.27

11. Increasethenumberofclientsservedbythe

organization 8 5.08

12. Increaseemployeeengagement 7 4.97

13. Increasethenumberofdifferentprograms,

servicesorproductsoffered 6 5.09

14. Innovationinmarketingandoutreach 5 4.73

15. Increasethenumberofstaff 1 3.93

104

SummaryQuestionsandTotalMOCAScores

OrgCode

TypeofOrganization

TotalMOCAScore

Ourorganizationishighlyeffective-itconsistentlymeetstheobjectivesthatit

setsforitself.

Ourorganizationisawareofwhatishappeningaroundit,andthecontextin

whichitworks.

Ourorganizationishighlyadaptive-itcontinuallymakeschangestomeetitsobjectivesbetter.

SAvg Other 233.57 5.80 6.40 5.40

H3Avg HA 233.01 6.67 6.67 6.67

H4Avg Other 228.81 5.50 6.50 5.75

H1Avg Other 223.10 6.67 7.00 7.00

PAvg CB 222.87 5.33 6.00 6.00

T1Avg CB 221.82 5.57 6.29 6.43

OAvg CB 210.80 5.33 6.33 6.00

T2Avg CB 208.90 4.25 4.50 6.25

EAvg CB 202.88 4.00 5.50 5.50

H2Avg HA 195.84 4.60 5.40 5.00

MAvg HA 192.46 5.80 6.20 5.20

CAvg HA 188.00 4.80 4.60 4.40

105

Appendix B: Interview Questions

Introduction

1. Inafewwords,whatwouldyousayistheobjectiveofyourorganizationinHaiti?

2. Whatisyourrolewithintheorganization?

Effectiveness

3. WhatdoesittaketorunaneffectiveorganizationinHaiti?Whatarethefactorsthatenableyourorganizationtobeeffectivehere?

4. DoyouthinkthatorganizationsneedtooperatedifferentlyinHaitithaninothercountriestobeeffective?Howso?

5. WhataresomeofthebarrierstobeinganeffectiveorganizationinHaiti?

OrganizationalAdaptation

6. Youmentionedtheabilityofyourorganizationtobeagileoradaptive.Tellmemoreaboutthatthatlookslikeforyourorganization.

OR

Youdidn’tmentiontheneedforyourorganizationtobeagileoradaptive.WouldyousaythatisanimportantpartofbeingeffectiveinHaiti(e.g.beingabletorespondtonewopportunities,changingstrategies,findingnewwaystoachieveobjectives)?

• Whatenablesyourorganizationtocontinuallyadapttonewsituations/opportunities/challenges?

• Whatmakesitdifficultforyourorganizationtocontinuallyadapt?

o Arethereanyorganizationcultureconstraintstobeingadaptive(e.g.managementculture,approachtoexperimentation,consequencesforfailure)?

o Arethereanyproceduralconstraintsinternaltoyourorganizationthatimpactsyourabilitytobeadaptive(e.g.decision-makingauthority,approvalprocesses,etc)?

o Arethereanyconstraintsexternaltoyourorganizationtobeingagileoradaptive(e.g.fundingagreements,donorpriorities,etc)?

7. Abigpartoflearningandbeingabletoadaptasanorganizationishavingaccesstotherightinformation–bothabouttheorganization’sactivities,aswellasaboutwhat’shappeningwithclientsandthegeneralcontext.

• Wouldyousayyourorganizationhastheinformationitneedstobeeffective?

• Howdoesinformation(orlackof)impactyourorganization’sabilitytolearnoradapt?

8. Wouldyousaythatyourorganizationisresponsivetochangesinclients’needs?

• Whatenablesyoutoberesponsive?

• Whatmakesitdifficultforyoutoberesponsive?

106

9. Wouldyousaythatyourorganizationisabletolearn–oradapttobemoreeffective–basedonpastexperiences?

• Whatenablesyoutolearn?

• Whatmakesitdifficultforyoutolearnorapplytheselearning?

CloseOut

10. Ifyoucouldchangeonethingaboutyourorganizationtomakeitmoreagileorcontinuouslyadaptive,whatwouldhavethegreatestimpact?

11. ArethereanyquestionsthatIdidn’taskyou,thatIshouldhave?/IsthereanythingelseyouthinkIshouldknow?

107

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