Toledo v. Civil Service Commission Petitioner Atty. Augusto Toledo was appointed by then Comelec Chairman Ramon Felipe as Manager of the Education and Information Department of the Comelec, At the time of his appointment, petitioner, having been born on July 8, 1927 was already more than fifty-seven (57) years old. Petitioner's appointment papers, particularly Civil Service Form No. 333 and his oath of office were endorsed by the Comelec to the Civil Service Commission (CSC, for brevity) on June 11, 1986, for approval and attestation. However, no prior request for exemption from the provisions of Section 22, Rule III of the Civil Service Rules on Personnel Action and Policies (CSRPAP, for brevity) was secured. Said provision prohibits the appointment of persons 57 years old or above into the government service without prior approval by the Civil Service Commission public respondent Comelec issued Resolution No. 206 to DECLARE as VOID from the beginning the appointment of Atty. Augusto Toledo as Manager of the Education and Information Department of this Commission. (pp. 49-50, Rollo) It is first contended by petitioner that CSC Resolution No. 89-468 is without legal basis because the CSRPAP is invalid and unenforceable for not having been published in the Official Gazette or in any newspaper of general circulation as required under Section 9(b) of P.D. 807. This being the case, petitioner argues that the requirement of prior CSC authority to appoint persons 57 years or older under Section 22, Rule III of the CSRPAP has not "become effective" and cannot be invoked against him. the Civil Service Act of 1959 (Republic Act No. 2260) took effect on June 19, 1959. That act, among other things, established a Civil Service Commission one of the functions of which was, "with the approval by the President, to prescribe, amend, and enforce suitable rules and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of ... the Civil Service Law," It is worthy of note, however, that the statute itself (RA 2260) contained no provision prohibiting appointment or reinstatement in the Government service of any person who was already 57 years old, or otherwise requiring that some limitation as regards to age be placed on employment in the Government service. This prohibition was purely a creation of the Civil Service Commission. Presidential Decree No. 807 The decree, known as the "Civil Service Decree of the Philippines," repealed or accordingly modified all laws, rules, and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent" with its provisions (Sec. 59), although it declared that "the former Civil Service Commission created under Republic Act No. 2260, as amended, and as organized under the Integrated Reorganization Plan may serve as the nucleus of the Civil Service Commission" ( It was this provision of the CSRPAP (Sec. 22, Rule III) which was applied to Toledo. According to the CSC, since prior authority for Toledo's appointment had never been obtained indeed, it would appear that the appointment papers were not transmitted by the COMELEC to the CSC until February, 1989 at which time Toledo's appointment was "approved as permanent" by the Executive Director of said CSCthe appointment had to be struck down. Now, these rules and regulations (CSRPAP) were never published either in the Official Gazette or any newspaper of general circulation, at least as of the time that Section 22, Rule III thereof was applied to Toledo to the latter's prejudice. The lack of publication is also attested by the Director of the National Printing Office who, in a Certification issued by him on January 30, 1989, stated that "the RULES ON

PERSONNEL ACTIONS AND POLICIES' promulgated on November 20, 1975 by the Civil Service Commission implementing Presidential Decree No. 807 was not submitted to this office for publication" (Annex J, petition). Now, it may reasonably be assumed that the law-making authority at the time, the President, was aware of the provision on 57-year old persons in the Revised Civil Service Rules promulgated under RA 2260. Yet when he promulgated PD 807 the President did not see fit to incorporate therein any provision regarding 57-year old persons or for that matter, to prescribe any age beyond which persons could become ineligible for appointment, reintatement or re-employment. This surely is an indication of an intention not to continue the provision in effect. In any event, the provision on 57-year old persons in the Revised Civil Service Rules (under said RA 2260) cannot be accorded validity. As already pointed out, it is entirely a creation of the Civil Service Commission, having no basis in the law itself which it was meant to implement. It cannot be related to or connected with any specific provision of the law which it is meant to carry into effect, such as a requirement, for instance, that age should be reckoned as a factor in the employment or reinstatement of an individual, or a direction that there be a determination of some point in a person's life at which he becomes unemployable, or employable only under specific conditions. It was therefore an unauthorized act of legislation on the part of the Civil Service Commission. It cannot be justified as a valid exercise of its function of promulgating rules and regulations for that function, to repeat, may legitimately be exercised only for the purpose of carrying the provisions of the law into effect; and since there is no prohibition or restriction on the employment of 57-year old persons in the statuteor any provision respecting age as a factor in employmentthere was nothing to carry into effect through an implementing rule on the matter. The power vested in the Civil Service Commission was to implement the law or put it into effect, not to add to it; to carry the law into effect or execution, not to supply perceived omissions in it. "By its administrative regulations, of course, the law itself can not be extended; said regulations 'cannot amend an act of Congress.' " The enactment of said section, relative to 57-year old persons, was also an act of supererogation on the part of the Civil Service Commission since the rule has no relation to or connection with any provision of the law supposed to be carried into effect. Apart from this, the CSRPAP cannot be considered effective as of the time of the application to Toledo of a provision thereof, for the reason that said rules were never published, as is admitted on all sides. The argument that the CSRPAP need not be published, because they were "a mere reiteration of existing law" and had been "circularized," flies in the teeth of the explicit and categorical requirement of PD 807 that rules and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of the Decree shall become effective thirty (30) days after publication in the Official Gazette or in any newspaper of general circulation. One last word. There is absolutely no question about the fact that the only reason for Toledo's separation from the service was the fact that he was already more than 57 years old when he was invited to work in the COMELEC by its former Chairman, but through no fault of his own, not all the conditions for his employment appear to have been satisfied. There is no question that it was not Toledo's fault that his papers were tardily submitted to the Civil Service Commission and approval of his appointment was made only by the Executive Director of the Commission and not by the Chairman thereof (to whom the function of the President of approving appointments like those of Toledo had been delegated under LOI 47, CSC Memo Circular No. 5, Series of 1983). There is no question, too, that he was actively engaged in law practice when taken into the COMELEC. There is absolutely no question about the fact that he was otherwise a

competent and efficient officer of the COMELEC and had not given the remotest cause for dismissal. equitable considerations

2. CIR v. CA during the period when the President of the Republic still wielded legislative powers, Executive Order No. 41 was promulgated declaring a one-time tax amnesty on unpaid income taxes, later amended to include estate and donor's taxes and taxes on business, for the taxable years 1981 to 1985. Availing itself of the amnesty, respondent R.O.H. Auto Products Philippines, Inc., filed, in October 1986 and November 1986, its Tax Amnesty Return No. 34-F-00146-41 and Supplemental Tax Amnesty Return No. 34-F-00146-64-B, respectively, and paid the corresponding amnesty taxes due. Prior to this availment, petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue, in a communication received by private respondent on 13 August 1986, assessed the latter deficiency income and business taxes for its fiscal years ended 30 September 1981 and 30 September 1982 in an aggregate amount of P1,410,157.71. The taxpayer wrote back to state that since it had been able to avail itself of the tax amnesty, the deficiency tax notice should forthwith be cancelled and withdrawn. The request was denied by the Commissioner, in his letter of 22 November 1988, on the ground that Revenue Memorandum Order No. 4-87, dated 09 February 1987, implementing Executive Order No. 41, had construed the amnesty coverage to include only assessments issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue after the promulgation of the executive order on 22 August 1986 and not to assessments theretofore made. On appeal by the Commissioner to the Court of Appeals, the decision of the tax court was affirmed. The added exception urged by petitioner Commissioner based on Revenue Memorandum Order No. 4-87, further restricting the scope of the amnesty clearly amounts to an act of administrative legislation quite contrary to the mandate of the law which the regulation ought to implement. Much more fundamental than either of the above, however, is that all such issuances must not override, but must remain consistent and in harmony with, the law they seek to apply and implement. Administrative rules and regulations are intended to carry out, neither to supplant nor to modify, the law. The real and only issue is whether or not the position taken by the Commissioner coincides with the meaning and intent of executive Order No. 41. We agree with both the court of Appeals and court of Tax Appeals that Executive Order No. 41 is quite explicit and requires hardly anything beyond a simple application of its provisions. If, as the Commissioner argues, Executive Order No. 41 had not been intended to include 1981-1985 tax liabilities already assessed (administratively) prior to 22 August 1986, the law could have simply so provided in its exclusionary clauses. It did not. The conclusion is unavoidable, and it is that the executive order has been designed to be in the nature of a general grant of tax amnesty subject only to the cases specifically excepted by it. Sec. 6. Immunities and Privileges. Upon full compliance with the conditions of the tax amnesty and the rules and regulations issued pursuant to this Executive order, the taxpayer shall enjoy the following immunities and privileges: a) The taxpayer shall be relieved of any income tax liability on any untaxed income from January 1, 1981 to December 31, 1985, including increments thereto and penalties on account of the non-payment of the said tax. Civil, criminal or administrative liability

arising from the non-payment of the said tax, which are actionable under the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, are likewise deemed extinguished. b) The taxpayer's tax amnesty declaration shall not be admissible in evidence in all proceedings before judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies, in which he is a defendant or respondent, and the same shall not be examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office. c) The books of account and other records of the taxpayer for the period from January 1, 1981 to December 31, 1985 shall not be examined for income tax purposes: Provided, That the Commissioner of Internal Revenue may authorize in writing the examination of the said books of accounts and other records to verify the validity or correctness of a claim for grant of any tax refund, tax credit (other than refund on credit of withheld taxes on wages), tax incentives, and/or exemptions under existing laws. There is no pretension that the tax amnesty returns and due payments made by the taxpayer did not conform with the conditions expressed in the amnesty order.

Land Bank of the Philippines Separate petitions for review were filed by petitioners Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) (G.R. No. 118745) and Land Bank of the Philippines (G.R. No. 118712) following the adverse ruling by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 33465. Petitioners assail the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on October 20, 1994, which granted private respondents' Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus and ruled as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus is hereby GRANTED:

a) DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990 is declared null and void insofar as it provides for the opening of trust accounts in lieu of deposits in cash or bonds; b) Respondent Landbank is ordered to immediately deposit not merely "earmark", "reserve" or "deposit in trust" with an accessible bank designated by respondent DAR in the names of the following petitioners the following amounts in cash and in government financial instruments within the parameters of Sec. 18 (1) of RA 6657: Private respondents are landowners whose landholdings were acquired by the DAR and subjected to transfer schemes to qualified beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law Aggrieved by the alleged lapses of the DAR and the Landbank with respect to the valuation and payment of compensation for their land pursuant to the provisions of RA 6657, private respondents filed with this Court a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction. Private respondents questioned the validity of DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1992 6 and DAR

Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990, 7 and sought to compel the DAR to expedite the pending summary administrative proceedings to finally determine the just compensation of their properties, and the Landbank to deposit in cash and bonds the amounts respectively "earmarked", "reserved" and "deposited in trust accounts" for private respondents, and to allow them to withdraw the same. Private respondents argued that Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990 was issued without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion because it permits the opening of trust accounts by the Landbank, in lieu of depositing in cash or bonds in an accessible bank designated by the DAR, the compensation for the land before it is taken and the titles are cancelled as provided under Section 16(e) of RA 6657. 9 Private respondents also assail the fact that the DAR and the Landbank merely "earmarked", "deposited in trust" or "reserved" the compensation in their names as landowners despite the clear mandate that before taking possession of the property, the compensation must be deposited in cash or in bonds. On October 20, 1994, the respondent court rendered the assailed decision in favor of private respondents. The contention is untenable. Section 16(e) of RA 6657 provides as follows:

Sec. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands xxx xxx xxx (e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. It is very explicit therefrom that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds". Nowhere does it appear nor can it be inferred that the deposit can be made in any other form. If it were the intention to include a "trust account" among the valid modes of deposit, that should have been made express, or at least, qualifying words ought to have appeared from which it can be fairly deduced that a "trust account" is allowed. In sum, there is no ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant an expanded construction of the term "deposit". The conclusive effect of administrative construction is not absolute. Action of an administrative agency may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if there is an error of law, a grave abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a legislative enactment. In the present suit, the DAR clearly overstepped the limits of its power to enact rules and regulations when it issued Administrative Circular No. 9. There is no basis in allowing the opening of a trust account in behalf of the landowner as compensation for his property because, as heretofore discussed, Section 16(e) of RA 6657 is very specific that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds".

GMCR Inc vs Bell Telecommunication Phil Inc : 126496 : April 30, 1997 : J. Hermosisima : First Division FACTS: Bell Telecommunication Philippines, Inc. (hereafter, BellTel) filed with the NTC an Application for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity to Procure, Install, Operate and Maintain Nationwide Integrated Telecommunications Services and to Charge Rates Therefor and with Further Request for the Issuance of Provisional Authority. At the time of the filing of this application, private respondent BellTel had not been granted a legislative franchise to engage in the business of telecommunications service. Since private respondent BellTel was, at that time, an unenfranchised applicant, it was excluded in the deliberations for service area assignments for local exchange carrier service[4]. Thus, only petitioners GMCR, Inc., Smart Communications, Inc., Isla Communications Co., Inc. and International Communications Corporation, among others, were beneficiaries of formal awards of service area assignments in April and May, 1994. March 25, 1994, Republic Act No. 7692 was enacted granting private respondent BellTel a congressional franchise which gave private respondent BellTel the right, privilege and authority to carry on the business of providing telecommunications services in and between provinces, cities, and municipalities in the Philippines and for this purpose, to establish, operate, manage, lease, maintain and purchase telecommunications systems, including mobile, cellular and wired or wireless telecommunications systems, fiber optics, satellite transmit and receive systems, and other telecommunications systems and their value-added services such as, but not limited to, transmission of voice, data, facsimile, control signals, audio and video, information service bureau, and all other telecommunications systems technologies as are at present available or be made available through technical advances or innovations in the future, or construct, acquire, lease and operate or manage transmitting and receiving stations and switching stations, both for local and international services, lines, cables or systems, as is, or are convenient or essential to efficiently carry out the purposes of this franchise. BellTel filed with the NTC a second Application[6] praying for the issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity for the installation, operation and maintenance of a combined nationwide local toll (domestic and international) and tandem telephone exchanges and facilities using wire, wireless, microwave radio, satellites and fiber optic cable with Public Calling Offices (PCOs) and very small aperture antennas (VSATs) under an integrated system The second application of private respondent BellTel which was docketed as NTC Case No. 94-229 was assigned to a Hearing Officer for reception of private respondent BellTels evidence. Written opposition and other pertinent pleadings were filed by petitioners GMCR, Inc., Smart Communications, Inc., Isla Communications Co., Inc. and International Communications Corporation as oppositors. CCAD, through Engr. Marle Rabena, submitted to Deputy Commissioner Fidelo Q. Dumlao, a Memorandum dated February 6, 1995[7] manifesting his findings and recommending that based on technical documents submitted, BellTels proposal is technically feasible. NTC Deputy Commissioners Fidelo Dumlao and Consuelo Perez adopted the same and expressly signified their approval thereto by making the following notation on the aforestated Memorandum of the CCAD

Legal Department thereof prepared a working draft[10] of the order granting provisional authority to private respondent BellTel. The said working draft was initialed by Deputy Commissioners Fidelo Q. Dumlao and Consuelo Perez but was not signed by Commissioner Simeon Kintanar. While ordinarily, a decision that is concurred in by two of the three members composing a quasi-judicial body is entitled to promulgation, petitioners claim that pursuant to the prevailing policy and the corresponding procedure and practice in the NTC, the exclusive authority to sign, validate and promulgate any and all orders, resolutions and decisions of the NTC is lodged in the Chairman, in this case, Commissioner Simeon Kintanar, and, thus, since only Commissioner Simeon Kintanar is recognized by the NTC Secretariat as the sole authority to sign any and all orders, resolutions and decisions of the NTC, only his vote counts; Deputy Commissioners Dumlao and Perez have allegedly no voting power and both their concurrence which actually constitutes the majority is inutile without the assent of Commissioner Kintanar. BellTel filed on May 5, 1995 an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Resolve Application and for the Issuance of a Provisional Authority[11]. Reference was explicitly made to the findings of the CCAD and recommendations of Deputy Commissioners Dumlao and Perez that were all favorable to private respondent BellTel. Anxious over the inaction of the NTC No action was taken by the NTC on the aforecited motion. BellTel filed a Second Urgent Ex-Parte Motion Petitioners-oppositors filed an Opposition[13] to the aforestated two motions of private respondent BellTel. In an Order dated May 16, 1995, signed solely by Commissioner Simeon Kintanar, the NTC, instead of resolving the two pending motions of private respondent BellTel, set the said motions for a hearing on May 29, 1995. On May 29, 1995, however, no hearing was conducted as the same was reset on June 13, 1995. the day of the hearing, private respondent BellTel filed a Motion to Promulgate (Amending the Motion to Resolve)[14] In said motion, private respondent prayed for the promulgation of the working draft of the order granting a provisional authority to private respondent BellTel, on the ground that the said working draft had already been signed or initialed by Deputy Commissioners Dumlao and Perez who, together, constitute a majority out of the three commissioners composing the NTC. To support its prayer, private respondent BellTel asserted that the NTC was a collegial body and that as such, two favorable votes out of a maximum three votes by the members of the commission, are enough to validly promulgate an NTC decision. NTC denied the said motion in an Order solely signed by Commissioner Simeon Kintanar. BellTel filed with this court a Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition seeking the nullification of the aforestated Order dated July 4, 1995 denying the Motion to Promulgate. fundamental issue to be that of the collegiality of the NTC as a quasi-judicial agency. We find the consolidated petitions wanting of merit. First. We hereby declare that the NTC is a collegial body requiring a majority vote out of the three members of the commission in order to validly decide a case or any incident therein. Corollarily, the vote alone of the chairman of the commission, as in this case, the vote of Commissioner Kintanar, absent the required concurring vote coming from the rest of the membership of the commission to at least arrive at a majority decision, is not sufficient to legally render an NTC order, resolution or decision. Simply put, Commissioner Kintanar is not the National Telecommunications Commission. He alone does not speak for and in behalf of the NTC. The NTC acts through a three-man body, and the three members of the commission each has one vote

to cast in every deliberation concerning a case or any incident therein that is subject to the jurisdiction of the NTC. When we consider the historical milieu in which the NTC evolved into the quasi-judicial agency it is now under Executive Order No. 146 which organized the NTC as a three-man commission and expose the illegality of all memorandum circulars negating the collegial nature of the NTC under Executive Order No. 146, we are left with only one logical conclusion: the NTC is a collegial body and was a collegial body even during the time when it was acting as a one-man regime. ORIGINS: the National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 146 which created the Public Service Commission (PSC). the PSC was not a collegial body As amended by RA 2677, the Public Service Commission was transformed into and emerged as a collegial body, composed of one Public Service Commissioner and five (5) Associate Commissioners. The amendment provided that contested cases and all cases involving the fixing of rates shall be decided by the Commission en banc. Presidential Decree No. 1 adopting and approving the Integrated Reorganization Plan which, in turn, created the Board of Communications (BOC) in place of the PSC. This time, the new regulatory board was composed of three (3) officers exercising quasi-judicial functions: Executive Order No. 546, creating the Ministries of Public Works, and of Transportation and Communications, merged the defunct Board of Communications and the Telecommunications Control Bureau into a single entity, the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC). The said law was issued by then President Marcos in the exercise of his legislative powers. Sec. 16 of E.O. 546 provides that We find and declare, in the present recourse, that the Puno Opinion is not correct. Admittedly, EO 546 does not specifically state that the NTC was a collegial body. Neither does it provide that the NTC should meet En Banc in deciding a case or in exercising its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions. But the absence of such provisions does not militate against the collegial nature of the NTC under the context of Section 16 of EO 546 and under the Rules of Procedure and Practice applied by the NTC in its proceedings. Under [Rule 15] of said Rules, the BOC (now the NTC) sits En Banc: x x x In every case heard by the Board en banc, the orders, rulings, decisions and resolutions disposing of the merits of the matter within its jurisdiction shall be reached with the concurrence of at least two regular members after deliberation and consultation and thereafter assigned to a member for the writing of the opinion. Any member dissenting from the order, ruling, decision or resolution shall state in writing the reason for his dissent. While it may be true that the aforesaid Rules of Procedure was promulgated before the effectivity of Executive Order No. 546, however, the Rules of Procedure of BOC governed the rules of practice and procedure before the NTC when it was established under Executive Order No. 546. This was enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. versus National Telecommunications Commission, 131 SCRA 200 when it declared that: The Rules of Practice and Procedure promulgated on January 25, 1978 by the Board of Communications, the immediate predecessor of respondent NTC x x x govern the rules of practice and procedure before the BOC then, now respondent NTC. x x x Hence, under its Rules of Procedure and Practice, the Respondent NTC, as its predecessor, the BOC, had consistently been and remains a collegial body.

If it was the intention of President Marcos to constitute merely a single entity, a oneman governmental body, instead of a commission or a three-man collegial body, he would not have constituted a commission and would not have specifically decreed that the Commission is composed of, not the commissioner alone, but of the commissioner and the two (2) deputy commissioners. Irrefragably, then, the NTC is a commission composed not only of Kintanar, but Perez and Dumlao as well, acting together in the performance of their adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions, conformably with the Rules of Procedure and Practice promulgated by the BOC and applicable to the NTC. It must be remembered by petitioners, however, that administrative regulations derive their validity from the statute that they were, in the first place, intended to implement. Memorandum Circulars 1-1-93 and 3-1-93 are on their face null and void ab initio for being unabashedly contrary to law. They were nullified by respondent Court of Appeals because they are absolutely illegal and, as such, are without any force and effect. The fact that implementation of these illegal regulations has resulted in the institutionalization of the one-man rule in the NTC, is not and can never be a ratification of such an illegal practice. At the least, these illegal regulations are an erroneous interpretation of E.O. No. 546 and in the context of and its predecessor laws. At the most, these illegal regulations are attempts to validate the one-man rule in the NTC as executed by persons with the selfish interest of maintaining their illusory hold of power. Since the questioned memorandum circulars are inherently and patently null and void for being totally violative of the spirit and letter of E.O. No. 546 that constitutes the NTC as a collegial body, no court may shirk from its duty of striking down such illegal regulations. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant consolidated petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Asso'n of Phil Coconut Desiccators vs Phil Coconut Authority : 110526 : February 10, 1998 : J. Mendoza : En Banc issue in this case is the validity of a resolution of the Philippine Coconut Authority in which it declares that it will no longer require those wishing to engage in coconut processing to apply to it for a license or permit as a condition for engaging in such business. Petitioner Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators (hereafter referred to as APCD) brought this suit for certiorari and mandamus against respondent Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) to invalidate the latters Board Resolution No. 018-93 and the certificates of registration issued under it on the ground that the resolution in question is beyond the power of the PCA to adopt, and to compel said administrative agency to comply instead with the mandatory provisions of statutes regulating the desiccated coconut industry, in particular, and the coconut industry, in general. seven desiccated coconut processing companies belonging to the APCD brought suit in the Regional Trial Court, to enjoin the PCA from issuing permits to certain applicants for the establishment of new desiccated coconut processing plants. Petitioner alleged that the issuance of licenses to the applicants would violate PCAs Administrative Order No. 02, series of 1991, as the applicants were seeking permits to operate in areas considered congested under the administrative order. trial court issued a temporary restraining order and, on November 25, 1992, a writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining the PCA from processing and issuing licenses to Primex Products, Inc., Coco Manila, Superstar (Candelaria) and Superstar (Davao) upon the posting of a bond in the amount of P100,000.00

Resolution No. 018-93, providing for the withdrawal of the Philippine Coconut Authority from all regulation of the coconut product processing industry. While it continues the registration of coconut product processors, the registration would be limited to the monitoring of their volumes of production and administration of quality standards. Subsequently and while the case was pending in the Regional Trial Court, the Governing Board of the PCA issued RESOLUTION NO. 018-93 WHEREAS, it is the policy of the State to promote free enterprise unhampered by protective regulations and unnecessary bureaucratic red tapes; WHEREAS, the issuance of permits or licenses prior to business operation is a form of regulation which is not provided in the charter of nor included among the powers of the PCA; WHEREAS, the Governing Board of PCA has determined to follow and further support the deregulation policy and effort of the government to promote free enterprise; PCA shall no longer require any coconut oil mill, coconut oil refinery, coconut desiccator, coconut product processor/factory, coconut fiber plant or any similar coconut processing plant to apply with PCA and the latter shall no longer issue any form of license or permit as condition prior to establishment or operation of such mills or plants; PCA shall limit itself only to simply registering the aforementioned coconut product processors for the purpose of monitoring their volumes of production, administration of quality standards with the corresponding service fees/charges. The PCA then proceeded to issue certificates of registration to those wishing to operate desiccated coconut processing plants, prompting petitioner to appeal to the Office of the President of the Philippines on April 26, 1993 not to approve the resolution in question. petitioner received no reply from the Office of the President. Exhaustion of admin remedies: obviously no application here. The resolution in question was issued by the PCA in the exercise of its rule- making or legislative power. However, only judicial review of decisions of administrative agencies made in the exercise of their quasi-judicial function is subject to the exhaustion doctrine. The exhaustion doctrine stands as a bar to an action which is not yet complete[4] and it is clear, in the case at bar, that after its promulgation the resolution of the PCA abandoning regulation of the desiccated coconut industry became effective. To be sure, the PCA is under the direct supervision of the President of the Philippines but there is nothing in P.D. No. 232, P.D. No. 961, P.D. No. 1468 and P.D. No. 1644 defining the powers and functions of the PCA which requires rules and regulations issued by it to be approved by the President before they become effective. The Philippine Coconut Authority was originally created by P.D. No. 232 on June 30, 1973, to take over the powers and functions of the Coconut Coordinating Council, the Philippine Coconut Administration and the Philippine Coconut Research Institute. On June 11, 1978, by P.D. No. 1468, it was made an independent public corporation . . . directly reporting to, and supervised by, the President of the Philippines,[9] and charged with carrying out the States policy to promote the rapid integrated development and growth of the coconut and other palm oil industry in all its aspects and to ensure that the coconut farmers become direct participants in, and beneficiaries of, such development and growth.[10] through a regulatory scheme set up by law. Executive Order No. 826 SECTION 1. Prohibition. - Except as herein provided, no government agency or instrumentality shall hereafter authorize, approve or grant any permit or license for the establishment or operation of new desiccated coconut processing plants, including the

importation of machinery or equipment for the purpose. In the event of a need to establish a new plant, or expand the capacity, relocate or upgrade the efficiencies of any existing desiccated plant, the Philippine Coconut Authority may, upon proper determination of such need and evaluation of the condition relating to: a. the existing market demand; b. the production capacity prevailing in the country or locality; c. the level and flow of raw materials; and d. other circumstances which may affect the growth or viability of the industry concerned, authorize or grant the application for, the establishment or expansion of capacity, relocation or upgrading of efficiencies of such desiccated coconut processing plant, subject to the approval of the President. The guidelines promulgated by the PCA, as embodied in Administrative Order No. 002, series of 1991, inter alia authorized the opening of new plants in non-congested areas only as declared by the PCA and subject to compliance by applicants with all procedures and requirements for registration under Administrative Order No. 003, series of 1981 and this Order. In addition, as the opening of new plants was premised on the increased global demand for desiccated coconut products, the new entrants were required to submit sworn statements of the names and addresses of prospective foreign buyers. This form of deregulation was approved by President Aquino in her memorandum These measures the restriction in 1982 on entry into the field, the reduction the same year of the number of the existing coconut mills and then the lifting of the restrictions in 1987 were adopted within the framework of regulation as established by law to promote the rapid integrated development and growth of the coconut and other palm oil industry in all its aspects and to ensure that the coconut farmers become direct participants in, and beneficiaries of, such development and growth.[ Contrary to the assertion in the dissent, the power given to the Philippine Coconut Authority and before it to the Philippine Coconut Administration to formulate and adopt a general program of development for the coconut and other palm oils industry[16] is not a roving commission to adopt any program deemed necessary to promote the development of the coconut and other palm oils industry, but one to be exercised in the context of this regulatory structure. In plain disregard of this legislative purpose, the PCA adopted on March 24, 1993 the questioned resolution which allows not only the indiscriminate opening of new coconut processing plants but the virtual dismantling of the regulatory infrastructure whereby, forsaking controls theretofore placed in its keeping, the PCA limits its function to the innocuous one of monitoring compliance by coconut millers with quality standards and volumes of production. In effect, the PCA would simply be compiling statistical data on these matters, but in case of violations of standards there would be nothing much it would do. The field would be left without an umpire who would retire to the bleachers to become a mere spectator. The issue rather is whether it can renounce the power to regulate implicit in the law creating it for that is what the resolution in question actually is. Under Art. II, 3(a) of the Revised Coconut Code (P.D. No. 1468), the role of the PCA is To formulate and adopt a general program of development for the coconut and other palm oil industry in all its aspects. By limiting the purpose of registration to merely monitoring volumes of production [and] administration of quality standards of coconut processing plants, the PCA in effect abdicates its role and leaves it almost completely to market forces how the coconut industry will develop. Art. II, 3 of P.D. No. 1468 further requires the PCA: (h) To regulate the marketing and the exportation of copra and its by-products by establishing standards for domestic trade and export and, thereafter, to conduct an

inspection of all copra and its by-products proposed for export to determine if they conform to the standards established; Indeed, by repudiating its role in the regulatory scheme, the PCA has put at risk other statutory provisions, particularly those of P.D. No. 1644, Section 1. The Philippine Coconut Authority shall have full power and authority to regulate the marketing and export of copra, coconut oil and their by-products, in furtherance of the steps being taken to rationalize the coconut oil milling industry. and the Revised Coconut Code Except in respect of entities owned or controlled by the Government or by the coconut farmers under Sections 9 and 10, Article III hereof, the Authority shall have full power and authority to regulate the production, distribution and utilization of all subsidized coconut-based products, and to require the submission of such reports or documents as may be deemed necessary by the Authority to ascertain whether the levy payments and/or subsidy claims are due and correct and whether the subsidized products are distributed among, and utilized by, the consumers authorized by the Authority. Although the present Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy,[19] it nonetheless reserves to the government the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare. At all events, any change in policy must be made by the legislative department of the government. The regulatory system has been set up by law. It is beyond the power of an administrative agency to dismantle it. Indeed, petitioner charges the PCA of seeking to render moot a case filed by some of its members questioning the grant of licenses to certain parties by adopting the resolution in question. It is alleged that members of petitioner complained to the court that the PCA had authorized the establishment and operation of new plants in areas which were already crowded, in violation of its Administrative Order No. 002, series of 1991. In response, the Regional Trial Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining the PCA from issuing licenses to the private respondents in that case. These allegations of petitioner have not been denied here. the PCA adopted the resolution in question to render the case moot. In so doing, the PCA abdicated its function of regulation and left the field to untrammeled competition that is likely to resurrect the evils of cut-throat competition, underselling and overproduction which in 1982 required the temporary closing of the field to new players in order to save the industry. The PCA cannot rely on the memorandum of then President Aquino for authority to adopt the resolution in question. As already stated, what President Aquino approved in 1988 was the establishment and operation of new DCN plants subject to the guidelines to be drawn by the PCA.[20] In the first place, she could not have intended to amend the several laws already mentioned, which set up the regulatory system, by a mere memoranda to the PCA. In the second place, even if that had been her intention, her act would be without effect considering that, when she issued the memorandum in question on February 11, 1988, she was no longer vested with legislative authority.[2 WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. PCA Resolution No. 018-93 and all certificates of registration issued under it are hereby declared NULL and VOID for having been issued in excess of the power of the Philippine Coconut Authority to adopt or issue.

Ople vs Torres : 127685 : July 23, 1998 : J. Puno : En Banc Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important

constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy. A.O. No. 308 was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos WHEREAS, there is a need to provide Filipino citizens and foreign residents with the facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and social security providers and other government instrumentalities; SEC. 2 Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee. An Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee (IACC) to draw-up the implementing guidelines and oversee the implementation of the System is hereby created, chaired by the Executive Secretary, On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, are charged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining its implementation. A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22, 1997 and January 23, 1997. Petitioner contends: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM REQUIRES A LEGISLATIVE ACT. AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OF CONGRESS TO APPROPRIATE PUBLIC FUNDS FOR EXPENDITURE. THE APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere administrative order but a law and hence, beyond the power of the President to issue. Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs.[21] It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents.[22] To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations. Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an administrative order. "Sec. 3. Administrative Orders.-- Acts of the President which relate to particular aspects of governmental operation in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders." An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy.[24] We reject the argument that A.O. No. 308 implements the legislative policy of the Administrative Code of 1987. The Code is a general law and "incorporates in a unified document the major structural, functional and procedural principles of governance"[25] and "embodies changes in administrative structures and procedures designed to serve the people." These Books contain provisions on the organization, powers and general administration of the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government, the organization and administration of departments, bureaus and offices under the executive branch, the organization and functions of the Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional bodies, the rules on the national government budget, as well as guidelines for the exercise by administrative agencies of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers. The

Code covers both the internal administration of government, i.e, internal organization, personnel and recruitment, supervision and discipline, and the effects of the functions performed by administrative officials on private individuals or parties outside government. It establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference System. It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the Administrative Code of 1987. Such a System requires a delicate adjustment of various contending state policies-- the primacy of national security, the extent of privacy interest against dossier-gathering by government, the choice of policies, etc. As said administrative order redefines the parameters of some basic rights of our citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well as the line that separates the administrative power of the President to make rules and the legislative power of Congress, it ought to be evident that it deals with a subject that should be covered by law. Nor is it correct to argue as the dissenters do that A.O. No. 308 is not a law because it confers no right, imposes no duty, affords no protection, and creates no office. Under A.O. No. 308, a citizen cannot transact business with government agencies delivering basic services to the people without the contemplated identification card. No citizen will refuse to get this identification card for no one can avoid dealing with government. It is thus clear as daylight that without the ID, a citizen will have difficulty exercising his rights and enjoying his privileges. Given this reality, the contention that A.O. No. 308 gives no right and imposes no duty cannot stand. As well stated by Fisher: "x x x Many regulations however, bear directly on the public. It is here that administrative legislation must be restricted in its scope and application. Regulations are not supposed to be a substitute for the general policy-making that Congress enacts in the form of a public law. Although administrative regulations are entitled to respect, the authority to prescribe rules and regulations is not an independent source of power to make laws." Assuming, arguendo, that A.O. No. 308 need not be the subject of a law, still it cannot pass constitutional muster as an administrative legislation because facially it violates the right to privacy. Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. It is debatable whether these interests are compelling enough to warrant the issuance of A.O. No. 308. But what is not arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented will put our people's right to privacy in clear and present danger. We can even grant, arguendo, that the computer data file will be limited to the name, address and other basic personal information about the individual.[57] Even that hospitable assumption will not save A.O. No. 308 from constitutional infirmity for again said order does not tell us in clear and categorical terms how these information gathered shall be handled. It does not provide who shall control and access the data, under what circumstances and for what purpose. he patient-identification requirement was a product of an orderly and rational legislative decision made upon recommendation by a specially appointed commission which held extensive hearings on the matter. Moreover, the statute was narrowly drawn and contained numerous safeguards against indiscriminate disclosure. The statute laid down the procedure and requirements for the gathering, storage and retrieval of the information. It enumerated who were authorized to access the data. It

also prohibited public disclosure of the data by imposing penalties for its violation. In view of these safeguards, the infringement of the patients' right to privacy was justified by a valid exercise of police power. Phil Bank of Communications vs Commissioner of Internal Revenue: 112024 : January 28,1999 : J. Quisumbing : Second Division Petitioner, Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom), a commercial banking corporation duly organized under Philippine laws, filed its quarterly income tax returns for the first and second quarters of 1985, reported profits, and paid the total income tax of P5,016,954.00. The taxes due were settled by applying PBComs tax credit memos and accordingly, the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) issued Tax Debit Memo Nos. 0746-85 and 0747-85 for P3,401,701.00 and P1, 615,253.00, respectively. Subsequently, however, PBCom suffered losses so that when it filed its Annual Income Tax Returns for the year-ended December 31, 1985, it declared a net loss of P25,317,228.00, thereby showing no income tax liability. For the succeeding year, ending December 31, 1986, the petitioner likewise reported a net loss of P14,129,602.00, and thus declared no tax payable for the year. On August 7, 1987, petitioner requested the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, among others, for a tax credit of P5,016,954.00 representing the overpayment of taxes in the first and second quarters of 1985. Thereafter, on July 25, 1988, petitioner filed a claim for refund of creditable taxes withheld by their lessees from property rentals in 1985 for P282,795.50 and in 1986 for P234,077.69. Pending the investigation of the respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue, petitioner instituted a Petition for Review on November 18, 1988 before the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). the CTA rendered a decision which, as stated on the outset, denied the request of petitioner for a tax refund or credit in the sum amount of P5,299,749.95, on the ground that it was filed beyond the two-year reglementary period provided for by law. The petitioners claim for refund in 1986 amounting to P234,077.69 was likewise denied on the assumption that it was automatically credited by PBCom against its tax payment in the succeeding year. Whether taxpayer PBCom -- which relied in good faith on the formal assurances of BIR in RMC No. 7-85 and did not immediately file with the CTA a petition for review asking for the refund/tax credit of its 1985-86 excess quarterly income tax payments -- can be prejudiced by the subsequent BIR rejection, applied retroactively, of its assurances in RMC No. 7-85 that the prescriptive period for the refund/tax credit of excess quarterly income tax payments is not two years but ten (10).[ Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in denying the plea for tax refund or tax credits on the ground of prescription, despite petitioners reliance on RMC No. 7-85, changing the prescriptive period of two years to ten years? Petitioner argues that its claims for refund and tax credits are not yet barred by prescription relying on the applicability of Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 7-85 issued on April 1, 1985. The circular states that overpaid income taxes are not covered by the two-year prescriptive period under the tax Code and that taxpayers may claim refund or tax credits for the excess quarterly income tax with the BIR within ten (10) years under Article 1144 of the Civil Code. Petitioner argues that the government is barred from asserting a position contrary to its declared circular if it would result to injustice to taxpayers. Citing ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation vs. Court of Tax Appeals[10] petitioner claims that rulings or

circulars promulgated by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue have no retroactive effect if it would be prejudicial to taxpayers. In ABS-CBN case, the Court held that the government is precluded from adopting a position inconsistent with one previously taken where injustice would result therefrom or where there has been a misrepresentation to the taxpayer. Sec. 246. Non-retroactivity of rulings-- Any revocation, modification or reversal of any of the rules and regulations promulgated in accordance with the preceding section or any of the rulings or circulars promulgated by the Commissioner shall not be given retroactive application if the revocation, modification, or reversal will be prejudicial to the taxpayers except Further, respondent Commissioner stresses that when the petitioner filed the case before the CTA on November 18, 1988, the same was filed beyond the time fixed by law, and such failure is fatal to petitioners cause of action. After a careful study of the records and applicable jurisprudence on the matter, we find that, contrary to the petitioners contention, the relaxation of revenue regulations by RMC 7-85 is not warranted as it disregards the two-year prescriptive period set by law. Due process of law under the Constitution does not require judicial proceedings in tax cases. From the same perspective, claims for refund or tax credit should be exercised within the time fixed by law because the BIR being an administrative body enforced to collect taxes, its functions should not be unduly delayed or hampered by incidental matters. The rule states that the taxpayer may file a claim for refund or credit with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, within two (2) years after payment of tax, before any suit in CTA is commenced. The two-year prescriptive period provided, should be computed from the time of filing the Adjustment Return and final payment of the tax for the year. When the Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued RMC 7-85, changing the prescriptive period of two years to ten years on claims of excess quarterly income tax payments, such circular created a clear inconsistency with the provision of Sec. 230 of 1977 NIRC. In so doing, the BIR did not simply interpret the law; rather it legislated guidelines contrary to the statute passed by Congress. It bears repeating that Revenue memorandum-circulars are considered administrative rulings (in the sense of more specific and less general interpretations of tax laws) which are issued from time to time by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. It is widely accepted that the interpretation placed upon a statute by the executive officers, whose duty is to enforce it, is entitled to great respect by the courts. Nevertheless, such interpretation is not conclusive and will be ignored if judicially found to be erroneous.[20] Thus, courts will not countenance administrative issuances that override, instead of remaining consistent and in harmony with, the law they seek to apply and implement. Further, fundamental is the rule that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors of its officials or agents.[24] As pointed out by the respondent courts, the nullification of RMC No. 7-85 issued by the Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue is an administrative interpretation which is not in harmony with Sec. 230 of 1977 NIRC, for being contrary to the express provision of a statute. Hence, his interpretation could not be given weight for to do so would, in effect, amend the statute. For there are no vested rights to speak of respecting a wrong construction of the law by the administrative officials and such wrong interpretation could not place the Government in estoppel to correct or overrule the same.[27] Moreover, the nonretroactivity of rulings by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue is not applicable in this case because the nullity of RMC No. 7-85 was declared by respondent courts and not by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Lastly, it must be noted that, as repeatedly held

by this Court, a claim for refund is in the nature of a claim for exemption and should be construed in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer.[

China Banking Co vs HDMF : 131787 : May 19, 1999 : J. Gonzaga-Reyes : Third Division appeal by certiorari PET are both employers who were granted by the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF) certificates of waiver for the identical reason of Superior Retirement Plan pursuant to Section 19 of P. D. 1752 otherwise known as the Home Development Mutual Fund Law of 1980 whereunder employers who have their own existing provident and/or employees-housing plans may register for annual certification for waiver or suspension from coverage or participation in the Home Development Mutual Fund created under said law. respondent HDMF Board issued an Amendment to the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. 7742 (The Amendment) and pursuant to said Amendment, the said Board issued on October 23, 1995 HDMF Circular No. 124-B or the Revised Guidelines and Procedure for filing Application for Waiver or Suspension of Fund Coverage under P.D. 1752 (Guidelines). Under the Amendment and the Guidelines, a company must have a provident/retirement and housing plan superior to that provided under the Pag-IBIG Fund to be entitled to exemption/waiver from fund coverage. Republic Act No. 7742, amending P. D. 1752 was approved CBC and CBC-PCCI applied for renewal of waiver of coverage from the fund for the year 1996, but the applications were disapproved. your retirement plan is not superior to Pag-IBIG Fund. Petitioners thus filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Regional Trial Court of Makati seeking to annul and declare void the Amendment and the Guidelines for having been issued in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction alleging that in requiring the employer to have both a retirement/provident plan and an employee housing plan in order to be entitled to a certificate of waiver or suspension of coverage from the HDMF, the HDMF Board exceeded its rule-making power. The Court dismissed the petition for certiorari on the grounds (1) that the denial or grant of an application for waiver/coverage is within the power and authority of the HDMF Board, and the said Board did not exceed its jurisdiction or act with grave abuse of discretion in denying the applications; and (2) the petitioners have lost their right to appeal by failure to appeal within the periods provided in the Rules for appealing from the order of denial to the HDMF Board of Trustees, and thereafter, to the Court of Appeals. The Court stated that certiorari will not lie as a substitute for a lost remedy of appeal. Essentially, petitioners contend that it does not question the power of respondent HDMF, as an administrative agency, to issue rules and regulations to implement P.D. 1752 and Section 5 of R.A. 7742; however, the subject Amendment and Guidelines issued by it should be set aside and declared null and void for being irrevocably inconsistent with the enabling law, P.D. 1752, as amended by R.A. 7742, which merely requires as a pre-condition for exemption for coverage, the existence of either a superior provident (retirement) plan or a superior housing plan, and not the concurrence of both plans. The core issue posed in the court below and in this Court is whether the respondents acted in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the Amendment to the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. 7742 and HDMF Circular No. 124-B on the Revised Guidelines and Procedure for Filing

Application for Waiver or Suspension of Fund Coverage under P.D. 1752, as amended by R.A. 7742, insofar as said Amendment and Guidelines impose as a requirement for exemption from coverage or participation in the Home Development Mutual Fund the existence of both a superior housing plan and a provident plan. We vote to give the petition due course. The assailed Amendment to the Rules and Regulations and the Revised Guidelines suffer from a legal infirmity and should be set aside. The law pertinent to the Home Development Mutual Fund, otherwise known as the PagIBIG Fund, should be revisited. Presidential Decree No. 1530 P.D. No. 1752, enacted on December 13, 1980, amended P. D. 1530 to make the Home Development Mutual Fund a body corporate and to make its coverage mandatory upon all employers covered by the Social Security System and the Government Service Insurance System. Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752 provides for waiver or suspension from coverage or participation in the fund Section 19. Existing Provident/Housing Plans. - An employer and/or employee-group who, at the time this Decree becomes effective have their own provident and/or employee-housing plans, may register with the Fund, for any of the following purposes: For annual certification of waiver or suspension from coverage or participation in the Fund, which shall be granted on the basis of verification that the waiver or suspension does not contravene any effective collective bargaining agreement and that the features of the plan or plans are superior to the Fund or continue to be so; or Republic Act No. 7742, amending certain sections of P.D. 1752 was approved. Section 5 of the said statute provides that within sixty (60) days from the approval of the Act, the Board of Trustees of the Home Development Mutual Fund shall promulgate the rules and regulations necessary for the effective implementation of (this) Act. Such waiver or suspension of coverage may be granted by the President of the Fund on the basis of verification that the waiver or suspension of coverage does not contravene any effective collective bargaining or other existing agreement and that the features of the plan or plans are superior to the Fund and continue to be so. Any employer with a plan providing both for a provident/retirement and housing benefits The provident/retirement and housing benefits as provided for under the plan must be superior to the provident/retirement and housing benefits offered by the Fund. HDMF Circular No. 124-B entitled Revised Guidelines and Procedure for Filing Applications for Waiver or Suspension of Fund Coverage under P.D. No. 1752, as amended by Republic Act No. 7742, was promulgated. ANY EMPLOYER WHO HAS A PROVIDENT, RETIREMENT, GRATUITY OR PENSION PLAN AND A HOUSING PLAN, EXISTING AS OF DECEMBER 14, 1980, THE EFFECTIVITY OF P.D. NO. 1752, may file an application for waiver or suspension from Fund coverage, provided, that - Petitioner contends that respondent, in the exercise of its rule making power has overstepped the bounds and exceeded its limit,. The law provides as a condition for exemption from coverage, the existence of either a superior provident (retirement) plan, and/or a superior housing plan, and not the existence of both plans. On the other hand, respondents claim that the use of the words and/or in Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752, which words are diametrically opposed in meaning, can only be used interchangeably and not together, and the option of making it either both or any one belongs to the Board of Trustees of HDMF, which has the power and authority to issue rules and regulations for the effective implementation of the Pag-IBIG Fund Law, and the guidelines for the grant of waiver or suspension of coverage.

The term and/or means that effect shall be given to both the conjunctive and and the disjunctive or; or that one word or the other may be taken accordingly as one or the other will best effectuate the purpose intended by the legislature as gathered from the whole statute. The term is used to avoid a construction which by the use of the disjunctive or alone will exclude the combination of several of the alternatives or by the use of the conjunctive and will exclude the efficacy of any one of the alternatives standing alone. It is accordingly ordinarily held that the intention of the legislature in using the term and/or is that the word and and the word or are to be used interchangeably. It is seems to us clear from the language of the enabling law that Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752, intended that an employer with a provident plan or an employee housing plan superior to that of the fund may obtain exemption from coverage. If the law had intended that the employee should have both a superior provident plan and a housing plan in order to qualify for exemption, it would have used the words and instead of and/or. Notably, paragraph (a) of Section 19 requires for annual certification of waiver or suspension, that the features of the plan or plans are superior to the fund or continue to be so. The law obviously contemplates that the existence of either plan is considered as sufficient basis for the grant of an exemption; needless to state, the concurrence of both plans is more than sufficient. To require the existence of both plans would radically impose a more stringent condition for waiver which was not clearly envisioned by the basic law. By removing the disjunctive word or in the implementing rules the respondent Board has exceeded its authority. It is well settled that the rules and regulations which are the product of a deligated power to create new or additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the Administrative agency. the basic law should prevail as the embodiment of the legislative purpose, and the rules and regulations issued to implement said law cannot go beyond its terms and provisions. We accordingly find merit in petitioners contention that Section 1, Rule VII of the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. 7742, and HDMF Circular No. 124-B and the Revised Guidelines and Procedure for Filing Application for Waiver or Suspension of Fund Coverage under P.D. 1752, as amended by R.A. 7742, should be declared invalid insofar as they require that an employer must have both a superior retirement/provident plan and a superior employee housing plan in order to be entitled to a certificate of waiver and suspension of coverage from the HDMF. WHEREFORE, the petition is given due course and the assailed Orders of the court a quo dated October 10, 1997 and December 19, 1997 are hereby set aside.

Maxima Realty petition for review on certiorari assailing the December 9, 1998 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 418661 which affirmed in toto the June 2, 1998 Order of the Office of the President in O.P. Case No. 56972 dismissing petitioners appeal for having been filed out of time. subject of the controversy is Unit #702 of Heart Tower Condominium, covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. 12152 and located along Valero Street, Salcedo Village, Makati City. Said unit was originally sold by Segovia Development Corporation (Segovia) to Masahiko Morishita, who in turn sold and assigned all his rights thereto in favor of Parkway Real Estate Development Corporation (Parkway) on October 16, 1989. Parkway and petitioner Maxima Realty Management and Development Corporation (Maxima) entered into an agreement to buy and sell, on installment basis, Unit #702 in consideration of the amount of 3 Million Pesos.4 It was further agreed that failure to pay

any of the installments on their due dates shall entitle Parkway to forfeit the amounts paid by way of liquidated damages. Maxima defaulted in the payment of the installments due but was granted several grace periods until it has paid a total of P1,180,000.00, leaving a balance of P1,820,000.00. Parkway, with the consent of Segovia, executed a Deed of Assignment transferring all its rights in the condominium unit in favor of Maxima. This Deed was intended to enable Maxima to obtain title in its name and use the same as security for P1,820,000.00 loan with Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC), which amount will be used by Maxima to pay its obligation to Parkway. RCBC informed Parkway of the approval of Maximas P1,820,000.00 loan subject to the submission of, among others, the Condominium Certificate of Title transferred in the name of Maxima and the Certificate of Completion and turn over of unit Maxima, however, failed to pay Segovia the amount of P58,114.00 for fees and charges. Thus, Segovia did not transfer the title of the condominium unit to Maxima. Since Parkway was not paid the balance of P1,820,000.00, it cancelled its agreement to buy and sell and Deed of Assignment in favor of Maxima. Maxima filed with the Office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), a complaint10 for specific performance to enforce the agreement to buy and sell Unit #702. HLURB Arbiter sustained the nullification of the Deed of Assignment and ordered Parkway to refund to Maxima the amount of P1,180,000.00. Segovia was further ordered to issue the condominium certificate of title over Unit #702 in favor of Parkway upon payment by the latter of the registration fees. Both Maxima and Parkway appealed to the Board of Commissioners of the HLURB (Board).12 During the pendency of the appeal, Maxima offered to pay the balance of P1,820,000.00, which was accepted by Parkway. The Board then ordered Maxima to deliver said amount in the form of managers check to Parkway; and directed Segovia to transfer title over the property to Maxima.13 The latter, however, failed to make good its offer, which compelled Parkway to file a Manifestation14 that the appeal be resolved. Board rendered judgment modifying the decision of the HLURB Arbiter by forfeiting in favor of Parkway 50% of the total amount paid by Maxima and ordering Segovia to pay Parkway the amount of P10,000.00 as attorneys fees. Maxima appealed17 to the Office of the President which dismissed the appeal for having been filed out of time.18 Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the Decision of the Office of the President. sole issue of: Was petitioners appeal before the Office of the President filed within the reglementary period? SGMC Realty Corporation v. Office of the President20 it was settled that the period within which to appeal the decision of the Board of Commissioners of HLURB to the Office of the President is fifteen (15) days from receipt of the assailed decision, pursuant to Section 1521 of Presidential Decree No. 957 The Court ruled that the thirty (30) day period to appeal to the Office of the President from decisions of the Board as provided in Section 27 of the 1994 HLURB Rules of Procedure,24 is not applicable, because special laws providing for the remedy of appeal to the Office of the President, such as Presidential Decree No. 597 and Presidential Decree No. 1344, must prevail over the HLURB Rules of Procedure. and Section 222 of Presidential Decree No. 1344. Section 27 of the 1994 HLURB Rules of Procedure appeal the decision of the Board of Commissioners or its division to the Office of the President within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof pursuant to and in accordance with Administrative Order No. 18 Administrative Order No. 18

an appeal to the Office of the President shall be taken within thirty (30) days from receipt by the aggrieved party of the decision/resolution/order complained of or appealed from. . Nonetheless, such thirty-day period is subject to the qualification that there are no other statutory periods of appeal applicable. If there are special laws governing particular cases which provide for a shorter or longer reglementary period, the same shall prevail over the thirty-day period provided for in the administrative order. This is in line with the rule in statutory construction that an administrative rule or regulation, in order to be valid, must not contradict but conform to the provisions of the enabling law. there are special laws that mandate a shorter period of fifteen (15) days within which to appeal a case to public respondent. First, Section 15 of Presidential Decree No. 957 provides that the decisions of the National Housing Authority (NHA) shall become final and executory after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from the date of receipt of the decision. Second, Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1344 states that decisions of the National Housing Authority shall become final and executory after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from the date of its receipt. Further, we note that the regulatory functions of NHA relating to housing and land development has been transferred to Human Settlements Regulatory Commission, now known as HLURB [by virtue of E.O. No. 684 (7 February 1981) and E.O. No. 90 (17 December 1986)]. Thus, said presidential issuances providing for a reglementary period of appeal of fifteen days apply in this case. Accordingly, the period of appeal of thirty (30) days set forth in Section 27 of HLURB 1994 Rules of Procedure no longer holds true for being in conflict with the provisions of aforesaid presidential decrees In the case at bar, Maxima had until May 4, 1994, the fifteenth day from receipt of the decision of the Board on April 19, 1994,26 to appeal to the Office of the President. The appeal which was filed on May 10, 1994 was clearly beyond the reglementary period.

Lokin Jr. v. COMELEC whether the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) can issue implementing rules and regulations (IRRs) that provide a ground for the substitution of a party-list nominee not written in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941,[1] otherwise known as the Party-List System Act, the law that the COMELEC thereby implements. (CIBAC) was one of the organized groups duly registered under the party-list system of representation that manifested their intent to participate in the May 14, 2007 synchronized national and local elections. Prior to the elections, however, CIBAC, still through Villanueva, filed a certificate of nomination, substitution and amendment of the list of nominees dated May 7, 2007,[6] whereby it withdrew the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and substituted Armi Jane R. Borje as one of the nominees. Villanueva sent a letter to COMELEC Chairperson Benjamin Abalos,[7] transmitting therewith the signed petitions of more than 81% of the CIBAC members, in order to confirm the withdrawal of the nomination of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and the substitution of Borje. On June 26, 2007, CIBAC, supposedly through its counsel, filed with the COMELEC en banc sitting as the National Board of Canvassers a motion seeking the proclamation of Lokin as its second nominee. The motion was opposed by Villanueva and Cruz-Gonzales.

Notwithstanding Villanuevas filing of the certificate of nomination, substitution and amendment of the list of nominees and the petitions of more than 81% of CIBAC members, the COMELEC failed to act on the matter, prompting Villanueva to file a petition to confirm the certificate of nomination, substitution and amendment of the list of nominees of CIBAC on June 28, 2007. COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8219,[10] whereby it resolved to set the matter pertaining to the validity of the withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and the substitution of Borje for proper disposition and hearing. The case was docketed as E.M. No. 07-054. With the formal declaration that CIBAC was entitled to an additional seat, Ricardo de los Santos, purportedly as secretary general of CIBAC, informed Roberto P. Nazareno, Secretary General of the House of Representatives, of the promulgation of NBC Resolution No. 07-72 and requested that Lokin be formally sworn in by Speaker Jose de Venecia, Jr. to enable him to assume office. Nazareno replied, however, that the request of Delos Santos could not be granted because COMELEC Law Director Alioden D. Dalaig had notified him of the pendency of E.M. 07-054. COMELEC en banc resolved E.M. No. 07-054[13] thuswise:

WHEREFORE, considering the above discussion, the Commission hereby approves the withdrawal of the nomination of Atty. Luis K. Lokin, Sherwin N. Tugna and Emil Galang as second, third and fourth nominees respectively As a result, the COMELEC en banc proclaimed Cruz-Gonzales as the official second nominee of CIBAC.[14] Cruz-Gonzales took her oath of office as a Party-List Representative of CIBAC on September 17, 2007. Lokin seeks through mandamus to compel respondent COMELEC to proclaim him as the official second nominee of CIBAC. Lokin assails Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 promulgated on January 12, 2007 e alleges that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 expanded Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941. [18] the law that the COMELEC seeks to thereby implement. (c) Whether or not Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 is unconstitutional and violates the Party-List System Act; and Under certain circumstances, the Legislature can delegate to executive officers and administrative boards the authority to adopt and promulgate IRRs. To render such delegation lawful, the Legislature must declare the policy of the law and fix the legal principles that are to control in given cases. The Legislature should set a definite or primary standard to guide those empowered to execute the law. For as long as the policy is laid down and a proper standard is established by statute, there can be no unconstitutional delegation of legislative power when the Legislature leaves to selected instrumentalities the duty of making subordinate rules within the prescribed limits, although there is conferred upon the executive officer or administrative board a large measure of discretion. There is a distinction between the delegation of power to make a law and the conferment of an authority or a discretion to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law, for the power to make laws necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be.

The authority to make IRRs in order to carry out an express legislative purpose, or to effect the operation and enforcement of a law is not a power exclusively legislative in character, but is rather administrative in nature. The rules and regulations adopted and promulgated must not, however, subvert or be contrary to existing statutes. The function of promulgating IRRs may be legitimately exercised only for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of a law. The power of administrative agencies is confined to implementing the law or putting it into effect. Corollary to this is that administrative regulation cannot extend the law and amend a legislative enactment. It is axiomatic that the clear letter of the law is controlling and cannot be amended by a mere administrative rule issued for its implementation. Indeed, administrative or executive acts shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. To be valid, therefore, the administrative IRRs must comply with the following requisites to be valid:[28] 1. 2. 3. 4. Its promulgation must be authorized by the Legislature; It must be within the scope of the authority given by the Legislature; It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure; and It must be reasonable.

The COMELEC is constitutionally mandated to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, a plebiscite, an initiative, a referendum, and a recall.[29] In addition to the powers and functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the COMELEC is also charged to promulgate IRRs implementing the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code or other laws that the COMELEC enforces and administers. The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7804 pursuant to its powers under the Constitution, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, and the Party-List System Act.[31] Hence, the COMELEC met the first requisite. The COMELEC also met the third requisite. There is no question that Resolution No. 7804 underwent the procedural necessities of publication and dissemination in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the resolution itself. Whether Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 was valid or not is thus to be tested on the basis of whether the second and fourth requisites were met. It is in this respect that the challenge of Lokin against Section 13 succeeds. Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 reads: No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, becomes incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list. The Legislature thereby deprived the party-list organization of the right to change its nominees or to alter the order of nominees once the list is submitted to the COMELEC, except when: (a) the nominee dies; (b) the nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; or (c) the nominee becomes incapacitated. The provision must be read literally because its language is plain and free from ambiguity, and expresses a single, definite, and sensible meaning. Such meaning is conclusively presumed to be the meaning that the

Legislature has intended to convey. Even where the courts should be convinced that the Legislature really intended some other meaning, and even where the literal interpretation should defeat the very purposes of the enactment, the explicit declaration of the Legislature is still the law, from which the courts must not depart.[34] When the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no reason for interpretation or construction, but only for application.[35] Accordingly, an administrative agency tasked to implement a statute may not construe it by expanding its meaning where its provisions are clear and unambiguous. legislative intent no more changes should be made in the names or in the order of listing. The usage of No in Section 8 No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, or becomes incapacitated, in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list renders Section 8 a negative law, and is indicative of the legislative intent to make the statute mandatory. Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 enumerates only three instances in which the party-list organization can substitute another person in place of the nominee whose name has been submitted to the COMELEC, namely: (a) when the nominee dies; (b) when the nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; and (c) when the nominee becomes incapacitated. The enumeration is exclusive, for, necessarily, the general rule applies to all cases not falling under any of the three exceptions. When the statute itself enumerates the exceptions to the application of the general rule, the exceptions are strictly but reasonably construed. The exceptions extend only as far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provision rather than the exceptions. Where the general rule is established by a statute with exceptions, none but the enacting authority can curtail the former. Not even the courts may add to the latter by implication, and it is a rule that an express exception excludes all others, although it is always proper in determining the applicability of the rule to inquire whether, in a particular case, it accords with reason and justice. Section 13. Substitution of nominees. A party-list nominee may be substituted only when he dies, or his nomination is withdrawn by the party, or he becomes incapacitated to continue as such, or he withdraws his acceptance to a nomination. The COMELEC, despite its role as the implementing arm of the Government in the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,[40] has neither the authority nor the license to expand, extend, or add anything to the law it seeks to implement thereby. The IRRs the COMELEC issues for that purpose should always accord with the law to be implemented, and should not override, supplant, or modify the law. It is basic that the IRRs should remain consistent with the law they intend to carry out. the COMELEC did not merely reword or rephrase the text of Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941, because it established an entirely new ground not found in the text of the provision. The new ground granted to the party-list organization the unilateral right to withdraw its nomination already submitted to the COMELEC, which Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 did not allow to be done. The insertion of the new ground was invalid.

An IRR adopted pursuant to the law is itself law.[46] In case of conflict between the law and the IRR, the law prevails. There can be no question that an IRR or any of its parts not adopted pursuant to the law is no law at all and has neither the force nor the effect of law. WHEREFORE, we grant the petitions for certiorari and mandamus. We declare Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 invalid and of no effect to the extent that it authorizes a party-list organization to withdraw its nomination of a nominee once it has submitted the nomination to the Commission on Elections.