1. Cojuangco, Jr vs PCGGG.R. Nos. 92319-20 October 2, 1990 109 SCRA 266

FACTS:President Corazon C. Aquino directed the Solicitor General to prosecute all persons involved in the misuse of coconut levy funds.

Pursuant to the above directive the Solicitor General created a task force to conduct a thorough study of the possible involvement of all persons in the anomalous use of coconut levy funds.

The Solicitor General filed two criminal complaints with respondent PCGG which assigned both complaints to prosecutor Cesario del Rosario for preliminary investigation. Del Rosario prepared a subpoena setting the preliminary investigation as to respondents Ma. Clara Lobregat, Jose Eleazae, Felix Duenas, Jr and Salvador Escudero, Eduardo Conjuangco, Rolando de la Cuesta and Hermenegildo Zayco.

At the scheduled preliminary investigation petitioner appeared through counsel and Instead of filing a counter-affidavit, as required in the subpoena, he filed two motions (1) a motion to disqualify/inhibit PCGG; alternatively, a motion to dismiss; and (2) motion to have the PCGG itself hear or resolve Cojuangco's motion to disqualify/inhibit PCGG alternatively, motion to dismiss.

Prosecutor del Rosario denied both motions and declared the proceedings submitted for resolution.

Petitioner filed in this Court petitions for prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction. He alleges that the PCGG has no right to conduct such preliminary investigation.

The PCGG issued an order that the complaints filed against them may now be considered submitted for resolution by this Commission and this Commission finds the findings and conclusions of fact of the investigating prosecutor, that a prima facie case has been established against all the respondents.

A panel of prosecutors designated by the PCGG issued a subpoena to petitioner in order to compel him to appear in the investigation of said cases. Petitioner prays that, after hearing, the PCGG be prohibited from continuing with the preliminary investigation and that it be ordered to forward the records of the case to the Ombudsman for appropriate action.

ISSUE: Whether PCGG has the authority to conduct a preliminary investigation of the criminal complaints filed against them by the Solicitor General

RULING:From the foregoing provisions of law, particularly Sections 2(b) and 3(a) of Executive Order No. 1 and Sections 1 and 2 of Executive Order No. 14, it is clear that the PCGG has the power to investigate and prosecute such ill-gotten wealth cases of the former President, his relatives and associates, and graft and corrupt practices cases that may be assigned by the President to the PCGG to be filed with the Sandiganbayan. No doubt, the authority to investigate extended to the PCGG includes the authority to conduct a preliminary investigation. Thus, the Tanodbayan lost the exclusive authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of these types of cases by the promulgation of the said Executive Order Nos. 1 and 14 whereby the PCGG was vested concurrent ent jurisdiction with the Tanodbayan to conduct such preliminary investigation and to prosecute said cases before the Sandiganbayan.Although such a preliminary investigation is not a trial and is not intended to usurp the function of the trial court, it is not a casual affair. The officer conducting the same investigates or inquires into the facts concerning the commission of the crime with the end in view of determining whether or not an information may be prepared against the accused. Indeed, a preliminary investigation is in effect a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of the case. Sufficient proof of the guilt of the accused must be adduced so that when the case is tried, the trial court may not be bound as a matter of law to order an acquittal. A preliminary investigation has then been called a judicial inquiry. It is a judicial proceeding. An act becomes judicial when there is opportunity to be heard and for, the production and weighing of evidence, and a decision is rendered thereon. The authority of a prosecutor or investigating officer duly empowered to preside or to conduct a preliminary investigation is no less than that of a municipal judge or even a regional trial court judge. While the investigating officer, strictly speaking is not a "judge," by the nature of his functions he is and must be considered to be a quasi judicial officer.2. First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs. CAGr 110571 March 10, 1994

Facts:The Board of Investments(BOI) in its decision dated December 10, 1992, granted the petitioner's application to change the scope of its registered products from "glazed floor tiles" to "ceramic tiles." Oppositor Mariwasa filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.

On February 24, 1993, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss holding that the CA had no appellate jurisdiction because such jurisdiction is vested with the SC according to Art. 82 of the Omnibus Investments Code (OIC). The CA dismissed the motion to dismiss causing the petitioner to file a petition for certiorari with the SC.

It is the opinion of the petitioner that the Judiciary Reorganization Act if 1980 (BP 129) and Circular 1-91, which prescribes rules governing appeals to the CA from decisions of the Court of Tax appeals and quasi-judicial bodies, cannot be basis of the appeal because it is contrary to Article 82 of the OIC. However, Mariwasa contended that the inconsistency was resolved by the issuance if Circular 1-91 which holds that decisions of the Court of tax appeals and quasi-judicial agencies are appealable to the CA.

Isaue:Whether or not the decision of the BOI is appealable to the CA.

Decision:The court ruled that the law governing the appeal of quasi-judicial agencies is the OIC, however, Circular 1-91 transfers the jurisdiction to the CA. The said circular was issued by the SC pursuant to the power granted by the constitution to promulgate rules relating to the procedure in all courts.

By this effect, Curcular 1-91 effectively repealed and superseded the Omnibus Investments Code insofar as the manner and method of enforcing the right to appeal decisions of the BOI.3. PEDRO W. GUERZON vs. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. 77707 August 8, 1988Facts:On January 9, 1981 petitioner Pedro Guerzon executed with Basic Landoil Energy Corporation, which was later acquired by respondent Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, a contract denominated as "Service Station Lease" for the use and operation of respondent SHELL's properties, facilities and equipment for a period of five (5) years from January 15, 1981 and ending on January 14, 1986. Paragraph 9 of the Service Station Lease Contract provides that the cancellation or termination of the Dealer's Sales Contract executed between the COMPANY and the LESSEE on January 7,1981 shall automatically cancel this Lease.On January 7, 1981 petitioner likewise executed with the same Corporation a "Dealer's Sales Contract" for the sale by petitioner of respondent SHELL's petroleum and other products in the leased service station which contract expired April 12,1986. Bureau of Energy Utilization (BEU) approved the Dealer's Sales Contract and issued a certificate of authority in petitioner's favor, which had a 5-year period of validity, in line with the terms of the contract.As early as January 2, 1986 respondent SHELL wrote to petitioner informing him that the Company was not renewing the Dealer's Sales Contract which was to expire on April 12, 1986 together with the service station lease, with copy furnished to BEU. But petitioner failed to turn-over the service station premises and all the equipment. Subsequently, BEU, through respondent Caasi, Jr., officer- in-charge of its Mindanao Division Office, issued the assailed order directing the petitioner to immediately vacate the service station and turn it over to Shell Petroleum Corporation; and show cause in writing, under oath within ten (10) days from receipt why no administrative and/or criminal proceedings shall be instituted against petitioner for the aforesaid violation.Pursuant to the said order, respondent SHELL, accompanied by law enforcement officers, was able to secure possession of the gasoline station in question together with the equipment and accessories, and turned them over to SHELL.Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental a complaint for certiorari, injunction and damages with preliminary mandatory injunction to annul the disputed order of respondent F.C. Caasi, Jr., but the complaint was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction to annul the order of a quasi-judicial body of equivalent category as the RTC.Petitioner filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari with a prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction seeking the annulment of respondent Caasi, Jr.'s order and the restoration to petitioner of possession of the service station and the equipment removed therefrom. But the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition after holding the disputed order valid and the proceedings undertaken to implement the same sanctioned by Presidential Decree No. 1206, as amended.Hence, petitioner's recourse to this Court.Issue:Whether or not BEU has the power to order the petitoner to vacate theleased service station Held:No. Under Section 7 of P.D. No. 1206, as amended the Bureau of Energy Utilization may, in case of a violation or non- compliance with any term or condition of any certificate, license or permit issued by the Bureau or any of its orders, decisions, rules or regulations: (1)impose a finenot exceeding P1,000.00; and (2) in case of failure to pay the fine imposed or to cease and discontinue the violation or non-compliance,order the suspension, closure or stoppage of operationsof the establishment of the guilty party. Its authority is limited to these two (2) options. It can do no more, as there is nothing in P.D. No. 1206, as amended, which empowers the Bureau to issue an order to vacate in case of a violation.As it is, jurisdiction to order a lessee to vacate the leased premises is vested in the civil courts in an appropriate case for unlawful detainer oraccionpubliciana. There is nothing in P.D. No. 1206, as amended, that would suggest that the same or similar jurisdiction has been granted to the Bureau of Energy Utilization. It is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law and those that are necessarily implied in the exercise thereof.Moreoverthe text of the assailed order leaves no room for doubt that it was issued in connection with an adjudication of the contractual dispute between respondent Shell and petitioner. But then the Bureau of Energy Utilization, like its predecessor, the defunct Oil Industry Commission, has no power to decide contractual disputes between gasoline dealers and oil companies, in the absence of an express provision of law granting to it such. As explicitly stated in the law, in connection with the exercise of quasi-judicial powers, the Bureau's jurisdiction is limited to cases involving violation or non-compliance with any term or condition of any certificate, license or permit issued by it or of any of its orders, decisions, rules or regulations.4. ANTIPOLO REALTY CORPORATION vs. THE NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITYG.R. No. L-50444 August 31, 1987153 SCRA 399Facts:By virtue of a Contract to Sell dated 18 August 1970, Jose Hernando acquired prospective and beneficial ownership over Lot. No. 15, Block IV of the Ponderosa Heights Subdivision in Antipolo, Rizal, from the petitioner Antipolo Realty Corporation.On 28 August 1974, Mr. Hernando transferred his rights over Lot No. 15 to private respondent VirgilioYuson. The transfer was embodied in a Deed of Assignment and Substitution of Obligor (Delegacion), executed with the consent of Antipolo Realty, in which Mr. Yuson assumed the performance of the vendee's obligations under the original contract, including payment of his predecessor's installments in arrears. However, for failure of Antipolo Realty to develop the subdivision project in accordance with its undertaking under Clause 17 of the Contract to Sell,Mr. Yuson paid only the arrearages pertaining to the period up to, and including, the month of August 1972 and stopped all monthly installment payments falling due thereafter. Clause 17 of the contract provides that Antipolo Realty obligates itself to provide the subdivision with: a) Concrete curbs and gutters b) Underground drainage system c) Asphalt paved roads d) Independent water system e) Electrical installation with concrete posts. f) Landscaping and concrete sidewall g) Developed park or amphi-theatre h) 24-hour security guard service. These improvements shall be complete within a period of two (2) years from date of this contract. Failure by the SELLER (Antipolo) shall permit the BUYER to suspend his monthly installments without any penalties or interest charges until such time that such improvements shall have been completed.Subsequently, the president of Antipolo Realty sent a notice to private respondent Yuson advising that the required improvements in the subdivision had already been completed, and requesting resumption of payment of the monthly installments. Mr. Yuson replied that he would conform with the request as soon as he was able to verify the truth of the representation in the notice. In a second letter, Antipolo Realty reiterated its request that Mr. Yuson resume payment of his monthly installments, citing the decision rendered by the National Housing Authority (NHA) in the case entitled "Jose B. Viado Jr. vs. Conrado S. Reyes,declaring Antipolo Realty to have "substantially complied with its commitment to the lot buyers pursuant to the Contract to Sell executed by and between the lot buyers and the respondent." In addition, a formal demand was made for full and immediate payment of the amount of P16,994.73, representing installments which, Antipolo Realty alleged, had accrued during the period while the improvements were being completed i.e., between September 1972 and October 1976.Mr. Yuson refused to pay the September 1972-October 1976 monthly installments but agreed to pay the post October 1976 installments. Antipolo Realty responded by rescinding the Contract to Sell, and claimed the forfeiture of all installment payments previously made by Mr. Yuson.Hence, Mr. Yuson brought the dispute with Antipolo Realty before public respondent NHA. Antipolo Realty filed a Motion to Dismiss. After hearing, the NHA rendered a decision ordering the reinstatement of the Contract to Sell under certain conditions.Antipolo Realty filed a Motion for Reconsideration asserting: (a) that it had been denied due process of law since it had not been served with notice of the scheduled hearing; and (b) that the jurisdiction to hear and decide Mr. Yuson's complaint was lodged in the regular courts, not in the NHA, since that complaint involved the interpretation and application of the Contract to Sell.The motion for reconsideration was denied by respondent NHA General Manager G.V. Tobias, who sustained the jurisdiction of the NHA to hear and decide the Yuson complaint. He also found that Antipolo Realty had in fact been served with notice of the date of the hearing, but that its counsel had failed to attend the hearing.The case was submitted for decision, and eventually decided, solely on the evidence presented by the complainant.Hence this petition for certiorari and Prohibition with Writ of Preliminary Injunction. The petitioner assailed the jurisdiction of the NHA. Petitioner further asserted that, under Clause 7 of the Contract to Sell, it could validly terminate its agreement with Mr. Yuson and, as a consequence thereof, retain all the prior installment payments made by the latter.Issue: Whether or not the NHA, in ordering the reinstatement of contract to sell, acted beyond its competence.Held: No.The substantive provisions being applied and enforced by the NHA in the instant case are found in Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 957 which reads:Sec. 23.Non-Forfeiture of Payments. No installment payment made by a buyer in a subdivision or condominium project for the lot or unit he contracted to buy shall be forfeited in favor of the owner or developer when the buyer, after due notice to the owner or developer, desists from further payment due to the failure of the owner or developer to develop the subdivision or condominium project according to the approved plans and within the time limit for complying with the same. Such buyer may, at his option, be reimbursed the total amount paid including amortization and interests but excluding delinquency interests, with interest thereon at the legal rate. (emphasis supplied.)Having failed to comply with its contractual obligation to complete certain specified improvements in the subdivision within the specified period of two years from the date of the execution of the Contract to Sell, petitioner was not entitled to exercise its options under Clause 7 of the Contract. Hence, petitioner could neither rescind the Contract to Sell nor treat the installment payments made by the private respondent as forfeited in its favor. The NHA was therefore correct in holding that private respondent's prior installment payments could not be forfeited in favor of petitioner.Neither did the NHA commit any abuse, let alone a grave abuse of discretion or act in excess of its jurisdiction when it ordered the reinstatement of the Contract to Sell between the parties. Such reinstatement is no more than a logical consequence of the NHA's correct ruling that the petitioner was not entitled to rescind the Contract to Sell. There is, in any case, no question that under Presidential Decree No. 957, the NHA was legally empowered to determine and protect the rights of contracting parties under the law administered by it and under the respective agreements, as well as to ensure that their obligations thereunder are faithfully performed.1. Bantolino V Coca ColaGR 153660 10 June 2003On 15 February 1995 sixty-two (62) employees of respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers, Inc., and its officers, Lipercon Services, Inc., Peoples Specialist Services, Inc., and Interim Services, Inc., filed a complaint against respondents for unfair labor practice through illegal dismissal, violation of their security of tenure and the perpetuation of the Cabo System.Thereafter, Labor Arbiter Jose De Vera conducted clarificatory hearing to elicit information from the ten (10) remaining complainants (petitioners herein) relative to their alleged employment with respondent firm.On 29 May 1998 Labor Arbiter Jose DeVera rendered a decision ordering respondent company to reinstate complainants to their former positions with all the rights, privileges and benefits due regular employees, and to pay their full back wages which, with the exception of Prudencio Bantolino whose back wages must be computed upon proof of his dismissal as of 31 May 1998, already amounted to an aggregate of P1,810,244.00.On appeal, the NLRC sustained the finding of the Labor Arbiter that there was indeed an employer-employee relationship between the complainants and respondents.Respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers appealed to the Court of Appeals which, although affirming the finding of the NLRC that an employer-employee relationship existed between the contending parties, nonetheless agreed with respondent that the affidavits of some of the complainants, namely, Prudencio Bantolino, Nestor Romero, Nilo Espina, Ricardo Bartolome, Eluver Garcia, Eduardo Garcia and Nelson Manalastas, should not have been given probative value for their failure to affirm the contents thereof and to undergo cross-examination.ISSUE:WON Administrative bodies are bound by the same technicalities of law as used by the courtsHELD:No, To reiterate, administrative bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the technical niceties of law and procedure and the rules obtaining in courts of law. Indeed, the Revised Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence may be given only stringent application, i.e., by analogy or in a suppletory character and effect. The submission by respondent, citing People v. Sorrel, that an affidavit not testified to in a trial, is mere hearsay evidence and has no real evidentiary value, cannot find relevance in the present case considering that a criminal prosecution requires a quantum of evidence different from that of an administrative proceeding. Under the Rules of the Commission, the Labor Arbiter is given the discretion to determine the necessity of a formal trial or hearing. Hence, trial-type hearings are not even required as the cases may be decided based on verified position papers, with supporting documents and their affidavits.

3. G.R. No. 6987124 August 1990189 SCRA 34Anita Villa v. Manuel Lazaro & the Human Settlements Regulatory CommissionNaravasa, J.:FACTSOn 18 January 1980, Anita Villa (petitioner) was granted a building permit to construct a funeral parlor at Santiago Blvd., General Santos City. The permit was issued by the City Engineer after the application was processed by Engr. Dominador Solana of the City Engineers Office, and on the strength of the Certification of Manuel Sales, City Planning and Development Coordinator that the project was in consonance with the Land Use Plan of the City and within the full provision of the Zoning Ordinance. Villa then commenced construction of the building. CFI In October 1980, as the funeral parlor was nearing completion, Dr. Jose Veneracion brought a suit for injunction against Villa. Dr. Veneracion was the owner of St. Elizabeth Hospital about 132.36 meters from the parlor. He averred that the construction of the funeral parlor was violative of the Zoning Ordinance of General Santos City. CFI dismissed the complaint as well as the counterclaim pleaded by Villa. The court found that a falsified Zoning Ordinance, containing a provision governing funeral parlors, was submitted to and ratified by the Ministry of Human Settlements. That ordinance, however, had never been passed by the Sangguniang Panglungsod. The genuine Zoning Ordinance contained no prohibition relative to funeral parlors distance from hospitals. Villa resumed construction.Human Settlements Regulatory Commission Dr. Veneracion did not appeal from judgment which therefore became final. Instead, he brought the same case with the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission. He lodged a complaint with a prayer that the funeral parlor be relocated because it was near St. Elizabeth Hospital and Villa failed to secure the necessary locational clearance. Two months after the CFI judgment (22 January 1982), Villa received a telegram from Commissioner Raymundo R. Dizon requesting for the transmittal of proof of locational clearance. On that same day, Villa sent a reply telegram. Villa then sent Dizon the certification of Josefina E. Alaba (Human Settlements Officer) and the certification of Manuel O. Sales, City Planning and Development Coordinator by registered mail on 27 January 1982. On 8 February 1982, Villa received the official communication referred to in the previous telegram. Considering that she already sent the clearance earlier, she made no response. On 2 June 1982, Villa received a Show Cause Order signed by Ernesto L. Mendiola in behalf of the Commission, requiring her to show cause why a fine should not be imposed on her or a cease-and-desist order issued against her for her failure to show proof of locational clearance. The order made no reference of the registered mail earlier sent by Villa. On that same day, Villa sent Dizon by registered mail, the same certifications she already sent. On 27 July 1982, she received an Order from Dizon imposing on her a fine of P10,000 and requiring her to cease operations. No reference was again made about the previous mails.

Villa subsequently went to see the Deputized Zoning Administrator of General Santos City, Isidro M. Olmedo. The latter issued her a Certificate of Zoning Compliance attesting that the land of Villas commercial building was located in a vicinity in which the dominant land uses were commercial/institutional/residential and that the project conformed with the land use plan of the city. Villa sent this certificate to Dizon on the same day she acquired it. This certificate is entirely consistent the earlier certification. On 16 November 1982, a writ of execution was served to Villa. She moved for reconsideration and attached copies of the documents earlier sent. The motion was denied by Dizon saying that the plea was presented out of time and the order had become final and executory. Villa appealed with the Commission Proper which was likewise denied on the same ground.Office of the Pres. Villa appealed to the Office of the President. It was acted on by the Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs, Manuel M. Lazaro (respondent). In a Resolution dated 21 Septemeber 1984, Lazaro denied the appeal and the motion for extension of time to submit an appeal memorandum. Villa filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the resolution was not in conformity with the law and the evidence and deprived her of due process of law. This was also denied in a Resolution dated 14 December 1984.ISSUE: Whether or not Villa was denied due process of law.HELDThe facts present a picture of official incompetence or gross negligence and abdication of duty, if not of active bias and partiality, that is most reprehensible. Dr. Veneracion resorted to the proscribed practice of forum-shopping. Following judgment of CFI, he lodged a complaint with the Commission instead of appealing that judgment. Also, while the Commission took cognizance of the complaint and by telegram required Villa to submit locational clearance, it did not bother to put Villa on notice, formally or otherwise, of Dr. Veneracions complaint. It was therefore only natural for Villa to assume that no formal adversarial inquiry was underway and that the telegram was only a routinary request to submit proof of compliance with locational requirements. There was absolutely no excuse for initiating what is held out as an administrative proceeding against Villa without informing her of the complaint which initiated the case; for conducting that inquiry in the most informal manner by means only of communications requiring submission of certain documents, leaving the impression that compliance was all that was expected of her and with which directives she promptly and religiously complied. Villa not once but thrice furnished the Commission with the required documents by registered mail. Dizon, however, failed to even acknowledge the existence of the documents. This was perpetuated by the Commission Proper and Lazaro and kept in limbo evidence that would have been decisive. No excuse can be advanced for avoiding all mention or consideration of certifications.All of the foregoing translates to a denial of due process against which the defense of failure to take timely appeal will not avail. Administrative proceedings are not exempt from the operation of certain basic and fundamental procedural principles, such as the due process requirements in investigations and trials. Administrative due process is recognized to include (a) the right to notice, be it actual or constructive, of the institution of the proceedings that may affect a persons legal right; (b) reasonable opportunity to appear and defend his rights, introduce witnesses and relevant evidence in his favor, (c) a tribunal so constituted as to give him reasonable assurance of honesty and impartiality, and one of competent jurisdiction; and (d) a finding or decision by that tribunal supported by substantial evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the records or disclosed to the parties affected.Petition is granted, Proceedings complained of are annulled and the challenged resolutions are vacated and set aside, for having been taken and/or issued in violation of petitioners right to due process.

4. G.R. Nos. 90660-61 21 January 1991193 SCRA 132Ute Paterok v. Bureau of Customs & Hon. Salvador N. MisonSarmiento, J.:FACTSIn March 1986, Ute Petrok (petitioner) shipped from Germany to the Philippines 2 containers: one with used household goods and the other with 2 used automobiles (1 Bourgetti and 1 Mercedes Benz 450 SLC). The first container was released by the Bureau of Customs (BOC) and later on, the Bourgetti car too. The Mercedes Benz remained under the custody of BOC, In December 1987, after earnest efforts to secure the release of the vehicle, Paterok received a notice of hearing from the legal office of the Manila International Container Port, BOC informing him that seizure proceedings were being initiated against the Mercedes Benz for violation of BP 73 in relation to Sec. 2530 (F) of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines (TCCP) and Central Bank Circular 1069. While case was pending, Paterok received on April 1988 a letter informing him that a decision ordering the forfeiture of Mercedes Benz had been rendered on 16 December 1986 by the District Collector of Customs, also an office under BOC. Before the letter, Paterok had not been informed of this separate seizure case. Paterok later found out that on 13 November 1986, a notice of hearing set on 2 December 1986 concerning the Mercedes Benz was posted on the bulletin board of the BOC at Port Area, Manila.

He filed a motion for new trial before the Collector of Customs which was denied, invoking the formers failure to appear in the hearing despite the posting of notice on the bulletin board. The Collector of Customs also contended that a reopening of the case was an exercise in futility since the forfeited property had an engine displacement of more than 2800 cubic centimeters and therefore under the category of prohibited importation pursuant to BP 73.Paterok filed a petition for review with the Dept. of Finance which the latter referred to BOC. He also addressed a letter to the Hon. Cancio Garcia, Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs, Office of the President requesting assistance for a speedy resolution the petition.Finally, BOC rendered a decision affirming the previous order of the Collector of Customs for the Forfeiture of the Mercedes Benz in favor of the government. Hence, this petition for certiorari.ISSUE: Whether or not a notice of hearing posted in the bulletin board is sufficient notice.HELD:A notice of hearing posted on a bulletin board of the BOC in a forfeiture proceeding where the owner of the alleged prohibited article is known does not constitute sufficient compliance with proper service of notice and procedural due process. Time and again, the Court has emphasized the imperative necessity for administrative agencies to observe the elementary rules of due process. No rule is better established under the due process clause of the Constitution than that which requires notice and opportunity to be heard before any person can be lawfully deprived of his rights.Although there was a notice of hearing posted on the bulletin board, the said procedure is premised on the ground that the party or owner of the property in question is unknown. This is clear from Secs. 2304 and 2306 (Notification of Unknown Owner and Proceedings in Case of Property Belonging to Unknown Parties) of TCCP relied upon by BOC. In the case at bar, the petitioner could not have been unknown. Aside from the fact the petitioner had previous transactions with BOC, there was a similar seizure case instituted by Manila International Container Port regarding the same property and owner. Respondents did not exercise reasonable diligence to ascertain the identity of the owner.BP 73 Notwithstanding the procedural infirmity, the petition nonetheless cannot be granted. The Mercedes Benz falls within the prohibited importation specified in BP 73 (a law intended to promote energy conservation) and as such, is liable for seizure and forfeiture by BOC. Redemption of forfeited property Redemption of forfeited property shall not be allowed in any case where the importation is absolutely prohibited or where the surrender of the property to the person offering to redeem the same would be contrary to law. Petition is dismissed.5. ARSENIO P. LUMIQUED (deceased), Regional Director, DAR-CAR, Represented by his Heirs, Francisca A. Lumiqued, May A. Lumiqued, Arlene A. Lumiqued and Richard A. Lumiqued, petitioners, vs. Honorable APOLONIO G. EXEVEA, ERDOLFO V. BALAJADIA and FELIX T. CABADING, All Members of Investigating Committee, created by DOJ Order No. 145 on May 30, 1992; HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, HON. ANTONIO T. CARPIO, CHIEF Presidential Legal Adviser/Counsel; and HON. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING, Senior Deputy Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, and JEANNETTE OBARZAMUDIO, Private Respondent, respondents.GR 117565 18 Nov 1997Facts:The dismissal was the aftermath of three complaints filed by DAR-CAR Regional Cashier and private respondent Jeannette Obar-Zamudio with the Board of Discipline of the DAR. The first affidavit-complaint dated November 16,1989, charged Lumiqued with malversation through falsification of official documents.From May to September 1989, Lumiqued allegedly committed at least 93 counts of falsification by padding gasoline receipts. He even submitted a vulcanizing shop receipt worth P550.00 for gasoline bought from the shop, and another receipt for P660.00 for a single vulcanizing job. With the use of falsified receipts, Lumiqued claimed and was reimbursed the sum of P44,172.46. Private respondent added that Lumiqued seldom made field trips and preferred to stay in the office, making it impossible for him to consume the nearly 120 liters of gasoline he claimed everyday.In her second affidavit-complaint dated November 22, 1989, private respondent accused Lumiqued with violation of Commission on Audit (COA) rules and regulations, alleging that during the months of April, May, July, August, September and October, 1989, he made unliquidated cash advances in the total amount of P116,000.00. Lumiqued purportedly defrauded the government by deliberately concealing his unliquidated cash advances through the falsification of accounting entries in order not to reflect on Cash advances of other officials under code 8-70-600 of accounting rules.The third affidavit-complaint dated December 15, 1989, charged Lumiqued with oppression and harassment. According to private respondent, her two previous complaints prompted Lumiqued to retaliate by relieving her from her post as Regional Cashier without just cause.In his counter-affidavit dated June 23, 1992, Lumiqued alleged, inter alia, that the cases were filed against him to extort money from innocent public servants like him, and were initiated by private respondent in connivance with a certain Benedict Ballug of Tarlac and a certain Benigno Aquino III. He claimed that the apparent weakness of the charge was bolstered by private respondents execution of an affidavit of desistance. He also addressed each charge against him in the complaint (he claimed that he didnt do anything wrong and the expenses were proper, tapos ung cashier dishonest and palaging absent).Committee hearings on the complaints were conducted on July 3 and 10, 1992, but Lumiqued was not assisted by counsel. On the second hearing date, he moved for its resetting to July 17, 1992, to enable him to employ the services of counsel. The committee granted the motion, but neither Lumiqued nor his counsel appeared on the date he himself had chosen, so the committee deemed the case submitted for resolution.After a thorough evaluation of the evidences (sic) submitted by the parties, this committee finds the evidence submitted by the complainant sufficient to establish the guilt of the respondent for Gross Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct. That most of the gasoline receipts used by the respondent in claiming for the reimbursement of his gasoline expenses were falsified.That the gasoline receipts have been falsified was not rebutted by the respondent. In fact, he had in effect admitted that he had been claiming for the payment of an average consumption of 108.45 liters/day by justifying that this was being used by the 4 vehicles issued to his office. Besides he also admitted having signed the receipts.This committee likewise finds that the respondent have (sic) unliquidated cash advances in the year 1989 which is in violation of established office and auditing rules. His cash advances totaling to about P116,000.00 were properly documented. The requests for obligation of allotments and the vouchers covering the amounts were all signed by him. The mere certification issued by the Administrative Officer of the DAR-CAR cannot therefore rebut these concrete evidences (sic).On the third complaint, this committee likewise believes that the respondents act in relieving the complainant of her functions as a Regional Cashier on December 1, 1989 was an act of harassment. It is noted that this was done barely two weeks after the complainant filed charges against her (sic). Accordingly, the investigating committee recommended Lumiqueds dismissal or removal from office, without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate criminal charges against him.Acting on the report and recommendation, former Justice Secretary Franklin M. Drilon adopted the same in his Memorandum to President Fidel V. Ramos dated October 22, 1992President Fidel V. Ramos himself issued Administrative Order No. 52 (A.O. No. 52), finding Lumiqued administratively liable for dishonesty in the alteration of fifteen gasoline receipts, and dismissing him from the service, with forfeiture of his retirement and other benefitsIn a petition for appeal addressed to President Ramos, Lumiqued prayed that A.O. No. 52 be reconsidered and that he be reinstated to his former position with all the benefits accorded to him by law and existing rules and regulations. (The driver was blamed)Treating the petition for appeal as a motion for reconsideration of A.O. No. 52, the OP, through Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing, denied the same on August 31, 1993.Undaunted, Lumiqued filed a second motion for reconsideration, alleging, among other things, that he was denied the constitutional right to counsel during the hearing. On May 19, 1994, however, before his motion could be resolved, Lumiqued died. On September 28, 1994, Secretary Quisumbing denied the second motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.Hence, the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus praying for the reversal of the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Committee, the October 22, 1992, Memorandum of then Justice Secretary Drilon, A.O. No. 52 issued by President Ramos, and the orders of Secretary Quisumbing. In a nutshell, it prays for the payment of retirement benefits and other benefits accorded to deceased Arsenio Lumiqued by law, payable to his heirs; and the backwages from the period he was dismissed from service up to the time of his death on May 19, 1994. Petitioners fault the investigating committee for its failure to inform Lumiqued of his right to counsel during the hearing. They maintain that his right to counsel could not be waived unless the waiver was in writing and in the presence of counsel. They assert that the committee should have suspended the hearing and granted Lumiqued a reasonable time within which to secure a counsel of his own. If suspension was not possible, the committee should have appointed a counsel de oficio to assist him.Issue: Whether or not the committee failed to inform Luminiqued of his right to counselRuling:These arguments are untenable and misplaced. The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an accused during custodial investigation.It is not an absolute right and may, thus, be invoked or rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative inquiry. In the case at bar, petitioners invoke the right of an accused in criminal proceedings to have competent and independent counsel of his own choice. Lumiqued, however, was not accused of any crime in the proceedings below. The investigation conducted by the committee created by Department Order No. 145 was for the purpose of determining if he could be held administratively liable under the law for the complaints filed against him.As such, the hearing conducted by the investigating committee was not part of a criminal prosecution. This was even made more pronounced when, after finding Lumiqued administratively liable, it hinted at the filing of a criminal case for malversation through falsification of public documents in its report and recommendation.(madami tong related to Admin so read the syllabus)Administrative Law; Right to Counsel; The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an accused during custodial investigation and may not be invoked by a respondent in an administrative investigation.Petitioners fault the investigating committee for its failure to inform Lumiqued of his right to counsel during the hearing. They maintain that his right to counsel could not be waived unless the waiver was in writing and in the presence of counsel. They assert that the committee should have suspended the hearing and granted Lumiqued a reasonable time within which to secure a counsel of his own. If suspension was not possible, the committee should have appointed a counsel de oficio to assist him. These arguments are untenable and misplaced. The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an accused during custodial investigation. It is not an absolute right and may, thus, be invoked or rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative inquiry. In the case at bar, petitioners invoke the right of an accused in criminal proceedings to have competent and independent counsel of his own choice. Lumiqued, however, was not accused of any crime in the proceedings below. The investigation conducted by the committee created by Department Order No. 145 was for the purpose of determining if he could be held administratively liable under the law for the complaints filed against him.Same; Same; Department of Justice; While it is true that under the Administrative Code of 1987, the DOJ shall administer the criminal justice system in accordance with the accepted processes thereof consisting in the investigation of the crimes, prosecution of offenders and administration of the correctional system, conducting criminal investigations is not its sole functionby its power to perform such other functions as may be provided by law, prosecutors may be called upon to conduct administrative investigations.Petitioners misconception on the nature of the investigation conducted against Lumiqued appears to have been engendered by the fact that the DOJ conducted it. While it is true that under the Administrative Code of 1987, the DOJ shall administer the criminal justice system in accordance with the accepted processes thereof consisting in the investigation of the crimes, prosecution of offenders and administration of the correctional system, conducting criminal investigations is not its sole function. By its power to perform such other functions as may be provided by law, prosecutors may be called upon to conduct administrative investigations. Accordingly, the investigating committee created by Department Order No. 145 was duty-bound to conduct the administrative investigation in accordance with the rules therefor.Same; Same; Public Officers; The right to counsel is not imperative in administrative investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measures against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service.While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the fact remains that under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondents capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such a body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel. In an administrative proceeding such as the one that transpired below, a respondent (such as Lumiqued) has the option of engaging the services of counsel or not. This is clear from the provisions of Section 32, Article VII of Republic Act No. 2260 (otherwise known as the Civil Service Act) and Section 39, paragraph 2, Rule XIV (on Discipline) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 202 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987). Excerpts from the transcript of stenographic notes of the hearings attended by Lumiqued clearly show that he was confident of his capacity and so opted to represent himself. Thus, the right to counsel is not imperative in administrative investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measures against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service.Same; Same; Due Process; The right to counsel is not indispensable to due process unless required by the Constitution or the law.The right to counsel is not indispensable to due process unless required by the Constitution or the law. In Nera v. Auditor General, the Court said: x x x There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a party in a non-criminal proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel and that, without such representation, he shall not be bound by such proceedings. The assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable. The legal profession was not engrafted in the due process clause such that without the participation of its members, the safeguard is deemed ignored or violated. The ordinary citizen is not that helpless that he cannot validly act at all except only with a lawyer at his side.Same; Due Process; An actual hearing is not always an indispensable aspect of due processas long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he cannot be said to have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due process.In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain ones side. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps even much more creditably as it is more practicable than oral arguments, through pleadings. An actual hearing is not always an indispensable aspect of due process. As long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he cannot be said to have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due process. Moreover, this constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Lumiqueds appeal and his subsequent filing of motions for reconsideration cured whatever irregularity attended the proceedings conducted by the committee.Same; Same; Public Officers; Security of Tenure; When the dispute concerns ones constitutional ri ght to security of tenure, public office is deemed analogous to property in a limited sensehence, the right to due process could rightfully be invoked.When the dispute concerns ones constitutional right to security of tenure, however, public office is deemed analogous to property in a limited sense; hence, the right to due process could rightfully be invoked. Nonetheless, the right to security of tenure is not absolute. Of equal weight is the countervailing mandate of the Constitution that all public officers and employees must serve with responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency. In this case, it has been clearly shown that Lumiqued did not live up to this constitutional precept.Same; Evidence; Well-settled is the doctrine that findings of fact of administrative agencies must be respected as long as they are supported by substantial evidence, even if such evidence is not overwhelming or preponderant.The committees findings pinning culpability for the charges of dishonesty and grave misconduct upon Lumiqued were not, as shown above, fraught with procedural mischief. Its conclusions were founded on the evidence presented and evaluated as facts. Well-settled in our jurisdiction is the doctrine that findings of fact of administrative agencies must be respected as long as they are supported by substantial evidence, even if such evidence is not overwhelming or preponderant. The quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt in administrative cases is only substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.Same; Public Officers; Dishonesty; Dishonesty is a grave offense penalized by dismissal and under Section 9 of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987, the penalty of dismissal carries with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits, and the disqualification for reemployment in the government service.Dishonesty is a grave offense penalized by dismissal under Section 23 of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987. Under Section 9 of the same Rule, the penalty of dismissal carriers with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits, and the disqualification for reemployment in the government service. The instant petition, which is aimed primarily at the payment of retirement benefits and other benefits, plus back wages from the time of Lumiqueds dismissal until his demise, must, therefore, fail.6. Casimiro V TandogGR 1461378 June 2005

Facts:

Petitioner Haydee Casimiro began her service in the government as assessment clerk in the Office of the Treasurer of San Jose, Romblon. In August 1983, she was appointed Municipal Assessor. On 04 September 1996, Administrative Officer II Nelson M. Andres, submitted a report2 based on an investigation he conducted into alleged irregularities in the office of petitioner Casimiro. The report spoke of an anomalous cancellation of Tax Declarations No. 0236 in the name of Teodulo Matillano and the issuance of a new one in the name of petitioners brother Ulysses Cawaling and Tax Declarations No. 0380 and No. 0376 in the name of Antipas San Sebastian and the issuance of new ones in favor of petitioners brother-in-law Marcelo Molina.

Immediately thereafter, respondent Mayor Tandog issued Memorandum Order No. 133 dated 06 September 1996, placing the petitioner under preventive suspension for thirty (30) days. Three (3) days later, Mayor Tandog issued Memorandum Order No. 15, directing petitioner to answer the charge of irregularities in her office. In her answer,4 petitioner denied the alleged irregularities claiming, in essence, that the cancellation of the tax declaration in favor of her brother Ulysses Cawaling was done prior to her assumption to office as municipal assessor, and that she issued new tax declarations in favor of her brother-in-law Marcelo Molina by virtue of a deed of sale executed by Antipas San Sebastian in Molinas favor. On 23 October 1996, thru Memorandum Order No. 17,5 respondent Mayor extended petitioners preventive suspension for another thirty (30) days effective 24 October 1996 to give him more time to verify and collate evidence relative to the alleged irregularities. On 28 October 1996, Memorandum Order No. 186 was issued by respondent Mayor directing petitioner to answer in writing the affidavit-complaint of Noraida San Sebastian Cesar and Teodulo Matillano. Noraida San Sebastian Cesar7 alleged that Tax Declarations No. 0380 and No. 0376 covering parcels of land owned by her parents were transferred in the name of a certain Marcelo Molina, petitioners brother-in-law, without the necessary documents. Noraida Cesar further claimed that Marcelo Molina had not yet paid the full purchase price of the land covered by the said Tax Declarations. For his part, Teodulo Matillano claimed8 deed of absolute sale over the parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 0236 in favor of Ulysses Cawaling, petitioners brother.

response to Memorandum Order No. 18, petitioner submitted a letter9 dated 29 October 1996, stating that with respect to the complaint of Noraida San Sebastian Cesar, she had already explained her side in the letter dated 26 September 1996. As to the complaint of Teodulo Matillano, she alleged that it was a certain Lilia Barrientos who executed a deed of absolute sale over the parcel of land subject of the complaint in favor of her brother, Ulysses Cawaling. Not satisfied, respondent Mayor created a fact-finding committee to investigate the matter. After a series of hearings, the committee, on 22 November 1996, submitted its report10 petitioners separation from service, the dispositive portion of which reads: recommending Evaluating the facts above portrayed, it is clearly shown that Municipal Assessor Haydee Casimero is guilty of malperformance of duty and gross dishonesty to the prejudice of the taxpayers of San Jose, Romblon who are making possible the payments of her salary and other allowances. Consequently, we are unanimously recommending her separation from service.

Undeterred by that setback, petitioner appealed to the CSC, which affirmed12 Mayors order of dismissal. A motion for reconsideration13 respondent was filed, but the same was denied.14 Dissatisfied, petitioner elevated her case to the Court of Appeals, which subsequently affirmed the CSC decision.15 Her motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.

ISSUE: WON petitioner was afforded procedural and substantive due process when she was terminated from her employment as Municipal Assessor of San Jose, Romblon.

HELD:

In essence, procedural due process refers to the method or manner by which the law is enforced. The essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard. In administrative proceedings, such as in the case at bar, procedural due process simply means the opportunity to explain ones side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. To be heard does not mean only verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also thru pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process. In administrative proceedings, procedural due process has been recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondents legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in ones favor, and to defend ones rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected.7. Globe Telecom, Inc. vs. National Telecommunications CommissionGR 143964 26 July 2004PETITIONER/S: GLOBE TELECOM, INC.,RESPONDENT/S: 1. THE NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION2. COMMISSIONER JOSEPH A. SANTIAGO3. DEPUTY COMMISSIONERS AURELIO M. UMALI and NESTOR DACANAY4. SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC.INTRODUCTION: Public Telecommunications Act of 1995 (PTA), as noted by one of its principal authors, Sen. John Osmea, under prior laws, the government regulated the entry of pricing and operation of all public telecommunications entities. The new law proposed to dismantle gradually the barriers to entry, replace government control on price and income with market instruments, and shift the focus of governments intervention towards ensuring service standards and protection of customers. Towards this goal, Article II, Section 8 of the PTA sets forth the regulatory logic, mandating that a healthy competitive environment shall be fostered, one in which telecommunications carriers are free to make business decisions and to interact with one another in providing telecommunications services, with the end in view of encouraging their financial viability while maintaining affordable rates. The statute itself defines the role of the government to promote a fair, efficient and responsive market to stimulate growth and development of the telecommunications facilities and services.

The present petition dramatizes to a degree the clash of philosophies between traditional notions of regulation and the au corant trend to deregulation. Appropriately, it involves the most ubiquitous feature of the mobile phone, Short Messaging Service (SMS) or text messaging, which has been transformed from a mere technological fad into a vital means of communication. And propitiously, the case allows the Court to evaluate the role of the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) in this day and age. The NTC is at the forefront of the government response to the avalanche of inventions and innovations in the dynamic telecommunications field. Every regulatory action it undertakes is of keen interest not only to industry analysts and players but to the public at large. The intensive scrutiny is understandable given the high financial stakes involved and the inexorable impact on consumers. And its rulings are traditionally accorded respect even by the courts, owing traditional deference to administrative agencies equipped with special knowledge, experience and capability to hear and determine promptly disputes on technical matters.At the same time, judicial review of actions of administrative agencies is essential, as a check on the unique powers vested unto these instrumentalities. Review is available to reverse the findings of the specialized administrative agency if the record before the Court clearly precludes the agencys decision from being justified by a fair estimate of the worth of the testimony of witnesses or its informed judgment on matters within its special competence, or both. Review may also be warranted to ensure that the NTC or similarly empowered agencies act within the confines of their legal mandate and conform to the demands of due process and equal protection.FACTS: Globe and private respondent Smart are both grantees of valid and subsisting legislative franchises, authorizing them, among others, to operate a Cellular Mobile Telephone System (CMTS), utilizing the Global System for Mobile Communication (GSM) technology. Among the inherent services supported by the GSM network is the Short Message Services (SMS), also known colloquially as texting, which has attained immense popularity in the Philippines as a mode of electronic communication.1. On 4 June 1999, Smart filed a Complaint with public respondent NTC, praying that NTC order the immediate interconnection of Smarts and Globes GSM networks. Smart alleged that Globe, with evident bad faith and malice, refused to grant Smarts request for the interconnection of SMS.2. Globe filed its Answer with Motion to Dismiss on 7 June 1999, interposing grounds that the Complaint was premature, Smarts failure to comply with the conditions precedent required in Section 6 of NTC Memorandum Circular 9-7-93,19 and its omission of the mandatory Certification of Non-Forum Shopping.3. On 19 July 1999, NTC issued the Order now subject of the present petition.a. both Smart and Globe were equally blameworthy for their lack of cooperation in the submission of the documentation required for interconnection and for having unduly maneuvred the situation into the present impasseb. NTC held that since SMS falls squarely within the definition of value-added service(VAS) or enhanced-service given in NTC Memorandum Circular No. 8-9-95 (MC No. 8-9-95) the implementation of SMS interconnection is mandatoryc. The NTC also declared that both Smart and Globe have been providing SMS without authority from it4. Globe filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition to nullify and set aside the Order and to prohibit NTC from taking any further action in the case. Globea. reiterated its previous arguments that the complaint should have been dismissed for failure to comply with conditions precedent and the non-forum shopping rule. b. claimed that NTC acted without jurisdiction in declaring that it had no authority to render SMS, pointing out that the matter was not raised as an issue before it at all.c. alleged that the Order is a patent nullity as it imposed an administrative penalty for an offense for which neither it nor Smart was sufficiently charged nor heard on in violation of their right to due process5. The CA issued a TRO on 31 Aug 1999.6. In its Memorandum, Globe called the attention of the CA in an earlier NTC decision regarding Islacom, holding that SMS is a deregulated special feature and does not require the prior approval of the NTC. Globe that its departure from its ruling in the Islacom case constitutes a denial of equal protection of the law.7. On 22 Nov 1999, the CA affirmed in toto the NTC Order. 8. On 21 December 1999, Globe filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, seeking to reconsider only the portion of the Decision that upheld NTCs finding that Globe lacked the authority to provide SMS and its imposition of a fine. After the Court of Appeals denied the Motion , Globe elevated the controversy to the Supreme CourtPETITIONERS (GLOBE) CONTENTION: Globe contends that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the NTC has the power under Section 17 of the Public Service Law to subject Globe to an administrative sanction and a fine without prior notice and hearing in violation of the due process requirements; that specifically due process was denied Globe because the hearings actually conducted dwelt on different issues; and, the appellate court erred in holding that any possible violation of due process committed byNTC was cured by the fact that NTC refrained from issuing a Show Cause Order with a Cease and Desist Order, directing instead the parties to secure the requisite authority within thirty days. Globe also contends that in treating it differently from other carriers providing SMS the Court of Appeals denied it equal protection of the law.

RESPONDENTS CONTENTION: Smart has deviated from its original position. It no longer prays that the Court affirm the assailed Decision and Order, and the twin rulings therein that SMS is VAS and that Globe was required to secure prior authority before offering SMS. Instead, Smart now argues that SMS is not VAS and that NTC may not legally require either Smart or Globe to secure prior approval before providing SMS. Smart has also chosen not to make any submission on Globes claim of due process violations.ISSUES: 1. Whether NTC may legally require Globe to secure NTC approval before it continues providing SMS; 2. Whether SMS is a VAS under the PTA, or special feature under NTC MC No. 14-11-97; and3. Whether NTC acted with due process in levying the fine against Globe RULING:1. The petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 22 November 1999, as well as its Resolution dated 29 July 2000, and the assailed Order of the NTC dated 19 July 1999 are hereby SET ASIDE.2. The assailed NTC Decision invokes the NTC Implementing Rules of the PTA (MC No. 8-9-95) to justify its claim that Globe and Smart need to secure prior authority from the NTC before offering SMS. a. The statutory basis for the NTCs determination must be thoroughly examined. b. Next, the regulatory framework devised by NTC in dealing with VAS should be examined. In short, the legal basis invoked by NTC in claiming that SMS is VAS has not been duly established. The fault falls squarely on NTC.3. NTC violated several of these cardinal rights due Globe in the promulgation of the assailed Order.a. The NTC Order is not supported by substantial evidence. Neither does it sufficiently explain the reasons for the decision rendered. b. Globe and Smart were denied opportunity to present evidence on the issues relating to the nature of VAS and the prior approval. Another disturbing circumstance attending this petition is that until the promulgation of the assailed Order Globe and Smart were never informed of the fact that their operation of SMS without prior authority was at all an issue for consideration.c. The imposition of fine is void for violation of due process. The matter of whether NTC could have imposed the fine on Globe in the assailed Order is necessarily related to due process considerations4. In summary: a. there is no legal basis under the PTA or the memorandum circulars promulgated by the NTC to denominate SMS as VAS, and any subsequent determination by the NTC on whether SMS is VAS should be made with proper regard for due process and in conformity with the PTA; b. the assailed Order violates due process for failure to sufficiently explain the reason for the decision rendered, for being unsupported by substantial evidence, and for imputing violation to, and issuing a corresponding fine on, Globe despite the absence of due notice and hearing which would have afforded Globe the right to present evidence on its behalf8. EMILIO SUNTAY Y AGUINALDO, petitioner vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE HONORABLE NICASIO YATCO, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch V, and THE HONORABLE CARLOS P. GARCIA, as Secretary for Foreign Affairs, respondents. 101 Phil 883GR No. L-9430 29 June 1957Facts:This is a petition for a writ of certiorari to annul an order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City directing the National Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Foreign Affairs for them to take proper steps in order that the accused, Emilio Suntay y Aguinaldo, who is alleged to be in the United States, may be brought back to the Philippines, so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law, (Exhibit D) and of prohibition to enjoin the Secretary for Foreign Affairs from cancelling the petitioner's passport without previous hearing. On 26 June 1954, Dr. Antonio Nubla, father of Alicia Nubla, a minor of 16 years, filed a verified complaint against Emilio Suntay in the Office of the City Attorney of Quezon City for taking Alicia Nubla from St. Paul's College in Quezon City with lewd design and took her to somewhere near the U.P. compound in Diliman, Quezon City and was then able to have carnal knowledge of her. Alicia Nubla is a minor of 16 years. (Seduction)On 10 January 1955 the petitioner applied for and was granted a passport by the Department of Foreign Affairs. On 20 January 1955 the petitioner left the Philippines for San Francisco, California, U.S.A., where he is at present enrolled in school. On 31 January 1955 the offended girl subscribed and swore to a complaint charging the petitioner with seduction which was filed in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City after preliminary investigation had been conducted. On 10 February 1955 the Court granted the motion ofthe private prosecutor praying the Court to issue an order "directing such government agencies as may be concerned, particularly the National Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Foreign Affairs, for the purpose of having the accused brought back to the Philippines so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law." On 7 March 1955 the respondent Secretary cabled the Ambassador to the United States instructing him to order the Consul General in San Francisco to cancel the passport issued to the petitioner and to compel him to return to the Philippines to answer the criminal charges against him." However, this order was not implemented or carried out in view of the commencement of this proceedings in order that the issues raised may be judicially resolved. Counsel for the petitioner wrote to the respondent Secretary requesting that the action taken by him be reconsidered and filed in the criminal case a motion praying that the respondent Court reconsider its order of 10 February 1955. Both denied. Hence this petition. The petitioner contends that as the order of the respondent Court directing the Department of Foreign Affairs "to take proper steps in order that the" petitioner "may be brought back to the Philippines, so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law," may be carried out only "through the cancellation of ,his passport," the said order is illegal because "while a Court may review the action of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs in cancelling a passport and grant relief when the Secretary's discretion is abused, the court cannot, in the first instance, take the discretionary power away from the Secretary and itself order a passport to be cancelled." The petitioner further contends that while the Secretary for Foreign Affairs has discretion in the cancellation of passports, "such discretion cannot be exercised until after hearing," because the right to travel or stay abroad is a personal liberty within the meaning and protection of the Constitution and hence he cannot be deprived of such liberty without due process of law. Issue: Whether or not the order of cancellation by the secretary of DFA is validRuling:The petitioner's contention cannot be sustained. The petitioner is charged with seduction. And the order of the respondent Court directing the Department of Foreign Affairs is not beyond or in excess of its jurisdiction. When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer; and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by these rules, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears most conformable to the spirit of said rules. (Section 6, Rule 124.) Moreover, the respondent Court did not specify what stepthe respondent Secretary must take to compel the petitioner to return to the Philippines to answer the criminalcharge preferred against him. Section 25, Executive Order No. 1, series of 1946, 42 Off. Gaz. 1400, prescribing rules and regulations for the grant and issuance of passports, provides that The Secretary of Foreign Affairs is authorized, in his discretion to withdraw or cancel a passport already issuedTrue, the discretion granted, to the Secretary for Foreign Affairs to withdraw or cancel a passport already issued may not be exercised at whim. But here the petitioner was hailed to Court to answer a criminal charge for seduction and although at first an Assistant City Attorney recommended the dismissal of the complaint previously subscribed and sworn to by the father of the offended girl, yet the petitioner knew that no final action had been taken by the City Attorney of Quezon City as the case was still under study. And as the Solicitor General puts it, "His suddenly leaving the country in such a convenient time, can reasonably be interpreted to mean as 'a deliberate attempt on his part to flee from justice, and, therefore, he cannot now be heard to complain if the strong arm of the law should join together to bring him back to justice." In issuing the order in question, the respondent Secretary was convinced that a miscarriage of justice would result by his inaction and as he issued it in the exercise of his sound discretion, he cannot be enjoined from carrying it out. Hearing would have been proper and necessary if the reason for the withdrawal or cancellation of the passport were not clear but doubtful. But where the holder of a passport is facing a criminal charge in our courts and left the country to evade criminal prosecution, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in the exercise of his discretion to revoke a passport already issued, cannot be held to have acted whimsically or capriciously in withdrawing and cancelling such passport. Due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing. When discretion is exercised by an officer vested with it upon an undisputed fact, such as the filing of a serious criminal charge against the passport holder, hearing may be dispensed with by such officer as a prerequisite to the cancellation of his passport; lack of such hearing does not violate the due process of law clause of the Constitution; and the exercise of the discretion vested in him cannot be deemed whimsical and capricious because of the absence of such hearing. If hearing should always be held in order to comply with the due process of law clause of the Constitution, then a writ of preliminary injunction issued ex parte would be violative of the said clause. 9. RCP v. NTC184 SCRA 517GR No. L-66683 23 April 1990PETITIONERS: Radio Communications of the Philippines (RCP)Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Corporation (PT&T)Clavecilla Radio System (Clavecilla)RESPONDENTS:National Telecommunications Commission (NTC)Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT)

FACTS:This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order seeking to annul and set aside the January 25, 1984 order of NTC and to prohibit them from taking cognizance of and assuming jurisdiction of the application of PLDT, for lack of jurisdiction. January 4, 1984: PLDT filed an application with NTC for the Approval of Rates for Digital Transmission Service Facilities January 25, 1984: NTC PROVISIONALLY approved the application and set the case for hearing within the 30-day period prescribed by law. February 2, 1984: NTC issued a notice of hearing, setting t on February 22, 1984 at 9:30 am. In the said notice, herein petitioners were not included in the list of affected parties. February 22, 1984: At the hearing, herein petitioners moved for some time within which to file an opposition alleging that they were not informed of the existence of this provisional authority. Hence, this petition. Petitioners contend that the application filed by PLDT is not actually for approval of rates but for authority to engage in new services not covered by their franchise. March 21, 1984: Second Division of this court issued a TRO and transferred the case to the Court En Banc.ISSUE: Whether or not NTC gravely abused its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing a provisional authority to PLDT without notice to the petitioners. HELD: NO. Section 16 of the Public Service Act (CA 146) provides for the fixing of rates by the commission, which shall be observed by any public serviceThe Commission may, in its discretion, approve rates proposed by public services PROVISIONALLY, and without necessity of any hearing; but it shall call a hearing within 30 days thereafter, upon publication and notice The Public Service Commission found that the application is indeed for approval of rates which it may approve provisionally without the necessity of any notice and hearing as provided by law. Under the Public Service Act, the Board of Communications, now the NTC, can fix a provisional amount for the subscribers investment to be effective immediately, without hearing. The reason is easily discerned from the fact that provisional rates are by their nature temporary and subject to adjusted in conformity with the definitive rates approved after final hearing. NTC did not grant PLDT any authority to engage in any new communication service, but merely approved provisionally, PLDTs proposed revision of its then authorized schedule of rates. As regards prior notice, it is impossible for the respondent NTC to give personal notice to all parties affected, not all of them being known to it. The notice of hearing was published and petitioners have timely opposed the petition in question, so lack of notice was deemed cured. There is a legal presumption that the rates are reasonable and it must be conceded that the fixing of rates by the government through its authorized agent, involves the exercise of reasonable discretion, and unless there is an abuse of that discretion, the courts will not interfere. Where the law confines in an administrative office the power to determine particular questions or matters upon the facts presented, the jurisdiction of such office prevail over the courts. Hence, findings of admin officials and agencies who have acquired jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but at times even finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence. WHEREFORE, petition dismissed for lack of merit. NTC order affirmed. TRO set aside. 10. MANILA INTL. AIRPORT AUTHORITY V. AIRSPAN CORP. GR No. 1575811 Dec 2004PETITIONER:Manila International Airport Authority: GOCC created on March 4, 1982 by EO 778. It owns, operates and manages the NAIA.RESPONDENTS:Airspan CorporationLBC Express Inc.A. Soriano AviationFlying Medical Samaritans Inc. Aboitiz Air Transport Corp.Asia Craft Overseas Phils. Inc. Asian Aerospace Corp.Pacific Jet Maintenance Services Inc. General Aviation Supplies Trading Inc. Airworks Aviation Corp. Federation of Aviation Organizations of the Phils. Inc. Normal Holdings and Devt. CorporationColumbian Motor Sales Corp. Users, lessees and occupants of petitioners properties, facilities and services. FACTS: May 19, 1997: MIAA issued Resolution No. 97-51 announcing and increase in the rentals of its terminal buildings, VIP lounge, other airport buildings and land, as well as check-in and concession counters. Concessionaire privilege fees was also increased. April 2, 1998: Resolution No. 98-30: 20% increase adoption as recommended by Punongbayan and Araullo (accounting firm) to take effect immediately on June 1st. Thus, the issuance of AO No. 1 Series of 1988 to reflect the new schedule of fees, charges, and rates. February 5, 1999: Resolution No. 99-11 which further increased the fees. Accordingly, AO No. 1 was amended. Respondents requested that the implementation of the new fess, charges, and rates be deferred due to lack of prior notice and hearing. Request denied. MIAA likewise refused to renew the identification cards of respondents personnel, and vehicle stickers to prevent entry to the premises. Complaint filed to Makati RTC for Injunction with Application of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or TRO. August 18, 1999: RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining MIAA from denying or preventing access to the NAIA premises. Complaint-In-Intervention was filed by Subic International Charter Inc., Normal Holdings & Devt. Corp., and Columbian Motor Sales Corp. RTC found that the intervenors were entitled to preliminary relief and thus issued a TRO for 20 days enjoining MIAA from denying entry, ejecting, and attempting or threatening plaintiffs-intervenors. February 17,2003: RTC nullified MIAAs Resolutions Nos. 98-30 and 99-11 and AO 1. ISSUE: Whether or not prior notice and conduct of public hearing are required before petitioner can increase its rates and charges for the use of its facilities. HELD: NO. Sec. 17 of the MIAA Charter, as amended by EO 903 provides that the authority may increase or decrease the rates of the dues, charges, fess or assessments collectible by the Authority subject to the provisions of BP. 325. BP 325 provides that the revision of rates shall be in conformity with the rules and regulations of the Ministry of Finance issued pursuant to Section 4 hereof, upon RECOMMENDATION OF THE IMPOSING AND COLLECTING AUTHORITIES CONCERNED, SUBJECT TO THE APPROVAL OF THE CABINET. Thus, MIAAs authority is limited to a mere recommendatory power. The Charter directly vests the power to determine revision of fess, and rates in the Ministry Head and requires the approval of the cabinet. Such Ministry Head is now the DOTC Secretary, MIAA being an attached agency of the DOTC. Accordingly, MIAA is governed by the Administrative Code which requires notice and public hearing in the fixing of rates and provided in Sec. 9, Book VII of the Code. Thus, the rate increases imposed are invalid for lack of prior notice and hearing as well as ultra vires because they are not the proper official authorized to issue such increase. Thus, the assailed resolutions and order are null and void. WHEREFORE, petition denied for lack of merit. February 17, 2003 decision by the Makati RTC affirmed. 11. Nicos Industrial Corporation vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 88709February 11, 1992.206 SCRA 127FACTS:On January 24, 1980, NICOS Industrial Corporation (NICOS) obtained a loan of 2M from United Coconut from private respondent Planters Bank (UCPB) and to secure payment thereof executed a real estate mortgage on two parcels of land in Marilao, Bulacan. The mortgage was foreclosed for supposed non-payment of the loan. Consequently, a sheriffs sale was held on July 11, 1983, without re-publication of the required notices after the original date for the auction was changed without the knowledge or consent of the mortgagor. UCPB was the highest and lone bidder and the mortgaged lands were sold to it for P3,558,547.64. Thereafter, UCPB sold all its rights to the properties to private respondent Manuel Co, who on the same day transferred them to another private respondent, Golden Star Industrial Corporation which, upon petition, successfully obtained a writ of possession upon the mortgaged lands.In view of the foregoing, NICOS, Juan Coquinco and Carlos Coquinco, as Chairman of its Board of Directors and its Executive Vice-president, respectively, filed an action for annulment of sheriffs sale, recovery of possession, and damages, with prayer for the issuance of a preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan.The plaintiffs presented two witnesses, including petitioner Carlos Coquinco, who testified at three separate hearings. They also submitted 21 exhibits.Thereafter, Golden Star and Evangelista filed a 7-page demurrer to the evidence where they argued that the action was a derivative suit that came under the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission; that the mortgage had been validly foreclosed; that the sheriffs sale had been held in accordance with Act 3135; that the notices had been duly published in a newspaper of general circulation; and that the opposition to the writ of possession had not been filed on time. Since no opposition to the demurrer was submitted despite notice thereof to the parties, Judge Nestor F. Dantes considered it submitted for resolution and on June 6, 1986, issued the following ORDER: Acting on the Demurrer to Evidence dated April 30, 1986 filed by defendants Victorino P. Evangelista and Golden Star Industrial Corporation to which plaintiff and other defendants did not file their comment/opposition and it appearing from the very evidence adduced by the plaintiff that the Sheriffs Auction Sale conducted on July 11, 1983 was in complete accord with the requirements of Section 3, Act 3135 under which the auction sale was appropriately held and conducted and it appearing from the allegations in paragraph 13 plaintiffs pleading and likewise from plaintiff Carlos Coquincos own testimony that his cause is actually against the other officers and stockholders of the plaintiff Nicos Industrial Corporation x x x for the purpose of protecting the corporation and its stockholders, as well as their own rights and interests in the corporation, and the corporate assets, against the fraudulent acts and devices of the responsible officials of the corporation, in breach of the trust reposed upon them by the stockholders x x x a subject matter not within the competent jurisdiction of the Court, the court finds the same (demurrer) to be impressed with merit. Hence, the complaint was dismissed.On Appeal with the Court of Appeals, the petitioners assailed the aforementioned order for being contrary to:1) Rule 1, Section 36 of the Rules of Court which provides that A judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall be in writing personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts on which it is based xxx;2) Article VIII, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution which states that No decision shall be rendered by any court without stating therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.Petitioners claim that it is not a reasoned decision and does not clearly and distinctly explain how it was reached by the trial court. The petitioners also complain that there was no analysis of their testimonial evidence or of their 21 exhibits, the trial court merely confining itself to the pronouncement that the sheriffs sale was valid and that it had no jurisdiction over the derivative suit. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal and affirmed the assailed order in toto, finding that the Order appealed from, which adverts to the Demurrer to the Evidence, expressly referred to the evidence adduced by the plaintiff as showing the validity of the Sheriffs auction sale and to the allegations in paragraph 13 of plaintiffs pleadings and plaintiff Carlos Coquincos own testimony from which it made the conclusion that the case does not fall under its jurisdiction, hence, it ruled that the assailed order substantially referred to the facts of the case and the law on which it was based in compliance with the above-cited rule and constitutional provision. Hence, this petition.ISSUE: Whether or not the assailed order sustaining the respondents demurrer to evidence did not substantially state the facts and the law on which it is based in contravention of the Rules of Court and Article VIII, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution.RULING: YES. The questioned order is an oversimplification of the issues and violates both the letter and spirit of Article VIII, Section 14, of the Constitution. It is a requirement of due process that the parties to a litigation be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. The court cannot simply say that judgment is rendered in favor of X and against Y and just leave it at that without any justification whatsoever for its action. The losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to a higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision should be reversed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is especially prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal.The constitutional provision does not, however, apply to interlocutory orders, such as one granting a motion for postponement or quashing a subpoena, because it refers only to decisions on the merits and not to orders of the trial court resolving incidental matters.

As it is settled that an order dismissing a case for insufficient evidence is a judgment on the merits, it is imperative that it be a reasoned decision clearly and distinctly stating therein the facts and the law on which it is based.

It may be argued that a dismissal based on lack of jurisdiction is not considered a judgment on the merits and so is not covered by the aforecited provision. There is no quarrel with this established principle. However, the rule would be applicable only if the case is dismissed on the sole ground of lack of jurisdiction and not when some other additional ground is invoked.A careful perusal of the challenged order will show that the complaint was dismissed not only for lack of jurisdiction but also because of the insufficiency of the evidence to prove the invalidity of the sheriffs sale. Regarding this second ground, all the trial court did was summarily conclude from the very evidence adduced by the plaintiff that the sheriffs sale was in complete accord with the requirements of Section 3, Act 3135. It did not bother to discuss what that evidence was or to explain why it believed that the legal requirements had been observed. Its conclusion was remarkably threadbare. Brevity is doubtless an admirable trait, but it should not and cannot be substituted for substance. As the ruling on this second ground was unquestionably a judgment on the merits, the failure to state the factual and legal basis thereof was fatal to the order.Significantly, the respondent court found that the trial court did have jurisdiction over the case after all. This made even more necessary the factual and legal explanation for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the plaintiffs evidence was insufficient.While it is true that this case does not involve the life or liberty of the defendant, there is still no reason for the constitutional short-cut taken by the trial judge. The properties being litigated are not of inconsequential value; they were sold for three and a half million pesos in 1983 and doubtless have considerably appreciated since then, after more tha