addressing security-related issues in east asiamost relevant for the national security council to...

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Addressing Security-Related Issues in East Asia U.S. Post Cold-War Policy Toward the Region

Asia Task Force

INTL 4250 by Young Ann, George Deng, Boone O’Neil, Eric Scheel and Ryoma Takahashi

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Brief on U.S. Policy Toward East Asia With a focus on security-related issues

Submitted to National Security Advisor Susan Rice

To be considered by the National Security Council of the United States of America

April 28, 2014

Task Force Members Young Ann

George Deng Boone O’Neil

Eric Scheel Ryoma Takahashi

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Executive Summary

- This task force has researched and analyzed a variety of issues emanating from East Asia that the U.S. currently faces. - We realize that the issues covered in this brief do not encapsulate all security issues from this region, but we have tried to choose the ones that would be the most relevant for the National Security Council to address. - We have noticed that security issues in this region tend to intertwine to a certain degree, so we have limited the discussion to the countries where this relationship is the most obvious. These countries include China, Taiwan, North Korea, South Korea, and Japan. - The scope of our analysis on U.S. policy is limited to post Cold-War policies, as U.S. grand strategy on security issues in the region shifted from one of containing communism to protecting U.S. hegemony and interests. We have divided the sections of our brief by country, with an additional trans-national issues section at the end. Each section will be divided into subsections, including…

I. Key Facts & Players II. Historical Background III. Policy Analysis IV. Policy Recommendations V. Appendix

- Some sections deviate from this framework slightly and include recommendations throughout the policy analysis sections.

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Table of Contents China ....................................................................................................................................................... 1-‐10

Key Facts & Players .................................................................................................................................................. 1

Historical Background ............................................................................................................................................ 1-2

Policy Analysis ....................................................................................................................................................... 2-8

Policy Recommendations ....................................................................................................................................... 8-9

Appendix ................................................................................................................................................................. 10

Taiwan .................................................................................................................................................. 11-‐20

Key Facts & Players ................................................................................................................................................ 11

Historical Background ........................................................................................................................................ 11-13

Policy Analysis ................................................................................................................................................... 13-18

Policy Recommendations ................................................................................................................................... 18-19

Appendix ................................................................................................................................................................. 20

North Korea .......................................................................................................................................... 21-‐31 Key Facts & Players ................................................................................................................................................ 21


General analysis of North Korea and Purpose of Report ................................................................................... 22-25

Security Policies for the Nuclear Weapons and Ballistic Missile Threats ......................................................... 25-31

Nuclear and Military Map of the Koreas………………………………………………………………………………………………..32

South Korea .......................................................................................................................................... 33-‐41



Policy Analysis ................................................................................................................................................... 34-40


Japan .................................................................................................................................................... 42-‐48


Historical Policy Analysis Background ............................................................................................................. 42-43

Policy Analysis ................................................................................................................................................... 43-44


Appendix .................................................................................................................................. 47-48 Transnational Issues ............................................................................................................................. 49-‐50

Nuclear Non-Proliferation ....................................................................................................................................... 49

Territorial Disputes ............................................................................................................................................. 49-50

Stationing of U.S. Troops ......................................................................................................................................... 50 Glossary of Acronyms and Terms ........................................................................................................................ 51-53 End Notes ................................................................................................................................................................ 54-57 Bibliography ........................................................................................................................................................... 58-65

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China I. Key Facts

• Population: 1.3 billion

• Name: People’s Republic of China (Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo)

• Government: Communist State with a one-party system

• GDP: $13.37 Trillion (2013 Est.)

• Military Expenditure as % of GDP: 2%

Key Players

• President: XI Jinping (since March 14th, 2013)

• Premier: LI Keqiang (since March 16th, 2013)

• China Ambassador to the U.S.: CUI Tiankai (since April 3rd, 2013)

• U.S. Ambassador to China: Max Baucus (since February 21st, 2014)

II. Historical Background

Sino-U.S. relations date back to the First Opium War of the 19th century. The first formal

treaty between the U.S. and China was the Treaty of Wangxia signed July 1844. This agreement

would allow for the U.S. to have unfettered access to the Chinese market1. After the fall of the

Qing dynasty, China underwent several changes of political system: from tribal warlords to the

Nationalist Party, soon toppled by the Communist Party. After the Nationalist Party came into

power, China became engaged in the Sino-Japanese Wars (Asiatic World War II theatre) and the

Chinese Civil War where Mao pushed the Nationalist Party led by Chiang Kai-Shek out of

China. For the purposes of this task force, the actual specifics of the wars are relatively

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insignificant. The main take away is that the conflicts gave rise to the current Communist Party

and became the foundation for sentiments of distrust.

After 1949, the Communist Party came to power and began to institute what is known as

the Cultural Revolution. This revolution would involve a rewriting of traditions, elimination of

the wealthy bourgeois, and re-administration of land. The Cultural Revolution is perhaps most

famous for the Great Leap Forward which was Mao’s attempt to rapidly industrialize China

through misguided actions like the collection of metal objects to create steel (which ultimately

failed) that eventually led to the deaths of millions due to starvation. While the Cultural

Revolution was going on, China also participated in the Vietnam and Korean War. The Korean

War in particular created a lot of anti-U.S. sentiment because of U.S. bombing runs on Chinese

soil.

Finally, one of the most important modern Chinese policies was Deng Xiaoping’s “Open

Door Policy”. This policy set forth in 1978 opened China to market economics and created

Special Economic Zones with tax breaks where foreign companies would invest2. Deng’s

liberalization of the market essentially created the modern China in terms of its economic

capabilities.

III. Policy Analysis

The policy analysis of China in regards to U.S. foreign policy is divided into two

sections: international concerns related to both the U.S. and China and domestic Chinese

concerns of significance to the US. The task force has deemed that an analysis of domestic

Chinese issues is equally significant because understanding the Chinese government’s concerns

will generate empathy and lead to a more effective relationship.

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1. International Concerns

a. China Military Modernization and Expansion

Another major concern in regards to China is its military modernization and expansion. The

change in military is evident in China’s recent military expenditures but also in increased

cyberspace attacks and foreign weapon sales & expenditures. Modernization of the Chinese

military produces a degree of unrest because it represents both China’s resurgence as a greater

world power but the possible prospect of future military engages with a strong foe for the US.

The rhetoric of influential members of both China and the US has returned to a pseudo-Cold War

type of style. The rhetoric includes fears of US containment upon China and fears of a rising

Chinese threat as a counter balance3. Despite fears of possible military engagements with China,

the actual prospect of war is still somewhat very low. First and foremost, China is still

developing in many respects as a nation and requires strong economic growth to maintain itself.

By entering in to war with the US, China eliminates one of its biggest consumers and by

extension any nations that allied with the US. On top of economic incentives to not enter war, the

prospect of nuclear weapons on both sides creates a very strong deterrent4. Furthermore, the aim

of Chinese military leaders is not to “repeat the Soviet mistake of trying to match US

capabilities… but [instead build] the kinds of forces that can deter the US in areas of core

interest5. Finally, as far as capabilities go, the US still very adequately outpaces China as far as

advance technology and global power.

1. Chinese Arms Sales

China’s arms exports pose a major threat to the US because it extends China’s sphere of

influence and proliferates weaponry despite a general international norm not to do so. In January

of this year, there were reports that both Algeria and Nigeria were engaging in extended military

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equipment contracts with China. Algeria would be receiving expansions for its newly established

navy, and Nigeria was in process of obtaining advanced propelled artillery and the possible

unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), or more commonly known as drones. Though not a direct

threat, the sales of Chinese weapons represents advancement in capabilities and extended

revenues from nations with newly forged relationships for China6. In realist terms, this expansion

translates to a relative decline in US capabilities. What is possibly more disheartening than

Chinese sales of arms is the Chinese purchase of prohibited arms from US allies. In December of

last year, Israeli Defense Ministry’s Head of Defense Export Control, Meir Shalit resigned after

green-lighting the sale of “miniature cooling systems for missiles” to China7. This sale directly

violated US-Israeli defense agreements and shows that Chinese influence may extend further

than just their own sale of arms.

2. Cyber Security Threats

The final major part of China’s military expansion is in the field of cyber-security and

warfare. According to a study by internet content delivery corporation Akamai, about 33% of

global cyber attack traffic originates from China8. According to Secretary of Defense Chuck

Hagel, despite bilateral US-Chinese talks on cyber security, the number of cyber attacks on US

interests has actually gone up in the past year 9. The central purpose of using cyber warfare for

China is to gain US intellectual property and gain intelligence on vital assets. As of now, the

attacks have not escalated to damaging infrastructure or impacting the immediate safety of

American lives. In light of recent intelligence leaks made by Edward Snowden, the US’s cyber

activities abroad have also been made clearer. Operation SHOTGIANT was a US covert cyber

operation to spy on Huawei, one of the largest Chinese telecommunications firms, to “determine

whether the company was a front for the army” 10. In response to SHOTGIANT, a top Chinese

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internet security agency has reported a 50% increase of cyber attacks on Chinese computers with

up to a third of them coming from the US.

b. Territorial Disputes

China is in a multitude of territorial disputes with countries that have alliances with the

U.S. Furthermore, the US’s relationship with Japan and South Korea in particular further

cements the US’s possible involvement in these disputes because of the presence of US military

bases. China’s rhetoric on the disputes has also been somewhat aggressive in their assertion of

sovereignty over the islands and waters, creating even more tension amongst the related nations.

1. Diao Yu/Senkaku Island Dispute

One of the major territorial disputes is the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands. In “China Might

Actually Seize Japan’s Southern Islands”, author James Holt outlines the possibility, pros and

cons, and consequences of China actually seizing the Senkaku Islands (one of multiple disputed

islands). Furthermore, Holt entertains the possibility of China moving on after Senkaku to the

Ryukyu Islands (inhabited by 1.5 million Japanese) in a pseudo-MacArthur style island-hopping

campaign. In fact, in 2013, there was a group of scholars, analysts, and military officials

“[converging] on Beijing's Renmin University to debate the nation's claim to the Ryukyus” 11.

The consensus reached by the delegation was that the Chinese government should at least make

the treat of claiming the Ryukyu Islands. With 14,000 U.S. soldiers stationed in Okinawa, the

prospect of a Chinese invasion would call into play the Japan-U.S. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation

where the U.S. would come to aid Japan. Though the threat seems eminent, the possibility of full

warfare is actually very low because China’s main goal with the Senkaku Islands is to secure a

“passage between the East China Sea and the Pacific Ocean”12. The cost of entering full conflict

with the US-Japanese allied force would outweigh the benefits.

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2. Nine-Dash-Line

Another major dispute that exists is over China’s “Nine-Dash-Line” (see Appendix). This

line is China’s proposed ring of influence on the South China Sea. It essentially says the China’s

operating area on the South China Sea is basically the whole sea, leaving other countries just

enough operating area to surround their borders. Many countries including the Philippines and

Malaysia contend the “Nine-Dash-Line” saying that it is unfair and does not conform to

international territorial practices. In January 2013, the Philippines challenged China’s “Nine-

Dash-Line” in the courts of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The

Philippines argued that their lines violated international treaties on coastline declarations. China

has rejected the Philippine’s argument and asserts that the Chinese government has “opted out of

UNCLOS procedures for settling disputes that involve sovereignty claims or maritime

boundaries”13. This line poses a threat to U.S. security because of defense pacts with the

Philippines and recent military agreements that will be called into action in the event of

aggression. More so than the existence of the dispute, China’s staunch position on not having

rulings for their “Nine-Dash-Line” conducted through international institutions is troubling and a

sign of stubbornness of issues of territorial sovereignty.

2. Chinese Domestic Concerns

a. Chinese-Japanese Relationship

The first aspect of Chinese domestic concerns is the present state of the Chinese-Japanese

relationship. Historically since 1980s, Japan was one of the largest foreign aid donors to China

with about $649 million annual from 1982 to 1989 14 .In addition to foreign aid, the rhetoric of

political leader Deng Xiaoping of China and then Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro of Japan

reflect a greater tendency towards peace. Despite a history of conflict, the two were seen as

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willing to overlook the past to create a better future. Since Deng and Nakasone’s time, the

relationship has become more hostile with events like China’s military expansion, the Senkaku

island debates, and resurgent rhetoric going back to the Sino-Japanese war. In a way, “both sides

have abused the memory of the war for political ends and are purposefully forgetting that China

and Japan have not always been enemies” 15 .The relationship is further complicated by the US’s

role as a political and military ally of Japan because increased aggression raises the possibility of

US intervention and engagement.

b. Unpredictable Political and Economic Intentions

1. Political

One of the biggest Chinese domestic concerns is uncertainty in their political and

economic development directions. With politics, newly elected President Xi Jinping has wide

spread of rhetoric style in relation to military issues. In the earlier half of 2013, President Xi was

noted to be more stringent and centered on active military expansion. One of the commonly

quoted phrases in his dialogues is the need for the Chinese military to be “capable of fighting,

and fighting victoriously” 16. Some analysts took this rhetoric as the preface of more aggressive

Chinese expansion and action. Following the first half of 2013, President Xi’s rhetoric showed a

significant shift towards moderation and an inclination for peaceful development. A “Peripheral

Diplomatic Work Conference” was held in 2013 and attended by members of the Standing

Committee of the CCP Politburo; one of the major initiatives was to adhere to a “good-neighbor-

policy” of peaceful resolution of conflict 17. With this shift and realignment of interests, the

intentions of China’s leadership become less clear and generate tensions.

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2. Economic

In terms of economic growth, China’s high rate of growth is somewhat unheard of and

some speculate that it is also unsustainable. Furthermore, some analysts contend that changes in

debt structure in the last decade have created conditions for a Chinese financial crisis. From 2008

to 2013, collective debt has risen from 138% of China’s GDP to 205%. The argument is that a

rapid growth in debt would mirror the US’s own debt-fueled financial crash. The proposed

solution would be a cut in credit growth rate from 17% to 10% and slowing down the ballooning

of debt 18. The solution sound plausible but it indiscriminately affects all debt-holders from

individual households to corporations. Furthermore, Stated-Owned-Enterprises and local

municipal governments have been pushing the debt ceiling the greatest. The suggested solution

by internal analysis is to enter debt restructuring for local governments and engaged in efficiency

analysis for SOEs. In particular, the effectiveness of SOEs needs to be re-evaluated because

since 2009 the average return on assets in SOEs “[have been] less than half of the private-sector

average” 19. The status of China’s financial health is a major concern because of Chinese-US

economic relations and because of the snowballing effect transnational financial crises has.

IV. Policy Recommendations

The task force will look at major ideas and examples that pertain to policy

recommendations for China. The first major idea is that China presents very significant military,

intelligence, and political risk but also represent a major economic asset. Therefore, the U.S.

must maintain a balance between soft and hard power, or as Joe Nye would put it smart power.

The U.S. must recognize that only a multifaceted and engaging solution will maintain a smooth

relationship with China. Furthermore, understanding that China has priorities that may not align

with those of the US, including assertions of dominance or territorial sovereignty, is vital.

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China’s at-times tense relationships with other Asian countries have created strong nationalistic

tendencies, which can further exacerbate island disputes or historical “wound-licking”.

Therefore, the US should pursue a strategy that employs a strategy of mutual understanding with

China and support its allies in the event of Chinese military aggression.

One example of mutual understanding would be a proposed agreement between China

and the US. The agreement pertains to weapons sales to Taiwan. It states that if the US maintains

only $941 million of weapons sales to Taiwan, China would remove 20% of the missiles aimed

at Taiwan 20. Chinese and US leadership have both expressed interest in this deal and if pursued,

could be the starting point more strategic resolution for Taiwan as a focal point of Chinese-US

relations.

The Philippines military has just agreed to give the US military access to its base in light

of recent developments in territorial disputes with China. The agreement could see extension of

US troop deployment and to bases across the Philippines. However, the Philippines have refused

a request for use of civilian facilities 21. This agreement not only creates another focal point in

the US’s Asian pivot engagement but also can quell Filipino tensions with regards to China.

Furthermore, with US military presence, the Chinese might be more willing to engage in multi-

lateral talks about the resolution of the disputes. It is paramount to make sure that the US military

presence does not come off as inducing an Asia power-pole shift but helping to create mediation

and communication.

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V. Appendix

China’s Proposed Nine-Dash-Line

http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/schina_sea_88.jpg

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Taiwan I. Key Facts

• Population: 23 million

• Name: Republic of China (Zhonghua Minguo)

• Government: Multiparty Democracy

• GDP (PPP): $926.4 billion

Key Players

• President: MA Ying-Jeou

• Vice President: WU Den-Yih

• Premier: JIANG Yi-Huah

• American Institute of Taiwan (AIT) Director: Christopher MARUT

• TECRO Representative: LYU Shun-Shen

II. Historical background

1. General

The Republic of China (ROC), which now governs Taiwan, was a founding member of the

United Nations and once a permanent member of the U.N. Security council. By 1979 the United

States had dropped recognition of its WWII ally in favor of the People’s Republic of China

(PRC). This section will examine the historical experience of Taiwan in context of the United

States-China-Taiwan triad from the period 1949 to 1979.

2. An Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier

The Chinese Civil War concluded with Mao’s Communist victory in October of1949.

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang retreated to Taipei and established a provincial

government, with the intention of regrouping and returning to drive out the Communists 22.

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During the 1950’s the PRC held equally hostile views towards Taiwan with a promise to “wash

the island with blood”23. Despite the continuation of U.S.-ROC ties, the United States showed

little interest in Chiang’s corrupt and militarily insignificant authoritarian regime. Just when U.S.

abandonment of Taiwan seemed possible, the 1950 invasion of Korea occurred and hardened

President Truman’s resolve on the importance of the island. Truman sent a naval fleet to prevent

any attack on Formosa (Taiwan), and stated that the “future status must wait upon restorations of

security in the Pacific”24. In 1951 the United States resumed direct assistance to the ROC and in

1954 signed the joint U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty making the two allies once again25. In

1955 by request of President Eisenhower, Congress authorized the president to deploy armed

forces to protect Taiwan. From this moment forth Taiwan would be seen as an important

foothold in Asia, an “unsinkable aircraft carrier” against communist forces during the Cold

War26.

3. U.S. Abandons Ship

In the 1970’s, threats to liberate Taiwan were less common and instead a “one country, two

systems” formula was advocated for; a reunification strategy 27. It was during Nixon’s opening

of China in the 1970’s that the U.S. also began to take a more cordial position towards the PRC,

with both countries seeing the strategic importance in curbing USSR power and realizing the

opportunity for economic gain. Another huge shift in American policy resulted from Nixon’s

Shanghai Communiqué of 1972, which began to set the stage for a reversal of US China post

WWII policy 28. This Communiqué acknowledged the “one-China” position of Beijing, called

for a peaceful resolution to the cross-Strait issue, and insisted it be solved by the Chinese

themselves. Taiwan suffered its greatest setback under U.S. and the PRC policies of

normalization when President Carter announced a 2nd communiqué, the Normalization

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Communiqué, highlighting the switch in official recognition of China to the PRC as of January

1, 1979. The ROC was notified that the following year the U.S. would terminate military

obligations to Taiwan under the 1954 U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty. Taiwan’s political

status in the eyes of the U.S. would be deemed undetermined, as it remains today.


1. Framework of US-Taiwan Relations

a. Three Communiqués

The three Joint U.S.-China Communiqués (1972, 1979, 1982) and the Taiwan Relations Act

(TRA) constitute the framework of American foreign policy towards Taiwan 29. In accordance to

the three Joint U.S.-China Communiqués issued in the Nixon, Carter, and Regan administrations,

the United States acknowledged the “one-China” policy and the need for a peaceful settlement to

be decided by the Chinese themselves. The communiqué which first recognized the PRC was

done without consultation of Congress. Prior to the 1982 August Communiqué, in which Regan

promised to end arms sales to Taiwan, Regan issued in his Six Assurances to Taiwan a pledge

not to set a date on the end of arm sales 30. Today the PRC often refers back these Communiqués

when accusing the United States of violating its promises by arming or supporting Taiwanese

goals.

b. Taiwanese Relations Act (TRA)

After severing ties with Taiwan, Carter’s proposed Taiwan Enabling Act did not adequately

protect Taiwan and so Congress revised and passed their own version, the Taiwan Relations Act

(TRA), which has continued to undermine China and U.S. friendly relations. The TRA stands as

the legal guide of conducting unofficial relations with Taiwan. In place of an embassy, it

established the American Institute of Taiwan (AIT). The AIT is a non-profit, tax exempt

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corporation separate from the U.S. government, and it is funded annually by U.S. government

appropriations 31. American officials must temporary separate from the US government when

accepting positions. Officials must also meet there counterparts in restaurants or bars, not offices

32. In addition, the TRA includes provisions for providing services and articles necessary for

Taiwan’s defense. This clause merely gives the option to go to war and is not an “iron clad”

security agreement as many suggest 33.

2. Policy of Strategic Ambiguity

a. General

American policy in regards to the Taiwan issue has largely focused on the process and not

the outcome 34. The policy of the United States since the Nixon’s era has been one of strategic

ambiguity. It has been in the interest of the United States to encourage peace in the cross-Strait

region, while signaling disapproval of both an armed invasion of Taiwan and a declaration of

independence by Taiwan. These two actions are seen as the most likely precursors to war in the

region, and most jeopardizing to the continued peace and prosperity in the Asian sphere.

Maintenance of the status quo and providing an environment for meaningful negotiation between

the PRC and ROC has been the priority of the Unites States. Clinton’s three “no’s statements” in

1998 included not allowing Taiwan to become a member of any organization where statehood is

a requirement, gain independence, or develop a “two-Chinas” system. President George W. Bush

took a strong stance against President Chen’s bid into the United Nations and occasional hostile

and revolutionary rhetoric 35. On the other hand, American leaders including President Bush and

President Obama have lauded Taiwan for being a democratic model for other nations, and have

responded with large, diverse packages of arms in keeping with its interests as defined in the

Taiwanese Relations Act.

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b. Issues of Strategic Ambiguity

1. Contradiction of Policy and Rhetoric

The legitimacy of the PRC that the three Communiqués intended to address has been

repeatedly violated by contradictory official statements and especially arm sales under the TRA.

Although general discourse among U.S. officials points toward a “one-China” policy”, many

slips of the tongue and candid remarks place Taiwan in an undetermined or even separate entity

status. President Bush in 2000 warned that that the U.S. would stand by Taiwan in defense of

military action by China, which signaled to some the end of strategic ambiguity. However, this

positioned softened once again as other officials made clear that the United States was not

obligated to come to Taiwan’s defense. In the 1982 third and final Communiqué the U.S.

pledged to gradually reduce arm sales to Taiwan, which to the contrary has greatly increased.

The policy of strategic ambiguity has created distrust towards the U.S. on both sides, with some

elements in the CCP fearing America’s hand in preventing unification, and some elements in the

Taiwanese pro-independence coalition fearing the opposite.

2. Arm Sales to Taiwan

U.S. justification of arm sales to Taiwan and occasional references to defend Taiwan remain

the thorniest issue in Sino-US relations 36.The TRA calls for necessary articles of defense, and

past administrations have provided anti-missile defenses, war planes, and the like. President

Obama’s $6.4 billion dollar weapon package to Taiwan in 2010 led to Chinese threats of

sanctions, end of military contact, and end to nonproliferation dialogue 37. Secretary of Defense

at the time, Robert Gates, was also refused visitation to the mainland. Beijing claims arms sales

strengthen the resolve of pro-independence forces in Taiwan, while others argue it gives Taiwan

a bargaining chip in negotiations. Chinese officials in 2002 told President Bush they would stop

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their missile buildup of what is now close to 1500 short-range ballistic missiles aimed at Taiwan,

if Bush would end sales to Taiwan 38. However, the U.S. has yet to end its arm sales to Taiwan as

promised in the 1982 Communique. Taiwan still remains outmatched in terms of military

strength (See Appendix).

3. Limited Support to Taiwan and a Rising China

In face of a rising and assertive China there exists an unwillingness to guarantee Taiwan full

support in a cross-Strait war. In addition, the nature of the weapon packages given to Taiwan

also demonstrates American feet-dragging on the issue. There continues to be debate in Congress

as to what the quantity and quality of defense articles should be. The sale of F-16C/D Fighter

planes was deferred under George Bush’s administration and again during Obama’s

administration. There are limits on how far the U.S. government is will go in providing security

to the island, lest mainland China react harshly. Taiwan often asks for more arms then America

is willing to sell 39. The U.S. was adamant about shutting down Taiwan’s nuclear program in the

1970’s, and again in the 1980’s 40. President Clinton, after Congress proposed legislation to

bolster arm sales to Taiwan threatened to veto it under threats and pressure from the PRC.

Confounding the issue is recent internal political battles in Taiwan and a lower than expected

defense spending and defense conscious than some policymakers would like to see in Taiwan 41.

A rising China places more pressure on both the U.S. and Taiwan. Many potential, future free

trade agreements between Taiwan and its neighbors have been placed under the shadow of China

42. In America, when China becomes a campaign issue or question, economics are the focus of

the debate, not Taiwan 43. Congress is not as vocal of a supporter of the island as before. During

Clinton’s administration, Clinton made an executive deal with leaders in Taiwan to stop

mobilizing its Congress to overturn administration policies. As a result, Taiwan’s lobbying clout

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vanished, a clout second only to the “Israel Lobby” 44. In 2009 the founder of the Congressional

Taiwan Caucasus resigned because of the troubling tilt of Taiwan towards China. Some in

Congress are calling for the abandonment of Taiwan because Taiwan remains the gravest,

potential source of conflict between the U.S. and China, and cooperation between the U.S and

China on international issues would greatly improve without it. United States has been

supportive of Taiwan’s international space and particularly its participation in international

organizations, but only those economic or technical in nature. In 2013 Taiwan attended a

meeting at the UN International Civil Aviation Organization as an observer, its first since its

removal from the UN in 1971 45.

c. Cross-Strait Rapprochement

1. Positive Implications

This strategic ambiguity policy has allowed for rapprochement across the Straits, a trend that

the recent Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (EFCA) has greatly accelerated. The

United States has strongly and publically supported this growing rapprochement between China

and Taiwan, for it’s in America’s interest for the two to reach a final solution, no matter what the

formula may be. Leaders of Taiwan and China both agree that economics and low-politics will

precede matters of security and high politics 46. A solution to the Taiwan issue will also present

greater opportunities for China and the U.S. cooperation on international issues such as global

warming, and a nuclear North Korea.

2. Negative Implications

America’s influence to control the dynamics and direction of the PRC and ROC future

relationship declines as the two nations move towards one another 47. When tensions were high

and there was little contact between the two, America had more control of the status quo. Cross-

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Strait peace may mean that China can focus less on the island and more on its neighbors as is

consistent with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) United Front strategy 48. Another issue is

the possibility of an increase in Chinese espionage if the two nations become more integrated.

Several Taiwanese persons have recently been accused of spying for the Chinese, with most

intelligence efforts focused on Taiwan’s missile defense systems 49. The United States has not

been overly supportive of confidence building measures (CBMs) between the nations in light of

ongoing and potential espionage. Domestic unrest will unfold as pro-independence elements in

Taiwan view President Ma’s policies as undermining their national sovereignty. The so-called

Sunflower Revolution has begun in response to the Economic Cooperation Framework

Agreement (EFCA), and many dismiss the government’s “benefits outweigh the benefits model” 50. President Ma’s low popularity and criticism for relying on a small circle of elites and

purchasing weapons for symbolic purposes does not bode well for the country’s internal stability

in the future. Also, if China were to absorb Taiwan either by force or coercion, then it would

gain Taiwan’s IT-rich human capital, U.S. sensitive information and technology, and a favorable

strategic position in which to project power into the Pacific 51.


1. End or Reduce Arms to Taiwan

The growing rapprochement between China and Taiwan should signal a need for the end of

the U.S. strategic ambiguity policy and weapons trade to Taiwan. Arming Taiwan is the greatest

impediment in China-U.S. relations, as expressed by Chinese officials. Whether this is true, or

whether China’s appetites will only strengthen in face of a weaker, lesser-armed Taiwan, the

United States should display patience by testing Chinese claims that a U.S. reduction of arm

sales to Taiwan will create greater mutual trust and cooperation in the Sino-U.S. relationship.

Backing Taiwan halfheartedly with a sluggish U.S economy and against a growing world power

is naive and self-defeating. Eventually the cost will become too great for America to stay

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committed, and there are many current international issues which require China’s cooperation

and trust.

2. Enhance Japan’s Role in cross-Strait issue

As Taiwan becomes less dependent on the United States, the United States needs to pressure

Japan to take greater responsibility in Taiwan’s security future. Japan and Taiwan are more

culturally and politically aligned, and Japan has more to lose in a scenario where Taiwan is

occupied by China, especially in terms of sea lanes and the movement of goods and energy

supplies Japan relies on.

3. Stronger Consensus and Consultation on Taiwan Issue

There should be more consultation between the executive branch and Congress before

decisions are made in regards to Taiwan. Congressmen see excessive secretiveness and

inflexibility on Taiwan issues. Carter’s initial step in renouncing Taiwan as an ally and

terminating the defense treaty was done without approval of Congress, a historic Supreme Court

level case. If possible, Congress should conduct a Taiwan Policy Review and come to a greater

consensus on what Taiwan means to America’s national interest in view of a rising China.

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V. Appendix

Taiwan-China Military Matchup

http://www.janes.com/images/assets/701/29701/g1487002.jpg

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North Korea

I. Key Facts

• Population: 24.6 million

• Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (Chosŏn Minjujuŭi Inmin Konghwaguk)

• Government: Communist Dictatorship

• GDP: $40 Billion)

• Military Expenditure as % of GDP: 29.4%

Key Players

• Chief of State: KIM Jong-Un

• Premier: PAK Pong-ju

• Minister of Foreign Affairs: PAK Ui-chun

• US Special Envoy for Human Rights: Robert KING

• US Special Envoy (’09): Stephen BOSWORTH

II. General analysis of North Korea and Purpose of Report

North Korea has demonstrated a wreak-less pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic

missiles for over twenty years, despite several agreements reached with the U.S. and its allies,

and despite numerous economic sanctions against the regime. For the most part, whenever North

Korea perceives any kind of threat from the U.S., they proceed with “rogue” behavior. Indeed,

one of the ways that the Kim regime holds on to its legitimacy is its constant reminder of

American brutality against its people, emphasizing how the U.S. bombed their cities and used

napalm against their troops, killing nearly a million people 52.

If regime survival is the overall goal of the government of North Korea, then the

likelihood of North Korea using a nuclear weapon against any of its adversaries is nearly

22

impossible. North Korea would have absolutely nothing to gain by doing so, but they would have

everything to lose because of a certain and swift nuclear retaliation from the United States.

Therefore, this task force believes that North Korea’s desire to build nuclear weapons and

ballistic missiles is an effort to build a deterrent against the United States, especially after

witnessing the U.S. invasion of Iraq. We also believe that when North Korea engages in “rogue”

behavior, it is sometimes for the purposes of securing concessions from the U.S. or other actors

by getting their attention, typically in the form of aid or a relaxation of economic sanctions.

To say that North Korea can be convinced to disarm would only be speculative, and it

would be naïve to assume that we could solve the nuclear issue with a few policy

recommendations. However, there have been past instances of North Korean cooperation with

the precept of U.S. amicability, which we aim to highlight. Moving forward, this task force will

provide relevant background for understanding post-Cold War U.S. policy toward North Korea,

and then analyze the various policies implemented by Presidents Bill Clinton, George W. Bush

and Barack Obama, with italicized findings and recommendations along the way.

III. Historical Background

In 1955, North Korean leader Kim Il-sung delivered a speech in which he successfully

planted to notion of Juche (meaning “self-reliance”) in the minds of the citizenry 53, an important

philosophy to keep in mind when trying to understand the behavior of North Korea. Juche’s

influence extended to political sovereignty, economic subsistence, and military self-reliance 54.

Kim Il-sung died in 1994 and the leadership shifted to his son, Kim Jong-il 55. Kim Jong-il took

his father’s Juche principles a step further and implemented the policy of Songun (“military-

first”), whereby the military is nestled into center of the political and social system of North

Korea 56.

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Though North Korea joined the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1974 and

signed the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985 57, Kim Jong-il would lead a

government with the newly found obsession of securing nuclear weapons. In 1992, North Korea

denied IAEA inspectors access to suspected plutonium-reprocessing facilities, prompting

suspicion from around the world 58. In 1993 North Korea announced that it would withdraw from

the NPT and the IAEA, and it began removing spent fuel rods from one of its reactors in

Yongbyon for reprocessing 59.

Attempts at forming agreements on the nuclear issue became the primary focus of American

foreign policy toward North Korea for the next twenty years. The Agreed Framework of 1994

was the first attempt at such an agreement. The Agreed Framework decided that in return for

North Korea shutting down its reactors, remaining in the NPT and allowing IAEA inspectors

access to the spent fuel rods from Yongbyon 60, the U.S. would secure light-water reactors

(LWRs) and 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil annually to assist North Korea in peaceful nuclear

development programs 61.

The Agreed Framework gave the U.S. and North Korea a working relationship for the rest of

President Clinton’s term, but there were still issues on the horizon. In 1998, North Korea test-

fired a short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) 62, initiating concerns for a different, yet related

security threat. Clinton attempted to address this concern when he sent Secretary of State

Madeline Albright to Pyongyang in October of 2000, where she started working out a deal with

North Korea on the ballistic missile program. Clinton’s presidency ended before a formal deal

could be made 63.

Some have argued that President Bush’s more hawkish policies led North Korea to consider

the Agreed Framework of 1994 null, and thus prompted them to start another uranium

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enrichment program, which the U.S. learned of in October, 2002 64. In December 2002, the

North Korea kicked all IAEA inspectors out of the country and removed the monitoring devices

from their nuclear facilities 65, and in January 2003, North Korea officially withdrew from the

NPT 66. In April, China hosted trilateral talks between themselves, the U.S., and North Korea. At

this meeting, a North Korean representative announced that his country had already made two

nuclear weapons 67.

These trilateral talks morphed into the Six-Party Talks (SPTs) that lasted from 2003-2007

and also included Japan, South Korea, and Russia. In September 2005, all parties came to an

agreement, known as the Joint Statement of 2005. The Joint Statement outlined how North Korea

would end its nuclear weapons programs and return to the NPT and IAEA Safeguard

Agreements in return for a security assurance from the U.S., as well as a deal with the other

members to provide it with energy assistance 68. Implementation of the Joint Statement was

stalled for several reasons. One reason was a series of ballistic missile launches in June of 2006,

suspected of being able to reach many targets throughout East Asia and the first of North Korea’s

missile tests since 1998 69. Another reason was North Korea’s first nuclear bomb test later that

year in October 70.

In a final attempt at improving diplomatic relations, Bush removed North Korea from the

U.S. state-sponsor of terrorism list in late 2008 71. North Korea was listed for bombing a South

Korean passenger flight in 1987, killing 115 people 72, among other instances of violence and

weapons proliferation.

Prior to North Korea’s launch of a long-range ballistic missile (LRMB) in April 2009,

believed to be capable of reaching targets in Guam, Hawaii, and parts of Alaska 73, and their

second nuclear weapons test in May of 2009, President Obama intended to adhere to the

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agreements made under the Joint Statement of 2005 74. Since then, Obama’s policy toward North

Korea has been labeled as “Strategic Patience”, which places pressure on the regime through the

imposition of sanctions designed to obstruct North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile

programs and its ability to proliferate such items, and also pressuring the regime by showcasing

the might of the U.S. military 75.

Kim Jong-Il died in December 2011. His son, Kim Jong-un, subsequently purged almost

everyone that his father placed in high rank to assist Kim Jong-un for the early years of his rule,

perhaps to secure his legitimacy 76. Under Kim Jong-un, North Korea tested its third nuclear

weapon in February 2013 77, and declared the 1953 Armistice Agreement null the following

month 78. North Korea also tested its first successful space-bound rocket in December 2012,

which it said was for the development of a satellite 79. Although Director of National

Intelligence, James Clapper says that “ North Korea has not yet demonstrated the full range of

capabilities necessary for a nuclear armed missile” 80, the prospect of North Korea developing an

inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) poses new hurdles for the Obama administration, and

future administrations as well.

IV. Security Policies for the Nuclear Weapons and Ballistic Missile Threats

1. Clinton Administration Policies

a. What Clinton did right

This task force summarizes President Clinton’s productive policies as consistent and

mutually beneficial to the U.S and North Korea. Clinton remained true to the principles of the

Agreed Framework throughout his second term in office, and during this time relations between

the U.S. and North Korea were much better than they ever have been. He provided North Korea

with long term benefits in the form of annual, heavy oil shipments and institutionalized the

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Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) for addressing North Korea’s

energy needs 81, as promised in the Agreed Framework.

b. What Clinton did wrong

This task force summarizes the Clinton administration’s counterproductive policies for

handling the North Korean nuclear threat as reactionary and too eager to solve a problem

rather than take the time to understand the problem. In response to North Korea’s withdrawal

from the NPT in 1993, the Clinton administration made a proposal with concessions to North

Korea in return for their return to the treaty 82. Kim Il-sung rejected this proposal and started

removing the spent fuel cells for reprocessing, 83, to which Clinton responded by increasing U.S.

troop presence in South Korea and sending an aircraft carrier to the region, reportedly ready to

go to war with North Korea if they acquired a nuclear weapon 84. Thankfully, former President

Jimmy Carter traveled to North Korea where he engaged the government in dialogue without

offering any short-term solutions, allowing for future talks to be held 85.

c. Findings and policy recommendations

Initially, a reactionary policy was necessary in dealing with an unpredictable regime,

which Clinton cannot be faulted for. For the sake of an analysis of U.S. policy toward North

Korea in general, however, we have decided to point out policies that the U.S. should not return

to so that we can learn from our mistakes. One such mistake was offering an agreement after

North Korea withdrew from the NPT. This taskforce recommends that the U.S. should not offer

agreements to the nuclear issue when provoked by North Korea, but instead in calm times when

tensions are relaxed. The idea here is to express to North Korea that we will not bend to threats

and other types of “rogue” behavior, nor will we reward them for it. Doing so only escalates

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tension, as can be seen in Clinton’s response, because rewarding “rogue” behavior inadvertently

encourages it.

Instead, the U.S. should attempt to engage North Korea in diplomatic efforts, force them

to the table, and try to understand the concerns and desires of North Korea rather than make a

quick solution to a problem that only exists because North Korea wants short-term rewards.

Clinton attempted to break this cycle by slightly normalizing diplomatic relations with North

Korea after the Agreed Framework was decided on, and providing them with long-term benefits,

decreasing their need, if you will, to engage in rogue behavior.

2. Bush Administration Policies

a. What Bush did right

This task force summarizes Bush’s successful policies as pragmatic. We admire Bush for not

rewarding “rogue” behavior, with the example of shutting off KEDO oil shipments after North

Korea admitted to its HEU program, which was more than likely being used to develop its

nuclear weapons. We also admire Bush for not being too quick to form some kind of agreement

after North Korea tested their first nuclear weapon in October of 2006. Bush also exhibited

pragmatism for not agreeing to any type of bilateral negotiations, which North Korea preferred,

relying on the superiority of the SPT framework instead 86. All six parties are relevant for the

discussion on the nuclear threat, and pressure from other nations makes the concern more valid.

Bush also followed through on his promise to take North Korea off of the state-sponsor of

terrorism list, as provided for under the Joint Statement 87. This allowed North Korea to join

international financial institutions (ISIs), which the U.S. is required by law to keep from

happening to states on the list 88. Taking North Korea off of the state-sponsor of terrorism list

was a pragmatic action because it showed consistency in following through on our promises and

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allowed North Korea access to badly needed relief packages for its starving and impoverished

citizens outside of Pyongyang, a win for the human rights realm.

b. What Bush did wrong

This task force summarizes Bush’s counterproductive policies as overly aggressive, and in

some cases, unnecessarily hostile. When the SPTs rekindled diplomatic negotiations between the

two countries, Bush stood by his tough nuclear weapons policy of complete, verifiable,

irreversible disarmament, or “CVID” 89, a policy that was, perhaps, too demanding or aggressive

for North Korea to swallow. In the unnecessarily hostile realm, Bush referred to North Korea as

a member of the “axis of evil” in his 2002 State of the Union Address before any diplomatic

talks between the two nations occurred 90, which was not well received on North Korea’s end.

Consistent with this hostile stance, Bush included the possibility of a preemptive nuclear strike

against North Korea as a policy option 91.

c. Findings and policy recommendations

Before Bush had an opportunity to showcase his commitment to calm, sensible negotiations,

he destroyed the delicate relationship that Clinton worked so hard to build, which is not

conducive to the merits of consistency, recommended above. We recommend that any future

hard-liner policies’ gains for political purposes be weighed against the possible, and likely,

responses from North Korea, which includes, but is not limited to: further resentment for the

U.S., increased eagerness to pursue the production of nuclear weapons and ICBMs, or increased

willingness to act outside of international law in the proliferation of weapons and weapons

technology. These kinds of policies make the U.S.’s job harder, not easier.

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3. Obama Administration Policies

a. What Obama has done right

At the start of Obama’s presidency, he sent Special Envoy Stephen Bosworth to

Pyongyang to inform Kim Jong-il of the U.S.’s commitment to working toward the 2005 Joint

Statement agreements, a great way of showing consistency in U.S. understandings between

administrations 92. In addition, Obama suspended negotiations on implementation of the Joint

Statement agreements after May 2009 when North Korea tested its second nuclear weapon 93,

suggesting that the U.S. would not jump at the chance to come to an agreement after an instance

of “rogue” behavior, no matter now drastic the action.

Obama has pushed hard for sanction against North Korea in the United Nations Security

Council (UNSC) whenever they test nuclear weapons or ballistic missiles, even gaining a few

unanimous consent sanctions 94. Support from other nations, particularly China, who has such a

strong influence on North Korea, is essential for these sanctions to work. When these sanctions

are “smart” sanctions”, whereby they aim to obstruct hostile intent from of a government without

hurting the citizens 95, they are extremely useful for not only aiming to reduce funding for North

Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. These sanctions also send a message

from the international community that North Korea’s “rogue” behavior and its status as a nuclear

state will not be accepted.

Finally, the task force recognizes the merits and originality of the policy of strategic

patience. Short of officially accepting North Korea as a nuclear state, the policy of strategic

patience allows North Korea to make its own decisions. By only rewarding North Korea for good

behavior through the relaxation of sanctions, this policy shifts responsibility for solving the

nuclear issue away from the United States and into the hands of North Korea. Perhaps the best

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action the U.S. can take to stop North Korea from making nuclear weapons is to stop taking

action.

b. What Obama has done wrong

Much like Bush, Obama has had a few policies that are overly aggressive, which could be

perceived as “hostile” by North Korea. The 2010 Nuclear Posture review leaves open the

possibility that, since North Korea is not currently signed on to the NPT, the U.S. would retaliate

against it in the event that we were attacked by a terrorist organization armed with nuclear

weapons 96. Furthering U.S. hostility are the joint U.S. – South Korean war exercises that

simulate defense measures, which, in 2012, included simulations of preemptive strikes against

North Korea and an enormous amphibious-landing exercise, involving 9,000 troops 97.

With these hostile acts in mind, we recommend that President Obama remove the aspect

of showcasing military strength from his overall policy of strategic patience. Specifically, we

recommend that the U.S. stop its war games and simulations with the South Korean army.

Military threats have never proven to tempt North Korea into submission, and are the very kind

of actions that strengthen the regime’s survival, national pride, and desire to build a nuclear

deterrent against the United States and its allies. We also recommend that the U.S. completely

abandon its policy option of a first-strike nuclear attack, even in the event of a nuclear attack

from a terrorist organization, as there would be no way to completely verify that such an attack

was the result of North Korea selling the weapon to the perpetrator. U.S. Director of National

Intelligence, James R. Clapper, even believes that the chances of North Korea taking this kind of

drastic measure are very small 98. The option of a second strike policy, in the event that North

Korea ever develops an ICBM capable of reaching the United States, should absolutely remain

on the table as a deterrent to such aggression.

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Former Director for Asian Affairs in the National Security Council, Victor Cha, says that

since the 2005 Joint Statement gave North Korea a security guarantee from the U.S. and North

Korea simply dismissed its significance, that they instead want a deeper, long term regime

security assurance instead 99. With this in mind, we find that a cooperative Kim regime that is

open to addressing its human rights concerns and curtailing its nuclear weapons aspirations is

better than a Kim regime that continually starves, enslaves, and oppresses its people and one who

is hostile toward the United States and its allies. In other words, perhaps the U.S. should no

longer consider measures to bring about regime collapse. Therefore, if ever Kim Jong-un can

demonstrate a prolonged period of cooperation within the SPTs and in accordance with

international law, the task force recommends that the U.S. advocate for a regional peace treaty,

whereby each member must sign on, and agree to, a reduction in arms and the promise not to

perform a military first strike against another member.

Not to ignore the need to address North Korea’s human rights issues, albeit a less relevant

mater for a national security brief, but important nonetheless, this task force also recommends

separating the discussion on human rights issues from discussion on security issues.

Negotiations on human rights matters need to be the domain of the domain Special Envoy for

Human rights, created by the North Korea Human Rights Act of 2004 100, instead of any other

diplomat or envoy. North Korea’s cooperation on the nuclear weapons issue should not be a

prerequisite for our willingness to aid the people of North Korea. Separating the human rights

issue from the nuclear threat issue will allow for more progress to be made on both issues.

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Nuclear and Military Map of the Koreas

33

South Korea

I. Key Facts


• Republic of Korea (Taehan-min'guk)

• Government: Republic

• GDP: $1.66 Trillion (2013 Est)

• Military Expenditure as % of GDP: 2.8% (2013 Est.)

Key Players

• President: PARK Geun-hye

• Commander of ROK/U.S. Combined Force Command : Curtis SCAPARROTTI

• South Korean Ambassador to the U.S.: AHN Ho-young (since 7 June 2013)

• U.S. Ambassador to South Korea: Sung Y. KIM (since 3 November 2011)

II. Historical Background

After a 35 year period of colonial rule in Korea, Japan surrendered in WWII in 1945,

with it, freeing the Korean Peninsula. The Korean Peninsula became divided at the 38th parallel

into two occupations in accordance with a United Nations arrangement. In 1948 the two separate

nations rose, with the Republic of Korea (R.O.K) in the South, recognized by the United Nations,

and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (D.P.R.K.) in the North. The United States

decided to establish diplomatic relations with the Republic of Korea in 1949 101.

With North Korean forces invading South Korea on June 25, 1950, marking the

beginning of the Korean War, the United States furthered this relation by supporting South

Korea with the war. The Korean War ended with the concluding of the Armistice Negotiations

on July 27, 1953 which was agreed by the United States, the People's Republic of China, and

34

North Korea (South Korea abstained) for a new border near the 38th parallel as the military

demarcation line between North and South Korea (known as MDL). The armistice was only a

ceasefire agreement, not a formal peace treaty ending the war 102. The United States and South

Korea established a Mutual Defense Treaty, in which it became the foundation of the current

alliance today. In 1978, the two countries agree to form the Combined Forces Command (CFC),

based in Seoul, and with a U.S. general in command to defend South Korea furthering, the U.S.-

South Korea ties. The Korean War stabilized the two separate governments into the existing

political entities of North and South Korea today 103.

On December 19, 2012, Park Geun-hye was elected as the 18th president of South Korea.

Being the first female president in Korean history, President Park was inaugurated on February

25, 2013 with a paradigm for a new era—“the happiness of the people and national

development” 104.

U.S.-South Korea shares ties on common values of democracy, human rights, and the

rule of law. South Korea and the United States also belong to a number of the same international

organizations, such as the United Nations, G-20, Organization for Economic Cooperation and

Development, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, Association of Southeast Asian

Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and World Trade

Organization 105.


1. Incidents of Threat from North Korea

The Korean War ended in 1953 without a peace agreement, leaving South Korea technically

at war for more than fifty years. This means that war between South Korea and North Korea can

35

erupt anytime. After the death of Kim Jong-il in December 11, his son Kim Jong-un succeeded

his father to take leadership in North Korea106.

A series of threats, missile test, and confirmations of North Korean nuclear weapons

possession fuels danger to South Korea 107. There have been several North Korean attacks

starting with attacking South Korean warship near border on January 1967 108.

On March 26, 2010, a Republic of Korea Navy ship named Cheonan was near the

disputed inter-Korea maritime border, which raised tensions between the two nations. A few

weeks’ later, an investigation concluded that North Korea was behind the attack based on

torpedo parts recovered from where the ship sank. North Korea repeatedly denied its

responsibility and rejected its claim as a “product of conspiracy” by South Korea and the U.S.

109.

A serious cross-border clash occurred in November 2010, where North Korea fired

dozens of artillery shells at Yeonpyeong Island, killing two marines, which resulted in the South

Korean military being placed on its highest non-wartime alert. The assault was during a nine-day

live-fire exercise conducted by South Korean forces at an U.N.-mandated maritime border, so-

called Northern Limit Line, which Pyongyang does not recognize. North Korea blamed these

exercises for the artillery fire, stating "despite our repeated warnings, South Korea provoked us

by firing artillery shells into our territory" from a statement from Pyongyang on the Korean

Central News Agency 110.

2. President Park’s policy for North Korean threat

In 2001, President Bush ended diplomatic talks with North Korea, citing violations of the

1994 agreement by Pyongyang. With North Korea’s claim of possessing nuclear weapons in

2005, followed by a long range missile test in 2006, the White House demanded a continuation

36

of the multilateral disarmament negotiations, which included South Korea, China, Japan, and

Russia, and planned to intensify sanctions against North Korea if it did not return to the Six Party

Talks. South Korea made cuts in humanitarian aid to its northern neighbor following the July

2006 missile tests, but questioned Washington's hard-line approach, fearing it might provoke an

aggressive response from Pyongyang 111.

South Korean President Park Geun-hye is seeking to ensure peace on the peninsula,

suggesting an "alignment policy" that incorporates the strongest elements of both the hardline

and engagement policies to deal with North Korea and bring about peace 112. Currently, President

Park’s administration is advocating a new trustpolitik policy, assuming “a tough line against

North Korea sometimes and a flexible policy open to negotiations other times,” emphasizing

having strong capacities to deter further North Korean attacks, followed by pursuit of parallel

inter-Korean and multilateral negotiations. If Pyongyang responds positively, the Koreas could

expand engagement to work toward long-term unification 113. Park has also made clear that she

will “respond decisively and exponentially to any new North Korean attacks”. She emphasized,

“it is important that there should be stern punishment for reckless provocations so as to break the

vicious cycle…. strong security is the basis for everything the new government pursues” 114. The

South reached agreement with the US to nearly triple the range of its ballistic missile system to

800 km. Given the ongoing tensions, South Korea is seeking to extend their due to resume

control over South Korean troops from the U.S. in 2015 115.

3. Problems in the event of North Korean regime collapse

In the event of a North Korean regime collapse, it can cause trouble for South Korea. If

the nuclear North Korea were to collapse, China and South Korea would try to claim as much

territory as possible. "… The Chinese and ROK-US forces would eventually make contact and

37

suffer accidents as the forces from the two sides come within range of each other," warns the

military analyst Bruce Bennett 116.

South Korea has always claimed sovereignty over the whole Korean peninsula. Most

South Koreans are unenthusiastic about sudden reunification, fearing the vast expense of

territory and sudden flow of refugees would derail their own economy. In the event of North

Korean collapse, the U.S. must intervene and secure WMD. After the collapse, Special Forces

and airborne units would move ahead to secure weapons of mass destruction - including North

Korea's nuclear and chemical programs. Chinese forces racing south from the Yalu River could

be tasked with similar objectives 117.

4. Military bases in South Korea and Anti-American Sentiment

Currently there are about 28,000 U.S. Forces Korea’s service members spread across

more than 100 bases all over South Korea 118. A majority of U.S. troops in South Korea are

scheduled to be moved in 2016 to regional hubs in Daegu and the Pyeontaek/Osan areas (areas

near North Korea and the Demilitarized Zone), and both south of Seoul. It is part of a

multifaceted plan designed to give the South’s Military a higher profile for the defense of its

country 119.

Incidents of bad behavior by U.S. soldiers have been in national news in South Korea and

have been condemned by government officials. A half-dozen 2ID soldiers were accused of

harassing a Korean woman on a subway train near Uijeongbu as well as civilian assaults. Three

soldiers not affiliated with the 2ID were accused of shooting passersby in Seoul with a BB gun

and leading police on a high-speed chase during which one of the soldiers was shot by a police

officer. Another incident where one soldier shoved a Korean police officer who subsequently fell

38

down some stairs, and another soldier struck a police officer, according to 2ID official have

created civilian dissent about prolonged stationed American soldiers in South Korea 120.

Some officials feel that there disadvantages and problems, such as hindering regional

development and infringing on the private ownership of people’s property 121. Lim Sang-o, head

of the Dongducheon Municipal Assembly’s Emergency Measure Committee, stated that “We

have no anti-American sentiment — not even 0.1 percent.” There are reports from the Korean

media that the U.S. military was lobbying to leave the 210th Fires Brigade behind at Camp Casey

(Dongducheon, near the DMZ), because the U.S. officials are concerned their forces would not

be able to quickly respond to a North Korean attack if the majority of the forces and equipment

are not stationed at Dongducheon. However Dongducheon officials have already made plans to

set aside Camp Casey for a science park, a university and corporate development once the base is

closed 122.

Dongducheon officials have held protests outside offices of South Korea’s defense

ministry, launching a drive to collect 100,000 signatures across the peninsula on petitions, of

which they plan to submit to various ministries and future presidential candidates, as well as the

National Assembly, asking Camp Casey to be vacated in 2016 and turning over the property to

the city 123.

Similar to Dongducheon’s situation, Uijeongbu officials, taking note of the Pentagon’s

announcement that the 23rd Chemical Battalion was moving back to Camp Stanley in Uijeongbu,

South Korea, have also voiced concerns about the plans to vacate Camp Stanley (also near the

DMZ) because agreements have already been placed for Seoul’s Konkuk University to develop a

new campus on the base’s property 124.

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According to a statement by 2nd Infantry Division of Public Affairs, the battalion is to

provide “nuclear, biological and chemical reconnaissance, equipment decontamination and

consequence management assistance” to support the U.S. and South Korean forces.

5. S. Korea-Japan dispute over Liancourt Rocks and renaming of Sea of Japan/East Sea

South Korea and Japan have long been in feud over the ownership of the islets, which are

internationally known as the Liancourt Rocks, located midway between the nations. They are

called Dokdo in Korea and Takeshima in Japan, and are currently occupied by South Korea 125.

Both Japan and South Korea say they have long-standing historical ties and claim the ownership

of the island grouping. The dispute over the Liancourt Rocks means a lot for the South Koreans.

From the South Korean perspective, losing “Dokdo” would share similar characteristics with the

post-facto legitimization of Japanese colonial rule. Liancourt Rocks, for South Koreans, invokes

strong nationalist feeling and lingering resentment over the war crimes committed by the

Japanese during their colonial occupation of the Korean peninsula 126.

The task force believes that this is a problem for the U.S. because both South Korea and

Japan are important allies and the U.S. has to be cautious not to violate its relationship with the

two countries. On February 14, 2014 the U.S. almost mistakenly gave support to South Korea

when John Kerry, the U.S. Secretary of State, mistakenly affirmed a question made by a report in

Seoul that the rocks are part of the defense treaty with South Korea 127. Situations when U.S.

sides with one country can deter the relationship of the other. Later the confusion was cleared up

by a State Department spokeswoman in Washington, when she clarified that Mr. Kerry’s answer

referred to the Japan – China dispute over a different island, not the Liancourt Rocks dispute 128.

In addition, recent disputes came up on what to call the sea between South Korea and

Japan, bringing U.S. in to the matter as well. Virginia's house of delegates has passed a bill

40

requiring all school textbooks to include the Korean name for the stretch of water, in which is

known as Sea of Japan in Japan and East Sea in South Korea 129. Following the reason behind the

dispute with Liancourt Rocks, the dispute over the sea's name also stems from an argument

between the two Asian countries about history. South Korea objects to the name "Sea of Japan"

claiming that it became widely used at a time when Japan ruled Korea as a colony. Kenichiro

Sasae, Japan’s ambassador to the U.S., wrote to the state Governor Terry Mcauliffe warning that

if the bill was passed it would damage economic ties between Virginia and Japan 130. The 80,000

Korean-Americans in Virginia also lobbied for South Korea’s name of the sea to be included in

history textbooks, as well as travelling to the state capital to push their claim at a series of rallies

131. The proposed legislation was approved by the House of Delegates with a vote of 81-15 132.

IV. Policy Recommendations: Imminent Threat of Nuclear North Korea Presence

The task force advises the United States to put objectives into protecting the democratic

South Korean allies from North Korean attack, and at the same time attempting to denuclearize

North Korea, as well as stopping nuclear proliferation. If the U.S. were to make a hasty

decision, it would signal the unstable and volatile North Korea for another Korean War,

endangering South Korea.

The task force recommends the U.S. to keep close ties with South Korea. One way to send

a strong message of support to South Korea is to pass a South Korea-U.S. Free Trade

Agreement, as well as consider Park’s administration’s trustpolitik policy. It is also

recommended to extend the delay transfer of wartime control of troops at Korea to South Korea

in order to keep a tight coordination and respond faster to a plausible North Korean invasion.

The task force advises that the U.S. should not take any actions that could provoke North

Korea. With information that North Korea is preparing for a 4th nuclear test, it is also important

41

to recognize that North Korea already has nuclear weapons, and advises the U.S. to make a

contingency plan in coordination with South Korea 133. We also advise the U.S. and South Korea

to be cautious with war games and simulations near waters of North Korea for the time being, in

efforts to prevent another 2010 Yeonpyeong Island attack, or worse. The task force also advises

U.S. to allow South Korea to possibly carry ballistic missile interceptors, as it allows Japan to,

in order to deter further attacks from North Korea.

42

Japan

I. Key Facts


• State of Japan (Nihon-koku)

• Government: Parliamentary Cabinet System

• GDP: $4.729 trillion (2013 Est.)

• Military Expenditure as % of GDP: 0.99% (2012 Est)

Key Players

• Prime Minister: SHINZO Abe

• Minister of Defense : ITSUNORI Onodera

• Minister of Foreign Affairs: FUMIO Kishida

• Japanese Ambassador to the U.S.: KENICHIRO Sase

• U.S. Ambassador to Japan: Caroline Kennedy

II. Historical background

Back 100 years ago, Japan had been engaged in two major wars: the Second Sino-

Japanese war and WWII. Those two wars have a significant impact on the current American

foreign policy toward Japan.

The Second Sino-Japan war became a gateway for Japan to engage in WWII with the U.S.

and the U.S. allies. In 1941, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, starting combat with the U.S., who was

willing to stop Japanese imperialism. The deadly war came to an end when two atomic bombs

dropped on Nagasaki and Hiroshima in 1945, followed by the surrender of Japan. Japan would

be controlled by General Headquarters, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers [GHQ]

after the surrender. GHQ made drastic changes in the Japanese military system, the legislative

43

system, and the emperor system.

At the conclusion of WWII, Japan and other countries finally reached an agreement on the

Treaty of Peace with Japan, also called Treaty of San Francisco. This treaty recognizes

Takeshima, Dokdo in Korean, and Senkaku islets as Japanese territory 134. Also, the U.S. and

Japan agreed that the U.S. bases would be placed in Japan in The Treaty of San Francisco.

However, the U.S. and Japan currently are talking about withdrawing from the Futemma base,

facing complaints from local residence. Despite the legitimacy of the treaty, the Republic of

Korea and China are challenging the ownership of those territories.135 Further, the Republic of

Korea is claiming that “the Sea of Japan” should be renamed “the East Sea.” 136 Some extreme

demonstrations have been increasing tensions on the disputed waters. “Chinese boats sometimes

darted past the maritime boundary, pursued by the coast guard.” 137


The U.S. bases in Okinawa

Thanks to the Treaty of Peace with Japan, the U.S. has placed its military bases in Japan.

Those bases are strategically important for stability in East Asia and U.S. interests. The U.S.

bases in Okinawa have especially played a vital role for the U.S. strategy, geologically. The

Okinawa islets are the closest in Japan to the Republic of Korea and Taiwan. Twenty-six

thousand US troops are stationed in Okinawa 138.The U.S. bases make it possible to take

advantage of the location if any military action is needed. However, not all of the residents

around the bases are happy about the existence of the U.S. bases. A woman from Okinawa said

in a BBC interview that “our children can't sleep because helicopters go over” 139 and that minor

violence from the U.S. army still exists in the area. For instance, in 1995 a schoolgirl was raped

by three service men, which led to the decision to shut down the Marine Corps station Futenma

140. Also one day, an U.S. helicopter crashed into a university 141. Those series of incidents made

44

local residents angry, resulting in numerous protests. Currently, there is a debate whether to

move the Futenma base from Okinawa.

Responding to the pubic opinions, some mayors who are willing to make an effort to

remove the U.S. bases from the land have been elected. BBC says “Residents of the Japanese

city of Nago, on Okinawa, chose a candidate opposed to the hosting of an American air base.” 142

Even if the number of people in Japan who oppose the base is not large, the U.S. and Japanese

government could not ignore the local voice.

The U.S., on one hand, has shown understanding on the issue. Long time efforts of both

countries have made several alternative solutions. One of the plausible solutions was moving the

bases in Futenma to Guam, but the plan was rejected because the new regime, at that time the

Democratic Party of Japan rejected the plan, which had been considered by the Liberal

Democratic Party who lost the election 143. So far, in short, any plans have not made progress,

and protests are only getting larger.

Despite deadlock in the relocation plan, The U.S. and Japan have been successfully

working on improving local sentiment. Both countries gave joint announcement 144. Further

efforts are still required, but the direction that the U.S. and Japan are going in is good in terms of

improving Okinawan sentiment.


Public opinion is the basis of democracy. However, sometimes public opinion has to be

sacrificed for a country’s objective. In the case of a base issue in Okinawa, most of the claims

from local residents are not based on U.S. and Japanese interests. The Futenma base issue, in

fact, came out of a rape incident by service men, as noted above. It is obvious that maintaining

the bases in Okinawa is strategically necessary to keep order in East Asia, and also to fulfill The

45

U.S.-Japan security Treaty. There have been physical conflicts between Japan, China and the

Republic of Korea. Still, China has been seeking hegemony in the region. Taking them into

account, the U.S. should maintain the bases in Okinawa.

Also, current agreements to move the Futenma base to Guam should be reconsidered.

There are many cons but and only a few pros. First off, the location is further than Futenma from

East Asia. “The Obama administration has reiterated that the 1960 U.S.-Japan security treaty

covers islands, like the ones in the East China Sea” 145 The location of Guam can delay U.S.

military action146. Additionally, Japan would not shoulder the cost of bases. Currently Japan

largely contributes to the costs of bases in Futanma. If the base was moved to Guam, Japan be

would less likely to help the U.S. financially147.

However, local people are still angry. The sentiment can be related to an anti-U.S.

movement, which results in boycotts and physically aggressive protests. The U.S. and Japan

have been keeping a desirable relationship with each other as allies. The relationship should not

be damaged by any factors that are not relevant to the both countries interests. The U.S. should

try to solve issues making local people angry about the existence of The U.S. bases.

First off, the U.S. should keep working to improve the situation as noted above. The U.S.

and Japan are making efforts to improve the environment, including noise pollution. Specifically,

the number of flights should be considered. Every 4 years, a U.S. aircraft crashes 148. Also,

flights are some of the causes of noise pollution. There are always accidents as long as aircrafts

fly. In order to decrease the accidents, the number of flights has to be limited until other methods

are available. Beside this, service men should be well educated and monitored. In Futenma, 3000

crimes are reported annually 149. The U.S. and Japan should cooperate more on decreasing the

number of crimes by U.S. servicemen.

46

Second, the U.S. should offer help to residents who are willing to move to new

hometowns. This measure can bolster residents who have complained about the existence of the

base to move. Even if the aid is financial, the cost of this aid would be much lower than moving

replacement of bases. So far Ginowan city, where Futenma base is located, does not offer

additional help to bolster moving. So far the Ginowan city has been receiving subsidies for the

base. These subsidies give resident incentives to live in the dangerous area. This resource can be

used for making the area less populated.

The U.S. bases should be positioned in the Pacific area. Japan is one of the U.S.’s most

important allies. Both countries also have mutual threats in the area. This task force believes that

the U.S. bases in Okinawa should be maintained for the reason of security. However, some

measures should be considered to calm down the anger of local people. Any measures should be

cheaper than the current agreement.

47

V. Appendix

Overview of Number and Sizes of US Bases across Japan

http://pub.ne.jp/bbgmgt/image/user/1376563913.gif

48

A Map Outlining the Positions of the Senkaku/Diaoyu and Dokdo/Takeshima Islands

http://www.economist.com/node/21564185

49

Transnational Issues

Nuclear Non-Proliferation

North Korea has reportedly sold to and coordinated missile technology with several

countries in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, including Pakistan, Libya, Syria, and Iran150

and North Korea is known to have coordinated with Syria on developing a plutonium nuclear

plant in that country 151. The consensus of the Intelligence Community, however, is that North

Korea and Iran are not currently engaging in covert nuclear development projects 152. The UNSC

has taken measures to stop this issue. Four unanimous resolutions have been passed, demanding

North Korea to stop proliferation and calling on UN member nations to take action in stopping

proliferation, twice in 2006, in 2009, and in 153.

George Bush started the Proliferations Security Initiative (PSI) during his presidency, and

Obama has endorsed it as well 154. PSI is designed to share intelligence with participating

members and interdict all shipments from North Korea to other countries that were suspected of

trying to proliferate WMD and missile components 155. There are over 100 participating

countries, including Japan and South Korea, but China is not a participant 156. The U.S. must

encourage non-participating members to engage in PSI in order to make efforts to keep North

Korea from proliferating weapons more effective.

Territorial Disputes

There are many territorial disputes that pertain to all countries in Asia at differing levels.

These issues are particularly important because they call into question sovereignty in an area that

already suffers tense relations due to past events. Furthermore, China has a heatedly debated line

of territory along the South China Sea which is objected by many countries. The main reason

50

these issues poses a great threat to the U.S. is because of various mutual defense agreements the

US holds with Japan and South Korea.

In response to these disputes, the U.S. needs to engage in diplomatic relation building

with allies and foes alike through extended bilateral and multilateral talks. The rhetoric that the

US needs to maintain should include ideas of respecting international norms and pushing for

extended dialogue.

Stationing of U.S. Troops

The stationing of troops in Korea and Japan are seen as strong military support gestures

but have also been criticized for creating negative externalities. With 26,000 US troops deployed

in Okinawa, the city of Okinawa is heavily influenced by the noise pollution and recurring

crimes associated with U.S. service members 157. In particular, August 2004, a helicopter from

the local US military base crashed into a school, luckily no casualties 158. For Korea, there are

about 28,000 US service members spread across the country 159. In addition to common

externalities, the military bases in Korea face domestic pressures to downsize and repurpose

bases for domestic use. Overall, as dictated before, a measure of accountability for U.S. service

individuals. An example would be having service members be tried for crimes in the local courts

instead being removed and exempted from local prosecution. China seems extended U.S. troop

presence as encroaching upon their sphere of influence. A possible way to ameliorate this tension

is to engage China in more bilateral talks on issues of military presence to give them reassurance

of non-aggression.

51

Glossary of Acronyms and Terms

China

• GDP: Gross Domestic Product

• Operation SHOTGIANT: US covert action to conduct spying on Chinese firm Huawei

for national security purposes

• UNCLOS: United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea

• ECFA: Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement

• ASEAN: Association of South East Asian Nations

• SOE: State Owned Enterprise

• Dragon-panda: nickname for the friend-enemy relationship with China

• Eastwest Institute: A US Thinktank

Taiwan

• People's Republic of China (PRC)

• Republic of China (ROC)

• American Institute if Taiwan (AIT)

• Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office (TECRO)

• Taiwan Relations Act (TRA)

• U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty 1954

• U.S.-China Joint Communiques

• People's Liberation Army (PLA)

• Confidence Building Measures (CBM)

• Cross-Strait

• Economic Cooperation and Framework Agreement (ECFA)

• One-China Policy

• Strategic Ambiguity Policy

• Clinton's Three Noes Policy

• F-16C/D Fighter plane

• UN International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)

52

• United Front Strategy 18. Sunflower Revolution

North Korea

• Juche: “Self reliance”

• Songun “Military-first”

• IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency

• NPT: Non-Proliferation Treaty

• LWRs: Light-Water Reactors

• SRBM: Short-range ballistic missile

• SPTs: Six-Party Talks

• ICBM: Inter-continental ballistic missile

• KEDO: Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization

• ISIs: International Financial Institutions

• CVID: Complete, Verifiable, Irreversible Disarmament

South Korea

• DMZ-Korean Demilitarized Zone

• MDL-Military Demarcation Line

• CFC-Combined Forces Command

• WMD – Weapons of Mass Destruction

Japan

• GHQ; The body created for dealing with affairs aftermath of WWII. GHQ influenced

current Japanese system.

• The Treaty of San Francisco; The peace treaty of WWII between Japan and allied

powers, signed on September 8 1991.

• Okinawa; One of Japanese prefectures, known as separeted islands from the homeland of

Japan. Since the allied powers occupied the prefecture, most of the U.S. troops are

stationed in Okinawa.

• Futenma Base; The U.S. Marine Corps station in Ginowan city, known as the most

dengerous base where to live nearby.

53

• Democratic Party of Japan; A ruling party that rejected replacement of Futenma base to

Guam. The leader of the party, Yukio Hatoyama became the prime minister of Japan

serving 2009 to 2010.

• Liberal Democratic Party; A Japanese party who wins most of elections but the landslide

rout in 2009, which resulted in giving up its leadership not only in Futenma base issue,

but also in the regime.

54

End Notes China 1Department of State 2British Broadcasting Corporation 3, 5Gurtov, 2014 4Keck, 2013 6Shinn, 2014 7Ben-zvi, 2013 8Milian, 2013 9, 10Sanger, 2014 11,12Holmes, 2014 13Haider, 2014 14, 15 Radchenko, 2014 16, 17 Shi, 2014 18, 19 Kroeber, 2014 20 China Times, 2014 21 Reuters, 2014 Taiwan 22Dumbaugh, 2010 23, 24Hickey, 2011 25Dumbaugh, 2010 26Twinning, 2013 27Hickey, 2013 28Dumbaugh, 1995 29Hickey, 2013 30Tucker and Glaser, 2011 31Dumbaugh, 2010 32Jue, 2011 33Hickey, 2011

34Kan, 2013 35Dumbaugh, 2010 36Fain, 2007 37Jue, 2011 38Twinning, 2013 39Friedman, 2013 40Mearsheimer, 2014 41Hart, 2006 42Chen, 2011 43Tucker, 2011 44Tucker and Glaser, 2011 45, 46Chai, 2008 47Wang, 2010 48Tsang, 2012 49Tai, 2012 50Pesant, 2013

55 51Hickey, 2011 N.Korea 52Feffer, p.33 53Hwang, p.213 54Han Park, p.93 55Hwang, p.253 56Han Park, p.99 57Berry, p.1 58Ibid, p.3 59Ibid, p.3-5 60Ibid, p.6 61Lynn, p. 30 62Berry, p.8 63Ibid, p.9 64Ibid, p.13 65Reed, p.124 66Berry, p.14 67Ibid, p.15 68Ibid, p.16 69 Reinhart, 2013 70Chantlett-Avery, 2014 71Kwak, p.7 72Park, 2014 73Cha, p.188 74Ibid, p186-187 75, 76, 77,79Chantlett-Avery, 2014 78Park, 2014 80Martnez, 2013 81Lynn, p.30 82Berry, p.4 83Ibid, p.3-5 84Yongho Kim, p.151 85Berry 5 86Reed, p.120 87Kwak, p.4-5 88Rennack, 2006 89Yongho Kim, p.143 90Berry, p.12 91Rumsfeld, 2002 92Cha, p.186 93Ibid, p.187 94Chantlett-Avery, 2014 95Johnson, p.423 96Pritchard, 2010 97Lee, Hyun and Christine Hong, 2013

56 98Clapper, 2014 99Cha, p.198 100Office of Special Envoy SKorea 101U.S. Department of State, 2014 102U.S. Department of State, 2013 103U.S. Department of State, 2014 104KOCIS 105U.S. Department of State, 2014 106Central Intelligence Agency, 2014 107Sanger & Sang-hun, 2013 108, 109Woo, 2013 110Powell, 2010 111Lee, 2011 112Park, 2013 113, 114Klingner, 2013 115BBC News, 2014 116, 117Scanlon, 2013 118, 119Chang & Rabiroff, 2012 120Slatter, 2013 121, 122, 123, 124Chang & Rabiroff, 2012 125Jun, 2014 126Park, 2011 127, 128Gale, 2014 129, 130, 131,132News, 2014 133Mullen, 2014 Japan 134The Treaty of San Francisco, 1951 135Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 136Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea 137The New York Times, 2012 138BBC, 2014 139BBC, 2010 140The Japan Times 141History: Okinawa International University 142BBC, 2010 143CNN, 2010 144Joint Announcement 145The New York Times, 2014 146, 147Lostumbo, 2014 148, 149Ginowan City Transnational Issues 150Lynn, p.40 151Pritchard, 2010 152Chantlett-Avery, 2014

57 153“Security Council Resolutions” 154Shulte, 2010 155Berry, p.22 156Proliferation Security Initiative 157BBC, 2014 158History: Okinawa International University 159Chang & Rabiroff, 2012

58

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