adorno_on the problem of musical analysis

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On the Problem of Musical AnalysisAuthor(s): T. W. Adorno and Max PaddisonSource: Music Analysis, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Jul., 1982), pp. 169-187Published by: Blackwell PublishingStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/854127

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gI The Adorno Foundation. Permission to reprint or to quote any part of this articleshould be directed to SuhrkampVerlag, Frankfurt.The editor and publishersof MusicAnalysisgratefullyacknowledgepermission o publish this article from the Adorno Foun-dationand SuhrkampVerlag.

T. W. ADORNO

ON THE PROBLEM OF MUSICAL ANALYSISIntroducednd translated yMax Paddison

-

On February24, 1969, a fezv monthsbeforehis death, T. W. Adornogavea public lecture, Zum Problemeder musikalischen nalyse', at the Hochs-chule fur Musik und Darstellende Kunst, Frankfurt-am-Main. Thereseems to have been no zvritten ext ( at least, none seems to have beenpreserved)and it is most likely that Adorno deliveredhis talk, as zvas hiscustom, rom minimalnotes. That it has survivedat all is due to a tape-recordingmade at the time by the Hochschule TonbandNr. 102, Biblio-thek der Hochschule ur Musik und DarstellendeKunst, Ffm. . I zvas

allozved y the Hochschule o make a cassettecopy of the recording, vAichI subsequentlyranscribed nd translated.This is the first time, therefore,that the materialof this talk has appearedn print.

Unavoidably, n viezv of the form of its originalpresentation s a lec-ture, a small amountof editinghas beennecessary.By all accountsAdornohad an impressive apacity to organize complex deas spontaneouslyntocoherent arguments,on the spot, so to speak. Nevertheless, there areinevitablya fezv purplepassageszvAere,t has to be admitted, he meaningis decidely obscure n any but the most general sense. Hozvever,zvhat isoffered in the follozving translation s, to all intents and purposes, 'the

zvhole',blemishes nd all, and the only bits of Adorno'stalk that I havecut out are the occasional 'Ladies and Gentlemen',and the odd asidezvAich endedto interrupt he flozvf the argument vAen ead as zvrittentext: I have referred o the asides n the notes.

Stylistically, as a 'talk', 'Zum Probleme der musikalischenAnalyse'cannot and should not be comparedzvith Adorno's concentratedandelegant zvritten exts (although the elliptical mode of expression, o mucha feature of Adorno'sprose, is also in evidencehere). The justification orthe publicationof this lecture does not, of course, lie in any stylistic

(C) MUSIG ANALYSIS 1: 2, 1982 169



T. W. ADORNO

feature such is not to be expected rom zvhatwas, in all likelihood, asemi-improvisedalk. Justification, f any be needed,lies instead in the

subject-matter: owhere lse that I am azvareof in his numerous vritingson music s there to befound such an extensiveaccountof Adorno'sviezvson musicalanalysis. This alone makes it of historicaland documentaryinterest. The ideasAdornoputsforwardin this talk are not nezv n them-selvesandare at timeson a rathergenerallevel, so that its mostinterestingaspectlies in the connectionsAdornomakesbetween ideas. He is provid-ing, in effect, a critiqueof analysis a 'philosophyof analysis' throughzvAich nalysismay reflectupon itself, questionand recognisets variousaims and limitations,and attemptto go beyond'mere tautology',as he

puts it. His dialecticalapproachdoesnot claim to be a system n its ozvnright, and offers no solutions.It operates nstead as a critiqueof existingideas and theoreticalsystems, to reveal their inner contradictionsandhiddenassumptions.

Thereare, of course,manyproblems resentedby the attemptto trans-late Adorno.It is not only that his sentencesare long and involved,andthat English-zvithits lack of genderin relativepronouns-doesnot takenaturallyto suchcomplexity. t is also that Adorno'suse of the Germanlanguages itself rather diosyncratic.Bearingboth thesepoints in mind, Idecided not to simplify his style and sentencestructuretoo drastically

merely in order to produce a translationzvAichreads like smoothandeffortlessEnglish.I have tried insteadto retain something f the 'againstthe grain' feel of the orzginal.The 'grain'and structureof his sentencesare as much part of zvhat Adorno is saying as are their apparentmeanings rather as the 'meaning'of a musical zvorkcannot be takenapart from a consideration f the zvork'stechnicalstructure.It zvouldperhapsnot be toofanciful to suggest hat the structureof the music he isdiscussinghas parallels in the structureof Adorno's ozvn convolutedprose.

Quite apartfrom suchgeneral translationproblems,hozvever,here area numberof individual terms, usually of a technical or philosophicalnature, zvAichpresentparticular difficultiesbecausethey have no con-venientor adequateEnglishequivalents.The readeris thereforereferredto the notes for a considerationof problematicalterms like Ele-mentaranalyse,AuflosungandWahrheitsgehalt.

Finally, a fezvpointson my useof italics and bracketsn the text. Italicsare used to indicate(i) certainbasicconceptsor categories vhichAdornoemploys particularly n their irst appearance);(ii) foreignzvords mainlyGerman); (iii) stress (zvAeret has seemed o me that Adorno s empha-

sisingcertainpointsin his mannerof deliveryon the tape); and (iv) titlesof zvorks,etc. Squarebracketsare used to indicate (i) reference o theoriginalGerman vord rphrasetranslated;and (ii) occasional xtra zvordsinserted nto the English translation o fill out the impliedsense of the

. . .

orzgznal.

170 MUSIC ANALYSIS 1: 2, 1982



ON THE PROBLEMOF MUSICALANALYSIS

I should like to thank Emma Scheele, Peter Siebenhuhner nd WillyBultermannor readingthroug:h nd checkingmy transcription gainst thetape, as zvell as for their invaluablesuggestionsor improving he trans-lation. I am alsograteful to ProfessorLudwig Finscherof FrankfurtUni-versity for his advice on certainparticularlymystifying sectionsand toFrau Reul and the libraryof the Hochschuleur Musik und DarstellendeKunst, Frankfurt,or puttingthematerialat my disposal.

The word 'analysis'easilyassociates tself in music with the idea of allthat is dead, sterileand farthest removedfromthe living workof art. Onecanwell say thatthe generalunderlyingfeeling towardsmusicalanalysis s

not exactly friendly. The musician's traditional antagonismtowards allso-called 'dead knowledge' is something that has been handed down ofold, and continuesto have its effect accordingly.One will encounterthisantipathyagain and again, above all in the rationalisation epresentedbythat absurd though utterly inextinguishablequestion: 'Yes, everythingyou say is all very well and good, but did the composer imselfknow allthis was the composerconscious f all thesethings?'

I should like to say straightaway that this question is completelyirrel-evant: it is veryoften precisely the deepest interrelationshipshat analyses

are able to uncover within the compositionalprocess which have beenunconsciouslyproduced; and one has to differentiateherc- differentiatestrictly betweenthe object itself (that is, between svhat s actuallygoingon within the object itself) and the way in which it may havearisen in theconsciousness or unconsciousnessof the artist. Otherwise one ends uparguingon the level of the retiredoperettadirector n Hamburgwho once,in the course of an analytical alkI was giving,cameup with the questionas to 'whether Mozarthad been consciousof all these things'. This con-cern with the unconscious seems to go only too naturallywith the pro-fessionof operettadirectoror operettacomposer.

The invalidityof this grudge against analysisis obvious, I think, to themusical experienceof eachpersonwho attemptsto come to termswith hisor her experience. I'll begin with the experience of the performer,orinterpreter. If he does not get to know the work intimately, theinterpreter and I think every practisingmusicianwould agree with mehere- will not be able to interpret the work properly. 'To get to knowsomethingintimately' if I may expressit so vaguely means in reality'toanalyse': that is, to investigatethe inner relationshipsof the work and toinvestigate what is essentially contained within the composition. One

could well say that) in this sense, analysismay be regardedas the homeground of tradition [der Ort der Tradition]. If, with an eye for thesethings, one examinesBrahms then one finds (and I regret that I have torefrainfrom showing this in detailhere) just how much his compositions(especially the earlier works, which I consider to be exeraordinarilym-portantand significant)are actuallythe product of the analysisof worksof

MUSIC ANALYSIS 1: 2, 1982 171



T. W. ADORNO

the past especiallythose of Beethoven.One sees how this music in itselfwould be unthinkablewithout the analytical process which preceded it.

Thus the infinite motivic economy which characterises he technique ofthe earlierBrahms(wherebypracticallyno note occurs which is not in factthematic) is really quite inconceivablewithout the dissolving process ofanalysis a process which is, at first sight, apparently rreconcilablewithsucheconomy.1

I should like to bring your attention to a further basic requirementofanalysishere: that is, the readingof music. As everybodyknows, this is amatter which is much more complicatedthan simply knowing the fivelines and four spaces, the accidentalsand the note-values the whole

system of signs, everything,that is to say, which is representedgraphicallyto be readas the score (I won't go into more recentdevelopments,wherein many cases notation is more precise, although in other cases is alsomore vague in this respect).The signs and the music which they signifyareneverdirectly one and the samething. And in orderto readnotationatall, so that music results from it, an interpretative act is alwaysnecessary that is to say, an analyticalact, which asks what it is that thenotation really signifies. Already in such elementaryprocesses as these,analysis is alwaysessentiallypresent. The facade i.e., the score as 'pic-ture' [dasNotenbild] has to be unravelled,dissolved,[auggelost]andthisas reliably as possible) in order to arrive at that which is indicatedby thescore.And once such ananalyticalprocess hasbeen set in motion(as is thecase, for example, with even the most elementary reading of notation),then such an analyticalprocessmay not be stopped at will, as the resultofsonle resolve or other which insists that, whateverhappens, one is notallowed, for Heaven's sake!, to touch the unconscious. That correct read-ing of the score is the prerequisitefor correctinterpretation s obvious,but ss by no means as self-evident as one might think. In the firstplace itis a featureof earlier musicalpractice that decisive musicalelementslike

tempo and dynamics,and very often also phrasing,arenot to be gatheredfrom the score at all, and have to be extrapolated.They are to be dis-coveredfrom that which is not written that is to say, from an analyticalact. But such an analytical process is still needed even sn the case ofcomposerswhere the score is alreadyhighly formulated. In this connec-tion I'm thinkingparticularlyof Beethoven andperhaps t is a good ideato considerthis for a moment, as there are questionshere which, in myopinion, arefar too seldomreflectedupon.

Beethoven is relativelysparing in his use of markingsin his scores.Apart from the bare musical text itself there is not much in the way ofmarkings;what there is, however, is extraordinarily recise and carefullythought out, and to some extent one needs to be familiar with certainBeethovenianSpielregeln 'rules of play', 'rules of the game') in order tounderstand ust how painstakingand precise the markingsare. One needsto know, for example, that the marking p within an overallforte field

MUSIC ANALYSIS 1: 2, 198272



ON THE PROBLEM OF MUSICALANALYSIS

indicatesthat, afteran accent, the pianodynamicshould then continue tobe played, whereassomething like sf within such a

context indicatesthatthe overalldynamic(f ) should continue. There is, moreover,the wholequestion of the interpretationof dynamicmarkingsin general: whetherthey are absolute e.g., whether crescendialways lead up to forte orwhether they are only relative within particular dynamically-definedfields. This in itself is already an extraordinarilydifE1cult roblem ininnumerablecases in traditionalmusic, and can only be resolved canonly be answered with recourseto the structureof the music. That is tosay, therefore, that this is also an essentially analyticalproblem. Fur-thermore, the most important 'rule' for the if I may so term it-

'elementaryanalyticalreading'of Beethoven is that, in his case, eachmar-king is basicallyvalid up to the next marking,and that only when a newmarking is quite clearly indicated may the performerdepart from thedynamic previously indicated. But even such a rule as this which, Iwould suggest, may in generalbe applied to Beethoven needs constantre-examination gainstthe structureof individualworks.

Analysis is thus concernedwith structure,with structuralproblems,andfinally, with structural istening. By structureI do not meanhere the meregroupingof musicalpartsaccordingto traditional ormalschemata,how-ever; I understand t ratheras havingto do with what is

going on, musi-cally, underneathhese formal schemata.But this is also somethingthatane dare not oversimplify,and it is alreadypossible to see here how bigthe problemsof musicalanalysis are. For, contraryto widespreadbelief,even that which is going on underneath s not simply a secondand quitedifferentthing, but is in fact mediated by the formal schemata, and ispartly, at any given moment,postulatedby the formalschemata,while onthe otherhand it consists of deviationswhich in their turn can only be atall understood through their relationship to the schemata. Naturallyenough, this refers most directlyto that traditionalmusic in which such

all-encompassinggeneralschematicrelationshipsexist at all. The task wehave before us, therefore, is the realisation of this alreadycomplex re-lationshipof deviationto schema,rather than just the one or the otheralone; and as a first step in this direction it can well be said that what weunderstandas analysis is the essence of the investigationof this relation-ship.

Althoughforgottentoday, partlydue to certainfollies of which he wasguilty and partlydue to his vulgarnationalism,Heinrich Schenker mustsurely, in spite of all, be given the greatestcredit for having been the firstto demonstrate hat

analysis s the prerequisite or adequateperformance.2And within the Schoenbergcircle, ever since the periodof the Vereinurmusikalische rivatauffuhrungen,his had already been placed quite con-sciously at the very centre of performancepractice. This was probablyfirst realised most fully by the Kolisch Quartet, the reason for whosefamous practiceand technique of plasJing rom memory in some respects




T. W. ADORNO

stems from the simplefact that, if one has reallystudiedworksthoroughlyand taken the trouble to analyse them, then one can

play them frommemory as a matter of course. That is to say, if each performer in aquartetplaysaccordingo the scoreas awhole and doesnotmerelyfollowhisown part,then this, in effect,already mpliessuch an intimateunderstand-ing of the work's structurethat playing from memory is essentially thenaturaloutcome. Schenkeriananalysis,distinguished as it often is by itsextraordinaryprecision,subtlety and insistence, reallyamounts to an at-tempt to bringmusic down to certainfundamental tructuresof the mostbasickind, among which the centralposition is occupied by whathe calledtheSFundamentalLine [Urlinie] a difficultconcept which oscillatesre-

markablybetween step-progression[Stufenfolge]nd basic thematicma-terial [thematischermaterial].n relation to this FundamentalLine allelse appearsto Schenkeras being, so to speak, quite simply fortuitous akind of 'additive'[Zusatz],as it were and it is this, I think, that alreadymarks out the limitations of the Schenkerianform of analysis. For, inreducingmusic to its most generalisedstructures,what seems to him andto this theory to be merely casual and fortuitous is, in a certain sense,precisely that which is really the essence, the being [das Wesen] f themusic. If, to take a ratherunsubtle example, you examinethe difference

between the styles of Mozart and of Haydn, then you will not expect todiscover this differencein generalstylistic models and characteristicsofthe formal layout (althoughvery significantdifferencesdo exist betweenthe Haydnesque and the Mozartiansonataform). You will have to resortinstead to examining small but decisive features little physiognomiccharacteristics in the way the themes themselves are constructed,fea-tures which, for Schenker, are of mere secondaryimportancebut whichmake all the difference and constitute, in fact, the differencebetweenHaydn and Mozart.Now what this means, therefore,is that what consti-tutes the essence, or 'Being' of the compositionis for Schenkermore or

less its very abstractness, n fact, and the individualmoments3throughwhich the composition materialises and becomes concrete [sichkonkretisiert],re reduced by him to the merely accidental and non-essential.Thus such a concept of analysis ntrinsicallymissesthe mark, forif it is really to revealthe specificstructure of the work, as I have main-tained, it has to come to terms with precisely those individualmomentswhich, in terms of Schenker'sreductiveprocess, merely superveneandwhich for him, therefore,are only of peripheral nterest. He himself triedto defend himself against this criticism (of which he was naturallyaware)

and he particularly ried to justifythe general natureof the FundamentalLinc- or the identity of FundamentalLines- by reference o certainbasicrelationships[Urverhaltnisse]n the music- a point of view which disre-gards the thoroughlyhistoricalstructureof all musical categories.But italso cannot be denied that, as far as Beethovenis concerned,Schenker'smethods hit upon a valid moment; as Rudolf Stephanhas remarked, he




ON THE PROBLEM OF MUSICAL ANALYSIS

Schenkerian method is actually only really fruitful in connection withBeethoven. The inadequacy of Schenker's approach can be seen veryclearly in his attitude to Debussy. As a Francophobe,Schenkerrepreatqd-ly attacked Debussy in a very shabby manner, and accused him (andothers, including Richard Strauss) of the destructionof the FundamentalLine, without being able to see that, in Debussy's case, there are criteriafor inner consistency and musical cohesion which are entirely differentfrom the requirementsof what he called the FundamentalLine, essentiallyderived as it is from the harmonised chorale. But it is possible to learnsomething from all this which I consider to be centralto the whole idea ofmusical analysis:namely that analysismust be immanent hat, in the first

instance, the form has to be followed a priori, so that a compositionunfolds itself in its own terms. Or, to put it another way, one has to allowthe composition something in advance: that is, one must let it assert tself,in order to be able to enter into its structureanalytically. t never seems tohave occurred o Schenker hat his accusingDebussy of the destructionofthe Fundamental Line could in any way have been connected with thecrisis in motivic-thematic composition (which Schenker had made totaland absolute).

Now, to get back to Beethoven, for whom, as I said, the Schenkerianapproach s, in a certain sense, legitimate. One can perhaps account forthis to a certain extent as follows: due to its artistically-plannedndiffer-ence towardseach of the individualaspects of the materials t uses, Beet-hoven's music amounts to something like a kind of 'justification'[Rechtgertigung]4f tonality itself and of the forms associatedwith tonal-ity. Beethoven, as it were, tried to reconstruct onality through his auton-omous and individualisedmusic. In a mannernot unlike Kant where, ifyou will allow me a philosophicaldigression, the objectively-givenworldof experience is thrown into question and has then to be recreatedoncemore by the Subject and its forms in Beethoven the forms (particularly

the large, dynamicforms like the Sonata) could be said to re-emergefromout of the specific process of the composition. It is actuallytonality tselfwhich, in Beethoven's case, is both theme as well as outcome, and in thissense the Schenkerianconcept of the FundamentalLine to some extentcorrectly applies here. However, Beethoven's genius consists precisely inthe fact that this process does not remain on a generalevel, but, on thecontrary and in a manner which correspondsexactly to the great tradi-tion of German philosophy (the philosophy of Hegel above allf itplunges itself from the most generalised and unspecific into the mostextreme concretion n order thus to lead back to the binding forces of theUniversal once more. The decisive factor in Beethoven's compositions isjust this 'way to concretion', and it is precisely here, because of thispeculiar change of emphasis, that Schenker has not gone the whole way.But it is exactly in this directionthat the way the idea of analysis reallydoes lie: that is to say, composition understood as a 'coherence', as a




T. W. ADORNO

dynamicset of interrelationships Zusammenhang]. nd it is within thisset of interrelationships if anywhereat all that the meaningof the com-

* * a

posltlonreslees.I should now like to draw a few conclusions from all this. Firstly,

althoughanalysis is certainlyof decisivehelp in questionsof performanceand interpretation, t is not actually from interpretationhat it is derived,but from the work itself. You couldput it this way: analysis s itself a formin its own right, like translation,criticism and commentary,as one ofthose media throughwhich the very work unfolds. Works need analysisfor their 'truth content' [Wahrheitsgehalt]5o be revealed. To returntoBeethovenagain: initiallyhe achievedhis effect throughwhat I think has

been called 'titanism',or throughhis expressivity;and only by meansofintensivestructuralanalysisdid it then laterbecome clearwhy his musiccan, with good reason,be called 'beautiful'and 'true',and also eventuallywhereits limits wereto be sought.

Aesthetictheorieson music and, aboveall, aestheticprogrammesthatisto say, claims made for and judgementspronouncedon music) are quiteinconceiveablewithout analysis.Analysisis to be understoodas an organnot only of the historicalmomentumof the works in themselves,but alsoof the momentumwhich pushes beyond the individualwork. That is tosay, all criticismwhich is of any value is foundedin analysis;to the extentthat this is not the case, criticism remainsstuck with disconnectedim-pressions,and thus, if for no otherreasonthan this, deserves to be regard-ed with the utmost suspicion.

If one takes Wagner's claim regarding music's 'coming of age'seriously that is, the inescapablerelationof musicto repexion then withthis the significanceof analysisas something mmanent o the worksthem-selves must also increasecorrespondingly,and has indeeddone so. Giventhe presenceof living experience,music unfolds itself throughanalysis;itbecomes fuller for this experience, richer rather than poorer. Any in-

terpreterwho has initially made music only from what, precritically[vorkritisch], s called 'musicality',and who has then subsequentlyper-formed from an all-encompassinganalyticalconsciousness,will, I think,have no difficulty in acknowledginghere what an enrichmentis to bediscoveredin the realisationof hidden relationshipswhich, so long as theworkis not analysed,cannot cometo the fore.

An artawareof itself is an analysedart [die iArer elbstbewussteKunst stdie analysierte].There is a kind of convergencebetween the analyticalprocess and the compositionalprocess-I have tried to show this in mybook on Berg,6 using him as a model whereby the music, in a certainsense, can be lookedupon as being its own analysis.So, the less it is thatworks operate within a pre-existing medium and with pre-existingforms and this is certainlythe overall tendency in the developmentofmodernmusic, particularly ince Tristan the more it is that, for the sakeof their own 'livingness'[umiAres igenenLebenswillen],they are in need





of specificallytailored analysis. A piece by Handel broadly speakingmay to some extent be grasped without analysis; Beethoven's DiabelliVariations, on the other hand, are already much less likely to be under-stood without it, whereas the Bagatellesf Weberncannot be grasped atall in this way. If Webern'sBagatellesre performedunanalysed, houghwith faithful attentionto all markings n the score but without uncoveringthe subcutaneous elationships a merelyrespectable enderingof the scoreas it stands, that is then the result, as is not difficultto imagine, is utternonsense[einvollkommeneralimathias].n the other hand, the momentthese pieces are analysed, and performed after having been analysed,they make sense and the light dawns.7. . . If, without analysis, such

music cannot be presented n even the simplest sense as being meaningful,then this is as much as to say that analysis is no mere stopgap, but is anessential element of art itself. As such it will only begin to be able tocorrespond to the status of art when it takes the demands of its ownautonomyupon itself. Otherwise, n the words of Heinz-Kiaus Metzger, itremains mere tautology' that is to say,a simpletranslation nto words ofthat which everyonecan hear in the music anyway.Analysishas to do withthe surplusdasMehr] n art; it is concerned with that abundancewhichunfolds itself only by means of analysis.It aims at that which as has beensaid of poetry (if I may be permitted a poetic analogyfis the truly

'poetic' in poetry, and the truly poetic in poetry is that which defiestranslation.Now it is precisely this moment which analysismust grasp if itis not to remainsubordinate.Analysis is more than merely ' the facts' [wasblossder Fall ist], but is so only and solely by virtue of goingbeyondhesimple facts [die einfachenTatbestande]y absorbing itself into them.Every analysis that is of any value, thereforand anyone who analysesseriously will soon realise this for himself is a squaringof the circle. It isthe achievement of imagination through faith; and Walter Benjamin'sdefinitionof imaginationas 'the capacity or interpolationnto the smallest

details' applies here.8Now, the ultimate 'surplus' over and beyond the factual level is thetruthcontent, nd naturally t is only critique that can discover the truthcontent. No analysis is of any value if it does not terminate in the truthcontent of the work, and this, for its part, is mediated through the work'stechnicalstructure[durch ie technischeomplexionerWerke].f analysishits up againsttechnical nconsistency, hen such inconsistency s an indexof the work's untruth I have attemptedelsewhere to demonstrate his inconcrete terms in certain specific aspects of the music of Wagner9and ofRichard Strauss. 0 At the moment, I wish only to put forward these

thoughts in their theoretical generality,however although with the im-mediate furtherqualification hat the work of art insists that one put thisquestion of truth or untruth immanentlynd not arbitrarilybring someyardstickor other of the cultural-philosophical r cultural-critical arietiestothe work fromoutside.




T. W. ADORNO

I now want to come to the point I have really been leading up to so far:analysis, as the 'unfolding' of the work, existsdinrelationship o the workitself and to its genre or 'compositionalarchetype'[Typus].This is per-haps most clearly to be seen in the first of the more primitive forms ofanalysis to have become generally effective- the so-called 'guide litera-ture' [Leitfadenliteratur]o the music of Wagner and the New GermanSchool, as associated with the name of Hans von Wolzogen. Here theintention was simply to ease orientation n the kind of music which avoidstraditional orms but which is held together by the drastic means of Leit-motivewhich, though admittedly varied, are always essentially recognis-able. This aim is achieved by the simple procedure of picking out the

Leitmotive,abelling them and identifying them in their different forms.(It may be noted in passing that this kind of analysis contradicts ts ownaim, and serves, in fact, to further that external, superficial ype of listen-ing which so characterises he old-style Wagner listener, proud if he isable to recognise the 'Curse Motif' in the Ringevery time somebody getsmurdered,given the necessaryreferences if he doesn't recognise t on thedarkenedstage anyway while in doing so he misses what is really hap-pening in the music.) This reified form of analysis, as representedby the'guide' to themes and motifs, serves a reifiedand false consciousnessof theobject. Because of its inadequacy,however, it has at least served to pro-mote another, and much more justifiable,type of analysis in particularthat associatedabove all with the Viennese classics and for which Riemanncould be said to have supplied the best-known examples. I am going tolabel this type 'elementalanalysis'[Elementaranalyse].1lith progressiveenergy it turns to the smallest single elements from which a piece is builtup roughly in the same way in which knowledge,according o Descartes,has continuallyto divide up its object into the smallest possible elements.Now, just as the principle of economyan be said to dominate n the musicof Viennese Classicism (that is, the Viennese tradition since Haydn, but

particularlyBeethoven and Brahms,and in a particular ense also Schoen-berg and his school) that is to say, that a maximum of different ap-pearances Erscheinungen]as to be derived from a minimum of basicshapes [Grundgestalten]o can the 'elemental' type of analysis be seen,in fact, to have its support in that kind of music which can be categorisedunder the concept 'motivic-thematic'composition. Implied here there isalso, of course, a hidden criticism of this type of composition, obligatoryas it was for more than 150 years.

'Elemental analysis' confirms a suspicion which irritateseveryone whopersists in occupying himself with [motivic-thematic]music: namely-and I'm going to say something blasphemous here its similarity to thejig-saw puzzle, constructed as it is out of elements over against whichdynamic development (which on the face of it predominatesto such anextent in this music) reveals itself in many ways to be merely a contrivedappearance. It could be said that the character of this 'aesthetic ap-




ON THE PROBLEMOF MUSICAL ANALYSIS

pearance' whicheven applies, in spite of all, to an art as far removedfrom

illusion as music, and through which music has integrated tself into thedevelopment of Europeanculture as a whole) has occurred as the conse-quence of an unceasing 'Becoming' or development from out of itself[aus sich Herauswerdendes].n reality, however, such music could moreaccurately be said to have been 'put together' [zusammengesetzt]n thequite literal sense of having been 'composed', contraryto the impressionmore usually associatedwith it. And incidentally,this may also be said toa certain extent to apply to Bach, producing at times in his case due tothe absence of the aspect of 'Becoming'[AspektdesWerdens]that im-pression of mechanicalnesswhich can be dispelled only by an ideological

effort [of interpretation]which actuallyglorifiesthe apparentmechanical-ness as a special kind of logicality.Indeed, all 'Becoming'in music is infact illusory, insofaras the music, as text, is really fixed and thus is notactually 'becoming'anything as it is alreadyall there.Nevertheless, musicis actually only a 'coherence'[Zusammenhang]hen regarded as a 'Be-coming', and in this there lies a paradoxfor musicalanalysis: analysis is,on the one hand, limited by what is actuallyfixed and available o it; but,on the other hand, it has to translate his back againinto that movementascoagulated n the musical text. But the 'elemental' ype of analysis is also

inadequateas far as Viennese Classicismis concerned.Schoenberg'ssen-

tence: 'music is the history of its themes', serves to remindus of this. May'Becoming'continuealways o haveits problematic xistence

All this appliesparticularly o Beethoven. In his case the germinalcells[die Keime]are very often as initially stated ingeniouslyindifferent, norder that they may smoothly [bruchlos]nd seamlessly lead up to thewhole; in fact, they simply represent the fundamental relationshipsof tonality itself. And it is particularly he case with Beethoven that,just for this very reason, it is much more importantwhat the themesbecomewhat happens to them and howthey develop than what the

basic elements themselves actually are. The real weakness of analysisup to now lies in the fact that it neglects this 'moment of Becoming'for the reduction [of music] to its elements. In this connection Iwould like to referonce more to what I said earlierabout analysisbeinganessential prerequisiteof criticism. I have just spokenof the 'indifference'of the materialin Beethoven. With Wagner, the basic motifs [Urmotive]which are supposedto represent the primeval world [das Urweltliche]fWotan and the Valhalladomain in the Ringare keptwithin a certain howshall I put it.> undifferentiated,or 'unspecific Universality'. But inWagner's case they are not, by a long way, as legitimateas they are withBeethoven becauseWagner's individual motifs have the significanceandweight of symbols, and contain basically the whole idea of the germinalcell of the Romantic Lied.For this reason they have pretensions to a'Beingness'[Sein]'in and for themselves'much morethan is ever the casewith Beethoven. And this weakness, inherent in the themes and contra-




T. W. ADORNO

dicting theirown claim to just 'beingthere'[dazusein],points,moreover,to theirrealweaknessas regardssubstance,n view of whathappenso them

and what they becomesomethingthat one would not think of in connec-tion with Beethoven,becausewith him the priorityof 'Becoming'verthatwhich simply is is alreadyestablishedright from the start. Yes, a reallytrueandadequateanalysiswouldhaveto point out such differences,anditis possible to see from this how an analysis of this type merges intocrltlclsm, lnto crltlque.

Any adequateanalysisof Beethovenhas to graspthe music as an event,as 'a somethingwhichis happening'[alseinGeschehendes],ndnot only asthe elementsflankedby this event. In the recapitulation f the firstmove-

mentof the Ninth Symphony, orexample, t is not the returnof the themeand the components, the basic constitutiveelements [Urbestandteile]fwhich it is formedthat matters;what is important s that this recapitu-lation appearsas the resultof the foregoingdevelopment.It is a similarsituation in the Appassionataoncerning the overwhelmingeffect of therecapitulationover the dominant pedal point in the first movement.Analysiswould have to show why hese kinds of effects are achieved,andnot simply that here, at this point, this or that theme recurs.To demon-stratethis is in realityextraordinarily ifficult; but by the very posing ofthis question you may already be able to recognisethat the tedium andaridityof analysis in general is a consequenceof the fact that analysis hasnot yet reallybegun to grapplewith its own problems something,in fact,whichshould be its properconcern.

Now, from all that I've been sayingso far it may have becomeplain toyou just how much any particularkind of analysisand its legitimacy areactuallythemselvesdependentUpOIlhe particularmusic which is beinganalysed. It goes without saying that radical serial and aleatorymusiccannot be graspedby traditionalanalyticalapproaches,and particularlynot by means of the 'elemental'type of analysis, because concepts like

'dynamiccoherence' [dynamischeinnzusammenhang]nd so on are farremovedfrom its basic assumptions.It is preciselyhere, when faced withaleatoryand serial music, that analysis is frequently confused with themere recordingof facts [blosseTatbestandsaufnahme].his then results inthe kind of absurdityonce reservedfor me at Darmstadt,where a com-poser (who, to his credit, has since given up the vocation)showed me acompositionwhichseemed to me to be the purestnonsense.When I askedhim what this or that meant, what meaning,what kind of musical sensethis or that particularphraseor developmenthad, he simply referredmeto correspondencesbetween dynamicmarkingsand pitches and so on-things which have nothing whateverto do with the musicalphenomenonas such. This kindof descriptionof the compositionalprocess,of whatthecomposerhas done in the composition,is totallyunproductive,just as areall those kinds of aestheticexaminationwhichareunable to extractfrom aworkanymorethanwhathas been put into it, so to speak whatit says in





the Baedekerguide. All such approachesare doomed from the outset asworthlessand irrelevant.

With so-called 'athematic', ree atonalitythe relationshipsare quite dif-ferent, and I mention this precisely because I feel myself to be on muchfirmerground here, analytically peaking,than when faced with serial andpost-serial music. Herc and I'm thinking above all especially of Webernin this connection one encounters once more particular ransformationsof the categoriesof traditional hematic-motiviccompositionalmethods. Ihave elsewhere attempted to develop this in some of the most daring ofWebern's works, like the Bagatelles and the violin pieces. 2 Here thetransmutation f the traditional i.e. thematic-motivic) ategoriesof musi-

cal coherence into something quite opposed to them can be traced anddemonstrated.The thematic technique of 'developing variation' a tech-nique which necessitatesthe unceasing derivationof the 'new', indeed theradically new, from the 'old' is 'radicalised' o become the negationofthat which used to be called the 'thematic development'or 'working-out'[thematischeArbeit]. And it is this coherencc this transmutation thatanalysis has to meet in such music. Its task, therefore, is not to describethe work and with this I have really arrived at the central issue con-cerning analysis generally its task, essentially, is to reveal as clearly aspossible the problem f each particularwork. 'To analyse'means much the

same as to become aware of a work as a force-feld [Kraftgeld]organisedaround a problem.Having said this, however, we must now be quite clearabout one thing: whether we like it or not analysis is inevitably to someextent, of its very nature, the reduction of the unknown, the 'new' withwhich we are confronted within the composition and which we want tograsp-to the alreadyknown, inasmuchas it is the 'old'. However, in thatevery modern compositioncontainsan essential, inbuilt moment that com-bats this mechanismof the familiarand the known, in so far can it be saidthat the analysis of modern works is also always a betrayalof the work-

although at the same time it is also actually demandedby the work itself.From this there also arises the question as to how analysis puts right thiswrong it inflicts on the work; and the way to an answer lies, I believe,precisely in the fact that analysis serves to pin-point that which I call the'problem' of a particularcomposition the paradox, so to speak, or the'impossible'that every piece of music wants to make possible. (Rather asin Schoenberg's Phantasy for violin and piano: how in the end theradically-dynamic rocess of composition tself results in a composition nco-ordinatedfields, and how the categories of the composition transformthemselves into the balance, the equilibrium of those fields, and then

finally, through this equilibrium, an effect is brought about which fulfilsthe dynamic.13)Once the problem I was almost going to say the 'blindspot' of the work has been recognised, then the individualmoments willthereby be clarified in a quite different manner than by the so-called'reductive'methodsof traditionalpractice.




T. W. ADORNO

Now all this has to be differentiated,of coursc and I must emphasisethis from the so-called 'holistic' method of examinationWanzheitliche

Betrachtung14]o popularwith the educationalists.With musical compo-sitions it is obviouslythe Wholehat matters; but the Whole is not some-thing which simply reduces the individual single moments to insignifi-cance. The Wholc if I may be permitted to express it in Hegelianterms is itself the relation between the Whole and its individualmo-ments, within which these latter obtain throughout their independentvalue. Analysisexists only as the uncoveringof the relationshipbetweenthese moments, and not merely by virtue of the obtuse and aconceptualpriorityof the Whole ove1its parts. It is particularlyn new music, more-

over, that analysis is concernedjust as much with dissociatedmoments[Dissoziationsmomente],ith the works' 'death-wish' [ Todestriebl thatis to say, with the fact that there are works which contain within them-selves the tendency to strive from unity back into their constituentelements as it is concerned with the opposite process; and these arequestionswhich have been totallyneglected in the name of the so-called'holistic' method, within which there are usually disturbinglypositivistimplications.Just as analysisshould no longer darebe of the 'elemental'type, it is also equally wrong that it should disregardthe individualmo-ments and reduce them all to the same level of indifferenceby takinga

rigid andoverridingconceptof the totalityas its point of departure.If onereallytakes the Whole as one's point of departure hen also simultaneouslyimplied here is the obligation to grasp the logic of the individualmoments that is, the concretionof the isolatedmusical 'instants'.Andcorrespondingly,if one takes the constituent elements as the point ofdepartureone's task is to understandhow these elements in themselves,and frequentlyin contradiction o eachother, and then throughthis con-tradiction,also simultaneouslygenerate he Whole.

In this sense that is, relativeto Whole ndto part analysis s alwaysa

double process[ein Gedoppeltes].rwin Ratz to whom we are indebtedfor some excellentanalysesof certainvery complexmovementsby Mahler(the Finale of the Sixth Symphonyand the first movementof the Ninth,for example)15 once formulated his very nicely in one of his analysesasfollows: there are really twoanalysesalways necessary; that which ad-vances from the part to the Whole i.e., just like the way in which theinnocent istenerhasno choice but to listenin the firstinstance,willy-nilly;andthen that which, from the already-wonawarenessof the Whole, deter-mines the individualmoments.And this is not merelya geneticdifference,determinedby the time-factor;the differenceis also determinedby the

object the compositionalstructure tself in which both these valid mo-mentsnecessarily ntermesh.

Moreover and this is of furtherimportance n distinguishingit fromany 'totalitycult' [Ganzheitskultus]he relationshipof whole to part isnever to be understood as the relationship of an 'all-embracing'





[Umfassenden] o an 'all-embraced' Umfassten],but is, instead,dynamic,which is to say a process.This means to say, on the one hand, that inmusic, as an artwhich unfoldsthrough timc all momentshave,generallyspeaking, something evolving about them, something 'becoming'[Werdendes], nd thus reachout beyondthemselves.The senseandaim ofan analysiswhich takes the individualmomentas its point of departure snot only as tends mostly to be the case- the indicationand fixing of theindividualmoments (or more extreme,their mere recognition);it is alsothe indication of that within them which propelsthem onward.Take, forexample, the well-known counter-subject o the first theme of Mahler'sFourthSymphony:16

Cl. Fag. a2

t _ L 2 <P ' -

Already,rightfromthe verybeginning, one hasto listen to this in terms ofthedirectiont wantsto go in and for which it yearns, in terms of the factthat it is strivingultimatelybeyonditself towardsthe high B,17in ordertofulfil itself; and if one doesn't hear this in its individualelements, if onedoesn't hear the theme'sown directional endencywithin each single ele-ment, then the descriptionof the individualmomentscan already, or this

veryreason,be said to havemissedthe point.If one analysesthe main theme of the firstmovementof the Eroica,for

example, then one sees that the point which occurs almost immediatelyand leaves the music hangingsuspendedon the C# that damming-upofforces which invests the initial Grundgestaltwith tensionafterits firstfewbars is decisiveandof muchmoreimportancehanthe indifferentbrokenmajortriadwith its closing minor seconds, the so-calledmaterialof thistheme(andof most of the themesof the so-calledVienneseClassics).

On the otherhand,attentionhas also to be paid to the way in which the

individualmotifs arepre-formedby the Whole, as is mostly the casewithBeethoven.Beethoven'smusic is not in fact formed, or built up, out ofthemesand motifs at all, as the 'elemental' ype of analysiswould leadusto believe; it is ratherthat these themes and motifs are insteadalready Ialmostsaid 'prepared',anachronistically, s one talks of 'preparedpiano':they adaptthemselvesto becomepart of the pervading dea of the whole.Beethoven'swork was, in fact as may be easily recognised from thesketchbooks essentiallyto tinkerwith the themes and motifs until theyfinally became capable of meeting their function within the Whole. Inrealitythis functionalways haspriority n Beethoven,althoughit seemsas

though everythingdevelops out of the 'motive-power' Triebkraft] f theindividualelements.And in this his music is no mereanalogyfor, but is infact directlyidentical o, the structureof Hegelianlogic. While one shouldnot overvalue the genesis of music ti.e., the way in which it comes intobeing] andshould not, aboveall, confuse it with the innerdynamicsof the


183



T. W. ADORNO

composition, with Beethoven,at least, this genesisneverthelesssufficestodemonstrate ust how much the conception of a Whole dynamicallycon-ceived 'in itself' [die Konzeption eines in sich dynamischvorgestelltenGanzen]definesits elements,and how, throughthis, the taskfacinganaly-sis right from the start will naturally be totally different from thatwhich the 'elemental' ype of analysismakes t out to be.

All in all, therefore if you will allow me a very roughgeneralisation-two types of music can be distinguished: 1) the kind which goes, in prin-ciple, from 'above' to 'below', from totality to detail; and 2) the kindwhich is organisedfrom 'below' to 'above'.Thus, accordingto which ofthese dominatesthe structureof the music, the samewill correspondingly

direct the analysis itself. If I may speak from my own experience for asecond: I hit upon the necessity for extensivemodifications o the conceptof analysisthroughthe studyof the music of my teacher,Alban Berg.TheBerg analyseswhich I wrote some 30 years ago, directlyafter his death,weretraditionalanalysesof the kind which brings the 'whole'down to thesmallestpossible number of what one calls 'germinalcells' [Keimzellen],and then shows how the music develops out of them.18 And there is noquestion but thatBerg himself,fromhis own understanding of the term],would also still have approvedof this traditionalkind of analysis.How-ever, as I came to reviseand preparethe book last year [1968], and so tooccupymyself with Berg's music with renewedintensity, I saw somethingthat I had, of course, dimly sensed for a long time: namely, that Berg'smusic is not at all a 'Something' [ein Etwas] which forms itself, so tospeak,out of a 'Nothingness'[ein Nichts] of the smallestpossible, undif-ferentiatedcomponentelements. It only seems like this at firstglance. Inreality it accomplishes within itself a process of permanentdissolution19[permanenteAuflosung],ratherthanachieving a 'synthesis' a termwhichany self-respectingpersonshould hardlybe able to get past his lips thesedays. So then, not only does Berg's music start out from the smallest

componentelements and then immediately urthersubjectthese to a kindof 'splitting of the atom', but the whole characterof his music is that ofpermanentre-absorptionack into itself [permanenteSelbstzurucknahme].Its 'Becoming', if I may term it thus at all events, where it crystallises-out its idea in its purest form is its ownnegation iAreeigeneNegation].This meansthat such a structuringof the inner fibreof a music also callsfor an analytical practice completelydifferent from the long-established'motivic-thematic' pproach and I should likeexpresslyto say that it wasin the Bergbook that I becameparticularlyawareof this necessity.How-ever, I don't in the slightestflattermyself as in any way havingsucceeded

in fulfilling this demand,and what I say here as criticismof analysis ingeneralalso applieswithout reservationas a criticismof all the countlessanalyses hatI myselfhave everproduced.

Analysis,therefore,meansmuch the same as the recognitionof the wayin which the specific,sustainingstructural dea of a piece of music realises




ON THE PROBLEM OF MUSICALANALYSIS

itself; and such a concept of analysis would need essentiallyto be derivedfrom eachworkanew. Nevertheless, I have no wish to stop shorthere withthis demand for the absolute singularity or absolute individuation ofanalysis.There aiso lies in analysis a momentof the Universal, the Gen-eral [desAllgemeinen] and this goes with the fact that music is certainlyalso, in essence, a language-and it is, furthermore,precisely in the mostspecificworks that this moment of 'Universality' s to be sought. I mightattempt to summariseor codify this universality n terms of what I oncedefined as the 'materialtheory of form in music' [materialeFormenlehreder Musik]: that is, the concrete definition of categories like statement[Setzung], continuation [Fortsetzung],contrast [Kontrast], dissolution

[AufiRosung],uccession [Reikung],development[Entwicklung],ecurrence[Wiederkehr], odifiedrecurrencemodifizierterWiederkehr],nd howeversuch categories may otherwise be labelled. And so far not even the be-ginningsof an approachhavebeen maderegarding llch a 'material heoryof form' (as opposedto the architectonic-schematicype of theory).These[i.e. dialectical]categories are more important than knowledge of thetraditional orms as such, even though they have naturallydeveloped outof the traditionalforms and can always be found in them. Were thisconception of analysis such as I have in mind, and which is in accordancewith structural istening were this conception to be consistentlyrealised,then something else, a further evel, something ike such a 'material heoryof musical form', would necessarilyemerge out of it. It would not, to besure, be fixed and invariable-it would not be a theory of form for onceand always, but would define itself within itself historically,according tothe state of the compositionalmaterial,and equallyaccordingto the stateof the compositional orces of production.

The crisis in composition oday and with this I shouldlike to closc isalso a crisis in analysis. I haveattempted o make you awareof why this isthe case. It would perhapsnot be too much of an exaggeration o say that

all contemporarymusicalanalyses be they of traditionalor of the mostrecent music have remained behind the level of contemporarymusicalconsciousness in composition.If analysis can be raised to this level with-out thereby lapsing into a vacuous obsessionwith musicalfact-collecting,then it will, in its turn, very probably be capable of reacting backon to,andcriticallyaffecting,composition tself.

NOTES

1. It may seem that Adorno is contradictinghimself here. What he means is

that, although the motivic economyof the early Brahmsis dependent uponthe analysis which precededit, there does at first sight appear to be some-thing irreconcilableabout these two processes.That is to say, on the onehand there is the process of composition and integrationwhich attempts toconceal the technical steps which went into its own construction,while, onthe other hand, there is the step-by-step process of analysis which, through




T. W. ADORNO

dissection,dissolutionand 'dis-integration',attemptsto reveal and lay bare

the technicalstructureof the integratedworkoncemore.

2. It has to be remembered hat Adornois speaking n 1969,but Schenkerstillremainsrelativelyneglected n Germany.

3. 'Moment'in the sense refersto the Germandas Moment,definedin Martin

Jay, The DialecticalImagination London: Heinemann, 1973), p. 54, as 'a

phaseor aspectof a cumulativedialecticalprocess. It shouldnot be confused

withderMoment,whichmeansa momentin time in the Englishsense'.

4. Although 'justification's perhapsan unexpectedword in this context, it is

neverthelessthe correct translationof Rechtgertigungere. It seems clear

enoughwhatAdornomeans.5. 'Truth content' [Wahrheitsgehalt]s a difficult concept as Adorno uses it.

The following two quotations from Adorno's Asthetische Theorie(Frankfurt/Main:Suhrkamp,1970)may help to providea few clues:

The truth content of the workof art is the objectivesolution of

the riddlecontainedin each work.... It is only to be obtained

throughphilosophicalspeculation.This, and nothing else, justi-

fies aesthetics [and,by implication,analysis](p. 193).Art aspiresto Truth, though is not Truth directly;to this extent

is Truth its content.Art is Knowledgethrough ts relationship o

Truth (p. 419).

The notion of 'truthcontent'ties up with the conceptionof the art workasbeingprimarilya formof cognition, f knowledge albeit,in the caseof music,

in purely musical-structuralerms). This particularlyHegelian position of

Adorno's calls to mind Schoenberg, in Ch. 6 of Fundamentals f Musical

Compositioncf. AlexanderGoehr, 'Schoenberg'sGedankeManuscript',four-

nal of theArnoldSchoenbergnstitute,Vo1.2, No. 1, p. 16): 'The realpurpose

of musicalconstructions not beauty,but intelligibility'.It is temptingalsoto

connectthe 'truthcontent'of the workwith the 'problem'aroundwhich the

work,as 'forcefield', forms itself (see p. 181of the present translation).

6. Adorno, Berg: der Meisterdes kleinstenUbergangs Vienna: Lafite, 1968).

Partsof this bookoriginallyappearedas contributions o Willi Reich'sAlban

Berg: mit Bergs eigenenSchriftenund Beitragenvon TheodorWiesengrund-AdornoundErnstKrenek Vienna:HerbertReichner,1937).

7. In an aside (whichI have omittedin the text) Adornosuggestswe follow up

the points he is makinghere by referring o the chapteron Webern'sBaga-

telles('InterpretationsanalyseneuerMusik [Webern,Schonberg,Berg]')in

Der getreueKorrepetitorGesammelteSchriften,Vo1. 15; Frankfurt/Main:

Suhrkamp,1976).8. In an aside Adorno mentions at this point that Walter Benjamin'sson is

present n the audience.9. T. W. Adorno, Versuch berWagner written 1937/38, publishedBerlinand

Frankfurt/Main:Suhrkamp, 1952). English translationby Rodney Liv-ingstone, as In Search of Wagner(London: NLB, 1981). See also 'Zum

"Versuch uber Wagner"' in appendix to GesammelteSchriften,Vo1. 13

(Frankfurt/Main:Suhrkamp,1971); 'WagnersAktualitat',and 'Nachschrift

zu einerWagner-Diskussion'n Gesammeltechriften,Vo1. 16, MusikalischeSchriften II (Frankfurt/Main:Suhrkamp,1978).

186MUSIC ANALYSIS 1: 2, 1982




10. T. W. Adorno, 'RichardStrauss',in Musikalische chriftenIII, Gesammelte

Schriften,Vol. 16 (Frankfurt/Main:Suhrkamp, 1978). An English trans-

lation,by Samueland ShierryWeber,appeared n Perspectivesf New Music,Fall-Winter1965,pp 1F32 and 113-129.

11. There are problems in finding an adequatetranslationfor Adorno's termElementaranalyse.Formal-motivicanalysis'perhapscomes as close as any-thing. However, I have opted for 'elementalanalysis'in the text, unsatis-factoryas it is, as I felt it necessaryto retainthe notion of 'element', 'ele-

mentary'and'elemental',n the senseof 'reduction o constituentelements'.12. See note 7.13. Adornois probablyreferring o the factthat Schoenbergcomposedthe violin

part of Op. 47 beforethe pianopart.

14. Adornois certainlyreferring o Gestaltpsychologyherc but in particular,twould seem, to that school of Gestaltknown as 'Ganzheitspsychologie'i.e.the Second Leipzig School of Gestalt Psychology associated withF. Krueger).This was a diluted formof Gestaltwhichdeifiedthe Whole overits parts.

15. Erwin Ratz, 'Zum Formproblembei GustavMahler:eine Analysedes erstenSatzes der IX. Symphonie',in Musikforschung,ol. 8, 1955, p. 169; ' eineAnalysedes Finales der VI. Symphonie', n Musikforschung,ol. 9, 1956, p.156. Also: GustavMahler(Berlin:1957).

16. Adornosimply singshis exampleat this point. It is the five-notemotif, which

appearson clarinetsand bassoonsat b. 20 of the firstmovementof Mahler'sFourthSymphony.17. The 'high B' referred o by Adornois most certainlythat on the cellos in b.

94, the high point of this 'counter-subject' i.e., the five-notemotif referredto in note 16 above)as it is ultimatelyextended in the cellos in bs 90-101.Adornoseems to have expecteda lot from his audience,that they shouldbeable to make this connectionon the spot, from the rathersparseindicationshe gives.

18. See note 6.19. It is not easy to find a satisfactory ranslation or Auflosung, s it can mean,

among other things, disintegration,solution, and also liquidation. I havedecided on dissolution s this is the term used by AlexanderGoehr in hisdiscussion of Schoenberg's Gedankemanuscript (Journal of the ArnoldSchoenbergnstitute,Vo. 2, No. 1, pp. F25). It is illuminatingto considerSchoenberg'suse of the termAuflosungas well as of the termliquidieren)nthe followingextractfrom the Gedankemanuscript p. 24):

Dissolution [Auflosung] s the exact counterpartof establishment[Aufstellung], irm formation,shaping.If in these the main objec-tive is, throughvariationof the basic shapes [Gestalten],to bringout their characteristics s sharplyas possible, to interconnect he

singleGestalten s closelyas possible,to keepthe tensionamong thetones high, the most importantthing in dissolutionis to drop allcharacteristics s fast as possible, to let the tensions run off and toliquidate [liquidieren]he obligations of the former Gestalteninsuch a way that there will be, so to speak,a 'cleanslate', so that thepossibilityfor the appearance f othermaterialss given.

adorno_on the problem of musical analysis

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