admin cases digested

8/12/2019 Admin Cases Digested

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Tecson vs. COMELEC , GR 16134 , March 3, 2004

FACTS: Petitioners questioned the jurisdiction of the COMELEC in taking cognizance of and deciding the citizenship

issue affecting Fernando Poe Jr. They asserted that under Section 4(7) , Article VII of the 1987 Constituition, only the

Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue of the case.

ISSUE: As the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) , does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction over the qualifications of

presidential candidates?

RULING: No. An examination of the phraseology in Rule 12, 13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the Presidential Electoral

Tribunal," promulgated by the Supreme Court on April 1992 categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over

contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines,

and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President. A quo warranto proceeding is generally defined as being an

action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office. In such context, the

election contest can only contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who would

have received either the second or third highest number of votes could file an election protest. This rule again

presupposes a post-election scenario.

It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987

Constitution, would not include cases directly brought before it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the

presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.

BENGSON vs. HRET and CRUZ

G.R. No. 142840

May 7, 2001

FACTS: The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the constitutional requirement that no

person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen.

Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Tarlac in 1960 of Filipino parents. In 1985, however,

Cruz enlisted in the US Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of

allegiance to the USA. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under CA No. 63 [(An Act Providing for the

Ways in Which Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or Reacquired (1936)] section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his

citizenship by, among other, rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country.

Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his naturalization as a U.S.

citizen in 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.

In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630 [(An Act Providing for

Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or Accepting

Commission In, the Armed Forces of the United States (1960)]. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of

the 2nd District of Pangasinan in the 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Bengson who was then running for

reelection.

Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent HRET claiming that Cruz was notqualified to become a member of the HOR since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6

of the Constitution.

HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring Cruz the duly elected

Representative in the said election.

ISSUE: WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born

Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

HELD: petition dismissed

YES

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. C.A.

No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen:1. by naturalization,

2. by repatriation, and

3. by direct act of Congress.

**

Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to:

1. desertion of the armed forces;

2. services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;

3. service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time,

4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and

5. political economic necessity


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Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his

citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a

natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born

Filipino.

R.A. No. 2630 provides:

Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the

Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United

States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the

Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the

Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry

of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, Cruz is deemed to have recovered his

original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears

stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine

citizenship.

G.R. No. 154198 January 20, 2003

PETRONILA S. RULLODA vs. COMELEC and REMEGIO PLACIDO

Facts:

Comelec denied petitioners request to substitute her deceased husband in the Barangay Chairman Candidacy despite

the fact that petitioner apparently garnered the highest votes when constituents wrote her name in the ballots.

Respondents cited resolution 4801 and Section 7 of the Omnibus Election Code which prohibits substitution of

candidates. Private respondent Placido contended that it was only right that he be proclaimed winner since he was

the only one who filed a certificate of candidacy and, hence, the only candidate running.

Issue:

Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion when Comelec denied petitioners request that she be allowed to

run for elections.

Ruling:

There being no specific provision governing substitution of candidates in barangay elections, a prohibition against said

substitution cannot be said to exist.

Petitioners letter-request was considered a certificate of candidacy when COMELEC issued its resolution denying the

same. In the contested election, it was petitioner who obtained the plurality of votes. Technicalities and procedural

niceties in election cases should not be made to stand in the way of the true will of the electorate. Laws governing

election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials may

not be defeated by mere technical objections.

Municipal Board of Canvassers of Glan v. COMELEC

Facts: A preproclamation controversy instituted by respondent Flora Benzonan and COMELEC. Benzonan who was a

mayoralty candidate in the Municipality of Glan, Sarangani during 2001 sought to declare null and void the canvass

conducted by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Glan and to recall the proclamation of petitioners respectively.

Respondent argued here pre-proclamation case on the ground that:

1. After the original and second Municipal Board of Canvassers had resigned, the third Municipal Board of Canvassers

was illegally constituted as it as its Chairman, Vice Chairman and Secretary which are not qualified over Omnibus

Code.

2. The canvassing proceeding with more initially held in the Session Hall of Sangunian Bayan were latter transferred to

the Provincial Capitol at Danao contrary to COMELEC Resolution.

3. The Secretary of Municipal Board of Canvassers failed to record the minutes of the canvassing.

4. Neither Benzonan nor her representatives were the last three days of the canvassing proceeding.

5. A sustancial number of election returns had been tampered with of falsificated.

6. Municipal Board of Canvassers falsificated the Certificate of Canvass Vote.


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The COMELEC en banc issued a resolution finding the based on the evidence presented the proclamation of the

winning candidates were declared null and void. And a re-canvass of the election returns was ordered. Arising from

the said decision was a petition for Certiorari filed to review the COMELEC en banc's resolution and praying that a

Temporary Restraining Order be given for the reason that COMELEC was not in the proper jurisdiction to render such

resolution.

Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC en banc has a jurisdiction over the case.

Held: Not all cases relating to election laws filed before the Comelec are required to be first heard by a division. Underthe constitution the COMELEC exercise both the administrative and quasi-judicial powers. The COMELEC en banc can

act directly on matters falling with in its administrative powers. It is only when the exercise of quasi-judicial powers

are involved that the COMELEC is mandated to decide cases first in division. It is clear that this case is one that

involves a preproclamation controversy that requires the exercise of the COMELEC's quasi-judicial powers as the

illegality of the composition and proceedings of the Municipal Board of Canvassers. Also, Benzonan filed her pre

proclamation case directly with the COMELEC en banc. Since COMELEC en banc is without jurisdiction to decide cases

involving such, the procedure taken by Benzonan resulted in a resolution in her favor thus declare null and void.

MIRIAM DEFENSORSANTIAGO versus FIDEL RAMOS (253 SCRA 559)

Facts:

The protestant, Miriam Defensor-Santiago ran for presidency and lost in the May 1992 election. In her Motion on the

16th

day of August in the year 1995, reiterated in her comment of the 29th

of August of the same year, protestant

Defensor-Santiago prayed that the revision in the remaining precincts of the pilot areas be dispensed with and the

revision process in the pilot areas be deemed computed.

The Court deferred action on the motion and required, instead, the protestant and protestee to submit theirrespective memoranda. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the election protest filed by Defensor-Santiago is moot and academic by her election as a Senator in

the May 1995 election and her assumption of office as such on the 30th

of June in the year 1995.

Held:

YES. The Court held that the election protest filed by Santiago has been abandoned or considered withdrawn as a

consequence of her election and assumption of office as Senator and her discharge of the duties and functions

thereof.The protestant abandoned her determination to protest and pursue the public interest involved in the matter of who

is the real choice of the electorate.

Moreover, the dismissal of this protest would serve public interest as it would dissipate the aura of uncertainty as to

the results of the 1992 presidential elections, thereby enhancing the all too crucial political stability of the nation

during this period of national recovery.

Also, the PET issued a resolution ordering the protestant to inform the PET within 10 days if after the completion of

the revision of the ballots from her pilot areas, she still wishes to present evidence. Since DS has not informed the

Tribunal of any such intention, such is a manifest indication that she no longer intends to do so.

MERCADO versus MANZANO (307 SCRA 630)

Facts:

Respondent Eduardo Manzano won as vice mayor of Makati City in the May 1998 elections.


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However, upon petition of a certain Ernesto Mamaril, the COC of Manzano was cancelled by COMELEC on the ground

that he is a dual citizen.

Issue:

Whether or Not private respondent is qualified to hold office as Vice-Mayor.

Held:

YES. Private respondent Manzano was qualified to run for the position of vice mayor of Makati. The COMELEC en banc

held that Manzano acquired US citizenship by operation of the United States Constitution and laws under the

principle of jus soli. He was issued an alien certificate of registration. This, however, did not result in the loss of his

Philippine citizenship since he did not take an oath of allegiance to the United States. It is an undisputed fact that

when Manzano attained the age of majority, he registered himself as a voter, and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995

and 1998, which effectively renounced his US citizenship under American law.

According to Article IV Section 5 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that dual allegiance of citizens is

inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law. Dual citizenship is not dual allegiance; as such dual

allegiance and not dual citizenship shall be dealt with by the law.

BORJA versus COMELEC

Facts:

Private respondent Jose T. Carpo, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term ending June

30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar

Borja. For the next two succeeding elections in 1992 and 1995, he was again re-elected as Mayor.

On March 27, 1998, private respondent Carpo filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Pateros relative to the May11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought Carpos

disqualification on the theory that the latter would have already served as mayor for three consecutive terms by June

30, 1998 and would therefore be ineligible to serve for another term after that.

COMELEC ruled in favor of petitioner and declared private respondent Carpo saying that In both the Constitution and

the Local Government Code, the three-term limitation refers to the term of office for which the local official was

elected. It made no reference to succession to an office to which he was not elected. Carpo won the election case

against Borja. Hence, this petition.

Issue:Whether or not a person who served in a position by operation of law could be considered as having served the term

for the purpose of the three-term limit under the Constitution.

Held:

NO. The court held that when Carpo occupied the post of the Mayor upon the incumbents death and served for

remainder of the term, he cannot be construed as having served a full term as contemplated under the three term

limit. The term he served must be one for which he was elected. Furthermore, before assuming the position of

Mayor, he served first as a Vice Mayor and the duties and responsibilities of the two positions are wholly different

from each other.

QUINTO versus COMELEC (G.R. No. 189698)

Facts:

Petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. filed a petition for certiorariand prohibition against the

COMELEC for issuing a resolution declaring appointive officials who filed their certificate of candidacy as ipso

factoresigned from their government offices because at such time they are not yet treated by the law as candidates.


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They should be considered resigned from their respective offices only at the start of the campaign period when they

are, by law, already considered candidates.

In this defense, the COMELEC avers that it only copied the provision from Sec. 13 of R.A. 9369.

Issue:

Whether or not the said COMELEC resolution was valid.

Held:

NO. In the Fariascase, the petitioners challenged Sec. 14 ofRA. 9006 repealing Sec. 66 of the Omnibus Election Code

(OEC) for giving undue benefit to elective officials in comparison with appointive officials. Incidentally, the Court

upheld the substantial distinctions between the two and pronounced that there was no violation of the equal

protection clause. However in the present case, the Court held that the discussion on the equal protection clause was

an obiter dictumsince the issue raised therein was against the repealing clause. It didnt squarely challenge Sec. 66.

Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 unduly discriminated appointive and elective officials. Applying the 4 requisites of a valid

classification, the proviso does not comply with the second requirementthat it must be germane to the purpose of

the law.

The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position to promote ones

candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence of the electorate. The measure is further aimed at

promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger that the discharge of

official duty would be motivated by political considerations rather than the welfare of the public. The restriction is

also justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electorate arena, while still in office, could result

in neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be attending to their campaign rather than

to their office work.

LONZANIDA versus COMELEC (G.R. No. 135150)

Facts:

Petitioner Romeo Lonzanida duly elected and served two consecutive terms as municipal mayor of San Antonio,

Zambales prior to the May 8 1995 elections where he ran for the mayoralty position of San Antonio, Zambales and

was again proclaimed the winner. He then assumed office and discharged said duties therof. His proclamation in the

year 1995 was however contested by his then opponent Juan Alvez who later on filed an election protest.

In the year 1997, the RTC of Zambales declared a failure of elections. After a revision and re-appreciation of the

contested ballot, COMELEC declared Alvarez the duly elected mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and ordered petitioner

to vacate the post.

On the 11th

of May in the year 1998 elections again, Lonzanida ran for mayor wherein his contender Eufemio Muli

filed a petition to disqualify the former from running for mayor of San Antonio in the 1998 elections on the ground

that he had served three consecutive terms in the same post.

Lonzanidas assumption of office by virtue of his proclamation in May 1995, although he was later unseated before

the expiration of the term, should be counted as service for one full term in computing the three term limit under the

Constitution and the Local Government Code.

Issue:

Whether or not tit may be considered that the petitioner had served three consecutive terms, granting that he did

not finish his term in 1995.

Held:

NO. By reason of his involuntary relinquishment of office, petitioner did not fully serve the 1995 to 1998 mayoral term

and became a private citizen. The said disqualification was primarily intended to forestall the accumulation of massive

political power by an elective local government official in a given locality in order to perpetuate his tenure in office.

The court set two conditions which must concur in order to disqualify an elective local official from serving more than

three consecutive terms such as that 1.) the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the

same local government post and that 2.) he has fully served three consecutive terms.
http://philippinelaw.info/statutes/ra9006.htmlhttp://philippinelaw.info/statutes/ra9006.html


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RIVERA III versus COMELEC (G.R. No. 167591)

Facts:

A petition for cancellation of the COC of Marino Morales as mayoralty candidate in Mabalacat, Pampanga for the May

2004 mayoralty was filed on the ground that he had already served three consecutive terms in the office that he

seeks to run for.

However, Morales argues that this is not so because although he really served in 19951998 in his first term and

20042007 for his third term, he was merely a caretaker or de facto mayor in the year 19982001 for his said to be

second term that is because his election was declared void by the RTC due to an election protest.

COMELEC ruled that Morales already served his third term and after an MR was filed, declared it final and executory

on May 14, 2004.

Issue:

Whether or not Morales had already served his three consecutive terms and if so, who should take his position.

Held:

For the three term limit for elective government officials to apply, two conditions must concur to wit: 1.) that the

official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and 2.) that he has

fully served three consecutive terms.

As the issue whether a caretaker or de facto officer, he exercises the powers and enjoys the prerequisites of the

office which enables him to stay on indefinitely.

With regard to the person who will replace Morales, it is a rule that the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority

votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A

minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.

Since his disqualification became final and executory after the elections, the candidate having the second highest

number of votes cannot assume the position. Hence, it is the petitioner, the elected Vice Mayor Anthony Dee who

should be declared as the mayor.

MITRA versus COMELEC (G.R. No. 191938)

Facts:

When his COC for the position of Governor of Palawan was declared cancelled, Mitra was the incumbent

Representative of the Second District of Palawan. This district then included, among other territories, the Municipality

of Aborlan and Puerto Princesa City. He was elected Representative as a domiciliary of Puerto Princesa City, and

represented the legislative district for three (3) terms immediately before the elections of 2010.

On March 26, 2007 (or before the end of Mitras second term as Representative), Puerto Princesa City was reclassified

as a "highly urbanized city" and thus ceased to be a component city of the Province of Palawan. The direct legal

consequence of this new status was the ineligibility of Puerto Princesa City residents from voting for candidates for

elective provincial officials.

On March 20, 2009, with the intention of running for the position of Governor, Mitra applied for the transfer of his

Voters Registration Record from Precinct No. 03720 ofBrgy. Sta. Monica, Puerto Princesa City, to Sitio Maligaya,Brgy.

Isaub, Municipality of Aborlan, Province of Palawan. He subsequently filed his COC for the position of Governor of

Palawan as a resident of Aborlan.

Soon thereafter, respondents Antonio V. Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr. (the respondents) filed a petition to

deny due course or to cancel Mitras COC.


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Issue:

Whether or not Mitra is qualified to run for Governor of Palawan.

Held:

YES. Mitra is qualified to rum for the position as Governor of Palawan. The Supreme Court ruled that Mitra did not

misrepresent himself and that he met the residency requirement as mandated by the Constitution.

The election of Abraham Kahlil Mitra as governor of Palawan in the May 10, 2010 elections was upheld in a vote of

11-3. The respondents were not able to present a convincing case sufficient to overcome Mitras evidence of effective

transfer to and residence in Aborlan and the validity of his representation on this point in his COC. Likewise, the

"COMELEC could not present any legally acceptable basis to conclude that Mitras statement in his COC regarding his

residence was a misrepresentation."

SOCRATES versus COMELEC

Facts:

Edward Hagedorn has already served for three consecutive terms as mayor from 1992 to 2001. He did not run in the

immediately following regular elections. One July 2, 2002, the incumbent mayor, Socrates, faced a recall proceeding

and was asked to step down from office.

On August 23 of the same year, Hagedorn filed his COC for mayor in recall election. A petition for his disqualification

was filed by Socrates on the ground that he cannot run for the said post for his 4th

consecutive term.

Issue:

Whether or not Hagedorn was qualified to run for the 2003 recall election.

Held:

YES. The court ruled that the rationale behind the three term rule was to prevent consecutiveness in holding office. In

the case of Edward Hagedorn, there was a break after the end of his third term and before the recall election.

Penera vs. Commission on Elections, et al.

G.R. No. 181613

25 November 2009

(motion for reconsideration)

Facts:

On 11 September 2009, the Supreme Court affirmed the COMELECs decision to

disqualify petitioner Rosalinda Penera (Penera) as mayoralty candidate in Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte, for engaging

in election campaign outside the campaign period, in violation of Section 80 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (the Omnibus

Election Code).

Penera moved for reconsideration, arguing that she was not yet a candidate at the time of the supposed premature

campaigning, since under Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436 (the law authorizing the COMELEC to use an automated

election system for the process of voting, counting of votes, and canvassing/consolidating the results of the national

and local elections), as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, one is not officially a candidate until the start of the

campaign period.

Issue:


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Whether or not Peneras disqualification for engaging in premature campaigning should be reconsidered.

Holding:

Granting Peneras motion for reconsideration, the Supreme Court En Banc held that

Penera did not engage in premature campaigning and should, thus, not be disqualified as a mayoralty candidate. The

Court said

(A) The Courts 11 September 2009 Decision(or the assailed Decision) considered a

person who files a certificate of candidacy already a candidate even before the start of the campaign period. This is

contrary to the clear intent and letter of Section 15 of Republic Act 8436, as amended, which states that a person who

files his certificate of candidacy will only be considered a candidate at the start of the campaign period, and unlawful

acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of such campaign period.

Thus, applying said law:

(1) The effective date when partisan political acts become unlawful as to a

candidate is when the campaign period starts. Before the start of the campaign

period, the same partisan political acts are lawful.

(2) Accordingly, a candidate is liable for an election offense only for

acts done during the campaign period, not before. In other words, election

offenses can be committed by a candidate only upon the start of the campaign

period. Before the start of the campaign period, such election offenses cannot be

so committed. Since the law is clear, the Court has no recourse but to apply it. The forum for examining the wisdom

of the law, and enacting remedial measures, is not the Court but the Legislature.

(B) Contrary to the assailed Decision, Section 15 of R.A. 8436, as amended, does not

provide that partisan political acts done by a candidate before the campaign period are unlawful, but may be

prosecuted only upon the start of the campaign period. Neither does the law state that partisan political acts done by

a candidate before the campaign period are temporarily lawful, but becomes unlawful upon the start of the campaign

period. Besides, such a law as envisioned in the Decision, which defines a criminal act and curtails freedom of

expression and speech, would be void for vagueness.

(C) That Section 15 of R.A. 8436 does not expressly state that campaigning before the start of the campaign period is

lawful, as the assailed Decision asserted, is of no moment. It is a basic principle of law that any act is lawful unless

expressly declared unlawful by law. The mere fact that the law does not declare an act unlawful ipso facto means that

the act is lawful. Thus, there is no need for Congress to declare in Section 15 of R.A. 8436 that partisan political

activities before the start of the campaign period are lawful. It is sufficient for Congress to state that any unlawful act

or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period. The only

inescapable and logical result is that the same acts, if done before the start of the campaign period, are lawful.

(D) The Courts 11 September 2009 Decision also reversed Lanot vs. COMELEC (G.R.

No. 164858; 16 November 2006). Lanot was decided on the ground that one who files a

certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the campaign period. This ground was based on the

deliberations of the legislators who explained that the early deadline for filing certificates of candidacy under R.A.

8436 was set only to afford time to prepare the machine-readable ballots, and they intended to preserve the existing

election periods, such that one who files his certificate of candidacy to meet the early deadline will still not be

considered as a candidate.

When Congress amended R.A. 8436, Congress decided to expressly incorporate the

Lanot doctrine into law, thus, the provision in Section 15 of R.A. 8436 that a person who files his certificate of

candidacy shall be considered a candidate only at the start of the campaign period. Congress wanted to insure that no

person filing a certificate of candidacy under the early deadline required by the automated election system would be


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disqualified or penalized for any partisan political act done before the start of the campaign period. This provision

cannot be annulled by the Court except on the sole ground of its unconstitutionality.

The assailed Decision, however, did not claim that this provision is unconstitutional. In fact, the assailed Decision

considered the entire Section 15 good law. Thus, the Decision was self-contradictory reversing Lanot but

maintaining the constitutionality of the said provision.

Penera vs. Commission on Elections (COMELEC), et al.

G.R. 181613

11 September 2009

Facts: The COMELEC disqualified petitioner Rosalinda A. Penera (Penera) as a candidate for

mayor of the Municipality of Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte, for unlawfully engaging in election

campaign before the start of the campaign period for the 2007 Synchronized National and Local

Elections, in violation of Section 80 of Batas Pambansa 881 (the Omnibus Election Code).

The COMELEC found that Penera and her party-mates, after filing their Certificates of

Candidacy (CoCs), conducted a motorcade through Sta. Monica and threw candies to onlookers,

aboard trucks festooned with balloons and banners bearing their names and pictures and the

municipal positions for which they were seeking election, one of which trucks had a sound

system that broadcast their intent to run in the 2007 elections.

COMELEC Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento dissented. He emphasized that under

Section 15 of Republic Act 8436 (the law authorizing the COMELEC to use an automated

election system for the process of voting, counting of votes, and canvassing/consolidating the

results of the national and local elections), as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, one is now

considered a candidate only at the start of the campaign period. Thus, before the start of the

campaign period, there can be no election campaign or partisan political activity because there is

no candidate to speak of. Accordingly, Penera could not be disqualified for premature

campaigning because the motorcade took place outside the campaign periodwhen Penera was

not yet a candidate. Sarmiento posited that Section 15 of R.A. No. 8436, as amended by R.A.

9369, has practically made it impossible to commit premature campaigning at any time, and has,

thus, effectively repealed Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Penera filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court to nullify the

disqualification. She argued that the evidence was grossly insufficient to warrant the

COMELECs ruling. She maintained that the motorcade was spontaneous and unplanned, and

the supporters merely joined her and the other candidates.

Issue: Whether or not Penera should be disqualified for engaging in election campaign or

partisan political activity outside the campaign period.

Holding: (A) The Supreme Court En Banc dismissed Peneras Petition and affirmed her

disqualification because:

(1) Penera raised a question of fact. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and the

sole function of a writ of certiorari is to address issues of want of jurisdiction or grave abuse of

discretion, and does not include a review of the tribunals evaluation of the evidence.

(2) The COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion. Evidence presented to the

COMELEC, including Peneras own evidence and admissions, sufficiently established that

Penera and her partymates, after filing their COCs x x, participated in a motorcade which

passed through the different barangays of Sta. Monica, waived their hands to the public, and

threw candies to the onlookers. With vehicles, balloons, and even candies on hand, Penera can

hardly persuade the Court that the motorcade was spontaneous and unplanned.

(T)he conduct of a motorcade is a form of election campaign or partisan political

activity, falling squarely within the ambit of Section 79(b)(2) of the Omnibus Election Code, on

*h+olding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies,

for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against

a candidate*.+ x x The obvious purpose of the conduct of motorcades is to introduce the

candidates and the positions, to which they seek to be elected, to the voting public; or to make


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them more visible so as to facilitate the recognition and recollection of their names in the minds

of the voters come election time. Unmistakably, motorcades are undertaken for no other purpose

than to promote the election of a particular candidate or candidates.

Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code prohibits any person, whether a voter, a

candidate or a party, from engaging in any election campaign or partisan political activity outside

the campaign period (except that political parties may hold political conventions or meetings to

nominate their official candidates within 30 days before the campaign period and 45 days for

Presidential and Vice-Presidential election).

And, under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, a candidate declared by final

decision to have engaged in premature campaigning shall be disqualified from continuing as a

candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Said candidate may also face

criminal prosecution for an election offense under Section 262 of the same Code.

Thus, Penera, who had been elected Mayor of Sta. Monica before the COMELEC

rendered its decision, was disqualified from holding the said office. The proclaimed Vice-Mayor

was declared her rightful successor pursuant to Section 44 of the Local Government Code which

provides that if the mayor fails to qualify or is removed from office, the vice-mayor shall become

the mayor.

(B) The Supreme Court disagreed with COMELEC Commissioner Sarmiento, saying that

Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code remains relevant and applicable despite Section 15 of

Republic Act No. 8436, as amended. The Court gave the following reasons:

(1) Republic Act No. 9369, which amended Republic Act No. 8436, did not expressly

repeal Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. An express repeal may not be presumed.

Implied repeals are disfavored, absent a showing of repugnance clear and convincing in

character. When confronted with apparently conflicting statutes, courts should endeavor to

reconcile the same instead of declaring outright the invalidity of one as against the other.

(2) There is no absolute and irreconcilable incompatibility between Section 15 of

Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, and Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, which

prohibits premature campaigning. It is possible to harmonize and reconcile these two provisions

and, thus, give effect to both, to wit:

(a) Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code prohibits any person,

whether or not a voter or candidate from engaging in election campaign or

partisan political activity outside the campaign period. Thus, premature

campaigning may be committed even by a person who is not a candidate.

Accordingly, the declaration in Lanot vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 164858; 16

November 2006) that (w)hat Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code prohibits

is an election campaign or partisan political activity by a candidate outside

of the campaign period, is erroneous.

(b) It is true that under Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended,

a person is not yet officially considered a candidate before the start of the

campaign period, even after the filing of his CoC. Nonetheless, upon the filing

of his COC, such person already explicitly declares his intention to run as a

candidate. When the campaign period starts and he proceeds with his candidacy,

his intent turning into actuality, act/s constituting election campaign or partisan

activity under Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code (holding rallies or

parades, making speeches, etc.), which he may have committed after filing his

CoC and before the campaign period, can already be considered as the promotion

of his election as a candidate, constituting premature campaigning, for which he

may be disqualified. Conversely, if he withdraws his CoC before the campaign

period, his act can no longer be viewed as for the promotion of his election, and

there can be no premature campaigning as there is no candidate to begin with.

Thus, a person, after filing his/her COC but prior to his becoming a

candidate (prior to the start of the campaign period), can already commit the acts

described under Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code as election


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campaign or partisan political activity. However, it is only after said person

officially becomes a candidate, at the beginning of the campaign period, can said

acts be given effect as premature campaigning under Section 80 of the Omnibus

Election Code. Only after said person officially becomes a candidate, at the start

of the campaign period, can his/her disqualification be sought for acts constituting

premature campaigning.

(c) While a proviso in Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended,

provides that any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall

take effect only upon the start of the campaign period, this does not mean

that the acts constituting premature campaigning can only be committed during

the campaign period. Nowhere in the said proviso was it stated that campaigning

before the start of the campaign period is lawful.

If the Court were to rule otherwise, not only will the prohibited act of premature

campaigning be officially decriminalized, the significance of having a campaign period before

the elections would also be negated. Any unscrupulous individual with the deepest of campaign

war chests could then afford to spend his/her resources to promote his/her candidacy well ahead

of everyone else, thus, undermine the conduct of fair and credible elections. Such is the very

evil that the law seeks to prevent. Our lawmakers could not have intended to cause such an

absurd situation.

TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON vs. COMELEC, LUIS M. BAUTISTA, ROBELITO V. PICAR and WILMA P. PAGADUANG.R. No. 198742

August 10, 2012Facts:

Petitioner, a natural-born Filipino citizen, became a naturalized Australian citizen owing to her marriage to a certain

Kevin ThomasCondon.

In 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship before the Philippine Embassy in Canberra,

Australia pursuant toSection 3 of R.A. No. 9225 otherwise known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act

of 2003.

It was approved and the petitioner took her oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines

In 2006, petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship before the Department of

Immigration andIndigenous Affairs, Canberra, Australia, which in turn issued the Order certifying that she has ceased

to be an Australian citizen.

Petitioner sought elective office during the May 10, 2010 elections this time for the position of Vice-Mayor. Sheobtained the highestnumbers of votes and was proclaimed as the winning candidate.

Separate petitions for quo warranto questioning the petitioners eligibility

were filed before the RTC. The petitions similarly sought

the petitioners disqualification from holding her elective post on

the ground that she is a dual citizen and that she failed to executea "personal and sworn renunciation of any and all

foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath" asimposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No.

9225.

Petitioner argues that a sworn renunciation is a mere formal and not a mandatory requirement.Issue: Whetherpetitioner is qualified to hold her elective postHeld: Yes

R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship for natural-born citizens who have lost

their Philippinecitizenship18 by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic

The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that restores ones Filipino citizenship and all civil and political rights and obligations

concomitant therewith, subject to certain conditions imposed in Section 5


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(Admin Law, PET, Quasi-judicial power)

Facts: Par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution provides: The Supreme Court, sittingen banc, shall be the sole

judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may

promulgate its rules for the purpose.

Sec 12, Art. VIII of the Constitution provides: The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by

law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.

The case at bar is a motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner of the SCs decision dismissing the formers petition

and declaring the establishment of the respondent PET as constitutional.

Petitioner argues that PET is unconstitutional on the ground that Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution does not provide

for the creation of the PET, and it violates Sec 12, Art VIII of the Constitution.

The Solicitor General maintains that the constitution of the PET is on firm footing on the basis of the grant of

authority to the Supreme Court to be the sole judge of all election contests for the President or Vice-President under

par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution.

Issue:

1. Whether or not PET is constitutional.2. Whether or not PET exercises quasi-judicial power.

Held:

1. Yes. The explicit reference of the Members of the Constitutional Commission to a Presidential ElectoralTribunal, with Fr. Joaquin Bernas categorically declaring that in crafting the last paragraph of Sec. 4, Art VII of

the 1987 Constitution, they constitutionalized what was statutory. Judicial power granted to the SupremeCourt by the same Constitution is plenary. And under the doctrine of necessary implication, the additional

jurisdiction bestowed by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to decide presidential

and vice-presidential elections contests includes the means necessary to carry it into effect.

1. No. The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution which providesthat the power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

The set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterize the resolution of electoral contests as

essentially an exercise of judicial power. When the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or vice-

presidential election contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power.

The COMELEC, HRET and SET are not, strictly and literally speaking, courts of law. Although not courts of law, they

are, nonetheless, empowered to resolve election contests which involve, in essence, an exercise of judicial power,

because of the explicit constitutional empowerment found in Section 2(2), Article IX-C (for the COMELEC) and Section

17, Article VI (for the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals) of the Constitution.

LEE vs COMELEC Case Digest

SALLY A. LEE v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and LEOVIC R. DIONEDA

405 SCRA 363 (2003), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.)

The doctrine that COMELEC is restricted to an examination of the election returns and is without jurisdiction to go

behind them and investigate election irregularities presupposes that the returns appear to be authentic and duly

accomplished on their face hence, if there is a prima facie showing that the return is not genuine, several entrieshaving been omitted in the questioned election return, the doctrine does not apply.

FACTS: Petitioner Sally A. Lee (Lee) and respondent Leovic R. Dioneda (Dioneda) were candidates for Mayor of

Sorsogon City. During the canvassing of the election returns, counsel for Dioneda moved for the exclusion of Election

Return No. 41150266 for Precinct No. 28A2 from Barangay Bucalbucalan, Sorsogon City on the ground that no entries

were made for the position of congressman and that Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) watchers were utilized to

fill up election returns.

The Board of Canvassers (BOC) ruled in favor of Lee on the ground that the questioned election return was clear andregular on its face, the BOC then proclaimed Lee as the winning candidate for Mayor of Sorsogon City. Dioneda then

filed a petition to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) for annulment of Lees proclamation and the exclusion of

the questioned election return.

The COMELEC Second Division granted Dionedas petition and accordingly excluded the questioned return from the

canvass and nullified the proclamation of Lee. Lee filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied by the COMELEC

En Banc.


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ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in annulling Lees proclamation and excluded the

questioned election return

HELD: Lee argues that as the case at bar is a pre-proclamation controversy, the COMELEC is restricted to an

examination of the election returns and is without jurisdiction to go [beyond] or behind them and investigate election

irregularities, citing the case of Loong v. Commission on Elections.

The doctrine cited by Lee presupposes that the returns appear to be authentic and duly accomplished on their

face. Where, as in the case at bar, there is a prima facie showing that the return is not genuine, several entries

having been omitted in the questioned election return, the doctrine does not apply. The COMELEC is thus not

powerless to determine if there is basis for the exclusion of the questioned election return.

Domino v. COMELEC

Facts:On 25 March 1998, Juan Domino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the Lone

Legislative District of the Province of Sarangani indicating initem no. 9 of his certificate that he had resided in the

constituency where he seeks to beelected for one (1) year and two (2) months immediately preceding the

election.On 30 Mar ch 1 998 , N arc i so Ra. Graf i lo , J r . , Eddy B . J ava, Juan P. Bayon ito, Jr . , Rosario

Samson and Dionisio P. Lim, Sr., filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Deny DueCourse to or Cancel Certificate of

Candidacy, which was docketed as SPA No. 98-022 andassigned to the Second Division of the COMELEC. They alleged

that DOMINO, contrary tohis declaration in t he certif icate of c andid acy, is not a res ident , muc h less a

registeredvoter, of the province of Sarangani where he seeks election.F o r h i s d e f e n s e , D O M I N O

m a i n t a i n s t h a t h e h a d c o m p l i e d w i t h t h e o n e - y e a r residence requirement and that he has been

residing in Sarangani since January 1997.On 6 May 1998, the COMELEC 2nd Div ision promulgated a

resolution declar in gDOMINO disqualified as candidate for the position of representative of the lone district

of Sarangani for lack of the one-year residence requirementOn 11 May 1998, the day of the election, the

CO ME LE C is su ed Su pp le me nt al Omnibus Resolution No. 3046, ordering that the votes cast for

DOMINO be counted butto suspend the proclamation if winning, considering that the Resolution disqualifying

himas candidate had not yet become final and executoryDomino received the highest votes in the

e l e c t io n t h a t i s wh y h e f i l e d a n M R of h i s disqualification but was denied. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner herein has resided in the subject congressional district for at least one (1) year

immediately preceding the May 11, 1998 elections.

Ruling: Negative. While his intention to establish residence in Sarangani can be gleaned from the fact that be bought

the house he was renting on November 4, 1997, that he sought cancellation of his previous registration in Qezon City

on 22 October 1997, and that he applied for transfer of registration from Quezon City to Sarangani by reason of

change of residence on 30 August 1997, DOMINO still falls short of the one year residency requirement under the

Constitution. In showing compliance with the residency requirement, both intent and actual presence in the district

one intends to represent must satisfy the length of time prescribed by the fundamental law. Domino's failure to do so

rendered him ineligible and his election to office null and void.

admin cases digested

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