Addressing Security and Nonproliferation for

Small Modular Reactors

Presented at:

Platts 3rd Annual Small Modular Reactors Conference

Hilton Crystal City, Arlington, VA

Robert A. Bari

May 22, 2012

1

U.S. Interest in SMRs

Climate Change

Reduce greenhouse gas emissions nationwide

Reduce GHG emissions within federal government

Department of Defense Missions

Study SMR deployment at DoD facilities

Address grid stability and fuel supply needs

Energy and Economic Security

Pursue energy security through a diversified energy portfolio

Improve the economy through innovation and technology leadership

To ensure that these benefits are realized, new SMR concepts must have acceptable security and nonproliferation characteristics

Security and Nonproliferation

For SMRs, the case for nonproliferation

and security risks needs to be

demonstrated.

This point is important even in purely

domestic programs because

oother countries may adopt similar

designs,

oother countries may be influenced by

U.S. behavior

3

Various concepts are being considered worldwide

NuScale

mPower

SMR-200

HI-SMUR 140

HPM

WESTINGHOUSE

KLT-40s

BREST-300

SVBR-75/100

ABV6 M

SMART

IMR CAREM

NHR-5

NHR-200

PFBR-500

PHWR 220

PHWR 550

PBMR

EC-6

CEFR

Flexblue

HTR-10 HTR-PM

4S VK-100

VK-300

GT-MHR

EM2

GT-MHR

ARC-100

Fuji MSR

Travelling

Wave Reactor

HTTR

MRX

STAR-H2

LFTR

Rapid-L

VBER-150 VBER-300

PRISM

And

Many

more

4

Some contemporary SMR designs represent evolution from designs of the

70s, 80s, 90s…

IRIS GT-MHR

NuScale

mPower

KLT-40

5 «

SMART

Security and Nonproliferation (2)

SMRs can offer a smaller footprint against

terrorist attack

o Underground siting can help to minimize this footprint

Long intervals between refueling limits access

to fuel to operators who seek to divert materials

for non-peaceful purposes – “battery concept”

o However, refueling intervals can be shorter for other

concepts (batch or continuous) and pose different

safeguards challenges

New designs can incorporate new safeguards

technologies that increase likelihood of

detection by the International Atomic Energy

Agency of non-peaceful activities

6

SMRs: Some Institutional Advantages and Challenges

Advantages

• Fitness for smaller

electricity grids

• Options to match demand

growth by incremental

capacity increase

• Site Flexibility

• Lower capital cost

• Easier financing scheme

Challenges

• Economic

competitiveness (impact

of economy of scale)

• Emergency planning zone

• Fuel leasing

• Safety of new concepts

Staffing in newcomer

countries to ensure

security and

nonproliferation

7

SMRs: Some Technological Advantages and Challenges

Advantages

• Shorter construction period

(modularization)

• Enhanced reliability & safety

• Simplicity in design & operation

• Suitability for non-electricity

application (i.e. process heat

and desalination)

• Tolerance to grid instabilities

• Rail or truck transportable

Challenges

• Licensability (delays due to

design innovation)

• Technical challenge for novel

reactor technologies

• Infrastructure requirements

• Spent fuel management

Impact of innovative

design and fuel cycle on

security and

nonproliferation?

8

Security and Nonproliferation Concerns

For nuclear energy systems, we distinguish two adversaries: o Host state decides to proliferate using its nuclear

energy systems

o Non-host entity (e.g. terrorist), threatens host with theft and/or sabotage

For host state, must have adequate international safeguards through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and related organizations

For non-host entity, national programs must be in place to prevent and manage threats

Potential Threats

Nonproliferation

Concealed diversion from declared

flows and inventories

Overt diversion from declared flows

and inventories (abrogation)

Concealed material production or

processing in declared facilities

Overt undeclared material

production or processing in

declared facilities (abrogation)

Production using dedicated

clandestine facilities

Security

• Theft of nuclear weapons-usable

material from facilities or transport

• Theft of hazardous radioactive

material from facilities and transport

for use in a radioactive dispersal

device (dirty bomb)

• Sabotage at a nuclear facility or

transport with the intention to

release radioactive material to harm

the public, damage facilities, or

disrupt operations.

• Information theft.

Generation IV Approach to Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection

(PR&PP)

CHALLENGES SYSTEM RESPONSE OUTCOMES

Threats PR & PP Assessment

CHALLENGES SYSTEM RESPONSE OUTCOMES

Threats PR & PP Assessment

Intrinsic - Physical & technical

design features

Extrinsic - Institutional

arrangements

Measures and Metrics

PR -Diversion -Misuse -Breakout -Clandestine Facility PP -Theft -Sabotage

Methodology Report approved for unlimited public distribution by the Gen IV International Forum: http://www.gen-4.org/PDFs/GIF_PRPPEM_Rev6_FINAL.pdf USA Contribution Co-sponsored by DOE/NE and DOE/NNSA

Using Gen IV Approach for SMRs

Design process should consider:

Adversary Context o Objectives

o Capabilities

o Strategies

System design features relevant to Nonproliferation and Security

o Types of targets being created

o Physical arrangements

o Assumptions about new designs can be regarded as performance requirements

Security and Safeguards Must be robust and effective for new systems

Safeguards Challenges for Small and Remote Reactors

(ref: J. Whitlock, AECL)

Lack of access to the core for monitoring and verification

Lack of strong thermal signal for remote sensing

Distributed and remote nature (geographically)

• challenges efficient and effective inspection (both travel

costs, and the logistic difficulty of making unannounced

inspections)

Sensitivity to environmental or infrastructure disruptions that

may compromise Continuity of Knowledge.

• e.g. SMR serving as a primary electrical power source can

act as a single point of failure to security and safeguards

systems.

Conventional safeguards approaches could be very expensive

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Summary: Nonproliferation and Security Comparison/Distinctions

Nonproliferation

Host state is adversary

Threats are

o Diversion

o Misuse

o Breakout

International Safeguards

Slow moving events

(not always)

Security

Sub-national is adversary

Threats are

o Material Theft

o Information Theft

o Sabotage

Domestic Security/Safeguards

Fast moving events

(sometimes)

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Conclusion

Technical and institutional challenges with

regard to security and nonproliferation must

be addressed and solved

Emerging programs on safeguards-by-

design in US (notably NNSA), other

countries, and IAEA can be beneficial to

new SMR concepts

New SMR designs are based on decades

of experience and can incorporate lessons-

learned from previous experience