Department of Agrarian Reform, represented by Secretary Jose Mari B. Ponce (OIC) vs. Delia T. Sutton, Ella T. Sutton-Soliman and Harry T. Sutton G.R. No.162070

Facts: The case involves a land in Aroroy, Masbate, inherited by respondents, which has been devoted exclusively to cow and calf breeding. On October 26, 1987, pursuant to the then existing agrarian reform program of the government, respondents made a voluntary offer to sell (VOS) their landholdings to petitioner DAR to avail of certain incentives under the law.

On June 10, 1988, a new agrarian law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, also known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988, took effect. It included in its coverage farms used for raising livestock, poultry and swine.

On December 4, 1990, in an en banc decision in the case of Luz Farms v. Secretary of DAR, the Court ruled that lands devoted to livestock and poultry-raising are not included in the definition of agricultural land and declared as unconstitutional certain provisions of the CARL insofar as they included livestock farms in the coverage of agrarian reform. In view of this, respondents filed with petitioner DAR a formal request to withdraw their VOS as their landholding was devoted exclusively to cattle raising and thus exempted from the coverage of the CARL.

On December 21, 1992, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer of Aroroy, Masbate, inspected respondents' land and found that it was devoted solely to cattle-raising and breeding. He recommended to the DAR Secretary that it be exempted from the coverage of the CARL.

On April 27, 1993, respondents reiterated to petitioner DAR the withdrawal of their VOS and requested the return of the supporting papers they submitted in connection therewith. Petitioner ignored such request.

On December 27, 1993, DAR issued A.O. No. 9, series of 1993, which provided that only portions of private agricultural lands used for the raising of livestock, poultry and swine as of June 15, 1988 shall be excluded from the coverage of the CARL. In determining the area of land to be excluded, the A.O. fixed the following retention limits.

On February 4, 1994, respondents wrote the DAR Secretary and advised him to consider as final and irrevocable the withdrawal of their VOS as, under the Luz Farms doctrine, their entire landholding is exempted from the CARL. On September 14, 1995, then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao issued an Order partially granting the application of respondents for exemption from the coverage of CARL. Applying the retention limits outlined in the DAR A.O. No. 9, petitioner exempted 1,209 hectares of respondents' land for grazing purposes, and a maximum of 102.5635 hectares for infrastructure. Petitioner ordered the rest of respondents' landholding to be segregated and placed under Compulsory Acquisition.

Respondents moved for reconsideration, contending that their entire landholding should be exempted as it is devoted exclusively to cattle-raising but it was denied. Respondents filed a notice of appeal with the Office of the President assailing: (1) the reasonableness and validity of DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, which provided for a ratio between land and livestock in determining the land area qualified for exclusion from the CARL, and (2) the constitutionality of DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, in view of the Luz Farms case which declared cattle-raising lands excluded from the coverage of agrarian reform. The OP affirmed the impugned order. On appeal to CA, the CA ruled in favor of respondents and declared A.O. No. 9, Series of 1993 as

void.

Issue: Whether or not DAR Administrative Order No. 09, Series of 1993 which prescribes a maximum retention for owners of lands devoted to livestock raising is constitutional? Held: The impugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes the Constitution. The A.O. sought to regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian reform and prescribing a maximum retention limit for their ownership. However, the deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter alia, all lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and poultry-raising. The Court clarified in the Luz Farms case that livestock, swine and poultry-raising are industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of "agriculture" or "agricultural activity." The raising of livestock, swine and poultry is different from crop or tree farming. It is an industrial, not an agricultural, activity. A great portion of the investment in this enterprise is in the form of industrial fixed assets, such as: animal housing structures and facilities, drainage, waterers and blowers, feedmill with grinders, mixers, conveyors, exhausts and generators, extensive warehousing facilities for feeds and other supplies, anti-pollution equipment like bio-gas and digester plants augmented by lagoons and concrete ponds, deepwells, elevated water tanks, pump houses, sprayers, and other technological appurtenance.

Petitioner DAR has no power to regulate livestock farms which have been exempted by the Constitution from the coverage of agrarian reform. It has exceeded its power in issuing the assailed A.O. Moreover, it is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that the reenactment of a statute by Congress without substantial change is an implied legislative approval and adoption of the previous law. On the other hand, by making a new law, Congress seeks to supersede an earlier one. In the case at bar, after the passage of the 1988 CARL, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7881which amended certain provisions of the CARL. Specifically, the new law changed the definition of the terms "agricultural activity" and "commercial farming" by dropping from its coverage lands that are devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine-raising. With this significant modification, Congress clearly sought to align the provisions of our agrarian laws with the intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude livestock farms from the coverage of agrarian reform. It is doctrinal that rules of administrative bodies must be in harmony with the provisions of the Constitution. They cannot amend or extend the Constitution. To be valid, they must conform to and be consistent with the Constitution. In case of conflict between an administrative order and the provisions of the Constitution, the latter prevails. The assailed A.O. of petitioner DAR wasproperly stricken down as unconstitutional as it enlarges the coverage of agrarian reform beyondthe scope intended by the 1987 Constitution. SO ORDERED.

LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO vs. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICEG.R. No. 132601. October 12, 1998

FACTS : On June 25, 1996, petitioner was convicted for the rape of his common law spouse’s ten-year-old daughter and was sentenced to death penalty. He filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raising for the first time the constitutionality of RA 7659 “ The Death Penalty Law”, and the imposition of death penalty for the crime of rape. The motions were denied with the court finding no reason to declare it unconstitutional and pronouncing Congress compliant with the requirements for its imposition.

Act 8177 was passed amending Art. 8 of the RPC as amended by Sec. 24 of RA 7659. The mode of execution was changed from electrocution to lethal injection. The Secretary of Justice promulgated the rules and regulations to implement R.A 8177 and directed the Director of Bureau of Corrections to prepare the Lethal Injection Manual.

Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition, injunction and TRO to enjoin the Secretary of Justice and Director of Bureau of Prisons from carrying out the execution, contending that RA 8177 and its implementing rules are unconstitutional and void. The Executive Judge of the RTC of Quezon City and Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 104 were later impleaded to enjoin them from setting a date of execution.

On March 3, 1998, the court required respondents to comment and mandated the parties to maintain status quo . Petitioner filed a very urgent motion to clarify status quo and to request for TRO until resolution of the petition.

The Solicitor General filed a comment on the petition dismissing the claim that the RA in question is unconstitutional and providing arguments in support of his contention. CHR filed a motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and appear as Amicus Curiae alleging that the death penalty is cruel and degrading citing applicable provisions and statistics showing how other countries have abolished the death penalty and how some have become abolitionists in practice. Petitioner filed a reply stating that lethal injection is cruel, degrading , inhuman and violative of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

ISSUE : WON R.A. 8117 and its implementing rules are violative of the unconstitutional proscription against cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment, violative of international treaty and obligations , discriminatory and an undue delegation of legislative powers.

RULING :

I. LETHAL INJECTION, NOT CRUEL, DEGRADING OR INHUMAN PUNISHMENT UNDER SECTION 19, ARTICLE III OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.

Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution proscribes the imposition of "cruel, degrading or inhuman" punishment. This is the challenge thrown at RA 8177 and its implementing rules and regulations.

The court explains that any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely incidental in carrying out the execution of death penalty and does not fall within the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. "In a limited sense, anything is cruel which is calculated to give pain or distress, and since punishment imports pain or suffering to the convict, it may be said that all punishments are cruel. The Constitution,

however, does not mean that crime, for this reason, is to go unpunished."

II.REIMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY LAW DOES NOT VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL TREATY OBLIGATIONS

Petitioner disputes that the reimposition of the death penalty law violates the International Covenant on Civil And Political Rights, which was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 16, 1996, signed and ratified by the Philippines on December 19, 1966 and October 23, 1986, respectively.

Although Article 6 of said covenant highlights an individual’s right to life, it also particularly recognizes that capital punishment is an allowable limitation on the right to life, subject to the limitation that it be imposed for the "most serious crimes".

The petitioner's assertion of our obligation under the Second Optional Protocol has gone astray since dates and circumstances related to its adoption prove that the Philippines neither signed nor ratified said document.

III. THERE IS NO UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER IN R.A. NO. 8177 TO THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AND THE DIRECTOR OF BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, BUT SECTION 19 OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO IMPLEMENT R.A. NO. 8177 IS INVALID.

The separation of power is a fundamental principle in our system of government and each department has exclusive cognizance of matters placed within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. A consequence of the doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of non-delegation of powers. In Latin maxim, the rule is : potestas delegata non delegari potest." (what has been delegated, cannot be delegated). There are however exceptions to this rule and one of the recognized exceptions is “ Delegation to Administrative Bodies “

The Secretary of Justice in conjunction with the Secretary of Health and the Director of the Bureau of Corrections are empowered to promulgate rules and regulations on the subject of lethal injection.

The reason for delegation of authority to administrative agencies is the increasing complexity of the task of government requiring expertise as well as the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention.

Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself – it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate – and (b) fix a standard – the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable – to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.

Considering the scope and the definiteness of RA 8177, which changed the mode of carrying out the death penalty, the Court finds that the law sufficiently describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority.

RA 8177 likewise provides the standards, which define the legislative policy, mark its limits, map out its boundaries, and specify the public agencies which will apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative purpose may be carried out.