Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. L-51009 June 10, 1992

LUZON POLYMERS CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.

HON. PRESIDENTIAL EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT JACOBO C. CLAVE, HON. MINISTER OF LABOR BLAS OPLE and LUZON POLYMERS LABOR UNION (FFW), respondents.

ROMERO, J.:

This special civil action of certiorari questions the administrative grant of an emergency allowance of fifty pesos to the employees of a corporation with a capital stock of one million pesos.

The emergency allowance of employees in the private sector has its origin in Presidential Decree No. 390, granting said allowance to government employees. On March 6, 1974, subsequent to the promulgation of P.D. No. 390, then President Marcos issued Letter of

Instructions No. 174 to implement the policy enunciated in said decree in the private sector. He directed the Secretary of Labor "to take such measures as maybe necessary to ensure orderly and effective response by employers in the private sector." A pertinent provision

of said LOI reads:

3. Determination of Amount of Allowances. „1¤7 In the spirit of Presidential Decree No. 390 granting allowances to government employees receiving less than P600.00 monthly, employers are urged to give top priority to their lowest

paid workers without prejudice, however, to extending similar assistance to higher grades of their personnel.

For purposes of construing the minimum guideline, for the private sector, the following scales are recommended:

For large-scale and medium-scale enterprises capitalized at P1 million to 4 million or more, P50.00 or higher;

For small-scale enterprises capitalized at P100.000 to P1 million, P30 or higher;

For enterprises lower than these categories, P15 or higher. (Emphasis supplied.)

To explain the meaning and scope of application of LOI No. 174, on March 11, 1974, the Department of Labor issued an Interpretative Bulletin, a relevant section of which states:

Sec. 5. Determination of Amount of Allowances. „1¤7 In determining the amount of allowances that should be given by employers to meet the recommended minimum standards, the LOI has classified employers into three general categories. As an implementation policy, the Department of Labor shall consider as sufficient compliance with the

scales of allowances recommended by the LOI if the following monthly allowances are given by employers:

(a) P50.00 or higher where the authorized capital stock of the corporation, or the total assets in the case of other undertakings, exceeds P1 million;

(b) P30.00 or higher where the authorized capital stock of the corporation, or the total assets in this case of other undertakings, is not less than P100,000.00 but not more than P1 million; and

(c) P15.00 or higher where the authorized capital stock or total assets, as the case may be, is less than P100,000.00 (Emphasis supplied.)

On July 31, 1974, the President issued P.D. No. 525 making mandatory the payment of emergency allowance under LOI No. 174. Pertinent sections thereof provide:

Sec. 1. Effective 1 August 1974, all employers who have not paid their employees emergency allowance in accordance with Letter of Instructions No. 174 shall pay their employees who are receiving less than P600.00 a month emergency allowance of P50.00 a month if their capitalization is more than 1 million pesos, P30.00 if their

capitalization is more than 100 thousand pesos but does not exceed 1 million pesos, and P15.00 if their capitalization is 100 thousand pesos or less; Provided, that this Decree shall not apply to any severely distressed industry or

branch thereof, or enterprise therein, as defined by the Department of Labor in accordance with established standards and methods of determining the same. (Emphasis supplied.)

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 3. The Department of Labor and the National Labor Relations Commission shall not entertain any complaints under this Decree against employers who have complied with Letter of Instructions No. 174 and filed the necessary

reports with the Department of Labor.

For the guidance of those concerned, on August 5, 1974 then Secretary of Labor Blas F. Ople promulgated the Rules and Regulations Implementing P.D. No. 525 with the following provisions:

Sec. 7. Amount of Allowances. „1¤7 Every covered employer shall give to each of his employees who is receiving less than P600.00 a month not less than the following monthly allowances:

(a) P50.00 where the authorized capital stock or total assets, whichever is applicable and higher, is P1 million or more;

(b) P30.00 where the authorized capital stock or total assets, whichever is applicable and higher, is at least P100,000.00 but less than P1 million; and

(c) P15.00 where the authorized capital stock or total assets, whichever is applicable and higher, is less than P100,000.00.

Nothing herein shall prevent employers from granting allowances to their employees who will receive more than P600.00 a month, including the allowances. An employer, however, may grant his employees an allowance which, if

added to their monthly salary, will not yield to them more than P600.00 a month. (Emphasis supplied.)

Sec. 8. Compliance under LOI No. 174. „1¤7 The Department of Labor and any of its entities, including the National Labor Relations Commission and its regional units, shall not entertain complaints against employers who have fully

complied with Letter of Instructions No. 174.

Where an employer has not granted to his employees the full minimum monthly allowance provided in LOI No. 174, such employer shall, within two (2) months from the effective date of these regulations, grant at least the difference

between the applicable monthly allowance provided in the Decree and that actually paid the employees, retroactive to 1 August 1974.

Under this statutory backdrop, petitioner, a corporation with an authorized capital stock of P1 million and total assets of P2,656,793.45 as of December 31, 1974, was named a respondent in a complaint for underpayment of emergency allowance filed before Regional

Office No. 4 of the Department of Labor in 1976 by the Luzon Polymers Labor Union (FFW) on behalf of 185 of its members. 1 Alleging that since February 1974, regular employees of petitioner corporation who were members of the union had been receiving P1.15 daily or P30.00 monthly emergency allowance, complainant-union contended that its members were entitled to P50.00 monthly emergency

allowance in as much as their employer's total assets were over and above P1 million.

For its part, petitioner corporation claimed that since it had fully complied with LOI No. 174, it had not underpaid its employees. Moreover, citing Sec. 3 of P.D. No. 525, it questioned the jurisdiction of the Department of Labor to entertain and hear the complaint.

Noting that petitioner corporation had total assets of more than one million in 1973 and 1974 or P1,920,529.04 and P2,676,793.45, respectively, Officer-in-Charge and Assistant Secretary Vicente Leogardo, Jr. ruled that petitioner had not fully complied with LOI No. 174 and therefore it could not validly invoke Sec. 8 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing P.D.No. 525, Citing the decision of the Office of the President in "Kalinisan Workers Association (FFW) v. Kalinisan Incorporated" 2 which held that "capitalization" means the "authorized capital stock or total assets, whichever is applicable or higher" which meaning was reflected in the Rules and Regulations Implementing P.D. No. 525, the Assistant Secretary's order of May 23, 1977 accordingly directed the petitioner corporation to pay its complainant-employees the deficiency of the emergency allowance equivalent to P20 a month from the start of their employment but

not earlier than August 1, 1974.

Petitioner appealed to Secretary Ople but the latter dismissed the appeal for lack of merit in the order of February 21, 1978 and directed petitioner "to pay the difference of P20.00 as awarded in the appealed order." 3 Hence, petitioner elevated the case to the

Office of the President which, through Presidential Executive Assistant Jacobo C. Clave, likewise dismissed the appeal in an undated decision. 4

Having failed to obtain administrative relief, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari praying that Sec. 7 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing P.D. No. 525 be declared null and void "insofar as it increases the liability of employers capitalized at P1 million from P30.00 a month to P50.00 a month" and that the decision of Presidential Assistant Clave be reversed. Petitioner further

prayed that execution of the questioned decision be stayed pending the resolution of the instant petition. 5 Granting this last prayer, on August 8, 1979 the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the public respondents from executing the questioned

decision. 6

Petitioner contends herein that: (a) in issuing the Rules and Regulations Implementing P.D. No. 525, particularly paragraph 7 thereof, the then Secretary of Labor exceeded his rule-making power in as much as said paragraph substantially altered and contradicted the

provisions of P.D. No. 525; (b) the Secretary of Labor's order of February 21, 1978 requiring petitioner to pay the deficiency of the emergency allowance it had paid its employees, is contrary to Sec. 3 of P.D. No. 525 providing that the Department of Labor shall not

entertain any complaint under said decree against employers who have complied with LOI No. 174; and (c) the decision of Presidential Executive Assistant Clave is contrary to law as it upholds the illegal exercise of law-making powers by the Secretary of Labor.

At the outset, it should be clarified that P.D.No. 525 had been superseded by other decrees, notably P.D. Nos. 1123, 1614, 1634 and 1678. 7 This fact, however, is not a deterrent to the resolution of the instant petition in view of the apparent confusing provisions of the

issuances and rules and regulations involved.

To start with, paragraph 3 of LOI No. 174 mandates the grant of P50 a month emergency allowance for employees of "enterprises capitalized at P1 million to P4 million or more" and P30 for employees of "enterprises capitalized at P100,000 to P1 million." While the determinative factor for the amount of emergency allowance is simply the capitalization 8 of the employer concerned, the problem lies

in the fact that the same provision of LOI No. 174 categorizes an enterprise capitalized at P1 million as under both the P50 and the P30 brackets of emergency allowance.

This grey area, however, was clarified by the Interpretative Bulletin on LOI No. 174 issued by the Department of Labor. Sec. 5 thereof which is quoted above states that an employer has to pay the fifty-pesos allowance "where the authorized capital stock of the

corporation, or the total assets in the case of other undertakings, exceeds P1 million or thirty pesos" where the authorized capital stock of the corporation, or the total assets in the case of other undertakings, is not less than P100,000 but not more than P1 million." Clearly then, the petitioner falls under the bracket of employers required to give a thirty-peso monthly emergency allowance under LOI No. 174

in view of the undisputed fact that it is a "domestic corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws" with an authorized capital stock of one million pesos. 9

While said administrative interpretation of LOI No. 174 is at best merely advisory for it is only the courts which have the power to determine what LOI No. 174 really means, 10 it is significant to note that said Sec. 5 of the Interpretative Bulletin was adopted in P.D. No. 525. As aforequoted, Sec. 1 of said decree states that an emergency allowance of thirty pesos shall be given to employees of

corporations with a capitalization of "more than 100 thousand pesos but does not exceed 1 million pesos."

What seems to have muddled the matter are the provisions of Sec. 7 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing P.D. No. 525. Under that section, petitioner appears to have been covered by the fifty-peso bracket for it states that a monthly emergency allowance of fifty

pesos is required "where the authorized capital stock or total assets, whichever is applicable and higher, is P1 million or more." It should be observed that this provision not only injects a new determinative factor, i.e., the total assets of the employer, but also

provides a choice for the determinative factor: whichever is higher between the employer's authorized capital stock and its total assets.

An examination of the issuances of the Department of Labor, however, reveals that said option is more apparent than real. In its Interpretative Bulletin aforementioned, the Department uses as a basis for granting the emergency allowance the "authorized capital

stock, or the total assets in the case of other undertakings." The phrase "authorized capital stock" clearly refers to employers which are incorporated by law and therefore have authorized capital stocks to speak of. Total assets as a determinative factor should only refer to

"other undertakings." The same Interpretative Bulletin gives a clue as to what "other undertakings" mean, Section 2 thereof states:

Sec. 2. Employees Covered. „1¤7 The LOI appeals (sic) to all employers in the private sector. Included within the scope of its application are commercial, industrial, and agricultural establishments and enterprises, as well as all

undertakings, institutions and organizations which are not operated or established for profit or gain, such as schools and other institutions of learning, hospitals, and charitable and religious organizations.

Excluded from the application of the LOI are employers of house-helpers and persons in the personal service of another in relation to such workers. (Emphasis supplied) (Rollo, p. 25).

Considering the provisions of this section and in view of the rule of ejusdem generis, the word "undertakings" in Sec. 5 of the Interpretative Bulletin should refer only to non-profit institutions. Therefore, in categorizing said institutions for the purpose of

determining the amount of emergency allowance for their employees, their "total assets" is the criterion. The petitioner herein, not being a non-profit enterprise, the determinative factor in gauging the amount of emergency allowance to be granted to its employees is its

authorized capital stock.

Sec. 2 of the Interpretative Bulletin is reflected in the Department of Labor's Rules and Regulations Implementing P.D. No. 525. Sec. 1 provides:

Sec. 1. Employees Covered. „1¤7 The Decree shall apply to all commercial, industrial, and agricultural establishments and enterprises, as well as to all undertakings; institutions and organizations which are not primarily

organized for profit or gain, except to those specifically exempted under Section 3 of these regulations. (Rollo, p. 32).

Thus, the same interpretation should necessarily be attached to the phrase "total assets" in Sec. 7 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing P.D. No. 525: it should refer only to employers which are not incorporated by law and which are

strictly non-profit "undertakings." Corollarily, however, "total assets" maybe the measure for determining the amount of emergency allowance for enterprises such as single proprietorships and partnerships which are not backed up by capital

stocks.

Sec. 7 of the Rules and Regulations, therefore, introduced a matter which is not germane to the provisions of P.D. No. 525 by considering total assets as a criterion. Moreover, it further complicated the law by the addition of the phrase "whichever is applicable and higher." In practice, the exercise of the option expressed in such phrase may lead to absurd situations. As demonstrated in this case, that which is higher, meaning petitioner's total assets, may not also be applicable because petitioner is not an "undertaking"

within the purview of the Interpretative Bulletin and the Rules and Regulations Implementing P.D. No. 525.

Consequently, Sec. 7 of the said Rules has not conformed with the standards that P.D. No. 525 prescribes. 11 Having been based on an erroneous decision of the Office of the President, it is further rendered obnoxious by the principle that an administrative agency like the

Department of Labor cannot amend the law it seeks to implement. 12

We need not concern ourselves unduly with regard to petitioner's contention that the complaint for under payment of emergency allowance is barred by Sec. 3 of P.D. 525. Suffice it to say that Sec. 7 of the Rules is not the proper basis for taking cognizance of the

case. As alleged by public respondents, Sec. 3 clearly states that compliance should be with LOI No. 174 and not with the implementing rules which were subsequently issued by the Department of Labor.

The issue of the sufficiency of the emergency allowance granted by employers to its employees has been ventilated before this Court. 13 In none of them, however, was the validity of Sec. 7 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing P.D. No. 525 specifically put in issue as in the instant case. While this Court has always been guided by the principle that in labor cases, any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the workers, we cannot close our eyes to the possible abuse of the rule making power on the part of the Secretary of Labor under the

guise of promoting social justice and affording protection to labor.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is GRANTED. Sec. 7 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing P.D. No. 525 insofar as it is contradictory to the provisions of said decree as herein by discussed, is hereby declared NULL and VOID. The temporary

restraining order issued by this Court on August 8, 1979 is hereby made PERMANENT. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Davide Jr., J., concur.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. L-57665 July 2, 1990

ALEJA SIBAYAN VDA. DE PINEDA, CLARA SIBAYAN VDA. DE GADDI, and MIGUELA SIBAYAN RAMENTO, petitioners, vs.The HON. TEODORO PEÑA, MINISTER OF NATURAL RESOURCES; The HON. JUANITO FERNANDEZ, DIRECTOR OF MINES & GEO-SCIENCES; and the KM. 21 MINING EXPLORATION CORPORATION; The BAGUIO GOLD MINING COMPANY, INC.; ELVIRA DE CARMELO and JOSEPH PALENGAOAN, respondents.

Rodolfo D. Dela Cruz for petitioners.

Emiliano L. Gayo and Honorato Y. Aquino for private respondents.

CORTES, J.:

Assailed in this petition for certiorari and prohibition is that part of the decision of the Director of Mines, affirmed by the Minister of Natural Resources, which declared that petitioners have abandoned and lost their rights over their mining claim.

This case originated from a protest case for alleged overlapping or encroachment between two mining claims.

The relevant facts are as follows:

The "Ped" mining claim was located by Pedro Sibayan in January, 1932. After Sibayan's death, his heirs Miguela and Aleja Sibayan executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement wherein they waived their rights and interest over the "Ped" claim, among others, in favor of co-heir Feliza Sibayan. Feliza then transferred said claims to Sofia Reyes.

The "Ullmann" mining claim was located by Elvira Carmelo in February, 1932, and was subsequently transferred to Joseph Palengaoan.

In 1962, Reyes, Palengaoan and several others formed the KM. 21 Mining Association, later converted into the KM. 21 Exploration Corporation, to which the members conveyed their respective mining claims, including the "Ped" and "Ullmann" claims. Ultimately, the claims were assigned to the Baguio Gold Mining Company for operation.

During this time, an amended declaration of location for the "Ullmann" claim was registered.

On November 23, 1972, petitioners instituted Civil Case No. Q-17136 against Feliza Sibayan, Sofia Reyes, KM. 21 Mining Exploration Corporation, et. al., with the Court of First Instance, Quezon City, Branch IX. Petitioners claimed that the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement from which private respondents derived their ownership and possession over the "Ped" claim was maliciously falsified [Annex "I" to the Petition; Rollo, pp. 78-79] and prayed for annulment of all subsequent transfers involving the mining claims.

During the pre-trial of Civil Case No. Q-17136, the parties entered into an amicable settlement, agreeing that: (1) private respondents win return to petitioners the disputed mining claims, including the "Ped" claim; (2) petitioners will reimburse private respondents all expenses, like assessment taxes, incurred in the preservation of the claims; and (3) private respondents shall execute the necessary documents to reconvey the mining claims to petitioners (Annex "I" to the Petition, pp. 4-5; Rollo, p. 78-79].

Thus, the Court of First Instance rendered a decision on November 11, 1974 ordering the parties to comply with the above settlement [Decision of the Minister of Natural Resources, p. 4; Annex "E" to the Petition; Rollo, p. 52].

On July 20, 1974, petitioners filed with the Bureau of Mines a letter-complaint (Mines Administrative Case No. V-784) against private respondents for alleged overlapping and encroachment of the "Ullmann" claim over the "Ped" claim.

On January 10, 1977, the Director of Mines rendered a decision declaring that there was no conflict between the "Ped" and "Ullmann" claims, the dispositive portion of which reads:

VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the protest and complaint-in-intervention should be, as hereby they are DISMISSED. Accordingly, respondents are hereby given the preferential right to possess, explore, develop, exploit and operate the area covered by their "Ullmann" claim. [Decision of the Director of Mines, p. 4; Rollo, p. 32].

Since the protest case was filed after Pres. Decree No. 463 (Mineral Resources Development Decree of 1974) took effect on May 17, 1974, the provisions of the law were made applicable to petitioners. Pres. Decree No. 463 mandates compliance with certain requirements in order for subsisting mining claims, such as the "Ped" claim, to avail of the benefits granted under the Decree. Otherwise, mining rights to the claim will be lost. The requirements are embodied in Sections 100 and 101, and Section 180 of the implementing regulations, quoted as follows:

Sec. 100. Old Valid Mining Rights May Come Under This Decree. — Holders of valid and subsisting mining locations and other rights under other laws, irrespective of the areas covered, may avail of the rights and privileges granted under this Decree by making the necessary application therefor and approval thereof by the Director within a period of two (2) years from the date of approval of this Decree.

Sec. 101. Recognition and Survey of Old Subsisting Mining Claims. — All mining grants, patents, locations, leases and permits subsisting at the time of the approval of this Decree shall be recognized if registered pursuant to Section 100 hereof. Provided, that Spanish Royal Grants and unpatented mining claims located and registered under the Act of the United States Congress of July 1, 1902, as amended, otherwise known as the "Philippine Bill", shall be surveyed within one (1) year from the approval of this Decree: Provided, further, That no such mining rights shall be recognized if there is failure to comply with the fundamental requirements of the respective grants: And provided, finally, That such grants, patents, locations, leases or permits as may be recognized by the Director after proper investigation, shall comply with the applicable provisions of this Decree, more particularly with the annual work obligations, submittal of reports, fiscal provisions and other obligations. [Emphasis supplied].

Sec. 180. Failure to File Application to Avail of the Rights and Privileges Under the Decree — Mining grants, patents, locations, leases, permits and other mining rights subsisting at the time of the approval of the Decree for which no corresponding application under Section 100 and 101 of the Decree has been filed with the period provided in Section 176 hereof shall be considered to have lapsed, and the area covered thereby, shall be open to relocation as if no grant, patent, location, lease, permit and other mining rights have been made or granted thereon.

Finding that petitioners failed to comply with the above-cited provisions, respondent director declared in the impugned portion of the decision that:

The records of this case show that respondents submitted in evidence (Exhibit 16) a certification dated August 24, 1976 issued by our Mines Regional Officer in Baguio City to the effect that protestants [petitioners] failed to file the required application to avail for "Ped" mineral claim. Under the circumstances, and considering that the period for the filing of said application has already expired as of May 17, 1976, protestants [petitioners] have lost whatever rights they have over their mining claim involved in this case. Moreover, protestants [petitioners] failed to perform the required annual assessment work since 1952 as evidenced by the certification issued by the Mining Recorder of Benguet (Exh. 17). Needless to state that failure to perform the required annual assessment work constitutes abandonment of the mining claim [Emphasis supplied; Decision of the Director of Mines, pp. 3-4; Annex "C" to the Petition; Rollo, pp. 31-32].

On appeal to the Minister of Natural Resources, petitioners argued that respondent Director was without jurisdiction or exceeded his jurisdiction in ruling that they have lost their rights over the "Ped" mining claim, since the case was only for overlapping or encroachment and the question of whether they complied with the provisions of Pres. Decree No. 463 was never placed at issue in the pleadings.

On November 19, 1980, then Minister of Natural Resources Jose J. Leido disposed of the appeal thus:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant appeal is hereby dismissed and the decision, dated January 10, 1977, of the Director of Mines affirmed.

SO ORDERED.

[Decision of Secretary of Natural Resources, p. 10; Annex "E" to the Petition; Rollo, p. 58].

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by respondent Minister in an Order dated July 10, 1981 [Order, p. 2; Annex "L" to the Petition; Rollo, p. 110]. Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition.

Petitioners pray for an order to (1) annul that portion of the decision which declared them to have abandoned and lost their rights on their "Ped" claim; (2) require public respondents to recognize petitioners' vested rights on their "Ped" mining claim; (3) enjoin private respondents to confine themselves within the boundaries of their "Ullmann" claim; and (4) require private respondents to return to petitioners' possession the "Ped" mineral claim [Petition, p. 18; Rollo, p. 19].

Private respondents and the Solicitor General filed their respective Comments, the Solicitor General adopting petitioners' position. Private respondents then filed their Comment to the Solicitor General's Comment. Thereafter, the Solicitor General submitted his Reply. Whereupon, the case was deemed submitted for decision.

Petitioners reiterate that the portion of the decision which declared petitioners to have lost and/or abandoned their rights to the "Ped" mining claim was issued without jurisdiction, in violation of due process and in grave abuse of discretion.

As counter-argument, private respondents assert that under Section 49 of Pres. Decree No. 463, when petitioners filed their protest case for overlapping of mining claims, they automatically subjected their "Ped" claim to questions on the validity of its location and on the locator's having complied with all the requirements of the Decree.

The issues to be resolved in this case are (1) whether or not public respondents have jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the "Ped" claim in a protest case of overlapping of mining claims; and (2) should public respondents have such jurisdiction, whether or not they committed grave abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction in declaring petitioners to have abandoned their mining claim.

On the issue of jurisdiction, petitioners contend that public respondents may not validly and legally take cognizance of an issue not raised in the complaint, i.e., the issue of the validity of the "Ped" mining claim.

This assertion is mistaken. Petitioners had filed the protest case pursuant to Pres. Decree No. 463 which vests the Bureau of Mines with jurisdiction over protests involving mining claims [Section 48, Pres. Decree No. 463].

Under the same Decree, Section 90 confers upon the Secretary of Natural Resources, upon recommendation of the Director of Mines, the authority to issue rules, regulations and orders necessary to carry out the provisions and purposes of the Decree. In accordance with the statutory grant of rule-making power, the Department Secretary on May 17, 1975 issued the Consolidated Mines Administrative Order Implementing Pres. Decree No. 463, which was published in the Official Gazette on June 16, 1975.

One such implementing rule is Section 128, which respondent Minister of Natural Resources relied upon in his decision to dispose of the jurisdictional issue raise d by petitioners. Section 128 provides:

Sec. 128. Issues Joined . . .

The Director, or the Secretary, in case of appeals, may motu proprio look into the validity of mining claims, whether raised as an issue or not.

It is established in jurisprudence that Congress may validly delegate to administrative agencies the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies [People v. Exconde, 101 Phil. 1125 (1957); Director of Forestry v. Munoz, G.R. No. L-24796, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 1183]. In order to be valid, the administrative regulation must be germane to the objects and purposes of the law, conform to the standards that the law prescribes [People v. Exconde, supra, citing Calalang v. Williams, 70 Phil. 727 (1940); Pangasinan Transportation v. Public Service Commission, 70 Phil. 221 (1940)], and must relate solely to carrying into effect the general provisions of the law [U.S. v. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil. 119 (1914)].

With these guidelines, Section 128 of the implementing rules invoked by public respondents as basis for their jurisdiction cannot be tainted with invalidity. First, it was issued by the Department Head pursuant to validly delegated rule-making powers. Second, it does not contravene the provisions of Pres. Decree No. 463, nor does it expand the coverage of the Decree. Section 128 merely prescribes a procedural rule to implement the general provisions of the enabling law. It does not amend or extend the provisions of the statute [People v. Maceren, G.R. No. L-32166, October 18, 1977, 79 SCRA 450, citing University of Santo Tomas v. Board of Tax Appeals, 93 Phil. 376 (1953)].

Neither can it be maintained that such an implementing rule results in a denial of procedural due process, for it is axiomatic in administrative law that what the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice, but the absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard [Catura v. Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No. L-27392, January 30,1971, 37 SCRA 303, citing De Borja v. Tan, 93 Phil. 167 (1953)]. In this case, petitioners were afforded the opportunity to be heard on the validity of the "Ped" mining claim when they submitted rebuttal evidence on appeal.

Section 128, being a valid implementing rule, has the force and effect of law. Thus, public respondents were duly empowered to inquire into the validity of the mining claims involved in the protest case, even if not raised in issue.

Having resolved the question of jurisdiction, the Court shall next determine if public respondents acted within their jurisdiction, or if they committed grave abuse of discretion which would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed for.

As a rule, the courts will not interfere with purely administrative matters involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, and findings of fact, of the administrative agency. The exception is when there is a clear showing that the agency acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion or when it acted in a capricious manner such that its action may amount to an excess or lack of jurisdiction [Pajo v. Ago, 108 Phil. 905 (1960); Ganitano v. Secretary of Agriculture, G.R. No. L-21167. March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 543; Beautifont, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 50141, January 29, 1988, 157 SCRA 481].

The petition is impressed with merit.

Public respondents found that petitioners failed to comply with the requirements set by law, and thus declared petitioners to have abandoned and lost their rights over the "Ped" claim.

However, respondent director's finding that petitioners failed to file the availment-application was based solely on evidence submitted by private respondents. This consisted of a certification issued by the Mines Regional Officer in Baguio City dated August 24, 1976 stating that petitioners failed to file the availment-application for the "Ped" claim within the period provided by law. The finding is effectively contradicted by the rebuttal evidence submitted by petitioners on appeal consisting of an "Affidavit to Avail of Benefits" and an "Application for Order of Survey of Mining Claim" (Appeal-Annex "B" and "B-1", Rollo, pp. 47-48) filed by petitioners with the Bureau of Mines office in Manila on May 12, 1975.

The certification issued by the Mines Regional Officer of Baguio City cannot prevail over the documents clearly evidencing the petitioners' filing the application. Not only was the application filed within the prescriptive period, it was also duly filed with the Bureau of Mines Office in Manila, the venue specified under Section 176 of the implementing rules.

Private respondents argue that the documents were not filed at the proper time since they were not formally offered in evidence when the case was still before the respondent Director, and were only submitted on appeal.

The contention is clearly untenable. Petitioners precisely were unaware that the validity of the "Ped" claim would be passed upon in the protest case since such was not raised as an issue. Hence it was only after the decision in the protest case was rendered that petitioners found the need to present evidence on appeal relating to the validity of the "Ped" claim.

Clearly, respondent Minister gravely abused his discretion when he disregarded the rebuttal evidence submitted by petitioners which otherwise would have had the effect of reversing respondent Director's finding.

As to petitioners' supposed failure to perform annual work obligations on the "Ped" claim since 1952, the conclusion is only partly correct. Annual work obligations, consisting of payment of assessment and taxes, had in fact been paid up to the year 1975, although not by petitioners. The record shows that the payor was the Baguio Gold Mining Company, to which the "Ped" claim, among others, had

been assigned by private respondents for operation (Rollo, pp. 93-98.) And subsequent to 1975, petitioners paid the taxes due up to 1981, in compliance with the law's mandate (Rollo, pp. 100-101.) All the documents showing these decisive facts were annexed to petitioners' "Rejoinder to Motion to Strike Out Appellants' Motion for Reconsideration" dated February 25, 1981, and submitted to respondent Minister [Annex "I" to the Petition, pp. 8-9; Rollo, pp. 81-82].

That petitioners were not the actual payors of the assessment due up to 1975 can be attributed to the fact that possession of the subject claim, even up to the date when the present petition was submitted for decision, remained with private respondents, and its ownership had been in dispute in Civil Case No. Q-17136. By the terms of the amicable settlement contained in the November 11, 1974 decision in said civil case, which had long attained finality, private respondent promised to return possession of the "Ped" claim to petitioners, subject to reimbursement by petitioners of all assessments and necessary expenses paid for by private respondents. Petitioners therefore cannot be faulted with non-payment of the assessment works, since such payment was in fact made, at least until 1975, by the party to which such payment pertained. Consequently, such payment inures to the benefit of petitioners.

Respondent Minister evidently knew of the existence of the amicable settlement, since he discussed the terms thereof in his decision [Decision of the Minister of Natural Resources, p. 4; Annex "E" to the Petition; Rollo, p. 52]. Nevertheless, respondent Minister overlooked the fact that from the terms of the settlement, petitioners clearly were not liable to pay the assessment works for the years in question, and that consequently there was no basis for a finding of abandonment of the "Ped" claim by petitioners.

Considering the foregoing, the Court holds that public respondents had the authority to ascertain the validity of the "Ped" claim. Nevertheless, in affirming that portion of the decision of the Director of Mines declaring petitioners to have "abandoned and lost their rights" over the "Ped" claim, respondent Minister committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. That part of the decision of the Director of Mines dated January 10, 1977 in Mines Administrative Case No. V-784 declaring petitioners to have "abandoned and lost their rights" over the "Ped" mineral claim is hereby declared NULL and VOID and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.

Fernan, C.J., is on leave.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 77372 April 29, 1988

LUPO L. LUPANGCO, RAYMOND S. MANGKAL, NORMAN A. MESINA, ALEXANDER R. REGUYAL, JOCELYN P. CATAPANG, ENRICO V. REGALADO, JEROME O. ARCEGA, ERNESTOC. BLAS, JR., ELPEDIO M. ALMAZAN, KARL CAESAR R. RIMANDO, petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION, respondent.

Balgos & Perez Law Offices for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:

Is the Regional Trial Court of the same category as the Professional Regulation Commission so that it cannot pass upon the validity of the administrative acts of the latter? Can this Commission lawfully prohibit the examiness from attending review classes, receiving handout materials, tips, or the like three (3) days before the date of the examination? Theses are the issues presented to the court by this petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals promulagated on January 13, 1987, in CA-G.R. SP No. 10598, * declaring null and void the other dated Ocober 21, 1986 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 32 in Civil Case No. 86-37950 entitled " Lupo L. Lupangco, et al. vs. Professional Regulation Commission."

The records shows the following undisputed facts:

On or about October 6, 1986, herein respondent Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) issued Resolution No. 105 as parts of its "Additional Instructions to Examiness," to all those applying for admission to take the licensure examinations in accountancy. The resolution embodied the following pertinent provisions:

No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like conducted by, or shall receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similars institutions during the three days immediately proceeding every examination day including examination day.

Any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to the sanctions prescribed by Sec. 8, Art. III of the Rules and Regulations of the Commission. 1

On October 16, 1986, herein petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure examinations in accountancy schedule on October 25 and November 2 of the same year, filed on their own behalf of all others similarly situated like them, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, a complaint for injuction with a prayer with the issuance of a writ of a preliminary injunction against respondent PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing the above-mentioned resolution and to declare the same unconstitution.

Respondent PRC filed a motion to dismiss on October 21, 1987 on the ground that the lower court had no jurisdiction to review and to enjoin the enforcement of its resolution. In an Order of October 21, 1987, the lower court declared that it had jurisdiction to try the case and enjoined the respondent commission from enforcing and giving effect to Resolution No. 105 which it found to be unconstitutional.

Not satisfied therewith, respondent PRC, on November 10, 1986, filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for the nullification of the above Order of the lower court. Said petiton was granted in the Decision of the Court of Appeals promulagated on January 13, 1987, to wit:

WHEREFORE, finding the petition meritorious the same is hereby GRANTED and the other dated October 21, 1986 issued by respondent court is declared null and void. The respondent court is further directed to dismiss with prejudice Civil Case No. 86-37950 for want of jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof. No cost in this instance.

SO ORDERED. 2

Hence, this petition.

The Court of Appeals, in deciding that the Regional Trial Court of Manila had no jurisdiction to entertain the case and to enjoin the enforcement of the Resolution No. 105, stated as its basis its conclusion that the Professional Regulation Commission and the Regional Trial Court are co-equal bodies. Thus it held —

That the petitioner Professional Regulatory Commission is at least a co-equal body with the Regional Trial Court is beyond question, and co-equal bodies have no power to control each other or interfere with each other's acts. 3

To strenghten its position, the Court of Appeals relied heavily on National Electrification Administration vs. Mendoza, 4 which cites Pineda vs. Lantin 5 and Philippine Pacific Fishing, Inc. vs. Luna, 6 where this Court held that a Court of First Instance cannot interfere with the orders of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the two being co-equal bodies.

After a close scrutiny of the facts and the record of this case,

We rule in favor of the petitioner.

The cases cited by respondent court are not in point. It is glaringly apparent that the reason why this Court ruled that the Court of First Instance could not interfere with the orders of the Securities and Exchange Commission was that this was so provided for by the law. In Pineda vs. Lantin, We explained that whenever a party is aggrieved by or disagree with an order or ruling of the Securities and Exchange Commission, he cannot seek relief from courts of general jurisdiction since under the Rules of Court and Commonwealth Act No. 83, as amended by Republic Act No. 635, creating and setting forth the powers and functions of the old Securities and Exchange Commission, his remedy is to go the Supreme Court on a petition for review. Likewise, in Philippine Pacific Fishing Co., Inc. vs. Luna, it was stressed that if an order of the Securities and Exchange Commission is erroneous, the appropriate remedy take is first, within the Commission itself, then, to the Supreme Court as mandated in Presidential Decree No. 902-A, the law creating the new Securities and Exchange Commission. Nowhere in the said cases was it held that a Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction over all other government agencies. On the contrary, the ruling was specifically limited to the Securities and Exchange Commission.

The respondent court erred when it place the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Professional Regulation Commsision in the same category. As alraedy mentioned, with respect to the Securities and Exchange Commission, the laws cited explicitly provide with the procedure that need be taken when one is aggrieved by its order or ruling. Upon the other hand, there is no law providing for the next course of action for a party who wants to question a ruling or order of the Professional Regulation Commission. Unlike Commonwealth Act No. 83 and Presidential Decree No. 902-A, there is no provision in Presidential Decree No. 223, creating the Professional Regulation Commission, that orders or resolutions of the Commission are appealable either to the Court of Appeals or to theSupreme Court. Consequently, Civil Case No. 86-37950, which was filed in order to enjoin the enforcement of a resolution of the respondent Professional Regulation Commission alleged to be unconstitutional, should fall within the general jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, now the Regional Trial Court. 7

What is clear from Presidential Decree No. 223 is that the Professional Regulation Commission is attached to the Office of the President for general direction and coordination. 8 Well settled in our jurisprudence is the view that even acts of the Office of the President may be reviewed by the Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court). In Medalla vs. Sayo, 9 this rule was thoroughly propounded on, to wit:

In so far as jurisdiction of the Court below to review by certiorari decisions and/or resolutions of the Civil Service Commission and of the residential Executive Asssistant is concerned, there should be no question but that the power of judicial review should be upheld. The following rulings buttress this conclusion:

The objection to a judicial review of a Presidential act arises from a failure to recognize the most important principle in our system of government, i.e., the separation of powers into three co-equal departments, the executives, the legislative and the judicial, each supreme within its own assigned powers and duties. When a presidential act is challenged before the courts of justice, it is not to be implied therefrom that the Executive is being made subject and subordinate to the courts. The legality of his acts are under judicial review, not because the Executive is inferior to the courts, but because the law is above the Chief Executive himself, and the courts seek only to interpret, apply or implement it (the law). A judicial review of the President's decision on a case of an employee decided by the Civil Service Board of Appeals should be viewed in this light and the bringing of the case to the Courts should be governed by the same principles as govern the jucucial review of all administrative acts of all administrative officers. 10

Republic vs. Presiding Judge, CFI of Lanao del Norte, Br. II, 11 is another case in point. Here, "the Executive Office"' of the Department of Education and Culture issued Memorandum Order No. 93 under the authority of then Secretary of Education Juan Manuel. As in this case, a complaint for injunction was filed with the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte because, allegedly, the enforcement of the circular would impair some contracts already entered into by public school teachers. It was the contention of petitioner therein that "the Court of First Instance is not empowered to amend, reverse and modify what is otherwise the clear and explicit provision of the memorandum circular issued by the Executive Office which has the force and effect of law." In resolving the issue, We held:

... We definitely state that respondent Court lawfully acquired jurisdiction in Civil Case No. II-240 (8) because the plaintiff therein asked the lower court for relief, in the form of injunction, in defense of a legal right (freedom to enter into contracts) . . . . .

Hence there is a clear infringement of private respondent's constitutional right to enter into agreements not contrary to law, which might run the risk of being violated by the threatened implementation of Executive Office Memorandum Circular No. 93, dated February 5, 1968, which prohibits, with certain exceptions, cashiers and disbursing officers from honoring special powers of attorney executed by the payee employees. The respondent Court is not only right but duty bound to take cognizance of cases of this nature wherein a constitutional and statutory right is allegedly infringed by the administrative action of a government office. Courts of first Instance have original jurisdiction over all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is not capable of pecuniary estimation (Sec. 44, Republic Act 296, as amended). 12 (Emphasis supplied.)

In San Miguel Corporation vs. Avelino, 13 We ruled that a judge of the Court of First Instance has the authority to decide on the validity of a city tax ordinance even after its validity had been contested before the Secretary of Justice and an opinion thereon had been rendered.

In view of the foregoing, We find no cogent reason why Resolution No. 105, issued by the respondent Professional Regulation Commission, should be exempted from the general jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.

Respondent PRC, on the other hand, contends that under Section 9, paragraph 3 of B.P. Blg. 129, it is the Court of Appeals which has jurisdiction over the case. The said law provides:

SEC. 9. Jurisdiction. — The Intermediate Appellate Court shall exercise:

xxx xxx xxx

(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.

The contention is devoid of merit.

In order to invoke the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals as provided for in Section 9, paragraph 3 of B.P. Blg. 129, there has to be a final order or ruling which resulted from proceedings wherein the administrative body involved exercised its quasi-judicial functions. In Black's Law Dictionary, quasi-judicial is defined as a term applied to the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action, and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. To expound thereon, quasi-judicial adjudication would mean a determination of rights, privileges and duties resulting in a decision or order which applies to a specific situation . 14 This does not cover rules and regulations of general applicability issued by the administrative body to implement its purely administrative policies and functions like Resolution No. 105 which was adopted by the respondent PRC as a measure to preserve the integrity of licensure examinations.

The above rule was adhered to in Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop vs. Ferrer. 15 In this case, the issue presented was whether or not the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction over a case involving an order of the Commission on Elections awarding a contract to a private party which originated from an invitation to bid. The said issue came about because under the laws then in force, final awards, judgments, decisions or orders of the Commission on Elections fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court by way of certiorari. Hence, it has been consistently held that "it is the Supreme Court, not the Court of First Instance, which has exclusive jurisdiction to review on certiorari final decisions, orders, or rulings of the Commission on Elections relative to the conduct of elections and the enforcement of election laws." 16

As to whether or not the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction in saidcase, We said:

We are however, far from convinced that an order of the COMELEC awarding a contract to a private party, as a result of its choice among various proposals submitted in response to its invitation to bid comes within the purview of a "final order" which is exclusively and directly appealable to this court on certiorari. What is contemplated by the term "final orders, rulings and decisions, of the COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law are those rendered in actions or proceedings before the COMELEC and taken cognizance of by the said body in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. (Emphasis supplied.)

xxx xxx xxx

We agree with petitioner's contention that the order of the Commission granting the award to a bidder is not an order rendered in a legal controversy before it wherein the parties filed their respective pleadings and presented evidence after which the questioned order was issued; and that this order of the commission was issued pursuant to its authority to enter into contracts in relation to election purposes. In short, the COMELEC resolution awarding the contract in favor of Acme was not issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions but merely as an incident of its inherent administrative functions over the conduct of elections, and hence, the said resolution may not be deemed as a "final order reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court. Being non-judicial in character, no contempt order may be imposed by the COMELEC from said order, and no direct and exclusive appeal by certiorari to this Tribunal lie from such order. Any question arising from said order may be well taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts. (Emphasis supplied.) 17

One other case that should be mentioned in this regard is Salud vs. Central Bank of the Philippines. 18 Here, petitioner Central Bank, like respondent in this case, argued that under Section 9, paragraph 3 of B.P. Blg. 129, orders of the Monetary Board are appealable only to the Intermediate Appellate Court. Thus:

The Central Bank and its Liquidator also postulate, for the very first time, that the Monetary Board is among the "quasi-judicial ... boards" whose judgments are within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the IAC; hence, it is only said Court, "to the exclusion of the Regional Trial Courts," that may review the Monetary Board's resolutions. 19

Anent the posture of the Central Bank, We made the following pronouncement:

The contention is utterly devoid of merit. The IAC has no appellate jurisdiction over resolution or orders of the Monetary Board. No law prescribes any mode of appeal from the Monetary Board to the IAC. 20

In view of the foregoing, We hold that the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to entertain Civil Case No. 86-37950 and enjoin the respondent PRC from enforcing its resolution.

Although We have finally settled the issue of jurisdiction, We find it imperative to decide once and for all the validity of Resolution No. 105 so as to provide the much awaited relief to those who are and will be affected by it.

Of course, We realize that the questioned resolution was adopted for a commendable purpose which is "to preserve the integrity and purity of the licensure examinations." However, its good aim cannot be a cloak to conceal its constitutional infirmities. On its face, it can be readily seen that it is unreasonable in that an examinee cannot even attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like, or receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, collge or university, or any review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor, official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similar institutions . ... 21

The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught committing the prohibited acts even without any ill motives will be barred from taking future examinations conducted by the respondent PRC. Furthermore, it is inconceivable how the Commission can manage to have a watchful eye on each and every examinee during the three days before the examination period.

It is an aixiom in administrative law that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to the end in view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for which they are authorized to be issued, then they must be held to be invalid. 22

Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees' right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they should prepare themselves for the licensure examinations. They cannot be restrained from taking all the lawful steps needed to assure the fulfillment of their ambition to become public accountants. They have every right to make use of their faculties in attaining success in their endeavors. They should be allowed to enjoy their freedom to acquire useful knowledge that will promote their personal growth. As defined in a decision of the United States Supreme Court:

The term "liberty" means more than mere freedom from physical restraint or the bounds of a prison. It means freedom to go where one may choose and to act in such a manner not inconsistent with the equal rights of others, as his judgment may dictate for the promotion of his happiness, to pursue such callings and vocations as may be most suitable to develop his capacities, and giv to them their highest enjoyment. 23

Another evident objection to Resolution No. 105 is that it violates the academic freedom of the schools concerned. Respondent PRC cannot interfere with the conduct of review that review schools and centers believe would best enable their enrolees to meet the standards required before becoming a full fledged public accountant. Unless the means or methods of instruction are clearly found to be inefficient, impractical, or riddled with corruption, review schools and centers may not be stopped from helping out their students. At this juncture, We call attention to Our pronouncement in Garcia vs. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, 24 regarding academic freedom to wit:

... It would follow then that the school or college itself is possessed of such a right. It decides for itself its aims and objectives and how best to attain them. It is free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the choice of students. This constitutional provision is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion.

Needless to say, the enforcement of Resolution No. 105 is not a guarantee that the alleged leakages in the licensure examinations will be eradicated or at least minimized. Making the examinees suffer by depriving them of legitimate means of review or preparation on those last three precious days-when they should be refreshing themselves with all that they have learned in the review classes and preparing their mental and psychological make-up for the examination day itself-would be like uprooting the tree to get ride of a rotten branch. What is needed to be done by the respondent is to find out the source of such leakages and stop it right there. If corrupt officials or personnel should be terminated from their loss, then so be it. Fixers or swindlers should be flushed out. Strict guidelines to be observed by examiners should be set up and if violations are committed, then licenses should be suspended or revoked. These are all within the powers of the respondent commission as provided for in Presidential Decree No. 223. But by all means the right and freedom of the examinees to avail of all legitimate means to prepare for the examinations should not be curtailed.

In the light of the above, We hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 10591 and another judgment is hereby rendered declaring Resolution No. 105 null and void and of no force and effect for being unconstitutional. This decision is immediately executory. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa and Cruz, JJ., concur.

Griño-Aquino, J., took no part.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 96681 December 2, 1991

HON. ISIDRO CARIÑO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture & Sports, DR. ERLINDA LOLARGA, in her capacity as Superintendent of City Schools of Manila, petitioners, vs.THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, GRACIANO BUDOY, JULIETA BABARAN, ELSA IBABAO, HELEN LUPO, AMPARO GONZALES, LUZ DEL CASTILLO, ELSA REYES and APOLINARIO ESBER, respondents.

NARVASA, J.:p

The issue raised in the special civil action of certiorari and prohibition at bar, instituted by the Solicitor General, may be formulated as follows: where the relief sought from the Commission on Human Rights by a party in a case consists of the review and reversal or modification of a decision or order issued by a court of justice or government agency or official exercising quasi-judicial functions, may the Commission take cognizance of the case and grant that relief? Stated otherwise, where a particular subject-matter is placed by law within the jurisdiction of a court or other government agency or official for purposes of trial and adjudgment, may the Commission on Human Rights take cognizance of the same subject-matter for the same purposes of hearing and adjudication?

The facts narrated in the petition are not denied by the respondents and are hence taken as substantially correct for purposes of ruling on the legal questions posed in the present action. These facts, 1 together with others involved in related cases recently resolved by this Court 2 or otherwise undisputed on the record, are hereunder set forth.

1. On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teachers, among them members of the Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook what they described as "mass concerted actions" to "dramatize and highlight" their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the latter's attention. According to them they had decided to undertake said "mass concerted actions" after the protest rally staged at the DECS premises on September 14, 1990 without disrupting classes as a last call for the government to negotiate the granting of demands had elicited no response from the Secretary of Education. The "mass actions" consisted in staying away from their classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peaceable assemblies, etc. Through their representatives, the teachers participating in the mass actions were served with an order of the Secretary of Education to return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal, and a memorandum directing the DECS officials concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings against those who did not comply and to hire their replacements. Those directives notwithstanding, the mass actions continued into the week, with more teachers joining in the days that followed. 3

Among those who took part in the "concerted mass actions" were the eight (8) private respondents herein, teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School, Manila, who had agreed to support the non-political demands of the MPSTA. 4

2. For failure to heed the return-to-work order, the CHR complainants (private respondents) were administratively charged on the basis of the principal's report and given five (5) days to answer the charges. They were also preventively suspended for ninety (90) days "pursuant to Section 41 of P.D. 807" and temporarily replaced (unmarked CHR Exhibits, Annexes F, G, H). An investigation committee was consequently formed to hear the charges in accordance with P.D. 807. 5

3. In the administrative case docketed as Case No. DECS 90-082 in which CHR complainants Graciano Budoy, Jr., Julieta Babaran, Luz del Castillo, Apolinario Esber were, among others, named respondents, 6 the latter filed separate answers, opted for a formal investigation, and also moved "for suspension of the administrative proceedings pending resolution by . . (the Supreme) Court of their application for issuance of an injunctive writ/temporary restraining order." But when their motion for suspension was denied by Order dated November 8, 1990 of the Investigating Committee, which later also denied their motion for reconsideration orally made at the hearing of November 14, 1990, "the respondents led by their counsel staged a walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire proceedings." 7 The case eventually resulted in a Decision of Secretary Cariño dated December 17, 1990, rendered after evaluation of the evidence as well as the answers, affidavits and documents submitted by

the respondents, decreeing dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber and the suspension for nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo. 8

4. In the meantime, the "MPSTA filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court of Manila against petitioner (Cariño), which was dismissed (unmarked CHR Exhibit, Annex I). Later, the MPSTA went to the Supreme Court (on certiorari, in an attempt to nullify said dismissal, grounded on the) alleged violation of the striking teachers" right to due process and peaceable assembly docketed as G.R. No. 95445, supra. The ACT also filed a similar petition before the Supreme Court . . . docketed as G.R. No. 95590." 9 Both petitions in this Court were filed in behalf of the teacher associations, a few named individuals, and "other teacher-members so numerous similarly situated" or "other similarly situated public school teachers too numerous to be impleaded."

5. In the meantime, too, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements dated September 27, 1990 to the Commission on Human Rights to complain that while they were participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their replacements as teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons completely unknown to them. 10

6. Their complaints — and those of other teachers also "ordered suspended by the . . . (DECS)," all numbering forty-two (42) — were docketed as "Striking Teachers CHR Case No. 90775." In connection therewith the Commission scheduled a "dialogue" on October 11, 1990, and sent a subpoena to Secretary Cariño requiring his attendance therein. 11

On the day of the "dialogue," although it said that it was "not certain whether he (Sec. Cariño) received the subpoena which was served at his office, . . . (the) Commission, with the Chairman presiding, and Commissioners Hesiquio R. Mallilin and Narciso C. Monteiro, proceeded to hear the case;" it heard the complainants' counsel (a) explain that his clients had been "denied due process and suspended without formal notice, and unjustly, since they did not join the mass leave," and (b) expatiate on the grievances which were "the cause of the mass leave of MPSTA teachers, (and) with which causes they (CHR complainants) sympathize." 12 The Commission thereafter issued an Order 13 reciting these facts and making the following disposition:

To be properly apprised of the real facts of the case and be accordingly guided in its investigation and resolution of the matter, considering that these forty two teachers are now suspended and deprived of their wages, which they need very badly, Secretary Isidro Cariño, of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, Dr. Erlinda Lolarga, school superintendent of Manila and the Principal of Ramon Magsaysay High School, Manila, are hereby enjoined to appear and enlighten the Commission en banc on October 19, 1990 at 11:00 A.M. and to bring with them any and all documents relevant to the allegations aforestated herein to assist the Commission in this matter. Otherwise, the Commission will resolve the complaint on the basis of complainants' evidence.

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7. Through the Office of the Solicitor General, Secretary Cariño sought and was granted leave to file a motion to dismiss the case. His motion to dismiss was submitted on November 14, 1990 alleging as grounds therefor, "that the complaint states no cause of action and that the CHR has no jurisdiction over the case." 14

8. Pending determination by the Commission of the motion to dismiss, judgments affecting the "striking teachers" were promulgated in two (2) cases, as aforestated, viz.:

a) The Decision dated December l7, 1990 of Education Secretary Cariño in Case No. DECS 90-082, decreeing dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber and the suspension for nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo; 15 and

b) The joint Resolution of this Court dated August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590 dismissing the petitions "without prejudice to any appeals, if still timely, that the individual petitioners may take to the Civil Service Commission on the matters complained of," 16 and inter alia "ruling that it was prima facie lawful for petitioner Cariño to issue return-to-work orders, file administrative charges against recalcitrants, preventively suspend them, and issue decision on those charges." 17

9. In an Order dated December 28, 1990, respondent Commission denied Sec. Cariño's motion to dismiss and required him and Superintendent Lolarga "to submit their counter-affidavits within ten (10) days . . . (after which) the Commission shall proceed to hear and resolve the case on the merits with or without respondents counter affidavit." 18 It held that the "striking teachers" "were denied due process of law; . . . they should not have been replaced without a chance to reply to the administrative charges;" there had been a violation of their civil and political rights which the Commission was empowered to investigate; and while expressing its "utmost respect to the Supreme Court . . . the facts before . . . (it) are different from those in the case decided by the Supreme Court" (the reference being unmistakably to this Court's joint Resolution of August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, supra).

It is to invalidate and set aside this Order of December 28, 1990 that the Solicitor General, in behalf of petitioner Cariño, has commenced the present action of certiorari and prohibition.

The Commission on Human Rights has made clear its position that it does not feel bound by this Court's joint Resolution in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, supra. It has also made plain its intention "to hear and resolve the case (i.e., Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775) on the merits." It intends, in other words, to try and decide or hear and determine, i.e., exercise jurisdiction over the following general issues:

1) whether or not the striking teachers were denied due process, and just cause exists for the imposition of administrative disciplinary sanctions on them by their superiors; and

2) whether or not the grievances which were "the cause of the mass leave of MPSTA teachers, (and) with which causes they (CHR complainants) sympathize," justify their mass action or strike.

The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say, determine with character of finality and definiteness, the same issues which have been passed upon and decided by the Secretary of Education, Culture & Sports, subject to appeal to the Civil Service Commission, this Court having in fact, as aforementioned, declared that the teachers affected may take appeals to the Civil Service Commission on said matters, if still timely.

The threshold question is whether or not the Commission on Human Rights has the power under the Constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of justice, 19 or even a quasi-judicial agency, 20 it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide, or hear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil or political rights.

The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. 21 This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have. 22

The proposition is made clear by the constitutional provisions specifying the powers of the Commission on Human Rights.

The Commission was created by the 1987 Constitution as an independent office. 23 Upon its constitution, it succeeded and superseded the Presidential Committee on Human Rights existing at the time of the effectivity of the Constitution. 24 Its powers and functions are the following 25

(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights;

(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;

(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection;

(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;

(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the primacy of human rights;

(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for compensation to victims of violations of human rights, or their families;

(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights;

(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority;

(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions;

(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and

(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.

As should at once be observed, only the first of the enumerated powers and functions bears any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment. The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It may also request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in extending such remedy as may be required by its findings. 26

But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings.

"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into systematically. "to search or inquire into: . . . to subject to an official probe . . .: to conduct an official inquiry." 27 The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry.

The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" 28 "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn describe as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not

require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters." 29

"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: . . . to pass judgment on: settle judicially: . . . act as judge." 30 And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: . . . to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy . . . ." 31

In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment." 32

Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has no power to "resolve on the merits" the question of (a) whether or not the mass concerted actions engaged in by the teachers constitute and are prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of carrying on and taking part in those actions, and the failure of the teachers to discontinue those actions, and return to their classes despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of Education, constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the grievances complained of by them; and (c) what where the particular acts done by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed for said acts or omissions.

These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the original jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.

Indeed, the Secretary of Education has, as above narrated, already taken cognizance of the issues and resolved them, 33 and it appears that appeals have been seasonably taken by the aggrieved parties to the Civil Service Commission; and even this Court itself has had occasion to pass upon said issues. 34

Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the conclusions reached by the Secretary of Education in disciplinary cases are correct and are adequately based on substantial evidence; whether or not the proceedings themselves are void or defective in not having accorded the respondents due process; and whether or not the Secretary of Education had in truth committed "human rights violations involving civil and political rights," are matters which may be passed upon and determined through a motion for reconsideration addressed to the Secretary Education himself, and in the event of an adverse verdict, may be reviewed by the Civil Service Commission and eventually the Supreme Court.

The Commission on Human Rights simply has no place in this scheme of things. It has no business intruding into the jurisdiction and functions of the Education Secretary or the Civil Service Commission. It has no business going over the same ground traversed by the latter and making its own judgment on the questions involved. This would accord success to what may well have been the complaining teachers' strategy to abort, frustrate or negate the judgment of the Education Secretary in the administrative cases against them which they anticipated would be adverse to them.

This cannot be done. It will not be permitted to be done.

In any event, the investigation by the Commission on Human Rights would serve no useful purpose. If its investigation should result in conclusions contrary to those reached by Secretary Cariño, it would have no power anyway to reverse the Secretary's conclusions. Reversal thereof can only by done by the Civil Service Commission and lastly by this Court. The only thing the Commission can do, if it concludes that Secretary Cariño was in error, is to refer the matter to the appropriate Government agency or tribunal for assistance; that would be the Civil Service Commission. 35 It cannot arrogate unto itself the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the Order of December 29, 1990 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, and the respondent Commission on Human Rights and the Chairman and Members thereof are prohibited "to hear and resolve the case (i.e., Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775) on the merits."

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ, concur.

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-29274 November 27, 1975

SEC. QUIRICO P. EVANGELISTA, in his capacity as Secretary of the Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government Operations, and the PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY ON REFORMS AND GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS (PARGO), petitioner, vs.HON. HILARION U. JARENCIO, as Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXIII, and FERNANDO MANALASTAS, Assistant City Public Service Officer of Manila, and ALL OTHER CITY OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES SIMILARLY SITUATED, respondents.

Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Ist. Assistant Solicitor General Esmeraldo Umali and Solicitor Bernardo P. Pardo for petitioners.

Gregorio A. Ejercito and Felix C. Chavez for respondents.

MARTIN, J.:

This is an original action for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul and set aside the order of respondent Judge, the Honorable Hilarion J. Jarencio, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dated July 1, 1968, in Civil Case No. 73305, entitled "Fernando Manalastas vs. Sec. Ramon D. Bagatsing, etc.", which reads as follows:

IT IS ORDERED that, upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P5,000.00, let the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by the petitioner [private respondent] be issued restraining the respondents [petitioners], their agents, representatives, attorneys and/or other persons acting in their behalf from further issuing subpoenas in connection with the fact-finding investigations to the petitioner [private respondent] and from instituting contempt proceedings against the petitioner [private respondent] under Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code. (Stress supplied).

Pursuant to his special powers and duties under Section 64 of the Revised Administrative Code, 1 the President of the Philippines created the Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government Operations (PARGO) under Executive Order No. 4 of January 7, 1966. 2 Purposedly, he charged the Agency with the following functions and responsibilities: 3

b. To investigate all activities involving or affecting immoral practices, graft and corruptions, smuggling (physical or technical), lawlessness, subversion, and all other activities which are prejudicial to the government and the public interests, and to submit proper recommendations to the President of the Philippines.

c. To investigate cases of graft and corruption and violations of Republic Acts Nos. 1379 and 3019, and gather necessary evidence to establish prima facie, acts of graft and acquisition of unlawfully amassed wealth ... .

h. To receive and evaluate, and to conduct fact-finding investigations of sworn complaints against the acts, conduct or behavior of any public official or employee and to file and prosecute the proper charges with the appropriate agency.

For a realistic performance of these functions, the President vested in the Agency all the powers of an investigating committee under Sections 71 and 580 of the Revised Administrative Code, including the power to summon witnesses by subpoena or subpoena duces tecum, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation. 4

Whereupon, on June 7, 1968, petitioner Quirico Evangelista, as Undersecretary of the Agency, issued to respondent Fernando Manalastas, then Acting City Public Service Officer of Manila, a subpoena ad testificandum commanding him "to be and appear as witness at the Office of the PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY ON REFORMS AND GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS ... then and there to declare and testify in a certain investigation pending therein."

Instead of obeying the subpoena, respondent Fernando Manalastas filed on June 25, 1968 with the Court of First Instance of Manila an Amended Petition for prohibition, certiorari and/or injunction with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order docketed as Civil Case No. 73305 and assailed its legality.

On July 1, 1968, respondent Judge issued the aforementioned Order:

IT IS ORDERED that, upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P5,000.00, let the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by the petitioner [private respondent] be issued restraining the respondents [petitioners], their agents, representatives, attorneys and/or other persons acting in their behalf from further issuing subpoenas in connection with the fact-finding investigations to the petitioner [private respondent] and from instituting contempt proceedings against the petitioner [private respondent] under Section 530 of the Revised Administrative Code. (Stress supplied).

Because of this, petitioners 5 elevated the matter direct to Us without a motion for reconsideration first filed on the fundamental submission that the Order is a patent nullity. 6

As unfurled, the dominant issue in this case is whether the Agency, acting thru its officials, enjoys the authority to issue subpoenas in its conduct of fact-finding investigations.

It has been essayed that the life blood of the administrative process is the flow of fact, the gathering, the organization and the analysis of evidence. 7 Investigations are useful for all administrative functions, not only for rule making, adjudication, and licensing, but also for prosecuting, for supervising and directing, for determining general policy, for recommending, legislation, and for purposes no more specific than illuminating obscure areas to find out what if anything should be done. 8 An administrative agency may be authorized to make investigations, not only in proceedings of a legislative or judicial nature, but also in proceedings whose sole purpose is to obtain information upon which future action of a legislative or judicial nature may be taken 9 and may require the attendance of witnesses in proceedings of a purely investigatory nature. It may conduct general inquiries into evils calling for correction, and to report findings to appropriate bodies and make recommendations for actions. 10

We recognize that in the case before Us, petitioner Agency draws its subpoena power from Executive Order No. 4, para. 5 which, in an effectuating mood, empowered it to "summon witness, administer oaths, and take testimony relevant to the investigation" 11 with the authority "to require the production of documents under a subpoena duces tecum or otherwise, subject in all respects to the same restrictions and qualifications as apply in judicial proceedings of a similar character." 12 Such subpoena power operates in extenso to all the functions of the Agency as laid out in the aforequoted sub-paragraphs (b),(e), and (h). It is not bordered by nor is it merely exercisable, as respondents would have it, in quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function under sub-paragraph (b). The functions enumerated in all these sub-paragraphs (b), (e), and (h) interlink or intertwine with one another with the principal aim of meeting the very purpose of the creation of the Agency, which is to forestall and erode nefarious activities and anomalies in the civil service. To hold that the subpoena power of the Agency is confined to mere quasi-judicial or adjudicatory functions would therefore imperil or inactiviate the Agency in its investigatory functions under sub-paragraphs (e) and (h). More than that, the enabling authority itself (Executive Order No. 4, para. 5) fixes no distinction when and in what function should the subpoena power be exercised. Similarly, We see no reason to depart from the established rule that forbids differentiation when the law itself makes none.

Nor could We impress upon this subpoena power the alleged strictures of a subpoena issued under the Rules of Court 13 to abridge its application. The seeming proviso in Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code that the right to summon witnesses and the authority to require the production of documents under a subpoena duces tecum

or otherwise shall be "subject in all respects to the same restrictions and qualifications as apply in judicial proceedings of a similar character" cannot be validly seized upon to require, in respondents' formulation, that, as in a subpoena under the Rules, a specific case must be pending before a court for hearing or trial and that the hearing or trial must be in connection with the exercise of the court's judicial or adjudicatory functions 14 before a non-judicial subpoena can be issued by an administrative agency like petitioner Agency. It must be emphasized, however, that an administrative subpoena differs in essence from a judicial subpoena. Clearly, what the Rules speaks of is a judicial subpoena, one procurable from and issuable by a competent court, and not an administrative subpoena. To an extent, therefore, the "restrictions and qualifications" referred to in Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code could mean the restraints against infringement of constitutional rights or when the subpoena is unreasonable or oppressive and when the relevancy of the books, documents or things does not appear. 15

Rightly, administrative agencies may enforce subpoenas issued in the course of investigations, whether or not adjudication is involved, and whether or not probable cause is shown 16 and even before the issuance of a complaint. 17 It is not necessary, as in the case of a warrant, that a specific charge or complaint of violation of law be pending or that the order be made pursuant to one. It is enough that the investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose. 18 The purpose of the subpoena is to discover evidence, not to prove a pending charge, but upon which to make one if the discovered evidence so justifies. 19 Its obligation cannot rest on a trial of the value of testimony sought; it is enough that the proposed investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose, and that the proposed witness be claimed to have information that might shed some helpful light. 20 Because judicial power is reluctant if not unable to summon evidence until it is shown to be relevant to issues on litigations it does not follow that an administrative agency charged with seeing that the laws are enforced may not have and exercise powers of original inquiry. The administrative agency has the power of inquisition which is not dependent upon a case or controversy in order to get evidence, but can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated or even just because it wants assurance that it is not. When investigative and accusatory duties are delegated by statute to an administrative body, it, too may take steps to inform itself as to whether there is probable violation of the law. 21 In sum, it may be stated that a subpoena meets the requirements for enforcement if the inquiry is (1) within the authority of the agency; (2) the demand is not too indefinite; and (3) the information is reasonably relevant. 22

There is no doubt that the fact-finding investigations being conducted by the Agency upon sworn statements implicating certain public officials of the City Government of Manila in anomalous transactions 23 fall within the Agency's sphere of authority and that the information sought to be elicited from respondent Fernando Manalastas, of which he is claimed to be in possession, 24 is reasonably relevant to the investigations.

We are mindful that the privilege against self-incrimination extends in administrative investigations, generally, in scope similar to adversary proceedings. 25 In Cabal v. Kapunan, Jr., 26 the Court ruled that since the administrative charge of unexplained wealth against the respondent therein may result in the forfeiture of the property under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, a proceeding criminal or penal in nature, the complainant cannot call the respondent to the witness stand without encroaching upon his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. Later, in Pascual, Jr. v. Board of Medical Examiners, 27 the same approach was followed in the administrative proceedings against a medical practitioner that could possibly result in the loss of his privilege to practice the medical profession. Nevertheless, in the present case, We find that respondent Fernando Manalastas is not facing any administrative charge. 28 He is merely cited as a witness in connection with the fact-finding investigation of anomalies and irregularities in the City Government of Manila with the object of submitting the assembled facts to the President of the Philippines or to file the corresponding charges. 29 Since the only purpose of investigation is to discover facts as a basis of future action, any unnecessary extension of the privilege would thus be unwise. 30 Anyway, by all means, respondent Fernando Manalastas may contest any attempt in the investigation that tends to disregard his privilege against self-incrimination.

A question of constitutional dimension is raised by respondents on the inherent power of the President of the Philippines to issue subpoena. 31 More tersely stated, respondents would now challenge, in a collateral way, the validity of the basic authority, Executive Order No. 4, as amended in part by Executive Order No. 88. Unfortunately, for reasons of public policy, the constitutionality of executive orders, which are commonly said to have the force and effect of statutes 32 cannot be collaterally impeached. 33 Much more when the issue was not duly pleaded in the court below as to be acceptable for adjudication now. 34 The settled rule is that the Court will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it. 35

Nothing then appears conclusive than that the disputed subpoena issued by petitioner Quirico Evangelista to respondent Fernando Manalastas is well within the legal competence of the Agency to issue.

WHEREFORE, the aforequoted order of respondent Judge, dated July 1, 1968, is hereby set aside and declared of no force and effect.

Without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Castro, Antonio, Esguerra, Muñoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur.

Makalintal, C.J., concurs in the result.

Barredo, Makasiar, and Concepcion, Jr., JJ, took no part.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, J., concurring:

The opinion of the Court, ably penned by Justice Martin, is both learned and comprehensive. It reflects the current state of doctrinal pronouncements in American Administrative Law, which up to now possesses worth in this jurisdiction. It is in accordance with the views expressed in two authoritative American treatises that of Davis 1 and that of Jaffe. 2 The compact but highly useful text of Parker yields the same conclusion. 3 A similar approach may be discerned in the casebooks of Katz, 4 and McFarland and Vanderbelt. 5 A concurrence is thus called for. That for me does not conclude matters though. The constitutional rights of a person who may be involved in such administrative investigation, call for respect. A recognition of the expanded reach of the administrative process in order to assure that the objectives of a regulatory statute be attained cannot obscure the protection that the Constitution affords a person who may find himself in the position of a respondent. It is worthwhile to my mind that there be a reference, even if far from detailed, to such an aspect. Hence this separate opinion.

1. The right to be protected against unreasonable search and seizure should not fall by the wayside. 6 The broad sweep of the administrative power of investigation cannot, consistently with the Constitution, go so far as to render it meaningless. It is with such a reading in mind that I view the pronouncement in United States v. Morton Salt Co., 7 on which reliance is placed in the opinion of Justice Martin. The doctrine formulated in such American case by Justice Jackson reads thus: "Of course a governmental investigation into corporate matters may be of such a sweeping nature and so unrelated to the matter properly under inquiry as to exceed the investigatory power. Federal Trade Comm. v. American Tobacco Co., ... . But it is sufficient if the inquiry is within the authority of the agency, the demand is not too indefinite and the information sought is reasonably relevant. "The gist of the protection is in the requirement, expressed in terms, that the disclosure sought shall not be unreasonable."" 8 It has been given approval in an impressive number of subsequent adjudications. 9 It suffices, however, to call attention to the words of Justice Jackson in the two paragraphs preceding the excerpts cited to remove any doubt as to its lending itself to the construction that an inroad into the right of search and seizure is now permissible: "The Commission's order is criticized upon grounds that the order transgresses the Fourth Amendment's proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures and the Fifth Amendment's due process of law clause. It is unnecessary here to examine the question of whether a corporation is entitled to the protection of the Fourth Amendment. ... Although the "right to be let alone — the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men," ... is not confined literally to searches and seizures as such, but extends as well to the orderly taking under compulsion of process, ... neither incorporated nor unincorporated associations can plead an unqualified right to conduct their affairs in secret. ... While they may and should have protection from unlawful demands made in the name of public investigation, ... corporations can claim no equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a right to privacy . ... They are endowed with public attributes. They have a collective impact upon society, from which they derive the privilege of acting as artificial entities. The Federal Government allows them the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce. Favors from government often carry with them an enhanced measure of regulation. ... Even if one were to regard the request for information in this case as caused by nothing more than official curiosity, nevertheless law-enforcing agencies have a legitimate right to satisfy themselves that corporate behavior is consistent with the law and the public interest." 10 Thus is rendered clear that the landmark Boyd decision which warned against the use of the subpoena power to trench upon this guarantee still speaks authoritatively. This Court has spoken to the same effect, Boyd having been cited in a number of cases. 11 I would, therefore, read the opinion of my brethren as not departing from but precisely adhering to its command. Whatever relaxation of its compelling force may be allowable in case of corporations should not apply where an individual is concerned. That should reassure respondent Manalastas that if

he could demonstrate a failure to abide by the constitutional mandate on search and seizure, he is not without a remedy.

2. Nor can I fully reconcile myself to the implications lurking in this observation in the opinion of the Court: "Since the only purpose of investigation is to discover facts as a basis of future action, any unnecessary extension of the privilege would thus be unwise." 12 The right not to incriminate oneself 13 is equally deserving of the utmost deference and respect. What is more, the present Constitution by the adoption of the Miranda doctrine has vitalized it even further. 14 There is, happily, the last sentence of such paragraph: "Anyway, by all means, respondent Fernando Manalastas may contest any attempt in the investigation that tends to disregard his privilege against self-incrimination." 15 When read in connection with the earlier reference to the fact that the respondent is called as a witness not as the party proceeded against, it cannot be said, in the light of the ruling in Planas v. Gil, 16 that it offends against this constitutional guarantee. As of now then, with the question of any modification of the Planas doctrine not being properly before us, I can yield my concurrence. Candor compels the statement, however, that for me a reexamination of such a pronouncement is desirable. A distinction between a witness and a respondent may be too tenuous if the realities of the situation be fully considered. I am bothered by the thought that the force of the Cabal 17 and the Pascual, Jr. decisions 18 may be eroded if the prospective respondent is first called as a witness and is thus compelled to testify. For the present, it may suffice if I express my misgivings. At any rate, concurrence is not ruled out in view of the aforementioned caveat in the able opinion of Justice Martin.

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

I am constrained to dissent from the main opinion of Mr. Justice Martin which grants the petition and sets aside respondent court's order and writ of preliminary injunction of July 1, 1968 and would therefore require respondent Fernando Manalastas as assistant city public service officer of Manila (and all other city officials similarly situated) to comply with the PARGO subpoena "to testify to matters relevant to the investigation of anomalies and sworn statements involving or implicating certain City officials or other public officers." 1

While the subpoena commands respondent Manalastas to appear as witness before the PARGO, 2 on the basis whereof the main opinion finds that said respondent "is not facing any administrative charge" and that "he is merely cited as witness in connection with the fact-finding investigation of anomalies and irregularities in the City Government of Manila with the object of submitting the assembled facts to the President of the Philippines or to file the corresponding charges", 3 it is a fact shown by the very petition at bar itself and its Annexes B and B-1 that respondent Manalastas is in fact and for all intents and purposes subpoenaed as a respondent or one directly implicated with alleged bribery and graft in the said sworn statements that concededly as per the petition itself initiated the PARGO's alleged "fact-finding investigation." 4

Thus Annex B of the petition which is a sworn statement of one Edilberto Arguelles, investigated by the PARGO on the overpricing of eight steam cleaners sold through him as commission agent to the City of Manila, sets forth the detailed allegations of said declarant that respondent Manalastas and a number of other city officials named and unnamed got the lion's share of the overpricing. Annex B-1 of the petition is the sworn statement of one Carlos Montañez with reference to some overpriced equipment sold by him to the City of Manila wherein he likewise narrated in detail the modus operandi and specifically named respondent Manalastas and five other officials to whom he allegedly gave: "due monetary consideration."

All claims of PARGO to the contrary notwithstanding, the very petition and said annexed sworn statements (which were not shown to respondent judge in spite of his expressly asking for them during the course of the hearing 5) show that respondent Manalastas (and others similarly situated) are indeed not merely witnesses but in reality respondents (subject to administrative and criminal charges.)

Respondent has therefore correctly invoked Cabal vs. Kapunan, 6 wherein the Court through then Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion held that therein petitioner rightfully refused to take the witness stand as against the order of the Presidential Committee investigating the complaint against him for alleged unexplained wealth (since such proceedings were in substance and effect a criminal one and his position was virtually that of an accused on trial and he therefore had the right to remain silent and invoke the privilege against self-incrimination in support of a blanket refusal to answer any and all questions) and ordered the dismissal of the criminal contempt charge against him.

Pascual Jr. vs. Bd. of Examiners 7 is equally in point, wherein the Court sustained the lower court's writ of injunction against the respondent board's order compelling therein petitioner to take the witness stand in a malpractice case (wherein he was respondent) in view of the penal nature of the proceedings and the right of the accused to refuse "not only to answer incriminatory questions, but also to take the witness stand." 8 The Court therein stressed that "the constitutional guarantee, along with other rights granted an accused, stands for a belief that while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable objectives should not be accomplished according to means or methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded the human personality. More and more in line with the democratic creed, the deference accorded an individual even those suspected of the most heinous crimes is given due weight. To quote from Chief Justice Warren, "the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government ... must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens."" and that "while earlier decisions stressed the principle of humanity on which this right is predicated, precluding as it does all resort to force or compulsion, whether physical or mental, current judicial opinion places equal emphasis on its identification with the right to privacy. Thus according to Justice Douglas: "The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force to surrender to his detriment."

That petitioner's investigation and subpoena against respondent Manalastas were in substance and effect criminal in nature against him as a respondent (and not merely as witness) as indicated above, is borne out by the fact of record in Sugay vs. Pamaran 9 (of which the Court can well take judicial notice) that on July 22, 1971 respondent Manalastas as well as Carlos Montañez the trader (affiant in Annex B-1, petition, supra, 10) and a number of other city officials were charged by the city fiscal in the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila for violations of Republic Act 3019 (Anti-Graft Law) in connection with the alleged gross overpricing of the same equipment (steam cleaners and air compressor) purchased for the City.

The main opinion's justification for upholding the subpoena, viz, that "since the only purpose of investigation is to discover facts as a basis of future action, any unnecessary extension of the privilege (against self-incrimination)would thus be unnecessary" 11 thus appears to be flawed in fact and in law: respondent was in fact being investigated as respondent-suspect and without submitting to the investigation was actually criminally charged in court; as a pure matter of legal principle, the 1973 Constitution has recognized the necessity of strengthening (and extending) the privilege against self-incrimination by expressly providing as a constitutional mandate in the Bill of Rights that "Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right" (Article IV, section 20) and outlawing the use of any confession obtained in violation of said section by declaring its inadmissibility in evidence.

Respondent Manalastas was therefore justified in invoking the privilege against self-incrimination and in securing the respondent court's injunction against enforcement of petitioner's subpoena. Respondent was unquestionably a party respondent who under the doctrine of Cabal and Pascual, supra, had the right to remain silent and invoke the privilege against self-incrimination and refuse to take the witness stand. This legal and constitutional right may not be defeated by the transparent expedient of citing respondent as a supposed witness in what was avowed to be a general fact-finding investigation but obviously was a fishing expedition to ensnare respondent as a prime suspect, as borne out by the sworn statements withheld from respondent court and now annexed to the very petition at bar and petitioner's contention that "In effect, the injunction issued by the lower court is one to restrain criminal prosecutions." This contention has of course been proven baseless by the events already cited above that such criminal prosecutions were in fact filed in court against respondent and others without the need of petitioner's "fact-finding investigation" and subpoenas.

The thrust of all this is that the State with its overwhelming and vast powers and resources can and must ferret out and investigate wrongdoing, graft and corruption and at the same time respect the constitutional guarantees of the individual's right to privacy, silence and due process and against self-incrimination and unreasonable search and seizure. This means that leads and charges must be investigated and followed up through the assistance of the corresponding police and law enforcement agencies as provided in the petitioner's executive charter 12 and the evidence secured by proper applications for search warrants, and as conceded in the petition itself, after the corresponding report to the President "to file the corresponding charges against the persons who may appear responsible or merely refer them to other appropriate offices such as the Fiscal's office, like what was done in other cases." 13

There appears to be validity in respondent's contention that the subpoena power granted petitioner in its executive charter does not apply to general fact-finding investigations conducted by it. 14 I find no need, however, of going

further into this issue, since this dissent is based directly on the fundamental tenet that respondent Manalastas was unquestionably being investigated by petitioner as respondent and a prime suspect (and not as a mere witness) and accordingly, under settled doctrine, he had every right to remain silent and to invoke his right against self-incrimination and to refuse to take the witness stand.

I therefore vote for upholding respondent court's injunction against enforcement of petitioner's subpoena.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, J., concurring:

The opinion of the Court, ably penned by Justice Martin, is both learned and comprehensive. It reflects the current state of doctrinal pronouncements in American Administrative Law, which up to now possesses worth in this jurisdiction. It is in accordance with the views expressed in two authoritative American treatises that of Davis 1 and that of Jaffe. 2 The compact but highly useful text of Parker yields the same conclusion. 3 A similar approach may be discerned in the casebooks of Katz, 4 and McFarland and Vanderbelt. 5 A concurrence is thus called for. That for me does not conclude matters though. The constitutional rights of a person who may be involved in such administrative investigation, call for respect. A recognition of the expanded reach of the administrative process in order to assure that the objectives of a regulatory statute be attained cannot obscure the protection that the Constitution affords a person who may find himself in the position of a respondent. It is worthwhile to my mind that there be a reference, even if far from detailed, to such an aspect. Hence this separate opinion.

1. The right to be protected against unreasonable search and seizure should not fall by the wayside. 6 The broad sweep of the administrative power of investigation cannot, consistently with the Constitution, go so far as to render it meaningless. It is with such a reading in mind that I view the pronouncement in United States v. Morton Salt Co., 7 on which reliance is placed in the opinion of Justice Martin. The doctrine formulated in such American case by Justice Jackson reads thus: "Of course a governmental investigation into corporate matters may be of such a sweeping nature and so unrelated to the matter properly under inquiry as to exceed the investigatory power. Federal Trade Comm. v. American Tobacco Co., ... . But it is sufficient if the inquiry is within the authority of the agency, the demand is not too indefinite and the information sought is reasonably relevant. "The gist of the protection is in the requirement, expressed in terms, that the disclosure sought shall not be unreasonable."" 8 It has been given approval in an impressive number of subsequent adjudications. 9 It suffices, however, to call attention to the words of Justice Jackson in the two paragraphs preceding the excerpts cited to remove any doubt as to its lending itself to the construction that an inroad into the right of search and seizure is now permissible: "The Commission's order is criticized upon grounds that the order transgresses the Fourth Amendment's proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures and the Fifth Amendment's due process of law clause. It is unnecessary here to examine the question of whether a corporation is entitled to the protection of the Fourth Amendment. ... Although the "right to be let alone — the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men," ... is not confined literally to searches and seizures as such, but extends as well to the orderly taking under compulsion of process, ... neither incorporated nor unincorporated associations can plead an unqualified right to conduct their affairs in secret. ... While they may and should have protection from unlawful demands made in the name of public investigation, ... corporations can claim no equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a right to privacy . ... They are endowed with public attributes. They have a collective impact upon society, from which they derive the privilege of acting as artificial entities. The Federal Government allows them the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce. Favors from government often carry with them an enhanced measure of regulation. ... Even if one were to regard the request for information in this case as caused by nothing more than official curiosity, nevertheless law-enforcing agencies have a legitimate right to satisfy themselves that corporate behavior is consistent with the law and the public interest." 10 Thus is rendered clear that the landmark Boyd decision which warned against the use of the subpoena power to trench upon this guarantee still speaks authoritatively. This Court has spoken to the same effect, Boyd having been cited in a number of cases. 11 I would, therefore, read the opinion of my brethren as not departing from but precisely adhering to its command. Whatever relaxation of its compelling force may be allowable in case of corporations should not apply where an individual is concerned. That should reassure respondent Manalastas that if he could demonstrate a failure to abide by the constitutional mandate on search and seizure, he is not without a remedy.

2. Nor can I fully reconcile myself to the implications lurking in this observation in the opinion of the Court: "Since the only purpose of investigation is to discover facts as a basis of future action, any unnecessary extension of the privilege would thus be unwise." 12 The right not to incriminate oneself 13 is equally deserving of the utmost deference

and respect. What is more, the present Constitution by the adoption of the Miranda doctrine has vitalized it even further. 14 There is, happily, the last sentence of such paragraph: "Anyway, by all means, respondent Fernando Manalastas may contest any attempt in the investigation that tends to disregard his privilege against self-incrimination." 15 When read in connection with the earlier reference to the fact that the respondent is called as a witness not as the party proceeded against, it cannot be said, in the light of the ruling in Planas v. Gil, 16 that it offends against this constitutional guarantee. As of now then, with the question of any modification of the Planas doctrine not being properly before us, I can yield my concurrence. Candor compels the statement, however, that for me a reexamination of such a pronouncement is desirable. A distinction between a witness and a respondent may be too tenuous if the realities of the situation be fully considered. I am bothered by the thought that the force of the Cabal 17 and the Pascual, Jr. decisions 18 may be eroded if the prospective respondent is first called as a witness and is thus compelled to testify. For the present, it may suffice if I express my misgivings. At any rate, concurrence is not ruled out in view of the aforementioned caveat in the able opinion of Justice Martin.

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

I am constrained to dissent from the main opinion of Mr. Justice Martin which grants the petition and sets aside respondent court's order and writ of preliminary injunction of July 1, 1968 and would therefore require respondent Fernando Manalastas as assistant city public service officer of Manila (and all other city officials similarly situated) to comply with the PARGO subpoena "to testify to matters relevant to the investigation of anomalies and sworn statements involving or implicating certain City officials or other public officers." 1

While the subpoena commands respondent Manalastas to appear as witness before the PARGO, 2 on the basis whereof the main opinion finds that said respondent "is not facing any administrative charge" and that "he is merely cited as witness in connection with the fact-finding investigation of anomalies and irregularities in the City Government of Manila with the object of submitting the assembled facts to the President of the Philippines or to file the corresponding charges", 3 it is a fact shown by the very petition at bar itself and its Annexes B and B-1 that respondent Manalastas is in fact and for all intents and purposes subpoenaed as a respondent or one directly implicated with alleged bribery and graft in the said sworn statements that concededly as per the petition itself initiated the PARGO's alleged "fact-finding investigation." 4

Thus Annex B of the petition which is a sworn statement of one Edilberto Arguelles, investigated by the PARGO on the overpricing of eight steam cleaners sold through him as commission agent to the City of Manila, sets forth the detailed allegations of said declarant that respondent Manalastas and a number of other city officials named and unnamed got the lion's share of the overpricing. Annex B-1 of the petition is the sworn statement of one Carlos Montañez with reference to some overpriced equipment sold by him to the City of Manila wherein he likewise narrated in detail the modus operandi and specifically named respondent Manalastas and five other officials to whom he allegedly gave: "due monetary consideration."

All claims of PARGO to the contrary notwithstanding, the very petition and said annexed sworn statements (which were not shown to respondent judge in spite of his expressly asking for them during the course of the hearing 5) show that respondent Manalastas (and others similarly situated) are indeed not merely witnesses but in reality respondents (subject to administrative and criminal charges.)

Respondent has therefore correctly invoked Cabal vs. Kapunan, 6 wherein the Court through then Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion held that therein petitioner rightfully refused to take the witness stand as against the order of the Presidential Committee investigating the complaint against him for alleged unexplained wealth (since such proceedings were in substance and effect a criminal one and his position was virtually that of an accused on trial and he therefore had the right to remain silent and invoke the privilege against self-incrimination in support of a blanket refusal to answer any and all questions) and ordered the dismissal of the criminal contempt charge against him.

Pascual Jr. vs. Bd. of Examiners 7 is equally in point, wherein the Court sustained the lower court's writ of injunction against the respondent board's order compelling therein petitioner to take the witness stand in a malpractice case (wherein he was respondent) in view of the penal nature of the proceedings and the right of the accused to refuse "not only to answer incriminatory questions, but also to take the witness stand." 8 The Court therein stressed that "the constitutional guarantee, along with other rights granted an accused, stands for a belief that while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable objectives should not be accomplished according to means or methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded the human personality. More and

more in line with the democratic creed, the deference accorded an individual even those suspected of the most heinous crimes is given due weight. To quote from Chief Justice Warren, "the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government ... must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens."" and that "while earlier decisions stressed the principle of humanity on which this right is predicated, precluding as it does all resort to force or compulsion, whether physical or mental, current judicial opinion places equal emphasis on its identification with the right to privacy. Thus according to Justice Douglas: "The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force to surrender to his detriment."

That petitioner's investigation and subpoena against respondent Manalastas were in substance and effect criminal in nature against him as a respondent (and not merely as witness) as indicated above, is borne out by the fact of record in Sugay vs. Pamaran 9 (of which the Court can well take judicial notice) that on July 22, 1971 respondent Manalastas as well as Carlos Montañez the trader (affiant in Annex B-1, petition, supra, 10) and a number of other city officials were charged by the city fiscal in the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila for violations of Republic Act 3019 (Anti-Graft Law) in connection with the alleged gross overpricing of the same equipment (steam cleaners and air compressor) purchased for the City.

The main opinion's justification for upholding the subpoena, viz, that "since the only purpose of investigation is to discover facts as a basis of future action, any unnecessary extension of the privilege (against self-incrimination)would thus be unnecessary" 11 thus appears to be flawed in fact and in law: respondent was in fact being investigated as respondent-suspect and without submitting to the investigation was actually criminally charged in court; as a pure matter of legal principle, the 1973 Constitution has recognized the necessity of strengthening (and extending) the privilege against self-incrimination by expressly providing as a constitutional mandate in the Bill of Rights that "Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right" (Article IV, section 20) and outlawing the use of any confession obtained in violation of said section by declaring its inadmissibility in evidence.

Respondent Manalastas was therefore justified in invoking the privilege against self-incrimination and in securing the respondent court's injunction against enforcement of petitioner's subpoena. Respondent was unquestionably a party respondent who under the doctrine of Cabal and Pascual, supra, had the right to remain silent and invoke the privilege against self-incrimination and refuse to take the witness stand. This legal and constitutional right may not be defeated by the transparent expedient of citing respondent as a supposed witness in what was avowed to be a general fact-finding investigation but obviously was a fishing expedition to ensnare respondent as a prime suspect, as borne out by the sworn statements withheld from respondent court and now annexed to the very petition at bar and petitioner's contention that "In effect, the injunction issued by the lower court is one to restrain criminal prosecutions." This contention has of course been proven baseless by the events already cited above that such criminal prosecutions were in fact filed in court against respondent and others without the need of petitioner's "fact-finding investigation" and subpoenas.

The thrust of all this is that the State with its overwhelming and vast powers and resources can and must ferret out and investigate wrongdoing, graft and corruption and at the same time respect the constitutional guarantees of the individual's right to privacy, silence and due process and against self-incrimination and unreasonable search and seizure. This means that leads and charges must be investigated and followed up through the assistance of the corresponding police and law enforcement agencies as provided in the petitioner's executive charter 12 and the evidence secured by proper applications for search warrants, and as conceded in the petition itself, after the corresponding report to the President "to file the corresponding charges against the persons who may appear responsible or merely refer them to other appropriate offices such as the Fiscal's office, like what was done in other cases." 13

There appears to be validity in respondent's contention that the subpoena power granted petitioner in its executive charter does not apply to general fact-finding investigations conducted by it. 14 I find no need, however, of going further into this issue, since this dissent is based directly on the fundamental tenet that respondent Manalastas was unquestionably being investigated by petitioner as respondent and a prime suspect (and not as a mere witness) and accordingly, under settled doctrine, he had every right to remain silent and to invoke his right against self-incrimination and to refuse to take the witness stand.

I therefore vote for upholding respondent court's injunction against enforcement of petitioner's subpoena.