Administrative LawCases for Powers of Administrative Agencies

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United States vs. Barrias1G.R. No. 4349 September 24, 1908Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. 4349 September 24, 1908THE UNITED STATES,plaintiff-appellee,vs.ANICETO BARRIAS,defendant-appellant.Facts: This case pertains to the defendant questioning the charge against him on violations of Paragraphs 70 and 83 of Circular 397 of the Insular Collector of Customs. Paragraph 70 reads as follows:No heavily loaded casco, lighter, or other similar craft shall be permitted to move in the Pasig River without being towed by steam or moved by other adequate power.Paragraph 83 reads, in part, as follows:For the violation of any part of the foregoing regulations, the persons offending shall be liable to a fine of not less than P5 and not more than P500, in the discretion of the court.The defendant-appellant alleges that the Insular Collector of Customs has no authority to issue such Circulars and impose penalties for violation of the non-delegation of powers embodied in the Constitution. To support this allegation, the defendant-appellant raises the provisions of Section 19 of Act No. 355 or tthe Philippine Customs Administrative Acts, as amended by Act Nos. 1235 and 1480. Under Act No. 1235, the Collector is not only empowered to make suitable regulations, but also to "fix penalties for violation thereof," not exceeding a fine of P500.Issue: Whether or not there is a violation of non-delegation of powers when the Insular Collector of Customs issued such Circular No. 397. Held: There is no violation of the doctrine on non-delegation of powers. The grant of power to the Insular Collector of Customs root from Act No. 1136, which authorizes the Insular Collector of Customs to license craft engaged in the lighterage or other exclusively harbor business of the ports of the Islands, and, with certain exceptions, all vessels engaged in lightering are required to be so licensed.Under this statute, which was not referred to on the argument, or in the original briefs, there is no difficulty in sustaining the regulation of the Collector as coming within the terms of Section 5. Section 5 read as follows:SEC. 5. The Collector of Customs for the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized, empowered, and directed to promptly make and publish suitable rules and regulations to carry this law into effect and to regulate the business herein licensed.Moreover, the reference to Act 355 as amended has no material effect to the case. However, as to the imposition of fines as penalties, the Court modified the decision of the Court of First Instance reducing the award for penalties to 25 pesos. Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940MAXIMO CALALANG,Petitionervs.A.D. WILLIAMS, ET AL, RespondentsFacts: In July 17, 1940 the National Traffic Commission recommended to the Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarinas Street from 7:30 AM to 12:30 PM and from 1:30 PM to 5:30 PM; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street from 7 AM to 11 PM; one year from the date of opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic.The Director of Public Works recommended to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that the closing of Rizal Avenue to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles be limited to the portion extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga Street during the same hours as indicated for a period of one year from the date of opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic.Issue: Whether or not there is the existence of undue delegation of power that would lead to granting for the writ of Prohibition.Held: The writ of prohibition prayed for is hereby DENIED. According to Judge Ranney: "The true distinction therefore is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done to the latter no valid objection can be made. The Legislature cannot delegate a power to make law, but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes or intends to make, its action depend. To deny this would stop the wheels of the government.By consideration of public convenience and welfare the National Assembly enacted CA 548. Persons may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the State. The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through education and personal discipline so that there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness for all.The State has exercised its Police Power in this case.Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaFIRST DIVISIONG.R. No. 115381 December 23, 1994KILUSANG MAYO UNO LABOR CENTER,petitioner,vs.HON. JESUS B. GARCIA, JR., the LAND TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISING AND REGULATORY BOARD, and the PROVINCIAL BUS OPERATORS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondents.Facts: This instant petition forcertiorariassails the constitutionality and validity of certain memoranda, circulars and/or orders of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) and the Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board LTFRB)which, among others, (a) authorize provincial bus and jeepney operators to increase or decrease the prescribed transportation fares without application therefor with the LTFRB and without hearing and approval thereof by said agency in violation of Sec. 16(c) of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended, otherwise known as the Public Service Act, and in derogation of LTFRB's duty to fix and determine just and reasonable fares by delegating that function to bus operators,Issue: Whether or not the delegation of the LTFRB to the provincial bus operators to set fare range to set a fare range over and above the authorized existing fare one that is of a valid delegation of power. Ruling: No, the delegation of the LTFRB is tantamount to undue delegation of power and is therefore illegal and invalid. Potestas delegata non delegari potest. What has been delegated cannot be delegated. The policy of allowing the provincial bus operators to change and increase their fares at will would result not only to a chaotic situation but to an anarchic state of affairs. This would leave the riding public at the mercy of transport operators who may increase fares every hour, every day, every month or every year, whenever it pleases them or whenever they deem it "necessary" to do so.Moreover, rate making or rate fixing is not an easy task. It is a delicate and sensitive government function that requires dexterity of judgment and sound discretion with the settled goal of arriving at a just and reasonable rate acceptable to both the public utility and the public. Several factors, in fact, have to be taken into consideration before a balance could be achieved. A rate should not be confiscatory as would place an operator in a situation where he will continue to operate at a loss. Hence, the rate should enable public utilities to generate revenues sufficient to cover operational costs and provide reasonable return on the investments. On the other hand, a rate which is too high becomes discriminatory. It is contrary to public interest. A rate, therefore, must be reasonable and fair and must beaffordableto the end user who will utilize the services.Given the complexity of the nature of the function of rate-fixing and its far-reaching effects on millions of commuters, government must not relinquish this important function in favor of those who would benefit and profit from the industry. Neither should the requisite notice and hearing be done away with. The people, represented by reputable oppositors, deserve to be given full opportunity to be heard in their opposition to any fare increase.Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaSECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. L-26803 October 14, 1975AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY, CARNATION COMPANY, CURTISS CANDY COMPANY, CUDAHY PACKING CO., CLUETT, PEABODY & CO., INC., CANNONMILLS COMPANY, FORMICA CORPORATION, GENERALMOTORS CORPORATION, INTERNATIONAL LATEX CORPORATION, KAYSER-ROTH CORPORATION, M and R DIETETIC LABORATORIES, INC., OLIN MATHIESON, PARFUM CIRO, INC., PROCTER and GAMBLE COMPANY, PROCTER and GAMBLE PHILIPPINE MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, PARFUMS PORVIL DENTRIFICES DU DOCTEUR PIERRE REUNIS SOCIETE ANONYME, R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY, SWIFT AND COMPANY, STERLING PRODUCTS INTERNATIONAL, THE CLOROX COMPANY, WARNER LAMBERT PHARMACEUTICALS COMPANY and ZENITH RADIO CORPORATION,petitioners,vs.THE DIRECTOR OF PATENTS, ATTYS. AMANDO L. MARQUEZ, TEOFILO P. VELASCO, RUSTICO A. CASIA and HECTOR D. BUENALUZ,respondents.Facts: Petitioners, American Tobacco Corporation et al, filed before the Philippine Patent Office concerning the use of trade mark and trade name. ATC et al challenged the validity of Rule 168 of the Revised Rules of Practice before the Philippine Patent Office in Trademark Cases as amended, authorizing the Director of Patents to designate any ranking official of said office to hear inter partes proceedings. Said Rule likewise provides that all judgments determining the merits of the case shall be personally and directly prepared by the Director and signed by him. These proceedings refer to the hearing of opposition to the registration of a mark or trade name, interference proceeding instituted for the purpose of determining the question of priority of adoption and use of a trade-mark, trade name or service-mark, and cancellation of registration of a trade-mark or trade name pending at the Patent Office. Petitioners filed their objections to the authority of the hearing officers to hear their cases, alleging that the amendment of the Rule is illegal and void because under the law the Director must personally hear and decide inter partes case. Said objections were overruled by the Director of Patents, hence, the present petition for mandamus, to compel the Director of Patents to personally hear the cases of petitioners, in lieu of the hearing officers.Issue: Whether or not the hearing done by hearing officers are within due process.Ruling: The SC ruled that the power to decide resides solely in the administrative agency vested by law, this does not preclude a delegation of the power to hold a hearing on the basis of which the decision of the administrative agency will be made. The rule that requires an administrative officer to exercise his own judgment and discretion does not preclude him from utilizing, as a matter of practical administrative procedure, the aid of subordinates to investigate and report to him the facts, on the basis of which the officer makes his decisions. It is sufficient that the judgment and discretion finally exercised are those of the officer authorized by law. Neither does due process of law nor the requirements of fair hearing require that the actual taking of testimony be before the same officer who will make the decision in the case. As long as a party is not deprived of his right to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof, and the decision is supported by the evidence in the record, there is no question that the requirements of due process and fair trial are fully met. In short, there is no abnegation of responsibility on the part of the officer concerned as the actual decision remains with and is made by said officer. It is, however, required that to give the substance of a hearing, which is for the purpose of making determinations upon evidence the officer who makes the determinations must consider and appraise the evidence which justifies them.Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaTHIRD DIVISIONG.R. No. L-45839 June 1, 1988RUFINO MATIENZO, GODOFREDO ESPIRITU, DIOSCORRO FRANCO, AND LA SUERTE TRANSPORTATION CORPORATION,petitioners,vs.HON. LEOPOLDO M. ABELLERA, ACTING CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION, HON. GODOFREDO Q. ASUNCION, MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION, ARTURO DELA CRUZ, MS TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., NEW FAMILIA TRANSPORTATION CO., ROBERTO MOJARES, ET AL.,respondents.FACTS: The petitioners and private respondents are all authorized taxicab operators in Metro Manila. The respondents, however, admittedly operate "colorum" or "kabit" taxicab units. On or about the second week of February, 1977, private respondents filed their petitions with the respondent Board for the legalization of their unauthorized "excess" taxicab units citing Presidential Decree No. 101, promulgated on January 17, 1973, "to eradicate the harmful and unlawful trade of clandestine operators, by replacing or allowing them to become legitimate and responsible operators." Within a matter of days, the respondent Board promulgated its orders setting the applications for hearing and granting applicants provisional authority to operate their "excess taxicab units" for which legalization was sought. Thus, the present petition.Opposing the applications and seeking to restrain the grant of provisional permits or authority, as well as the annulment of permits already granted under PD 101, the petitioners allege that the BOT acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the petitions for legalization and awarding special permits to the private respondents.Presidential Decree No. 101 vested in the Board of Transportation the power, among others "To grant special permits of limited term for the operation of public utility motor vehicles as may, in the judgment of the Board, be necessary to replace or convert clandestine operators into legitimate and responsible operators." (Section 1, PD 101) ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION HAS THE POWER TO LEGALIZE, AT THIS TIME, CLANDESTINE AND UNLAWFUL TAXICAB OPERATIONS UNDER SECTION 1, P.D. 101; ANDRULING: Indeed, a reading of Section 1, PD 101, shows a grant of powers to the respondent Board to issue provisional permits as a step towards the legalization of colorum taxicab operations without the alleged time limitation. There is nothing in Section 4, cited by the petitioners, to suggest the expiration of such powers six (6) months after promulgation of the Decree. Rather, it merely provides for the withdrawal of the State's waiver of its right to punish said colorum operators for their illegal acts. In other words, the cited section declares when the period of moratorium suspending the relentless drive to eliminate illegal operators shall end. Clearly, there is no impediment to the Board's exercise of jurisdiction under its broad powers under the Public Service Act to issue certificates of public convenience to achieve the avowed purpose of PD 101Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaTHIRD DIVISIONG.R. No. L-44485 June 27, 1988HEIRS OF SANTIAGO PASTORAL and AGUSTIN BATO,petitioners-appellants,vs.THE SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS and COMMUNICATIONS, THE CITY ENGINEER OF DAGUPAN CITY and LEONARDO ESPANOL,respondents-appellees.Facts: Sometime in October 1958, residents of Bacayao Norte, Caranglaan, and Mayombo Districts of Dagupan City led by Leonardo Espanol filed complaints with the Secretary of Public Works and Communications (hereinafter referred to as Secretary) denouncing the heirs of Santiago Pastoral and Agustin Bato for "alleged encroachments into the Tulao River ... to the prejudice of public interest."Based on the evidence submitted by the parties, the Secretary rendered two separate decisions ordering the removal of the encroachments complained of within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice.Petitioner alleges violation of due process on the order given by the Secretary. Issue: Whether or not there have been a violation of due process Held: All in all, we find no grave abuse of discretion or an illegal exercise of authority on the part of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications in ordering the removal of the encroachments designated as Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of Exhibit "A".The rules of due process were observed in the conduct of investigation in the two cases. The parties concerned were all notified and hearings of the two cases were conducted by the Secretary through the City Engineer of Dagupan City. All parties were given opportunity to present evidence to prove their claims after which the Secretary rendered separate decisions pursuant to Republic Act 2056.The factual findings of the Secretary are substantiated by evidence in the administrative records. In the absence of any illegality, error of law, fraud or imposition, none of which were proved by the petitioners in the instant case, said findings should be respected.Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANC

G.R. No. L-31711 September 30, 1971ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS as Mayor of the City of Manila and MANUEL D. LAPID,petitioners-appellants,vs.ABELARDO SUBIDO as Civil Service Commissioner, EDUARDO Z. ROMUALDEZ as Secretary of Finance, JOSE R. GLORIA as Acting Asst. City Treasurer of Manila, and HON. CONRADO M. VASQUEZ as Presiding Judge of Branch V, Court of First Instance of Manila,respondents-appellees.Facts: "In a letter dated June 3, 1968, respondent Eduardo Z. Romualdez, Secretary of Finance, authorized respondent Jose R. Gloria of the Office of the City Treasurer of Manila to assume the duties of Assistant City Treasurer effective June 1, 1968, vice Felino Fineza who retired from the government service on May 31, 1968. In administrative Order No. 40, series of 1968, dated June 17, 1968, petitioner Antonio J. Villegas, Mayor of the City of Manila, directed respondent Gloria to desist and refrain from exercising the duties and functions of the Assistant City Treasurer,' on the ground that respondent Romualdez "is not empowered to make such designation." On January 1, 1969, Mayor Villegas, appointed petitioner Manuel D. Lapid, chief of the cash division of the Office of the City Treasurer of Manila, as Assistant City Treasurer. In a 1st endorsement dated February 14, 1969, respondent Abelardo Subido, Commissioner of Civil Service disapproved the appointment of Lapid, basing his action, on an opinion of the Secretary of Justice dated September 19, 1968 to the effect that the appointment of Assistant Provincial Treasurers is still governed by Section 2088 (A) of the Revised Administrative Code, and not by Section 4 of the Decentralization Law, Republic Act No. 5185."5Thereafter on February 25, 1969, to quote anew from the appealed decision: "Mayor Villegas and Manuel D. Lapid filed the instant petition for prohibition,quo warrantoandmandamus, with application for writ of preliminary injunction, praying that judgment be rendered to declare illegal and voidab initiothe authorization given by respondent Romualdez to respondent Gloria to assume the duties of assistant city treasurer of Manila, and that a writ of mandamus be issued to respondent Commissioner of Civil Service Subido commanding him to approve the appointment of petitioner Lapid to the said office in accordance with the civil Service Rules."6It was not until the filing of the petition that respondent Jose R. Gloria was nominated by the President of the Philippines to the position of Assistant City treasurer of Manila and thereafter duly confirmed. After the case was submitted for judgment on the pleadings and the documentary exhibits stipulated by the parties, the court rendered its decision on August 4, 1969 dismissing the petition. Hence this appeal by way of certiorari.Issue: Whether or not the Charter of the City of Manila should be followedHeld: It is understandable why the choice for the lower court was not difficult to make. What has been so clearly ordained in the Charter is controlling. It survives in the face of the assertion that the additional power granted local officials to appoint employees paid out of local funds would suffice to transfer such authority to petitioner Mayor. A perusal of the words of the statute, even if far from searching would not justify such an interpretation. This is all more evident, considering the fidelity manifested by this Court to the doctrine that looks with less than favor on implied appeals. The decision now on appeal, to repeat, must be affirmed.Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaTHIRD DIVISIONG.R. No. 110120 March 16, 1994LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL JN. SERAPIO, Presiding Judge RTC, Branch 127, Caloocan City, HON. MACARIO A. ASISTIO, JR., City Mayor of Caloocan and/or THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF CALOOCAN,respondents.Facts: The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through RA No. 4850 in order to execute the policy towards environmental protection and sustainable development so as to accelerate the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces and towns.PD No. 813 amended certain sections of RA 4850 since water quality studies have shown that the lake will deteriorate further if steps are not taken to check the same.EO 927 further defined and enlarged the functions and powers of the LLDA and enumerated the towns, cities and provinces encompassed by the term Laguna de Bay Region.Upon implementation of RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991), the municipalities assumed exclusive jurisdiction & authority to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters since Sec.149 thereof provides: Municipal corporations shall have the authority to grant fishery privileges in the municipal waters and impose rental fees or charges thereforeBig fishpen operators took advantage of the occasion to establish fishpens & fish cages to the consternation of the LLDA.The implementation of separate independent policies in fish cages & fish pen operation and the indiscriminate grant of fishpen permits by the lakeshore municipalities have saturated the lake with fishpens, thereby aggravating the current environmental problems and ecological stress of Laguna Lake.The LLDA then served notice to the general public that (1) fishpens, cages & other aqua-culture structures unregistered with the LLDA as of March 31, 1993 are declared illegal; (2) those declared illegal shall be subject to demolition by the Presidential Task Force for Illegal Fishpen and Illegal Fishing; and (3) owners of those declared illegal shall be criminally charged with violation of Sec.39-A of RA 4850 as amended by PD 813.A month later, the LLDA sent notices advising the owners of the illegally constructed fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures advising them to dismantle their respective structures otherwise demolition shall be effected.Issue: Whether the LLDA is a quasi-judicial agency?Held: The LLDA has express powers as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body in respect to pollution cases with authority to issue a cease and desist order and on matters affecting the construction of illegal fishpens, fish cages and other aqua-culture structures in Laguna de Bay.Sec.149 of RA 7160 has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the LLDA, RA 4850, as amended. Thus, the LLDA has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of municipalities situated therein and the authority to exercise such powers as are by its charter vested on it.Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. 140563 July 14, 2000DANTE M. POLLOSO,Petitionervs.HON. CELSO D. GANGAN, AS CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, HON. RAUL C. FLORES, COMMISSIONER, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, HON. EMMANUEL M. DALMAN, COMMISSIONER, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, RespondentsFacts: In 1994, the National Power Corporation (NPC), represented by its President Dr. Francisco L. Viray entered into a service contract with Atty. Benemerito A. Satorre. Under said contract, Satorre was to perform the following services for the Leyte-Cebu and Leyte-Luzon Interconnection Projects of the NPC:On 12 January 1995, Unit Auditor Alexander A. Tan, NPC-VRC, Cebu City issued Notice of Disallowance No. 95-0001-135-94 for the payment of the services rendered by Atty. Satorre for the period covering March to December 1995 in the total amount of P283,763.39. The following reasons were cited for said disallowance: The contract for services did not have the written conformity and acquiescence of the Solicitor General or the Corporate Counsel and concurrence of the Commission on Audit as required under COA Circular No. 86-255 dated April 2, 1986. The contract was not supported with Certificate of Availability of Funds as required under Sec. 86 of P.D. 1445. The contract was not submitted to the Civil Service Commission for final review and was not forwarded to the Compensation and Position Confirmation and Classification Bureau, DBM for appropriate action as required in CSC MC # 5 Series of 1985.3Issue: Whether or not that the circular requiring the approval of the SOLICITOR GENERAL was UNCONSTITUTIONAL because it restricted to practice LAW.Ruling: The circular was merely a safeguard to prevent irregular, unnecessary, excessive, and extravagant or unconscionable expenditures.We cannot grant the prayer of the petitioner that Atty. Satorre should be compensated based on the principle of quantum meruit, on the ground that the government will be unjustly enriched at the expense of another. We do not deny that Atty. Satorre has indeed rendered legal services to the government. However to allow the disbursement of public funds to pay for his services, despite the absence of requisite consent to his hiring from the OSG or OGCC would precisely allow circumvention of COA Circular No. 86-255.WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of showing that the respondents committed a reversible error.Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. 140563 July 14, 2000REMEDIO BLAQUERA, ET AL,Petitionervs.HON. ANGEL C. ALCALA, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and HON. CARLITO R. ALETA, in his capacity as the Director of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute, respondents.Facts: On Feb. 21, 1992, then President Aquino issued AO 268 which granted each official and employee of the government the productivity incentive benefits in a maximum amount equivalent to 30% of the employees one month basic salary but which amount not be less than P2, 000.00. Said AO provided that the productivity incentive benefits shall be granted only for the year 1991. Accordingly, all heads of agencies, including government boards of government-owned or controlled corporations and financial institutions, are strictly prohibited from granting productivity incentive benefits for the year 1992 and future years pending the result of a comprehensive study being undertaken by the Office of the President.The petitioners, who are officials and employees of several government departments and agencies, were paid incentive benefits for the year 1992. Then, on Jan. 19, 1993, then President Ramos issued AO 29 authorizing the grant of productivity incentive benefits for the year 1992 in the maximum amount of P1,000.00 and reiterating the prohibition under Sec. 7 of AO 268, enjoining the grant of productivity incentive benefits without prior approval of the President. Sec. 4 of AO 29 directed all departments, offices and agencies which authorized payment of productivity incentive bonus for the year 1992 in excess of P1, 000.00 to immediately cause the refund of the excess. In compliance therewith, the heads of the departments or agencies of the government concerned caused the deduction from petitioners salaries or allowances of the amounts needed to cover the alleged overpayments.Issue: Whether or not AO 29 and AO 268 were issued in the valid exercise of presidential control over the executive departments Held: The President is the head of the government. Governmental power and authority are exercised and implemented through him. His power includes the control of executive departments as provided under Sec. 17, Art. VII of the Constitution.Control means the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. The President can, by virtue of his power of control, review, modify, alter or nullify any action or decision of his subordinate in the executive departments, bureau or offices under him. When the President issued AO 29 limiting the amount of incentive benefits, enjoining heads of government agencies from granting incentive benefits without approval from him and directing the refund of the excess over the prescribed amount, the Pres. was just exercising his power of control over executive departments.The President issued subject AOs to regulate the grant of productivity incentive benefits and to prevent discontent, dissatisfaction and demoralization among government personnel by committing limited resources of government for the equal payment of incentives and awards. The Pres. was only exercising his power of control by modifying the acts of the heads of the government agencies who granted incentive benefits to their employees without appropriate clearance from the Office of the Pres., thereby resulting in the uneven distribution of government resources. The Presidents duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. So, too, is his control of executive departments.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. 97203 May 26, 1993HON. ISIDRO CARIO, substituted by HON. ARMANDO V. FABELLA, Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, and VENANCIO R. NAVA, Regional Director, DECS Region IX, Davao City,petitioners,vs.HON. IGNACIO M. CAPULONG, Presiding Judge of RTC-Makati, Br. 134 and AMA COMPUTER COLLEGE, INC., Davao City and AMA COMPUTER COLLEGE,respondents.Facts: By virtue of a "Contract of Lease with Option to Buy" entered into with Light Bringer School (LBS) on 14 May 1990, Ama Computer College (AMA) took possession of the premises of the former located at Marfori Heights, Davao City. LBS is a duly recognized and licensed elementary school which transferred its operation elsewhere in Davao City.On 21 May 1990, Regional Director Venancio R. Nava, Region IX-DECS, received AMA's letter of intent to operate as an educational institution in Davao City.Responding to the said letter, Regional Director Venancio R. Nava reminded AMA "of the provisions of the Rules and Regulations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 232, specifically Article E, Section 7, Rule III that the filing of the application shall be at least one (1) year before the opening of classes" and the "provisions of the Private School Law reiterated in the Educational Act of 1992 which prohibits the operation of unauthorized schools or courses."Nevertheless, AMA proceeded to announce its opening through news and print media, and thereupon, started to enroll students in elementary, secondary and tertiary levels. Taking remedial action, the DECS Regional Director directed AMA to stop enrollment and to desist from operating without prior authorization.AMA, however, not only continued the enrollment but even started to hold regular classes, and thereafter, on 15 June 1990, filed a formal application to operate. Acknowledging receipt of the said operation, the Regional Director reiterated the earlier directive for AMA to stop operation with a warning that further failure to comply "would constrain the Office to invoke the Memorandum Agreement with the Defense Department to stop unlawful operation of the school."5Again, AMA ignored the directive and continued to operate illegally.On 22 June 1990, a DECS inspection team was sent to the premises of AMA to look into the case. In its report, the inspection team confirmed AMA's defiance of the DECS directive. Hence, military assistance was requested by the Regional Director to effect closure of AMA Computer College, Inc., Davao City. However, in a letter dated 25 June 1990, AMA's Officer-in-Charge requested that the closure be held in abeyance for fifteen (15) days,7which the Regional Director denied on the same day.On even date, i.e. on 25 June 1990, the Regional Director received a letter from AMA asking that the parties await the decision of the Secretary of DECS on its application for permit to operate before the closure order is effected. On 27 June, 1990, the Secretary of DECS denied AMA'sapplication.Hence, AMA filed this petition for mandamus to enjoin the DECS to compel the release of their license to operate. Issue: Whether or not the petition for mandamus would prosperRuling: As a rule,mandamuswill lie only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty but not a discretionary function. A ministerial duty is one which is so clear and specific as to leave no room for the exercise of discretion in its performance. On the other hand, a discretionary duty is that which by nature requires the exercise of judgment. As explained in the case ofSymaco vs. Aquino,A purely ministerial act or duty to a discretional act, is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment, upon the propriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer, and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment.In the present case, the issuance of the permit in question is not a ministerial duty of the petitioners. It is a discretionary duty or function on the part of the petitioners because it had to be exercised in accordance with and not in violation of the law and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. Thus, as aptly observed by the Solicitor General in his Motion to Dismiss thepetition Establishment or recognition of private schools through government grant of permits is governed by law, specifically Batas Pambansa Blg. 232. The authority to grant permit is vested upon the judgment of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, which prescribes the rules and regulations governing the recognition on private schools (Section 27, Batas Pambansa Blg. 232).Whether to grant or not a permit is not a ministerial duty of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports. Rather it is a discretionary duty to be exercised in accordance with the rules and regulations prescribed.Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaSECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 113219 August 14, 1995ANICETO G. MATEO, MAXIMO SAN DIEGO, QUIRINO MATEO, DANIEL FRANCISCO, and LEONILA KUIZON,petitioners,vs.HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ARTURO A. MARAVE, and EDGAR STA. MARIA,respondents.FACTS: Petitioners, all Board Members of MOWAD, conducted an investigation on private respondent Edgar Sta. Maria, then General Manager. When placed under preventive suspension, Maximo San Diego was designated in his place as acting General Manager. He was later dismissed from service.Private respondent then filed a Special Civil Action before the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, Branch 78, challenging his dismissal by petitioners.Petitioners moved to dismiss the case on two grounds: 1. The court had no jurisdiction over the case; and2. Quo warranto was not the proper remedy.Respondent judge denied the motion to dismiss and the motion for reconsideration as well.Issue: Whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Rizal has jurisdiction over a case involving dismissal of an employee of Morong Water District, a quasi-public corporationHeld: No. MOWAD is a quasi-public corporation created pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 198, known as the provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973, as amended. Employees of government-owned or controlled corporations with original charter fall under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.Indeed, the hiring and firing of employees of government-own and controlled corporations are governed by the provisions of the Civil Service Law and Rules and Regulations.Presidential Decree No. 807, Executive Order No. 292, and Rule II section 1 of Memorandum Circular No. 44 series of 1990 of the Civil Service Commission spell out the initial remedy of private respondent against illegal dismissal. They categorically provide that the party aggrieved by a decision, ruling, order, or action of an agency of the government involving termination of services may appeal to the Commission within fifteen (15) days. Thereafter, private respondent could go on certiorari to the Supreme Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court if he still feels aggrieved by the ruling of the Civil Service Commission.SUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. 92008 July 30, 1990RAMON P. BINAMIRA,petitioner,vs.PETER D. GARRUCHO, JR.,respondent.Facts: The petitioner bases his claim on the following communication addressed to him by the Minister of Tourism on April 7, 1986:MEMORANDUM TO: MR. RAMON P. BINAMIRAYou are hereby designated General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority, effective immediately.By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter upon the performance of the duties of the office.(Sgd.) JOSE ANTONIO GONZALES Minister of Tourism and Chairman, P.T.A. BoardPursuant thereto, the petitioner assumed office on the same date.On April 10, 1986, Minister Gonzales sought approval from President Aquino of the composition of the Board of Directors of the PTA, which included Binamira as Vice-Chairman in his capacity as General Manager. This approval was given by the President on the same date.1Binamira claims that since assuming office, he had discharged the duties of PTA General Manager and Vice-Chairman of its Board of Directors and had been acknowledged as such by various government offices, including the Office of the President.He complains, though, that on January 2, 1990, his resignation was demanded by respondent Garrucho as the new Secretary of Tourism. What does is that on January 4, 1990, President Aquino sent respondent Garrucho the following memorandum,2copy furnished Binamira:4 January 1990MEMORANDUM TO: Hon. Peter D. Garrucho, Jr.. Secretary of TourismIt appearing from the records you have submitted to this Office that the present General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority was designated not by the President, as required by P.D. No. 564, as amended, but only by the Secretary of Tourism, such designation is invalid. Accordingly, you are hereby designated concurrently as General Manager, effective immediately, until I can appoint a person to serve in the said office in a permanent capacity.Please be guided accordingly.(Sgd.) CORAZON C. AQUINOcc: Mr. Ramon P. Binamira Philippine Tourism Authority ManilaGarrucho having taken over as General Manager of the PTA in accordance with this memorandum, the petitioner filed this action against him to question his title. Issue: Whether or not the appointment of Garrucho should be the one sustainedRuling: It is not disputed that the petitioner was notappointedby the President of the Philippines but onlydesignatedby the Minister of Tourism. There is a clear distinction between appointment and designation that the petitioner has failed to consider.Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office.3When completed, usually with its confirmation, the appointment results in security of tenure for the person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his office. Designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the imposition by law of additional duties on an incumbent official,4as where, in the case before us, the Secretary of Tourism is designated Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Tourism Authority, or where, under the Constitution, three Justices of the Supreme Court are designated by the Chief Justice to sit in the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of Representatives.5It is said that appointment is essentially executive while designation is legislative in nature.Designation may also be loosely defined as an appointment because it likewise involves the naming of a particular person to a specified public office. That is the common understanding of the term. However, where the person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority. In this sense, the designation is considered only an acting or temporary appointment, which does not confer security of tenure on the person named.Even if so understood, that is, as an appointment, the designation of the petitioner cannot sustain his claim that he has been illegally removed. The reason is that the decree clearly provides that the appointment of the General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority shall be made by the President of the Philippines, not by any other officer. Appointment involves the exercise of discretion, which because of its nature cannot be delegated. Legally speaking, it was not possible for Minister Gonzales to assume the exercise of that discretion as analter egoof the President. The appointment (or designation) of the petitioner was not a merely mechanical or ministerial act that could be validly performed by a subordinate even if he happened as in this case to be a member of the Cabinet.An officer to whom a discretion is entrusted cannot delegate it to another, the presumption being that he was chosen because he was deemed fit and competent to exercise that judgment and discretion, and unless the power to substitute another in his place has been given to him, he cannot delegate his duties to another.6In those cases in which the proper execution of the office requires, on the part of the officer, the exercise of judgment or discretion, the presumption is that he was chosen because he was deemed fit and competent to exercise that judgment and discretion, and, unless power to substitute another in his place has been given to him, he cannot delegate his duties to anotheRepublic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. L-28511 August 22, 1968ARTURO SERIA,petitioner,vs.THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BUKIDNON, ERNESTO VILLALON,respondents.Facts: The complaint stems from a report received by Arturo Serina, then Municipal Mayor of Kibawe, Bukidnon, and a candidate for reelection to the same position in the 1967 election that the election returns of Precinct No. 20 of Kibawe was tampered with, altered and falsified particularly the copies thereof which correspond to the Provincial Treasurer, Municipal Treasurer and the Commission on Elections. Thereupon, petitioner filed with respondent Court a petition for the judicial recount of the ballots in Precinct No. 20 of Kibawe. It was also stated that the other respondent, Ernesto Villalon, likewise a candidate for municipal mayor, received 525 votes while in the copy for the Municipal Treasurer, the number of votes appearing opposite his name is 2,525. The Court of First Instance denied Complainants motion to permit the Municipal Treasurer to open the ballot box of Precinct No. 20 of Kibawe, Bukidnon for the sole purpose of retrieving the ballot box copy therein contained, as well as another order of respondent court directing the Municipal Board of Canvassers to proceed with the canvass of the votes in such precinct without requiring such Board of Inspectors to fill up omissions of certain data in both the Commission of Elections as well as the Municipal Treasurer's copies of election returns as required by Section 162 of the Revised Election Code.Villalon however contended that the issue is already moot and academic as there was an admission that the ballot box in question (for Precinct No. 20) was opened in the Court of First Instance of Bukidnon, before the respondent Presiding Judge and the lawyers and representatives of both parties and it showed that there was uniformity of votes, with Villalon obtaining 525 votes. The court however denied the motion to dismiss but eventually ruled in the same manner after a motion for reconsideration for the dismissal was filed by Villalon.

Issue: Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the complaint filed by Serina.

Ruling: The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over the complaint filed by Serina. There is no occasion for the coming into play of the supervisory power of the Supreme Court over inferior tribunals, the matter having been rendered moot and academic. However the Supreme Court reminded the inferior courts that they must likewise hear in mind that where the provisions of the Election Code as in Section 142 and 162 are couched in mandatory form, the power does not exist for any court to distinguish between material and immaterial omissions. What the law decrees must be obeyed. It is as peremptory and as simple as that.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaFIRST DIVISIONG.R. No. L-36181 October 23, 1982MERALCO SECURITIES CORPORATION (now FIRST PHILIPPINE HOLDINGS CORPORATION),petitioner,vs.HON. VICTORINO SAVELLANO and ASUNCION BARON VDA. DE MANIAGO, et al., as heirs of the late Juan G. Maniago,respondents.G.R. No. L-36748 October 23, 1982COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,petitioner,vs.HON. VICTORINO SAVELLANO and ASUNCION BARON VDA. DE MANIAGO, et al., as heirs of the late Juan G. Maniago,respondents.Facts: A case regarding deficiency corporate income tax was decided by the herein Respondent-Judge Savellano. On May 22, 1967, the late Juan G. Maniago (substituted in these proceedings by his wife and children) submitted to petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue confidential denunciation against the Meralco Securities Corporation for tax evasion for having paid income tax only on 25 % of the dividends it received from the Manila Electric Co. for the years 1962-1966, thereby allegedly shortchanging the government of income tax due from 75% of the said dividends.Petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue caused the investigation of the denunciation after which he found and held that no deficiency corporate income tax was due from the Meralco Securities Corporation on the dividends it received from the Manila Electric Co. The Commissioner accordingly rejected Maniago's contention that the Meralco from whom the dividends were received is "not a domestic corporation liable to tax under this Chapter." This prompted the late Maniago to file a case for mandamus with the RTC. The case was decided by the Respondent-judge in favor of the late Maniago.The Petitioners then filed for an appeal on grounds of no jurisdiction of the Respondent-judge with the case at hand.Issue: Whether or not the judge has jurisdiction over the caseRuling: Respondent judge has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case because the subject matter thereof clearly falls within the scope of cases nowexclusivelywithin the jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals. Section 7 of Republic Act No. 1125, enacted June 16, 1954, granted to the Court of Tax Appealsexclusive appellate jurisdictionto review by appeal, among others, decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties imposed in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue Code or other law or part of law administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue.Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaSECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 90314 November 27, 1990LOIDA Q. SHAUF and JACOB SHAUF,Petitioners,vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DON E. DETWILER and ANTHONY PERSI,Respondents.Facts: Petitioner Loida Shauf, a Filipino by origin and married to an American who is a member of the US Air Force, applied for the vacant position of Guidance Counselor, GS 1710-9, in the Base Education Office at Clark Air Base, for which she is qualified. She had functioned as a Guidance Counselor at the said Air Base at the GS 1710-9 level for approximately four (4) years at the time that she applied for the same position in 1976. Her application was forwarded to Anthony Persi, an Education Director, who by then had some reservations regarding Shaufs work experience. Persi requested the Civilian Personnel Office to initiate immediate inquiry to the Central Overseas Rotation and Recruiting Office (CORRO). Persi was informed by CORRO that an Edward Isakson was selected for the position. By the reason of her non-selection to the position, Shauf filed an equal employment opportunity complain against the respondents for alleged discrimination by reason of her sex and nationality. RTC ruled in favor of Shauf ordering defendants to pay $39,662.49 as actual damages + 20% of such amount as attorneys fees + P100k as moral & exemplary damages. Both parties appealed to the CA. Shauf prayed for the increase of the damages to be collected from defendants. The defendants on the other hand, continued using the defense that they are immune from suit for acts done/statements made by them in performance of their official governmental functions pursuant to RP-US Military Bases Agreement of 1947. They claim that the Philippines does not have jurisdiction over the case because it was under the exclusive jurisdiction of a US District Court. They likewise claim that the petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative remedies and the case should be dismissed. CA reversed the RTC decision. According to the CA, defendants are immune from suit. Shauf claims that the respondents are being sued in their private capacity and this is not a suit against the US government which would require consent and the respondents still maintain their immunity from suit. They further claim that the rule allowing suits against public officers & employees for criminal and unauthorized acts is applicable only in the Philippines and is not part of international law.

Issue: Whether or not the private respondents are immune from suit being officers of the US Armed Forces.

Ruling: No, they are not immune. As expressed in Art. XVI, Sec. 3 of the 1987 Constitution, the State may not be sued without its consent. This is a generally accepted principle of international law under Art. II, Sec. 2. The case may be taken as a suit against the US since the damages to Shauf will be taken from funds of the US. However, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the course of their duties. The unauthorized acts of the government officials are not acts of the State. The respondents are being sued in their private and personal capacity.Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. L-47051 July 29, 1988BLUE BAR COCONUT PHILIPPINES; CAGAYAN DE ORO OIL CO; CENTRAL VEGETABLE OIL MANUFACTURING CO.; COCONUT OIL MANUFACTURING (PHIL.) INC., GRANE EXPORT CORPORATION; IMPERIAL VEGETABLE OIL CO., INTERNATIONAL OIL FACTORY; LEGASPI OIL CO., INC.; LIBERTY OIL FACTORY; LUCENA OIL FACTORY, INC., AND 14 OTHER CORPORATIONS,petitioners,vs.THE HONORABLE FRANCISCO S. TANTUICO, JR., Acting Chairman of the Commission on Audit; and DR. GREGORIO YU, Auditor of the Philippine Coconut Authority,respondents.Facts: On June 30, 1973, the then President of the Philippines issued Presidential Decree No. 232 creating a Philippine Coconut Authority, with a governing board of eleven members, which was later reduced to nine by Presidential Decree No. 271 and finally to only seven by Presidential Decree No. 623.

Thereafter, the Respondent-Chairman initiated a special coconut end-user companies which included the Petitioner. The chairman directed to collect short levies and overpriced subsidies to apply the same to settlement of short levies they should fail to pay. The Commission on Audit agreed to release the subsidy provided they post a bond equivalent to the amount of the disputed claim. Petitioner contended that it is unacceptable that the COA Chairman and Auditor had no jurisdiction. They caused the withholding of the subsidy case endorsed to the court.

Issue: Whether or not Respondent-Chairman may disregard the PCA rules and decision had became moot

Ruling: The legal presumption is that official duty has been duly performed; and it is "particularly strong as regards administrative agencies...vested with powers said to be quasi-judicial in nature, in connection with the enforcement of laws affecting particular fields of activity, the proper regulation and/or promotion of which requires a technical or special training, aside from a good knowledge and grasp of the overall conditions, relevant to said fields, containing in the nation. The consequent policy and practice underlying our Administrative Law is that courts of justice should respect the findings of fact of said administrative agencies, unless there is absolutely no evidence in support thereof or such evidence is clearly, manifestly and patently insubstantial. Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. 109113 January 25, 1995CONCERNED OFFICIALS OF THE METROPOLITAN WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE SYSTEM (MWSS),petitioners,vs.HON. OMBUDSMAN CONRADO M. VASQUEZ AND MEMBERS OF THE PHILIPPINE LARGE DIAMETER PRESSURE PIPE MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION (PLDPPMA),respondents.Facts: The Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System launched Angat Water Supply Optimization Project in order to provide about 1.3 million liters of water to about 3.8 million people in the Metropolitan area. The project was financed by funds loaned by the Overseas Economic Fund of Japan to the National Government.

MWSS caused the publication of invitations to bid for the project. The PLDPPMA sent letters offering suggestions for technical specifications. Thereafter, three lowest bidders for the project were known. FF-Cruz and Inc. was recommended but other members opted for rebidding. Nonetheless, the bid was still awarded to FF-Cruz.

PLDPPMA filed protest with the office of the Ombudsman. The petitioner's questions this act, stating that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Issue: Whether or not the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the case

Held: No, the particular aspect of his functions that, however, really finds relevance to the present case relates to his investigatory power and public assistance duties which can be found in the first and second paragraphs, respectively, of Section 13, Article XI, of the Constitution, along with the corresponding provisions of the Ombudsman Act. While the broad authority of the Ombudsman to investigate any act or omission which ". . . appears illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient" may be yielded, it is difficult to equally concede, however, that the Constitution and the Ombudsman Act have intended to likewise confer upon it veto or revisory power over an exercise of judgment or discretion by an agency or officer upon whom that judgment or discretion is lawfully vested. It would seem to us that the Office of the Ombudsman, in issuing the challenged orders, has not only directly assumed jurisdiction over, but likewise pre-empted the exercise of discretion by, the Board of Trustees of MWSS. Indeed, the recommendation of the PBAC-CSTE to award Contract APM-01 appears to be yet pending consideration and action by the MWSS Board of Trustees.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. 90591, November 21, 1990GOVERNOR AMOR R. DELOSO petitioners,vs.HON. MANUEL C. DOMINGO, in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon and PC/INP/CIS, respondents.Facts: An alleged ambushed led to the prosecution of Governor Delloso who was charged before the Special Prosecutor with multiple murder. Governor Delloso questioned the said referral to the Ombudsman alleging that the same has no jurisdiction over the case for being irrelevant of the crime he committed to his official function as governor.Issue: Whether or not the Ombudsman has jurisdiction Held: The Court ruled in a positive manner. As protector of the people, the office of the Ombudsman has the power, function and duty to act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials to investigate any act or omission of any public officials when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The Ombudsman is also empowered to direct the officer concerned, in this case, the Special Prosecutor, to take appropriate action against a public official and to recommend his prosecution. Further, the court ruled that the law does not require that the acts or omissions be related to or be connected with or arise from the performance of an official duty.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. 101666 June 9, 1992DR. ELISEO L. RUIZ, President of Central Luzon State University (CLSU), Muoz, Nueva Ecija,petitioner,vs.HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FRANKLIN DRILON, HON. ISIDRO CARIO, in his capacity as DECS Secretary; ATTY. RENO CAPINPIN, Director III, DECS, in his capacity as Chairman, Investigating Committee; DALMACIO CASISON, in his capacity and as Member, Investigating Committee; EDUARDO PARAY, LUIS CASTRO, HIPOLITO MALAMUG, NEMESIO TORRES and NOLASCO HIPOLITO,respondents.No. 103570 June 9, 1992DR. ELISEO L. RUIZ, President, Central Luzon State University (CLSU), Muoz, Nueva Ecija, petitioner,vs.THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS; HON. ISIDRO CARIO, in his capacity as DECS Secretary; MARINA S.J. PANGAN, in her capacity as Asst. Secretary of DECS and DR. FORTUNATO BATTAD, respondents.Facts: On 6 May 1991, President Corazon Aquino issued Administrative Order ("AO") No. 218 dismissing petitioner Eliseo Ruiz for cause from his office as President of the Central Luzon State University ("CLSU").In two (2) orders dated 2 July 1991 and 3 September 1991, the Executive Secretary, acting by authority of the President, denied petitioner's first and second motions for reconsideration therefrom, the first for lack of merit and the second for beingpro forma.Consequently, AO No. 218 became final and executory.Petitioner filed with the Supreme Court the present petition (G.R. No. 101666) forcertiorariand prohibition with prayer for a TRO for the purpose of annulling, for alleged grave abuse of discretion, the issuance of AO No. 218 as well as of the orders of the Executive Secretary denying his motions for reconsideration therefrom.Issue: Whether or not the Petitioner was denied due processRuling: Petitioner is not entitled to be informed of the findings and recommendations of any investigating committee created to inquire into charges filed against him. He is entitled only to an administrative decision that is based on substantial evidence made of record and a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges made against him and the evidence presented against him during the hearings of the investigating committees. There is no doubt that he has been accorded his rights.AO No. 218 made certain findings of fact on the basis of which petitioner was removed from office. Those findings included the facts that (a) petitioner terminated the CLSU's Executive Vice-President, offered new academic courses, undertook unprogrammed projects resulting in wastage of university property, all without the necessary approval of the Board of Regents; (b) he directed the purchase at uncanvassed prices of chemicals unsuitable for the required school purposes from a firm owned by him; (c) he executed, on behalf of CLSU, a crop harvest sales agreement in favor of a company where he was holding a directorship; and (d) he collected financial contributions from the faculty and students in disregard of the provisions of R.A. No. 5546. These acts constitute dishonesty and grave misconduct, and furnish legal basis for dismissal from the public service.