advaita and neoplatonism

Advaita and Neoplatonism

A Critical Study in Comparative Philosophy

J.F. Staal

bronJ.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism. A Critical Study in Comparative Philosophy. University of

Madras, Madras 1961

Zie voor verantwoording: http://www.dbnl.org/tekst/staa009adva01_01/colofon.htm

© 2008 dbnl / J.F. Staal

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Foreword

This is a study in comparative philosophy. The systems selected for comparisonare Advaita and Neoplatonism. The author of this work, Dr. J.F. Staal, came fromHolland as a Government of India scholar in 1954 and worked in the UniversityDepartment of Philosophy for three years, registering himself as a candidate for theDegree of Doctor of Philosophy. The present publication constitutes the thesis whichhe wrote in part fulfilment of the conditions for the degree which was awarded tohim.

The present study does not conform to the usual type of comparative philosophywhich contents itself with comparing two or more systems as object-philosophies.Dr. Staal, as a Westerner, approaches Advaita through a comparable tradition inthe West - the tradition of impersonalism - which is to be found in Neoplatonism.And, his approach, further still, is from the standpoint of existentialism cumphenomenology which is a dominant contemporary trend in that part of Europewhence he hails. The experience he gained in British and American Universitiessubsequent to his stay in India, he says, has somewhat changed his perspective.The pages of this work will speak eloquently to the great change which India hasevidently made in his outlook.

The treatment of the metaphysics of Advaita from the phenomenological standpointattempted here is quite interesting. It does not follow the usual sequence of topicsthat is almost the rule in the Advaita classics. Dr. Staal avoids what he regards asthe epistemological bias of later Advaita. Although references to post-Śaṅkarawritings are not absent, the main sources on which this study relies are the worksof Śaṅkara. After sketching

J.F. Staal, Advaita and Neoplatonism

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the principal doctrines of Advaita, Dr. Staal turns to a comparison of these with theteachings of Plotinus and his followers. Here, what he does is to select only suchtopics as would be helpful in an understanding of Śaṅkara's Advaita. This is ajustifiable procedure because the author's principal aim is, as he observes, to studyAdvaita. While the similarities between the two systems are pointed out, theirdissimilarities are also discussed. Dr. Staal shows that these differences result fromthe different traditions from which Advaita and Neoplatonism arose and to whichthey belong, respectively. Regarding the question of the possible influence of Indianthought on Neoplatonism, Dr. Staal contents himself with appending a notesummarising the discussions of other scholars.

It is regretted that there are several printing mistakes. A list of corrections of themajor ones is added at the end.

Madras, December 15, 1961

T.M.P. MAHADEVAN


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Preface

There are several kinds of books that could be written about a philosophy whichhas developed in a culture different from one's own. One book might let the textsspeak for themselves. Another might look for answers to questions in which theauthor is interested. The present book finds neither approach entirely satisfactory.Misunderstandings occur despite extensive knowledge and in spite of soundphilosophic outlook. These arise because categories within which philosophiesoperate can be basically different from each other. Therefore the main difficulty liesin understanding unfamiliar categories and this may call for a re-orientation. Theinformation required can be gathered neither from texts alone, nor from one's ownphilosophic background. It should be obtained by constantly checking the conceptsmet against solutions that appear natural in one's own tradition. Such a study isphilosophic for it tends to increase the awareness of one's own background anddraws attention to other frameworks of thought. In addition basic misunderstandingswhich often appear in the course of study are avoided from the beginning.

Advaita is studied here in this spirit. While a textual study presupposes little morethan a sound philological basis, a philosophic study can only be made from aparticular philosophical point of view. Advaita will be studied from the point of viewof contemporary Western philosophy, with some emphasis on existentialism andphenomenology. Such an undertaking unavoidably constitutes a kind of comparativephilosophy. The first part deals with philosophical implications of a comparativestudy of Advaita. It leads to general considerations of method but also meets withunexpected problems. Western philosophy reacts in a characteristic way to theproblems of Advaita, so that Advaita is first studied as an aspect of Western thought.This is possible because the Neoplatonic tradition provides a relatively appropriateframework of categories. In Western philosophy Advaita is therefore naturallyregarded as a kind of Neoplatonism.


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The second part applies the results of the first to Advaita itself. Principally it aims toanalyse the assumptions which are made in Advaita explicitly as well as implicitly.It turns out that the results of an analysis using modern philosophical tools aresometimes different from those provided by a traditional philological analysis, thoughboth are of course compatible.

The third part makes a comparative study of Advaita and Neoplatonism. Since thereare similarities as well as dissimilarities the issue arises as to which are the moresignificant. This can be decided only by evaluation in the light of philosophicassumptions, so that once again the role played by the observer has to be examined.

An Appendix discusses evidence for the historical influence of Indian thought onNeoplatonism.

This book was first submitted as a thesis for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy ofthe University of Madras in 1957. After four years I find myself in basic agreementwith most of my views. Though I should have preferred a different presentation Ihave only made minor corrections, mainly affecting style and bibliography. Had Iopportunity to re-write the book I would take more for granted and be less concernedwith the phenomenological and existentialist phases in contemporary Westernphilosophy. I should spend less time on the methods by means of which results arereached and more time on the results themselves. This might have produced a morereadable book. But as the assumptions which I now take for granted still constituteunsolved problems, the new book might have been more accessible but less useful.There may be no easier road than the long way I painstakingly travelled.

As for phenomenology and existentialism, the years I spent in British and AmericanUniversities have somewhat changed my perspective. Although I have continuedto observe that the English speaking countries (including India) and the continentalEuropean countries appear to compete in neglecting each other's philosophies, Ino longer regard existentialism and phenomenology as the only true heirs to classicalWestern philosophy. Onemajor conviction, implicit in the thesis, has gradually grownstronger: a serious study of Indian systems of thought might well help to overcomethe impasses reached in the mutually exclusive schools of contemporary Westernphilosophy.


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The pleasant task remains to thank those persons and institutions that have assistedme in many different ways. I am deeply indebted to the Governments of India andof the Netherlands. Both (the former through its Reciprocal Scholarships Scheme)enabled me to live and study in India for three years. I hope that this book will givesome idea of my Indian experiences, which have been a constant source ofinspiration ever since.

I am greatly indebted to the University of Madras for having permitted me to workin the University and to submit the thesis upon which the present work is based.

My gratitude goes in the first place to my teacher and guide, Dr. T.M.P. Mahadevan,Professor of Philosophy and Head of the Department of Philosophy of the Universityof Madras. He helped me in every conceivable way. He not only taught me thedoctrines of Advaita, but showed me by his example how an Advaitin thinks andlives.

It is a pleasant duty to acknowledge my debt to Dr. V. Raghavan, Professor ofSanskrit and Head of the Department of Sanskrit of the University of Madras, whomI often approached with questions and who always supplied me immediately andunhesitatingly with a wealth of information and references.

I should also like to thank Mr. S. Sankarasubrahmanya Ayyar, B.A., of theKuppuswami Sastri Research Institute, Mylapore, who with great enthusiasm andperseverance acquainted me both with the principles of Sanskrit and with thetechniques of Pāṇini.

It is a privilege to be able to express my gratitude to His Holiness Abhinava VidyāTīrtha Svāmigal, present Śaṅkarācārya of the Śṛṅgeri Maṭha, for his kindness andinterest in my work. By living in his proximity and by speaking with him I came tounderstand more than texts could provide.

I should have liked to thank personally my first teacher in philosophy, Dr. H.J. Pos,Professor of Philosophy in the University of Amsterdam. His personal interest in mywork and his brilliant expositions of Greek thought from Thales to Plotinus were verymuch alive in mymind when I received in India the announcement of his unexpecteddeath.


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With pleasure I acknowledge my indebtedness to numerous Indian friends, inparticular to Miss Sita T. Chari, to the Rev. Dr. R. Panikker and to my wife, whohave made valuable observations on earlier versions of this work.

I am very grateful to the University Grants Commission which has contributed to theexpenses of the present publication, and tomembers of the Department of Philosophyof the University of Madras who have assisted me in correcting the proofs.

London-Philadelphia, August, 1961.

J.F. STAAL


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Part ICharacter and Methodology of ComparativePhilosophy - with Special Reference toAdvaita and Neoplatonism1. Introduction

A Western student of Advaita cannot approach his subject in the same way as aphilosophy which belongs to his own tradition. Nobody is entirely free to think as hewishes, for first reactions are partly determined by a philosophical background. Therelation to one's own background determines the direction one should take in orderto reach a system of thought like Advaita. So the simplest kind of comparativephilosophy comes into being: that between one's own view of one's own philosophicbackground and the philosophy which is the object of study. Comparative philosophytherefore cannot be avoided when a system like Advaita is studied outside its owntradition.

Comparative philosophy however is not a technique, a tool, of which the origin isirrelevant and which has no history like a machine: it is a phenomenon whichoriginated in Western civilization and it has to be understood as such. Though itcame into being with the book of Paul Masson-Oursel, La philosophie comparée,in 1923, its manifestation was foreshadowed in various ways and is characteristicof European culture. In order to see what comparative philosophy means and canmean, it becomes desirable to consider its background.

2. The background of comparative philosophy

Comparative philosophy has been preceded in Europe by two other fields ofcomparative studies, comparative linguistics and the comparative study of religions.The relation between these three clarifies much of their respective structures,methods, achievements and aims.

Both disciplines arose mainly out of studies in Indian languages end civilisation, Itwas mainly the study of Sanskrit as an


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Indo-European language which led to comparative linguistics. In this field objectivestandards enable us to pass judgments which may be universally accepted byscholars as ‘objectively true.’

Likewise, the study of a variety of religious developments, partly Indian, led in Europeto the comparative study of religions. Here the material is completely different fromthat of the preceding case: the contents of a religion represent absolute truth for theadherents, whereas the student of different religions has at the same time either hisown religion, or conceptions which he believes to take the place of a religion. In thiscontext the problem of truth arises and two attitudes become possible: (1) the‘phenomenological attitude’, which leaves out the question of truth; this is embodiedin the ‘phenomenology of religion’; (2) what may be called the ‘missionary attitude’(though its propounders need not be missionaries, nor have any desire to makepropaganda for their own religion), which takes as its starting point the acceptanceof the truth of one's own religion. Advantages and disadvantages of both attitudesare obvious: the first method is more reliable andmakes amore scientific impression,but it is poor in that it is restricted to the studies of forms and manifestations(‘phenomena’ in the pre-phenomenological sense) and cannot have access to whatis most essential to the religious human being: religious belief, faith, experience orconviction, each with its presumed transforming power. Apart from this, the firstmethod may unconsciously depend upon what is accepted as truth according toone's own religion. The second method is at any rate at the same level as the religionstudied, but it is subjective.

In the comparative study of philosophy the complications are greater. Whereas thecomparative study of religions has no pretention of being itself a religion, comparativephilosophy is, according to the term, philosophy. This makes the subject dependentupon the concept of philosophy, itself one of the major problems of philosophy. If itis denied that the subject is an aspect or part of philosophy, the situation becomeseasier, the question of truth can be left out and it seems that a purely descriptivephenomenological method would be sufficient. But, apart from the inevitable dangercaused by the influences of unconscious prejudices, a new question arises: whatis the significance of comparative philosophy?


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Being aware of the fact that an important part of the existing literature of comparativephilosophy would accept the above mentioned view, although these questions aregenerally neither asked, nor answered, we reject it, as it seems that the subjectwould lose its significance by removal of the truth value. Comparative philosophywould become of no philosophical and of little scholarly interest.

If comparative philosophy is philosophy, the problem of truth arises in all itsmysteriousness. The more so as there is an important difference between religiousand philosophical concepts of truth. In the former case there was a conviction onthe part of the student regarding his own religion, whereas in the case of philosophythere cannot be such a conviction; there can only be open-mindedness and freedom.It will be necessary to study the implications of comparative philosophy regardedas philosophy.

In the special case of Indian thought, there are additional difficulties for here theEuropean definitions and concepts of ‘religion’ and ‘philosophy’ are not adequate.According to Indian tradition philosophy and religion are not separate, as they arein European tradition. Therefore two fields of comparative studies have come intobeing in Europe: comparative philosophy and the comparative study of religions.These two have therefore to colloborate when Indian phenomena are studied. Thisjustifies the above comparison.

3. Comparative philosophy as philosophy

When comparative philosophy is studied by Europeans it becomes a twentiethcentury European phenomenon. As an aspect of philosophy it is not free to choosean arbitrary mode of thought to which it would like to belong. It is by nature connectedwith modern European philosophy, whether this relation is at the moment manifestor hidden.

The consequences thereof seem to be grave. Should the philosophical problemswhich play an essential part in comparative philosophy, such as the problem of truth,be determined by modern European philosophy? But this merely means thatcomparative philosophy is philosophy; that it is not a tool; and that it is not irrelevantwho deals with it. It is clear that this leads


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to the problem of historicism. Thus it is inevitable that the following pages will containcontemporary European philosophy, as the treatment intends to be philosophicaland absence of explicitness would only mean hidden dependence. (Lack ofknowledge of modern European philosophy on the part of scholars dealing with anysubject does not mean that there cannot be any dependence, as philosophypreviously shaped and still permeates the cultural tradition in a fundamental thoughoften unnoticed way).

The first philosophical problem of comparative philosophy, determining its actions,its assertions and its judgments, is the problem of truth.

A. Truth in Comparative Philosophy.

The present section falls into five subdivisions. The titles of the first three are takenfrom a lecture by Karl Jaspers in Frankfurt on August 28, 1947, on the occasion ofthe Goethe prize being awarded to him. The words give an indication as to thedirection of this investigation: ‘How can we receive what need to be in art, in poetry,in philosophy - receive it not in dogmatic traditionalism, not in relativistic indifference,not in esthetic irresponsible emotion, but as a claim upon us, affecting all that weare?’.1

In dealing with the problem of truth our point of view will depend on considerationsconcerning the special kind of comparative philosophy dealt with here.

(i) Relativistic indifference. Is faith necessary?

One preconceived view about the truth-nature of philosophical questions is the viewthat each philosophy is true for the community and period in which it arose, and thisis all that can be said about the truth-value. If two solutions of a philosophical problemare contradictory they are nevertheless equally true, because there is no absolutetruth to which both could refer or fail to refer and which would be a commonmeasure.The reason is that this, truth would again be the truth according to a specialphilosophical view. Though this relativistic view seems to be

1 Translated into English by H.E. Fischer in: K. Jaspers, Existentialism and Humanism, NewYork, 1952, 50.


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theoretically weak, there is a difficulty regarding actual philosophies, which favoursit. Each philosophy arose in a special context and closer study often reveals thatthe tenets of each are in certain respects best suited to the context. This relativism,therefore, is not so easy to overcome and it will occupy us again.

The personal attitude connected with relativism is generally one of indifference. Itmight be despair. The former attitude is, in matters of philosophy, undesirable andit should never prevail so long as the case of relativism is not proved. For indifferencefails to participate in the seriousness either of conviction or of quest which is inherentin almost all philosophies; it excludes the possibility that the studying subject shouldever be personally involved; it has a negative answer in advance and it does notallow for the possibility that new truth can be found. It also ignores the fact that thephilosophy studied deals with entities which may be of vital importance to the student,irrespective of philosophical context.

Thus, in the quest for truth in comparative philosophy, the attitude of indifferenceon the one hand and relativism as a preconceived view and method on the other,are both to be rejected. But the possibility that relativism is true - the unique andonly truth in this case - eventually to be reached as a kind of conclusion, may notbe initially excluded.

The one certain device against relativistic indifference is faith. If we accept faith, wewill reach the truth embodied and presupposed in the act of faith. This is evidentlya circle for the outsider, but we are not ready to reject it even when we are not readyto ‘jump’ into it. For faith may lead to certainty and experience.

The philosophies with which we are to deal have stressed the importance and eventhe inevitability of faith. That faith (śraddhā) has to be accepted as a serious claimespecially in Indian thought can be seen frommany texts. The Chāndogya Upaniṣadsays: ‘When one has faith, then one reflects; without faith one does not reflect; onereflects only when one has faith’2 and the

2 7.19; Cf. also 7.20.


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Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad: ‘In this fire (i.e., heaven) the Gods offer faith’.3 TheBhagavad Gītā says: ‘The faith of each is in accordance with his nature, O Bhārata.Man is made up of his faith; as a man's faith is, so is he’.4 Faith is further given asone of the qualifications needed for those who want to study Advaita: Śaṅkara'sBrahmasūtrabhāsya enjoins5 as the third requirement for an adhikāri the attainmentof the means of realisation beginning with peace and restraint(śama-dama-ādisādhana-sampad). The sixth and last of these is, according to theVedāntasāra6, śraddhā, ‘faith’ interpreted7 as ‘faith in the truths of Vedānta as taughtby the guru’.8 Plotinus also mentions faith (pístis) in given teachings as a requirementfor those who want to contemplate the One.9

Even if we were personally and existentially ready to accept faith, it cannot bepresupposed in the present study. In philosophy faith prevents communication withthose who do not share the same faith. Even though the ‘credo ut intelligam’ aspectof philosophy and religion - ‘I believe in order that I may understand’ - cannot beexcluded in advance, it should not be utilized in a philosophical study. One mustrealise however that this may fundamentally limit our understanding of otherphilosophies, and therefore our own philosophising.

(ii) Esthetic approach.

The esthetic approach likes the philosophy it deals with. It is ready to pronouncejudgments such as ‘a profound statement’, ‘a beautiful passage’, ‘an impressivethought’. But it is afraid to think clearly and calmly to the end. It escapes, consciouslyor not, from the philosophical questions: is it true? What does it mean if it is true?What does it imply if it is true? And what does it imply for me if it is true?

3 Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, 6.2.9.4 Bhagavad Gītā, 17.3.5 Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, 1.1.1.6 Vedāntasāra 18. (Ed. Bombay 1934; ed. & transl. Almora 1949; Poona 1929).7 Id. 24.8 Cf. Vedāntaparibhāsā 9.40 (S.S. Suryanarayana Sastri).9 Enneads VI.9.4.32 (Bréhier).


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The esthetic approach therefore betrays the presence of a weakness of thinking.The final implications are not faced, the philosophy is not taken as what it is meantto be and as what it may have signified for human beings. As such it is irresponsible,it does not rely exclusively upon the one philosophy, but considers it implicity as ofrelative importance. The esthetic approach dominates many Westerners who areattracted by Oriental systems of thought. They do not ask the question about absolutetruth, and they generally do not confront the actual problems of their own life withthe philosophies they like. Thus a difference between theory and practice arises.This shows that through the esthetic approach the Romantic movements of theWesthave been attracted by the East.

This approach can also be evaluated in a different way. If there is no sympathy fora certain way of thinking, or at least for the human beings who thought so, therecan be no proper understanding in philosophy, because much in philosophy goesbeyond the level of pure reason (certainly in the philosophies studied here). Thisapplies especially in the case of comparative philosophy, where the philosophiesstudied are often foreign to one's own philosophical climate. Thus a certain degreeof congeniality, an initial liking at least in certain respects, is needed.

There is truth too in Augustine's dictum: ‘One does not enter in the truth, if not bycharity’10 and in Pascal's thought: ‘We know the truth not only by reason, but alsothrough our heart.’11

(iii) The approach through tradition.

This is an approach, which is properly speaking no approach at all, as there is noquestion of a movement from a starting point to a goal: there is inmutability. One'sown philosophy, as it has been consciously or unconsciously accepted from earlychildhood, is continuously looked upon as the only valuable philosophy; it may beoccasionally restated, even readapted within certain limits

10 ‘Non intratur in veritatem, nisi per charitatem’.11 ‘Nous connadasons la vérité, non seulement par la raison mais encore par le coeur’: Pensees

282 (Brunschvieg).


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and also defended against other views. The truth of the philosophical statements isnever doubted or even questioned, nor is the truth of the personal relation to them.New experience is truth of the personal relation to them. New experience is integratedas a confirmation of the old view, absent is the truly ‘experiencing attitude’: to haveno theory, simply to experience in the widest and fullest sense, and afterwards toattempt an explanation which may lead to a theory. This attitude can be in particulardogmatic if it refuses to question the validity of certain principles; in addition to that,it can be traditionalistic if it refuses to question the reliability of those who havetransmitted the principles concerned. The disadvantage of self-sufficiency,one-sidedness, etc., belonging to this attitude, are obvious. It may be asked, however,whether there are advantages too.

For this, in our case, we turn to the Indian philosophical climate. Here tradition isessential for several reasons: firstly, the texts often aim at an experience and aremost properly transmitted by one who has had that experience: his experience isvalued higher than our own free investigation which is considered limited by ourmental development. Secondly, there is often an oral tradition alongside the text inwhich such experiences are embodied, and a traditional way of expounding a textwithout which it would remain partly unintelligible (not only where religious experienceis to be transmitted, but also for instance in scientific disciplines). In Indian philosophythese two factors cause the importance of initiation of a disciple by a qualified teacher.

At the same time it is clear that in this case also there can be no certainty. There isno method whatsoever to ascertain whether there are different kinds or degrees of‘divine’ experiences, and there is no guarantee that the word-transcending experienceof the guru (or even of the student of comparative philosophy) is the same as theexperience to which the text alludes. In addition the oral tradition may haveundergone innumerable changes in the course of centuries, unmanifest andunverifiable (though there is no parallel in the modern West for the accuracy withwhich some texts in the Orient - for instance the. Vedas - are orally transmitted andfor the power of memory needed therefore). Notwithstanding the obvious reasonsfor carefulness and


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a critical attitude, the student of comparative philosophy has with regard to Indianphilosophy to take into account the data provided by this traditional approach, asthey may contain elements of truth which are not otherwise accessible. Thereforewe must consider the approach through tradition if we want to receive the past as‘a claim upon us, affecting all that we are’.

Among orientalists, dealing with ancient civilisations that continue to-day (Islam,India, China, until recently perhaps), there is increasing interest for traditionalinterpretations, because it is realised that the Western philological and historicalmethods are, in their exclusiveness, not sufficiently adapted to their subject (c.f., forinstance, the work on Hindu Tantrism by Sir John Woodroffe or Arthur Avalon,together with his collaborators).12 The differences between the two methods arebrought out clearly by D.H.H. Ingalls.13

(iv). Objective truth.

Repeated reference has been made to truth as a goal for the investigations ofcomparative philosophy. To come closer to this truth and eliminate possibilities oferror, the previous three sections have attempted to judge which methods,approaches and attitudes have to be considered. Which truth is meant? Evidently‘objective’ truth, i.e., the truth of the ideas expressed in a text. For instance if wehave a statement in Plotinus' Enneads like ‘one need not remember everythingwhich one has seen’, objective truth does not mean that it is true that this statementoccurs in the Enneads (a truth we have to accept from philologists who have providedus with the text), nor that it was taken from earlier Greek thinkers and in turn takenby later medieval thinkers (a truth to be investigated by historians of philosophy),nor that the manuscript provides us with certain variants; but it

12 The French Arabist Louis Massignon emphasized that the Kuran has to be studied in the lightof living tradition, and not by exclusive concentration upon the text.

13 D.H.H. Ingalls, The Study of Śaṅkarācārya, Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental ResearchInstitute 33 (1952) 1-14. The author shows how the traditional method aims at kūṭasthanityatva,‘unchangeable timelessness’, whereas the historical method studies temporal difference.


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means that one need not remember everything that one has seen. This can onlybe established as an objective truth by ascertaining whether everything that hasbeen seen is remembered. We have to effectuate what Edmund Husserl has calledthe ‘historical epoche’, i.e., refrain from historical judgments about the opinions ofothers; we are interested in the ‘things’ themselves. If it can be established that acertain statement corresponds directly to that to which it refers, it is evidentlyobjectively true. This follows from the well known characterisation of truth as‘adequatio intellectus et rei’, the adequacy of the intellectual image of the thing andthe thing itself. If the truth is investigated in this sense, it will have answered in aphilosophical way to the challenge which each philosophical text contains.Unfortunately this is impossible.

We have assumed that there is an objective truth which can be found by us ratherthan by the philosophers studied. This pretentious view is not justified. We have noright to believe that philosophy brings questions nearer to a final solution in thecourse of time, as experience neither shows this nor the contrary. We cannottherefore claim that we belong to a higher level than the thinkers we study, whichwould enable us to pass final judgments on the truth value. We can at the mostinvestigate our opinion about the ‘things’ themselves, with which the texts also deal,and then compare the two. But do we not slip back then into relativism? There is noway out of these difficulties unless we are willing to reconsider the concept ofobjective truth itself.

(v) Existential truth.

Martin Heidegger14 has analysed the traditional concept of truth as ‘adequatio rei etintellectus’15 and has shown how this derives from an original concept of truth asdis-covery and dis-covering. Anything which is dis-covered in this sense has a‘discovered-being’ (‘Entdecktheit’) which is called truth. The human being (‘Dasein’)who has originally discovered it, has a ‘discovering-being’ (‘Entdeckendsein’), whichis also called truth.

14 Sein und Zeit, par. 44; Cf. Vom Wesen der Wahrheit, Frankfurt 1943.15 This so-called correspondence theory of truth is also criticised, but from a totally different

point of view, by logicians, e.g., A.J. Ayer, Truth, Revue internationale de philosophie 7 (1953):183-200. Cf, JSL. 20 (1955) 58.


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But these truths as ‘discovered-being’ and ‘discovering-being’ are only possible onaccount of a special mode of human being, which is therefore to be called ‘truth’ inthe original and primary sense, whereas discovered-being is true in the secondarysense. Secondary truth depends on primary truth. Thus there is only truth in so farand as long as there is human being (‘Dasein’). Heidegger illustrates this with thelaws of Newton, which were before Newton neither true nor false. With these laws,however, being was discovered and showed itself as being, which had existedpreviously. There can be ‘eternal truths’ if human being is proved to be eternal,which is not the case. ‘Objective truths’ are not only erroneously conceived as eternal,but also presuppose that there could be discovered-being without discoveringbeing,which is not so.

Heidegger's concept of truth corresponds not so much to the notion of truth whicheveryday language uses for instance in: ‘his statement is true’ as to that which isused in: ‘he is a true friend’ and still more in: ‘he is true to himself’. By the thesis thatthe former kind of truth depends upon the latter kind, no subjectivism is intended. Itmerely means that the foundation of a concept which has become apparentlyself-evident is made visible by means of a phenomenological, ‘hermeneutical’,analysis. - Since ‘Dasein’ is temporal (‘zeitlich’), Heidegger's analysis implies acertain ‘temporality’ of truth, which he has not further specified.16

It is possible to give several interpretations of Heidegger's thesis. For our purpose,we will try to confront the philosophies studied with a truth concept referring to thestudent of comparative philosophy rather than to these philosophies. This exemplifiesone way in which this concept of truth can be understood. Accordingly we will notask the unanswerable andmeaningless (according to Heidegger's analysis) questionof objective truth, but inquire how far we can establish a relation which can be calledtrue between ourselves and the philosophies studied, Advaita and Neoplatonism.Thus we may discover truth and discover ourselves.

16 Cf., however, Sein und Zeit par, 76.


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(B). The problem of historicism.

The history of philosophy shows different thinkers stating different truths. If weclassify them historically we find different ages believing in different truths. We cantry to find the ‘real’ truth by comparing these different ideas and concepts; but thenwe forget that we necessarily belong to our own age and hence will be inclined toaccept as true that which is considered true in this age. Wilhelm Dilthey, who wasfully aware of this ‘problem of historicism’ saw no other task for philosophy than ahistorical treatment of all philosophical systems. One wonders whether there is away out of this difficulty.

If the problem is stated thus (and we shall see that it is only possible to state it in aslightly different way) theoretically no solution is possible. We cannot becomeindependent from our own age, and there would be no standard to measure suchindependence. Even if we should state an objective, ‘timeless’ truth concerning anyphilosophical idea expressed in the course of history, we would have no certaintythat it was such a truth. Burckhardt once expressed this by defining history as anaccount of the facts which one age considers important in another age.

We cannot break through this circle, but it leads to a conclusion with respect tomethod. In the history of Western philosophy we see ‘not at all the perpetual changeof standpoints, which historicism claims, but the amazing continuity, with whichEuropean thinking reflects upon the same themes and problems’.17 When dealingwith the history of Western philosophy, therefore, we can only hope to arrive at arelatively correct picture by showing the relationship of a certain period to our ownperiod and by becoming conscious of our own position in this way. In another waywe reach the same conclusion i.e. that we should be related to the philosophiesstudied and study this relationship.

17 ‘Was uns die Geschichte der Philosophie tatächlich zeigt ist aber gar nicht der vomHistorismusbehauptete unaufhörliche Wechsel der Weltansichten, sondern lie erstaunliche Kontinuitāt,mit der das abendlāndische Denken immer wieder dieselben Themen und Problemedurchdenkt’: K. Löwith, Die Dynamik der Geschichte und der Historismus, ERANOS - Jahrbuch1952, Zürich 1953, 217-254: 237.


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In Indian philosophy ‘most of the systems developed side by side through thecenturies’ and this development made them ‘more and more differentiated,determinate and coherent’.18 It is possible to give fundamental points of agreementbetween all of them.19 A modern Indian can study Indian philosophy on account ofthis continuity and tradition. But how can comparative philosophy grasp its subject?For a Westerner, the only possibility is to find in the Western philosophical traditionwhich factors can account for the understanding of Oriental philosophy. Thecorresponding historical question is how and when Oriental philosophies enteredthe West. Comparative philosophers should first study how it became possible onaccount of the internal development of Western philosophy for Oriental philosophiesto be studied in Western civilisation. Oriental philosophies can be studied in Westernphilosophy only as possibilities of Western philosophy, just as, in (existential)phenomenology in general the phenomena can only be understood as possibilitiesof human existence.20

(C). The concept of time.

The first to deal with the history of philosophy in a similar way was Nietzsche in ‘DiePhilosophie im tragischen Zeitalter der Griechen’ (1873). He exemplifies here theunity between scholar and human existence. Unfortunately the unity between subjectand object led in this early work to subjective statements. This is the danger inherentin a method, which includes the relation of the person studying to the philosophystudied - but it is no reason to abandon this method for the sake of so-calledimpersonal objectivity.

In the prefaces of his work of 1874 (?) and 1879 Nietzsche expresses a view whichis typical of the European attitude with regard to the history of philosophy:‘Philosophical systems are absolutely true only to their founders, to all laterphilosophers

18 S.N. Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy I, Cambridge 1922, 5.19 Id. 71-75; M. Hiriyanna, Outlines of Indian Philosophy, London 1932, Introduction.20 See below: II, 5: 66.


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they are usually one big mistake....’.21 He turns to the personal element as the onlyirrefutable element: ‘For in systems which have been refuted it is only this personalelement that can still interest us, for this alone is eternally irrefutable’.22

In the West there is also a contrary opinion. This is a consequence of a particularview of time.23 We will sketch this concept of time which is of Christian origin (butsince long secularised in different ways) and compare it with the Greek as well asthe Indian view.

In Greece and India time is generally conceived as cyclical. The world is a perpetuallyrecurring phenomenon. The deity is above these circles and is non-temporal; hence,especially in India, time is little valued. In Christianity God manifests himself in time.He has created the world once and Christ has come once, just as there will be inthe end one Day of Judgment. This rectilinear view forms the background of thelater ideas of evolution and progress. We must understand this as constituent ofEuropean consciousness (which at the same time remains often unconscious), notas a belief in external progress or evolution. For the Occidental possibilities arealways open towards the future and can always be realised in the present. Whathas happened, happened once and for all; we can learn from it because traditionforms our consciousness. Through the process of time we will be able to find truth.This is no vulgar and unreflected optimism; it is a mode of conceiving ourexperiences, a kind of (cultural) a priori. From this view the doctrine that truth istemporal arose.

21 Transl. M.A. Mugge, London 1924. - ‘Nun sind philosophische Systeme nur für ihre Grunderganz wahr: für alle spãteren Philosophen gewöhnlich ein grosser Fehler......’

22 ‘Denn an Systemen, die widerlegt sind, kanz uns eben nur noch das Persönliche interessieren,denn dies ist das ewig Unwiderlegbare’.

23 Cf H. - C. Puech, Temps, histoire et mythe dans le christianisme des premiers siècles,Proceedings of the 7th Congr. for the History of Religions, Amsterdam 1951, 33-53; theauthor's Over het cyclische en het rechtlijnige tijdsbegrip, Amsterdam 1954, the bibliographyof which refers to the important authors on the subject, e.g., apart from Puech, O. Cullmann,M. Eliade, J. Guitton, etc. See also below III, 1: 164 sq.


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The Indian view is, like the ancient Greek one, connected with a different sentiment(‘Stimmung’): the ideal is at the beginning; it is the golden age, the age of Kronosamongst the Greeks and the Satya yuga of each kalpa in Hinduism. Thus we shouldlook back, and try to restore and preserve tradition faithfully.

We have given a rough sketch, in black and white as it were, of the complicatedpicture reality offers. However, the circular view exists also in the West, whereasthe rectilinear view is at present influencing the whole of Asia. Here we are interestedin these concepts in so far as they reflect a method for the history of philosophy.Each attitude affects every total view, also if the contrary view is taken into account.Nietzsche24 manifests an attitude with regard to history, which is mainly determinedby a feeling of ‘being ahead’. The Occidental may look back at sources becausethey led to later developments which are his real concern. The Indian looks in generalat sources as the richest germs, the later development of which is an adaptation tochanging circumstances and often a degeneration (‘Hiraṇyagarbha’).

In the study of comparative philosophy one has to be aware of this difference,especially in the study of Plotinus and Śaṅkara, both ‘circularists’, whereas themodern Western view is mainly (but not exclusively) ‘rectilinear’. Similarly the aimat a ‘personal’ approach differs greatly from both ‘object’ -philosophies.25 Only aconscious use of inevitable, but often unconscious modern Western concepts mayclear the way for a relatively adequate understanding of philosophies like Advaitaand Neoplatonism, which utilize different concepts. Only in this way one may attainawareness of and perhaps independence from one's own concepts and basicpresuppositions.

24 It cannot be shown here that Nietzsche's doctrine of eternal recurrence of the identical (‘dieewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen’), according to Heidegger his central doctrine, rests onassumptions that are alien to the Indian as well as (in a lesser degree) to the Greek ideas;paradoxically as it may seem, they are connected with the attitude and the sentiment of‘rectilinear’ time.

25 See below III, 5.


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4. Method

In the previous sections several references have been made to method. As in thismatter everything is interconnected, we have touched upon some topics underdifferent headings. Now a survey will be given of four points which are of primaryimportance in dealing with comparative philosophy.

(A). The ‘Standard Consciousness’

It passes our understanding how scholars have been able to compare twophilosophies, without realising that a standard of comparison is needed resultingfrom a third philosophy (which, in special cases, may be the same as the first or thesecond). That this has generally not been realised can only mean that this thirdphilosophy remained unconscious andmanifested itself only indirectly in the principlesof comparison, in treatment, methods, order, and evaluation of what is consideredas important and finally in the conclusions. Our first aim is to become conscious ofthis ‘standard philosophy’ and to make it explicit.

The ‘standard philosophy’ cannot be chosen arbitrarily, as we have stressed before:it is the attitude of the modern Westerner, in as far as it implicitly contains aphilosophy. This ‘standard philosophy’ manifests itself in the ‘standard consciousness’of the modern Occidental. To describe it fully would mean to describe what (better:who) the modern Westerner is, which is of course impossible in the present context.This ‘standard consciousness’ can be considered as consisting of a great numberof ‘constituents’. It is our task to investigate which are the most important of thesein the present context. An example mentioned before is the ‘rectilinear concept oftime’, which can be called one of the (very important) constituents of the standardconsciousness.

The discovery of these constituents is a matter of enlarging our consciousness; itcan be brought about by phenomenological analysis and study of the history ofWestern philosophy. It may lead to the awareness of what might be called ‘culturalapriorism’. The importance of comparative philosophy lies for a great part in thisdiscovery of ‘cultural a prioris’ - concepts and ideas which are considered asself-evident in a certain culture, but which may


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become relativised when other cultures are studied. What is most interesting incomparative philosophy is not the comparison (a purely academical achievement),but the better understanding of the compared terms and of one's own ‘standardconsciousness’.

(B). The existential attitude.

An existential attitude requires the absence of what has been referred to as relativisticindifference, esthetic approach, and dogmatic traditionalism, as well as the presenceof a readiness to accept what is studied as a ‘claim upon ourselves, affecting all thatwe are’. This readiness is essential; whether we are ‘totally affected’ depends ofcourse on our subject and on our own nature. This attitude can be specified in tworespects which are each other's complements.

Firstly, we should not only have an ‘open mind’, i.e., a tolerant attitudes but weshould also possess what could be called an ‘open personality’, i.e., a personalattitude of studying a certain philosophy in complete freedom, ready to accept thatwhat we find may be the truth and may have to replace what we accepted as truebefore. As this requirement is not easy to fulfil, it is useful to realise always thatphilosophy is intended for human beings as a standard and guide to life. Nothing isbetter, therefore, than actual contact with these human beings, a possibility whichcan be realised in the case of all ‘living’ philosophies.

The ‘open personality’, however, entails as its corollary a second attitude. If we arenot personally involved, we can study and compare many philosophies. But if weare personally involved, we cannot escape choice. After the readiness to acceptwhat characterizes an open personality, we have to choose which philosophies ordoctrines we are going to reject or accept ourselves. Remembering Nietzsche'sremark we may say that no philosophies of the past are generally accepted in theirtotality. But each detail and aspect can claim the right to be accepted or rejected,i.e., to be taken seriously. To hesitate because of an attitude of prudence andprecaution, which the self-criticism of the sciences has produced, can be consideredan aspect of this attitude of choice, provided hesitation results from a personalconflict (in


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the sense in which Pascal said, that there is no living belief without doubt), and notfrom a desire to escape.

This kind of choice was first stressed by Kierkegaard.

(C). The historical character.

Constituents of the standard consciousness can be discovered through aphenomenological analysis of the treatment of ‘foreign’ philosophies. However thiscan be achievedmore easily through historical analysis of the background of standardconsciousness, i.e., through studying relevant parts of the history of one's ownphilosophy. A Westerner must study the main lines of development of Westernphilosophy before he is able to approach Oriental philosophies. Then only does heknow the answers and attitudes of Western thought which influence his approach.Only then can he know in how far he understands other philosophies and in howfar he is a priori in a position to understand them. Without this preparation there willbe no adequate understanding and nothing is reached but the mistake of whichFaust was reproached by the vanishing spirit:

You resemble the spirit, whom you understand already, Not me!26

This happens frequently when Westerners deal with the Orient, though there maybe no spirit to tell them so.

(D). The circular procedure.

When we stressed a certain difference in the concept of time between Indian andmodern Western philosophy, which would have to be taken into account whenapproaching Indian thought, it may have seemed that a grave methodological errorwasmade: we used a certain knowledge of Indian philosophy in order to understandIndian philosophy - apparently a vicious circle. Likewise, in other sections of thisfirst part some knowledge of Advaita will be presumed and utilized.

This is however not a mistake but an inevitable procedure inherent in our method.As soon as some knowledge of Indian philosophy is acquired it produces a certainattitude which influ-

26 Goethe, Faust I: Du gleichst dem Geist den du begreifst, Nicht mir!


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ences our views with respect to Western as well as Indian thought. It is thereforeimpossible to give a linear enumeration of subjects in a philosophical treatment.Philosophical knowledge is always a process, which is never achieved and in whicheverything is interconnected. The reason for this is that a personal connection with‘the material’ is desirable, so that all previously acquired knowledge, which hasbecome part of the investigator's consciousness, has to be taken into account. Atreatment which would not consider the interdependence of all terms would beunconsciously dependent upon other factors than those dealt with at the moment.

Thus we shall utilize throughout a certain knowledge of Advaita as well as ofNeoplatonism. Arriving at the comparison itself, our procedure will consist in a gradualrefinement and a continuous testing of initial ‘working’ opinions. This procedurebelongs to the method used here, for it is the actual procedure developing in themind, before an artificial shifting and selecting, philosophically obscure andphenomenologically not given, will take place.

Those who object to this apparent impurity can realise its inevitability by reflectingupon the analogous ‘circular procedures’ which have been manifest throughoutWestern philosophy, for instance in Parmenides' fragment: ‘for me it is common,wherever I start; for there I will again return,27’ and likewise in Hegel, Dilthey andHeidegger.28

5. On synthesis and choice

In comparative philosophy several constituents of the standard consciousnessdetermine the approach, consciously or unconsciously. One of the most importantof these is the underlying aim of the student in which is embodied the answer to thequestion: in the search for truth, should philosophies be synthetised, or should achoice be made between them? We have voted already for the second alternative.But when scholars conclude appa-

27 5. 1-2 (Diels).28 See e.g., the beginning of the Hegel-monograph by T, Litt. Cf. Śein und Zeit, par. 7 et passim.


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rently logically on apparently purely phenomenological grounds, that we can arriveat a world philosophy by synthetising the main philosophical trends, or alternativelywhen scholars arrive at the acceptance of one philosophy while rejecting the others,such ‘conclusions’ merely manifest deeper lying and generally hidden attitudes ofsynthesis or choice.

Western consciousness possesses in the first place a constituent of choice, andonly in the second place one of synthesis. This could be shown by historical analysis,which would at the same time show the subordinate place of the synthetising attitude,and the repeated reactions against, it. A short summary of this development will begiven below. It will be shown in the second and third parts29 that in Indian philosophyin general, but in the philosophies under consideration in particular, the synthetisingattitude prevails.

As for choice, the essential dependence of Western philosophy upon the ‘tertiumnon datur’ and the ‘principium contradictionis’ must be emphasized: Aristotle said‘Each statement is either true or untrue’30 and ‘The same attribute cannot at thesame time belong and not belong to the same subject in the same respect’.31 Aristotlehas shown that even those, who would, ‘seriously or for the sake of argument’oppose these principles, accept them in fact and utilize them unconsciously. Hisargument remains largely valid, whereas it seems that the reaction against itculminating in the multi-valued logics based upon the intuitionism of L.E.J. Brouwer,remain as yet secondary trends in Western philosophy.32

29 See esp. II 13.30 De Interpretatione 9, 18 a 37-38.31 Metaphysics Г 3, 1005 b 19-20.32 I cannot agree with the thesis of C.T.K. Chari (On the dialectical affinities between East and

West, Philosophy East and West 3 (1953-1954) 199-221, 32-336), that there is a kind ofparallelism between the multivalued logics and some Oriental modes of thought, for thefollowing reasons: (1) in a three-valued logic, which is itself a meaningless formal system likeits generalisations into multivalued logics, only one meaningful interpretation in the semanticscan be given to the third value ‘u’: it means ‘undecided’, and this means in general: ‘not yetdecided’, and possibly: never to be decided. But this is not in contradiction with the law ofcontradiction; as nobody doubts that the truth value, once the decision may have taken place,will be either ‘t’ (true) or ‘f’ (false). The difficulty arises, as Brouwer has pointed out, becausewe are dealing in such cases with infinite sets. (2) When a mystic affirms: God is neither anor non-a, the logical meaning of this statement can only be that God transcends suchattributions, which does not contradict the law of the excluded middle. Example: ad (1): definea number A as follows: A = 1, if anywhere in the decimal development of π a sequence offive sevens occurs; A = 0, if nowhere in the decimal development of π a sequence of fivesevens occurs. Now to the statement ‘P’, meaning: ‘A = 1’ the truth value ‘u’ has to be assigned;but nobody doubts that we may be either able to prove A = 1, and hence the statement Pobtains the value t; or that we may be able to prove A = 0, and hence the statement P getsthe value f. There is no possibility that both are realizable whereas the value ‘u’ is preservedto express the fact that no proof is yet realised. - ad. (2): if we say ‘God is light and God isnot light’ it does not mean that we expect that we will one day be able to prove that God islight and to refute the reverse, or conversely; but it means that God can in some respect besaid to be light, and in some other respect not to be light. But this does not contradict the lawof contradiction, because it is exactly for this reason that Aristotle had added the clause ‘inthe same respect’ (katà tô autó). - See also below II, 11: 120.


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Just as the foundation for the logical attitude of choice was laid by Aristotle, thefoundation for the existential attitude of choice was laid by Christ.33 This is observablethroughout the New Testament, e.g., in: ‘Think not that I am come to send peaceon earth. I came not to send peace, but a sword. For I am come to set a man atvariance against his father, and the daughter against her mother, and thedaughter-in-law against her mother-in-law. And a man's foes shall be they of hisown household. He that loveth father or mother more than me is not worthy of me;and he that loveth son or daughter more than me is not worthy of me’.34 Suchpassages are not lacking in other religions, but they have perhaps never been takenso seriously and so much emphasised as in Christianity. This becomes especiallyclear in the scenes of Christ's temptations by the devil, where three alternatives areoffered and rejected in three acts of choice.35 Dostoievski has given an existentialinterpretation of these passages and has thereby shown how this attitude hasremained of central

33 The existential choice is also announced in Greek philosophy, as I hope to show elsewhere.34 Matth. 10.34-37; Cf. Luke 12.51-53; 14.26,27; Micah. 7.635 Math. 4.1-11; cf. Mark 1.12,13; Luke, 4.1-13.


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significance in the West.36 In the Faust legend the choice for the devil shows hownegative choice is as decisive and existentially irrevocable as positive choice.Reacting against the synthesizing efforts of Hegel, Kierkegaard considers choice,which was already announced by Pascal, the decisive factor of human existence.Existentialism has developed this and expressed it in a more philosophical way.

With Plotinus, who was in this respect a forerunner of Hegel, the synthesizing attitudebecomes predominant in Greek thought. In his age, syncretism, for which Alexandriawas the symbol, had become widespread. The synthesizing attitude of Plotinus isconnected with his traditionalism which will be studied below.37 This holds similarlyfor many currents in Indian philosophy, and in particular for Śaṅkara's Advaita.38

The synthesizing attitude is still more characteristic of Śrī Aurobindo.39

The synthesizing attitude, a minor trend of thought in Europe, has become importantin the United States. The historical reasons for this are clear. The American questfor a world-philosophy, as expressed for instance in the East-West philosopher'sConferences held in Hawaii, ‘Attempts at World Philosophical Synthesis’, by scholarslike C.A. Moore, E.A. Burtt, F.C.S. Northrop and others,40 has found little responsein Europe. On the other hand, the philosophies which emphasize choice, e.g.,existentialism, have been often misunderstood in the United States (and in theEnglish speaking world in general).

6. On influences

Those who are interested in comparative philosophy have often occupied themselveswith possible influences of philosophies upon each other. The problem of the possiblehistorical influences of Indian thought upon Advaita will be discussed below in an

36 in: The Brothers Karamazov, Book 5, Chapter 5: The Great Inquisitor.37 See below III 1.38 See below II 13.39 See below p. 134-5, n. 444 and p. 137, n. 449.40 Cf. the journal: Philosophy East and West - A Journal of Oriental and Comparative Thought,

published by C.A. Moore in Honolulu, Hawaii.


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appendix. However a general remark may be made about this problem, though it isnot primarily a philosophical question. The treatment of problems of influence andof origination depends on philosophical convictions, and therefore, in the case ofcomparative philosophy, on constituents of the standard consciousness.

The constituents concerned are those regarding causality. Here opinions rangebetween two extremes: the docrtine of the ‘preexistence of the effect in the cause’41

and the doctrine of ‘creatio ex nihilo’.42 Whoever is inclined, perhaps unconsciously,to the first view, will tend to stress points which are common to a certain field andits preceding background, and interpret these as effect and cause respectively;whoever is inclined to the other view will stress the differences and try to show thatthere are elements of the later phenomenon counterparts of which cannot be foundin the earlier phenomenon. The first view stresses causality and is especiallyappropriate for scientific explanations; rationality requires a certain amount of identity.Whoever holds the second view is in a better position to understand phenomenasuch as creativity and freedom. In these cases the approach determines the resultup to a degree which varies with each case. It will be seen how far our comparativestudy depends upon the view which stresses ‘creatio ex nihilo’; for in comparisonswe will often stress the differences.

The same consideration applies to the different views on possible Oriental originsof Greek civilisation. It becomes clear how Westerners, stressing the novelty ofphenomena in general, came to speak about ‘le miracle grec’ for denoting theincrease of creativity in Greek culture during the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. Theimpact of these constituents is considerable and should not be underrated. It shouldnot be concluded, however, that statements concerning influences and origins cannever be valid conclusions from phenomenological observations.

One other factor has to be considered. When influences are supposed to exist, it isnot enough to prove this supposition by

41 e.g. the Indian Satkāryavāda. See below II. 12: 126.42 The theistic (Judaic, Christian, Muslim) doctrine; and the Nyāya ārambhavāda.


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showing that similarities exist, that historical contacts took place, that more directinfluences cannot account for a certain development and that the creativity andoriginality of the philosophers concerned were not a sufficient explanation. In additionto this the susceptibility, by which a certain existing influence was also acceptedand absorbed, must be explained. This can only be done by studying thephilosophical characteristics of doctrines supposed to have undergone influence.Philosophical investigations into parallels and similarities should therefore precedehistorical investigations into the problem of actual influences. In short the capacityto be influenced has to be understood as a possible development of the entity whichhas undergone an influence.

7. Comparative philosophy and the Orient

A few remarks may be added which apply in particular to the comparison of Westernand Eastern philosophies by Westerners.43 If a previous remark, i.e., that Orientalphilosophies can only be studied as possibilities of Western philosophy, is true, thequestion arises what is ‘the Orient’ as a constituent of the Occident.

For this extensive historical investigations would be required. It may be shortlyindicated in which direction such specifications should be sought, disregarding manydetails.

It can be said that Western culture is built upon a double foundation: Greek cultureand Christian religion. Christianity follows upon Judaism and is, like Judaism,generally regarded as an Oriental religion. At the same time it has become thereligion of theWest. Having shaped the whole of Western civilisation (not exclusivelyin the religious realm), it is tightly interwoven with Greek elements and is traceableand visible almost everywhere (also in secularisation, itself a phenomenon ofChristian

43 Philosophically, it remains justified to speak of East and West, though the terms aregeneralisations and though we know that ‘East’ and ‘West’ in the most general sense, applyingto all fields of life, are abstractions. See esp. P.J. Zoetmulder, Cultuur Oost en West,Amsterdam 1951, reviewed by C.Tj. Bertling in: Bijdragen Taal-, Land-en Volkenkunde 108,2.


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origin). The continuous struggle and tension between Greek and Christian elementsis one of the main reasons for the Western search for self-knowledge. Because ofthis the West does not only contain, but is in its inner essence constituted by anOriental element. The discrimination ‘East and West’ did arise in the West becausethe West itself covers East and West. Therefore the West is vitally interested in theEast. It has a greater understanding (not only enumerative and ‘external’ knowledge,as it is sometimes said) of the East, than the East has of the West - for the simplehistorical reasons that some of its knowledge of the East results from self-knowledge.The East is more than a mirror into which the West looks, as has been said.44 TheWest sees in the East at a ‘safe’ distance something which internally moves itselfand which therefore fascinates it. There is no doubt that the fascination for the Orientamong Westerners (which has a different character from the enthusiasm of somemodern Orientals for the West) has to be partly explained on account of this.

However, the advantage of a first understanding implies a disadvantage: the Orientis the scene on which the West projects; it is a receptacle of Western projections.Though the sources of these projections are often Oriental, there is no guaranteethat the reality upon which these projections are imposed corresponds to the image.So, paradoxically as it may seem, the misunderstanding of the East by the West isalso greater than that of theWest by the East. All this could originate, because thereis an urge in theWest towards the East ‘which is outside’, because of the East ‘whichis inside’. The primary step to be taken by Westerners who want to have a realunderstanding of any aspect of the East, is to try to remove the projections.

As Christianity may be considered the ‘Oriental element’ in Western civilisation, itmight be assumed that always Christianity is projected upon Oriental systems ofthought. This has very often been the case at least unconsciously, for conciouslythe Christian claim of unicity tended to differentiate, which was favourable for laterscholarly discrimination. But Christianity is by no means the only source ofprojections. The actual situation is less

44 H.S. Nyberg, Das Studium des Orients und die europäische Kultur, Zeitschrift der deutschenmorgenländischen Gesellschaft 103 (1953) 9-21: 20.


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simple and consists of an increasing number of structures and superstructures, ofwhich little is known.

The Christian element is emotionally connected with the Orient (though a deeperanalysis shows that certain Oriental modes of thought are more Greek in characterthan Christian - as will be repeatedly seen in this study). This is connected with thehistory of Western Orientalism. This discipline originated when Bible study wasrevived on account of Protestantism. Hebrew language and thought were studied,and subsequently other Semitic languages, especially Arabic (and hence Islam).Once the study of Oriental languages and cultures had begun, India became thegreat rediscovery of the Romantic movements45 and China of the Enlightenment.

Apart from this religious relation to the Orient, fore-shadowed in Christianity andsymbolized in the words: ‘Ex Oriente Lux’ - ‘The light comes from the East’ - therelation between West and East has also been conceived as a relation of tensionand opposition, as for instance in the wars of Greece against the Persians or in thecrusades against the Muslims. Also in this connectionWestern consciousness arosebut as a reaction and protest against the great Oriental powers - with theconsciousness of the child, who revolts against his parents, and sets himself free.Nietzsche's somewhat exaggerated words about the relations of the Greeks to othercountries apply in particular to the Orient: ‘Nothing is more foolish than to swear bythe fact that the Greeks had an aboriginal culture; no, they rather absorbed all theculture flourishing amongst other nations, and they advanced so far, just becausethey understood how to hurl the spear further from the very spot where anothernation had let it rest’.46

Both attitudes resulted in what may be called historical consciousness, itself adevelopment of the Christian concepts of time and history. Nyberg says about whatcould be called the oriento-

45 Cf. above, p. 7.46 Transl. M.A. Mugge, London 1924 - ‘Nichts ist törichter, als den Griechen eine autochtone

Bildung nachzusagen, sie haben vielmehr alle bei anderen Volkern lebende Bildung in sicheingesogen, sie kamen gerade deshalb so weit, weil sie es verstanden, den Speer von dortweiter zu schleudern, wo ihn ein anderes Volk liegen liess’ (o.c., 1).


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version of Western historical consciousness: ‘Only contact with the Orient and ourcapacity to assimilate this meeting internally caused the origin and development ofhistorical consciousness.’47

8. Comparative philosophy and Advaita

Advaita also presents an inner possibility of Western philosophy (this does not meanthat we are entitled to affirm dogmatically that the West has its own Advaita; but itmeans that what we can philosophically understand of Indian Advaita can only bethe development of a possibility of Western thought).48 Some material will here bepresented which may contribute to the solution of the problem of the philosophicalfoundation of ‘Western Advaita’. It may be suggested as a tentative solution to thisproblem that modern Western interest in philosophies like Advaita, is only the latestform of an ancient ‘counter-tradition’ of impersonalism. This tradition starts withNeoplatonism (according to Emile Bréhier),49 or at least contains Neoplatonism asone of its earliest manifestations. It re-appeared regularly and has been repeatedlycriticised and rejected. In a similar manner as Augustine rejected Plotinus, themedieval church rejected Meister Eckehart, Muslim orthodoxy50 rejected Ibn 'Arabīand, in only a partly secularized way, Kierkegaard rejected Hegel.51. We look throughNeoplatonic eyes at Advaita, and the attitude of Western thought with regard toNeoplatonism predetermines our attitude to Advaita.

Finally a few remarks may be added about Schopenhauer and Deussen, the firstphilosophical interpreters of Advaita in Europe, for they do not seem to belong tothe impersonalist tradition. The incorrectness of their historical perspective, whichnowadays seems

47 ‘Erst die Berührung mit dem Orient und unsere Fähigkeit, diese Begegnung innerlich zuerleben haben bei uns das geschichtliche Bewusstsein erweckt und erweitert’ (Ibid).

48 Moreover it is not at all against the spirit of Advaita to be expounded in different ways: cf.T.M.P. Mahadevan, Western Vedänta in: Vedänta for modern man, New York, 1951, 15-19.

49 La philosophie de Plotin, Paris 1928, Chap. VII: ‘Avec Plotin, nous saississons done le premierchaînon d'une tradition religieuse, qui n'est pas moins puissante que la tradition chrétienne....’

50 e.g. Ibn. Taimīya.51 see e.g. M. Bense, Hegel und Kierkegaard, Kōln-Krefeld 1948.


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evident, can be easily gathered from a booklet by Deusson entitled ‘Vedänta andPlatonism in the light of Kantian philosophy’.52 There Indian thinkers are regardedas subjective idealists, especially Sankara, notwithstanding the essential differencesbetween Advaita and subjective idealism.53 Moreover, Parmenides and Plato arealso interpreted in a Kantian way: for instance, when Parmenides speaks aboutbeing as indivisible and unchanging, it is argued that indivisibility excludes spaceand time from being and immutability excludes causality (which is true), so that theseentities have to be attributed to the human subject in the Kantian sense. Lastly, Kanthimself is interpreted in a Schopenhauerian (i.e. metaphysical) way, through theidentification of will as the thing in itself. Through all these interpretations andinterpolations a unified and apparently final world view has come into being. Nomajor difficulties are left for a philosopher like Deussen. But in fact we have not gonebeyond the philosophy of Schopenhauer, itself only one of the possible developmentsof Kant's thought, the latter itself only one of the various outcomes of Greekphilosophy combined with later reflection and analysis. And likewise an interpretationof Advaita is given, which tells us more about Schopenhauer than about Advaita.

52 P. Deussen, Vedänta und Platonismus im Lichte der Kantischen Philosophie, Berlin 1922.53 See below II, 11: 123.


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Part IIThe Metaphysics of AdvaitaIntroduction

Much has been written about the Advaita Vedānta of Śrī Saṅkarācārya. When inthe following pages another attempt is made to describe the main features of hismetaphysics little that is new can be achieved. Especially in this field of Indianphilosophy, the widespread quest for originality has to give way to the more modestrecognition of work previously done by noteworthy scholars. Still controversiesremain concerning the significance, if not the interpretations of several points of theĀcārya's doctrine. In the following description and analysis the search for a moreexistential characteristic in the sense laid down in the first part has led to specialattention being paid to three concepts which denote entities rooted in human being:sacrifice, meditation and knowledge. All three are closely related to the Vedicscriptures which every Hindu (who is vaidika, āstika) accepts: sacrifice is the actprescribed in the Veda; meditation takes place according to the supposed injunctionsin the Veda; knowledge comprises what is taught in the Veda. These are the central‘existential’ acts or attitudes from which the various concepts of Advaita came intobeing. A short investigation into the meaning of śruti and smṛti will therefore precedethe main description. Here stress will be laid upon the sacred texts as they occur inŚaṅkara's works and especially in the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, as the investigation isnot historical but searches for the significance śruti and smṛti had for Śaṅkara.Likewise, the following remarks (under 1.) are not intended as a short descriptionof the historical development from the Veda to the Vedānta, but intend to point outthe influence of the older tradition on Śafiṅkara's works.

Concerning historical factors it must again be borne in mind that the question ofmethodological approach is related to the background of the investigator, and thatit is not often on objective grounds that scholars utilize to a greater or lesser degreethe historical approach. This is evident from the fact that most Western


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scholars pay much attention to the historical order of texts, manifesting thereby thestress laid in European philosophy on time and history; whereas most Indian scholarsdisregard historical problems in favour of the philosophical questions concerned,thereby showing the low evaluation of the temporal in Indian thought. Aphenomenological investigation into the desirability and justifiability of either approachhas to proceed on the basis of the material studied. As long as this is not explicitlyquestioned it will be advisable to follow a more or less ‘middle path’. We shall nothesitate to elucidate points which are not fully clear or which are insufficientlydeveloped in Śaṅkara, in the light of earlier as well as later texts. But on the otherhand we will not attribute these later developments to Śaṅkara himself nor claimthat they were ‘potentially’ contained in his works. For by this practice we wouldhave implicitly voted for satkāryavāda, a metaphysical doctrine which itself constitutesa problem.1

Over a considerable length of time it has been fashionable to approach philosophicalproblems from an epistemological point of view and to claim this as the only soundand reliable method. This has been an increasing tendency in Western philosophyfrom the beginning of the modern period, after the middle ages, until Kant, and ithas also been an important element in later Advaita, e.g., in theKhaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya2 or in the Vedāntaparibhāṣā.3 Accordingly it is often saidthat Śaṅkara recognised three valid means of knowledge (pramāṅas): perception(pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna) and scriptural testimony (śabda).4 But no explicitdiscussion of these pramāṇas occurs in the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya where especiallythe śabdapramāṇa is stressed. Though in later Advaita six pramāṇas are recognized,5it seems more true to the spirit of Śaṅkara's Advaita not to apply this epistemological

1 Cf. below II, 12: 126.2 Of the 12th century, made partly accessible in: A. Bhattacharya Sastri: Studies in Post-Śaṅkara

dialectics, Calcutta, 1936.3 Of the 17th century. Ed. and trans. Madras 1942.4 e.g. S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy II, New York - London, 1951, 488.5 See P. Deussen, The System of the Vedānta, Chicago 1912, 89-90. In BSB 2.1.11 a quotation

occurs of Manusmrti (XII 105, 106); ‘Perception, inference and the śāstra according to thevarious traditions, this triad is to be known well by one desiring clearness in regard to right’,


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monism, and accordingly not to make an attempt to build his Vedānta upon anepistemological basis. Nearer to the Eastern as well as Western (Greek andmedieval) traditional outlook are the later developments of Western philosophy,where it is realised that all epistemology is rooted in human being or is at any ratedependent upon the general structure of being, so that it is an ontological mistaketo make a discussion of the validity of knowledge the starting point of metaphysics.6For those who have much regard for the epistemological approach - it is not ourtask to refute such a view, as has been done in post-Kantian philosophy7 - thefollowing investigation may be considered an inquiry into the nature and backgroundof ṇabdapramāṇa.

That the Brahmasūtras themselves entitle us to stress above all the importance ofśabda is evident right from the beginning: ‘Then therefore the enquiry into Brahman’(athāto brahmajijṇāsā) says the first sūtra, and the third: ‘(The omniscience ofBrahman follows) from its being the source of scripture’ (śāstrayonitvāt). The objectof Uttara Mīmāṋsā is the enquiry (jijñāsā) into Brahman and Brahman is the source(yoni) of the scripture. Śaṅkara also refers to another interpretation where śruti,taken as a means of valid knowledge, leads to Brahman. The commentary itselfleaves no doubt about the importance of śabda, scriptural testimony or revelation,as has been shown previously by Deussen8 and recently by Lacombe.9 The latterhas analysed a passage,10 which states that our chains of inference starting fromperception cannot reach Brahman; they are important only on the basis of revelation.Not only does the idea of the Absolute depend on śabda (Lacombe speaks in thisconnection somewhat misleadingly of ‘theology’, a monotheistic term, as perhaps‘revelation’ is too), but the whole of metaphysics depends on it, as for instancevivartavāda: for pratyakṣa and anumāna can only lead to pariṇāmavāda.11 In shortthe suprasensible realm is exclusively the

6 See e.g. M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit par. 31-33.7 Especially (implicitly) in phenomenology.8 O.c. 94-96: ‘The revelation of the Veda’.9 O. Lacombe, L'Absolu selon le Védānta, Paris 1937, 218-224; ‘Raison et révélation’.10 2.1.11.11 See below II. 12.


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sphere of śabda. Śaṇkara says: ‘It is impossible to reach suprasensible objectswithout the śāstras’.12 Some portions of the text analysed by Lacombe and referredto above run as follows: ‘In matters to be known from Scripture mere reasoning isnot to be relied on for the following reason also. As the thoughts of men are altogetherunfettered, reasoning which disregards the holy texts and rests on individual opiniononly has no proper foundation. We see how arguments, which some clever menhad excogitated with great pains, are shown, by people still more ingenious, to befallacious, and how the arguments of the latter again are refuted in their turn byother men; so that, on account of the diversity of men's opinions, it is impossible toaccept mere reasoning as having a sure foundation. Nor can we get over this difficultyby accepting as well-founded the reasoning of some person of recognised mentaleminence, may he now be Kapila or anybody else; since we observe that even menof themost undoubtedmental eminence, such as Kapila, Kaṇāda, and other foundersof philosophical schools, have contradicted one another...13 It is clear that in thecase of a perfect knowledge (samyagjñāna) a mutual conflict of men's opinions isimpossible. But that cognitions founded on reasoning do conflict is generally known;for we continually observe that what one logician endeavours to establish as perfectknowledge is demolished by another, who, in his turn, is treated alike by a third.How, therefore, can knowledge, which is founded on reasoning, and whose objectis not something permanently uniform, be perfect knowledge?... The Veda, whichis eternal and the source of knowledge, may be allowed to have for its object firmlyestablished things, and hence the perfection of that knowledge which is founded onthe Veda cannot be denied by any of the logicians of the past, present or future...Our final position therefore is, that on the ground of scripture and of reasoningsubordinate to scripture14 the intelligent Brahman is to be considered the cause andsubstance of the world.’15

12 BSB. 2.1.1 referred to by Lacombe, o.c. 223, n. 5.13 This may have been taken from Bhartṛhari: See J.F. Staal in: Philosophy East and West, 10

(1960), 53-7.14 Āgamavaśenāgamānusāritarkavaśenāca.15 BSB. 2.1.11 transl. Thibaut, Oxford, 1890, Cf. also the often quoted passage: ‘Even a hundred

śrutis, declaring fire to be cold and without light, cannot prove authoritative’: Gītābhāṣya 18.66ap. T.M.P. Mahadevan, Gauḍapāda: A Study in Early Advaita, Madras 1954, 80, n. 5 andS.K. Belvalkar, Basu Mallik Lectures on Vedanta Philosophy I, Poona 1929, 17, note.


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Thus the relation between the two pramāṇas, śabda and pratyakṣa is as follows:pratyakṣa informs us about the sensible realm, śabda (and only śabda) about thesuprasensible. For instance: ‘The Lord, about whom ordinary experience tells usnothing, is to be considered as the special topic of all scriptural passages’, whereasit is on the other hand said with reference to the jīva: ‘It is not the primary purport ofscripture to make statements regarding the individual soul’.16

The metaphysical ground for the belief in authority and for traditionalism is theconviction that time passes from higher to lower, that the ideal was in the beginningand that development is degeneration. Then it becomes desirable to attempt torestore the original situation, to try to live up to it and hence to accept its scripturesas infallible authority. This conviction exists in the idea of the four yugas, the purest,Satya yuga, in the beginning, the basest, Kali yuga, at the end. Combined with theidea of perpetual saṁsāra17 the belief of ever recurrent world cycles (manvantaras)arises, as it is found in the Purāṇas and existed for Śaṅkara. In the Vedas, the beliefin a gradual deterioration of time does not occur and neither does a looking up atan ideal original situation, nor traditionalism and belief in authority prevail. Later, thebelief in evolution came to be expressed in the idea of sarvamukti.18

Notwithstanding the relative stress on śabda in a discussion of the value of thepramāṇas, it cannot be said that Advaita is ultimately based upon śruti in the sameway as Mīmāṁsā. For ultimately the śabdapramāṇa is unreal, as we will see below.Ultimately for Advaita one's own plenary experience anubhava counts and producesthe conviction that the Advaitic doctrines are true.19 This had already been the thesisof Gauḍapāda,20 who also stressed

16 1.3.7. Thibaut's translation (‘It is nowhere the purpose of scripture to make statements regardingthe individual soul’) is not justifiable on the basis of the succinct expression of the text:tasyāvivakṣitatvāt.

17 See below II, 3.18 See below II, 14.19 See below II, 7: 88-9.20 See Mahadevan, Gauḍapāda. Chap. III. 77-88.


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the independent value of reasoning.21 In this spirit Ānandagiri says in his gloss onGauḍapāda's Kārikā with an unambiguous reference to Mīmāṁsā, about a personwho possesses anubhava: ‘Such an enlightened person does not become abondslave of the Veda. The meaning that he gives of the Veda, that alone becomesthe meaning of the Veda’.22

1. Scripture: śruti and smṛti

A few well known facts, to be constantly referred to below, will be mentioned here.The term śruti (‘what is heard’), denotes the revelation received by the seers (ṛṣis)and handed over by them to their descendants who did not receive any directrevelation.23 Being itself not of human or personal origin (apauruṣeya), it consistsof the mantras (saṃhitās), the brāhmaṇas, the āraṇyakas and the upaniṣads. Thesmṛti (‘what is remembered’), which is of human origin but inspired by the texts ofthe śruti, consists for example of the sūtras24 along with the Darśana literature,vedāṇgas, upavedas, dharmaśāstras, itihāsas and purāṇas.25

The doctrine of the superhuman, impersonal origin of the Veda (apauruṣeyatva),stressing the principal difference between śruti and smṛti as between directexperience and memory, is the Mīmāṁsā doctrine and was rejected for instance bythe Naiyāyikas who held the Veda to be the work of Īśvara and therefore pauruṣeya.The position of Advaita is that the Vedas are apauruṣeya but nevertheless the workof Īśvara, who is the Absolute conditioned by māyā.26 The Naiyāyika reasoning doesnot hold, as any utterance by a person need not be paurunṣeya: the guru for instanceutters knowledge which is apauruṣeya, as there is

21 See above p. 32, n. 15.22 II. 30 ap. Mahadevan, Gauḍapāda, 88.23 See Nirukta 1.20, where it is stated that ‘duty (dharma) revealed itself to the ṛṣis, who handed

it down by oral instruction to their descendants, to whom dharma did not manifest itself’, (V.S.Ghate, Lectures on the Ṛgveda, Poona, 23).

24 Wrongly classified under śruti by J. Masui and R. Daumal in their ‘Survey of the developmentof the Hindu tradition’. (Approches de l'Inde, Paris 1949, 28-29).

25 Cf. T.M.P. Mahadevan, Outlines of Hinduism, Bombay 1956, 31 sq.26 See below II, 14.


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‘contingence of personal origin through the succession of teachers’.27 Accordingly,apauruṣeyatva ‘consists in the fact that the Vedas in this creation are exactly likethose in the previous creation and so on without beginning’.28 According to theVedāntaparibhāṣā: ‘in the initial period of creation Parameśvara created the Vedawith the same sequence as the sequence of the Veda existent in earlier creation,but not a Veda of a kind different from that....’.29

It seems that the Vedāntic view concerning the superhuman character of the Vedafinds more support in the text of the Ṛgveda itself than the Nyāya view. There arereferences to knowledge supernaturally communicated or favours divinely conferredon Vaśiṣṭa and on Viśvāmitra. Sometimes the divine speech (vāk) is described ashaving entered into the ṛṣis, whereas amiraculous power is attributed to their prayers.Ghate who gathered these references concludes therefore that ‘it is quite clear thatsome of the ancient ṛṣis entertained a belief, though, no doubt, indistinct andhesitating, in their own inspiration.’30 Thus, the words of the Veda were ‘expired’ byBrahman and immediately observed (‘heard’ - cf. śruti: ‘seen’ - cf. ṛṣi) by the ‘inspired’sages.31

This impersonal and superhuman ‘sacred knowledge’ (veda) consists in the saṁhitāportions mainly of hymns, prayers and ritual formulas. The object to be secured isnot mokṣa (release, as in the Vedāntic systems) or even svarga (heaven, as in thePūrva Mīmāṁsā), but ‘a long life for full hundred years, prosperity, warlike offspring,in short, all pleasures of this earth. Conquest of enemies, freedom from diseases,abundance of food and drink seem to be the happiest ideal which the Vedic ṛṣisplaced before themselves’.32 When sacrifice is introduced how-

27 Vedāntaparibhāṣā 4.54.28 Ghate, o.c. 114.29 Vedāntaparibhāṣā 4.55. Cf. J.F. Staal, Nambudiri Veda Recitation, 's-Gravenhage 1961, 11.30 Ghate, o.c. 116. Cf. also L. Renou in: Etudes Védiques et Pāṇinéennes I, Paris 1955, 1-27.31 L. Renou-J. Filliozat, L'Inde classique I, Paris 1947, 270.32 Ghate, o.c. 126. - Some interpret the Veda exclusively in a spiritual sense, e.g., Śrī Aurobindo,

who interprets, e.g. ṛta as ‘Spiritual, interior truth’; the frequent go not as cow but in the firstplace as light ray and then as a ray of knowledge; ghṛta not as ghee, but as light and henceas mystical light (in his Introduction to: Hymns to the Mystic Fire, Pondicherry 1946). Cf. alsothe defence of Aurobindo's view against modern scholarship, Sāyaṇa and Mīmāṁsā by T.V.Kapali Sastri, Lights on the Veda, Pondicherry 1946. - For an evaluation of this view seebelow p. 42, n. 54.


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ever, the above aim undergoes, as we will see, a certain modification.

The Brāhmaṇas are in particular concerned with the sacrifice or ritual act (karma)par excellence, which we will consider below. The Āraṇyakas form the transition tothe Upaniṣads, which represent the jñānamārga, ‘way of knowledge’, in oppositionto the karmamārga, ‘way of action’. The respective portions of the Vedic literatureare accordingly called karmakāṇḍa and jñānakāṇḍa. But this Vedāntic distinction isnot accepted by Mīmāṁśā, which looks upon the Veda as karmakāṇḍa only. Theroad which (according to Advaita) having started with the recitation of the mantras,leads from action to knowledge, goes via meditation (upāsanā), as could be seenfor instance from the parallelism which is sometimes established between the fourparts of the śruti and the four stages of life (āśrama): the student, brahmacārī hasto recite the mantras; the householder, gṛhastha, has to perform the actions andrites as prescribed mainly in the Brāhmaṇas; the forest-dweller, vānaprastha, hasto perform meditations as dealt with in the forest books, Āraṇyakas; and thesaṁnyāsin's task is to find the ultimate knowledge (jñāna). Mīmāṁsā accordinglyrejects saṁnyāsa. But in Advaita, since knowledge is unconnected with karma ormeditation, one can at any time go beyond the āśramas33 and become a saṁnyāsinwho is atyāśramin. This is a typically Advaitic view, which is for instance expressedin the Mahābhārata in the ‘dialogue between father and son’, where the fatherrepresents the orthodox view, that renunciation should come at the end of the āśramadiscipline, whereas the son wants to take up saṁnyāsa immediately.34 Śaṅkarahimself became according to tradition a saṁnyāsin at an early age

33 Originally (e.g. in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad) a division into three āśramas existed, to whichlater (Śvetāśvataropaniṣad) a fourth and highest stage was added for the person who isbeyond the āśramas (atyāśramin), to be called subsequently saṁnyāsin, ‘who has renounced’(Maitryupaniṣad; Dharmasūtra) (Renou-Filliozat, o.c., 379).

34 See M. Hiriyanna, Outlines of Indian Philosophy, London 1932, 21.


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(as still do his successors in the four maṭhas).35 The Nambudiri Mīmāṁsakas of hiscommunity disapproved of this. On the other hand, the legendary conversion of theMīmāṁsaka, Maṇḍana Miśra, to Advaita36 is expressed in his taking up of saṁnyāsaunder the new name Sureśvara.

This short description shows that the Upaniṣads, the jñānakāṇḍa, constitute themost important source for all later philosophical systems, which each in their ownway aim at knowledge besides the other aim, especially stressed by some, i.e.release (there is in Advaita a close connection between the two). But it should notbe forgotten that this knowledge is in fact the successor of meditation, so that thelater generations were facing two possibilities: either to accept these results asapauruṣeya, revelation, faithful and dogmatic, as authority; or, to perform again theoriginal existential act and arrive at the same knowledge by performing themselvesthe meditation as prescribed in the text, i.e., meditating on the basis of the text, not‘freely’. Thus the apauruṣeya experience of the ancient seers is utilised, butpersonally regained.

The old duality karma-jñāna corresponds among the later darśanas (viewpoints,rather than systems)37, to the two-fold aim: dharma and brahma of (Pūrva) Mīmāṁsāand Vedānta respectively. The proper denomination, pūrva and uttara mīmāṁsā ismore instructive. Mīmāṁsā is a term derived from the root man-, ‘to think’ (cf. manas).This derivative has the function of desire and intensification; mīmāṁsā could thereforebe translated as ‘attempt an intense reflection’. In both cases this refers to meditationwhich will lead to (Mūmāṁsā) or which will have to make place for (Advaita)knowledge. The difference is gradual: Pūrva Mīmāṁsā means the first, the earlier,the previous meditation (a denomination given, of course, by the Vedāntinsexpressing their advancement with regard to the Mīmāṁsakas); Uttara Mīmāṁsā

35 See below II 13: 139. Suka was born a saṁnyāsin. The head of the Advaitic maṭha must bea brahmacārī even before the installation; the heads of the Rāmānuja or Madhva maṭhas mayhave been gṛhasthas and celibacy is enjoined only after installation: Cf. V. Krishnaswami,Swami in Kanchi, Madras 1957, 13.

36 See below II, 8 94 with n. 270.37 See R. Guénon, Introduction générale à l'étude des doctrines hindoues, Part III, Chap. 8: ‘Les

points de vue de la doctrine’, Paris, 1932, 213-222.


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means the ultimate, final meditation. When it is said that Pūrva Mīmāṁsā deals withthe interpretation of acts and rituals as prescribed in the Veda (especially in theBrāhmanas) and Vedānta with pure knowledge, it should not be forgotten that thelink between the two is the act of meditation. The reflection on texts dealing withsacrifice in the Pūrva Mīmāṁsā can be intensified and become a meditation whichwill ultimately be replaced by the highest knowledge. The word dharma as occurringin the first sūtra of Jaimini's Mīmāṁsāsūtra: ‘Then therefore the enquiry into dharma’(athāto dharmajijñāsā) refers to the religious duties and acts to be performed; theirstudy can be looked upon as a first meditation. The ultimate meditation, however,will make place for the knowing of the Absolute itself, and thus it is but natural thatBādarāyana's Brahmasūra begins with: ‘Then therefore the enquiry into Brahman’(athāto brahmajijñāsā).

Terms like jñāna (also vidyā) cannot be simply identified with Western terms likeknowledge, Erkenntnis, connaissance or even gnōsis (though the Gnostic use ofthe latter term resembles the Vedātic usage of the Sanskrit term). They have to beunderstood in their context and against the background of the sacrifice, of whichthey are, as it were, an interiorisation in a particular way to be specified below. ThusSénart could translate the term vidyā and its counterpart avidyā, as they occur inthe Chāndogyopaniṣad, by ‘magical efficiency of knowledge and inefficiency of itscontrary’.38

We are now in a position to see: (1) that śruti and smṛti are related to each other asimmediate experience and mediate memory; (2) that the second depends on thefirst in such a way that smṛti as ‘second-hand (human) exposition of the (divine)inspiration’, can become ‘memory’ through ameditation or reflection and thus becomeknowledge, i.e., first-hand knowledge, comparable to the original immediateexperience of the sages; (3) therefore that knowledge as used in this context isderived from a meditation on a revealed text, in such a way that the derivedknowledge rises to the level of the original knowledge.39

38 Chāndogya Upaniṣad, ed. et. transl. E. Sénart, Paris 1930, 142.39 The relation śruti-smṛti can also be compared to pratyaksa-anumāna: Sankara interprets the

latter terms, when occurring in a sūtra, several times as denoting the former.


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We see, therefore, that where there seemed to be an unbridgeable gap betweenhuman and divine knowledge, a closer analysis shows that there is in fact continuity,the reason being that smṛti ‘memory’, becomes knowledge, when the originalknowledge, which constituted śruti, is regained. There are texts, where thisfundamental and cognitive aspect of ‘memory’ is stressed; some are collected byCoomaraswamy.40 We may quote as an example the Chādogyopaniṣad: ‘Memoryis from the Self’ (ātmatah smaraḥ).41 There are traces in Buddhist literature too. Inthe Dīgha Nikāya it is said that the Gods fall from heaven only when their ‘memoryfails and they are of confused memory’.42

If meditation on a revealed text leads to a knowledge comparable to that which waspossessed by the seers of the revealed text, we find here announced a veryinteresting doctrine which combines infallible authority with independent philosophicalreflection.

There seems to be no justification in śruti itself, which directly enjoins that one shouldattempt to regain the original knowledge. The term vidhi43means injunction, formula,precept, especially (in the Brāhmanas) the injunction for the performance of a rite,a ritual act or sacrifice, as for instance injunctions of the form: yajeta, ‘he ought tosacrifice’, kuryāt, ‘he ought to perform’. This is further developed in Mimāṁsā. WhileAdvaita accepts the Mīmāṁsaka interpretation of vidhi, it lays more stress on thejñāna aspect, as we shall see below.

2. Concepts of continuity. Karman

An analysis of the duality of śruti and smṛti leads to a recognition of the continuitywhich exists between the two. Likewise it was seen that the ritual act can be gradually‘interiorised’ and can lead to meditation and subsequently to immediate knowledge.

40 A. K. Coomaraswamy, Recollection: Indian and Platonic, Suppl. to the Journal of the AmericanOriental Society 1944, 1-18. It remains questionable whether the author is right in hisidentification of smṛti with the Platonic anámnēsis. Cf. below III, 4, 188. Memory is also requiredfor memorizing śruti: Cf. Staal, Nambudiri Veda Recitation, 15, passim.

41 7, 26.1. ap. Coomaraswamy, o.c. 3.42 I. 19-22, ap. id. 7.43 M. Monier-Williams, A Sanskrit-English Dictionary, Oxford 1951, s.v.


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Meditation on a sacred text, originally a matter of interpretative reflection andelucidation (in Pūrva Mīmāṁsā) develops gradually into a meditation on the Absoluteitself and into knowledge of or identity with the Absolute (in Uttara Mīmāṁsā). Thecommon factor of all these developments is the element of continuity, a characteristicof early Indian thought.

It is a primary tendency of man to experience himself as an everlasting andindestructible entity.44 The belief in immortality of the soul, the reluctance to acceptdeath, the immortalization of kings (e.g., amongst the old Egyptians), of heroes, ofsages, of saints, and later of everybody, but also the urge of modern man to preserveand continue his personality are some of the manifestations of this. So are thenegative counterparts: the fear to die, to be dissolved or destroyed. In all ancient45civilisations this desire for continuity is projected (in a more than psychological sense)outside upon the external world, which is in its entirety perceived as a continuum.In ancient India this tendency must have been exceptionally strong, as can be seenfrom many facts. Betty Heimann, who noted this, speaks of a certain constancy(‘Konstanz’) and explains this in the light of the richness of tropical vegetation.46 Inthe light of the fact that the first achievements of ancient Indians took place in theplain of the Ganges or still further towards the North West, where there was noexuberance of tropical vegetation, it seems preferable to accept this simply as ahuman tendency which is general and which seems to have especially developedin India for reasons which are unknown to us.

Three examples of this preponderance of ideas about continuity and preservationmay be given, which are each instructive in themselves. They are connected withthree important terms: ṛta, annam and karman.

44 E. Neumann, Ursprungsgeschichte des Bewusstseins, Zürich 1949, 242: ‘Grundtendenz imMenschen, sich als ein Bleibendes und Unzerstōrbares zu erfahren’.

45 A term to be preferred to primitive, primordial un(der)developed, in which a certain unjustifiedevaluation is implied.

46 B. Heimann, Studien zur Eigenart indischen Denkens, Tübingen 1930, 146, sq. Cf. also F.D.K.Bosch, De gouden kiem, Haarlem 1945. The discontinuous in Indian thought, especially inBuddhism, is the special subject of the work by L. Silburn, Instant et cause, Paris 1955.


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The most important of the general or all-encompassing (it may be doubted whetherit is appropriate to speak here about ‘abstract’)47 concepts of the Veda is ṛta,48 asupra-divine force (though in particular connected with Varuṇa) expressing a kindof general order, cosmic, ritual as well as moral. Ghate discriminates49 (the modernmind must discriminate and dissolve when dealing with the unity in meaning of sucharchaic concepts) the following developments of these three meanings: (1) ṛtaregulates the alternations of the seasons and of day and night, in short of all therecurrences of natural phenomena (which are, it may be remarked, of specialimportance in an agricultural society - something to be accounted for when we arriveat a general idea of who and what the original ‘Aryans’ were - and which are typicalfor the Indian climate with its regularly recurrent monsoons). Ṛta gives birth to theGods too. (2) From this(?) it comes to signify the correctness and the regularity ofthe cult or sacrifice; the ritual acts are conducted by ṛta50. (3) It then denotes themoral law which every righteous man must observe.

The postulate of continuity explains how such a unifying term for order or law, a linkbetween a variety of phenomena, could come into existence. A term like ṛta wouldnot have any definite meaning and would be merely confusing if this belief incontinuity were not to exist in the background. This unity of denotation exists in theidea of order and presupposes the idea of continuity.

Secondly, the term annam clearly shows the continuity which exists between thematerial and the psychical and spiritual. This unity is difficult for the modern mindto understand. But after the increasing dualism of body and soul in modern philosophysince Descartes, which led to nothing but insoluble problems and insurmountabledifficulties, there is again a tendency in philosophy to accept the unity of body andsoul and the identity of the material, psychical and spiritual.51 This is a return - in away which is more justified than ever (i.e., on a phenomenological basis) -

47 Renou-Filliozat, o.c. 329.48 Cf. the Avestan aša.49 o.c. 144 sq.50 See e.g., J.C. Heesterman, The Ancient Indian Royal Consecration, 's-Gravenhage 1957.51 See e.g. J.-P. Sartre, L'êre et le néant, Paris 1943, 368-427; ‘Le corps’ (troisi ème partie,

chapitre II).


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to the traditional view, itself a development of the archaic view as it existed in ancientIndia and as it is for instance manifest in the term annam. Annam, from the root ad-,‘to eat’, means food. Nothing is as continuous as eating; food is continuously eaten,digested and absorbed, throughout the life of each individual. Moreover, the desirefor a continuation of eating is one of the most basic desires. Before this phenomenonhad become unconscious and self-evident, it must have been an important consciouselement, drawing the full attention of human beings. In that period of humandevelopment it must have been looked upon as a ready basis for many analogies.Under such circumstance annam could mean ‘Everything which is eaten, digestedand transformed on the fundamental basis of transformation’.52 Subsequently itbecame an equivalent of the later concept of substance. Betty Heimann has shownby analysing several Upaniṣadic texts,53 that the term points at a universal belief intransformation, a continuous transformation from everything into everything. Thatthis should not be interpreted in an exclusively spiritual way is evident. But that thereis, on the other hand, not even a preponderance of the material aspect (both errorsresult from habits of thought of the period of philosophy from Descartes to Kant)54can be easily seen from a text like Chāndogyopaniṣad 6.5.1: ‘When absorbed, thefood (annam) is transformed into three portions: the most gross elements becomethe excrements (purīsa) the middle become flesh (māṁsa); the most subtle becomespirit (manas)’.

52 B. Heimann in: The Journal of Oriental Research (Madras) 23 (1954) 8 sq.53 CU 6. 5.1; 6, 7.1; Ait. Up. 2.1 sq.; BAU. 1.2.11 sq; 2.5.1 sq. ap. Id. 8-10.54 Thus as well a spiritualistic as a materialistic monism fails: Sri Aurobindo (see above p. 35,

n. 32) as well as W. Ruben, Die Philosophen der Upanishaden, Bern, 1947, who identifiedthe whole realm of denotations of a trem like annam exclusively with the material, which wasconvincingly refuted by Betty Heimann, o.c. (Cf. also L. Renou, Religions of Ancient India,London,. 1953, 17). It is instructive to observe how as well a convinced materialist as a greatspiritualist can err when facing archaic undifferentiated unities of entities where we are usedto discriminate. In such cases the all too often blamed spirit of detached scholarly research,if undogmatic even in its method, is beneficial.For Ruben's book, see also the review by P. Hacker, Zeitschrift der deutschenmorgenl'dndischen Gesellschaft 100 (1950) 393-398.


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Since annam had a very general significance it could become extremely importantand central, connected with the fundamental phenomena of life and death and oflife-giving breath (prāṇa; cf. ātman - both concepts which manifest too theunseparatedness of material and spiritual). We read for instance: ‘It is food that iscalled exhaling and inhaling; it is food that is called life and death. It is food thatBrahmins call growing old; it is food which is called procreation’.55 Similarly theultimate concept, Brahman, is identified with food.56

Annam as food is not an image denoting phenomena of transformation in general,but denotes substance which is the principle of any transformation. Analogous termsare also utilised, for instance the term bhoktṛ, ‘enjoyer of the food’, which has becomea very important term in later philosophy, denoting the experiencer in general. Theconcept also occurs in Śaṅkara: ‘The highest self, when reabsorbing the entireaggregate of effects may be said to eat everything‘ (when commenting upon thesūtra: ‘The eater (is the highest self) since what is movable and what is immovableis mentioned (as his food) )’.57

This symbolism of eating and food (which is not only Indian, but occurs for instancein the Christian eucharist)58 has reached a kind of existence in the human mind,though sometimes in the unconscious layer where modern psychology discoveredit. The importance of eating and of food is manifest from the fact that sexualsymbolism as discovered by Sigmund Freud, is preceeded by a more fundamentalsymbolism, namely that of food and of its digestion. Also in the struggle for life theurge for food is stronger than the urge for sexual satisfaction. In the footsteps ofJung, Neumann has shown that the concept of eating can express living as well asthe general idea of possessing power. There are numerous references to this, oldEgyptian for instance as well as Indian,59 where food is described as the entirecontent of the world and

55 Taittirīya Brāhmana II, 8.8. 3 ap. H. Oldenberg, Dis Weltanschaung der Brahmana-Texte,Gōttingen 1919, 42, n. 4.

56 Taittirīya Upaniṣad 2.2.1.57 BSB. 1.2.9.58 See Matthew 26.26; ‘And as they were eating, Jesus took bread, and blessed it, and broke

it, and gave it to the disciples, and said: Take, eat; this is my body’.59 o.c. 40 sq.


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hunger as the negation of everything, as destruction and death (which actually itcan be). The same ideas are traceable in contemporary dreams. In the historicalprocess there is a development towards spiritualization or interiorisation; to eat andto digest the world becomes to conquer the world and lastly to be beyond ‘this world’.In case of the Gods, to eat the world comes to mean to withdraw or to dissolve it,60and philosophers interpret this in a purified terminology as a ‘reabsorption of theentire aggregate of effects’ (Śaṅkara). This occurs in archaic world views as wellas in contemporary dream material, whereas it can be shown to possess a specialsignificance for the child in an early stage of its development. To this conceptualrealm belong breath, hunger, thirst, semen, excrement, breasts, sweat, spitting,teeth, etc.61

One might wonder whether any philosophical significance can be attached to this.The answer is in the affirmative and the significance might be formulated as follows.Originally in human being (and still in us, although often as a hidden background)a unity of different entities existed, which the progress of consciousness (whichmeans repeated bifurcations through negation) split up in parts some of which weremore highly evaluated than others. Then the tension which is typical forconsciousness comes into being, and errors arise when the mind starts reflectingand identifying the original whole with one of the parts which have come out of it.The mind is unable to regain the fundamental unity which is at the back of suchpartition. To understand archaic concepts like ṛta and annam we would have toabandon the multiplicity which has arisen in the meantime through furtherdevelopments and refinements, not by a synthesis of the manifold, but by anendeavour to see the continuous background of the whole.

Perhaps the boldest generalisation of ancient India is the idea of karma.62 This worddenoted originally the ritual act, which established identity or continuity, or at anyrate a link between the

60 Ait. Up. 2.1; Tait. Up. 2.2; 3.2; Muṇḍ. Up. 1.1.8; Maitrāyaṇa Up. 6.9.1; BAU. 1.1.1; 1.2.5 ap.Neumann, o.c. 41-43.

61 See Neumann, o.c. Index s.v.62 See Renou-Filliozat, o.c. 341-342; 555-558; Heimann, o.c. 32-35; Oldenberg, o.c. 162; J.

Gonda Inleiding tot het Indische denken 53-60.


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performer of the sacrifice and his aim (see below). Later it came, to be applied tomoral activity and to its results. It retained its function of re-establishing a continuity,applied in this case to human life in its duration as a whole. Thus it filled the gapbefore birth and after death, and took the shape of a rational causal elementexplaining the ancient doctrine of rebirth or saṃsāra. Man is supposed to dissolveat the moment of his death, but ‘his’ (and the meaning of a possessive pronounbecomes questionable in such cases where the possessor has ceased to be) karmanis the indestructible substance which survives him and causes a new birth determinedby good or bad acts of a previous existence.

This doctrine of karman offers a solution for the discontinuous and thereforeunintelligible elements of human existence and it explains at the same time theexistence of suffering, solving the problem of the ‘theodices’ (bound to arise, as wewill see, especially in such world views as the Christian). The doctrine of karmanneed not, as it is sometimes said (referring to its identity with destiny as expressedin terms like niyata, vidhi, or diṣṭa, ‘fixed, settled’, etc.) destroy human freedom,63because every human being, though born in a particular situation and provided witha determinate karmic inheritance, can in his life freely accumulate good or badkarman.64 Advaita develops this in its own way, as we shall see.65

It follows from this idea of strict causality in human life, where a kind of equivalentto the law of preservation of energy holds (which the Western mind does not acceptin the spiritual realm, because of the idea of creativity) that karman is conceived assomething close to annam. On the other hand, it preserves the idea of a universallaw in its causality, cosmic as well as individual. Here it turns out to be the properheir to the ancient ṛṭa. The karman substance belongs again to the realm wherephysical and mental are not separated. Thus, karman is assimilated to the currentof

63 As the Ājīvikas did.64 As such its general structure is not so very different from the structure of freedom in the

existentialism of Heidegger. Entschlossenheit (resolution, decision, decisiveness) is stressed,but on the basis of and in conflict with the in-die-Welt-geworfen-sein,‘to-be-thrown-in-the-World’.

65 See below II. 14.


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a river, to the shadow which follows man,66 or again to the food, in particular specifiedas its undigested portion.

The ritual background of karman is never lost in the later developments of itsmeaning; and there may be even an element of magic or witchcraft alwaysdistinguishable in it. A psychological or mental tendency must have been associatedwith it from the early beginning, as we can see from the root kr- itself, which can beapplied to manas with the meaning: ‘to direct the thoughts or the mind’ (occurringsince the Ṛgveda) and later also connected with buddhi, etc.67

The idea of karman has remained a central idea and dogma of Hinduism, (as S.N.Dasgupta frankly admitted) probably mainly as the rational expression of the notionof saṁsāra.68 It becomes an all-powerful principle on which also the Gods depend.Apart from explaining social inequality and providing a metaphysical basis andtherefore justification for the caste-system, it is a kind of general theory of heredity,which applies to character, intelligence, behaviour and physique.69 Its fruitfulness inthe field of psychology was especially great:70 the saṁskāras (a term derived fromthe same root kṛ-), the impressions left in the mind from previous experience,particularly during a former life, are forerunners of what modern psychology callsdeterminants (determining factors) of the unconscious. It can even be said that withthe ‘collective unconsciousnesses’ of C.G. Jung (however questionable as yet thestatus may be of this philosophically unclarified and problematic concept) we areno more so far removed from an interpretation of the theories of reincarnation.

66 Notice a curious prefiguration of Schatten (shadow), a technical term in the psychology ofC.G. Jung, denoting an important factor of personal unconsciousness, constituting a kind ofcomplement to the conscious personality and consisting of dark ‘shadows’ and ‘shades’ andof obscure, generally unrecognised or oppressed, tendencies. The karmic influences are inparticular those which we would nowadays call activities of the unconscious, so that theconnection is not unexpected. Cf. also the term saṁskāra, ‘residual impression’, which couldbe compared with the mechanism of Jung's archetypes.

67 Monier-Williams' dictionary s.v.68 Concerning the historical problem, see below II, 3.51.69 Renou-Filliozat, o.c. 557.70 See above n. 66.


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In the doctrine of karman the tendency towards the establishment or re-establishmentof continuity has found a rational expression, especially on account of its causalstructure. Its rationality makes this doctrine universally intelligible and popular evenin the West.71 But we have to investigate further into its background. We shall finda causality which is much more universal and tends towards identifications of specialsets of particulars. Of this, the karmic causation constitutes only the most intelligibleand rational portion. This will be seen in the next sections, dealing with identificationsand with sacrifice. Sacrifice will lead to the act of meditation.

3. Karman - Samsāra - Transmigration

We shall now consider a few problems connected with karman and saṁsāra asdiscussed mainly in Buddhism and in Advaita Vedānta. Such considerations do notconcern us only as history, but they investigate the background of self-evidence,which is often the determining factor of purely metaphysical doctrines.

The Indian doctrine of karman was accepted in Buddhism as kammagāda72 orkirtavāda.73 Buddhism sought to avoid two extremes: (1) the view that ‘all that abeing suffers from or experiences is due to the sum totals of his deeds in the past;’(2) the view that ‘all that a being experiences in this life is only a matter

71 Cf. C. Eliot, Hinduism and Buddhism, I. London 1954, Iv. n.3; ‘Several other Europeans ofeminence have let their mind play with the ideas of metempsychosis, pre-existence and karma,as for instance Giordano Bruno, Swedenborg, Goethe, Lessing, Lavater, Harder,Schopenhauer, Ibsen, von Helmont, Lichtenberg and in England such different spirits asHume and Wordsworth. It would appear that towards the end of the eighteenth century theseideas were popular in some literary circles on the continent. See Bertholet, The Transmigrationof Souls, pp. 111 ff. Recently Prof. McTaggart has argued in favour of the doctrine with greatlucidity and persuasiveness. Huxley too did not think it absurd... As Deussen observes, Kant'sargument of the moral law, attainable only by an infinite process of approximation, points totransmigration rather than immortality in the usual sense’. As for Deussen's interpretation ofKant, it might be suggested that there is more connection with the Christian idea of Purgatory.- As for the Greeks see below III, 1: 165.

72 Kamma is the Pali equivalent of the Sanskrit karma.73 Cf. for the following B.C. Law, Concepts of Buddhism, Amsterdam 1937, Chapter IX.


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of chance.’74 It has succeeded in avoiding these by stressing the possibility offreedom, by making the ancient Hindu doctrine more explicit. It is pointed out forinstance in theMahāniddesa75 ‘that a man need not be afraid of the vast accumulationof karma through a long cycle of births and rebirths. For considered from the pointof view of the mind the whole of such accumulation may be completely undone bya momentary action of mind. Mind is in its own place and as such can make andunmake all such accumulations of karma.’

Accordingly, karman becomes cetanā, ‘volition’, and Buddhaghosa defines it as‘volition expressed in action.’76 The result constitutes the substance which is thecause of another existence, but in a very general and impersonal way. The moreindividual khandhas, which originated in the past as consequences of actions(volitions), have ceased to be. In actual existence other khandhas arise out of theconsequences of past deeds, but they are destroyed too. In another existence otherswill be produced from those in this existence, not a single condition will pass on tothe next existence.77

The Buddhists do not believe in a theory of transmigration of the individual soul: ‘Itgoes without saying,’ says Law,78 ‘that the Buddhist thinker repudiates the action ofthe passing of the ego from an embodiment to an embodiment.’ ‘With the Buddhist,rebirth is to be considered as kammasantati or the continuity of an impulse.’79 Thisis still more evident from a text of the Śālistamba sūtra.80 ‘There is no element whichmigrates from this world to the other; but there is recognition (realisation) of thefruition of karma, as there is continuity of causes and conditions. It is not as it werethat one, dropping out from this world, is born into another, but there is continuityof causes and conditions.’

74 It may be remarked here, that this excludes an ‘unphilosophical’ monotheistic doctrine, i.e.,that ‘all what a being experiences is due to the will of God.’

75 I. 117-118 ap. Law, o.c. 56.76 Atthasālinī 88, ap. Id. 57.77 Viśuddhimagga II. 603 ap. id, 58.78 Id. 45.79 Id. 46.80 Quoted in T.R.V. Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, London 1956, 33.


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This conclusion should not be looked upon as a philosophical addition to the Buddha'steachings, which never deal, as some say, with metaphysics; for the Buddha issometimes expressed to have ‘rigorously eschewed all theoretical considerationsas vain.’ But this is not true.81 The same idea can be found in less philosophical, butperhaps more suggestive language in a parable from the Milindapanha.82

Said the king: ‘Bhante Nagasena, does rebirth take place without anythingtransmigrating?’ - ‘Yes, your majesty, rebirth takes place without anythingtransmigrating’, - ‘How, Bhante Nagasena, does rebirth take place without anythingtransmigrating? Give an illustration’. - ‘Suppose, your majesty, a man were to lighta light from another light; pray, would the one light have passed over to the otherlight?’ - ‘Nay, verily, Bhante’. - ‘In exactly the same way, your majesty, does rebirthtake place without anything transmigrating.’

Thus with Buddhism we are back in the realm of the original Vedic idea of karmanas universal causality and continuity.

What has Śaṅkara to say to this? He may be expected to uphold the Brahmanicalātmavāda as against the Buddhist anātmavāda. Let us consider his view moreclosely.

There are many passages in the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya where views concerning ‘lifeafter death’ are put forward, which seem to leave no doubt about the implicitconviction of Śaṅkara that there is a continuity of the ego after death. This seemsto be evident, for instance, from the treatment of the Upaniṣadic pitṛyāṇa anddevayāṇa. Especially in the Chāndogya but also in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka83 at least twopossible destinies for the individual soul after death are mentioned. Some soulsascend, passing through divisions of time and astral bodies, up to Brahman andattain release (devayāṇa, the path of the gods, or archirmārga, the bright way);others ascend only partially and have to return to the earth (pitṛyāṇa, the path of thefathers, or dhūmamārga, the dark way). Those who follow the pitṛyāṇa do not passbeyond the sphere of

81 Murti, o.c. 29-31 and Chapter 11.82 From H.C. Warren, Buddhism in translations. Cambridge Mass. 1947, 334; Cf. 234-241.83 CU. 4.15. 5-6; 5.10. 3-7; BAU. 6.2.16.


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the moon (cf. candramāsaṃ jyotiḥ in the Gītā84) which signifies according to Guénon85

that these souls remain invested with bodies and therefore remain individual; theothers transcend the sublunary world and are beyond all form and individuality.

The superiority of knowledge to works, which is a characteristic doctrine of Advaita,86is manifest in the interpretation that pitṛyāṇa is for those who have attained rightknowledge. Śaṅkara interprets the verses of the Gītā referring to this as follows:‘Those who die, having been engaged in the contemplation of Brahman, reachBrahman by this path’ (i.e. devayāṇā);87 whereas by the other path (pitṛyāṇa) ‘theYogin - the karmin who performs sacrifices (to Gods) and other works - attains tothe lunar light, and on the exhaustion thereof, returns again to earth.’88

In the commentary on the Brahmasūtras, however, in 4.3.7-14, Śaṅkara holds theview that Brahman which is attained as goal of the devayāṇā is not the highestBrahman, or, let us say (anticipating a future discussion of the doctrine of the ‘two’Brahmans), is not the real Brahman. Then who is to reach the real Brahman, andhow?

The answer cannot be provided at this level of knowledge and thinking, which iscapable only of attaining a lower insight according to Śaṅkara. If there is higher aBrahman which can be attained in some way, there must also be a higher knowledgewhich refers to it. Here we see the origin of the doctrine of parabrahman andaparabrahman to which correspond respectively paravidyā and aparavidyā. Deussen,who speaks in this connection about an exoteric and an esoteric eschatology,89describes Śaṅkara' system as a combination of both. But the term combina-

84 BG. 8.25.85 R. Guénon, L'homme et son devenir selen le Védānta, Paris 1947, Chapitre XXI.86 See below II. 6-8.87 Ad BG. 8.24; transl. A. Mahadeva Sastry, Madras, 1947, 235.88 Ad BG. 8.25; transl. ibid.89 Deussen, o.c. Chapter XXIX, Section 2 (358-359). All the three terms, exoteric, esoteric and

eschatology, breathe too much of a Christian or at any rate not Indian atmosphere and shouldnot be applied. Eschatology is characteristic of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, where it hasa specific significance.


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tion is much too weak: higher knowledge transcends lower knowledge in its entiretyand in fact does away with it. In reality Śaṅkara does not believe in a continuity ofthe ego after death, despite many texts which make a contrary impression. Ultimatelytransmigration is not real. The ultimate doctrine is clearly stated as follows: ‘Thereis in reality no transmigrating soul different from the Lord.’90 This is nothing but theconsequence or mere re-statement of the central Advaitic doctrine that the individualsoul is not different from the Absolute.

Concluding this short investigation, in which anticipations of future analyses had tooccur, we may say that it is clear that in Buddhism as well as in Advaita Vedāntathe somewhat simple or naive doctrine of the transmigration of souls or ofreincarnation in the popular sense does not occur. In both cases general andimpersonal forces and supraindividual causal relations replace the view of the simplecontinuity of the ego after death, and thus we return again to the ancient doctrineof impersonal karman.

A historical but philosophically speaking important question is whether originallyonly the impersonal karman theory occurred in India, or whether there was also theconcept of an individual soul which is reborn after an interval separating death andbirth. Both possibilities have found ardent and learned advocates. In the opinion ofA.A. Macdonell and A.B. Keith91 the theory of transmigration was only introducedwith the Upaniṣads and did not exist previously. Against this R.D. Ranade defendedthe view that the idea of transmigration could be traced back to the Vedas. He quotesespecially a hymn of the first maṇḍala of the Ṛgveda,92 of which the last two versesstate that ‘the immortal principle, conjoined with the mortal one, moves backwardsand forwards by virtue of its natural power; but the wonder of it is, the poet goes onto say that the mortal and immortal elements keep moving ceaselessly in oppositedirections, with the result that people are able to see the one but unable to see theother.’93 Ranade fol-

90 Satyam, neśvarād anyaḥ saṁsārī: BSB. 1.1.5.91 Taittirīya Saṁhitā, Introduction clxxii: ‘absence of metempsychosis before 600 B.C.’92 I. 164.93 R.D. Ranade, A Constructive Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy, Poona 1926, 151.


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lows here the interpretation of Roth, Böhtlingk and Geldner - against Oldenberg -,i.e., that the idea of transmigration is contained in these verses. It seems, however,not quite necessary to draw this conclusion. It is possible and perhaps even likelythat the lines express a more or less contrary view. When we consider the versemore closely, we see first expressed the conviction that there are two principles inmen, one immortal and one mortal - the well known theme of ‘due sunt in homine’(‘there are two in man’), which is universally found (cf. the celebrated Vedic hymnof the two birds on the tree, one eating and one watching; etc.). Next it is stressedthat it is the immortal (and not the mortal) principle which moves, which comes thusvery near to Śaṅkara's ‘verily, there is no other transmigrant than the Lord.’ If thisrefers to transmigration at all it is incompatible with the opinion that a mortal principletransmigrated. After this the lines speak of movements of both principles in oppositedirections. This may have come into being by noticing how the tendencies in manwhich aim at temporal aims contrast with those whose aim is everlasting. Lastly itis stressed that the mortal principle is visible while the immortal is not; a necessarystatement, as it has to elucidate the fact that there are two in man, whereas we seeonly one.

The last passage which Ranade quotes in support of the view that reincarnationoccurs in the Veda speaks about the ‘guardian of the body’ ‘returning frequently(varīvarti)’ inside the mundane regions.94 His argument that this guardian denotesthe soul is convincing. But then it must be specified which of the two souls is meanthere: and there can be no doubt that it is the immortal principle. It is then likely thatwe should understand that this divine principle comes again and again into the world,manifesting itself in us, as the immortal principle.

If our interpretations are right, there is no reincarnation in the Vedas, whereas it isalso rejected or subordinated in different ways in Buddhism as well as in Advaita.The theory of karman may have originated among the Ājīvikas.95 It seems to bebeyond doubt that it is an Upaniṣadic doctrine. The locus classicus96 for

94 Ṛgveda I. 164.31 ap. Ranade, ibid.95 See Renou, Religions of Ancient India, 117.96 Ranade, o.c. 154.


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reincarnation is perhaps the following passage of the Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad:97‘Being attached, he, together with the work, attains that result to which his subtlebody or mind is attached. Exhausting the results of whatever work he did in this life,he returns from that world to this for (fresh) work. Thus does the man who desires(transmigrate)’. Even this passage has been interpreted by Coomaraswamy98 in ananti-reincarnationist sense; but his arguments are not very convincing.

There is no certainty that the theory of transmigration was ever universally accepted;it is quite possible that it was a popular belief, from time to time rejected by thephilosophers. This holds for Buddhism and Advaita. In Buddhism, the ego does nottransmigrate because there is merely continuity of karman; in Advaita neither theego nor transmigration is real; the notion of transmigration disappears as soon asthe Self is realized as the sole reality.

The karmic causality, of which the theory of transmigration is a further development,constitutes a special case of a much more universal trend of thought, tending, aswe said, towards identifications of special sets of particulars.

4. Identifications. Plenitude

In a verse of the Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad, preceding the verse quoted in the previoussection,99 Brahman, the Self, is identified consecutively ‘with the intellect, the manasand the vital force, with the eyes and ears, with earth, water, air and ether, with fireand what is other than fire, with desire and the absence of desire, with anger andthe absence of anger, with righteousness and unrighteousness, with everything -’in short, ‘identified with this and with that,’ i.e., according to Śaṅkara in thecommentary, with what is perceived and with what is inferred.

Onemight suppose that such lists of identifications are especially applied to Brahmanas it is the Absolute and the supporter of everything, and is probably contained insome way or

97 4.4.6.98 A.K. Coomaraswamy, On the one and only Transmigrant. Supplement, Journal of the American

Oriental Society 3 (1944) 19-42.99 BAU. 4.4.5.


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another in everything. But this is not so. The identifications of all kinds of entitieswith each other, already beginning in the Vedas, occur very frequently in theBrāhmaṇas, of which they can be said to be characteristic. Examples are abundant.We may quote, with Oldenberg:100 ‘Viṣṇu is the sacrifice’, ‘Prajāpati is the year’, ‘thecow is breath’, ‘there are three kinds of water: the frog, the water plant avakā andthe bamboo stem’, etc.

Oldenberg has shown that the significance is not merely symbolic. Here are realitiesand real identifications, as can be seen from the fact that identities are utilised toinfluence reality. When for instance a certain reality is to be influenced, it isconsidered equally effective if the same influence is exerted on another entity, whichis considered ‘identical’ with the former. Before attention is paid to the magicalelement which is undoubtedly contained herein, texts of the Brāhmaṇas themselvesmay be considered. They offer two further suggestions. Firstly a term is used whichcharacterises the relation between two identified entities: nidāna (from the root dā-,‘to bind’). It denotes in the Ṛgveda a band, a rope or a halter, referring for instanceto the bondage of cows before they are released by Indra. In the Brāhmaṇas itcomes to denote the reason and foundation of identifications, e.g., ‘verily, thesacrificing priest is the animal by virtue of the nidāna’,101 etc.102 A magical rope orband binds the two phenomena which are considered identical.

The second suggestion consists of explanations, e.g., ‘the animal is breath; becauseas long as it breathes it is an animal’103 or ‘the ṛks (of the Ṛgveda) are the earth,because they are recited on the earth’;104 and various etymological explanationslike: ‘Indra is the central breath; because the central breath kindles the other breathsand is accordingly called indha, “kindling”’ etc.

These explanations are valid in so far as they explain why certain entities areconnected with others (whether they are

100 H. Oldenberg, Die Weltanschaung der Brāhmaṇa-Texte. Gōttingen 1919, 110. For whatfollows 110-123.

101 Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa III. 7.1.11 ibid., 117.102 Id. III. 2.4.10.15 ibid.103 Id. III. 8.3.15. ibid., 118.104 Id. IV. 6.7.1 ibid.


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sometimes so-called ‘secondary’ explanations does not concern us here); but theydo not explain why this special mode or connection, i.e., identity, is supposed toexist; this is presupposed. Likewise, it remains unclarified why the nidānas do notonly bind, but establish identity between two sides.

When such forms of thought are characterised as ‘magical’,105 a term is used whichdenotes that at least the following two elements are present here: the convictionthat knowledge is power; and the conviction that power over an entity can be obtainedby gaining power over another entity which is considered identical with the former.When a power B is known, power over another entity A is secured by gainingknowledge of the effective identity of A and B: ‘the main procedure in achieving thatknowledge’, says Gonda,106 ‘consisted in identifying these powers, because, in theiropinion, a potency A would doubtless be known and controlled, if only its identitywith a potency B which was already known, could be established.’

That identifications are magically effective and not arbitrary or a play with conceptsand words can also be seen from the fact that certain identifications are rejected.Oldenberg has given examples such as: ‘goats, sheep and wild animals are not allanimals; but cattle constitutes all animals’.107 The wrong identifications are asdangerous as the right ones are beneficial. This is seen especially when the ideasof identity receive concrete shape in the central ritual act, the sacrifice, as we shallsee below.

105 A term like magical need not be associated exclusively with primitive and undeveloped(nowadays also ‘underdeveloped’) stages of humanity. It is on the contrary a permanent factorin all ancient civilisations and in civilisations like the Indian, which are highly developed. It isfor instance an essential element, amazingly effective too, in Gandhi's satyāgraha, ‘holdingto the truth’, as Zimmer has shown describing in general the power of the ‘act of truth’ (H.Zimmer, Philosophies of India, London 1952, 160-172). - For magical elements in other aspectsof Indian culture see for instance: J. Gonda, Zur Frage nach dem Ursprung und Wesen desIndischen Dramas, Acta Orientalia 19 (1943) 329-453; W. Ruben, Schamanismus im altenIndien, Acta Orientalia 18 (1940); J.F. Staal, Sanskrit and Sanskritization.

106 J. Gonda, Notes on Brahman, Utrecht 1950, 9; Cf. id., Inleiding tot het Indische denken,Antwerpen-Nijmegen 1948, ch. II.

107 Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa XIII 3.2.3 ap. Oldenberg, o.c. 119.


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Prāyaścitta, ‘atonement, expiation’108 became necessary in connection with wrongidentifications, i.e., errors in performance of the ritual. Whether the ritual act isdisturbed by an error made by the priest (wrong recitation of a mantra, reversedorder of certain actions, effects of forgetfulness, changes, etc.) or by factors whichlie outside him (extinction of the fire, breaking of a ritual object, theft of the soma,appearance of a raven on the sacred beverage, etc.) - the result of the sacrifice isannihilated and dangerous consequences may result.109 In such cases prāyaścittahas to take place, consisting in general in a sacrifice addressed to Varuṇa.

From this magical efficiency of the right identification and the calamity resulting fromwrong identification, or from the corresponding effects of rightly and wronglyperformed ritual acts, it is but a step to the ideas expressed in the terms vidyā andavidyā, translated by Sénart as ‘magical efficiency of knowledge and inefficiency ofits contrary.’110 This translation is justified from the beginning of the Chāndogya,which deals with the sacred syllable Om.111 First certain identifications are given:‘Ṛk is speech; Sāma is life; the udgītha is the syllable Om...’. Then it is stated thatknowledge of those identities is magically effective: ‘He verily becomes the gratifierof desires, who, knowing (vidvān) this, realises that the syllable Om is the udgītha...From this syllable the threefold knowledge (trayī vidyā, i.e., the three Vedas) comesforth: Om precedes the incantations (of the Yajurveda). Om precedes the recitations(of the Ṛgveda). Om precedes the chants (of the Sāmaveda)... Through this syllablesacrifices are performed by those who know this and by those who do not. Knowledge(vidyā) and ignorance (avidyā), how-

108 See Renou-Filliozat, o.c. 360-361. The term occurs since the Atharvaveda.109 S.N. Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy I, Cambridge 1922, 21, gives a good example:

‘... when Tvastr performed a sacrifice for the production of a demon who would be able to killhis enemy Indra, owing to the mistaken account of a single word the object was reversed andthe demon produced was killed by Indra’. Cf. Śatapathabrāhmaṇa I 6.3.10. Con scious useis made of the effects of a wrongly performed sacrifice, in order to injure the lover of one'swife, in BAU 4.4. 12 (see B. Heimann, o.c. 155).

110 See above p. 38, n. 38.111 CU. 1.1.5; 7-10.


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ever, are different. Only what is performed with knowledge (vidyā), with faith(śraddhā), with upaniṣad112 is effective (vīryavattaraz)’.

Thus knowledge of identifications gives power, and this power is gained primarilyby the central act which effectuates and realises identifications: the sacrifice. It canbe approximately seen what the universe (in which man is supposed to be included)must have been, at least in one of its aspects, for the human beings who expressedthemselves in the BrāhmaǤas and the Upaniṣads: an originally unknown anduncontrolled whole, unified through recurrent identifications which increase man'spower over it and which make man realize the whole to be a whole of interdependententities where ‘everything is in everything’113 (the inter-connections between insideand outside are still so close and numerous that it is impossible to discriminate herebetween realism and idealism). This remains the background of Advaita: its influencecan be perceived throughout the system. It can be symbolically expressed in thecentral idea of pūrṇam, plenum, plenitude, fullness, which occurs in a famousBrāhmaṇa of the Bṛhadāraṇyankopaniṣad, known as the peace chant:114

‘That is plenitude, this is plenitude,Plenitude proceeds from plenitudeTaking plenitude from plenitude,It remains as plenitude’.

Its survival in Advaita can be seen from the identification of pūrṇan with releaseitself, for instance by Sureśvara.115 Śaākara interprets in his commentary116 ‘that’(adaḥ) as Brahman and ‘this’ (idam) as the universe. PūrǤam, he says, is infiniteand all-pervading. This differentiated Brahman (the universe) pro-

112 Which probably means here ‘truth’; cf. Sénart ad hoc.113 The expression is from J.C. Heesterman.114 BAU. 5.1.1.115 Saṁbandha Vārtika 268-269 a: ‘wholeness is release (pūrṅam niḥśsreyasam). Hence the

non-wholesomeness (apūrṇam) which is on account of nescience appears but illusory.Therefore, when nescience is destroyed through the knowledge of the real self, wholenessalone remains’. I am thankful to Dr. T.M.P. Mahadevan, who has given me free access to histranslation of the Saṁbandha Vārtika.

116 Transl. Swami Madhavananda, Almora 1950, 801 sq.


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ceeds from the infinite supreme Brahman as the effect proceeds from its cause. But‘although it emanates as an effect, it does not give up its nature, infinitude, the stateof the supreme Self; it emanates as infinite’. If our ignorance is removed, the originalidentity between the two, which has in reality never disappeared, is realized and ‘itremains as the unconditioned infinite Brahman alone’. The Ācārya quotes otherscriptural passages which have the samemeaning, e.g., ‘This was indeed Brahmanin the begining. It knew only itself. Therefore it became all (sarvam)’.117 Elsewherehe quotes a passage which is a typical example of the magical concept of theuniverse: ‘Whatever is here is there and whatever is there is here’.118

Sarvam has almost always to be understood in this sense, which refers to certainmagical connections and relations which keep the whole together and unify the All.In this manner the significance of the epithet ananta ‘infinite, endless’ must beunderstood. It occurs at an important and central place in the Taittirīya as a properdefinition (svarūpalakṣaṇa)119 of Brahman: ‘Brahman is reality, knowledge, infinity’120and in his commentary upon this passage Śaṇkara calls the infinitude a characteristicmark of Brahman.121

The same remark occurs in the commentary on the Brahmasūtras, when Śaṅkarainterprets ether (ākāśa) in the sütra: ‘the ether on account of characteristic marks’122- as meaning Brahman. One of the arguments for this equation is based upon twoidentifications, where both entities have the infinite as their common characteristic.One infinite is identified with the udgītha,

117 BAU. 1.4.10.118 KaǦha Up. 4.10: Yadeveha tadamutra yadamutra tadanviha. Such a principle can be called

the foundation of the entire Tantra, a doctrinal development (or a Veda, namely, the fifth) ofundoubtedly magical character. Cf. Viśvasāratantra: yad ihāsti tad anyatra. yan nehāsti natat kvacit. ‘What is here is elsewhere; what is not here is nowhere’ (c.f. P.H. Pott, Yoga enyantra, Leiden 1946, 31, 126, 153, 159), where magical significance is given to these wellknown lines of the Mahābhārata, where they denote the ‘wholeness’ of itihāsa itself.

119 See e.g. Mahadevan, The Philosophy of Advaita, London 1938, 104.120 Tait. Up. 2.1: satyaǤ j÷ānam anantam brahma.121 taccānantyam brahmaliṅgam.122 ākāśtallingāt BS. 1.1.22.


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of which the Chāndogya says: ‘the udgītha is superior to everything; it is infinite(ananta)’123 after which the bhāṣyakāra remarks: ‘Now this endlessness (infinity) isa characteristic mark of Brahman.’124

The idea of ananta preserves a universe filled with magical connections andidentifications. This aspect is in all probability much more fundamental and certainlymore difficult to understand for the ‘modern mind’, than the purely quantitative aspectwhich is also present.125 The quantitative element is traceable in other terms denotingthe same infinitude, as for instance (apart from the above mentioned pūrṇam andsarvam) bhūman, ‘greatness, abundance’,126 or bṛhat ‘the great’, signifying in theprogrammatic title of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka according to Śaṅkara not only that this isthe greatest of the Upaniṣads, but also that it is ‘the greatest in respect of itssubstance and theme’,127 as it deals with the great, bṛhat i.e., Brahman, the Absolute.Apart from this, the quantitative aspect is also expressed by ŚaǤkara in hiscommentary upon the definition of the Taittirīya, where he says that Brahman isomnipresent, i.e., infinite in space, eternal, i.e., infinite in time and a universalsubstance, i.e., infinite in substance.128 That is, Brahman is actually infinite.

This actuality of infinity in Brahman is the basis of perhaps the most important, andcertainly the most striking, of the doctrines of Advaita: i.e., that the Absolute is notonly a reality, but the only reality. For in Śaṇkara's interpretation outside actualinfinitude nothing can exist. From the thesis that only Brahnan is real the wholesystem of Advaita can be derived. It is presupposed in all the other Advaitic doctrines.

The quantitative aspect of infinity remains secondary: magical identifications remainin the background of the ‘plenum’, as we

123 CU. 1.9.2.124 BSB. 1.1.22.125 Cf. also Lacombe, o.c. 213-214.126 e.g. in CU. 7.23 sq.127 S. Kuppuswami Sastri, Introduction to Swami Madhavananda's translation of Śaṇkara's

commentary on the BAU, vii.128 tatra trividhaṃ hyānantyaṃ deśataḥ kālato vastutaśceti, ap. Lacombe, o.c, 214, n. 3.


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shall observe repeatedly. Thus Śaṇkara comments upon pūrṇa in the peace chantof the BṛhadāracǤyaka as: ‘pūrṇa, not limited by anything (infinite), i.e., all-pervading’.This gives not only a literal interpretation (as infinite), but also (unconvincinglyconnected) a more significant dynamic interpretation, which transcends thequantitative denotation of infinitude and which contains a magical element.

In general magic plays an important, though often hidden, part in Śaṅkara'sdoctrine.129 These heritages of the Brahmāṇical and Upaniṣadic days play a smallerpart in later Advaita, where the rational approach becomes increasingly predominant.The magical aspect interests us here not for historical reasons, but because itspower undoubtedly pervades much of original Advaita. Advaita interpreted as therational system, which it becomes in later works (Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya,Vedāntaparibhāṣā etc.) could never have captured the mind as entirely as it hasdone. It could not have conquered Buddhism, however rationalistic the Buddhisticsystems, especially Mādhyamika were at that time, and it could not have unifiedHinduism as it did. But as we shall see, Śaṅkara's concept of j÷āna goes beyondmagic, whereas there are reasons to accept the tradition that Śaṅkara set limits tosome magical practices of Tantric origin.130

A seemingly lucid concept like anantatva, ‘infinity’ is pervaded by magical elements.The background and content of this concept is totally different from the backgroundand content of the concept of infinity in the West. The terminological parallelism,here as often, is misleading. This may be seen from three characteristics of theWestern concept (or concepts) of infinitude. Later the meaning of the Neoplatonicinfinite will be considered in greater detail.

(1) In the deeper and possibly unconscious layers of the Western mind, the infiniteis associated with the ouroborós, the infinity of the snake which keeps its own tailin its mouth. This is an obscure dragonish being, a terrible and devouring mother,dwelling in a profound and dangerous region.131 (2) In Greece, the limited

129 Cf. especially Lacombe, o.c. 305 sq. and Index, s.v. magic; cf. also B. Heimann, o.c. 154, n.1.

130 See below II, 10, 110, n. 357.131 Cf. E. Neumann, o.c. Index s.v. Ouroboros.


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is the clear cut and well ordered divine, whereas the unlimited and infinite, ápeiron,is chaotic dark matter (húlē), counterpart of the deity, sometimes conceived as theevil principle (kakón). In the classical age of the Greeks the Gods are never conceivedas infinite beings. Infinity as a positive concept appears late and becomespreponderant only in Neoplatonism.132 (3) The Christian God is infinite, but his infinitydoes not prevent him from being arbitrary in his choices of existence in space andtime. He creates for instance once, at a particular time, and not in all eternity (assome later sects interpret it). Likewise he appears once and is not omnipresent(despite the contrary opinion of some later mystics).133 Infinity does not mean thatnothing exists outside God: it has on the contrary only meaning in opposition to andin contrast with the finitude of the created being.

A comparative study of the infinite or plenum is bound to yield interesting and possiblyunexpected results. In connection with contemporary European philosophy we willhave to ask what the place of freedom can be in a universe conceived as a plenum.

Identifications constitute the background of much of Śaṅkara's Advaita, as will beseen below. The fundamental relation of Advaita, however is identity, and notidentification. Adhyāsa on the other hand, perhaps the most original of Śaṅkara'sconcepts, is an identification. Lacombe has moreover shown how identifications as‘correspondances ontologiques’ could develop into the theory of lakṣaṇa, ‘indirectexpression’.134

5. Sacrifice. Ontological reflections

In Vedic literature the religious act par excellence is the sacrifice (yaj÷a, homa).135The view that sacrifice is an act by which certain advantages are gained, such asprosperity, long life, health, cattle and male offspring, is only partly true; the realsignificance lies deeper. According to Hubert and Mauss, sacrifice is a con-

132 See below III, 3 and Appendix 236-7.133 Cf. the author's Remarks on rationality and irrationality in East and West, Mysindia, June 19,

1955.134 o.c. 83. Cf. R. de Smet, The Theological Method of Śaṅkara. Revue philosophique de Louvain

52 (1954) 31-74.135 Renou-Filliozat, o.c. 345-346.


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secreation which transforms not only the victim, but also the sacrificing priest andsometimes an external object, which is connected with the ritual act. Thus ittransforms profane into sacred and establishes with the victim as mediator acommunication between profane and sacred. This communication is a transformation,‘fulfilled not by the grace of the Gods, but as a natural result of the sacrifice’.136 Thusit becomes difficult to discriminate between a sacrifice and amagical act. Accordingly,the efficacy of the sacrifice is determined by the correctness of the ritual mechanism,which does not depend upon will or intention of the sacrificing priest. Therefore, andalso because the Gods play no part in granting the fruit of an act137 which itselfproduces the effects, the sacrifice can be called an impersonal activity or process.

The doctrine of sacrifice is the central topic of the Brāhmaṇas, which are rightlycalled ‘the true source of Indian thought’.138 The God of sacrifice is also the creativeprinciple of the world, Prajāpati. He creates for instance the sun by sacrificing.139There is a close connection between the creative act in the Vedic sense and the actof sacrifice. Betty Heimann has dealt with this and summarizes her investigationsas follows. She refers to myths of creation where the creator is also the materialcause of the universe (e.g., the primordial puruṣa is sacrificed and his parts becomethe different realms of the world). In connection with sacrifice she refers to the ‘dout des-principle’,140 which explains the significance of the sacrifice only partly.141 Shesays: 142 ‘Both the concept of creation and the concept of sacrifice contain possibilitiesof development which are unintelligible for the West. The Indian idea of creationstarts from the unconscious andmechanical urge towards emanation, and developsonly in the second place into the variant, in which the material cause is replaced bya conscious activity. The sacrifice is conceived in India as it were as a scientificprocess of transformation; (starting with the con-

136 Dasgupta, o.c. I, 21.137 See below 65.138 Renou-Filliozat, o.c. 293.139 Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa II, 2.4.6 ap. Oldenberg. o.c. 173. Cf. also Ṛgveda. 10.130: Sṛṣṭiyaj÷a.140 e.g. BAU, 6.3.1.141 Keith shared this opinion; Cf. Renou-Filliozat, o.c. 345.142 Heimann, o.c. 153.


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scious “give and take”) it comes to denote (also) changes which are unconsciousand more or less mechanical’.

Thus eating and digesting, but also speaking are acts interpreted as sacrifices.143On the other hand, there are many examples which show that entities come intobeing not through creation, but through sacrifice. In the Chāndogyopaniṣad, forinstance, it is said144 that each member of the sequence: rain, food, sperm, embryo,‘is born from this offering.’145 Through the sacrifice transformation takes place, whichpresupposes the existence of a factor which transforms, a kind of substance whichcan be represented by food.146 The idea of sacrifice can also denote unconscious,organical transformation. The sacrificial background limits creation rigorously to thatwhich follows the rule of continuity, - that nothing can come out of nothing. In thiscontext we have to understand numerous passages such as the famous Chāndogyatext:147 ‘How from the non-existent could the existent be produced?’148 which playsa very important role in the later philosophies. The Indian concept of creation neednot imply the idea of creation out of nothing, as it generally does in the monotheisticreligions, Judaism, Christianity and Islam. This will be discussed below.149 Indianideas of sacrifice and creation can be characterized as continuous, objective,scientific as it were, and entirely impersonal.

With regard to sacrifice the ways in which transformations take place and connectionsare established should be specified. In general magical connections are establishedbetween ritual acts and the cosmic order. These connections are the abovementioned nidānas. Through these connections ‘sacrifice has created the world,and its correct order determines and maintains the world process’.150

143 id. 157.144 CU. 5.5.1-5.8.2.145 tasyā āhuter saṁbhavati.146 See above II, 2: 41-44.147 6.2.2; Cf. BG. 2.16. See the author's Parmenides and Indian thought, The Philosophical

Quarterly 28 (1955), 81-106: 86 sq. and below II. 12.148 Kaṭham asataḥ saj jāyeta?149 Especially III, 5.150 Renou-Filliozat, o.c. 338.


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This last remark is important and may explain the real significance and meaning ofthe Vedic sacrifice. It is not easy to understand, personally and existentially, theworld view and sentiment of those, for whom the sacrifice was so central. A fullerelucidation will require reference to contemporary philosophy.

Our easy way of approaching ancient or distant philosophies is to seek their answersto our questions. Instead of following the inner rhythm which a sensitive studentmay perceive in ancient texts, we order our questions in large frames, which seemuniversally applicable. Thus it has become customary to report about philosophiesunder three headings (either preceded or not by an epistemological introduction):God, world and the human soul. This procedure is at any rate preferable to the onewhich is unconsciously determined by this world view. Both are however misleading.Concerning the epistemological point of view, referred to above, we can be brief:though it has become increasingly important in later Advaita, it is strikingly out ofplace in connection with original Advaita. There is some truth in a remark of Guénon,an often exaggerating and emotional interpreter of Indian thought despite hisprofundity, that modern man has become so much interested in the theory ofknowledge itself has receded into the background.

We fail accordingly if we try to apply the three headings mentioned above to Vedicviews. For there is not only no God in any sense associated with that concept in ourmind, but there is no world which surrounds us as an independent external entityor as an object; and there is no soul as foundation of our consciousness or receptacleof sense perceptions. That those concepts play no central part in Vedic literaturemeans that we have to remove them from our mind. Such concepts should not bein the background as an established order, in which e.g. the sacrifice can beunderstood and interpreted. We should for example not assume that there is ahuman being and an outside world and that one of the possible relations betweenthe two is the act of sacrifice. Both ‘human being’ and ‘world’ are ideas which arosein a modern context. Therefore we have to see how sacrifice existed in the beginningand how only later ‘human beings’ and ‘world’ came to exist. If a kind of meditativereflection can lead us away from the modern phenomena and lead us towardssacrifice as a unique phenomenon, we may be in a position to understand how only


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sacrifice created a world which was the predecessor of what we now call world. Wehave to imagine sacrifice as the act, physical as well as spiritual, which organizedand ordered an entirely unknown and unintelligible chaos into a world and mademan himself man. Sacrifice is one of the possible steps by which man reachedconsciousness of a world as the basis of a world view and of himself as a being.Through the sacrificial act the world and man came into being as conscious andintelligible beings; i.e., sacrifice provided being with what was previously inaccessible.This does not mean that sacrifice created man and the world as entities inthemselves, but that it made them exist for human consciousness (and createdhuman consciousness), and made them accessible or gave them intelligibility. Thisis the philosophical significance of the belief that sacrifice created everything.Sacrifice determined previously unknown chaos as being for some being. The worldand man did not exist for anybody until the sacrifice made them accessible and‘discovered’ them.

That the Gods were unimportant when compared with sacrifice can be seen fromthe Mīmāṁsā view, a later and more formal development in the spirit of theBrāhmaṇas. According to the Prābhākara school, the sacrifice ‘cannot be regardedas laid down for the purpose of securing the favours of the Deity.... the Deity is thereonly as a hypothetical entity postulated as the recipient of the sacrificial offering’.151In Mīmāṁsā the Gods were simply regarded as ‘grammatical datives’.

He who creates intelligibility makes being accessible, because that which isintelligible, must be. The reverse does not hold according to all philosophicaldoctrines, but in the West it is generally accepted, since its scholastic formulationin the thesis of the intelligibility of being. Among contemporary philosophers, beingand intelligibility seem to coincide completely for Martin Heidegger.152 An attemptwill be made to show that the Vedic sacrifice is the counterpart of the concept ofbeing as conceived by

151 Śālikanātha Miśra, Prakaranapa÷cikā, 185 sq. ap. G.N. Jha Pūrva Mīmāṁsā in its sources,Banaras 1942, 257.

152 M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit; cf. A. deWaelhens, La philosophie de Martin Heidegger, Louvain1955, Chap. XVI, 267-274. For Plotinus, see below III. 3: 185.


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this important contemporary thinker, whose chief interest is ontology.

Heidegger on methodological grounds chooses as a starting point for hisinvestigations human being (Dasein). His ultimate aim is to proceed to being itself(Sein) and thus towards a general ontology. We do not in the beginning know whatbeing is, as there is at first only the opaque, chaotic and unintelligible structure ofthe various kinds of ‘existants’ (Seiendes), of which our own being is one. We haveto presuppose that our Seiendes, Dasein, has as a mode of its being,‘discovering-being’ (Entdeckendsein); because of this it is able to discover being.Being, on the other hand, (including Dasein itself) must be principally open,accessible, intelligible - nay, constitute the intelligibility itself which our being projectsupon the ‘existants’. Neither the intelligibility of being nor being as intelligibility, northe Entdeckendsein of our own being have to be understood in an intellectual senseonly. To discover being means on the one hand to superimpose upon the existantsintelligibility and order, on the other hand to realize some of the possibilities of ourown being. The latter is a pro-ject and it cannot be otherwise, as it is evidentaccording to Heidegger153 that our own being cannot transcend its own possibilities,but only realise them. Thus ‘the constitution of being of the existants is equivalentto the interpretation of these existants as a function of our own possibilities ofexistence’.154

Thus we find in Heidegger's work a philosophy - only part of its foundation could besketched here - which reduces being and intelligibility to our own human being andwhich shows how our own being through being gives shape to the chaos of existants,which only then becomes accessible or becomes ‘being’. Such a philosophical viewis the basis of e.g., the psychological view according to which consciousnessoriginates from the unconscious and constitutes the outside world as outside worldas well as the inside world as inside world. The metaphysical idea, however,

153 But it is difficult to understand the significance of the expression; a being transcends its ownpossibilities.

154 ‘On le voit: constituer l'être des existants équivaut à interpreter ces existants en fonction despossibilités d'existence du Dasein lui-même’: de Waelhens, o.c. 269. Cf. above I. 3 B: 13.


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should not be understood as a psychologism; it is on the other hand the ontologicalfoundation of any possible psychology.

The Vedic sacrifice can now be interpreted as one of the modes of human beingwhich constitutes being. This ontological interpretation enables us to see how it waspossible (ontically, as Heidegger would say) that such importance was attached tothe ritual act. Any other approach would be bound to judge ritualistic ideas asexaggerations.

The transformation or consecration which is effectuated through sacrifice, is not asa transformation from one being into another but the constitution of being itself.Previously nothing existed but the undifferentiated and chaotic, unknown andunconscious, supposed unity of the existants. The sacrifice brought the light ofconsciousness, in accordance with the well known psychological interpretation ofmany light mythologies (C.G. Jung, E. Neumann, etc.), as well as the light of beingin the sense alluded to above. Human being realised in the sacrificial act one of itspossibilities and discovered therefore apart from other being also its own being.Because of this it must have become impressed with its own power and strength.Accordingly, a deeper interpretation has to be given to other phenomena connectedwith the sacrifice. It is not meaningful to hold the view that sacrifice connects previousknown beings with each other; on the contrary, it gives being and makes accessiblewhat previously was entirely hidden. This differentiation breaks through a chaoticunity, which is supposed to have previously existed only at the time of thedifferentiation itself. The frightening and abysmal character, which must have beenconnected with these first differentiating discoveries,155 caused man to desire to beconnected or united with the newly discovered reality. The nidānas and identificationsdo not connect previously known beings with each other, but discover aspects ofbeing and try at the same time to appease the conflict of differentiation by positingconnections and identifications. This explains the unifying tendency found in allancient and archaic civilisations. Later, human being was able to endure the tensionsof the mind regarding unidentified and unconnected entities.

155 Cf. Neumann, o.c. Index s.v. Grosse Mutter als furchtbare Mutter, 520.


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When in the beginning, for example, the cow is identified with breath, the ‘power’ -interpretation fails to give any explanation: we do not possess power over breath,and try to obtain power over a cow, or the reverse. Although this interpretationremains sometimes valid, another activity of human being is at work here: first beingis discovered, i.e., the cow is understood as being a cow and breath as being breath;next, the awe and perhaps fear resulting from this discovery is somewhat temperedby the bold identification of cow and breath. This fear is not something ‘modern’,but it existed wherever being came into being or where consciousness arose, asfor instance in the Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad:156 ‘The Ātman existed alone, in thebeginning, in the form of a puruṣa. Looking round himself, he saw nothing but himself.Then he said: ‘I am’!.... He feared thereupon; therefore he who is alone fears’. Onlythe fact that we have gone beyond identifications and have accepted discriminationsmore fully, i.e., recognised as being the meagre connections which exist betweenbreath and cow, accounts for the fact that we style the previous mode of being ofhuman being ‘magical’.

It is probable that man started soon reflecting about this discovery and creativeactivity, in which being came into being. To say that he tried to appease thediscrimination by identification is the same as saying that he refused to accept hisactivity as really creative and held on to the doctrine that no being can originate ifnot from being. The power nevertheless connected with this activity must have beenso impressive that human being ascribed it readily to the superhuman, rather thanbear himself this first responsibility, which must have been experienced as a guilt157in as far as it created the awe-inspiring but conflicting discriminations. Thus theGods were created by the performance of a sacrificial act and nothing new wassupposed to have come into being through them. The sacrificial act led necessarilyto the existence of Gods - and this was recognised explicitly (with more readinessthan in many modern minds): according to our texts, the Gods have come into beingthrough sacrifice and they have

156 i. 4. 1-2; quoted as a motto for the chapter on existentialism in: I.M. Bocheński, EuropāischePhilosophie der Gegenwart, Bern 1947, 159.

157 In a non-religious sense; cf. for instance in Sartre's ‘we are condemned to be free’.


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gained immortality through sacrifice. Rightly famous is the Ṛgvedic verse: ‘withsacrifice the Gods sacrificed the sacrifice. These were the first usages’.158

Here we have almost all the themes which will develop into Advaitic doctrines. Themagical and creative activity by which being came into being and which caused aweand fear becomes adhyāsa, ‘superimposition’, which is the key-term of Śaṅkara'sexplanation (which is an ‘explaining away’, as a modern Advaitin said) of the world.The constitution of being or the sacrifice which also produces the Gods, results inthe idea that even Īśvara is conditioned by māyā (as avidyā or adhyāsa). The viewthat nothing can come into being through discriminations and through human ordivine creativity, becomes the doctrine that only Brahman exists, the rest beingillusory, whereas Īśvara is not really creative. The appeasing of discriminations byresorting to identifications leads to the central idea of mokṣa, ‘release’, the highestidentity, the fullness (pūrṇam) of being, the ultimate peace (śānti). And thus the aimof Advaita can provisionally be described as the re-constitution of this fullness ofbeing which is mokṣa. That this can be realised by knowledge, and no longer bykarma, is Śaṅkara's thesis, which is related to the general reaction against karmawhich took place in Indian thought.

The above interpretation of the sacrifice as being could be further corroborated byterminological investigations. There seems to be a close connection between satand ṛta, which meant originally159 the wheel, described by the sun in its daily orannual revolution. Subsequently it denoted the wheel of existence (saṁsāra,transmigration) as the norm of existence (in ṛta and later in dharmacakra).160 If thesacrifice is sat, it is appropriate that the ritual exactness, with which it is performedis called satyam, as in the Brāhmaṇas.161

One last remark, referring to Heidegger's thought, may be made concerning the‘world’. That sacrifice created man and his world in a certain sense means that man,constituted himself as a

158 Ṛgveda 1.164. 50.159 See above II 2: 42.160 Cf. Silburn, o.c. 14-16; 192, n. 2.161 Cf. id. 89: ‘exactitude rituelle’.


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being, and therefore as Dasein, a Seiendes of which the most central characteristic(existential) is ‘being-in-the-world’ (in-der-Welt-sein). The negative aspect of thiscreation is accordingly expressed as ‘being immersed in the world’ (Saṁsāra).162

6. Reaction against the sacrifice

The Vedic sacrifice was a mile-stone, symbolising and indicating one of theimpressive achievements of human being in its development as being and towardsbeing. The conviction that sacrifice was the basis of the entire universe, includingeven the Gods, shows that it was itself the basis of the entire Vedic civilisation andthe main inspiration of the vast Vedic literature. But as soon as the reality, whichwas accessible to it, was discovered and the sacrificial act had lost its creativeefficacy, the central place accorded to the sacrifice led to over-emphasis andcodification, which became increasingly rigid. This led to several new developmentswhich are clearly interconnected: (1) the ritual acts were maintained, but interpretedsymbolically (as for instance in the Āraṇyakas and in the opening sections of theBṛhadāraṇyaka, where the horse-sacrifice (aśvamedha) is interpreted allegorically);163

(2) the ritual acts were ‘interiorised’164 or spiritualised (leading to another act of equalimportance: meditation, and hence to the Advaitic jñāna or vidyā); (3) the ritual actswere regarded as ineffective in the purely spiritual realm (leading to one of the maintheses of Advaita: the inferiority of karma): and (4) the ritual acts were abolishedaltogether (leading to the rejection of the authority of the Vedas and thus to avaidikaand nāstika doctrines, of which the most important ones are the Bauddhadoctrines.)165 Only Mīmāṁsā maintained the Vedic tradition of sacri-

162 This connection was pointed out by Prof. J.L. Mehta (Banaras).163 T.M.P. Mahadevan, The Upanishads in: History of Philosophy, Eastern and Western

(Government of India), London 1953, 57.164 See, however, below 71 sq.165 The close relation between these developments shows clearly that Buddhism was but a

natural, though revolutionary, development, a possibility of which the realisation could beexpected, and thus closely connected with the vaidika and āstika developments in the Hindutradition. This view need not conflict with the view of Murti that there are two traditions inIndian philosophy: ātmavāda and anātmavāda, or the substance view of reality and the modalview of reality (following a Jaina discrimination dravyārthika and paryāyārthika naya: seeMurti's book, quoted above 48, n. 80, especially 10 sq.). But it changes the content thereofand makes the distinction somewhat more existential than logical: if our view that the sacrificewas the central act and entity is right, the idea of a continuous, self-identical human soul isonly a consequence thereof; this is the significance of the statement that the sacrifice whenpreformed creates the being of human being (or: that the human being becomes human beingor realises himself through the sacrificial act). If the idea of sacrifice lies much deeper thanthe idea of the soul, the abolition of the sacrifice led first to the nairātmya doctrine and nextto the ‘Modal view of Reality’. It may be also possible to see the modal view of reality as thedirect outcome of the above mentioned discriminations, which come into being with theorigination of being.


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fice and karma, though even here further developments took place. We have toconsider the second and third developments in greater detail, as they lead to theheart of Advaita.

It is sometimes suggested that a development from the ‘outer’ to the ‘inner’ sacrificetook place.166 This is not exactly correct, because the discrimination between innerand outer did not exist in the earlier portions of the Vedas: when the inner is opposedto the outer, a developed form of self-consciousness has already come into being,and the supremacy of the sacrifice means exactly that this is not yet so and that thedualities of the opposites (the later dvandvas) are yet unseparated.167 In the oldestVedic sacrifice, the sacrificial act is a total act of what we have afterwardsdiscriminatingly called body andmind. Separation of the two constitutes degeneration:the sacrifice became an external act, after which it was only natural that the possibilityof an internal act, which only came then into existence, should be realized. Thus itis merely a convenient modern representation when we speak about a degenerationof the Vedic sacrifice into a purely external activity and subsequently, as a reaction,into interiorisation. In reality it is different: the degeneration itself, caused by the lossby sacrifice of its creative and discovering function has two aspects: exteriorisationand interiorisation. ‘Inner’ sacrifice is required

166 e.g., Ranade, o.c. 6-8.167 Cf. Renou-Filliozat, o.c. 339: ‘on no distingue pas...entre substance et qualité, substrat et

force, animé et inanimé’. The dvandvas are later again felt as a burden, when the philosopherwants to return to the original, primordial, unified, plenary situation, comparable with the Vedicsituation (cf. the previous section). See e.g. Vedāntasāra 1.22, where one of the preliminaryrequirements for the qualified pupil, titikṣā, is defined as ‘the ability to bear the pairs ofopposites like heat and cold’ (śītoṣṇādidvandvasahiṣṇutā) (see the translation of Hiriyanna,Poona 1929, and Nikhilananda, Mayavati 1949, 13 and cf. Zimmer, Philosophies of India,55).


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only in the case of prevailing ‘outer’ sacrifice, which occurs only at a later stage. Itis therefore incorrect to say that the older texts lack the ‘inner’ and purely spiritualsacrifice. It is an anachronistic projection to blame the early Vedic sacrifice forexternalism. Originally, there was nothing external and therefore no need for anythinginternal.

When discrimination begins there is no conflict yet and unity is still experienced (orperhaps desired for as an escape from beginning conflict). This is expressed in apassage of a Brāhmaṇa of the Sāmaveda,168 where the creator ‘thinks silently in hismind: what is in his mind becomes the sāman Bṛhat.’ For thinking the root dhyā- isused, connected with dhyāna about which we shall speak below. Thinking is stillconceived quite materially, as is manifest from the next sentence: ‘he speaks, hisspeech gives birth to the sāman Rathaṁtara, which is, located in him as an embryo’.But it is important to bear in mind - though often forgotten by scholars dealing withancient civilisations, as well as cultural anthropologists - that in such cases not onlythe spiritual is conceived rather materially, but the material rather spiritually as well- the two being in fact unseparated.

A transition to the inner sacrifice (from the earlier situation in which the concept ofinner and outer is not yet meaningful) is constituted by the prāṇa sacrifice. Theoccasions at which this may have been utilized and the reasons for this are dealtwith in a passage of the Taittirīya Saṁhitā. This shows how a more spiritualizedsacrifice was called for, whenever technicalities of the sacrifice led to a conflict ofhighly formal character (announcing Pūrva Mīmāṁsā and Dharmaśāstra) and theliving force of the ancient sacrifice seemed to have been lost. The difficulty isexpressed as follows: ‘The theologians say: “Should an offering, be made in thehouse of one who is consecrated, or should an offering not be made?” The manwho is consecrated is the oblation, and if he were to sacrifice he would offer a partof the sacrificer; if he were not to sacrifice, then he would omit a joint of thesacrifice’.169 Keith says. that the solution of this paradoxical difficulty consisted inthe performance of the sacrifices concerned, i.e., the new and

168 Pañcaviṁśa Brāhmaṇa 7.6.1 ap. Oldenberg, 91, 173.169 Taittirīya Saṁhitā VI. 1.4.5 transl. Keith II, 490.


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full moon sacrifices (darśapūrṇamāsa), not in the ordinary way, but ‘In the breath’(prāṇa) - ‘an idea not rare.’170

A prāṇāgnihotra,171 which was also used by the Vaiṣṇava Vaikhānasa,172 occurs inthe Chāndogyopaniṣad.173 The last portion of the fifth prapāṭhaka of the Chāndogyadeals with the Vaiśvānara, ‘common to all men, universal,’ an epithet of ātman andearlier an epithet of Agni.174 Six sages (the sixth being the famous Uddālaka Āruṇi)expound their views to king Aśvapati Kaikeya, but he characterizes all views aspartial views of reality; the Ātman Vaiśvānara is all that and much more. Śaṅkaraquotes in the commentary the well known parable of the blind men, touching differentparts of an elephant; and proceeds to give more meanings for Vaiśvānara. The nextverse175 contains several identifications which Śaṅkara explains in the followingterms: ‘The text proceeds to show how in the case of the knower of theVaiśvānara-Self, the act of eating constitutes the agnihotra offering.’176 Hence theidentifications: the chest of the Vaisvānara-Self is the altar, the hairs are the grass(which is strewn on the altar), the mouth is the Āhāvanīya fire, etc. The agnihotra(thus being identified with the Vaiśvānara-Self, the performance of the agnihotra isreplaced by ameditation on these identifications and connections. Śaṅkara expressesthis as: ‘the whole of this may be taken as an injunction of meditation (vidhi) - thesense being that one should meditate in this manner.’177

170 Ibid. n. 2; ‘Cf. Aitareya Āraṇyaka III. 2.6; Śatapatha Āraṇyaka VIII. 11’.171 The agnihotra is the most important and one of the most simple sacrifices, to be performed

in the morning and in the evening by every brāhmaṇa or vaiśya householder.172 See Renou-Filliozat, o.c. 346.173 CU. 5.18-24 (trans. Sénart) and Śaṅkara's bhāṣya (text: Ānandāśrama Series XIV, 309-318;

transl. G.N. Jha, Poona 1942, 283-290).174 See Ṛgveda 3.2 (236) and 3.3 (237). The universal character of the Ātman Vaiśvānara is

foreshadowed by the universal character of Agni Vaiśvānara: see e.g. 3.2.10, 11: Agni placesin all beings his fiery germ (Geldner: ‘In diese Wesen legt or seinen Keim’). The individual'swish to participate in the splendour of the Agni Vaiśvānara, which foreshadows the equationof Ātman and Brahman, occurs in 3.3.10; ‘Vaiśvānara! your properties I wish for me.....’(Geldner: ‘Vaiśvānara! Deine Eigenschaften wünsche ich mir’).

175 5.18.2.176 bhojane 'gnihotraṁ sampipādayisannāha.177 athavā vidhyarthametadvacanamevamupāsya iti.


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Thus a sacrificial act is replaced by an act of meditation. Even if one objects on theground that this is only Śaṅkara's interpretation, and not necessarily the meaningof the somewhat obscure Upaniṣad (a view which would merely change thechronology of this philosophical development), it must be admitted that the agnihotrasacrifice is not performed, but replaced by other acts, i.e., offering to the differentmanifestations of prāṇa.178 In the following verses symbolic offerings are prescribed,taking place in the mouth of the sacrificer, which is regarded (according to previousidentifications) as the fire Āhavanīya. These are offerings to the differentmanifestations of prāṅa, because they have to be performed while uttering: ‘svāhāto prāṇa’, ‘svāhā to vyāna’, etc. Every time the magical efficacy of the symbolicsacrifice is described in analogous terms, for instance (in the first case) as follows:‘Prāṇa being satisfied (tṛpyati), the Eye becomes satisfied; the Eye being satisfied,Heaven becomes satisfied; Heaven being satisfied whatever is under the Heavenand under the Sun becomes satisfied; and through the satisfaction thereof, he himselfbecomes satisfied; also with offspring, cattle, food, brightness (boldness) and Brahmicglory’.179

Lastly some general and very instructive reflections follow. The agnihotra seems tobe deprecated in another verse180 where a person who performs it without knowingthe philosophy of Vaiśvānara, is compared to someone who commits grave mistakesin the performance. This implies that the philosophy of Vaiśvānara (in Śaṅkara'swords: Vaiśvānaradarśana) is evaluated more highly than the sacrifice. Śaṅkarahimself does not go so far and understands the text as an eulogy: ‘By deprecatingthe well-known agnihotra, the text means to eulogise the agnihotra-offering madeby one who knows the Vaiśvānara’. Knowledge, however, increases the efficacy,because the Upaniṣad says: ‘But if one knowing this offers the agnihotra, his libationfalls upon all regions, all beings and all selves.’181

178 Mahadevan, o.c.179 19.2.180 24.1.181 24.2:.... sarveṣu lokeṣu sarveṣu bhūteṣu sarveṣv ātmasu.


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Next it is said that whoever sacrifices while knowing the Vaiśvānara, loses all sin.Śaṅkara stresses in the commentary the value of knowledge of the Self for theremoval of previously gathered ‘merit and demerit’. Ritual mistakes like offering theremnants of one's food to a Caṇḍala are unimportant when the Vaiśvānara is known.

This passage, referred to by Mahadevan as well as by Ranade,182 is rightly famous.Still it is not a completely inner sacrifice which is found here;183 there are still manypurely ritualistic remnants. But this text constitutes a transition to the pure act ofmeditation.

Both scholars also refer to a text which is more explicit. It occurs in theKauṣītaki-Brāhmaṅa Upaniṣad184 and speaks about an inner agnihotra(antara-agnihotra) in the following terms: ‘As long as a man speaks, so long hecannot breathe, then he offers the breath in speech; as long as a man breathes, solong he cannot speak, then he offers the speech in the breath. These are the twonever ending immortal oblations; waking and sleeping, he continually offers them.All other oblations have an end and possess the nature of works. The ancients,knowing this true sacrifice, did not use to offer the agnihotṛ’185 Here the sacrifice isrejected and replaced by generally unconscious activities which may be performedconsciously (as for instance in prāṇāyāma, in the daily sandhyā or in elaboratedevelopments of the Yoga-dar-śana which have preserved characteristics of a ritualact).

182 Mahadevan, I.c.; Ranade o.c. 7-8.183 It seems that Ranade sees too much of an inner sacrifice in the text; he says: “Even so early

as at the time of the Chāndogya, the efficacy of the ‘inner sacrifice’ had come to be definitelyrecognised” and continues with a translation of the passage which is somewhat free andmodernised; ‘our real sacrifice consists in making oblations to the prāṇa within us. One whodoes not know this inner sacrifice, even if he were to go in for a formal sacrifice, throws oblationmerely on ashes. On the other hand, he who knows this inner sacrifice is relieved of his sinsas surely as wool is burnt in a flame of fire. Knowing this inner sacrifice, even if a man wereto do acts of charity for a Caṇḍāla, he may verily be regarded as having sacrificed to theUniversal soul’.

184 2.5.185 Transl. R.R. Mitra and E.B. Cowell, Adyar, 1932, 298.


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More interesting than the rejection of sacrifice is its preservation and transformationas meditation. Here the efficacy is preserved as in the ritual act. Before discussingthis further a passage of the Muṇḍakopaṇiṣad186 may be mentioned, where thesacrifice is termed inefficient and useless: ‘Perishable (and) transient are verily theeighteen supporters187 of the sacrifice, on whom, it is said the interior work depends.The fools who consider this (work) as the highest (object of man), undergo againeven decay and death.... Fancying oblations and pious gifts (to lead to) the highest(object of man) fools do not know anything (as the cause of the) good. Havingenjoyed (the fruit of) their works, on the high place of heaven, which they gained bytheir act they enter again this world or one that is lower.’188 Here the inferiority ofkarma is evident; whoever depends on karma will be reborn.189 In order to understandthis we should know what jñāna, which replaces karma, really signifies.

Śaṅkara in the commentary on the Brahmasūtras does not go far in denouncingsacrifice.190 His quotations are taken from Agnirahasyam, i.e., the tenth book of theŚatapatha Brāhmaṇa, which speaks about: ‘fire-altars, made of mind (manas), builtof mind (manas)’191 or: ‘built of knowledge (vidyā)’.192 An entire sacrifice is to beperformed in the mind only: ‘With mind only (manasaiva) they are established, withmind only they are piled, with mind only the cups were taken, with mind the udgātṛpraised, with mind the hotṛ recited; whatever work is done at the sacrifice, whateversacrificial work was done as consisting of mind, by mind only, as those fire-altarsmade of mind, piled by mind’.193 Śaṅkara shows that this mental sacrifice is not partof the sacrifice (so that mental acts could be substituted for the actual act) butconstitutes itself a subject of meditation (vidyā): ‘For the text expressly asserts that“they are built of knowledge only”......’ and: ‘these agnis are indeed knowledge-piledonly.’

186 1.2. 7-10; also referred to by Ranade and Mahadevan, 11. o.c.187 Namely, according to Śaṅkara, sixteen priests, the sacrificer and his wife.188 Transl. E. Roer, Adyar, 1931, 148-150.189 See above, II. 3: 50.190 BSB. 3.3.44-50.191 Agnīnarkānmanomayānmanaścitaḥ192 Vidyācita.193 Ad. BS. 3.3.47 and 49.


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Śaṅkara then does not want to replace the actual sacrifice by meditation, as onecould have expected. But this is characteristic. He does not reject, but subordinates.Similarly the Mīmāṁsā view is not rejected, but allotted its proper place. The ritualact may lead to svarga, heaven, the highest goal of Mīmāṁsā and of the greaterpart of Vedic literature. But the Advaitic goal, mokṣa, which is higher in a way to bespecified below, can only be reached through jñāna. According to Advaita, in theempirical level of our everyday experience Mīmāṁsā, and (according to laterAdvaitins) in particular the Bhāṭṭa-school of Mīmāṁsā, holds:194 VyavalvāreBhāṭṭa-nayaḥ.195

In the same context reference is made to a mental (mānasa) cup which is offeredalso meritally: ‘all the rites connected with that cup, viz., taking it up, putting it downin its place, offering the liquid in it, taking up the remaining liquid, the priests invitingone another to drink the reminder, and the drinking, all these rites the text declaresto be mental only, i.e., to be done in thought only’.196 In a note Thibaut refers to othertexts where this occurs.197 Śaṅkara also refers to the above quoted passage of theKauṣītakī Brāhmaṇa Upaniṣad, where reference is made (in his words) to an‘imaginary agnihotra consisting of speech and breath’.198

Throughout the Upaniṣad texts are utilized as prescripts which enjoin meditations.But the substitution of meditation for the ritual act must also have been influencedby the fact that many of the sacrifices required materials which only a wealthy personlike a king could afford. Meditation gradually takes the place of the ritual act andcomes to share in all its particular powers. Though the inner sacrifice tends to rejectthe ordinary sacrifice, it preserves in itself all the significant characteristics of thelatter. Meditation is magical in its efficacy199 and constitutes one of the importantmodes of being.

194 See below II. 13.195 See Hiriyanna, Outlines of Indian Philosophy, 357, n. 4.-‘Bhaṭṭa’ refers to the school of Kumārila

Bhaṭṭa.196 Transl. Thibaut II. 261.197 Ibid. n. 2; ‘Cf. Tāṇḍya Brāh. IV. 9; Taitt. Saṁh. VII.3.1.’198 vākprāṇamayo, gnihotra.199 See below II. 9.


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For these reasons the act of meditation must be considered in greater detail: it isthe gateway to Advaita. We propose to do this in the three following sections: in thefirst section (7) more examples will be given of meditations on sacrificial acts whichwill lead to the central meditation on Brahman; it will then be seen in which respectmeditation itself is transcended; in the second section (8) certain conclusionsregarding sacrifice, meditation and knowledge in Pūrva and Uttara Mīmāṁsā andthought and action in general will be considered; and in the third section (9) aninvestigation will be made into concepts of meditation and knowledge, occurring indifferent forms in different texts, while the thesis of their magical efficacy will bequestioned. The middle section of these three sections (8) will also consider therelation of Advaita in this respect to some other systems of thought in India.

7. Meditation - pariṇāma - saguṇabrahman

Large portions of Śaṅkara's commentary on the Brahmasūtras interpret texts dealingwith sacrifices as giving injunctions to meditate on sacrifices or portions thereof(e.g., the third pāda of the third adhyāya). Everyone who reads the bhāṣya mustpay attention to these portions, including those who are only looking for the so-calledpurely philosophical portions. The latter often maker the mistake of having apreconceived idea of what philosophy is (an idea which is generally formed onmodern lines, even in the case of those who try to follow the tradition, the sanātanadharma) -and imposing that upon the text. But the text does not indicate which arethe so-called philosophical portions and which are not. Thus a discrimination andevaluation of the text is forced upon us, which is as difficult to justify as Śaṅkara'sown evaluation of different Upaniṣadic passages, for instance their being of differentvalue when dealing with saprapañca and niṣprapañca expositions.200Declaring someportions, for instance, those dealing with the interpretation of texts or with sacrifices,less important from a ‘philosophical’ point of view, disregards that the bhāṣya includesthose portions (though it may assign them their proper place) and is as such differentfromWestern ways of thinking. Such anachronistic attitude underrates the supremeimportance attached to śabdapramāṇa.

200 Cf. Hiriyanna, Outlines, 59 sq.


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The exposition attempted here does not present Advaita as a system of philosophywith a modern structure, resting upon an epistemological basis, etc. This does notmean that we criticise Śaṅkara's Advaita as being not ‘up to the standard of modernphilosophy’ - which would be a somewhat ridiculous presumption. It means, on thecontrary, that we are able and willing to abstain not only from modern philosophicalideas, but also from their high evaluation. Though an epistemological approachwould be quite in accordance with some later works on Advaita, this approach itselfbelongs to a phase of thought which seems to be superseded in theWest.201. Shortly,to present Advaita as a modern system of thought is not paying it a compliment, butbetrays the presence of an implicit high evaluation of some modern systems ofthought.

It is of little value to attempt to show that Advaita is rationalistic, when this attemptis based upon an implicit faith in reason, as may occur in some later philosophieswhich the investigator happens to prefer. But it can be valuable to show without anyimplicit or explicit evaluation whether Advaita is rationalistic or not, and to compareit with other doctrines, rationalistic or not, ultimately investigating in this way theattitude towards rationality which is implicit in contemporary philosophy.202

These remarks formulate only some of the principles of scholarly research. But it isnot superfluous to formulate them when dealing with Advaita, where so much of theliterature (implicitly or explicitly) praises or blames or tries to establish the superiorityor inferiority of the system. Just like the sage according to the Gītā, every philosopherand scholar has to strive for the attainment of sarvakarmaphalatyāga - theabandonment of the fruit of all works.

We should attempt to find in Śaṅkara's works some data concerning the relationshipbetween meditation on a sacrificial act on the one hand and sacrifice itself on theother hand. It is stated that meditations, such as the Udgītha, are based upon thesacri-

201 In different ways in the existential as well as in the logical current which are the characteristicalachievements of contemporary philosophy.

202 See the author's Remarks on rationality and irrationality in East and West.


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fices along with which they are prescribed, but are not dependent on them and aretherefore valid separately.203 Thus meditations are more general than sacrifices.Accordingly, meditations are not restricted to particular śākhās (branches, schools)of the Veda, but belong to all śākhās: ‘the vidyās mentioned refer to the udgītha andso on belonging to all śākhās because the text speaks only of the udgītha and soon in general.‘204

Some scriptural passages with which the bhāṣyahāra deals enjoin ritual actions andothers meditations, for instance the meditation on Brahman. There is no conflictwhen different texts prescribe different sections. According to Śaṅkara thekarmakāṇḍa of the Veda enjoins a ‘plurality of works’ (karmabahutva). But he asks205whether there can also be a plurality in Brahman (brahmabahutva). In this case weare not dealing with an injunction to perform an act, but with an injunction to meditatewhich is similar to an instruction. In the passage concerned, Śaṅkara refers backto his commentary on one of the beginning sūtras (tattusamanvayāt),206which statesthat ‘the knowledge of Brahman (brahmavijñāna) is produced by passages whichtreat of Brahman as an existing accomplished thing and thus do not aim at enjoininganything’.207Here what probably was originally an injunction to meditate has becomea teaching-but a kind of teaching which seems to be as ‘magically’ loaded as sacrificeandmeditation themselves. The sūtra referred to might be profitably consulted beforethis discussion is continued.

This sūtra: tat tu samanvayāt, ‘but that because it is connected’ is one of the importantsources of the entire Vedānta and will occupy us below. In the commentary Śaṅkaradiscusses the question whether scriptural texts enjoin action or simply conveyinformation or knowledge. The Pūrva Mīmāṁsā view, to which he refers is clear andseems plausible. Śabara says, commenting upon the first sūtra of Jaimini: ‘the objectof the Vedas is evident: it is to give information with regard to action(karmāvabodhana)’.

203 Śaṅkara ad. 3.3.42.204 Ad. 3.3.55.205 Ad. 3.1.1.206 1.1.4.207 Transl. Thibaut II. 165.


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The scriptural texts prompt action (pravṛtti) or prevent action (nivṛtti). This meansthat a text is not purely informative in a general, impersonal and as it were scholarlyway. The pūruapakṣhij, Śaṅkara combats,208 is explicit about this: ‘If the Vedāntatexts were considered to have no reference to injunctions of actions,209 but to containstatements about mere (accomplished) things, just as if one were saying. ‘the earthcomprises seven islands’,210 ‘that king is marching on’, they would be purportless,because then they could not possibly be connected with something to be shunnedor endeavoured after’.211Here all purely indicative sentences are rejected. Accordingto the pūrvapakṣin, Vedānta texts are injunctions to meditate and this is a highlypurposeful act: ‘From the devout meditation (upāsanā) on this Brahman there resultsas its fruit (phalam) final release (mokṣa) which although not to be discerned (aḍṛṣṭa)in the ordinary way, is discerned (ḍṛṣṭa) by means of the śāstra’.212Plausible as all this may seem, Śaṅkara disagrees entirely with it (‘to all this, we,

the Vedāntins, make the following reply’). He establishes the siddhānta view, thatbrahmavijyñāna is not fruit of any action, not even of (the act of) meditation. Textsdealing with Brahman do not enjoin but inform and convey knowledge.213

Regarding brahmabahutva Śaṅkara says: ‘as Brahman is one and of uniform nature,it certainly cannot be maintained that the Vedānta-texts, aim at establishing a pluralityin Brahman comparable to the plurality of works’.214 ‘If it should be assumed that thedifferent Vedānta-texts aim at teaching different cognitions of Brahman, it wouldfollow that only one cognition could be the

208 The Ācāryadeśīya according to the Bhāmatī, the vṛttikāra according to the Ratnaprabhā (L.Renou. Prolégomènes au Vedānta, Paris 1951, 21, n. 2).

209 kartavyavidhyananupraveśē.210 saptadvīpā, vasumatī: an example from Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya.211 Ad. 1.1.4, transl. Thibaut I, 25.212 Ad. 1.1.4.213 The old magical view, superseded by Śaṅkara, is alive in contemporary India among those

who uphold a spirituality on the basis of purposeful knowledge while rejecting all ‘useless’indicative information - thus interpreting the Indian tradition and deprecating Westernphilosophy, assumed to deal only with knowledge like ‘the earth comprises seven islands’,which does not lead to liberation.

214 Id., Transl. Thibaut II, 184.


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right one while all others were mistaken, and this would lead to a general distrustof all Vedānta’.215

At this point an important distinction is introduced. Scripture teaches that somemeditations on Brahman have, like acts, various results: ‘some of them have visibleresults, others unseen results, and others again-as conducive to the springing upof perfect knowledge-have for their result release by successive steps’.216 Thereforeit is impossible to hold the opinion that all the texts teach only one cognition ofBrahman. This difficulty is solved by a discrimination which is rightly famous andcharacteristic of Advaita:217 that between the saguṇabrahman and thenirguṇabrahman (the qualified and the unqualified Brahman).218 Śaṅkara's final viewis therefore that ‘devout meditations on the qualified Brahman may, like acts, beeither identical or different’;219 whereas knowledge of the nirguṇabrahman can onlybe one, for the reasons stated above.

Thus we have arrived at the view, that in the scriptures different acts are prescribed;different meditations may be prescribed on the saguṇabrahman; but only onecognition exists of the nirguṇabrahman. There is a certain progress when oneproceeds from action to meditation and from meditation to knowledge, whileconsidering respectively the sacrifice, the saguṇabrahman, and the nirguṇabrahman.This constitutes a series of entities of increasing value, culminating in the highestvalue; and accordingly graded conceptions of the ultimate being.

215 Ibid.216 Id., Transl. II, 185.217 Especially as conflicting with Viśiṣṭādvaita: Rāmānuja combats at length the doctrine of the

‘two Brahmans’; see e.g. P.N. Srinivasachari, The Philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita, Adyar 1946,Chap. III, 61-92; or the first objection of the sixty-six objections against Advaita of Veṅkaṭanāthain his Śatadūṣaṇī (See Dasgupta III, 306).

218 To speak about a nirguṇa entity involves logical difficulties, just as to speak about the ineffablein Western philosophy. Vyāsa-tīrtha attacked Advaita for it; if Brahman is nirguṇa, it becomesśūnya ‘void’ (and Śaṅkara becomes a śūnyavādin: see below II, 13: 136, n. 447.. Cf. alsoDasgupta IV, 312). But Śaṅkara had complained already that Brahman was ‘regarded bypersons of dull intellect as śūnya’ (Chāndogyopaniṣadbhāṣya 8, Introduction; transl. 414).

219 Ad. 1.1.4, ibid,


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Concrete examples follow in further sūtras.220 Commenting upon ‘Bliss and other(qualities) as belonging to the subject of the qualities (have to be attributed toBrahman everywhere)’221 Śaṅkara establishes the view that qualities like ānanda,‘bliss, delight’, and the other qualities which belong to the subject (pradhāna) areall to be understood in each place (sarvatra), because the subject referred to isBrahman and is one and non-different. These are evidently qualities (dharmāḥ)which do not literally qualify and have to be ‘attributed to’ (in as far as we can speakof attribution) the nirguṇabrahman-a term which Śaṅkara, however, does not mentionin this text because of the somewhat embarassing connection of the unqualifiedwith qualities. The next sūtra, however, ‘(Such qualities as) joy being its head andso on have no force (for other passages); for increase and decrease belong toplurality (only)’222 is interpreted as referring to qualities, in which lower and higherdegrees can be distinguished223 and which therefore refer to the saguṇabrahmanand have no universal application. They have no validity for other meditations onBrahman and do not belong to the unqualified highest Brahman (nirguṇaparabrahman). But the following sūtra: ‘But other (attributes are valid for all passagesrelative to Brahman), the purport being the same’224 refers again to attributes suchas bliss and so on and belong again to the nirguṇabrahman which is one. ButŚaṅkara adds: ‘those attributes are mentioned with a view to knowledge only, notto meditation’.225 In the next sūtra qualities are again supposed to refer to thesaguṇabrahman ‘for the purpose of pious meditation (dhyāna)’.

Let us for the moment leave aside the purely metaphysical question-a questionwhich has occupied religious thinkers both of the East and of the West-of how farwe can deal with a nirguṇa entity (to which even according to Śaṅkara himself stillthe qualities such as ‘bliss and so on’ refer). We observe that meditation (dhyāna)may lead to saguṇabrahman but not to nirguṇabrahman

220 3.3. 11-13, etc.221 ānandädayaḥ pradhānasya: 3.3.11222 priyaśirastvādyaprāptirupacayāpacayau hi bhede 3.3.1.2.223 upacitâpacitagunatva.224 itare tvarthasāmānyāt: 3.3.13.225 ad hoc. transl. Thibaut II, 204.


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which belongs to the domain of pure knowledge. Though the philosophicaldevelopment kas proceeded from the sacrifice to meditation with knowledge as itsfruit, Śaṅkara's thesis is that there is a knowledge which is independent of previousaction or meditation and which arises spontaneously (svābhāvika). We will examinethe difference between meditation and knowledge and their relationship.

The most important distinction is that knowledge (jñāna) is not subordinate to action(kratvartha), as meditation is. Mere knowledge (kevala vidyā) effects the purposeof man (puruṣārtha, i.e. mokṣa) and is independent (svatantra).226 This knowledgedoes not lead to mokṣa, but constitutes mokṣa itself, mainly because it is knowledgein which there is no difference between subject and object, as we shall see below.There is no establishment of a link and no identification, and this knowledge cantherefore no longer be called magical: it is not effective but constitutes its ownpurpose. The texts ‘establish the fact that the so-called release doffers from all thefruits of action (karmaphalavilakṣaṇa).’227 That this knowledge is release itself pointsback to the sacrificial background; but that it springs from itself and is not a fruit ofaction or meditation shows that it is a new concept.

That mokṣa is entirely independent from action is brought out clearly by Padmapādain his Pañcapādikā, in the gloss on the commentary on the sūtra: tattusamanvayāt.228

It is summarised by Venkataramiah in his ‘conspectus’ as follows:229 ‘Any karma tobe purposeful must originate something (utpatti), secure something (āpti), bringabout some changes (vikāra), or effect purification (saṁskāra). Now since karmais incapable of effecting mokṣa in any of these ways there is no scope for it, i.e.,there is not even the remotest connection of mokṣa with action’.

Śaṅkara's view underscores that meditation also is an act and therefore unfit to bethe basis of knowledge. This is stated in

226 See ad. 3.4.1, 16, etc.227 Ad. 1.1.4, transl. I. 28.228 Pañcapādikā, 9.10 (22-26).229 Transl. D. Venkataramiah, Baroda 1948, 399. Cf. Mahadevan, Philosophy of Advaita 240

(Vivaraṇaprameyasaṁgraha) and Sureśvara, Saṁbandhavārtika, 236.


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several passages in the same context, for example: ‘The meditation, for instance,on man and woman as fire, which is founded on CU 5.7.1; 8.1; .... is on account ofits being a Vedic statement merely an action and dependent on man; that conceptionof fire, on the other hand, which refers to the well known (real) fire, is neitherdependent on Vedic statements nor on man, but only on a real thing which is anobject of perception; it is therefore knowledge and not an action’230 (note here therejection of magical identification); or: ‘The meditations on the other hand arethemselves acts, and as such capable of a special injunction; hence there is noreason why a special result should not be enjoined for those meditations which arebased on sacrificial acts’.231 The term jñāanakriyā is used for ‘aact of meditation’(not ‘act of knowledge’).232

The examination of the development from sacrifice to the act of meditation and frommeditation to knowledge and in particular to that knowledge which is no longerdependent on it, leads to three conclusions: (I) Actions are generally performed onthe ground of Vedic injunction, while knowledge of Brahman is independent ofactions. The highest knowledge (paramavidyā) is independent of the Vedicinjunctions: ‘knowledge which has the existant Brahman as its object is not dependenton Vedic injunction’.232a Scripture may lead to the knowledge of Brahman, but thisknowledge does not depend on it. Thereby Advaita does not become a doctrinewhich might be called avaidika, as it accepts the authority of the Veda and Īśvarais the source of scripture.233 This doctrine safeguards the purity, independence andtranscendence of the cognition of Brahman and therefore of Brahman itself.234(II) Whereas a causal series of karmic processes can reach most goals, including

the felicity of heaven, svarga (the highest goal in the Pūrva Mīmāṁsā); there is ahighest goal which is

230 Ad. 1.1.4 transl. I. 35.231 Ad. 3.3.42, transl. II. 256.232 Venkatararniah, o.c. 309.232a bhūtabrahmātmaviṣayamapijñānaṁ na codanātantram: Ad. 1.1.4., Transl. I. 35.233 śāstrayonitvāt: 1.1.3.234 See below, third conclusion: 87-8,


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entirely transcendent and which can never be the result of activities as it is beyondall causes and effects. This is mokṣa. Whereas all causal activity proceeds step bystep and is a process of transformation (pariṇāma), this highest release is a suddenrealization which manifests itself spontaneously. It does not change our mode ofbeing, but it shows the existence of a more authentic235mode of being. Since Advaitarejects the reality of transformation and change, mokṣa is eternal (nitya). It is notthe result of an act or the effect of a cause which is bound to appear at a certainmoment in time: mokṣa is absolutely real (pāramārthika), fixed (kūṭastha),236 eternal(nitya), omnipresent (sarvavyāpin) like the atmosphere, free from all modifications(sarvavikriyārahita), eternally self-sufficient (nityatṛpta), not composed of parts(niravayava) and of self-luminous nature (svayam-jyotiḥsvabhāva). That bodilessstate (aśarīratva), to which merit and demerit (dharmādharma) with theirconsequences (saha kāryeṇa) and threefold time (kālatraya) do not apply, is calledmokṣa. This definition agrees with scriptural passages such as the following:237‘different from merit and demerit (dharmād-anyatraadharmād-anyatra), differentfrom effect and cause (kṛtakṛtāt), different from past and future (bhūtāccabhavyācca)’.238 Sureśvara says that action is not eternal (anitya) but knowledge iseternally attained (nityaprāpta).239

As the state of mokṣa is beyond all actions and their fruit beyond all causal relationand beyond time, nothing ‘happens’ when somebody ‘attains’ release. Hence,

‘there is none in bondage, none aspiring for wisdom, no seeker of liberation(mumukṣu) and none liberated (mukta)’

as Gauḍapāda has already said.240 That a like verse occurs in

235 ‘eigentlich’.236 Possibly of Buddhist origin (kūṭattho) and occurring in the Bhagavad Gītā (see Renou,

Prolégomènes, 25, n. 53).237 Kaṭha Up. 1.2.14.238 Ad. 1.1.4, transl. Thibaut I, 28 with some alterations in accordance with Renou, o.c. 25.239 Saṁbandhavārtika, 369 b; cf. 300.240 Kārikā, 2.32.


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Nāgārjuna241 need not imply that Gauḍapāda has taken it from him (a historicalpossibility of relative philosophical importance)242 but reminds us of a wider context:in a less revolutionary but perhaps more subtle way than the Buddhists, Śaṅkaragoes beyond the sacrifice without abolishing it. This is itself a manifestion of thepredilection for the continuous as the ‘substance of tradition’ in Hinduism. For sacrificeis connected with the doctrines of karma, cause and temporal action. Śaṅkaraovercomes the sacrificial mentality by means of a knowledge which is no longer atemporal act (as meditation is) and which transcends the realm of karma andcausation. In this way we arrive at Brahman as the new concept of being, realisedby mokṣa as the new intuition of being. Śaṅkara however does not reject karma andcausality but accepts them in subordinate position.

(III) The third conclusion enables us to introduce in an existentially andphenomenologically justifiable way the Absolute, Brahman. In the Veda this termmay have denoted a kind of power connected with the sacrifice and manifestingitself as sacred or magical word.243 Its manifestation results from the ritual act andappears magically loaded. As a result of the ritual act, which creates and discoversbeing, Brahman is being itself. In Śaṅkara Brahman is likewise not an abstractconcept but the goal itself, i.e., mokṣa. The above exposition can be called existentialand phenomenological in the sense that it starts with the mode of our being whichis sacrifice and proceeds to the mode of our being which is knowledge or mokṣa,without referring to external, i.e., phenomenologically unaccessible entities. The textdealing with mokṣa quoted above, proceeds as follows: ‘It (i.e. mokṣa) is thereforethe same as Brahman,244 in the enquiry (jijñāsā) into which we are at presentengaged’ (Cf. the first sūtra: athāto brahmajijñāsā). Therefore Brahman is beyondall karma,245 beyond all causality and beyond time. This means that it is not the resultof an act, not even of the act of meditation; that it is

241 Madhyamaka, 16.5.242 Cf. Mahadevan, Gauḍapāda.243 See T. Gonda, Notes on Brahman, Utrecht 1950 and the literature referred to.244 atastadbrahma.245 Cf. Ratnaprabhā, ad hoc, quoted by Thibaut 28, n. 2.


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neither an effect, nor a cause e.g. of the universe (as we will see below);246 and thatit is the ever unchanging timeless.

Mokṣa or Brahman is nitya, ‘eternal’ and this eternity excludes all change andtransformation (pariṇāma). It is, as Śaṅkara remarks, not eternal in the less propersense in which some things are conceived as ‘eternal, although changing’(pariṇāmānitya), for instance the guṇas in the Sāṁkhya system.247 For the guṇasare in a perpetual process of always uniting, separating and uniting again, and inthis sense the Sāṁkhya professes the eternity of the world (pariṇāmanityatva),248as Advaita professes the perpetuity of saṁsāra. But Brahman is in Advaita eternalwithout any modifications (sarvavikriyārahita).

The doctrine that Brahman is the only reality signifies that mokṣa is not only moreauthentic than ordinary experience, but also shows the illusoriness of ordinaryexperience. It is an important but philosophically unsoluble question, whether thisdoctrine is the outcome of speculation or of the experience (anubhava) of mokṣaitself. Against the second view it might be objected that such an unqualifiedexperience in which subject and object are one is not likely to have the characterof a possible cause the outcome of which may be any metaphysical doctrine.249 Insupport of the view that the basis of Advaita is speculative it can moreover be arguedthat the doctrine of the sole reality of Brahman follows from the view that the Absoluteis unqualified. For the relation of Brahman to any other reality would affect itsnirguṇatva. The fact that we can understand Advaita and follow the developmentsof its thought and arguments may also show that its basis is speculation.

But even if the basis is speculation it need not be exclusively speculation. Forspeculation can lead to a consistent philosophical doctrine but cannot establishtruth. If the basis of Advaita were mere speculation nobody could be sincerelyconvinced of its truth, We may by philosophical means arrive at the conclusion that

246 II. 14.247 Ad. 1.1.4.248 See e.g. Dasgupta I, 243-245.249 See below II. 15: 159.


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Advaita is a consistent system without being convinced of its being true. Theexperience is decisive. As long as we do not possess it we can neither affirm nordeny its validity.

In accordance with this Śaṅkara generally shows in his commentaries the consistencyof his doctrines without attempting to prove them by referring to the experiencewhich tradition attributes to him. There may be one passage in the Sūtrabhāṣyawhere he refers indirectly to his own experience, though we cannot be certain evenhere. This passage, mentioned by Mahadevan,250 deals with the concept ofJīvan-mukti and expresses with an insistence which seems based upon personalexperience that the experience of the Jīvan-mukta cannot be contested: ‘How canone contest the heart-felt condition of another as possessing Brahman-knowledge,even though bearing a body?’251

Summarizing we can say that meditation is considered an act like sacrifice whileknowledge is not; that acts and meditations can be many while knowledge is one;that acts and meditations may have several purposes and objects, includingsaguṇabrahman, while nirguṇabrahman can only be the object of knowledge orrather knowledge itself (because in this knowledge subject and object are identicaland therefore identical with knowledge itself) which is mokṣa. Such knowledge isgiven in some Vedic texts, which are not injunctions or prescriptions to act but areof a purely indicative character. This knowledge arises spontaneously, is not thefruit of any action, not even of meditation, is not effect of a cause (or cause of aneffect) and is eternal. The same applies to mokṣa and Brahman, which are identicalwith it and with each other. The reaction against sacrifice has also entailed a certainindependence with regard to the Vedic authority, which is accepted as such butwhich is not the cause of the knowledge which is mokṣa, the śāstra being itselffounded in Īśvara.

All these topics are closely interwoven and interconnected and this is a sign of theunity of thought reached and achieved in the Advaitic doctrine on the basis of atradition which does not at all make such a unified impression. It is difficult to indicateat the

250 T.M.P. Mahadevan, Outlines of Hinduism, Bombay 1956, 143-144.251 4.1.15.


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same time all meanings and to develop the ideas in all directions. This is as we sawin the first part252 due to the ‘circular procedure’ which is characteristic of philosophy.Some of the topics already dealt with have therefore to be developed somewhatfurther. The next section (Section 8), will once again deal with karma and jñāna butin a different context; it will also touch upon an instructive and interesting comparisonwith another ‘revolt against karma’, which has a Western counterpart. The sectionfollowing (Section 9) will study magical efficacy of meditation and the concept ofjñāna by means of a discussion of their terminology and occurrence in several texts.

8. Action - meditation - knowledge: Advaita and other systems

The term karman characterises the atmosphere of the beginning of Vedic literature.It denotes any action which is conceived as causation and it can be applied todifferent levels, which coincided in the beginning. It denotes everyday actionconsciously applied on the basis of causal connections which are generally observed(or, with a philosophical critique, which manifest themselves to the observer): everyaction establishes a cause desired for the sake of an effect. It denotes the sum totalof activities which result after death in a certain status leading to a new life; andlastly it denotes certain magically efficient acts, the sacrifices, which lead to variousdesirable results. In the last two cases it is not always obvious what constitutes thesubstratum of the causal connection (e.g. dharma and adharma or puṇya and pāpasubsisting after death). For this reason Prabhākara and his followers in Mīmāṁsācall the result of sacrificial acts apūrva (litt. ‘never before’).253 This apūrva is a typicallymagical concept and by rejecting it Śaṅkara shows the magical and unintelligiblecharacter of all activity, even there where the result is immediately present so thatno apūrva is needed. The evidence for Advaita, the jīvan-mukta, ‘wbo is releasedwhile embodied’, is dṛṣṭa, ‘visible’, whereas the proof for Mīmāṁsā, apūrva, is adṛṣṭa‘invisible’. Sureśvara therefore says: ‘The Vedānta-texts have seen fruit (dṛṣṭa-

252 1.4.D.253 Hiriyanna, Outlines, 327. Cf. L. Renou in: Journal Asiatique, 233 (1941-42), 126-7.


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phala), whereas svarga or the result of agnihotra is an unseen fruit (adṛṣṭaphala)’.254

Elsewhere he calls jñāna a dṛṣṭārtha.255The Karmakāṇḍa deals with all these aspects of karman but the Jñānakāṇḍa

supplements it. The difference between the two corresponds to the differencebetween Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads, between sacrifice or action in general andknowledge (with meditation as a link between the two) and between Pūrva andUttara Mīmāṁsās. In Pūrva Mīmāṁsā Vedic injunctions are interpreted as referringto action only; in Advaita knowledge is Vastu-tantra dependent on the thing and noton injunction. One school of Pūrva Mīmāṁsā is nearer to Advaita: the school ofKumārila Bhaṭṭa. Whereas the rival school of Prabhākara holds that scripturalstatements point only at things to be accomplished (sādhya), the school of KumārilaBhaṭṭa believes that scriptural statements may either point to sādhya or else tosiddha, an existent and accomplished thing. Both schools agree that action is themajor mode of our being referred to in the Veda and prescribed there. Even if theexistence of passages which merely refer to existent things (siddha) is recognized,these are looked upon as arthavāda, ‘explanatory passages’, i.e., passagesexplaining the injunctions. In the context of any siddha passage another passagecan be found which prescribes an action and to which the siddha can be related. Itis obvious that this practice may become artificial when dealing with passages likethe famous ‘tat tvam asi.’The Advaita view is that the Vedic propositions refer to both siddha and sādhya,

but that the siddha statements are the most important. We saw already instancesof the fact that Śaṅkara does not reject, but subordinates. The same occurs in thiscontext. Whereas the activity which is prescribed in śruti is supposed to be able tohelp us and to lead us to heaven (svarga) and prosperity (abhyudaya),256 Śaṅkaraholds that the siddha passages are not connected with any action but establish theknowledge of Brahman, which is mokṣa and the highest good (niḥśreyasa).257 Suchsiddha

254 Saṁbandhavārtika, 275/6; cl 341, Transl. Mahadevan.255 Id. 296, with a reference to Muṇḍakopaniṣad, 2.2.8.256 Ad. 1.1.1. The Ratnaprabhā calls this the abode of the pitṛyāṇa (Renou, Prolégomènes, 7, n.

6). Cf. above II. 3.257 ‘The good beyond which there is no other good’: identical with mokṣa according to the

Ratnaprabhā (Renou. id. 8, n. 1).


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passages treat directly of matters of fact (bhūta-vastu), which is especially importantin mahāvākyas like ‘tat tvam asi’. The relative validity of the Mīmāṁsaka point ofview is expressed in the saying quoted above: vyāvahāre Bhāṭṭa-nayaḥ, ‘in the levelof everyday experience the opinion of the Bhāṭṭa holds’.258

It may be lastly remarked that Advaita remains close to this Mīmāṁsaka point ofview in as far as even these purely indicative passages are of importance only inas far as they embody the knowledge which is mokṣa. They are not of purelytheoretical interest, as are greater portions of Western philosophy in certainrespects.259It is clear that according to Śaṅkara the Pūrva and Uttara Mīmāṁsās are not

conflicting views but merely refer to different realms. The higher goal is that for whichthe Uttara Mīmāṁsā-unstrivingly-strives. It must be remembered however260 thatUttara Mīmāṁsā is in certain respects a continuation of Pūrva Mīmāṁsā. Advaitahas developed on the basis of Pūrva Mīmāṁsā and it can be rightly said that‘Śaṅkara's work is entirely pervaded by Mīmāṁsā’.261 Notwithstanding the explicitdifferences between the two Mīmāṁsās, it is possible to trace several commonpoints. This is also the view of Pūrva Mīmāṁsā itself.262 A comparable view isadvocated by Viśiṣṭādvaita as against Advaita: ‘The twoMīmāṁsās are really integralparts of one systematic whole, and their object is to lead the seeker after truth stepby step till he ascends to his home in the absolute. Rāmānuja, following Bodhāyana,therefore thinks that the entire Mīmāṁsā Śāstra.... has a definite spiritual meaningand value .... The Vedavādin who follows karma .... realizes its perishing value andtries to become the Brahmavādin. The transition from karma-vicāra to Brahmavicārathus involves temporal sequence as well as logical consequence’ saysSrinivasachari.263 The same opinion is defended by the Viśiṣṭādvaitin Vātsya Varada,about whom Dasgupta remarks: ‘Vātsya Varada holds that the study of Vedicinjunction and the

258 For the last paragraph see Hiriyanna, Outlines, 318-319, 357-8.259 See above II, 7, 81, n. 213.260 See above II, 1.261 ‘Śaṅkara est tout pénétré de Mīmāṁsā’: Renou, Id. III,262 See Jha, Pūrva Mīmāṁsa, 7-9.263 Srinivasachari, The Philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita, 135-36.


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inquiry relating to Brahman form the parts of one unified scripture, i.e. the latterfollows or is a continuation of the former; and he mentions Bodhāyana in hissupport’.264

The word atha with which the Brahmasūtra commences (athāto brahmajijñāsā) isnot an argument in favour of the opinion that Uttara Mīmāṁsā is merely a continuationof PūrvaMīmāṁsā. For the PūrvaMīmāṁsā sūtra starts in the samemanner (athātodharmajijñāsā). Śaṅkara and Śabara commenting upon the first sūtra of Jaimini andBādarāyaṇa respectively interpret atha in the same manner: it denotes immediatesequence and signifies that both jijñāsās follow immediately upon the recitation ofthe Veda (Vedādhyāyana). Śaṅkara denies that Brahmajijñāsā can only take placeafter dharmajijñāsā: ‘For a man who has read the Vedānta portions of the Veda itis possible to enter on the inquiry into Brahman even before engaging in the inquiryinto dharma’. The reason is of course that no action can give access to Brahman:‘the knowledge of active religious duty has for its fruit transitory felicity, and thatagain depends on the performance of religious acts. The inquiry into Brahman, onthe other hand, has for its fruit eternal bliss and does not depend on the performanceof any acts’.265

There were also important teachers, not only amongst the Mīmāṁsakas but alsoamongst the Vedāntins, who apparently disagreed with Śaṅkara that only jñānaeffects mokṣa. In Mīmāṁsā, through Vedāntic influence attention was also paid tomokṣa as a higher aim than svarga. But it was held that the seekers for mokṣashould not abstain from all karma but only from kāmyaharma and pratiṣiddhakarma,the activities leading to respectively good and bad births. Nobody can abstain fromthe performance of nityakarma; otherwise he will be disobeying the Vedic law.266

A combination of knowledge and works, jñānakarmasamuccaya, was not only heldby the Mīmāṁsakas (e.g. Kumārila), but also by the Vedāntin Brahmadatta.267 Itoccurs likewise in the

264 Dasgupta, III. 3.50.265 Ad. 1.1.1. Transl. Thibaut, I, 10-11.266 See Naiṣkarmyasiddhi, ed. G.A. Jacob, Poona 1925, Introduction (by M. Hiriyanna), xiv.267 Id. xxii.


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Yoga-Vāsiṣṭha.268 It is noteworthy, that also Maṇḍana Miśra was apparently asamuccayavādin; but not the celebrated Sureśvara269 (the latter two were thereforenot identical, notwithstanding tradition, unless there was a change of opinion whichis perfectly possible),270 who was on the contrary very clear about the differencebetween karma and jñāna:271 ‘He alone is eligible to the study of the Vedāntas, whohas renounced all actions without residue ....’.272 And elsewhere: ‘Action is requiredin respect of what is to be accomplished (sādhya). In respect of the established(siddha) it is of no use.’273 ‘Knowledge removes entirely all action’274 And more inparticular about rites and about the act of meditation: ‘Rites are enjoined on the manwho is endowed with nescience’.275 According to Sureśvara, Mīmāṁsā is wrongwhen it holds that mokṣa results from the injunction ‘meditate’ (upāsīta), just asabhyudaya results from the injunction ‘perform the rite’ (kurvītḥ kratum).276 For ‘thegood (śreyaḥ) is one thing, the pleasing (preyaḥ) quite another’.277 And combined:‘Nor is knowledge of one self dependent on practice (abhyāsa); nor is it dependenton meditation (bhāvanā) for the sake of release’.278 Thejñānakarmasamuccaya-sādhana is also explicitly mentioned and refuted in theAitareyopaniṣadbhāṣya ascribed to Śaṅkara.279

In later Advaita a difference arises concerning the relation between karma and jñānabetween the Bhāmatī and the Vivaraṇa schools. In the Bhāmatī karma is called aremote auxiliary (ārādupakāraka) for the generation of knowledge; for through itsinflu-

268 See Dasgupta, II. 228.269 See, however, Brahmasiddhi, ed. S. Kuppuswami Sastri, Madras 1927, Introduction xlvi.270 Id. xxiv-lvii; Naiṣkarmyasiddhi, Introduction xxxiii. Cf. also M. Hiriyanna in JRAS 1923 (April),

1924 (January). See, however, Dasgupta II, 82-87.271 Cf. Saṁbandhavārtika, 356 sq. against jñānakarmasamuccaya.272 Id. 12.273 Id. 90.274 Id. 124.275 Id. 164.276 Id. 22.277 Id. 24. Cf. Kaṭhopaniṣad. 2.1.278 Id. 438 b.279 Introduction, transl. D. Venkataramiah, Bangalore 1934, 2; cf. 6. The occurrence of the term

may indicate that the bhāṣya is not genuine.


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ence sin can decrease, and with the cessation of sin sattva, i.e., the intellect, ispurified. This leads to the desire for knowledge and hence to pure knowledge.280That karma is cause of the desire for knowledge can be inferred from a text of theBṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad:281 ‘That (Self) the Brahmins desire to know through studyof the Veda, through sacrifice, through gifts and through austerities like fasting’.282Following the same śruti Sureśvara says: ‘Reciting the Vedas etc. are for the sakeof generating the desire to know the inner Self (pratyagvividiṣā)’.283

According to the Vivaraṇa school, however, karma is useful in generating vidyāitself: it is a proximate auxiliary (sannipatyaupakāraka). This comes nearer to theMīmāṁsakā view. The Vivaraṇa view occurs in the Vedāntaparibhāsā: ‘And thisknowledge (i.e., brahmajñāna) results from consumption of sin (pāpakṣaya), whilethis (in turn) results from observance of (obligatory) rites (i.e. nityakarma); there isthus indirect utility for rites’.284At first sight it seems that a kind of samuccayavāda of jñāna and karma occurs

in the Bhagavad Gītā for it teaches renunciation from the fruits of works as the meansto mokṣa and this is not the same as jñāna. Moreover the Gītā seems to combinedifferent tendencies. Since the Gītā is one of the threemembers of the prasthānatrayaŚaṅkara has in his Gītābhāya given an Advaitic interpretation. This interpretationcan neither be logically proved, nor refuted, as it declares that all non-Advaiticpassages, like the saprapañca-passages of the Upaniṣads, refer to thevyāvahārika-realm (see below). This interpretation, which recon-ciles the differenttendencies, is defended by some scholars,285 but rejected by others.286 The historicalproblem need not occupy us

280 Bhamatī, ad. 1.1.1., ed. and transl. Madras 1933, 85.281 Quoted by Mahadevan, Philosophy of Advaita, 243 and by S.S. Suryanarayana Sastri in the

Notes to the edition of the Vedāntaparibhāṣā, 81.282 BAU. 4.4.22.283 Saṁbandhavārtika, 14. Cf. also 191b-193a.284 Prayojanam, 24. Cf. also Mahadevan, ibid., and the note ad loc. by Stiryanarayana Sastri.

Cf. also B.K. Sengupta, A Critique on the Vivarana School, Calcutta 1959, and: J.F. Staal in:Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, (1960) 192-3.

285 See e.g. T.M.P. Mahadevan, The two-fold path in the Gītā, Kalahasti 1940.286 For example, B, Faddegon, who has especially dealt with this problem in his book; Śaṅkara's

Gītābhaṣya toegelicht en beoordeeld. Amsterdam 1906, the conclusion of which (115) reads:‘voor ons kan het voldoende zijn te hebben aangetoond, welkeen afstand er ligt tussen dechaotische, soms verheven en poetische gemoedswereld van den Gitadichter eenerzijds ende subtiele, soms diepzinnige doch meestal spitsvondige en ledige dogmatiek van Śaṅkaraanderzijds’.


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here,287 neither the kindred problem of Śaṅkara's correctness in interpreting theBrahmasūtras.288

To give an idea of the complications which can arise in interpreting the Gītā we mayquote a verse translated by F. Edgerton as follows:289

Action arises from Brahman, know;And Brahman springs from the Imperishable (akṣara);

Therefore the universal BrahmanIs eternally based on worship (yajñe pratiṣṭhitam).

This śloka seems to state clearly the efficacy of karma for those who want to reachBrahman. But according to the traditional view, if the words are understood in theirordinary sense Brahman cannot be the highest in the Gītā, where Kṛṣṇa is an avatāraof Brahman (not of Viṣṇu). Therefore the terms akṣara and brahma are said todenote each a different concept according to the great commentators. But theĀcāryas differ on the other hand greatly

287 A few facts about which there can be no difference of opinion, may be recalled here. Śaṅkaraquotes in the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya not only the Gītā much less often than the Chāndogya orthe Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad (the number of quotations from the Gītā being about a sixth ofthose from the Bṛhadāraṇyaka and an eight of those from the Chāndogya), but also less oftenthan the Kaṭhopaniṣad or the Muṇḍakopaniṣad (see Thibaut, Index of quotations, II, 421-430).The twelfth adhyāya which deals with bhakti is never quoted, In the 38 ślokas which arequoted the term bhakti occurs once, in an unessential context: ‘at the time of death...disciplinedwith devotion (bhaktyā, yuktaḥ) and the power of discipline (yogabalena)....he goes to thatsupreme divine Spirit’ (8.10), of which Śaṅkara quotes only a part (‘at the time of death withunswerving thought’), leaving out the rest (ad. 4.1.12). The term bhākta occurs once whenthe sloka 7.21 is quoted completely (ad. 3.2.41); but this passage is only utilised to show thatthe Lord is ‘not only the giver of fruits, but also the causal agent with reference to all actionswhether good or evil’ (transl. II. 184). An evaluation of the member of quotations can only begiven after studying the quotations in the Brahmasūtra itself.

288 See V.S. Ghate, The Vedānta-A study of the Bramaūtras with the Bhāsyas, Poona, 1926 (inFrench-1918).

289 3. 15 (F. Edgerton, The Bhagavad Gita, Cambridge Mass. 1946).


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in the actual interpretation of what the terms denote. Thus Śaṅkara interprets brahmaas the Veda and akṣara as the nirguṇabrahman; Rāmānuja interprets brahma asprakṛti (hesitatingly followed by Edgerton in his note) and akṣara as the jīvātman;and Madhva accepts brahma in the ordinary sense whilst interpreting akṣara as thetext of the Veda.290

As an example of the typical Advaitic way of interpretation another śloka may bequoted, which again seems nearer to Mīmāṁsā or the Brāhmaṇas than to Advaitaor even samuccayavāda. This śloka is translated by Edgerton as follows

The (sacrificial) presentation is Brahman; Brahman is the oblation;In the (sacrificial) fire of Brahman it is poured by Brahman;

Just to Brahman must he go,Being concentrated upon the (sacrificial section that is Brahman).

Śaṅkara stresses the unreality of everything apart from the absolute by speakingabout ‘the instrument by which the oblation is poured in the fire’ as being ‘nothingbut Brahman (tat brahmaiva iti). He declares in the commentary that ultimately allaction is unreal: ‘the action performed by him who wishes to set an example to theworld is in reality no action (karma paramārthato 'karma), as it has been destroyedby the realisation of Brahman (brahmabuddhyupamṛditatvāt)’. The reason is that ‘toone who realises that all is Brahman there is no action’.291

The Bhagavad Gītā presents fundamental problems. It cannot easily be maintainedthat it reacts against karma in an Advaitic way; it cannot even be said with certaintythat its teaching constitutes at all a reaction against karma. It may be that in the Gītāan attempt is made to synthetise the karmic and the non-karmic trends of Indianthought. One example from later Indian thought shows that the doctrine of karmawas also overcome in

290 Cf, R.C. Zaehner, Hindu and Muslim Mysticism, London 1960. Chap. IV.291 brahmaiva idaṁ sarvam iti ābhijānatar viduṣaḥ karmābhāvaḥ: Gītābhāṣya, ad. 4.24,


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another way-although related to the Gītā. It occurs in Viśiṣṭādvaita, especially in theTeṅkalai school. In the whole of Viśiṣṭādvaita bhakti-yoga counts more thanjñāna-yoga. Mukti is defined as the conquest of karma by kṛpā, ‘redemptive love’.292

Īśvara rules the world by His relentless law of karma’, says Srinivasachari,293 ‘andHis holy wrath against the evil-doer is inescapable, but the rigour of karma isoverpowered by the redemptive love of kṛpā. Evil is destroyed and the evil-doersaved’.

In the two schools of the later Viśiṣṭādvaita, the Northern school (Vaḍakalai)recognizes a certain usefulness of works, whereas the Southern school (Teṅkalai)only believes in grace, prapatti and the utter inefficacy of works, emphasising theunconditional nature of God's grace (nirhetuka kaṭākṣa)294 and the emptiness of allother means (upāya-śūnyatā).295

These doctrines parallel the attitude of Protestantism in Christianity, where salvationcan be gained sola fide, ‘through faith alone’. This parallelism has been studied byR. Otto.296

So karma is replaced by jñāna i.e., the sacrifice, with its unity of the spiritual andthe material, has been overcome by a purely spiritual entity (indicating therefore thepresence also of a purely material entity). Thus a new concept of being is evolved.It remains for us to understand this jñāna which is as mokṣa and Brahman at thesame time the new concept of being.

9. Concepts of meditation and knowledge

In the previous section several points of view regarding the relations between karma,meditation and jñāna have been reviewed. Now several definitions will be consideredin order to analyse further what is meant by the terms for meditation (dhyāna,nididhyāsana; ef. manana, ‘reflection’) and knowledge (jñāna, vijñāna ; vidyā; cf.bodha, ‘thought’ cit, ‘intelligence’).

292 Srinivasachari, o.c. 402.293 id. 166; cf. 174.294 id. 530; cf. 536.295 Dasgupta III 87.296 R. Otto, Indiens Gnadenreligion und das Christentum, Gotha 1930.


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Already in the Śvetāśvataropaniṣad a characterization of dhyāna occurs, whichshows how the sacred syllable Om becomes efficacious only through dhyāna andhow on that account an all together novel effect is produced. Making use of theanalogy of kindling fire by means of rubbing297 two pieces of wood (araṇi) together,the text says:298

Making his body the lower araṇi and the sacred syllableOm the upper araṇi-

He can by that practice of rubbing which is meditation(dhyāna) see God as the hidden (fire becomes visible).

It seems to be a mystery how from dry, dark, cold wood fire can suddenly spring;likewise it seems to be a mystery how the unmanifest divine can suddenly becomemanifest. That this phenomenon can be produced as the effect of a cause is clearfrom the text. The mysterious or magical efficacy has as its divine prototype thecreator, who things silently in his mind and who subsequently materializes the contentof his thought.299 The act of meditation is one of the remnants of the period whenmaterial and spiritual were not conceived as different and separate realms. Sincethe two are discriminated by the increasingly differentiating consciousness, theirinterconnection has also become mysterious or magical. Moreover, it becomesintelligible that Śaṅkara sees the samemagical and unintelligible adhyāsa300 at workin the act of meditation and in Īśvara's creation.

More and better, though perhaps less suggestive, characterizations of whatmeditation really consists of can be collected from Śaṅkara's works. In theBṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣya meditation is spoken of as a mental act ofconcentration, approaching the form of an object, dependent on scriptural injunctionsand resulting in complete identification: ‘Upāsanā is mentally approaching (upa) theform of a deity or something else as delineated in scriptural passages relating tomeditation, and concentrating the mind

297 Cf. the lamp of Aladin in the Arabian 1001 Nights and the psychoanalytical interpretation(Diets), which reveals one aspect of the mysterious result in its psychological value.

298 Śvetāśvataropaniṣad 1. 14.299 Cf. above II 6: 72, n. 168.300 Cf. below II. 11.


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on it (āsanā), uninterrupted by secular thoughts, till one is as completely identifiedwith it as with one's own body, conventionally regarded as one's self’.301 Meditationcannot go beyond the world of names and forms (nāmarūpa), though it may help toreach the highest reach thereof. Therefore we read somewhere else in the samecommentary: ‘Through meditation (vidyayā) the world of the Gods (devaloka) is tobe won....therefore they praise meditation’.302

Concentration is especially stressed in a passage of the Gītābhāṣya:303 ‘Upāsanaconsists in approaching the object of worship by way of meditating on it accordingto the teaching (yathāśāstram) and dwelling for a long time steadily in the currentof same thought, (continuous) like a thread of descending oil’. When the meaningof concentration is further analysed, it is seen that it is rather difficult to express whatit positively contains since its content manifests itself only ultimately. Therefore thenegative is stressed in the Gītābhāṣya,304 as follows: ‘Dhyāna consists in withdrawingby concentration (upasaṁhrtya) hearing and other senses into the manas (mind)away trom sound, etc, and other sense objects, then withdrawing manas into theinner intelligence and then contemplating (the inner intelligence)’. This leads furtherto the definition of the Vedāntaparibhāṣā:305 ‘What is called contemplation(nididhyāsana) is that mental operation, which, in the case of mind (citta) attractedto (external) objects by beginning-less evil associations, is helpful to turn it awayfrom (external) objects and secure firmness (for it) in respect of the Self (alone) asobject’. In the definition of the Vedāntasāra both aspects are mentioned:306‘Nididhyāsana is the procession of like thoughts referring to the secondless Brahman,dissociated from other objects like the body and so forth’. The positivecharacterization occurs already in the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya too:307 ‘By upāsana weunder-

301 Ad. 1.3.9, transl. Swami Madhavananda; cf. M. Hiriyanna's translation of the first threebrāhmaṇas of the first chapter of the Bṛhadārāṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣya, Srirangam 1919, 92.

302 Ad. 1.5.16. Here vidyā denotes ‘meditation’.303 Ad. 12. 3-4.304 Ad. 13-24.305 IX. (Prayojanam) 24.306 192; transl. Hiriyanna 59.307 Ad. 4.1.7.


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stand the lengthened carrying on of an identical train of thought.’308

The positive characterisation corresponds to the central Advaitic idea expressed as‘the world is (in as far as it really is) identical with Brahman’. The negativecharacterisation corresponds to the same idea expressed as ‘the world is (in as faras it is different from Brahman) unreal.’ Both ideas may have the same significance;but the second is more especially Saṅkara's approach309 and is reflected in thedefinition of meditation rather as a withdrawal from the world than as a concentrationupon the Absolute. Both, however, cannot be separated.

In one passage of the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya meditation and knowledge are veryclearly differentiated; it may serve as a transition to the consideration of knowledge.There it is said,310 that meditation (dhyāna) and reflection (cintana) are mental(mānasa); they may be performed or not performed or modified (kartumakartumanyathā vā kartum śakyam) by a human being (puruṣena), because of theirdependence on man (puruṣatantratvāt). But knowledge (jñāna) is the result of themeans of right knowledge (pramāṇjanyam) and the pramāṇas refer to the things asthey exist (pramāṇam yathābhūtavastuviṣayam). Therefore one cannot say thatknowledge may be performed or not performed or modified (kartumakartumanyathāvā kartum aśakyam): it only depends on the thing (kevalam vastutantram eva), noton Vedic injunction (na codanātantram) and also not on man (na api puruṣatantram).Meditation is performed (or not performed), i.e. it is an act of the human being, takingits starting point from śruti. Knowledge is independent from man and from śruti; itis not an act,311 but it represents the things as they are. This quite phenomenologicaldefinition of knowledge does away with the subjective element of meditation as wellas with the magical element.

308 samānapratyayapravāhakaraṇam.309 The first approach will find an exponent in Śrī Aurobindo, who substitutes līlāvāda for

māyāvāda.310 Ad 1.1.4; Nirṇaya Sāgar ed. 83.311 A mistake, easily made in the Thomistic tradition (where the act plays such an important part)

and also in the French language, occurs throughout the work of Lacombe who speaks of‘l'acte de connaissance’ (e.g., p. 184).


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Through jñāna Śaṅkara goes beyond the magical atmosphere of previous thoughtand arrives at an approach to reality which might be called gnoseological in as faras it places knowledge in the centre, but goes beyond the pure intellect.

According to Śaṅkara the objectivity of jñāna is a fact, while the objectivity ofmeditation is not. He explicitly denies the reality of certain identifications to whichmeditation may lead; they have to be understood figuratively. In the commentaryon the Brahmasūtras, for instance, reference is made to mantras and arthavādaswhich have to be explained in a secondary sense, when the primary literal sense isrendered impossible by other pramāṇas.312 ‘The following arthavāda passage, forinstance’, says Thibaut,313 ‘the sacrificial post is the sun’, is to be taken in ametaphorical sense; because perception renders it impossible for us to take it in itsliteral meaning. This is different from the archaic atmosphere of magical identificationin the Brāhmanas.

The view that jñāna is objective ‘just like the things as they exist’(yathābhūtavastu)-appears as realistic in the epistemological sense. But we haveto discriminate between two kinds of knowledge: empirical knowledge of externalthings and knowledge of the Self. The first is adequate in as far as it reveals thesecond; in every experience the Absolute is given and can be revealed anddiscovered.314 Themechanism of knowledge is analysed in the later Advaita Vivaraṇaschool in the following manner.315 It is hardly necessary to say that also this analysisshows that the Advaitic position cannot be adequately understood when comparedwith critical idealism in epistemology (Deussen; cf. Vijñānavāda).

According to Vidyāraṇya316 in empirical knowledge the mind when pervading anobject assumes the form of that object. This constitutes a modification or (astranslated by Mahadevan and by Bhattacharya) psychosis (vṛtti) of the internal organ(antaḥkaraṇa) in which there is a reflection (ābhāsa) of the intelligence-self (cit). Butfor the ‘known-ness’ as well as for the ‘unknown-

312 Ad. 2.1.13.313 Ad hoc: I, 318, n. 1.314 See Murti, o.c. 315 for the difference with Vijñānavāda.315 See Mahadevan. Philosophy of Advaita. 9 sq.316 Pañcadaśī 4.28 ap. Mahadevan, o.c. 11.


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ness’ of an object Brahman-intelligence is required. The reflection of intelligence(cidābhāsa) is an appearance of which Brahman is the sole reality. Whereas ābhāsareveals the object alone, Brahman-intelligence illuminates vṛtti, ābhāsa and theobject as well. Such knowledge arises through the psychosis of the internal organand is called vṛttijñāna.

In the case of Self-knowledge there is no external object, there is nothing outside,there can be no ābhāsa, no object and no subject. Concerning this jñāna expressedin the mahāvākya ‘aham brahmāsmi’317 the Vedāntasāra says:318 ‘Spirit (caitanya)as reflected in that state of mind, being unable to illumine the self-luminous Brahman,not distinct from the internal self, will be overcome as a lamp flame for example is,by the sun's rays, being unable to overcome them. And it will lapse into Brahmanitself, not distinct from the inmost self, as its condition (upādhi), viz., the mental state,is no longer there .... Its being affected by the vṛtti is necessary in order that ignorancemay be dispelled.319 The reflection serves no purpose here, Brahman beingself-luminious’.320 This knowledge is called svarūpajñāna and is possible becauseof a characteristic of knowledge which is very much stressed in Advaita:self-luminosity (svaprakāśatva). In this knowledge none of the characteristics ofvṛtti-jñāna remain. But it remains affected by vṛtti for the purpose of dispelling theignorance regarding it. In other words there is vṛtti-vyāpti (pervasion by psychosis),and not phala-vyāpti (pervasion by fruit, i.e., reflection).

Self-luminosity explains not only svarūpajñāna but also empirical knowledge, forlight is the condition of any possible reflection. In a suggestive comparison theself-luminosity of knowledge (jñānasvaprakāśatva), rooted in the self-luminosity ofthe Absolute which is identical with it, is compared to the lamp used on the stagewhen dance or drama is performed (nāṭakadīpa).321 The lamp illuminates the actorsfor the audience and the audience itself; but it shines even if the theatre be emptiedof all persons.

317 BAU 1.4.10.318 173, 175, 176; transl. Hiriyanna 58.319 Pañcadaśi 6, 90.320 Pañcadaśī 6.92; svayamprakāśamāṅatvānnābhāsa upayujyate.321 Mahadevan, o.c. 175.


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Similarly objects as well as subjects are revealed by Brahman which manifests itselfas self-luminous in the knowledge in which subjects and objects have altogetherdisappeared. In the unity which still is the mark of India's traditional culture, not onlydo philosophers take their illustrations from the stage and from nāṭyaśāstra, butdancers or actors also realise the symbolism of their performance. At present thestage lamp (valiya vilakku or kali vilakku in Malayāḷam) is considered essential andcentral on the stage of Kathakaḷi-the dance-drama of Kerala, the homeland ofŚaṅkara.322 Its symbolic significance is felt and explained.323

Apart from being self-luminous (about which more below) knowledge is one and issaid to rest upon one-ness, unity, as opposed to the multiplicity of works.324Knowledge, not being an effect or cause, springs from itself and is svābhāvika. Itsimmediacy and the fact that it is not knowledge of an object distinct from itself (inthe case of svarūpajñāna) causes its fruit to be also immediately present and notmanifest only at a later time, as the fruits of action.325 Knowledge is therefore dṛṣṭa,goes beyond the magical realm and does not need an unseen, adṛṣṭa, entity likethe Mīmāṁsā apūrva. Accordingly there can be no successive stages in knowledgeeither.326 The jīvan-mukti is a fact of experience, direct and immediate. Śaṅkara'sinsight into the absolute character of jñāna differentiates hirn from mysticalphilosophers who speak about numerous levels and stages of illumination, mysticalinsight and realization.

The concept of self-luminosity is analysed at length by Citsukha in theTattvapradīpikā327 by means of a discussion of its several definitions. It may bereferred to here as an example of the ‘logistic’ of later Advaita. When a thing isconsidered self-luminous if and only if illumination constitutes its very being and

322 Śaṅkara was probably born in Kaladi, near Alwaye on the banks of the river Pūrna (Periyar)in Kerala.

323 Cf. K.B. Bharata Iver. Kathakali-the sacred dance-drama of Malabar, London 1955, 23-25and plate XIX.

324 Cf also BAU-bhāṣya ad. 2.4.14.325 Cf. BSB ad. 3.4.15.326 See BSB ad. 4.1.2.327 See Bhattacharyya, Studies in Post-Śaṅkara dialectics. 48 sq. The discussion is simplified

here.


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nature, then we have not yet expressed that the illumination is caused by itself andnot by something else, as for example the paraprakāśatva (‘alter-illumination’) ofthe Naiyāyikas. Thus, svaprakāśatva must be considered as caused by itself. Butthis knowledge must also be manifest, as no sane knower argues that he has,knowledge which is not manifest to him. Therefore it is to be jñānasattāka, alwaysknown and never unknown. As the same holds however for pleasure, pain and othersimilar feelings, the definition is too wide. It is therefore proposed to defineself-luminosity as something which can never be the object of knowledge (avedya),as pleasure, pain, etc. are. But, the Naiyāyikas object and question, how it can bethe subject of any discussion in that case? Again a refinement is brought into thedefinition, which ultimately characterizes the self-illuminating character of knowledgeas follows: ‘Self-luminosity is that, which, while being not an object of knowledge,is fit to be called immediate.’328 ‘Even this elaboration of the concept might be madethe target of criticism’ says Bhattacharyya.329 However we shall not follow theseinvestigations, which exemplify the style of later Advaitic works such as theTattvapradīpikā, any further.

It is sometimes held that, since knowledge is self-luminous, jīva is self-luminous too,as it is constituted by knowledge.330

The importance of jñāna lies in the fact that Brahman or mokṣa is the fruit of theknowledge of Brahman. Knowledge is the means to mokṣa (mokṣasādhana),331which is the realization of Brahman. For this view there is considerable scripturalsupport,332 especially the passage of the Muṇḍaka: ‘he who knows that

328 This is the translation of Dr. Mahadevan, which is clearer than Bhattacharyya's ‘thoughincapable of being an object of knowledge, yet possessing competence for perceptual use’.

329 Bhattacharyya, o.c. 52.330 See Vadāntaparibhāṣā VIII (viṣayāh) 84.331 e.g. Aitareyopaniṣadbhāṣya, transl. Venkataramiah 3.332 Cf. the quotations given by Śaṅkara in the bhāṣya and 3.4.1. ‘He who knows the Self

overcomes grief’ (CU 3.4.1); ‘he who knows Brahman attains the highest’ (Tait, Up. 2.1); ‘hewho has searched out and understands the self which is free from sin etc. etc, obtains allworlds and all desires’ (CU. 8.7.1: the latter might refer to svarga rather than tomokṣa)-commenting the sūtra ‘the purpose of man (is effected) thence (i.e, through the mereknowledge of Brahman) thus Bādarāyaṇa opines’ (puruṣārtho 'tah śabdāditi Bādarāyaṇaḥ).


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highest Brahman becomes verily Brahman’.333 Jñānān mokṣa ‘from knowledgeliberation’334 is the principal doctrine of Śaṅkara concerning mokṣa and concerningjñāna. It occurs for instance as the conclusion of the last chapter of theVedāntaparibhāṣā entitled prayojanam, ‘the fruit’.335 ‘Thus, therefore, release resultsfrom Brahman-knowledge (tadevam brahmajñānānmokṣa) .... hence is establishedthe fruit (iti siddham prayojanam)’.

Brahman is also directly conceived as pure knowledge. It consists of nothing butknowledge, ‘a solid mass of knowledge only’ (vijñānaghana eva), says theBṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad.336 Therefore the term vijñānātman, ‘the Self of knowledge’,occurs.337 Śaṅkara comments upon the passage as follows ‘the word ghana (a solidmass) excludes everything belonging to a different species .... the particle eva, ‘only’,is intensive. The idea is that there is no foreign element in it’. We recognise herethe idea of the actual infinite. The same passage is quoted in a text of the greatcommentary, where existence and thought are equated in Brahman;338 existence isthought and thought is existence (sattaiva bodho bodha eva ca sattā). Śaṅkaraelaborates this at length, showing that Brahman is existence but not excludingthought, and thought but not excluding existence. Since it cannot have both asdistinct attributes it is both, and both are identical with each other.

The ultimate reason for saying that knowledge is the only means to realise Brahman,which is neither a cause nor an effect, is that Brahman itself is knowledge orconsciousness. This is manifest in the most famous svarūpalakṣaṇa, ‘essential,intrinsic definition’ occurring in the Taittirīyopaniṣad: Brahman is satyaṁ jñānamanantam ‘(true) reality-knowledge-infinity’.339 Later Brahman was mostly spoken ofas Saccidānanda, ‘being-consciousness-bliss’.

333 sa yo ha vai tatparamaṃ brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati: Muṇḍakopaniṣad 3.2.9.334 Deussen refers (The system of the Vedānta 269) in this connection to Kapila's(?) Sāṁkhyasūtra

3.28; jñānam muktiḥ.335 IX. 56.336 2.4.12.337 e.g. BSB. 1.3.25.338 Ad. 3.2.21, partly quoted and analysed in Lacombe, o.c. 119-129 notes.339 Tait. Up. 2.1.


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In his commentary upon jñānam, the second element of the definition, Śaṅkaraclearly states what should be understood here:340 ‘The term jñānam meansapprehension (jñāpti), consciousness (avabodha). It denotes the ontologicalperfection (bhāvasādhana) (of knowing) and not the fact of being a performer ofacts of knowledge (na tu jñānakartṛ). It denotes Brakman, in fact, in accordance withthe terms satyam, and anantam, and true reality and infinity are incompatible withthe fact of being a performer of acts of knowledge. For, being dependent upon thechange of the fact of being a performer of acts of knowledge, how could Brahmanbe true reality and infinity?What is infinite, indeed, cannot be separated from anythingelse, and if Brahman is a knower it has to be separate from the knowing and fromthe known and it cannot be infinite.’

10. Identifications and the central Advaitic identity

The result of identification is complete identification. This identification was calledmagical, because the two identified elements are not ordinarily identical. WhenŚaṅkara comments upon that text of the Brhadāraṇyakopaniṣad where sampad,‘meditation based on resemblance’ is spoken of341 he explains this as follows: ‘Bythis is meant a meditation, by virtue of some point of resemblance (sāmānya), onrites with inferior results like the agnihotra, as rites with superior results, in order toobtain these results’.342

While meditation is being spoken of in connection with saguṇabrahman,nirguṇabrahman, is exclusively connected with cognition (knowledge);343 thereforethere may be different meditations on saguṇabrahman, whereas there is only oneknowledge (which is identical with) nirguṇabrahman. Assuming that in meditationon saguṇabrahman identity is reached, we shall only consider the realnirguṇabrahman in the following investigation. In a sūtra of the fourth adhyāya344 thepivotal question is taken up;

340 Transl. de Smet. o.c. 47 sq., where the commentary is analysed in as far as it is an applicationof what the author calls the Indian ‘polyvalence sémantique des mots’ in the theory of definition.For the translation of jñapti as ‘acte de de connaître’ see above 101, n. 311.

341 3.1.6-10.342 Ad. 3.1.6. transl. Swami Madhavananda 421; cf. also ad. 1.4.10343 See above II, 7: 82 sq.344 4.1.3.


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in how far in the knowledge345 of the highest Brahman the latter is known as identicalwith something else, known before, so that this cognition would in fact be arecognition.346 As the ego is the starting point of each meditation and the basis ofany knowledge, it is asked whether the highest Brahman is to be understood as theI or as different from it. The siddhānta view, basing itself exclusively upon scripturalauthority, is that the Absolute must be understood as the self. For this several textsare quoted of which the most important are: ‘I am Brahman’347 and: ‘That thou art’.348With regard to these scriptural passages an important assertion of the pūrvapakṣinhas to be refùted first. Is it not possible that these passages merely teach the seeing(darśana) of Brahman in certain symbols (pratīka), analogous to the seeing of Viṣṇuin an image? This is rejected for two reasons: (1) it would violate the principle thattexts should, if possible, be understood in their primary sense (mukhyārtha) and notin their secondary sense (lakṣyārtha): ‘mukhyatvāt’ as Śaṅkara himself enunciatesit ad. 4.3.12. This is known in Pūrvamīmāṁsā under the name barhirnyāya, ‘themaxim of the Kuśa-grass’.349 (2) It would contradict the syntactical form generallyused in the scripture for teaching contemplation bymeans of a symbol, e.g., ‘Brahmanis mind’350 or ‘Brahman is Āditya’.351 Moreover the contrary interpretation is explicitlyrejected in other important texts such as: ‘Now if a man worships another deity,thinking the deity is one and he another, he does not know’352 and: ‘whosoever looksfor anything elsewhere than in the Self is abandoned by everything’.353

345 Not meditation, as Thibaut says in his conspectus (I lxxvi). I have never found that Śaṅkarauses the term meditation in immediate connection with the highest Brahman; but the termdṛṣṭi ‘vision’ occurs, e.g. in 4.1.5.

346 In how far in Advaita all cognition is in reality recognition is a point (resulting directly from theunreal character of avidyā) developed further by Coomaraswamy in his Recollection: Indianand Platonic, Suppl. Journal of the American Oriental Society 3 (April-June 1944) 1-18. Inthis paper smṛti is unconvincingly equated with the Platonic anāmnēsis.

347 BAU. 1.4.10.348 CU. 6.8.7.349 Jha, Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā, 379, n. 34; cf. Mahadevan, Philosophy of Advaita, 45 sq.350 CU. 3.18.1.351 CU.3.19.1.352 BAU. 1.4.10.353 BAU. 2.4.6; also quoted: BAU 4.4.19.


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Śaṅkara discusses again in his commentary upon the next sūtras the exceptionalcases where Brahman is viewed as a symbol. He sharply differentiates these‘pratikopāsanās’ from the knowledge that Brahman must be understood as the Self.In the commentary upon sūtra, 4.1.3 the significance of the statement is broughtout by answering the main objections which can be made against it. Thesedevelopments are important and have to be followed in greater detail.

Firstly, it is clear that almost exclusively śabdapramāṇa is used in establishing thecentral doctrine of identity of the self and the Absolute. Scripture, especially theBrāhmaṇas, goes in its identifications even beyond the establishment of connectionsand relations. That amongst all these, identification of the Self with the Absoluteoccurs is not surprising. But with Śaṅkara the identity is neither magical, nor can itsfoundation in śruti be termed dogmatic.

(1) It is not magical because we are here concerned with an identity and not withan identification. ‘Identification’ means ‘making identical’, e.g., through an act ofmeditation; according to Śaṅkara, this is a subjective process, e.g. (an example ofZimmer) the gradual identification of the ego with a cow to which no objective realityneed correspond.354 ‘Identity’, on the other hand, means ‘being identical’ in reality.This is according to Śaṅkara,355 objective and does not depend on any activity onour part. As it is real or true, the question is only whether we ‘see’ it or ‘know’ it.Therefore Śaṅkara speaks in connection with the identity of the Self and of Brahman,of dṛṣṭa ‘vision’, and vidyā, ‘knowledge, cognition’,356 which are not activities. Thedifference between identity and identification

354 Cf. for instance, the identification of certain points with other points in topology, a branch ofmodern mathematics, which can be arbitrarily done (at least in principle), and where it is notrequired that these ‘magical’ identifications correspond to identities, i.e. ‘exist’ (a dubiousconcept in mathematics). They can be developed into a formal system of connections.

355 Cf. previous section: yathābhūtavastu, ‘just like the things as they exist’, i.e., objectively.356 We should consequently translate the acts dhyāna and upāsanā as respectively ‘meditation’

and ‘contemplation’, and dṛṣṭa as ‘vision’ (not as contemplation, as Thibaut does ad 4.1.5:brahmadṛṣṭi....).


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reveals a new aspect of the struggle against magical and subjective applications ofthe idea of karma.357

(2) Śaṅkara's use of the śabdapramāṇa is not dogmatic. This is sometimesmisunderstood because we are here in a kind of vicious circle. Those who areseeking for justification by means of pramāṇas do not possess the vision of theAbsolute, which conceals all duality. They deny the truth of the central Advaiticidentity because they are enveloped by ignorance concerning it. If they would possessthe highest knowledge (paravidyā), śabdapramāṇa -and all other pramāṇas-wouldaltogether vanish for them. The position of Advaita regarding this point is clear.Advaita is not based upon scripture: all relations and contradictions disappear inmokṣa which is the goal of the system. Advaita is therefore consistent, which neednot lead to any conviction regarding its truth.358 Plotinus said: ‘Thus we arrived at aproof; but are we convinced? A proof entails necessity, but not conviction. Necessityresides in the intelligence, and conviction in the soul.’359 Theorems in logic are onlyacceptable for those who accept certain axioms and rules of inference.

In the same adhikaraṇa Śaṅkara refers to this problem and accepts unhesitatingly,paradoxically enough on scriptural authority, that śabdapramāṇa and śruti and smṛtithemselves are unreal, as soon as the Brahman-knowledge arises: "Nor do wemindyour objection....that scripture itself ceases to be valid (becomes unreal: abhāva);for this conclusion is just what we assume. For on the ground of the text ‘Then afather is not a father’360 upto ‘Then the Vedas are not Vedas’361we ourselves assumethat when knowledge springs up scripture ceases to be valid. And should you askwho then is characterised by the absence of true knowledge, we reply: You yourselfwho ask this question! And if you

357 It may be mentioned here that there is still a tradition in India that one of the importantachievements of Śaṅkara was to control and limit magical practices which were widespreadat the time, partly due to exaggerations and abuses of Tantric practices. Tantric elementshave, on the other hand, been traced in Śaṅkara's works. Cf. Lacombe, o.c. 379 (IV).

358 Cf. above II, 7.359 Enneads V 3.6.8-10 (Bréhier).360 BU, 4.3.22.361 Ibid.


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retort: ‘But I am the Lord as declared by scripture’, we reply: ‘very well, if you havearrived at that knowledge, then there is nobody who does not possess suchknowledge’. The position of the last sentences can be summed up by saying: hewho disagrees is ignorant; if he knew he would agree. This excludes the possibilityof somebody who knows and nevertheless disagrees. This is evidently appropriatein the case of brahmavidyā; whoever knows that the self is Brahman will certainlyhave no objection against the doctrine which propounds this thesis. But one mightperfectly well understand the meaning and significance of the statement ‘the self isidentical with the Absolute’, without having confidence in its truth and without agreeingwith it.362

The topic of the unreality of śabdapramāṇa has repeatedly occupied the laterAdvaitins. Appaya Dikṣita for instance asks363 whether the śabdapramāṇa, which isthe evidence for Brahman is real or unreal. ‘If it be real, then, as there is a realitywhich is other than Brahman, the latter's non-duality will be destroyed. If it be unreal,then, what is revealed by an unreal evidence should also be unreal’. But the latterconclusion is invalid, as what is unreal can nevertheless be practically efficient, justas the roaring of a dream-lion in a dream can sublate the dream-experience itselfand awaken the dreamer.364

The commentary upon the same sūtra, 4.1.3. also refutes other objections. Oneobjection is that Advaita is not in accordance with experience. It seems to contradictall our experiences radically; we know the Self as ourselves, i.e., our egos, investedwith a number of qualities which cannot belong to the Absolute which is nirguṇa,without qualities365; e.g., all evil qualities and qualities of ignorance. But this oppositionof qualities has to be declared false, says Śaṅkara: ‘Nor is there any force in theobjection that things with contrary qualities cannot be identical; for this oppositionof qualities can be shown to be false.’ Not false in the sense that the evil qualitieshave to be ascribed to the

362 It is unfortunately an all-too-easy opinion among some Advaitins that whoever disagrees withAdvaita, evidently does not understand it. This is defining disagreement a priori as ignorance.

363 Siddhāntaleśasaṁgraha ap. Mahadevan, Philosophy of Advaita, 57 sq.364 Mahadevan o.c. 59.365 Śaṅkara treats it in this context rather as saguṇa.


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Absolute so that the Lord would not be a Lord; but in non-ascribing these samequalities to the other side of the duality, i.e., the Self, which is not the same as ourtransmigrating soul: ‘Nor is it true that from our doctrine it would follow that the Lordis not a Lord. For in these matters scripture alone is authoritative, and we, moreoverdo not at all admit that scripture teaches the Lord to be the Self of the transmigratingsoul, but maintain that by denying the transmigrating character of the soul it aimsat teaching that the soul is the Self of the Lord. From this it follows that the non-dualLord is free from all evil qualities, and that to ascribe to him contrary qualities is anerror.’

Thus we arrive at the real Self ‘by denying the transmigrating character of the soul’(ātma) saṁsāritvāpohena.366 This being posited as the truth it becomes a matter ofrealisation to see this non-transmigrating Self as the deeper ground of ourtransmigrating selves. This knowledge cannot arise for the transmigrating soul forit has to be gained by ceasing to transmigrate, i.e., by attaining mokṣa. To conceiveof the deepest Self as the transmigrating soul constitutes the principal ignorance(avidyā) which obstructs insight and real knowledge (vidyā). All positions differingfrom the ultimate truth are affected by avidyā. Avidyā is the main stumbling-blockobstructing the brahmavidyā. It poses the main metaphysical problem of Advaita.Although it is a unique concept in Śaṅkara, its central position in the system and itspsychological appeal could only be explained by a series of older ideas, such asthe dangerous actions performed in erroneous sacrifices, which have to be expiatedby prayaścitta, and also the magical inefficiency of avidyā as it occurs in theChāndogyopaniṣad.

The Sanskrit term Ātman does not fully correspond to the English term Self, as thelatter can only be used in connection with persons whereas the former has a muchwider application. Commenting upon the sūtra 4.1.4, Śaṅkara speaks for instanceof gold as being the ātman of golden ornaments: ‘for golden ornaments and figuresmade of gold are not identical with each other but only in as far as gold constitutesthe ātman of both’. Lacombe367

366 Note here the occurrence of the term apoha, which is of central importance in Vijñānavādaand in several speculations about language.

367 o.c. 52.


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quotes a passage, where quality (guṇa) has its ātman in substance (dravyātma).368

Here ātman could be translated as ‘essence’.369 Compare also the usages of ātmanin BAU 1. 2.1 and 1. 2. 4, where it might be similarly translated by ‘essence’.According to Lacombe, ātman designates ‘the metaphysical moment where beinginteriorizes and becomes perfect, complete, final, reaching the Absolute by this veryinteriorization’.370 But in Advaita ‘interiorizing’, ‘becoming’, ‘reaching’ cannot beunderstood as changes or transformations and seem rather to denote a situation.Though we need not deviate from the established usage of translating ātman by‘Self’, we have to realize that the term has a greater extension. Were we to adoptthe term essence the central Advaitic doctrine could be formulated in a way whichsounds more familiar in Western philosophical terminology: ‘the Absolute, i.e., theessence of the All, is identical with the essence of myself’. What prevents us fromseeing this is avidyā, the incapacity to see the essence underlying themanifestations.

It may be remarked here, that in this formulation the similarity with some later phasesof Muslim thought, becomes exceedingly great. The doctrine of Ibn 'Arabī can besummarized as: ‘the essence of the creator is identical with the essence of thecreatures’. Kindred formulations occur also in Angelus Silesius.

11. Adhyāsa - avidyā - māyā

What is avidyā? In the beginning of the great commentary this concept is introducedand defined as adhyāsa, adhyāropa, ‘superimposition’.371 This idea is often discussedand defined by the important Advaitic thinkers. We will analyse its significance byconsidering a passage in the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya where the term is used in anordinary sense, not referring to the metaphysical adhyāsa which is identical withavidyā. This passage establishes a

368 Ad. 2.2.17; not as Lacombe has it: the guṇa is the ātman of the dravya (tasmāddravyātmakatāguṇasya).

369 Lacombe (o.c. 51; cf. 104) mentions on the other hand as the Sanskrit equivalents of ‘essence’:svarūpa, svabhāva, bhāva, sāra.

370 ‘Le moment métaphysique ou l'être s'intériorise et de quelque façon s'achève, se termine etfinalement se hausse à l'absolu par ce mouvement même d'intériorisation’. ‘Mouvement’ iscertainly misleading: the French language is too dynamical.

371 upodghāta.


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connection with the sūtra just analysed372 and deals with the above mentionedpratīkopāsanās.

In the commentary upon the sūtra ‘Not in the symbol (is the Self to be contemplated);for he (the meditating person) (may) not (view symbols as being the Self).’373 Śaṅkaraargues, that when Brahman is meditated upon in a symbol, pratīka (e.g. Āditya), thepratīka should not be understood as the Self. This follows from previousconsiderations. When scripture speaks about a meditation on a symbol, this cannotbe understood as the Self, which is never the object of meditation. The questionarises as to which mental act is enjoined by: ‘Āditya is Brahman’ and which relationobtains in such a case between Brahman and its pratīka, āditya. The answer is thatthe act and the relation, which it establishes, are adhyāsa ‘superimposition’.

The commentary upon the next sūtra deals with the question whether the vision(dṛṣṭi) of Āditya is to be superimposed upon Brahman (brahmaṇyadhyasitavya), orthe vision of Brahman upon Āditya. This doubt arises because scriptural texts presentboth members in the same case and in apposition (āditya brahma, prāṇo brahma).An objection is that these texts inform us perhaps about a causal relation betweenBrahman and Āditya, etc. Against this it is argued, that it would be entirelypurposeless to mention any particular effect of Brahman. However, if the text doesnot embody knowledge, it must be an injunction to meditate. In that case, as twomembers are given, their relation must be superimposition.

To the question, which is to be superimposed upon which, the sūtra answers: theBrahman-vision upon Āditya, ‘on account of exaltation’ (utkarṣāt). ‘For thus Ādityaand so on are viewed in an exalted way (utkarṣeṇa), the vision of something higherthan they being superimposed upon them.’ We might think of some pratīka as anactual object and superimpose that object upon Brahman, i.e., view Brahman asthis limited object. But it is ‘exalting’ to take the pratīka only as the starting point fora meditation, in which Brahman is superimposed upon it: for the

372 4.1.3.373 na pratīke na hi saḥ: 4.1.4.


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pratīka is exalted and Brahman is not degraded. This is even true, Śaṅkara adds,according to a worldly (laukika) rule, ‘viz., the one enjoining that the idea of somethinghigher is to be superimposed upon something lower, as when we view-and speakof- the king's character as a king. This rule must be observed in worldly matters,because to act contrary to it would be disadvantageous; for should we view a kingas a charioteer, we should thereby lower him, and that would be in no way beneficial’.

The usage of the term adhyāsa becomes perfectly clear, especially from the example:viewing something lower as if it were something higher or seeing the higher entityin the lower is ‘superimposing’ the higher on the lower. ‘Superimposition’ denotesas well the relation from the higher to the lower, as also, from the point of view ofthe agent, the activity which establishes this relation. We may go one step furtherand say that adhyāsa evidently does not rest upon an identity which is objectivelyreal, but is an identification. It can be realized through the identifying act of meditationand depends on subjective activity. Other examples, equally instructive, arementioned by Śaṅkara, for instance: the idea of the God Viṣṇu is superimposedupon a statue of Viṣṇu, etc.374

In the context of the last example a kind of definition is also given, which is interestingas here again we are concerned with ordinary adhyāsa and not with the metaphysicalconcept which is identical with avidyā. Śaṅkara says:375 ‘Adhyāsa takes place whenthe idea of one of two things not being dismissed from the mind, the idea of thesecond thing is superimposed upon the first thing; so that together with thesuperimposed idea the former idea remains attached. to the thing on which thesecond idea is superimposed. When e.g., the idea of (the entity) Brahmansuperimposes itself upon the idea of the name (i.e., Om), the latter idea continuesin the mind and is not driven out by the former’. This needs almost no clarification,but may be restated utilising the previous terminology and including the concepts‘higher’ and ‘lower’ as follows: Adhyāsa, ‘superimposition’, is a mental act ofidentification of a higher entity A and lower entity B, in such

374 Ad. 3.3.9; cf. also ad. 4.1.5, towards the end,375 Ibid.


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a way that the lower B is looked upon as A or that A is seen through or in B, i.e.,while the entity B also continues in the mind (which would otherwise not identifytwo, but move from the one to the other). It is said, then, that A is ‘superimposed’upon B. Thus it is clear that superimposition is a kind of identification which can berealized by a meditation and which has a subjective and unintelligible-magicalcharacter. This meaning arises even before we turn to metaphysics.

Now let us turn to definitions of the metaphysical adhyāsa, which is avidyā. Thesignificance of this concept is stressed by the fact that the great commentary'sintroduction (upodghāta) opens with its definition and discussion. In this introductionŚaṅkara is not bound by any text and can freely explain the meaning of perhapsthe most original of his ideas-partly coined, it is true, in order to maintain the unityof the scriptural texts, but itself not easily justifiable with the help of scriptural support.The upodghāta of the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya gives the best picture of the thought ofŚaṅkara, as it constitutes the ‘free’ introduction to the work which is (apart from theUpadeśasāhasrī, which is genuine as it is quoted by Sureśvara) least bound by thetext it comments upon (because of the unintelligibility of the Brahmasūtrasthemselves). It is therefore always and rightly taken as the basis for the study of hissystem.376

In the upodghāta Śaṅkara defines adhyāsa as follows: ‘the apparent presentation(avabhāsa) (to consciousness) of something previously observed (pūrvadṛṣṭa) insome other thing (paratra), in the form of remembrance (smṛtirūpah)’.377Here adhyāsais again presented as a mental activity, through which the higher is not seen in thelower (as in the above definition), but the previously observed in the actuallyobserved. Thus we have previously observed silver while observing mother-of-pearlat present. But only if we see mother-of-pearl as silver or see silver in mother-

376 A detailed and perhaps stylometric study of the language of the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, has tobe the standard for judging the authenticity of other works (a task begun by P. Hacker)-asPlato's Laws, commonly regarded as his last work, was taken as a starting point for establishingthe relative chronology of his dialogues.

377 Smṛtirūpaḥ paratra pūrvadṛṣṭāvabhāsaḥ.


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of-pearl, we superimpose silver upon mother-of-pearl. This identification is onlycalled superimposition, in the newly defined sense, if it is erroneous and subjective:for instance, if we perceive at present a silver ornament and see in it the silver whichwe perceived before, this is not called superimposition. As here silver is alsoperceived at present, this is actual perception and not of the nature of remembrance,as the definition requires (smṛtirūpah). In this way the additional clause is explainedin the Bhāmatī.378 The addition is very important, as it stresses the fact that adhyāsais subjective and ‘magically-creative’ in the sense in which identifying meditation is.Comparing this definition with the abovementioned definition of ‘meditation-adhyāsa’,it can be said that it analyses further in one respect whereas it differs in anotherrespect. (1) It analyses more deeply because it observes that, from the point of viewof the agent, an entity A cannot be superimposed upon an actually perceived entityB, if A were not previously observed. This stresses the temporal character ofadhyāsa, which is an activity (and not a situation or a timeless vision or knowledge).It also shows that Śaṅkara does not operate with a priori concepts, which are in acertain way also superimposed upon the objects.379 (2) The definition of themetaphysical adhyāsa differs from that of the meditation-adhyāsa because thecondition, that only the higher should be superimposed upon the lower, hasdisappeared.

This also follows from the context in which the definition is given. It is preceded byexamples, where the lower is superimposed upon the higher, such as thesuperimposition of the body upon the I (in expressions like ‘I am the body’, or ‘I amthis’, ahamidam) and it leads to the conclusion that it is not absurd to superimposethe non-Self upon the Self.

The upodghāta starts with the observation that to superimpose upon the subject(which is the sphere or realm of the notion ‘I’), with all its attributes, the object (whichis the sphere of the

378 See Thibaut I, 4, n.3.379 Kant's a priori concepts do neither spring from experience, nor do they arise without experience:

but as soon as the object is experienced, the a priori manifests itself as being superimposedupon it. The discovery of an a priori could be considered the removal of a superimposition.


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notion ‘Thou’), with its attributes-and the reverse likewise has to be considerederroneous. This is continuously done in everyday life. Because of this error adhyāsais the same as avidyā. Next the full significance of the metaphysical adhyāsabecomes manifest: it is superimposition of the non-Self upon the inner Self(pratyagātman). It may be understood more definitely from the following examples:‘Extra-personal attributes are superimposed upon the Self if a man considers himselfsound and entire, as long as his wife, children, and so on are sound and entire.Attributes of the body are superimposed upon the Self if a man thinks of himself (hisSelf) as stout, lean, fair, as standing, walking or jumping. Attributes of thesense-organs, if he thinks ‘I am mute, or deaf, or one-eyed, or blind’. Attributes ofthe internal organ (antaḥkaraṇa) if he considers himself (his Self) subject to desire,intention, doubt, determination, and so on. Having superimposed the producer ofthe notion of the ego (ahampratyayin, i.e. the antaḥkaraṇa) upon the inner Self ....one superimposes again the inner Self upon the inner organ, etc. Thus is the natureof the original adhyāsa, beginningless and endless (anādirananta), having the formof an erroneous notion (mithyāpratyayarūpa),380 cause of the fact that the individualsouls are agents and enjoyers (kartṛtva-bhoktṛtva-pravartaka), observed by everyone(sarvalokapratyakṣa)’. All this is presupposed in the level of daily practical activity(vyavahāra). But, concludes the introduction, the abolition of this wrong notion whichis the cause of all evil is the purport of all Vedānta texts; thus will be established‘the knowledge of the absolute unity of the Self (ātmaikatva)’.

There is a parallelism here which provides us with a deeper philosophical explanationof doctrinal differences: just as Śaṅkara has combated, in the name of jñāna, theMīmāṁsakas with their magical karmavāda and the karma-background of Indianthought in general, he shows how a deeper lying magical activity, superimposition,causes the situation where all who are in the level of vyavahāra, will be exempt frombrahmavidyā in their wrong identification of the non-Self and the Self. The mostsubtle of all

380 In Śaṅkara, avidyā is the same as mithyājñāna; amongst other Advaitins it is its cause: P.Hacker, Eigentümlichkeitein der Lehre und Terminologie Śaṅkaras: Avidyā, Nāmarūpa, Māyā,Īśvara, Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft 100 (1950) 246-268; 249.


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karmas is the superimposing activity, adhyāsa,381 which Śaṅkara combats in thename of jñāna. He need not fight this concept in specific groups of human beings,e.g. the Mīmāṁsakas, but finds it everywhere in human nature itself, sincesuperimposition is at the root of human existence. We do not only fail to reach thegoal when we engage upon the activities of sacrificing and meditating (these beingadditional, secondary superimpositions), but we even fail when we do not cancelthe deepest activity, i.e., the superimposition of the non-Self which is presupposedin all other forms of action.

The addition smṛtirūpaḥ ‘in the form of remembrance’, underscores the subjectivecharacter of adhyāsa. But adhyāsa necessarily has an objective character too. Inorder to know how far the latter is related to its subjective character, we may contrastadhyāsa which is smṛtirūpaḥ with smṛti ‘remembrance’ itself.382 In remembrance weare conscious of the fact that we are concerned with a mental image of the past. Insuperimposition we do not possess that consciousness (we are deluded in avidyā)and we take the mental image as referring to an extra-mental fact. But what is thestatus of the mental image, say, the silver of the stock-example? In the situation ofsuperimposing it upon mother-of-pearl, it is neither real, nor unreal. It is not real,because it is sublated; but it is not unreal, because it appears. It is sublated, becauseit does not really occur in mother-of-pearl; it appears, because it is based upon thepast perception of real silver. It is therefore called anirvacanīya, ‘inexplicable’. If thisholds for the mental image, adhyāsa and avidyā must necessarily be anirvacanīyatoo.383 They neither belong to the category of being, nor to that of non-being. If avidyāwould be unreal it would not trouble us and we would not be caught in it; if it wouldbe real the Absolute would not be the only reality and we would lose the non-dualisticposition. Therefore, it neither is, nor is not; it

381 Cf. Lacombe o.c. 125: ‘....dans la synthèse çankarienne avidyā marque la place qui revientau karman .... l'une et l'autre sont essentiellement dynamiques ....’

382 See A. Bhattacharya Sastry, o.c. 237 sq.383 Śaṅkara himself in the sūtrabhāṣya does not characterise adhyāsa or avidyā as anirvacanīya;

but it occurs there as an attribute of nāmarūpe; see Hacker, o.c. 255.


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is of a different category, about which we cannot speak; it is anirvacanīya.It is clear that there lies a problem here.384 In fact, any slightest negation of the

unreality of avidyā attributes being to it and thus destroys non-dualism.385 In orderto safeguard the advaitic character of Advaita, avidyā is sometimes called tucchā,‘non-being’;386 but this holds only for the possessor of brahmavidyā. The Pañcadaśīclarifies the position as follows. According to the ultimate point of view, for the personwho has attained realization, māyā is tucchā, ‘non-being’; for the metaphysician ordialectician it is neither real nor unreal (anirvacanīya); and for the man in the streetit is real (vāstavī).387 One of the main objections of Rāmānuja against Advaita is the‘neither-being-nor-non-being’ character of avidyā, which violates according toRāmānuja the law of the excluded third.388 Also modern critics of Advaita often lookupon anirvacanīya as the weakest point of the system. But we ought rather to admireŚaṅkara for the firmness of mind, with which he has accepted the conclusion, thatmultiplicity becomes inexplicable if Brahman is posited as the only reality. He readilyadmits that there are important points which his system fails to explain, but this isdue to a principal inexplicability based upon the structure of reality. In otherphilosophies we often discover flaws where their explanation fails. In Advaita thesefailures are part of the system.

No term expresses better the magical and erroneous character of the primaryidentification than anirvacanīya. Śaṅkara, having

384 Cf. the ambiguity of anirvacarīzyatva, which can be interpreted as strength or as weakness.Rāmānuja formulated in the Śrī Bhāṣya his sapta-vidha-anupapatti (seven main objections)against Advaita; but the Advaitins replied: these objections are bhūṣana ‘ornaments’, notdūṣaṇia, ‘defects’.

385 Cf. D.H.H. Ingalls, Whose is avidyā? Philosophy East and West 3 (1953-1954) 69-72, whereit is shown how Śaṅkara always denies any connection of avidyā with the soul, but nowheredenies the reality of avidyā itself.

386 e.g. Prakāśānanda: Dasgupta II 224.387 Pañcadaśī 6.130. See Mahadevan, Philosophy of Advaita 216.388 It is perhaps not superfluous to add for the seekers for parallels that there is no connection

between the Advaitic anirvacanīya and the third undeclined ‘u’ value of the intuitionism ofL.E.J. Brouwer, which denies the validity of the law of the excluded third (cf. above I 5: 20, n.32). Śaṅkara, moreover, seems to accept the principle of the excluded. third (see below II13: 136, n. 446) and uses it (e.g. ad 3.1.1, quoted above II 7 : 81-2). Cf. also Staal, Negationand the law of contradiction in Indian thought-A comparative study, Bulletin of the School ofOriental and African Studies 25 (1962).


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criticized the magical character of karmic activity as manifest e.g. in the apūrva ofMīmāṁsā, and safeguarding the intelligibility of brahnavidyā and of brahmajñāna,has descended from the pure realm of the non-dual Absolute and recognised theinscrutable character of the activity which causes the multiplicity of this world.

The characterization of the metaphysical adhyāsa as superimposition of the non-Selfupon the Self answers more questions than we have yet asked. Thus it is oftenasked in later Advaita what the āśraya, ‘locus’, of avidyā is. Where does avidyāexist?389 The jīva cannot be its locus (although this was the opinion of VācaspatiMiśra and his followers), as it itself a product of avidyā. It is clear that the only entitywhich is independent from avidyā is Brahman, and that therefore, if avidyā. has alocus at all (which must be the case), it must be Brahman. But this means thatsuperimposition is of the non-Self upon the Self. That avidyā has its locus in Brahmanalso means that it is the function of avidyā to cover and to conceal the real natureof Brahman, just as a cloud hides the sun.

The magical activity of the mind which wrongly identifies the object with the Absoluteconstitutes the superimposition of non-Self upon the Self. Thus interpreted, humanexistence as we know it is superimposition. This existence arose by superimpositionand it continues by superimposition. In Heidegger's terminology, superimpositionwould be the first ‘Existential’ of ‘Dasein’. The Vedic sacrifice, which correspondsto our notion of being in as far as it makes being accessible and determines beingas being, including the human being of the sacrificer, led to the interiorised activityof meditation. Here the newly discovered being wants to reassure itself of its unityand continuity and accept differentiations. Hence it meditates and identifies thediscontinuous. In a next step, the discriminations are accepted-but as unreal orinexplicable; the illusory character of identification is underlined; hence the distrustof upāsanā and of adhyāsa. Lastly we have arrived at the doctrine of a universalerroneous identification, termed adhyāsa, which is a closer characterization of humanbeing itself. In its most authentic mode of being, the rest appears again as illusoryif the ultimate knowledge of being arises.

389 Sec Bhattacharyya op. cit. 288.


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The ancient interconnectedness of things expressed in archaic continuity and in thesymbolic pūrṇam requires that all being as we know it and as it presents itself to us(i.e. being in the sense of Seiendes, ón, not as ultimate being, the sat ofsaccidānanda) is likewise superimposition. This is the ultimate significance of theexpression, that the non-Self is superimposed - and not only that ‘we superimpose’,which may reveal our nature. Thus adhyāsa, avidyā or ajñāna has an objective orontic aspect, apart from its being the complement of the gnoseological aspect ofreality exhibited in jñāna or vidyā. For this objective aspect Śaṅkara has used theterm māyā. Just as jñāna in the ultimate analysis is the same as Brahman, àjñānais also the same asmāyā. If in jñāna there is unity of knowledge, knower and known,and therefore non-difference from the object, Brahman - avidyā must necessarilyalso be the same as its objective counterpart, māyā.If māyā is the same as avidya its nature is not at all fully expressed by the

conventional rendering ‘illusion’. Here another line of investigation, followed byseveral authors, joins our investigation and leads to the same conclusion. If weanalyse the common denotation of the term māyā, we do not find anything like‘illusion’, but rather ‘magically-creative activity’. But we have tried to show exactlythat the concept of māyā in Advaita expresses the erroneous identification whichcreates this world in a magical sense. Hence the term māyā was very appropriate,as can be seen from its meaning before Śaṅkara.390Not ‘illusion’, but ‘creative activity’ seems to be the principal meaning of māyā in

the Vedas: ‘the powerful Aśvins, with māyā endowed, created (heaven and earth).’391The divine craftsman, who fabricates for instance tumblers for the Gods, is rich inmāyā.392 Āditya creates the day and night by his māyā,393 etc. A consideration of theterm māyā also shows that in the Veda ‘there is no basis for any conception of theunreality of the world’ (Radhakrishnan). In the Śvetāśvataropaniṣad Maheśvara ismūyin, ‘who operates with or who possesses māyā’; his māyā is pra-

390 The following references are taken from: J. Gonda, Maya, Tijdschrift voor Philosophie 14(1952) 3-62.

391 Ṛgveda 10.24.4.392 id. 53.9.393 Atharvaveda 13.2.3.


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kṛti ‘nature’.394 In the Bhagavad Gītā the term manifests its covering, concealing,hiding character: ‘I am not easily perceivable for everybody, being covered by myyogamāyā.’395With Gauḍapāda the term comes to possess a more central philosophical

significance. The meaning of creative (and perhaps also: deluding) activity remainsessential, e.g., ‘all bodies in the phenomenal world are projected in the manner ofa dream by the māyā of the Ātman’.396 It is conspicuous how this could develop intoŚaṅkara's characterization ‘superimposition of the non-Self upon the Self.’

The subjective aspect (avidyā) can be conceived as rooted in the human being andis acceptable from an existential-phenomenological point of view. This does notmean that the objective aspect (māyā) is not likewise acceptable. Phenomenologyis not subjectivism. But the phenomenological method has to consider avidyā firstand māyā next. That for Śaṅkara both occupy the same level may be true, but it isnot phenomenologically given. It is a metaphysical assertion concerning reality,which we can neither deny, nor take as our methodological starting point, unlesswe are ready to go beyond the phenomenological approach. Analogously, theprinciple of anirvacanīyatva reveals itself first in the human realm, and subsequentlyin the total realm of māyā.

Considering the objective māyā aspect of avidyā, we have to realize that also thisrenders an idealistic interpretation of Advaita impossible. As we have seen alreadyfrom the analysis of the process of perception, Advaita is quite different from anykind of subjective idealism:397 the subject does not create the objective world. It istrue that there is no world outside the Self which is real; but the Self is not at all thesame as ‘the subject’. The outside world of māyā does neither depend upon myavidyā, nor does

394 id. 4.9.10.395 BG. 7.25.396 3.10.397 It should never be forgotten that also Kant did not propound any subjective idealism, but

critical idealism, which is more ‘criticism’ than 'idealism". As for Śaṅkara, the fact that herejects the subjective idealism of Vijñānavāda (ad 2.2.28-32) speaks for itself. Cf. Murti o.c.313-316; and D.H.H. Ingalls, Śaṅkara's arguments against the Buddhists. Philosophy Eastand West 3 (1953-1954) 291-306.


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the reverse hold: both are aspects of the same mysterious activity of adhyāsa. Theapproach of Deussen and his endeavour to show the virtual identity of the Advaitaof Śaṅkara with the doctrines of Kant and Schopenhauer398 were erroneous andhave led to much misunderstanding of Advaita in the West. This misunderstandingrests upon the confusion of the Self with the subject, as can for instance be seenfrom Deussen's account of adhyāsa:399 ‘.... the Vedanta declared the empiricalconcept which represents to us a manifold existing outside the Self, a world of theObject existing independently of the subject, to be glamour (māyā), an innate illusion(bhrama) resting on an illegitimate transference (adhyāsa) in virtue of which wetransfer the reality, which alone belongs to the subject, to the world of the object,and, conversely, the characteristics of the objective world, e.g., corporeality, to thesubject, the Self, the Soul.’ Deussen also spoke erroneously, in connection withbrahmavidyā about an ‘objectless knowing subject’,400whereas in fact this knowledgetranscends both subject and object.

The difference from subjective idealism is also manifest in the characterization ofavidyā as positive -notwithstanding the clanger of dualism. This positive characterexplains that avidyā can cover or conceal Brahman. This concealment consists inthe fact401 that the jīva is ignorant of its own self-luminosity. This is one of the marksof the jīva, as we saw before, on account of the svayamprakāśatva of jñāna. It seemsthat the positive character of avidyā is not yet stressed in the Sūtrabhāṣya.402 Ingeneral, the later Advaitins seem to have increasingly substantialized avidyā.Nevertheless, in Śaṅkara also the substantial aspect occurs and deserves a closeranalysis.

12. Vivarta, Nāmarūpe

Several adhyāsas have been noticed to which several āśrayāḥ, ‘loci’, correspond:the texts speak of superimposition upon an

398 Or of Plato with Kant and Schopenhauer, as was still more or less the view of Cohen andNatorp. Cf. above I.8: 27-8.

399 System of Vedanta 43.400 Rightly criticised by Hiriyanna, Outlines of Indian Philosophy, 71.401 Bhattacharyya, o.c. 292.402 See Hacker, o.c. 254-255.


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image, upon a king's charioteer, and generally upon essence (ātman). But ‘essence’was for instance the element silver in a silver ornament i.e., what Aristotle calledthe material cause. In the Indian terminology the formal cause is superimposed uponthe material cause and this is a wrong identification because the formal element isultimately unreal. In the case of the king and the charioteer, it is simply the wrongname or concept, ‘king’ which is superimposed upon the king's charioteer: no otherreality whatsoever. These two examples illustrate the two elements, which aregenerally superimposed upon essence: i.e., nāmarūpe, ‘(the world of) names andforms.’ Śaṅkara called avidyā or adhyāsa, anādi ‘beginningless’ and ananta,‘endless’. This can be specified by the fact that there are avyākṛte nāmarūpe,‘unmanifest names and forms,’ and vyākrte nāmarūpe ‘manifest names and forms.’They denote respectively the material cause of the world403 and the phenomenalworld as it appears.404 Śaṅkara says that avidyā ‘makes’ the nāmarūpe, which ‘fixes’them ‘upon’, ‘attaches’ them ‘to’, ‘throws’ them ‘over’ the essence (Ātman).405 All thisactivity is superimposition, and since this is a temporal activity, whereas thenāmarūpe which are māyā are beginningless and endless, the nāmarūpe are calledavyākṛte before the superimposition and vyākṛte afterwards. He quotes406 as scripturalsupport for this ‘in the beginning this was that only which is not’407 and ‘non-existent(asat) indeed this was in the beginning.’408Here not absolute non-existence is meant,but ‘only a different quality or state, viz., the state of names and forms beingunmanifest, which state is different from the state of names and forms beingmanifest.’ And also: ‘the designation of ‘non-existence’ applied to the effect beforeits production has reference to a different state of being merely. And as those thingswhich are distinguished by name and form are in ordinary language called ‘existent’,the term ‘non-existent’ is figuratively applied to them to denote the state in whichthey were previously to their differentiation.’

403 ‘Nāmarūpe als Urstoff’: Hacker, o.c. 258. The avyākṛte nāmarūpe are once called prakṛt (ad.2. 1.1.14).

404 ‘Nāmarūpe als Erscheinungswelt’; 259.405 Id. 264.406 Ad. 2.1.17.407 CU. 3.19.1.408 Taitt, Up. 2.7.


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What strikes us in this way of thought is the continuity; it is the idea that nothing cancome out of nothing, and that for this reason and in this sense only the world isbeginningless and endless. This solves at the same time another difficulty. If adhyāsais not a situation but an activity, or at any rate nearer to the second concept than tothe first, the question arises as to when this activity took place; whether it was forinstance a unique occurrence comparable to creation in the monotheistic religions.Although it is an activity, it has a continuous, everlasting and also omnipresentcharacter. The only thing that ‘happens’ through it is that the unmanifest becomesmanifest. When looked upon from the Absolute, nothing happens at all. This is whyadhyāsa could be called anādirananta. The erroneous identification by which a worldof names and forms seems to come into being is a continuous ephemeralphenomenon, superimposing itself upon Brahman but not affecting Brahman.

Thus we find the archaic continuity back in the celebrated Advaitic doctrine that theeffect is only an illusory imposition upon the cause, or, popularly speaking, theopinion that nothing comes out of nothing. A specific form of the universal adhyāsais that we superimpose upon what we call ‘causes’ other entities which we call‘effects.’ As the superimposition is erroneous, the effects are unreal and the causesare no causes. Because of this specific form of our adhyāsa we create a world ofchange and causality by supposing that the cause transforms itself into the effect(pariṇāma); it seems to us (this is the satkāryavāda or parināmavada of the Sāṁkhyasystem409) that there is always a material cause which manifests itself in differentforms. The truth is that the forms are superimposed, i.e., neither real, nor unreal,but anirvacanīya. In connection with this view of causality, a special technical termfor adhyāsa is introduced in post-Śaṅkara Advaita: vivarta. This may be defined asadhyāsa of the effect upon the cause. satkāraṇavada is therefore also calledvivartavāda.

These indications may be further specified by a closer examination of some of thetexts. The examples with the help of which satkāraṇavāda or vivartavāda is illustratedare mostly

409 A system which Śaṅkara generally combats (ad. 2.1.1-2; 2.2.1-10); its pariṇāmavada, as wewill see, implicitly.


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taken from the material realm. We are here concerned with an evaluation and notwith a phenomenological observation: when it seems that the clay is transformedinto a jar, we can either attach a higher value to the material cause (clay) and lookupon the form as ephemeral (as Śaṅkara does), or we can evaluate the form morehighly and speak of the creation of something new, the jar. This shows that the wayin which we conceive of causation is a priori and depends on us rather than on thephenomena. Because of this we are entitled to say that the archaic universal desirefor continuity continues to live in satkāraṇavāda. But in addition to that we have alsoto note that our rational thinking cannot accept creation out of nothing, which makesa very irrational impression. Satkāraṇaväda is therefore more rational. Rationalityrequires continuity. Satkäraṇavāda or vivartavāda, therefore, depend on a mentalstatus and on a rational or rationalizing attitude, not on phenomenological data. Weshall discuss this below and note that there is much in common with Aristotle'sdoctrine of ‘potentiality’ and ‘actuality’.

Śaṅkara discusses causality at length in the commentary upon the apparentlycreationistic passages of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka beginning with ‘there was nothingwhatsoever here in the beginning’.410 K.C. Bhattacharyya analysed this passage411

and we may refer for further details to his discussion. Śaṅkara says that ‘nothing’should not be conceived as a mere void (śūnya), but rather as ‘something’. Thisfollows from the scriptural context and also from the eternity of both cause and effect.Elaborate proofs for both views are given. Even if the text seems to speak about akind of creation, Śaṅkara infers ‘the existence of cause and effect before creation’.In this way the idea of creation become meaningless. The eternity of the cause isplausible when we regard cause as material cause, as Śaṅkara does, and take theexample of the clay. For clay continues to exist in the jar. This is subsequentlygeneralised. The eternity of the effect is less obvious. But according to Śaṅkaraexistence refers only to the manifest state, whereas the effect exists in the causein the unmanifest state as the form of the jar previous to its production in the clay.It seems that the term ‘unmanifest’ in this case has no meaning at all. But even if it

410 naiveha kimcanāgra āsīt; BAU. 1.2.1.411 K.C. Bhattacharyya, Studies in Vedantism, Calcutta 1909, 26-28.


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were meaningful, we are speaking at the level of māyā as if this world of names andforms and of causes and effects existed. Actually it is anirvacanīya and in Brahmanneither cause nor effect has any meaning. Analogously Śaṅkara shows that whatis in the future and not in the present is not non-existent, but only unmanifest. Ifobjects lastly would not be eternally existent how would foreknowledge of God orof the yogin be possible?

‘This elaborate discussion of causality’, concludes Bhattacharyya, ‘leads to therecognition of Brahman as the material cause of the universe and of the primal hidingprinciple, co-eternal with Brahman, viz., māyā, which by itself is nothing, like theblue tint which seems to pervade objects viewed through blue glasses.412 But headds, that the ‘dynamic principle’ he has been seeking for ‘remains undiscovered’.This will occupy us again.413 That Brahman is the material cause of the universe414

is more in accordance with strict non-dualism than calling avidyā positive or stressingthe nāmarūpa-prakṛti, which is extremely near to Sāṁkhya. It expresses the sameas the doctrine of super-imposition of the ‘inessential’ upon essence. To say thatBrahman (or Īśvara: see below) is the material cause of the universe is the sameas saying that Brahman is the āśraya of all superimpositions.

The same problems-though with less emphasis upon the theory of causation-arediscussed in the Chāndogyopaniṣadbhāṣya. First415 the Upaniṣad says: ‘just asthrough a lump of clay, all that is made of clay would become known;-all productsbeing due to words, a mere name; the clay alone is real....’; and Śaṅkara adds: ‘theproduct (effect) is non-different from its (material) cause....it exists in name only’.This shows that it is irrelevant whether the apparent difference in the effect is ascribedto the form or to the name; both have the same function and are erroneouslysuperimposed upon the one and only real material cause.416 When discussing thequestion whether there

412 Id. 28.413 See below II. 14: 149.414 Cf. also ad. 1.4. 23-27.415 CU. 6.1.4.416 With the theory of causation in Śaṅkara it is as with the concept of metaphysics, especially

in scholastic philosophy; when he speaks about pariṇāmavāda the term cause may refer tocause in general or to the saguṇabrahman, and when he speaks about vivartavada it maylikewise denote cause in general or the nirguṇabrahman. Thus when we speak about being,it may either denote being in general (in the metaphysica generalis: ontology), or it may denotethe divine being (in the metaphysica specialis: theology).


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was being or non-being in the beginning, he refutes the Vaiśeṣika asatkāryavāda,‘the doctrine that the effect is non-existent before its production’. But not only theVaiśeṣika asatkāryavāda (which is obviously unacceptable to Advaita) but also theŚāṁkhya satkäryaväda has to be refuted. The differences between these two isbrought out more clearly by later Advaitins than by Śaṅkara himself. The latter seemsfor instance inconsistent when he explains the fact, that Brahman is the materialcause of the universe, with the term: pariṇāmāt, ‘because of transformation’, followingthe term of the sūtra upon which he comments.417 A later commentator,Nārāyaṇānanda Sarasvatī, therefore says that in this passage pariṇāma denotesvivarta. It would also be possible to interpret Brahman in this passage assaguṇabrahman, as is done elsewhere when it is said:418 ‘The view of Brahman asundergoing modifications will, moreover, be of use in the devout meditations on thesaguṇabrahman’. It would be rather confusing if the qualification saguṇa had beenleft out in the present context. On the other hand, the explanation of this pariṇāmātin the commentary sounds more like vivartavāda than like pariṇāmavāda. ‘The Self,although in full existence previously to the action, modifies itself into somethingspecial, viz., the Self of the effect. Thus we see that causal substances, such asclay and the like, are, by undergoing the process of modification, changed into theirproducts’. The term ‘Self of the effect’ seem to point in the direction of vivartavāda,the second sentence again in the direction of pariṇāmavāda. No reference is madeto the saguṇabrahman, but only to cause in general. In Śaṅkara the terms pariṇāmaand vivarta did not yet possess the specific technical meaning which they wouldlater possess.

The position is clearer in a section entirely devoted to the problem of causality,419from which several important passages have been quoted already. The Chāndogyapassage420 is discussed

417 1.4.26.418 e.g. Ad. 2.1.4. last Unes.419 Ad. 2.1.14-20.420 6.1.4.


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again.421 The products of causation are non-different from the original situation,because ‘in as far as they are (new) names they are untrue; in as far as they areclay they are true.’ Many objections are again answered, including familiar ones. Ifthere is non-difference of effect and cause and nothing but absolute unity, whathappens to the scriptural injunctions and prohibitions?What of the pramāṇas?Whatof the distinction between teacher and pupil? The answer is also familiar: ‘Theseobjections we reply, do not damage our position because the entire complex ofphenomenal existence is considered as true as long as the knowledge of Brahmanbeing the Self of all has not arisen; .... For as long as a person has not reached thetrue knowledge of the unity of the Self, so long it does not enter his mind that theworld of effects with its means and objects of right knowledge and its results ofactions is untrue....’ The dialectic of causality is foreshadowed by Gaudapāda in hiskārikās, for which reference may be made to Mahadevan's discussion.422

The apparently contradicting statements of Śaṅkara can be explained by holding(though Śaṅkara himself is nowhere so explicit) that pariṇāmavāda applies tosaguṇabrahman and vivartavāda to nirguṇabrahman. Saguṇabrahman is called thematerial cause of the universe, and not nirguṇabrahman. This is in accordance withthe fact that in the Vivaraṇa school Īśvara is called the material cause of theuniverse.423 Likewise the saguṇabrahman is meant when Brahman is called theefficient cause (nimitta karaṇa) of the world.424 The nirguṇabrahman cannot be calleda cause and stands in no relation to this world. In the taṭaṣṭha-lakṣaṇa, ‘definitionby accidents’ it is called ‘that from which the origin, subsistence and dissolution ofthis world proceed’, as in the second sūtra: janmādyasya yataḥ, where janmādimeans: ‘janman, utpatti (birth, origin), sthiti (subsistence, conservation) and bhaṅga,nāśa, pralaya (dissolution, destruction).425 In other words, Brahman is not the

421 Ad. 2.1.14.422 Gaudapāda, Chapter VI: ‘Non-origination’.423 Siddhāntaleśasaṁgraha II 13-14 ap. Mahadevan, The Philosophy of Advaita 179; cf. id.

184-187.424 Cf. ad. I.4.23: prakṛtiśca...., ‘the material cause also....’, which is interpreted as referring to

the nimitta karaṇa.425 Ad. 1.1.2.


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cause but the locus upon which all causal connections are super-imposed throughthe erroneous activity of avidyā

These ideas are closely connected with the ancient ideas of karma and with theVedic sacrifice. Only the Absolute is really transcendent. Pariṇāmavāda expressesthe ideas of saṁsara, of transmigration and of the efficacy of the sacrifice (cf. alsothe digestion of the food, which could be called pariṇāma). Vivartavāda, on the otherhand, expresses that we can attain release from saṁsāra, from karma and fromrebirth. Śaṅkara says that ‘the works of him who knows Brahman are extinguished,’426otherwise it would follow ‘that he must necessarily enjoy the fruits of his works andthus cannot obtain release.’ Likewise all sin is extinguished. It is characteristic ofmokṣa and accounts for its desirability (though desire would not bring it nearer it isnevertheless a necessary condition: mumukṣutvam): ‘and his works are extinguished’,as the Muṇḍakopaniṣad says.427

Also in as far as it is opposed to the idea of creation, the doctrine of thenon-difference of cause and effect is closely related to the Vedic concepts. Doctrineslike pariṇāmavāda and vivartavāda were virtually contained in many Vedic modesof thought.428 This explains the relative rareness (in comparison with other religiousmythologies) of creation myths in the Veda429 and also the fact that creation isreplaced by, for instance, sacrifice (‘the rain, the food, the sperm, etc., are originatedfrom sacrifices’). Creation in general is also looked upon as a sacrifice (Prajāpati).

In refuting creation the great predecessor of Śaṅkara was Gaudapāda. Accordingto him, the creation texts of śruti are merely a device (upāya) to introduce the trueteaching which relates to the non-dual reality.430 The saprapañca is only a

426 Ad. 4.1.2.13.427 kṣīyante cāsya karināṇi: Mund Up. 2.2.5 quoted Ad. 4.1.14.428 Cf. above II 5.429 Renou and Filliozat noticed the relative rareness of creation myths in the Veda and the relative

frequency of vegetation hymns. The latter, related to the Indian climate, are typicallycontinuity-myths, often possessing a cyclical character (cf. M. Eliade, Le mythe de l'éternelretour, Archétypes et répétition. Paris 1949).

430 Kārikā 3.15 ap. Mahadevan, Gauḍapāda, 129.


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means; the niṣprapañca is the end.431 The main doctrine of Gauḍapāda, for whichhe adduces several arguments, is ajāti, ‘non-origination.’432

Śaṅkara is equally explicit and clear on this point: for him creation (‘with its ether,air, etc.’) is unreal.433 In the commentary upon one sūtra he deals almost exclusivelywith creation.434 Here the pūrvapakṣin mentions a number of apparently conflictingscriptural passages. Śaṅkara reconciles them partly (about the principle of suchreconciliation we shall speak below), but concludes with the remark: ‘And, to considerthe matter more thoroughly, a conflict of statements regarding the world does noteven matter greatly, since the creation of the world and similar topics are not at allwhat scripture wishes to teach. For we neither observe nor are told by scripture thatthe welfare of man (puruṣārtha) depends on these matters in any way; nor have wethe right to assume such a thing; because we conclude from the introductory andconcluding clauses that the passages about the creation and the like form onlysubordinate members of passages treating of Brahman’. Elsewhere, the relativevalidity of the concept of creation is shown by referring to a number of consecutivecreations (with their respective dissolutions, pralaya), which are ‘essentially’ thesame and which are embedded in the karma-doctrine: ‘As therefore each newcreation is (nothing but) the result of the religious merit and demerit (of the animatedbeings of the preceding creation), it is produced with a nature resembling that of thepreceding creation.’435

All this holds for the human being too. Human being is characterized bysuperimposition; superimposing, it creates a world of names and forms and of causesand effects. This creation is only a manifestation of avidyā and māyā. The changewhich a human being may cause or introduce cannot be said to be real- though itmay not be possible to call it unreal either. Human being itself does therefore notchange either; all change is anirva-

431 3.26 ibid. 130.432 See Mahadevan, Chap. VI.433 Ad. 3.2.4.434 1.4.14.435 Ad. 1.3.30.


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canīya. This is realized by whoever has attained brahmavidyā: then everythingbecomes nothing, tucchā. This is not a transformation but the mere realization ofan eternal reality, which was temporarily hidden on account of inexplicable reasons.

13. Vyavahāra and paramārtha

One of the most important Advaitic doctrines is the doctrine of vyavahāra andparamārtha. This doctrine is related to the distinction between paravidyā andaparavidyā and correspondingly between parabrahman and aparabrahman.Westerners need special introduction to this topic as they are likely to look withoutsympathy upon such a doctrine for reasons which we shall have to study too.436Some illuminating remarks regarding this can be found in the short introduction toK.C. Bhattacharyya's book and can be recommended to every Western student ofIndian Philosophy.

Vedānta in general has a triple scriptural basis, the prasthānatraya consisting ofUpaniṣads, Bhagavad Gītā and Brahmasūtra. Advaita is presented as thesystematised philosophy which is embodied in these texts. For convenience thedoctrine of revelation or apauruṣeyatva of these texts will be disregarded and theṛṣis or other human beings will be considered as their authors. This restriction willlater be removed. The question then arises as to whether the claim that Vedāntaembodies the metaphysical views of these texts means, that every ‘author’ of anUpaniṣad adhered to Advaita Vedānta. This would repeatedly lead to difficulties(e.g., in connection witli the Gïtä).437 But this seems not to have been Śaṅkara'sintention either. According to Bhattacharyya,438 ‘Śāndilya, the teacher of theŚāṇḍilya-vidyā in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, may not have ‘looked upon his doctrineas anything else but a statement of the highest truth accessible to man’, ‘but that isno reason why Śaṅkara may not look upon it as the inferior wisdom.’ This showsclearly that Śaṅkara did not claim to give a

436 See e.g. Thibaut in the introduction to his translation. Also Rāmānuja criticised this doctrinevehemently. See further below III. 7.

437 See above II 8: 95 sq.438 o.c. viii.


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historical interpretation, i.e., an interpretation in which he tried to reconstruct theintentions of a historical author. He did not give commentaries but explanations byconstructing a philosophical system on the basis of which every textual statementcan be explained and understood. Historians generally misunderstand this sincethey look upon Advaita also as a historical system (‘as a historic curiosity ratherthan a recipe for the human soul’ says Bhattacharyya).439 But only when we fullyrealize that Advaita claims to be true440 are we able to accept that it must in thatcase attempt to explain everything, including Upaniṣadic statements, whether thecontents of the latter themselves embody the Advaitic wisdom or only a ‘lower’wisdom.441 The lower wisdom must be such that it can in principle be extended tothe higher wisdom: it may not be incompatible with it as for instance the Bauddhadoctrines can be. There is no scope for questioning the sincerity of the bhāṣyakārawith regard to the author: Śaṅkara did never hold that Śaṇḍilya was an Advaitin whofor opportunistic reasons (as, e.g., Rāmakṛṣṇa Paramahaṁsa) expounded at acertain occasion the lower wisdom-e.g., because of the limited spirituality of hisaudience. Śaṅkara simply looked upon Śāṇḍilya himself as a man of limitedspirituality. śaṅkara himself admits elsewhere that the Ṛgveda ‘and so on’ constitutesonly the lower wisdom.442 This view solves the difficulty of historical interpretationand of sincerity. If this interpretation is right, we ought to translate bhāṣya not bycommentary but by explanation. This seems feasible: Gītābhāsya, would mean‘explanation of the Gītā’ i.e., explanation that the views expounded in the Gītā arenot incompatible with the views of Advaita Vedānta.443 What holds for Śaṅkara islikely to hold also for the Ācāryas of the rival schools of Vedānta.444

439 id. v.440 Cf. above 1.3. A.441 Even the different types of Upaniṣadic seers ought, in principle, to be explained (as Jaspers

tries to do for Western philosophy in his ‘Psychologie der Weltanschaungen’, referred tobelow).

442 Ad. 1.2.21.443 Cf. the terminological differences sometimes made between bhāṣya, ṭīkā and vārtiha, where

the maximal freedom is allotted to the bhāṣya. Compare the differences between the‘commentaries’ upon Aristotle by Alexander Aphrodisias, Ibn Rushd, Thomas Aquinas, or SirDavid Ross.

444 It is the same case, mutatis mutantis, with Śrī Aurobindo. When he says ahout Śaṅkara thathe ‘stresses the aspect of the divine unity’ and of the Buddha that he ‘stresses the phenomenalcharacter, which is an aspect of this world’, he would do a grave injustice to the personalitiesof Śaṅkara and of the Buddha, who did not ‘stress aspects’ but who stood for their respectivedoctrines as total and not partial explanations of reality. But Aurobindo's view becomesacceptable, whether we agree with it or not, if we understand it as an attempt to explain thephilosophies and personalities of Śaṅkara and of Buddha in the light of his own philosophy.


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This view can also be held when we accept the divine origin, apauruṣeyatva, of thetext, as the term śruti demands. In that case we need not assume that all the seershave received complete revelations: many, or even all, may have been partiallyenlightened. Śaṅkara's system can be described as an attempt to reconstruct onthe basis of partial revelations and with the help of other pramāṇas, the real contentof the transcendental divine wisdom (paramārthika paravidyā).

This practice of the bhāṣyas (and we have to be more explicit in this respect thanŚaṅkara himself was), is related to the treatment which philosophers generally giveto their colleagues. Aristotle for example reviews in the first book of the Metaphysicsthe Pre-Socratics and Plato, from the standpoint of the causes he discovered himself.Hegel interprets the previous philosophies as steps leading to his own doctrine445

and explains this entire process itself as the unfolding of Reason. Heidegger neverfails to explain why doctrines which he combats (e.g. Descartes or Hegel) hadnevertheless to come into being. Jaspers, lastly, in his ‘Psychologie derWeltanschaungen’ uses the same practice systematically.

Historians are nevertheless, right when they reject most of these interpretations asunhistorical. It would indeed not be wise to study the Pro-Socratics exclusively fromAristotle, Hegel or Nietzsche-nor the Upaniṣads exclusively from Śaṅkara, Rāmānujaor Madhva. But philosophers may see more deeply than historians.

A doctrine like Advaita, which denies the reality of everything other than Brahman,i.e., which denies itself, its expression, its reasoning, its teaching, its teachers andits pupils-in short, everything which enters our consciousness in as far as we havenot yet

445 Cf. again Aurobindo.


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entered brahmavidyā-such a doctrine cannot abstain from discussing the unrealityto which it claims to belong itself. Advaita accordingly enters the anirvacanīya worldof māyā and of avidyā and deals with many of the problems which presentthemselves there. The true answer to all these problems is always the same: theydo not exist, as only the Absolute exists. But such answers would fail to satisfy us,and answers are therefore given at the practical level of unreality to which theproblems belong as much as we ourselves. Unless Advaita would be altogethersilent this is an unavoidable but useful compromise with the ‘world’. This explainsthat the Absolute is in one place declared nirguṇabrahman while elsewhere thesaguṇabrahman is accepted and discussed; or vivartavāda is established as theonly truth about causation, while elsewhere pariṇāmavāda is accepted and discussed.In general there are a higher and a lower wisdom, para and aparavidyā. ‘Lowerwisdom’ or ‘lower knowledge’ are here euphemistic expressions: ultimately they areavidyā. This follows from the principle of the excluded third which Śaṅkara neverdenies.446 In reality the saguṇabrahman does not exist and the pariṇāmavāda doesnot hold. The two levels, in which these two kinds of wisdom of knowledge resideand in which the explanations take place, are called paramārthika ‘the absolutelyreal (level)’ and vyāvahārika ‘the practical (level)’. They have necessarily to obtainin any philosophy which denies the reality of the world in which we live and whichcontains us, but which nevertheless presents itself as a philosophy. It existed beforeŚaṅkara in Nāgārjuna's distinction of paramārthasatya, ‘absolute truth’, andsaṁvṛtisatya, ‘apparent truth’.

Unlike Nāgārjuna447 Śaṅkara has a second and equally important reason to adoptthe view of two levels: he has to explain the

446 Cf. II. 11: 120, n. 388. Cf. the term śabdāntaram and context Ad. 3.2.21 in fine. Cf. alsoŚrutisārasamuddharana (by a pupil of Śaṅkara) 149-150; ‘an intermediary entity between satand asat does not exist’. P. Hacker, Untersuchungen über texte des frühen Advaitavāda, 1.Die Schüler Śaṅkara's Akademie der Wiss. und der Lit., Abhandl. der Geistes- undSozialwissenschaftlichen Klasse, 26 Mains-Wiesbaden 1950, 2069. Later the catuṣkoṭi (sat,asat, sat and asat, neither sat nor asat) are accepted as possible categories.

447 This fact has to be taken into account when it is investigated in how far Śaṅkara (or hisparamaguru Gauḍapāda) might have been influenced by the great śūnyavādin, whose doctrinehe combats (e.g. Ad. 2.2.18, 21). It is true that he combats other Buddhist schools moreextensively: the Sarvāstivāda Ad. 2.2.18-27 and the Vijñānavāda Ad. 2.2.28-32. C. above II.11: 123, n. 397; Ingalls, Śaṅkara's arguments against the Buddhists and Murti, o.c. 312-313.


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scripture. Since roughly speaking two main views occur there, the best device is toexplain their discrepancy by declaring one view as absolutely true and the other asapparently true. The latter view is in fact untrue, but practically speaking a lowerview which can be looked upon as a step towards the higher view. In the Upaniṣadsfor example we find niṣprapañca and saprapañca views:448 the first is absolutistic,non-dualistically inclined, looks upon the divine as quality-less and is akin tovivartavāda; the second is realistic, creationist, dualistic, looks upon the divine asquahiied and is akin to pariṇāmavāda. The first is impersonalistic, the second morepersonalistic. Śaṅkara's Advaita is the culmination of the first view, but themetaphysical structure of his absolutism enables him to interpret the second viewas lower wisdom. This explains that we see that Śaṅkara so often subordinatesother views, without rejecting them. There are however also views which are explicitlyrejected and others which are chosen and preferred:449 Śaṅkara can beuncompromising.450Nevertheless he has with the help of this distinction ‘synthesized’the scriptural doctrines. He speaks therefore about samanvaya ‘concord (of thetexts)’, commenting upon the fourth sūtra; tat tu samanvayāt, ‘but that (Brahman isto be known from scripture), because there is concord’.451 This is explained in thecommentary as follows: ‘i.e., all the texts of the Vedānta are concordant (samanugata)in establishing the same meaning and in tending towards the same aim (tātparya)’.

448 Hiriyanna (Outlines of Indian philosophy) classifies the Upaniṣadic doctrines thus.449 Śrī Aurobindo goes much further in rejecting nothing and subordinating everything. There is

a general modern tendency, widespread all over the world but especially in India, to do this.But when support for the all-encompassing attitude, which is more syncretistic thansynthesizing, is sought in Śaṅkara, it is forgotten that he vehemently and uncompromisinglyattacked Buddhism, Nyaya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṁkhya, etc.

450 Cf. also in connection with the two levels, Śaṅkara's criticism of the view of Bhartṛprapañcaand BAU. 5.1.1. (transl. Swami Madhavananda 804-805).

451 Thibaut translates samanvayāt: ‘because it is connected (with the Vedānta texts) as theirpurport’; Renou, more rightly, ‘parce qu'il ya concordance’.


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There are however views which cannot be understood properly and adequatelywhen interpreted as ‘lower wisdom’, as for instance the view that the divine is qualifiedmeaning not only that the divine is qualified, but also that anything which is notqualified is not the divine and is not higher or more perfect than it. Recognizing thelegitimacy of the interpretation of this view prevents it from being regarded as ‘lowerwisdom’ along with a ‘higher wisdom’ concerning a quality-less divine. Because ofhis compromising attitude Śaṅkara comes to misinterpret other views, and thoughthis does not matter very much when historical interpretation is concerned, it becomesvery important when an attempt is made (as often throughout the history of Advaita)to prove the supremacy of Advaita over contemporary or later systems (e.g.Viśiṣṭadvaita) by allotting a ‘lower’ place to those system and by subordinating, butnot rejecting them. This apparently powerful weapon of apologetics is often boundto fail, as it rejects the exclusiveness which is essential for many doctrines (e.g., thesaguṇa-doctrine of Viśiṣṭādvaita is essentially incompatible with a highernirguṇa-wisdom). These problems will occupy us again.

The Upaniṣads provide us with a distinction between higher and lower knowledgeas applicable to the higher and lower Brahman respectively.452 They do not state,however, that this duality should be utilized for the interpretation of the Upaniṣadictexts themselves. Śaṅkara clearly goes beyond scripture453 by adopting a standardwith the help of which he explains the scriptural texts themselves. This need notimply that he was necessarily influenced by śūnyavāda (though this is of coursepossible), but shows that both Nāgārjuna and Śaṅkara adopted on metaphysicalgrounds the same view of two levels. So there is a metaphysical and a historicalreason for the theory of two levels. Next Śaṅkara's own formulation of this doctrinemay be examined.

‘Two kinds of knowledge,’ says the Ācārya,454 ‘are enjoined... a lower and a higherone. Of the lower one it is said that it

452 See e.g., Svetāśvātaropanisad, 5.453 Cf. Thibaut's introduction; esp. cviii sq., together with the remark about Thibaut's opinion

concerning māyā, in Bhattacharyya's introduction, viii.454 Ad, 1.2.21.


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comprises the Ṛgveda and so on, and the text continues455 “the higher knowledgeis that by which the indestructible (akṣara) is apprehended”.’ Two remarks come toour mind: if Śaṅkara looks upon ‘the Ṛgveda and so on’ (ṛgvedädi), which probablycomprises the entire śruti with the exception of the Upaniṣads (and perhaps alsosmṛti apart from the Bhagavad Gītā and the Brahmasutras) as ‘lower wisdom’, i.e.,in reality as avidyā-this implies that (1) there is no harm in looking upon a sage likeŚāṇḍilya as a person of limited spirituality; and (2) there is in as far as the problemof authority is concerned, not so much a philosophical as a practical difference withBuddhism, which rejected śabdapramāṇa alltogether. For the greater part of thescripture Śaṅkara does in fact the same (calling it compromisingly andeuphemistically lower wisdom), while on the other hand the Buddha could also havefound scriptural support in the Vedic tradition. This did not concern the Buddhawhereas Śaṅkara had in addition to a philosophical aim also ‘worldly’ aim, i.e.,restoring the unity of Hinduism.

That the latter aim was attained was not due to the purely metaphysical pāramārthikadoctrine of Advaita, but to its compromising and synthesizing attitude in the practical,vyāvahārika realm. Śaṅkara did not reject any part of the Vedic tradition and wastherefore welcomed by all who regarded themselves as followers of the sanātanadharma. Śaṅkara's philosophical compromise with the vyāvahārika realm isconnected with the fact that he was not a secluded cave-dwelling sage, as somepicture him, but an active and creative mind and a great organiser, who, in a shortlife, established according to tradition the four maṭhas at ŚṚṅgeri, Puri, Dvārakaand Badrināth (and perhaps another one at Kāñcīpuram), expelled Buddhism fromIndian soil, founded the six ‘cults’ still preponderant in Hinduism,456 established themain orders of saṁnyāsa, kept Tantrism within limits and expelled magical practiceswhich had become abundant.457 In addition he was so sincere

455 It is not known which text; in the context Śaṅkara quotes the Muṇḍakopaniṣad several times.456 Śaiva, Vaiṣṇava, Śākta, Saurya, Ganapatīya, Kaumāra.457 Cf. above II 10: 110, n. 357. This is the traditional account partly basect upon the

Śaṅkaradigvijaya. It has little additional evidence to support it. Śaṅkara did not defeat Mīmāṁsāwhich is still the philosophic presupposition of Hindu orthodoxy, or rather: orthopraxy (‘rightpractice’: see J.F. Staal in: Kairos. Zeitschrift für Religionswissenschaft und Theologie 4 (1959)215-8) is itself primarily a Mīmāṁsā concept. Mīmāṁsā is especially strong in Śaṅkara'sbirthplace Kerala, called karmabhūmi despite Śaṅkara's lifelong struggle against theentanglement by karma.


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in his compromising attitude458 that he composed a number of devotional (bhākta)hymns,459 in which the saguṇa aspects of the deity are praised. We do not knowwhich of these are authentic and which are spurious.460 In all these respects it isclear that the vyāvahārika realm is an important aspect of Advaita. The paradoxtherefore arises that a doctrine summarized in the words jaganmithyā ‘the world isfalse’ is expounded by a jagadguru or ‘world teacher’.461

By his attempts to establish Hinduism as a ‘national’ religion Śaṅkara shows howin India philosophy influences not only the individual (as is often stressed) but alsothe country.462 Despite these vyāvahārika efforts, the pāramārthika realm deniesuncompromisingly that any effort of karma may lead to brahmavidyā. Almost allAdvaitins therefore reject samuccayavāda.463 The later Advaitins pay less attentionto the vyāvahārika realm, which comes under the jurisdiction of Mīmāṁsā. The aimof Mīmāṁsā in the vyāvahārika realm is called svarga, whereas the pāramārthikarealm is the realm of mokṣa: ‘for the distinction of higher and lower knowledge ismade on account of the diversity of their results, the former leading to more worldlyexaltation, the latter to absolute bliss’.464 All concepts related to karma andmeditation,to Vedic injunctions etc., are transferred to the lower level. The terms Pīrva andUttara Mīmāṁsā are generally interpreted by Advaitins as referring to the lower andthe higher level respectively. Whosoever is incapable of realizing the nirguṇabrahmanbelongs to the vyāvahārika level and is hence bound by all that holds and isapplicable in this level. ‘The lower knowledge which comprises the Ṛgveda and soon is mentioned preliminary to the knowledge of Brahman for the mere purpose ofglorifying the

458 This is rightly stressed by H. Zimmer in: Philosophies of India, London 1951, 460-1.459 Cf. for example Thomas Aquinas.460 Cf. above II 11: 116, n. 376.461 This title is given to the present Śaṅkarācāryas of the maṭhas.462 See further Belvalkar, Lectures on Vedanta, 239.463 See above II 8: 93 sq.464 Ad 1.2.21.


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latter; as appears from the passages in which it (the lower knowledge) is spoken ofslightingly, such as ‘but frail indeed are these boats, the sacrifices, the eighteen inwhich the lower ceremonial has been told. Fools who praise this as the highest goodare subject again and again to old age and death.’465 Whoever turns away from thelower knowledge is prepared for the highest one:466 ‘Let a brāhmaṇa after he hasexamined all these worlds which are gained by works acquire freedom from alldesires. Nothing that is eternal can be gained by what is not eternal. Let him in orderto understand this take fuel in his hand and approach a guru who is learned anddwells entirely in Brahman’.467

The last 58 sūtras of the Brahmasūtras468 are interpreted by Śaṅkara as ‘describingthe path of the Gods (devayāna) which leads those who possess the lower kind ofknowledge towards the attainment of their reward’.469 This describes the fate afterdeath of souls which possess aparavidyā. Occasional remarks are added concerningthe status of the soul which possesses paravidyā and is free from all rebirth.470 Inthis connection later Advaitins deal with the difference between two kinds of humanbeings which have gone beyond lower knowledge: the videha-mukta ‘released atthe moment of death’, and the jīvan-mukta ‘released while embodied’.471

The refinement of the theory of two levels into three levels is a natural extensionthough it is not of great metaphysical importance. It plays an important part in theepistemology of later Advaita. If vyāvahārika denotes the sum total of all errorscaused by avidyā, we have to distinguish those errors which are made

465 Muṇḍ. Up. 1.2.7.466 Id. 1.2.12.467 Ad. 1.2.21.468 Adhyāya 4, padas 2-4.469 Ad. 4.2.1.470 In particular with regard to the last three sūtras Rāmānuja and Thibaut cannot accept their

interpretation as referring only to the soul who possesses a lower knowledge. Thibaut pointsin this connection at the solemn final sūtra: anāvṛttiḥ śabdād anāvṛttiḥ śabdāt, ‘(of them) thereis non-return according to scripture; non-return according to scripture’. But the repetition inthe end is familiar to readers of the Upaniṣads and the content expresses simply in the succinctsūtra style that scripture teaches that the souls, who have reached there, do not return.

471 e.g. the Jīvanmuktiviveka of Vidyāranya.


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within the vyāvahārika level and which may be cleared at that level too: for instancethe error of the famous example of taking mother-of-pearl for silver.472 Such errorsare as it were errors of the second degree. What pertains to these errors is denotedby the term pratibhasika. According to Murti,473 the doctrine of these three truths, inAdvaita as well as in vijñānavāda, is necessitated by the fact, that both analyse firstan empirical illusion and then apply this analysis analogically to the world-illusion.‘The Madhyamika, however, addresses himself directly to the world-illusion....’.

14. Īśvara

The saguṇabrahman belongs to the vyāvahārika level. It was first introduced as theobject of dhyāna or upāsanā, in contradistinction to nirguṇabrahman which is thesame as its knowledge or mokṣa. Also Īśvara, ‘God’, is the object of dhyāna andupāsanā.474 It seems that Īśvara and saguṇabrahman are more or less the same.In later Advaita the saguṇabrahman is often conceived as Īśvara and the worldtogether. A detailed analysis of the denotations of both terms in the bhāṣya ledHacker to the conclusion that in Śaṅkara Īśvara is a concept that ‘in a strange wayresides somewhere between para- and aparabrahman’.475 In later Advaita Īśvara,saguna- or aparabrahman are further specified existentially (1) and metaphysically(2). (1) Brahmavidyā is knowledge from which all temporality is excluded, whichmanifests itself suddenly and which arises on account of its own nature (svābhāvika).

472 In the erroneous judgment ‘This is silver’, ‘this’ belongs to the vyāvahārika, ‘silver’ to thepratibhāsika realm.

473 o.c. 321.474 See Hacker, Eigentümlichkeiten .... 283.475 Id. 286: ‘Īśvara ist bei Śaṅkara sin Begriff, das merkwürdig in der Schwebe steht zwischen

Param und Aparam Brahma’. Such conclusions are important in as far as they establishterminological characteristics of Śaṅkara's language, required when the authenticity of worksis to be determined. Metaphysically speaking, in the pāramārthika realm nirguṇabrahman andsarguṇabrahman are the same. When the reality of the world is denied and when everythingis ultimately regarded as one and the same, terminological discriminations become lessimportant. This explains that Śaṅkara often disregards the systematical analysis of conceptsand likewise definitions as Hacker concluded (‘nach dieser Betrachtung müssen wir alsallgemeine Eigentümlichkeit des Denken Śaṅkaras eine Abneiging gegen Definìtionen undeine souverāne Sorglosigkeit gegenüber begrifflicher Systematik festhalten’; id. 285). Whendiscrimination and differentiation are metaphysically adopted the need for terminologicaldifferentiation is much greater. TheWestern Orientalist, whose implicit philosophy is generallya kind of bhedavāda, should not expect terminological differentiations where they are notphilosophically necessitated.


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It can therefore be called intuition, samādhi.476 As this status is not an exceptionalphenomenon but the eternal reality only under special circumstances accessible tous, samādhi is called sahaja-samādhi, ‘natural intuition’. Later Advaitins sometimesadopted the Yoga discrimination of two kinds of samādhi: savikalpa-samādhi‘determinate intuition’, and nirvikalpasamādhi, ‘indeterminate intuition’. The formerterm denotes477 that a level is reached where the illusoriness of everything otherthan the Absolute is realized and where this stage is thereby overcome. The latterterm means that even the consciousness of the illusoriness of everything other thanthe Absolute has disappeared. The first section corresponds to Īśvara, who isconscious of the illusoriness of the world in which he operates. The secondcorresponds to Brahman which is only self-conscious in self-luminosity. Therefore(2) the later Advaitins (e.g. Vidyāraṇya) define Īśvara as the Absolute qualified bymāya.478 This specifies guṇa in saguṇabrahman. In the Vedāmtasāra, Īśvara isdescribed as the conditioned Brahman which ‘experiences joy through subtlemodification of ajñäna’.479 This denotes the close connection between the situationof Īśvara and svarga, the goal reached through the accumulation of good karma.

This is in accordance with the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, where all works are conceivedas dependent on Īśvara: the fruits of action do not spring from the actions themselvesbut come from Īśvara.480 In any kind of pariṇāmavāda actions cannot produce theirown effects. This would lead to the assumption of the apūrva of Mīmāmsā, whichŚaṅkara rejects (in the same context).481 In

476 The term occurs in sūtra 2, 3.39.477 If we rightly understand Bhattacharyya's interpretation (o.c. 14-16).478 In the Vivaraṇaprameyasaṁgraha: see Mahadevan, o.c. 179; and in the Pañcadasï: see

Hacker, o.c. 285.479 Transl. Hiriyanna, 48.480 Ad. 3.2.38-41.481 Ad. 3, 2, 40; ‘Jaimini (thinks) for the same reason that religious merit (is what brings about

the fruits of actions)’.


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the vyāvahārika realm there is no reason to reject apūrva. Therefore Śaṅkara says:‘The final conclusion then is that the fruits come from the Lord with a view to thedeeds done by the souls, or, if it be so preferred, with a view to the apūrva springingfrom the deeds’.482 There is hardly any reason to reject in the vyāvahārika realmapūrva on account of its magical character, since it is replaced by Īśvara, who ishimself affected by the inexplicable avidyā and who is himself often called a yoginor magician.483

How can the fruits of action spring from Īśvara? This is specified in the commentaryupon two other sūtras,484 where Īśvara is called hetukartṛ, ‘the counsel agent in allactivity’. He ‘makes the soul act, having regard to the efforts made by it, whethermeritorious or non-meritorious’. ‘Having regard to the inequality of the virtuous andvicious actions of the souls, the Lord, acting as a mere occasional cause(nimittatva-mātreṇa), allots to them corresponding unequal results’. Thus God doesnot act himself but arranges the whole field of action for the soul: ‘The Lord indeedcauses it to act, but it acts itself’.485 From a comparison of the causal activity of Īśvarawith that of the rain, ‘an occasional cause’, we see that ‘the Lord arranges favourableor unfavourable circumstances for the souls with a view to their former efrorts’. Thismeans that Īśvara acts as a sufficient cause, not as a necessary cause. Hence thereis scope for free activity on the part of the souls themselves. Assuming for themoment that Īśvara also possesses free activity, the question arises as to whetherhe will ever use his power to create ‘favourable or unfavourable circumstances’according to his own free will. It appears that this is not so as can be concluded fromthe following interesting passage: ‘Moreover, the Lord in causing it to act now hasregard to its former efforts previous to that existence; a regressus against which,considering the eternity of the saṁsāra, no objections can be raised’. EvidentlyĪśvara always needs the meritorious or non-meritorious karma-substance of aprevious birth, with a view to which he will arrange the circumstances. This is alwayspossible

482 Ad. 3.2.41.483 e.g. ad. 1.3.19 (Thibaut translates ‘thaumaturg’) cf. ad, 2.1.18 and also Dakṣiṇamūrtyaṣṭakam

2.484 2.3.41-42; cf. Hacker, o.c. 282.485 kurvanta hi tam īśvara kārayati.


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because of the beginningless nature of saṁsāra. Similarly Īśvara creates in eachcreation the Veda as it existed in the previous creation.486 That means that the ancientkarma theory is not discarded. It remains true that every soul is born in a situationwhich depends on its karma of a previous life. It can act freely during its actual lifewithin the limits of its actual situation and thus create a new amount of karma,meritorious or non-meritorious, leading to the situation in which it will be reborn inits next life, etc. Thus Īśvara is only an explicatory link in the karma theory. Whereasthe original karma doctrine does not explain the mechanism of causation, Mīmāṁsāgave a partial explanation with the help of the apūrva concept. Mīmāṁsākas of theschool of Prabhākara were very definite in stating that there can be no connectionbetween ‘dharma-adharma’ and a possible God. God cannot control these subtleentities, cannot supervise them and cannot even know them.487 Śaṅkara saw theinsufficiency of the apūrva concept as an explanatory factor and introduced Īśvaraas a conscious agent, who judges the karma sum of previous life and creates thebirth situation accordingly. Śaṅkara felt that it was impossible to judge (the traditionalkarma theory also implies some judgment of karma which remained howeverunclarified) without affecting the laws of karma. In this sense Īśvara is justice,488 buta justice which strictly adds and substracts according to the eternal laws of karmicarithmetic. In this theory, there seems to be no room for anything like grace, i.e.,the allotment by Īśvara of a birth situation, regarding previous merit but disregarding(a part of) previous demerit.

However the main thesis of Advaita is that we can be released from saṁsāra by theunpredictable manifestation of brahmavidyā, which is not the effect of previouskarma, but which is svābhāvika and svayaṁprakāśa. This is exactly the significancewhich may be given to the term grace, which cannot be primarily characterized (asin the monotheistic religions) as an act of the inscrutable will of God, but whichshould be characterized as an exception

486 See above II 1: 35.487 According to the Prakaraṇa-pañcikā (137 sq. ap. Jha. Pūrva Mīmāṁsā, 45) of Śālikanātha

Miśra, a work probably written shortly after Śaṅkara (see id., Appendix 34, 31).488 See K.C. Bhattacharyya, o.c. 41.


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to the rule that there is no effect without a cause in which the effect was notpre-existent, i.e., as an effect not pre-existent in any cause. This would involve aneffect without a cause, i.e., a svābhāvika phenomenon. Viewed from the karmictransmigration in the vyāvahārika level mokṣa can only arise if the intelligent agent,who creates circumstances on account of previous karma, disregards this karmicsubstance and allows mokṣa to take place-i.e., through the mercy of Īśvara. This isperfectly consistent.

To these conclusions we are led not so much by expositions of traditional Vedāntaas by ‘problematic constructions on Vedantic lines’.489 In the Sūtrabhāṣya we findconfirmation of the above: ‘we must .... assume that final release also is effectedthrough knowledge caused by the grace (anugraha) of the Lord’.490 Moreover aremainder of karma does not prevent the occurrence of mokṣa.491 The concept ofgrace (which according to several critics is alien to Advaita Vedānta) can in Advaitaonly be explained in the way sketched above. Grace means in this context theoccurrence of a causeless phenomenon: the vyāvahārika anugraha of Īśvaracorresponds to the pāramārthika svabhāvikatva of mokṣa. In the monotheisticreligions grace could be described as the occurrence of a phenomenon, not causedby the actions of the creature, but by the will of the Creator. It follows also that Īśvarais free because of mokṣa (as he allows the occurrence of mokṣa by freelydisregarding the laws of karma).

Another important characteristic of Īśvara is his function as a creator. In Mīmāṁsāthe existence of a creator is denied.492 In Advaita we have seen that nirguṇabrahmanis according to the taṭastha definition ‘the cause of the origin, subsistence anddissolution of the world’, i.e., itself not causally connected with the world, whereasthe saguṇabrahman can be called its material cause. In later Advaita Īśvara is calledthe material as well as the

489 As Bhattacharyya calls his own Studies in Vedāntism (Introduction, v).490 tadanugraha hetukenaiva ca vijñānena mokṣasiddhirbhavitumarhati; ad. 2.3.41.491 Ad. 3.1.8, in fine.492 See Jha, o.c. 45-52.


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efficient cause of the world.493 Moreover, we may expect a certain kind of creativityin connection with Īśvara since avidyā and adhyāsa are themselves creative activities,whereas Īśvara is Brahman as qualified by them. Creativity is on the other handexcluded by the perpetual nature of saṁsāra: every moment tnat Īśvara couldpossibly create, he faces the pre-existence of merit and demerit caused by souls ininnumerable former lives. Moreover the souls are explicitly described as uncreatedand eternal.494On the other hand, the world is a manifestation of what exists in Īśvarain a subtle form (as is illustrated in a Purāṇic myth). But this also is different fromcreativity.

Theoretically there is the following possibility. If all souls attain mokṣa and if thereis universal release (sarvamukti) this Universe disappears because it is ‘universally’realized that it was eternally non-existant (provided there is no good karma left inthe universe, because in that case svarga still subsists). This leads to mahāpralaya,‘universal dissolution’, and ‘afterwards’ (though also time will have disappeared inthe non-dual Brahman) Īśvara can create a new universe in no way connected withthe previous one. Because of the perpetual nature of saṁsāra we must assume aninfinite number of creations and dissolutions. This is often envisaged in Indianspeculations (cf. the kalpas and manvantaras) and signifies perhaps that we haveto conceive of creation against a background of the timeless (which we cannot doin our vyāvahārika consciousness).

Sarvamukti was a doctrine of some later Advaitins, especially Appayya Dīksiṭa inhis Siddhāntaleśasaṁgraha. The above possibilities can therefore be realized inhis perspective of thought. It seems that Śaṅkara did not believe in the possibilityof sarvamukti495 and that therefore these considerations are not relevant to hissystem. But he did believe in an infinity of creations and universes.496 That herecreation is meant in a relative sense follows from the fact that in the interval betweentwo creations

493 abhinna-nimitto-pādāna-kāraṇa: ap. Mahadevan, o.c. 180. In the Naiṣkarmyasiddhi ofSureśvara avidyā is often called upādāna: see P. Hacker, Untersuchungen .... 1970.

494 Ad. 2.3.17.495 Cf. ad. 3.2.21; cf. Pañcapādikā Introduction xli.496 See e.g. ad. 2.1.8-9; 1.3.30.


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(‘the night of Brahma’, or ‘the sleep of Viṣṇu’ of the Purāṇas) not only the non-dualBrahman subsists, but also the subtle forms of merit and demerit of the previouscreation, i.e., apūrva or Īśvara. This can be seen from a previously quoted497 passage:‘As therefore each new creation is (nothing but) the result of the religious merit anddemerit (of the animated beings of the preceding creation), it is produced with anature resembling that preceding creation.498 Hence neither creation (sṛṣṭi) nordissolution (pralaya) are to be conceived in an absolute sense. Mahāpralaya is notthe same as sarvamukti and there neither is creation out of nothing nor are theintervals nothing apart from the non-dual Brahman. All this holds in the vyāvahārikalevel. In the pāramārthika level there is no creation at all since creation is a typicalsaprapañca idea.

The question arises as to what these ‘relative’ creations really signify. Īśvara isspoken of in a creationist sense in texts which deal with the nāmarūpe.499 There weread: ‘That the highest Lord (parameśvara) is he who manifests the names andforms (nāmarūpayorvyākartṛ) is a principle acknowledged by all the Upaniṣads’.500Hence creation in a ‘relative’ sense merely means manifestation. The creatortransforms the avyākṛte nāmarūpe into vyākṛte nāmarūpe; therefore he is calledvyākartṛ. Sṛṣṭi is ‘vyākarma’. The unmanifested names and forms are manifestedby avidyā or adhyāsa. Hence creation or manifestation is the same as avidyā oradhyāsa, and the activity of Īśvara is nothing but the inexplicable superimposingactivity. This means ultimately that the āśraya of adhyāsa is Brahman, for Īśvara issaguṇabrahman. The term māyāvin, ‘magician’, as an epithet of Īśvara, obtainstherefore the specific significance of: ‘he who produces māyā‘.

In adhyāsa superimposition, the superimposed and the superimposing activity (notthe locus of superimposition) are the same, and therefore the creative activity andcreation are likewise the same. Īśvara is therefore both material and efficient causeof the universe. That we make such erroneous distinctions is due to the

497 Above II, 12: 132.498 Ad. 1.3.30.499 Cf. above II 12.500 Ad. 2.4.20; cf. also ad. 1.3.41.


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fact that we have personified au impersonal entity. Summarising, we may say thatthe vyāvahārika Īśvara corresponds as a creator to adhyāsa.501

This implies that creation is not a very important concept in Advaita.502 It is rather anegative concept too. Creation which is considered a positive activity from the worldaffirming vyāvahārika point of view, is the same as the obscure and negativesuperimposing activity. This is ultimately an evaluation since the same reality isevaluated differently in the vyāvahārika and in the pāramārthika realm.

That in Īśvara the creative activity, the preexistent material and the (subtle form of)creation are one and the same503 can also be observed from the use of the conceptśakti ‘power’. This concept is the dynamical principle Bhattacharyya was seeking.504Among later Advaitins śakti is a power, and at the same time prakṛti from which theuniverse is created: the śakti attributed to Īśvara is a bījaśakti.505 This power makesthe unreal appear as real; it resides in Brahman, but it is māyā (as also māyā residesin Brahman). Bhattacharyya regards it as a dynamic principle, because he says:‘Brahman existing in the śakti becomes the effect: the effect is thus not non-existent.’But this is clear, as it has been shown that in the vyāvahārika realm not vivartavādaholds, but pariṇāmavāda. The ‘dynamical’ creation of the vyāvahārika level, whichpresupposes pariṇāmavāda, corresponds to the doctrine of adhyāsa, which is interms of causation the same as vivartavāda.

More details could be given if a descent would be attempted from the self-luminousBrahman into the obscure regions of the inexplicable māyā. But as it would at thesame time be necessary to go beyond Śaṅkara on to the later Advaitins, a merereference

501 Cf. the attribution of characteristics of Īśvara to avidyā by Sureśvara (see above 147 n. 493and below n. 505).

502 See above II 12.503 ‘Schöpferkraft Material der Schöpfung und Urzustand desGeschaffenen fallen also zusammen:

eine folge substanzialistischen Denkens ebenso wie des satkāryavāda’: HackerEigentümlichkeiten .... 274. It is rightly remarked that this identity is also a consequence ofsatkāryavāda.

504 See above II 12 and Bhattacharyya, o.c. 28-29.505 Hacker, ibid. Sureśvara uses for avidyā also bīja ‘seed’ (Hacker, Untersuchungen .... 1970).


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may be made to four different directions in which further specification can be sought:(1) ajñāna can be conceived as possessing two powers, āvaraṇa, ‘the obscuring’,and vikṣepa, ‘the diversifying.’ Both are closely connected with the superimposingactivity, as can be seen from the Vedāntasāra.506 (2) Either māyā itself, or the abovementioned vikṣepa, can be conceived as threefold when use is made of the Sāṁkhyacategories sattva, rajas and tamas. The resulting cosmogony is described byDasgupta.507 (3) The avyākṛte nāmarūpe and the vyākṛte nāmarūpe in their cosmicaspect can be brought into connection with two other entities of ancient origin,Hiraṇyagarbha and Virāṭ. Their relation to Īśvara is analysed by Mahadevan,508 (4)The concept of śakti can be further developed and two forms of Īśvara can bedistinguished. This line of thought is followed by Bhattacharyya.509

In this way entities of the vyāvahārika realm, such as Īśvara, conceived as a mercifulbeing or as a creator, can be shown to be actually unreal and can be reduced tothe basic concepts of the highest truth, which can in turn be reduced to Brahmanand adhyāsa, - the latter mysterious entity mysteriously residing in the former.Attributes of God which play an important part in religion, such as grace and creativity,can be interpreted in Advaita. This yields a more detailed picture of the way in whichŚaṅkara accepts and sometimes subordinates the Vedic heritage. Despite thisdevelopment the concept of a central deity such as Īśvara even if ultimately denied,and in the pāramārthika level devoid of sense, plays a much more important part inAdvaita than in the religious feelings of the Vedic period. The reason for this is thatthe non-dual Brahman becomes Īśvara as soon as we speak or think about theuniverse or about ourselves as individuals. Īśvara is God of the universe as thequalified manifestation of Brahman. Śaṅkara's non-dualism is therefore nearer tomonotheism than to Vedic polytheism and henotheism (despite the monotheistictendencies in later Vedic texts, themselves connected with the development of‘proto’-Advaitic ideas).510 Advaita is, however, a metaphysical

506 Transl. Hiriyanna 48 sq.507 II. 73-77.508 o.c. 192-193.509 o.c. 29 sq.510 Cf. the famous passage Ṛgveda 1.164.46, where the Gods, named variously by the sages,

are said to be one.


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doctrine and not a religion. It is an exaggeration which is not far from the truth whenWadia says that ‘Śaṅkara did not attach any importance to religion’.511

The gods of Vedic polytheism are not altogether denied and rejected as in Mīmāṁsā,which considers the deities as ‘hypothetical entities postulated as the recipients ofthe sacrificial offering’ and as ‘grammatical datives.’512 But they are, as is also oftenthe case in the Vedas, considered beings of a somewhat higher order than humanbeings. This may for instance be inferred from the way in which Śaṅkara discussesthe problem whether the gods are entitled to knowledge of Brahman.513 The answeris in the affirmative, whereas the Mīmāṁsakas denied them even this.514

Lastly an important problem may be raised in view of the above considerations: isĪśvara a person? The answer is in the negative: even in the vyāvahārika realm heis not a person. Īśvara creates mechanically and both in creation as in supervisingkarmic results he makes less use of his hypothetical freedom than the souls whoperform their karma. But even if he could be termed a relative personalization (inthe vyāvahārika realm) of impersonal entities (in the pāramārthika realm), he couldnot be called a person for the idea of the personal implies and includes that a personis as person more perfect and higher than anything impersonal. Therefore it isimpossible to say that the lower God is a person, when the higher Deity is animpersonal Absolute. The notion of the personal itself excludes the supra-personal.515

Impersonalism is traditional in India. The idea of karma transcends the humanindividuality. The highest authority, śruti, is of apauruṣeya origin. The sacrifice istypically impersonal: only the precise and faultless performance of the prescribedritual act counts and is beneficial, not the intentions of the sacrificer. The

511 A.R. Wadia, Can Indian and Western philosophy be synthetised? Philosophy East and West4 (1954-55) 293 : 292.

512 See above II. 5: 65.513 Ad. 1.3.26-27.514 Ad. 1.3.31; cf. Jha. o.c. 308.515 To say that the Absolute ought to be called supra-personal and not impersonal is, from the

point of view of the personal, a mere terminological difference: nāma eva.


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idea of meditation can be aptly characterised as de-personalization: it is a progressivedenial of everything outside the one entity concentrated upon, including attributesof the person of the meditating being.516 The object of meditation, saguṇabrahman,is similarly impersonal, just as Īśvara is. This holds especially for the nirguṇabrahman,which is without qualities, formless and nameless (or: which is beyond the world ofnames and forms) and which accordingly can only be described by neti, neti.

It is difficult to establish a chronology of personalism and impersonalism in India. ‘Itis not even possible to show that Ṛgvedic texts which present an impersonal firstcause or ultimate substratum are older than those in which the method of creationis differently conceived’ says Gonda.517 The same uncertainty prevails with regardto Brahmā, in certain respects a predecessor of the Advaitic Īśvara and Brahman.518

Though it seems justified to speak about impersonalism in India,519 it is misleadingto hold that Hinduism ‘starts with the idea of an impersonal Absolute, Brahman, andonly later advances towards the idea of a personal God.’520

15. The jīva. Avasthātraya

Śaṅkara asserts that ‘It is not the primary purport of scripture to make statementsregarding the individual soul (jīva).’521

516 Cf. also Heimann, o.c. 251-252.517 J. Gonda, Notes on Brahman, 62.518 Ibid Chapter VII passim.519 We may add one remark about the avatāras of God (especially of Viṣṇu), which are often

compared with the Christian concept of incarnation, in order to see in how far justification forsuch a view can be found in Śaṅkara. In the commentary upon the passage of the Chāndogyawhere ‘The Deity, by entering three Divinities through this Living Self, differentiates name andform’ is mentioned it is stated: ‘It is not right and proper that the Deity .... should deliberatelydetermine to enter-and actually enter-the body which is the receptible of experience .... forsuffering painful experiences’. The contradiction with the passion of Christ is evident, and itmight be more cautious to translate avatāra by ‘descent’ (as P. Masson-Oursel did.). Cf. alsosūtra 2.3.46: ‘(As the soul is affected by pleasure and pain) not so the highest (Lord)....’.

520 Zaehner op.cit., 78 et passim.521 Ad. 1.3.7. (quoted above II Introduction: 33).


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We are justified to view this as an expression of his own interest in such matters,about which ordinary experience informs us sufficiently. It is therefore necessary torefer only shortly to the status of the jīva and to a few connected topics (especiallythe avasthātraya, ‘the three states of consciousness’).

The jīva's status is characterized by saṁsāra, a term which denoted transmigration,became with the Buddha the symbol of all human suffering and came lastly to signify‘empirical existence’ in general.522 But when the jīva's status is characterized bysaṁsāra, the term signifies the ‘jīva's state of immersion in worldliness’, as it isexpressed by J.L. Mehta (Banaras).523 The latter compares this with Heidegger'sin-der-Welt-sein, ‘being-in-the-world’, which is the first existential in the analysis ofhuman being.524 Similarly, saṁsāra is characteristic for the state of the jīva. Just asthere is difference between ‘world’ and ‘being-in-the-world,’525 a difference can bemade between jagat and saṁsāra. Especially Vallabha distinguished between jagatas the world in its objective reality, independent from jīva, and saṁsāra as the jīva'sbondage and state of immersion in worldliness.526 Parallels with contemporaryphenomenological investigations can be found due to the fact that we enter with thejīva a realm which is phenomenologically accessible.

The general cause of saṁsāra is avidyā; it is therefore discovered and realized aseternally non-existent with the sudden manifestation of brahmavidyā. The specificform of this cause in the case of the jīva is its karman, and the latter's cause is kāma‘desire’. Śaṅkara comments upon this passage of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka: ‘The humanbeing (puruṣa) is identified with desire alone.527 What it desires, it resolves; what itresolves, it works out; and what it works out, it attains’528 in the following terms:

522 Mahadevan, o.c. Glossary s.v. 276.523 In a letter of 1-5-1956.524 Cf. the author's An Introduction to the existentialism of Martin Heidegger, Journal of the Madras

University, 28 (1956) 9-35.525 See Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, III: Die Weltlichkeit der Welt.526 This information I owe to the same letter of Prof. Mehta.527 Kāmamaya evāyaṃ puruṣa. G.N. Jha translates puruṣa by ‘self’ which is rather confusing.528 4.4.5.


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‘Other authorities on bondage and liberation say: It is true that good and bad deedsprompted by desire, etc., are the cause of a man's taking a body; still it is under theinfluence of desire that he accumulates these deeds. When desire is gone, work,although present, does not lead to the accumulation of merit and demerit.529 Evenif he goes on doing good and bad deeds, those, bereft of the desire, produce noresults; therefore desire is the root of transmigratory existence’. This is furtherspecified as follows: ‘The desire manifests itself as the slightest longing for aparticular object, and, if unchecked, takes a more definite shape and becomesresolve. Resolve is determination, which is followed by action’. But as the jīvabecomes what it does and acts, as the Upaniṣad has stated just before, ‘desire isthe only cause of its identification with everything as well as of undergoingtransmigration.’

When it is said that the soul is identified with desire alone we are on aphenomenological basis. This phenomenon may be phenomenologically identifiedas the cause of our immersion in worldliness, saṁsāra. Desire is not called thecause of the world, jagat, so that the above cannot be interpreted as subjectiveidealism.530 When saṁsāra is understood as transmigration, the phenomenologicalbasis is left behind; but this is not necessary in the present context. When kāmaand saṁsāra are interpreted as ultimately constituting themanifestation and outcomeof avidyā or adhyāsa, we also go beyond phenomenology, and enter the realm ofmetaphysics.531 This phenomenological basis points in the direction in whichcontemporary analysis has gone much further. Husserl stressed the ‘intentionality’of consciousness, which was still a relatively formal and intellectualistic characteristic.Heidegger considers Sorge, ‘care, anxiety’, as the ‘essential’ mode of being of ourbeing. The concept of desire combines very well with the latter concept. Both areequally related to ‘attachment’, which is the human characteristic we have toovercome in ‘detachment’ according to Indian metaphysics and ethics in general.The term kāma, used in the above context, has come to denote in

529 Cf. the sarvakarmaphalatyāga of the Bhagavad Gītā.530 Cf. above II 11, in fine.531 Cf. the article quoted above 153, n. 524.


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particular ‘sexual desire, lust’ and refers as such to the strongest kind of humanattachment.532

This leads to an important question: Is the desiring human being responsible for hisdesires and their consequences?533 Answers are virtually contained in someconsiderations of the previous section: souls act freely and are therefore principallyresponsible. Īśvara allots to them at birth a certain situation, but doing this he merelyacts according to the karmic results of previous birth. Hence the soul is responsiblefor its situation and Īśvara is not. Where the latter deviates from the laws of karmait is only for the good, i.e., for mokṣa (never does he disregard good karma andstress bad karma, sending the soul to damnation). Īśvara, therefore is partlyresponsible for the good. In other words, God is good.534 Generally speaking, theindividual soul is the cause of evil and the Lord is not,535 because evil is lack ofknowledge and avidyā and results unwittingly in bondage. This is illustrated byŚaṅkara as follows: ‘No free person will build a prison for himself and take up hisabode in it.’536 But whereas Īśvara cannot be held responsible for evil, though heallows it, the problem has in connection with Brahma no meaning at all sinceultimately it does not exist. If these two answers are still regarded as unsatisfactory,it must be pointed out that the problem of the theodicee, perhaps the major problemof monotheistic (Jewish, Christian andMuslim) philosophies (i.e., how is the existenceof evil and of suffering compatible with the goodness of God?) is merely a theologicalformulation of the central problem

532 As regards the phenomenological analysis of our physical existence (which was universallyneglected, also Heidegger, until Sartre's L'être ét le néant, 1943) we find the firstphenomenological datum ‘I am the body’ stated and immediately rejected on philosophicalgrounds in several Upaniṣads (cf. further above II 11: 118) whereas it is assumed that wecan speak about a human being as a soul, jīva, whether embodied or disembodied (e.g. ad.4.4.10-14; cf. ad. 3.3. 53-54 and ad. 4.2.12-14).

533 Cf. also Lacombe o.c. 255 sq.534 Cf. sūtra. 2.1.34; ‘Inequality (of dispensation) and cruelty (the Lord can) not (be reproached

with .... )’. To ‘allow’ (anujñā, ‘permission’, cf. Lacombe, o.c. 256, n. 5) evil or to allow mokṣa(which does not arise on account of merit) however might be called ‘inequality’.

535 Ad. 2.1.21-23.536 Ad. 2.1.21.


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of Advaita, i.e., why is there avidyā? To this the Advaitic answer is that there is noanswer and that avidyā is anirvacanīya.

If we forward the claim of a phenomenological basis, i.e., Husserl's claim that ourpoint of departure should be any entity as immediately present to us in ourconsciousness, Advaita will readily make this claim its own. But in addition to thatit will point out that we unnecessarily limit ourselves to one state (avasthā) ofconsciousness, namely the waking state. Advaita bases itself upon a fourfoldexperience by adding also the dream state, the state of dreamless sleep, and lastly,transcending all these, the ‘fourth state’, turīya. A few remarks concerning thisimportant topic must suffice here, as much literature on the subject exists and asespecially Bhattacharyya has made this his main approach to the problem ofAdvaita.537

The dream state (svapna) is mainly considered in two kinds of context: (1) itexemplifies a total change of consciousness, as occurs in brahmavidyā, and thusit is in the same way related to the waking state as the latter to the state of mokṣa.The dream state is daily sublated, the waking state is daily sublated to make placefor the dream state but is also in a different way sublated under exceptionalcircumstances.538 (2) The dream state is a good example of the effects of karma:‘That state of sleep during which one sees dreams, is “Dream-cognition” which isaccompanied by pleasure, pain and as such is the effect of merit and demerit....asfor merit and demerit again, they can be productive of such effects as pleasure andpain and their cognition only through the momentum imparted by ignorance anddesire, never other-

537 o.c. 1-17 (‘An approach through psychology’); Likewise R. Guénon, L' Homme et son devenirselon le Védānta, beginning chapters, dealing with the Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad, where the threestates are symbolically represented by the three letters A, U, M constituting the sacred syllableOM, together with its essence, the fourth state, turīya. See also Brahmasūtrabhāṣya 3.2.1-10and BAU 2.1.15-19; 4.3.9-34 and CU 6.8.1; 8.6. 3-4; 8.10.1, etc., with Śaṅkara's commentaries.Cf. B. Heimann, o.c. 130-145, (Die Tiejschlaf-Spekulation der alten Upanischaden). It was apreferential topic of Gaudapāda in his kārikās: see Mahadevan, Gauḍapāda, Chapter IV. Cf.also Deussen, o.c. Chap. XXVIII (special states of the soul).

538 Bhattacharyya, o.c. 3.


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wise’.539 This interpretation is principally the same as the much more specific dreaminterpretations of Freud or Jung.

The state of dreamless sleep (suṣupti) is an important state of consciousnessanalogous to the state of brahmavidyā or samādhi. Not as if the idea of the latterwould be copied from the former and as if Advaita would strive for a kind of deepsleep for the human being,540 but in so far as both are negatively the same: the worldof diversity and of external and internal impressions has disappeared. In additionthe absence of suffering produces the positive phenomenon which makes us sayafter waking up from sleep: ‘Happily did we sleep; we knew nothing in our sleep’.541But there can be no doubt that we are in suṣupti also in the realm of avidyā. It issometimes stated, rightly but somewhat misleadingly, that in sleep we are Brahmanwithout our knowing it. This gives the impression that the state of samādhi is almostthe same as sleep. Actually this description applies generally: we are alwaysBrahman without knowing it. The difference is clearly described by Bhattacharyya:542‘In both, the consciousness of duality lapses; in both the self enjoys undifferencedbliss; in both, the timeless seeds of knowledge and action (vidyā-karma) persist,accounting for the recognition of the past on awakening from them. But whereas onawakening from suṣupti, the self remembers that it was in the attitude of knowingobject though the object there was a blank,543 on rising from samādhi it ought toremember it was the object in that state and not in the object-knowing attitude atall. In the former, the self as always limited was simply isolated; in the latter, it burstits bonds, destroyed the barrier between subject and object, and became theabsolute.’

Attempting an evaluation of these different states of consciousness as a possiblebasis for philosophical considerations, it has first of all to be borne in mind thatwhatever state of consciousness is our apparent starting point in any investigation,the waking state

539 Śaṅkara ad. CU. 6.8.1.540 An opinion to which B. Heimann sometimes seems to come dangerously close.541 Mahadevan o.c. 160.542 o.c. 15.543 This is said more often, but it seems questionable whether this formulation conveys any

meaning.


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records it. We know any state only in and through the waking state. We analysewhether for instance a certain dream image is a dream experience or not. But itnever is, whatever the appearance may be. For only through conscious reproductionin memory in the waking state do we record it as an image. We do not only speakand write about it in the waking state, but we know it only in the waking state. Tosay that we know it in the dream state as such has no meaning, because we canonly say this in the waking state whereas we would be unable to express it in thedream state. An introspective analysis of the rare cases where we seem to beconscious in our dream consciousness of the fact that we are dreaming, shows thatwe are only apparently conscious of this and not in fact realising that we are lyingin a bed or on a mat and producing or reproducing mental images.544 It is likewiseevident that no statements are made in a dream which are as such meaningful; theymay in some cases become meaningful through further analysis and interpretationin the waking state. Likewise no scriptural passage concerning the dream state hasbeen actually produced during that state. All the preserved texts can be shown toconstitute pieces of conscious reflection produced in the waking state concerningmemories from the dream state, recorded and recognised as such in the wakingstate. The dreaming state does not supply immediate information, but mediateinformation through the waking state.

Because of these considerations we must assign an unquestionable priority to ourconsciousness of the waking state, a priority which is in the first place methodological.In Western Philosophy this is formulated in the following claim: any philo-

544 The author may be permitted to recall one of his dreams: ‘I am flying in an aeroplane togetherwith several people. I address them and say, that we are not really flying, but that it is onlymy dream’. The analysis in the waking state of the dream souvenir convinced me that thewords which I spoke in the dream were merely words, the meaning of which I did notunderstand at that moment. Why should I otherwise address people expressing this truth,when I had realised that these people were only mental images in my dream? But why alsodid I have, after awakening, the common sensation which comes as a sudden and newrealisation: it was a dream-if I had really known already during the dream that it was a dream?


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sophical view or doctrine is ontically founded in the situation in which we are whenwe philosophize.545

Analogous considerations hold with regard to mokṣa where a paradoxical situationarises. Advaita is a speculative metaphysical system which aims at offering a rationalworld view and an explanation of all known phenomena. But the final proof of thetruth of Advaita cannot be given on metaphysical grounds; it lies in the Advaiticexperience. In that situation we realize, that Brahman is real, the rest unreal; thewhole of Advaita can be deduced from this simple statement.546 But brahmavidyāand the waking consciousness in which we are when we philosophize, areincompatible: the one excludes the reality of the other. All thinking is bound to occurin the waking state. We may try to solve this difficulty by preferring the Advaiticexperience and by giving up philosophizing and thinking; but even such an act ofpreference is a philosophizing act in the waking state. When Advaita claims that anexperience in another state than the waking state constitutes its final justification,this poses a methodological problem - though it may be perfectly real and true atthe same time. However we cannot prove or refute this, since proof and refutationare only possible in the waking state.

If we would actually possess the Advaitic experience it would be incommensurablewith any possible content of waking consciousness. However our knowledge andinterpretation of this state occur in the waking state only. But then the experiencecannot be decisive as to its philosophical (that is: ‘communicative’547) interpretation.The two are incommensurable and therefore

545 Cf. the article quoted above 153, n. 524: 13. n. 10. This was announced e.g. by Schelling(who did not always follow his own prescript): ‘Alles Ūberfiiegen unseres jetztigen Zustandes,jedes Wissen, des nicht eine Entwicklung aus dem gegenwärtigen Wirklichen ist .... istverwerflich und führt zu Schwärmerei und Irrtum’ (Werke IX 30).

546 In the well known lines which give a summary of Advaita:

brahma satyam jagan mithyājīvo brahmaiva nā'parah-

the second can be derived from the first: if we express the first truth, there must be somethingreal in us expressing this. But this reality must be the essence of our being then, our jīva; andas everything different from Brahman is mithyā, the jīva cannot be different from Brahman.

547 Without communication philosophy ceases to be philosophy. Jaspers' insistence onKommunikation in this respect is not dissimilar from Wittgenstein's criticism of the concept ofprivate language.


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different interpretations of the experience can be given. In addition there is anotherdifficulty: we do neither know, nor are we able to judge, whether there is only oneexperience like samādhi which was differently interpreted by Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja,etc., or whether there is an Advaitic, a Viśiṣṭādvaitic experience, etc. The evaluationof different experiences of this kind can only be given during the waking state. Theevaluation of the Advaitic experience can never immediately follow from thisexperience itself.

Though the Advaitic experience cannot philosophically justify the system of Advaita,it may well constitute the basic experience to which the system leads. We mustdistinguish between two points of view regarding a state of consciousness which isdifferent from the waking state. The one accepts the state of consciousness as adatum, just like any other experience.548 The other invokes it as proof for a certainview. We have no justification for contesting the validity of the former.549 But we cancontest the validity of the latter since validity of a proof is a matter of logic and occursentirely within the waking state. Similarly we cannot contest that Columbus discoveredland; but we need not accept that the land he discovered was India. The interpretationgiven in Advaita of the Advaitic experience is consistent with the philosophic tenetsof the system; but neither is based upon the other in the philosophical sense. Śaṅkaraseems to have been aware of this for, unlike some other philosophers, he nowhereinvokes the Advaitic experience as a proof for his doctrines. Neither Śaṅkara northe later Advaitins recognized mystical experience in any Western sense as apramāṇa. This may have puzzled some Western observers, but is the outcome ofa sound philosophic outlook. It need not of course prevent Advaitins from consideringmokṣa the authentic mode of human existence and the ultimate aim of man.

548 Śrī Aurobindo deals with different kinds of these experiences in a manner which cannot bechecked phenomenologically. I cannot agree in this respect with J.N. Mohanty, who holdsthat Aurobindo provided a ‘phenomenology of mysticism’. On the contrary, almost none ofthe experiences Aurobindo describes are phenomenologically given to the reader'sconsciousness. The validity becomes a matter of belief and probability (see: J.N. Mohanty,Phenomenology in Indian Philosophy, Proceed. Xth International Congress of Philosophy,Bruxelles 1953, XIII 255-62).

549 H. Bergson (in: Deux sources de la morale et de la religion) regards mystical experience asthe main evidence in support of the view that God exists.


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Part IIIA Comparison between Advaita andNeoplatonismIntroduction

In the previous part a sketch of the principal doctrines of Advaita was given. In thispart a comparison of these ideas with the Neoplatonic doctrines as expressed inthe Enneads of Plotinus will be made. Occasional reference is made to some of theother Neoplatonists (e.g. Proclus and Damascius). It is not feasible to put forwarda description and discussion of the metaphysics of Neoplatonism in the same wayas for Advaita. Many topics which could not play any part in the comparison intendedwould have to be included. Therefore the following method will be adopted: everytopic of Advaita as discussed in the second part will be discussed in connection withNeoplatonism in this part: The order of topics will be principally the same, so thatsections of the third part correspond (not numerically as their length is often different)with those of the second part. But a different system of thought does not alwaysallow such a transposition. Therefore the parallelism has been abandoned where itbecame artificial. The reader will do well to refer occasionally to the sections of thesecond part.

This method would seem to constitute a comparison between two entities placedon an unequal footing and to do a phenomenological injustice to Plotinus' philosophy.But some knowledge of the general tenets of Neoplatonism is assumed. Moreover1the principal aim of this work is to study Advaita. This cannot be satisfactory andcritical, as pointed out in the first part, if it is not comparative; and for reasons alsostated there the Neoplatonic doctrines provide the best basis of comparison for aWestern approach to Advaita. As a consequence of those preliminaries the ‘tertiumcomparationis’ cannot be left out of consideration. Hence in this part more than inthe last, contemporary and, in general, later philosophical ways of thought will occur.In this respect the

1 See above I, 1.


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present study could have been called ‘A critical and comparative study of Advaita -with special reference to Neoplatonism’ - were it not that the Enneads play animportant part in the whole work.

A student of Advaita must know what constitutes its background and has thereforeto turn especially to the Brāhmaṇas, the Upaniṣads and Pūrva Mīmāṁsā. A studentof Neoplatonism must first turn to Platonism; but then also to Parmenides2 andAristotle,3 both forerunners of Neoplatonism. This background will not besystematically studied here, but will frequently be referred to.

1. Evaluation of the tradition. Action and contemplation

It seems at first sight that nothing like śabdapramāṇa occurs in Plotinus because ingeneral the Greeks did not accept authority and were convinced of the value of freethought, investigation and speculation. Moreover, the form of Plotinus' writings seemsto point in the same direction; they were not commentaries, but independentinvestigations into philosophical topics, often suggested by somebody in theaudience.4

This view cannot be maintained unless it is subject to some modification. First theterm Neoplatonism implies that a certain authority must have been attributed by theNeoplatonists to Plato. In addition there are Neoplatonic commentators, for instanceProclus (who wrote important commentaries upon the Timaaus, the Parmenidesand other Platonic dialogues). Lastly Plotinus himself refers always to Plato as (hotheîos Platōn), ‘the divine Plato’, and always quotes him uncritically withoutquestioning the validity of his affirmations.5 He tries to show how his own opinionsare in accordance with those of Plato:"....we will now give our opinions concerningthis matter, attempting to bring them back

2 See J.F. Staal, Parmenides and Indian Thought, Philosophical Quarterly 28 (1955), 81-106.3 Cf. below III, 1, etc., P. Merlan has proved the existence of an ‘Aristoteles Neoplatonicus’ (P.

Merlan, From Platonism to Neoplatonism, The Hague 1953, Chapt. VII and conclusion); seebelow, Appendix 249.

4 See Porphyry, Vita Plotini 13, 15-17 (Bréhier).5 Cf. e.g. III: 5.1.5-7 (Bréhier).


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(anágein) to the opinion of Plato,6 or: ‘Thus it seems according to us; and thus it isin accordance (sumphōnos) with Plato's opinion.’7 There is sufficient justification forcomparing this Plotinian sumphōnia with the Advaitic samanvaya of all texts. Plotinusalso declares himself a traditionalist: ‘We have undoubtedly to believe that the truthhas been discovered by some of the ancient and blessed philosophers.’ But headds; ‘It is advisable to see who were those who found it and how we can ourselvesreach it.’8 He sometimes quotes a number of important previous philosophers in asomewhat traditionalistic spirit.9 But he mostly refers to Plato himself. SometimesPlato is not mentioned but understood, as for example where Plotinus speaks about‘teachings received from the ancient thinkers.’ Here he wants to show that his ownthesis is ‘in accordance (śúmphōnos) or at least not incompatible (díaphōnos) withthem.’10 From these passages we conclude that the Corpus Platonicum constitutesthe śruti for Plotinus, whereas in certain respects he looks upon his own work assmṛti.

In general, the traditional attitude was relatively rare amongmost Greek philosophersfrom Thales to Aristotle. There were schools, as there have always been in thedevelopment of philosophy, where pupils followed the masters; but philosophersamong the former did not, as far as we know, explicitly claim the infallibility of thefounder, with the possible exception of the Pythagoreans (autòs éphē). There issome truth in Nietzsche's remark that the early Greek philosophers were lonelygiants who called each other over empty intervals of thought. This reveals thedifference that exists between the development of early Greek thought and thedevelopment of philosophical traditions which grow side by side, e.g., in the Christianand Muslim middle ages and in āstika Indian philosophy.

In Aristotle the absence of the traditional attitude manifested itself perhaps mostclearly. He is able to see continuity (with all Greek predecessors in the first book ofMetaphysics and with Plato everywhere), but he does not hesitate to differ. WithPlato and

6 VI. 2.1.4-5.7 VI. 3.1.1-2.8 III. 6.1. 13-16.9 E.g. V. 1.9.10 VI. 4.16. 4-7.


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Aristotle the Academy of the Platonists and the Lyceum of the Aristotelians cameinto being together with a certain kind of traditionalism. The two great thinkers werelooked upon as the masters; however, it was in principle not impossible to surpassthem. By Plotinus' time, the third century, traditionalism had become widespread; itis, as Bréhier expressed it,11 an age of commentators.

At the same time the concepts of the Golden Age of Hesiodus and the Age of Kronosof Plato are raised to a philosophical status and manifest themselves with aseriousness, which reminds us of the four yugas of the Hindus. The ideal time wasconsidered to have existed at the beginning, and there was no progress or evolution.‘If the things become gradually better, they were evidently not good in the beginning!Or if they were good, they have to remain always identical with themselves.’12

This parallelism might be explained by observing how both in Greece and in Indiathe ‘classical’ age existed before the times of Plotinus and Śaṅkara respectivelythough the interval of time elapsed in each case is not the same. Both could lookback for a ‘golden age’ to earlier manifestations of cultural activity. Belief in a pastgolden age cannot be expected to arise during the first creative periods of acivilisation.

It is probable that we have to look deeper13 and that Neoplatonic and Advaitictraditionalism depend consciously or unconsciously upon the concept of time as acyclical phenomenon, where progress or evolution is never ultimate and there isdegradation within each cycle. Modern consciousness on the other hand has asone of its main constituents a concept of time which originated and developed mainlyunder Christian influence.14 In early Christianity, which

11 E. Bréhier, La philosophie de Plotin, Paris 1938, Chap. I: ‘âge des commentateurs’.12 VI. 7.2 (?) ap. Bréhier, o.c. Chap. I.13 The explanation of the difference on account of the acceptance or rejection of authority is not

sufficient: it was accepted in the Christian and Muslim middle ages and, on the other hand,rejected by all avaidika schools in India,-Cf. also the author's Over het cyclische en hetrechtlijnige tijdsbegrip.

14 It is not merely the outcome, as some say, of nineteenth century optimism and belief inuniversal progress.


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was like early Islam characterised by an atmosphere of ‘eschatological expectation’,time is rectilinear and qualified by a few well-marked phenomena, each of which isunique: creation, incarnation of Christ, day of judgment. In Antiquity this attitude wasmainly absent, with few exceptions (i.e. Polybius and cf. Thucydides).15 In the Westit is predominant (all the main social and political currents of the day depend on it),and exceptions are extremely rare (e.g. reactionary movements like the traditionalismof R. Guénon, F. Schuon and others). The modern Western judgment of Advaiticand Neoplatonic traditionalism depends on this rectilinear concept of time, which isalso the main attitude in philosophy. This is not only explicit, as abundant examplescould show, but also implicit, e.g.: ‘to understand Kant means to go beyond him’(the attitude of Neokantians, which is quite different from that of Neoplatonists).When, on the other hand Neo-advaitins and Aurobindo adopt a more evolutionaryview, it is due to the influence of the nineteenth century West (which is still extremelygreat in India) and perhaps also to the missionary activities of Christianity and Islam(which is less likely, as the rectilinear concept of time seems to be almost absentfrom the consciousness of Indian Christians and Muslims). The susceptibility to suchan influence may be explained by the fact that a not very important ‘eschatologicalexpectation’ existed in India also, connected with Maitreya (among Mahāyānists)and Kalkī (among Hindus).16

As for a theory of transmigration, it is well known that the Pythagoreans believed inmetampsychosis. Xenophanes ridicules this theory and relates how Pythagorasrecognised the soul of one of his former friends in a dog.17 Empedocles subscribedto the same doctrine in his Katharmoí ‘Purifications’. Plato's doctrine of remembranceor recollection (anámnēsis) presupposes preexistence of the soul in a higher world,and one of his main topics is the immortality of the soul. Both subjects are illustratedby myths, as for instance the myth of Er in the tenth book of the Republic. There wefind the doctrine of rebirth referred to,

15 See e.g. S. Lauffer Der antike Fortschrittsgedanke, Actes du XIème congr. internat. dephilosophie, Bruxelles 1953, XII, 37-44.

16 Cf. in general I. 3. C.17 Fragment B 7 (Diels).


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moreover the souls are given retribution according to actions performed during theirearthly life. Tnere is no elaboration of this doctrine analogous to the Indiansystematisation and no concept like beginningless saṁsāra has been evolved.Plotinus follows Plato in these matters.

Though it is impossible to explain Neoplatonism like Advaita mainly as a revoltagainst the supremacy of karman, Plotinus has nevertheless definite views aboutthe place to be allotted to activities. This will again be dealt with in three stages:sacrifice, meditation and knowledge.

Plotinus did not belong to an ancient and established religion with a caste of priests,with temples and sacrifices (though such entities did exist in Rome). However duringhis age, there was an invasion of Oriental cults in the Roman Empire (such asGnosticism and other forms of Christianity), which Plotinus opposed.18 Moreoverthe character of the Stoa became increasingly religious; it prescribed prayers andthe abandonment of man to God and it conceived of a philanthropist God. Thesedevelopments were also rejected by Plotinus. Concerning prayers, he has expressedhis opinion in a curious passage, where their impersonal, ritualistic and unintentionalcharacter is stressed. It is manifest that they do not belong to the philosophical, butto a magical realm. The effect of prayer, says Plotinus, neither depends on the willof the God i.e., a heavenly body, nor on the intention of the believer, but on thecorrectness with which the prayer is performed.19 ‘In the stars (i.e. in the Gods) thereis no will to answer our prayers.... Their powers are used without will, whether theyare provoked (by us) or not, through a scientifically efrective procedure (tékhnē)....the performer may be a bad person (kakós)-it need not surprise us; bad peoplefetch water from the rivers; the being which gives, does not know that it gives; itsimply gives’.20 This tékhnē is an impersonal ritualistic act, which can be comparedto the tékhnē of doctors and of magicians (epaoidoí). The explanation of the efficacyof prayers lies in the fact that the whole universe is one and is like one organism.‘The universe thus gives to its parts,

18 Cf. the well known treatise ‘Against the Gnostics’: II. 9.19 See Bréhier's notice ad. IV. 3, p. 53.20 IV. 4.42. 3-4, 6-8, 14-17.


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whether by itself or through some influence....he who prays for some influence ishimself not separate from the universe’.21 ‘Prayer is effective because one part ofthe universe sympathises with another part, as in the stretched string (of a lyre),where the vibration moves from below upwards. Often also, when one string vibrates,another one perceives the vibration as it were, because they are tuned in accordand harmony. If vibrations even move from one lyre to another, it can be seen howfar the ‘sympathy’ (sumpátheia) stretches. In the universe too there is one universalharmony (mía harmonía) even if it consists of contraries....’22

The Plotinian universe starts by being the kósmos in the established Greek sense,and become one wonderful organic harmony (harmonía), like a symphony(sumphōnía) held together in universal sympathy (sumpátheia). As early asChrysippus in the Stoa, this idea was called ‘sympathy of the whole (s)’, sumpátheiatōn hólōn.23 If we disregard its well ordered and esthetic character, which is theheritage of the idea of kósmos and of the artistic ideals of Hellas, we are left with auniverse which is unified, the parts being related by magical connections;24 itresembles the universe of the Brāhmaṇas. But the similarity is still more striking inthe idea of the ritual act (sat), where it is the exactness (satyam) which counts andnot the intention of the sacrificing priests. The ‘visible’ Gods i.e., the heavenly bodies,are according to Plotinus, like mechanical parts or organs of an organism-likeuniverse-almost the ‘hypothetical entities’ of Pūrva Mīmāṁsā.

In another passage Plotinus shocking and surprising those who heard him, expressedhis opinion of the Gods and showed his personal feelings about sacrifices. His pupilPorphyry25 records in his biography: ‘Amelius was a lower of sacrifices (philothútos),who would neither miss the New Moon offerings nor any of the recurrent festivals.Once he wanted to take Plotinus with him, but the latter answered: ‘It is up to theGods to come to me; not

21 Ibid., 11-14.22 IV. 4. 41-1-8.23 Cf. K. Reinhardt, Kosmos und Sympathie.24 There are magical connections in Plotinus: see below, and the Index attached to the edition

of Bréhier, s.v. Magie (VI, 2, p. 272).25 Vita Plotini 10. 33-38.


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up to me to go to them’.26What the mentality (dianoía) underlying these proud wordswas we could neither understand, nor did we dare to ask. It is remarkable how nearthe Mīmāṁsakas are to those philothútoi and how close their opponent Śaṅkara isto Plotinus. The pride attributed to Plotinus resembles the uncompromising attitudeof the Advaitin, who rejects the samuccayavāda which combines sacrifices andknowledge.

Though these isolated passages do not form an integral part of the metaphysics ofthe Enneads, as the rejection of karman does in Advaita, they throw much light onthe mentality of Plotinus and show how like Śaṅkara he reacted against any formalritualism.

The relation between action (prâxis) and contemplation (theōría), is not a centraltopic of the Enneads but is the object of metaphysical considerations and forms thesubject of almost all the chapters of the treatise, ‘About nature, contemplation andthe One.’27 We propose to give an analysis of this treatise as it deals with theproblems concerned and gives at the same time an excellent introduction to Plotinus'thought. In the next section we will discuss the material which is thus made available.The analysis follows the text rather closely and a general survey of the significanceof its ideas is not given in advance: the reader is first invited to judge for himself.

Chapter 1. The thesis is put forward that all beings desire (ephíesthai) contemplation(theōría) and aim at that end. The reason is that they are themselves the outcomeof contemplation. This will be discussed with particular reference to somefundamental entities28 such as nature (phúsis), soul (psukhḗ) reason (lógos) andlastly with reference to intelligence (noûs)29 and the one (hén).

Chapters 2-4. Nature like reason produces while remaining immobile. Like reasonit is not an activity. (prâxus), but a contemplation (theōría). This is however a kindof contemplation which is a production (poíēsis) or generation (génnēsis). If naturecould

26 ekeínous deî prôs emè érkhesthai, ouk emè prôs ekeínous.27 III. 8: Perí phúseōs kaí theōrías kaí toû henós. Cf. R. Arnou, Prâxis et theōría, a book which

was unfortunately not available to me.28 Discussed in this order in the Stoa.29 This special Plotinian term may be left untranslated.


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speak, she would explain this as follows: ‘When I contemplate, the traces (grammaí)of the bodies (sōmata) come into being (huphí stanai) as if they fall from me(ekpíptein).30 ‘I ammyself born from a similar non-active contemplation’. Thus silentlynature produces its own object of contemplation ‘in all its splendour and grace’. Thiscontemplation is higher than any activity: ‘Also human beings, if their (power of)contemplation becomes feeble, come to action, which is a shadow (skiá) ofcontemplation and reason’.31

Chapters 5-7. The relation between action and contemplation is further discussedand applied to the soul: action follows and derives from contemplation; it is weakenedcontemplation, Conversely, contemplation which is the principle of action is also itsgoal. Acting with such a goal, the soul ceases to act; it does not continue striving,it is full (‘filled’: plērōtheîsa); it possesses its contemplation internally....thus unity isintroduced in it; the more unity, the more calm it is. Then the knowing part of thesoul (ginōskon) is one with what is known (hèn tōi gnōsthénti).

The soul has greater powers of contemplation than nature. But it seeks further,abandons contemplation and goes to the multiplicity of things. After this it returnsand contemplates with its superior part, which it has abandoned. ‘This does nothappen, however, when the soul remains in itself. The sage therefore.... manifeststo others only what he finds in himself; his sight is turned towards himself (pròsautòn ópsis). He isolates himself from the outside world (éxō), turning towards theOne and quietness. He turns towards himself and finds everything inside (pántaeísō).’32

Chapter 8. The soul finds unity with its object only in its superior part. Butcontemplation is more unified (henouménos) in the nous. The soul does not haveplenitude (ou plḗres) but is inferior to the nous which is prior to it. In the nous thereis no difference between subject and object at all. Therefore it is said: ‘The same isbeing and thinking.33 But this unity and contem-

30 4.9.10.31 4.32: skiàn theōrias kaí lógou tēn prâxin poioûntai. (Quoted as typical for the difference

between Neoplatonic and Christian mysticism by H. Bergson in: Les deux sources de lamorale et de la religion).

32 6. 36-40.33 8.8. Parmenides: taūtòn tô eînai kaí tô noeîn eînai.


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plation, which is ‘thought’ or ‘intellection’ (nóēsis), is also life (Zōē) as it was in nature.Thus there is a first intellection, a second, etc, and likewise a first life, a second, etc.

The nous itself is a product of becoining (gínetai) and by contemplation it entersagain into multiplicity: it unfolds itself. It is therefore not the primary (prōtos) andhighest entity.

Chapters 9-11: Beyond the nous therefore is the One (tó hén). It is neither intelligencenor intelligible, for it is that from which intelligence and all intelligibility originate. Itis good and simple, known only through the nous. It can be known by what in usresembles it. As principle of all beings it can only be beyond being. It is the (dúnamis)(power, potency) of everything. ‘Imagine a well (pḗgē) without origin; it gives itself(hautḗn) to all rivers; but it is not diminished by that, it remains quietly in itself......’34

2. Interiorisation. Non-dualism and the hierarchy of being

The topic of the above treatise on contemplation can be developed, with referenceto Advaita, in several directions. It is a true specimen of the Plotinian method whichleads us from the sensible realm upwards to the One. This upwards trend is whatPlotinus calls dialectics.35

First, it is clear that contemplation is higher than action. Plotinus starts his treatisewith a reference to the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, and (as Bréhier remarks)36the ancient reader must have recalled, that the chapter on the Ethics from whichthis passage is taken37 is quite soon followed by a chapter,38 where contemplationis regarded as the highest good, but where it is at the same time limited to the mostdivine in the noû of human being. The priority of contemplation is still more explicitin Aristotle's Metaphysics, In Aristotle the term theōría has often the meaning ofstudy or science, a meaning which is secondary in the Enneads.39

34 10. 5-7.35 Cf. I. 3, ‘About dialectics’.36 Notice, 149.37 X. 1.38 X. 7.39 Cf. the first line of Met. α, ‘the study of the truth; hē perî tês alētheías theōría and Met. 1005

a 29,


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The meaning of theōría in Plotinus is the same as in Plato. The priority of thiscontemplation goes back to the Republic, where the well-being of individual andcommunity depends on the contemplation of the eternal being by a small numberof elected persons.

In Book Λ of the Metaphysics, the celebrated book dealing with the theology of theStagirite, the Prime Mover leads a life of activity ‘such as the best that we can forbrief periods enjoy.’40 ‘Its very activity is pleasure (hēdonḗ) - just as waking(egrḗgorsis), perceiving (aísthēsis), thinking (nóēsis) are most pleasant (hḗdiston)because they are activities.’41 ‘All physical activity being excluded by the immaterialnature of the first mover, Aristotle can only ascribe to it mental activity, and only thatkind of mental activity which owes nothing to the body, viz., knowledge; and onlythat kind of knowledge which does not grasp conclusions by the aid of premissesbut is direct, intuitive (nóēsis)....’. This knowledge is also called contemplation(theōría), ‘the pleasantest and best of all things’. But the knowledge of God mustbe self-knowledge: it is a knowledge which has only itself for its object. Ross hasconvincingly proved that Aristotle's God does not know the world and that theinterpretation that he knows the world at least in principle or en parérgōi, has to berejected. This interpretation is due to Thomas Aquinas, who also held that God'sknowledge has to be conceived as self-knowledge. ‘But,’ says he, ‘it does not followthat everything different from him is not known to him; for by knowing himself heknows everything else.’42 This is akin to Śaṅkara's view, where the same difficultyarises on account of the svayamprakāśatva of knowledge; ‘Moreover you (theVedāntin) also who assume an all-knowing Brahman can ascribe to it all-knowingnessin so far only as that term means capacity for all knowledge. For Brakman cannotalways be actually engaged in the cognition of everything.’43

40 Aristotle's Metaphysics, ed. W.D. Koss I, Introduction cxli, Oxford 1924, also for what follows.41 See Ross' colispectus II. 373, of Met. Λ, 6, 1072 b, 14-18.42 Nee tarnen sequitur quod omnia alia a se ei sunt ignota: nam intelligendo se intelliget amnia

alia: in Met. 12, 11 ap. Ross, o.c. I, cxlii.43 BSB ad. 1.1.4, in fine.


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Plotinos develops in a more consistent manner than Aristotle, the Platonic doctrineof transcendent ideas which form a kosmos nóētos. Aristotle emphatically callsGod's being an activity, and with him (as also with Plato, as we shall see) nóēsisand theōría are activities.44 But when Aristotle specifies this activity with regard toGod, it turns out to be a purely interiorised self-knowledge, which cannot even knowthe world - i.e., in fact an inactivity. Plotinus, who is nearer to Plato, says that ifcontemplation is ‘the pleasantest and the best of things’ and so unlike an activity, itmust be better than any activity too. Developing this in his own manner he attributescontemplation to all things; but the higher the being, the further is its contemplationremoved from activity.

The general trends in Plotinus and Śaṅkara are the same, but the differences areconspicuous too. For Śaṅkara meditation is a lower activity and knowledge is higherthan activity. For Plotinus there is a scale of contemplations, the higher the lessactive, ultimately transcending all activity. The general trend is subordination ofactivity under contemplation (in Plotinus) and knowledge (in Śaṅkara).

In the above passages of the Enneads the concept of knowledge has no separateplace as in Śaṅkara, but is another term for the higher forms of contemplation. Butin a chapter of the treatise which states that the One does not think,45 it is clearlyexpressed that the self-knowledge of the nous and its final release are the same.Self-knowledge is only possible because of knowledge of the One: ‘Self-knowledgeexists only in a being different from the Good (i.e., the One)46....knowing the Good,it subsequently knows itself; looking at the Good it knows itself’.47 Plotinus oftenspeaks about self-knowledge as nearest to the knowledge of the One. But this resultsfrom the same idea which led Advaitins to the thesis of the self-luminosity ofknowledge: i.e. the tendency to conceive a knowledge which does not presupposeany relationship.

44 Compare for instance the fact that the theōría is often regarded by Aristotle as actuality,epistēmē as potentiality of knowledge, e.g. Met Λ 7 1072, b. 24 (with seven parallel passages,quoted by Ross ad hoc).

45 V. 6: What is beyond being does not think.46 See below III, 3. 184.47 V. 6. 5. 12-17.


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Thus Plotinus says: ‘especially one should not view the One by means of otherthings.’48 Similarly Śaṅkara says that one should not see the Absolute in a symbol(na pratīke....).

Both the lower forms of contemplation in Plotinus and meditation (dhyāna) areproductive. When Plotinus says that nature through silent contemplation produces‘the traces of the (physical) bodies’ we are on the one hand reminded of the creatorin the Brāhmaṇas, who ‘thinks silently in his mind: what is in his mind becomes thesāman Bṛhat’ (leading later to the equally inactive process of creation of names andforms -‘traces’-in Advaita); while on the other hand we recall dhyāna whichmysteriously produces (through apūrva) svarga and celestial felicity, just as natureproduces through theōría itself and its own beauty and grace.

Both the higher forms of contemplation in Plotinus and knowledge in Śaṅkara arenot productive. Their aim hes in themselves and they reach the perfect unity ofsubject and object. Thus the highest theōría in Plotinus leads to the One, whereasthe Advaitic jñāna leads to and is identical with Brahman.

For Plotinus we have to go beyond the nous in order to reach the One. For Śaṅkarabrahmajñāna is not ordinary, discursive knowledge but a direct experience, But isnot Brahman for Śaṅkara cit which seems to be more or less the same as nous andwould not be the highest in Plotinus? It is true that Śaṅkara at this important pointfollows the well-known śruti, that Brahman is saccidānanda. But his actualinterpretation identifies these three qualifications throughout and entirely, in such away that they disappear in the quality-less Brahman where nothing is left of theunity-in-multiplicity characteristic of the nous. Elsewhere Plotinus says that the soulwants to go beyond the nous and cease to think (noeîin), because ‘thinking is amovement.’49 Similarly saccidānanda is beyond all movement and cit in thiscompound is a higher entity than nous.In the treatise on contemplation an increasing plenitude corresponds to the upward

movement towards the One. The unity

48 V. 5.10.1.49 VI. 7.35.2: tò noeîn kínēsis.


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of the Onemanifests itself as plenitude in the nous. This plenitude, when diversified,manifests itself as harmony, as a ‘symphony’, as a sumpátheia tōn hólōn. But thoughthis plenitude proceeds from the One, the One remains undiminished and unaffected,just as the Absolute is described in the ‘peace chant’ of the pūrṇam: plenitudeproceeds from plenitude, but it remains as plenitude.

The most isnteresting parallel in the analysecl treatise is the description of thesage-foreshadowed in Plato and in the Stoa-as a person who finds the One byturning towards himself and finding ‘everything inside’. Whoever is familiar withIndian terminology is tempted to translate: who finds the Self by turninginward-another way of expressing the celebrated tat tvam asi. For the purpose ofcomparison with Advaita it is relevant to know whether according to Plotinus theindividual soul is actually and always identical with the Absolute, or whether it canfind itself identical with it under certain circumstances. It is clear that the soul is forPlotinus a third divine being, which seems prima facie different from the first divinebeing. This first question therefore becomes whether the individual soul is in the lastresort, ‘in reality’, one with the One, or whether it possesses the possibility ofbecoming One (identifying itself) with the One. Or, more generally formulated, a,second question is, whether the One is the only reality, notwithstanding the threehypostases, or whether there are other realities too. The first question will beconsidered first.

Are psukhḗ and nous ultimately the same as the One, or do they merely becomethe One?-Let us first listen to the divine Plato, whom Plotinus generally follows.Plato conceives of the soul in two ways which are apparently contradictory: in thePhaedo and the Republic the psukhḗ is the principle of knowledge and a statical,thinking soul.50 In the Phaedrus and the later dialogues the psukhḗ is the principleof life and movement, a dynamical, moving soul.51 It is defined as: tò huph'heautonkînoumenon, ‘the self-moving principle of movement’.52 The only interpreta-

50 J.H.M.M. Loenen, De NOUS in het systeem van Plato's philosophie, Amsterdam 1951,101-102, 107-108.

51 Id. 119-120.52 Phaedrus 245c-e, and frequently until Laws 894b.


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tion of these two divergent defrnitions seems to be the one suggested by Loenen,i.e. that nous is a function of the psukhḗ (for which there are other indications) andthat nous is kínēsis, ‘a movement’53 or poîein, ‘an activity’.54 As mentioned earherthe doctrine of psukhḗ as movement and activity occurs in Aristotle and in Plotinus.In Plotimis the paradox arises, that this moving thought comes to a standstill in thecontemplation of the One, which the soul finds in itself. This implies that the definitionof the soul as a self-moving principle of movement is no longer valid for Plotinus(which he apparently never recognises): for it finds in itself also the calmness andquiet which is the One, and in that situation it neither moves itself nor anything else.We have to conclude that the soul can assume states of motion, connected with theworld of multiplicity, and states of rest and union (hénōsis) in the One.

Thus we are led to Bréhier's conclusion55 that the soul is ‘the power and capacity totravel along all things and to assimilate itself to each of them through a series oftransformations’.56 Accordingly we read in Plotinus: ‘for the soul is many things andall things, the superior and the inferior, and it extends over life vx its entirety.’57 Thisis sometimes specified with the help of the Aristotelian pair of concepts actuality(enérgeia) and potentiality (dúnamis) e.g., with regard to the relation between theindividual and universal soul or the individual and universal nous. Puech summarizessome passages as follows:58 ‘Our individual soul is individual in actuality, but theuniversal soul in potentiality, whereas the universal soul is universal in actuality, butthe individual soul in potentiality.59 Likewise each individual nous is individual inactuality, but all nóoi the universal nous, in potentiality, whereas the universal nousis in actuality all the individual nóoi

53 Sophistes 249a.54 Sophistes 248 e 6-249 b 6.55 Philosophie de Plotin, Chap. V.56 ‘la puissance de parcourir les choses et de s'assimiler a chacune d'elles par tuie série de

transformations’.57 III. 4.3.21-23.58 H.-C. Puech, Position spirituelle et signification de Plotin. Bulletin de l'Association Guillaume

Budé 58 (October 1938) 43.59 VI. 4.16.


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and in potentiality each of them."60 The process of actualization of the potential issince Aristotle a process of transformation (as will be stressed below) and thus itfollows that the Plotinian soul is subject to a kind of pariṇāmavāda. But this universalpossibility of actualization also throws more light upon the different contemplationsabout which Plotinus speaks. It actually converges to the idea of dhyāna in theBrāhmanas and in Pūrva Mīmāṁsā, where the human soul is capable of identifyingitself with everything.Unlike Śaṅkara, Plotinus does not say that these identifications are ‘subjective’;

on the contrary, they are the actualizations of existing possibilities. We become whatwe know, says Plotinus, generalizing Aristotle, who said that the mind in knowingimmaterial forms is one with its object.61 This can in turn be looked upon as ageneralization of what the Muṇḍakopaniṣad taught: ‘He who realises Brahmanthrough knowing becomes Brahman’. Śaṅkara interprets this not as becoming, butas the realization of being: he who knows Brahman, knows that he is Brahman.Here we observe again how a similar idea manifests itself in Plotinus as a hierarchyand in Śaṅkara as a well marked differentiation:62 according to Plotinus knowledgeis higher the more completely subject and object are one; according to Śaṅkarasubject and object are generally different,63 but they are one in brahmavidyā. Thedegrees of contemplation and unification of which Plotinus speaks are perhapsphenomenologically given, but logically they are not very clear. The distinctions ofŚaṅkara are the result of a superior logic. Though Plotinus generally accepts thephenomena and compromises with them in their phenomenal character, there isalso an uncompromising ‘transcendentalising’ direction in his thought. Śaṅkara onthe other hand, in principle strictly logical and uncompromising with the world ofavidyā, com-

60 VI. 2.20.61 See W.D. Ross, Aristotle, London 1953, 147.62 That is: the hierarchy of contemplations in Plotinus and the well marked differentiation of

dhyāna or upāsana sas activities and jñāna as non-activity in Śaṅkara.63 See e.g. the opening lines of the upodghata of the BSB: ‘It is a matter not requiring any proof

that the object and the subject whose respective spheres are the notion of the “Thou” (theNon-Ego) and the “Ego”, and which are opposed to each other as darkness and light are,cannot be identified’.


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promises with regard to the vyāvahārika realm. Both contrary trends seem toessentially belong to the two systems of thought.

Let us consider an example from both, beginning with the ‘contrary’ trend in Śaṅkara.It has been pointed out above (andmore extensively by Bhattacharyya) how Brakmangives its reality to the vyāvahārika realm by means of its śakti. Sanskrit śakti seemsto denote the same idea as Greek dúnamis (in the pre-Aristotelian, pre-technicalsense). And thus there is accordance when Plotinus characterizes not only the soulas dúnamis, but also calls (as we saw above) the One dúnamis pántōn, ‘power,potency of everything.’ Here dúnamis has the same meaning as śakti and does notyet have the technical meaning of ‘potentiality’. Aristotle would never call his PrimeMover a dúnamis; it is an actuality, enérgeia. This is due to the fact, that for Aristotleactuality is always prior to potentiality; he proves this with several arguments,64 e.g.on account of the actual force which is needed when something potential becomesactual Plotinus fully accepts this priority,65 and this may seem inconsistent when hecalls the One dúnamis pántōn. But it only shows that the latter denomination doesnot mean that the One is a potentiality, but that everything is potentially containedin it. The One is the potency of everything, because everything originates from it.66

The other ‘contrary’ trend will here be considered with regard to the highest stateof the soul, where it is one with the One. This is the samdāhi which Plotinusexperiences and which he called ékstasis in a descriptive passage. Here he speaksabout ‘a vision (théama), but a different kind of seeing, an ecstasy (ékstasis), asimplification (háplōsiss), an abandonment of oneself (epídosis hautoû), a desirefor immediate contact, a standstill (stásis)....’67 It is well known that Porphyry hasrecorded that Plotinus had this vision four times, tetrákis, but it is generally for gottenthat this was during five years only, for Porphyry adds: ‘during the time that I waswith him’,68 which must have been

64 Met. 1049 b. 4-1051a. 2.65 See e.g. VI. 26. 1-3: ‘Themost absurd is...not to give preference to actuality above, potentiality’.66 This recurs with Guénon.67 VI. 9.11. 22-24.68 Vita Plotini 23. 16-17,


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from 263 until 268 A.D. (two years before Plotinus' death in 270). P. Henry hasrightly emphazised this.69 Throughout his life Plotinus may have had this experiencemore frequently, and he speaks in fact about the occurrence of his own awakening70

as a phenomenon which took place pollákis ‘often’-not tetrákiss. Bréhier71 andDodds72 rightly remark that this experience cannot be regarded as the starting pointof the metaphysics of Plotinus, as its interpretation is independent from theexperience itself.73

That we are entitled to speak in this context about a ‘contrary trend’ (to the generalworld-affirmative outlook of Plotinus' writings) follows from the fact that in thehierarchy of states of the soul this state is evidently evaluated most highly as the‘goal’. Although Plotinus does not deny the other realities which are accessible tothe ever transforming and assimilating soul, this state is not a transformation andis undoubtedly the most significant. In addition Plotinus often describes thecontemplative state in negative terms as a withdrawal from the world-in a similarmarnier as Advaitins define the concentration of dhyāna and upāsanā. He speaksin the above passage of a epídosis Kautoû, ‘an abandonment of oneself’, and in theabove discussed section on the theōría of the nous it is said that the nous reachesthe One by as it were abandoning itself.74 Elsewhere, he says with reference to theOne: ‘If you pronounce its name and think about it, leave everything else (tà állapánta áphes); leaving thus everything, abandon even the word: It’.75 Plotinus givesa short characterization of his own ideas in the words: áphele pánta, ‘leave everythingbehind’. All these passages point strongly in the direction of world-negation.76

69 Plotinus weer in de mode. Studiën (1937) 245-255.70 egeirómenos. See the beginning of IV 8.71 Philosophie de Plotin 160.72 E.R. Dodds, The Parmenides and the Neoplatonic One, Classical Quarterly 22 (1938) 129-143:

140-141.73 Cf. above II, 15.74 III. 8.9.30: hoîon heantôn aphénta.75 VI. 8.21. 26-27.76 Cf. Plotinus neglect of his own body (Vita Plotini 1 and the beginning of 2), which shows more

asceticism than his philosophical statements generally express. Cf. P.V. Pistorius, Plotinusand Neoplatonism, Cambridge 1952, 141,


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But there is more. Though Plotinus is nowhere entirely explicit, there is good reasonto follow the opinion of Bréhier who says: ‘The fact that ecstasy rarely manifestsitself in the soul tied to the body, exceptionally and momentarily, does not excludeits being the normal and necessary state of the soul and of the nous’.77 This impliesthat unification with the One is the normal and necessary state, in other words: theOne is real being. Moreover, that the One is always the underlying reality, and itsoccurrence not simply due to a transformation of the soul, is evident from a passagewhere Plotinus corrects himself in his own usage of language, which is generallyunder the influence of a pariṇāma-like mode of thinking: ‘When the soul happensto go to the principle, or, better (mâllon), when the latter's presence manifests itself(parón phanēi)....’78

Summarising it can be said that there is in the Enneads, despite the positivecharacterization of life and contemplation even in the lower stages, and despite thedescription of ordered beauty of the cosmos,79 a contrary trend of withdrawal fromthis world and of search for a reality which is more real and more true.80

3. Infinity and being

Is there anything in Neoplatonism which corresponds to the distinction betweennirguṇa- and saguṇa-brahman? The only similar distinction is that between the firstand the second hypothesis, i.e., between the One and the nous. Similarly, thoughnot in exactly the same way, the One is unqualified and the nous is qualified.

The One is even called ‘beyond being‘, epékeina óntos, ousías,81 (as will be seenbelow), which certainly imphes that it

77 Philosophie de Plotin 166; ‘La forme rare, exceptionnelle, momentanée sous laquelle il sepresente dans l'âme liée au corps n'empêche qu'il est l'état normal et nécessaire de l'âme etde l'intelligence’.

78 VI. 7.34. 8-9.79 Cf. below III. 6: and especially Enn. I. 6: ‘About the beautiful’.80 Plotinus even comes close to the term non-dualism, a-dvaita; ‘The name ‘One’ denotes nothing

but a negation of multiplicity (tà pollá). Therefore the Pythagoreans referred to it amongstthemselves in a symbolical way as A-pollon, i.e. negation of multiplicity’ (V. 5.6.26-28).

81 Passim; e.g. V. 5.6. 8-13; epékeina ousías (taken from Plato's Republic 509 b) in V. 1.8. 7-8;4.1. 9-10; VI. 7.40.26, etc.


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is beyond all qualifications. It is beyond qualifying or qualified thinking since it isbeyond the nous: epékeina noû,82 kreîtton noû, ‘better than the nous’83 prò noû ‘priorto the nous’84 etc. Likewise it is devoid of a number of other specifications and hencean adequate denotation of neti, neti: it is ineffable, árrētos;;85 immutable, akinḗtos;ménōn;86without any want or desire, anendeés;87 indivisable, améristos;88 adiéstatos;89

formless, aneídeos;90 infinite, ápeiros;91 etc. In short Plotinus says: ‘Nothing can beaffirmed of the One, which is suitable to it’,92 as ‘it is even for itself nothing’.93

These negations were introduced by Pseudo-Dionysius Areo-pagita94 into theChristian and Muslim middle ages and led to Negative Theology. The negation canbe traced far back beyond Plotinus to the Parmenides of Plato and to the poem ofthe historical Parmenides, as R. Klibansky has shown.95 The philosophical reasonfor negation is given by Proclus in his commentary on the Parmenides (in Plotinusthis is unexpressed but understood), summarised by Bréhier as follows: ‘Affirmationindicates a limitation, whereas negation signifies an indefinite possibility. The domainof ‘not-man’ is much vaster than that of ‘man‘.96 This leads to Spinoza's famous‘omnis determinatio est negatio’.

82 V. 1.8.7; V. 4.2.3; III, 8.9.9-10.83 V. 3.16.38.84 V. 3.11.20.85 V. 3.10.42; V. 3.13.1; Cf. VI. 9.4. 11-12.86 V. 1.6.25 sq., Cf. I. 7.1.15, etc.87 I. 8.2.4; III. 8.11.41; V. 6.4.1; VI. 9.6.15; Cf. VI. 7.23.8.88 IV. 1.1.12.89 VI. 8.17.21.90 V. 5.6.4; VI. 7.32.9; etc.91 VI. 9.6.10; etc.92 VI. 7.41.38.93 Ibid., 27.94 In his works Mystica Theologia and De divinis Nominibus.95 The continuity of the Platonic tradition during the middle ages, London 1939, 25. The author

supposes that Dionysius must have known to the Parmenides of Plato, because he disregardsthe link which the Enneads provide (compare with the passages he quotes VI. 7.41. 37-38;V. 3.13.4; VI. 8.18.53; V. 3.10.42; V. 3.13.1; VI. 9.5.32).

96 Proclus, In Parmenidem, 1074 ap. E. Bréhier, L'idée de nêant et le problème de l'origineradicale dans le néoplatonisme grec, Revue deMétaphysique et deMorale 26 (1919) 443-476;459.


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This is related to another topic. The One is called infinite, ápeiron. This is thusspecified: ‘It is not finite; by what could it be limited? But neither is it infinite in size;where could it have need to proceed? .... But its dúnamis possesses infinity’.97 ‘Itpossesses infinity, because it is not a multiplicity and because there is nothing tolimit it’.98 And elsewhere: ‘It has to be admitted that its infinity does not consist inlack of completion in size or number, but in lack of limitation in dúnamis’99 In otherwords, the One is not actual infinite but potential infinite. This is quite different fromŚaṅkara, according to whom anantameans infinity in space, in time and in substance,i.e., actual infinity.

That Plotinus hesitates to attribute actual infinity to the One merely underlines thathe was a Greek philosopher. The Greeks abhorred nothing as much as the infinite,indefinite, undetermined, indistinct, formless and unlimited. To the Greeks absolutenegation, matter and non-being are ápeiron. This goes back to Pythagoras or thePythagoreans, who recognised ten pairs of opposites in which the first of each pairwas always good and positive and the second bad and negative. This list openswith the pair: (péras-ápeiron) ‘limit-unlimited’.100 In Plato the ideas are ‘forms’ (theappropriate translation of eídos), i.e., determinations and limitations. in the Philebusan attempt is made to explain the universe with the aid of four principles. The activeand positive principle is again péras and the inert and matter-like one ápeiron. InPlato's unwritten doctrines, the ágrapha, recorded by Aristotle and by others, allnumbers presuppose the same elements: the One (taking the place of péras) and‘the great and small’ (taking the place of the ápeiron).101 The latter entity is alsocalled ‘the indefinite dyad’ and is explained by Aristotle in the following words: ‘Platomade the indeterminable dual, because they are supposed to exceed all limits (cf.the ápeiron) and to proceed ad infinitum in the direction both of increase and ofreduction’.102 A similar account is given by a Platonist of the first genera-

97 V. 5.10. 18-12. Cf. VI. 9.6. 7-8.98 V. 5.11. 1-2.99 VI. 9.6. 10-12.100 Met. A. 5,986 a 23.101 See Ross, Plato's theory of ideas, 184 sq., also for what follows.102 Physics 206 b. 27.


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tion, Hermodorus, quoted in Simplicius' commentary on the Physics. According toSextus Empiricus, ‘the One and the in-definite dyad emerged as the supremeprinciples of all things’.103

With Aristotle ‘matter’, húlē, is mainly described as ápeiron. Similarly in Plotinus‘matter’ 'or ‘non-being’ is tò ápeiron (see below). For these reasons (for which thereis abundant evidence) the One cannot be conceived as actually infinite. But thesame reasons also give support to the opinion, that for Plotinus not only the Oneexists, as for Śaṅkara, but also other and lower realities.

By calling the One aneídeos, ‘formless’, Plotinus seems to withdraw further fromthe Greek heritage, due to the following arguments: ‘The essence (ousía), born fromthe One, is form (eídos); not a particular form, but the universal form, leaving oustideitself no other form. Thus necessarily the One (which is beyond essence: epékeinaousías) is formless’.104 Elsewhere Plotinus makes a concession and discloses hisGreek background: ‘The principle (arkhḗ, i.e. the One) is formless; not that it lacksform (ou tò morphēs deoménon), but in the sense that every intellectual form comesfrom it’.105

The Greek preference for what is limited continues to live in Western culture. It canbe traced everywhere and can be easily exemplified, e.g. in Goethe's saying ‘It isby limiting himself that a master shows his mastership’.106 Alongside this monisticmystics and metaphysicians stressed under Neoplatonic or Christian influence theinfinity of the Divine. In Christianity, especially in Protestantism, God's infinity doesnot signify that he is the only reality; it is moreover potential rather than actual. Thatactual infinity does not exist is a recurrent thesis of Western philosophy (defendedeven in modern intuitionistic mathematics). Regarding the temporal aspect, theChristian God is eternal, but he creates once and manifests himself at special times(kairós). Likewise he is not infinite in space, nor omnipresent. An important moderntheologian and phenomenologist of religion, Rudolf Otto, says: ‘This doctrine of the‘omnipresence’ of God, as if he had to be at each

103 See Adv. math. 10.258-280.104 V. 5.6. 1-5.105 VI. 7.32. 9-10.106 ‘In der Beschränkung zeigt sich der Meister’.


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place and at all time because of a necessity of his nature, as a natural force in space,is a barren invention of speculative metaphysics, of which scripture knows nothing.Scripture does not know of ‘omnipresence’, neither of the expression, nor of thething; but it knows the God, who is where he wants to be and is not where he doesnot want to be-the Deus mobilis....’.107

In Advaita, Brahman is all-pervading and omnipresent: sarvagata, vibhu. It has tobe so since Brahman is the only reality. In the Enneads two treatises which go underthe same title: ‘That what is one and identical can be at the same time omnipresent(pantakhoû, everywhere)’.108 Plotimus follows in the beginning of these a discussionin Plato's Parmenides, where the same thesis is forwarded and where it is shownhow there is no contradiction between unity and omnipresence. With regard to timePlotinus also agrees with Śaṅkara and opposes Christianity. Neoplatonism andAdvaita believe in eternal cyclical time and do not recognize (as we will see below)creation in the ordinary sense. J. Guitton, who especially dealt with this question,109comes to the conclusion that in Neoplatonism time is not real and the real isintemporal.110 Thus formulated this doctrine supports the secondary ‘Advaitic’ trendin Plotinus' thought. In terms of the hierarchy there is reality at a lower level thanthat of eternal being.

Though there is no Neoplatonic parallel to the cit of saccidānanda, since the Oneis beyond the nous, also in Śaṅkara's inter-

107 R. Otto, Aufsätze das Numinose betreffend, Gotha 1923, 175: ‘diese Lehre von derAllgegenwart Gottes, als ob er von Not seiner Natur zu allem Ort und aller Zeit sein müsse,wie einer Naturkraft im Raume, ist ein frostiges Fündlein spelculierender Metaphysik, von derdie Schrif nichts weiss. Sie kennt keine ‘Allgegenwart’, weder dem Ausdruck, noch die Sache,sondern sie kennt den Gott, der da ist, wo er sein will und da nicht, wo er nicht sein will, denDeus mobilis....’

108 VI. 4 and 5.109 J. Guitton, Le temps et l'éternité chez Plotin et St. Augustin, Paris 1933. Cf. H.C. Puech,

Temps, histoire et mythe dans le christianisme des premiers siècles. Proc. VIIth Congr. forthe History of Religions, Amsterdam 1951, 33-52; and the author's Over het cyclische en hetrechtlijnige tfjdsbegrip.

110 ‘Il tempo non e reale. Il reale e intemporale’ summarizes B. Marien, Bibliographia critica deglistudi plotiniani con rassegna delle lore recenzioni, riveduta e curata da V. Cilento, Bari 1949,144.


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pretation cit loses the characteristics of nous. What can be said with regard to satand ānanda? Starting with the latter, Plotinus often calls the One the Good (tàgathón)and declares that both are exactly the same: ‘When we say the One and when wesay the Good we must think about the same nature and we must affirm it as one".111Once it is further specified, that ‘the One is not a good for itself but for the otherthings’112 it follows that the One is the highest Good and for that reason the mostdesirable goal for mankind (which the abstract philosophical One need not be) justlike the felicity of ānanda, bliss. Plotinus carefully elucidates-and Śaṅkara wouldagree with him-that this does not signify that the One is good in the ordinary moralsense: tàgathón is not good,113 it is super-good.114 Its being the Good is differentfrom the goodness which the soul may possess.115 Or it is said: ‘Because it is priorto all beings, we call it the Good’.116 Plotinus has taken the term tàgathón from Plato(especially the Republic), just as tò hén is probably taken from the dialogueParmenides interpreted in a Neoplatonic, ‘hypostasing’ sense. The term tò hén mustalso have played an important part in Plato's unwritten doctrines, which dealextensively with the ‘ideal numbers’. Also Plotinus' equation of the One and theGood may go back to Plato, for the latter seems to have identified both in his lectureson the Good, of which we possess only some records by others. Aristoxenus, indescribing these lectures, used the phrase kaì tò péras hóti agathòn éstin hén117

translated by Ross as: ‘and the lecture culminated in the statement that there is oneGood’.118 ‘But’, adds Ross, ‘it is equally possible .... that what Plato main-

111 II. 9.1. 5-6: ‘Phrase qui fut écrite longtemps aprés que fut composé et, sans doute, intitulé letraité VI, 9, mais que Plotin, peut avoir prononcée de vive voix longtemps avant de l'écrire’:P. Henry, Les états du texte de Plotin, Paris 1938, 28. See the title of VI, 9: ‘About the Goodor the One’.

112 VI. 7.41.29. Cf. Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita's distinction: ‘Par rapport a la creation...Dieuest le Bien; par rapport à lui-même, le nom emprunté aux creatures qui. lui convienne le moinsmal est celui d'Etre’ (E. Gilson, La philosophie au moyen-âge, Paris 1947, 83).

113 V. 5.13. 1-6.114 VI. 9.6.40; huperagathón.115 I. 7.1.116 VI. 7.24. 6-7; Cf. also VI. 9.6. 55-57; V. 3.11. 25-26.117 Harm. II. 30.118 Theory of ideas 244.


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tained was that the One is good-the doctrine which Aristotle in two passagesattributes to him. We do not know and it would be fruitless to guess.’

One of the most characteristic doctrines of Plotinus is that the One is not being, sat.It is often mentioned that the One is epékeina óntos, ‘beyond being’. This iselucidated as follows: ‘If everything is contained in what has come into being, withwhich of these beings could one designate the One? As it is none of those things,we can only say that it is beyond them. These things, however, are the beings andbeing; the One is therefore beyond being’.119 This signifies only that it is not‘something definite’ (to toûto).120 In other words, that the One is beyond being meansthat it is not qualified and individualised in a particular being; it is not a ‘Seiendes’-inthe German terminology. Ὁn in Plotinus does not denote being in general, sat, butdenotes qualified being and each particular, individual being. It does not denote thekind of being of a being, being qua being, ón ḕi ón, as in Aristotle's Metaphysics121or as Sein in German thought. Ὁn belongs to the second hypostasis, to the realmof the nous. Both are explicitly equated: ‘The nous and the ón are the real and firstworld’.122 ‘Both are one’.123 Elsewhere the nous is called the law of being.124 In shorttò ón denotes definite, qualified being, and nous represents its definiteness andintelligibility. The reason for this is the same as the reason for the fact that the Onein unintelligible: for Plotinus being is always intelligible (as for the Scholastics theintelligibility of being will be the main assumption). But then we are entitled tocompare the duality sagunanirguṇa with that of nous-One, for nous is qualified andintelligible being. There is no contradiction between Śaṅkara's affirmation thatBrahman is sat ‘the plenitude of unqualified being’, and Plotinus' thesis that the Oneis beyond ón, i.e., beyond qualified and intelligible being.

Despite the fact that this Plotinian expression is consistent with his system, it issomewhat misleading since we should not

119 V. 5.6. 8-13.120 Ibid., 13.121 See, however, below; Appendix 249.122 III. 2.1. 26-28.123 V. 9.8.16: tà ámphō hén, Cf, V. 9.8.11 and Bréhier, p. 164 note.124 V. 9.5. 28-29.


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think that the One is a non-entity, a blank, a śūnya. The śūnyavādins had to undergothe same interpretation. Even excellent interpreters of Plotinus' thought have beenstartled by this doctrine, e.g. Arnou, who is of the opinion that ‘Plotinus ought tohave admitted the identification of the One and of being’.125 Such a judgment evidentlyresults from the Christian identification of being and God which the medievalphilosophers saw expressed in the biblical: ‘I am that I am’.126

Also this expression of Plotinus has its roots in the Corpus Platonicum: the epékeinaousías of the Republic has been mentioned already. Also the difficulties of thedialogue Parmenides can be interpreted in such a way that the highest entity isbeyond being; this was done by the Neoplatonists and also by some modernscholars.127 One of the successors of Plato in the Academy, Speusippus, and someNeopythagoreans called the supreme principle huperoúsion, ‘the supra-essential’or anoúsion, ‘the non-essential’.128 Also one of the Gnostics, Basilides, conceivedof a divine non-being.129

These expressions result from a desire to protect the transcendent. One against allearthly impurities. The same applies to the attitude with regard to concepts likeprinciple and cause, which Śaṅkara relegated to the vyāvahārika realm. Plotinussometimes calls the One hḕ arkhḗ, ‘the principle’.130 Elsewhere he hesitates to applythis concept, which presupposes the notion of relationship: ‘It is the principle of allthings; and still, in another way, it is not a principle’.131 The Neoplatonist Damasciusheld for the same reason that we have to assume above the One the ‘Ineffable’, ‘ofwhich it can not even be affirmed that it is a principle’.132

125 R. Arnou Le désir de Dieu danṣ la philosophie de Plotin, Paris 1921, 137. ‘Plotin eût duadmettre cette identification de l'un et de l'Etre’.

126 Exodus 3 : 14.127 H. Wundt; J. Wahl.128 See Dodds, o.c. 138-140; Merlan, o.c. 117.129 See Gilson o.c. 36; cf. W.R. Inge, The Philosophy of Plotinus I, London-New York-Toronto

1929, 107 n. 1.130 Passages enumerated in Arnou, o.c. 131, 158.131 VI 8:8. 8-9.132 Damascius, Dubitationes et solutiones de primis principiis Ed. Ruelle, Paris 1889, I. 10.22

ap. Bréhier; L'idée de néant, 471.


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Śaṅkara refuses to call Brahman a cause, as this concept belongs inherently to thevyavahāara or pariṇāma realm. Brahman can be called that, from which theorigination, subsistence and dissolution of this world proceed-according to thetaṭastha definition at least. In Plotinus the same idea is expressed in au entirelydifferent way: ‘When we call the One cause (aítion), this does not mean that weattribute anything to it, but that we qualify ourselves with an attribute; we receivefrom it, but it remains in itself’.133 Elsewhere the One is called aítion toû aítiou,134which might be translated as ‘cause of causation’, i,e., an entity beyond the realmof causation.135.

Resuming, we are entitled to speak also in Plotinus' case about a highest nirguṇaOne and a lower saguṇa being or nous. Is the second entity ultimately, as in Śaṅkara,unreal, or only real in so far as identical with the One? And does this hold for thethird hypothesis, the soul, and for húlē, ‘matter’136 too? In order to solve this centralproblem the architecture of the hypostases may first be considered in general.137

The origination of the second hypostasis from the first, or of multiplicity from unity,rightly called by Merlan ‘the most fundamental difficulty characteristic of what iscalled Neoplatonism’,138 is dealt with by Plotinus mainly in images, as logic seemsto fail here. In these passages the central difficulty for Plotinus is not that somethingdifferent from the One can come into an apparent kind of being, but that somethingdifferent from it can actually

133 VI. 9.3.49-51.134 VI. 8.18.38.135 In the Arabic translation of portions of the Enneads (the well known ‘Theology of Aristotle’

and a ‘Letter on the divine wisdom’ recently discovered by P. Kraus) this expression occursand the editor assumed that it was due to the influence of the Christian translator (a SyrianJacobite). But the attributes ‘cause’, ‘first cause’ and ‘cause of cause (s)’ occur in the Enneadsand are not ‘assez étrangères è la pensée plotinienne’ (P. Kraus, Plotin chez les Arabes,Bulletin de l'Institut d'Egypte XXIII, Le Caire 1941, 293).-This is significant as it shows thatapparently theistic attributes of the One can be found in Plotinus, but that the generalatmosphere of his thought is such that one does not expect them.

136 See however, below III 4: 191.137 Cf. Bréhier, Philosophie de Plotin, Chap. IV.138 o.c. 1.


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come into being without affecting the One. ‘It has to be said that whatever comesfrom the One, comes from it without any movement’.139 When the nous comes intobeing the reality of duality is presupposed, e.g.,: ‘each produced being desires itsproducer and loves it, especially when the producer and the produced are alone’.140Elsewhere Plotinus derives conclusions from the following hypothesis: ‘If somethingexists after the first thing....’.141 In another context he says about thinking: ‘that itcame into being because the Good made it exist’,142 etc. All these passages showthat what comes from the One is itself real. The reason given is that nothing isseparate from the One (cf. Rāmānuja's apṛthaksiddhi)143 though nothing is identicalwith it either: ‘Nothing is distant or separated from what is prior to it’.144 Elsewhere;‘Nothing is separated, which originates from the One, but nothing is identical with iteither’.145

4. Knowledge. The húlē

Plotinus describes self-knowledge as the entity nearest to knowledge of the One.We know the Principle by knowing ourselves. This can be regarded as the ultimateconsequence in Greek philosophy from the ancient saying Gnōthi seautón, ‘Knowthyself’. But can we, as with Śaṅkara, reverse this and are we in a general situationof avidyā when ignoring the One?

Plato, consulted in this matter, provides the thesis, closely related to the theory ofideas, that knowing is a remembering, ánamnḗsis.146 Conversely the soul has come‘in’ the body due to a fall which is the result of its forgetfulness. Plotinus thinks inthe same perspective of thought when he says: ‘How is it that the souls have forgottentheir divine father .... and that they ignore

139 V. 1-6. 22-23.140 Ibid. 50-52.141 V. 4.1.1.142 V. 6.5.6-7.143 See e.g. Dasgupta, A history of Indian philosophy III. 299.144 V. 2.1.21-22.145 V. 3.12.45-46 .... oude .... aūtòn. hautōi.146 Equated, all too uncritically, by Coomaraswamy (Recollection: Indian and Platonic) with the

Indian smṛti, smara.


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themselves as well as him?147 ‘Having arrived at the most distant spot, they ignoreeven that they themselves are from there’.148 Elsewhere he says that release (lúesthai‘to be released’) of the soul takes place when it contemplates (theâsthai) beingshaving started with remembrance (ex anamnḗseōs).149

In Plotinus' century and probably earlier (since the first centuries before Christ)parallels with Advaitic doctrines existed in the Corpus Hermeticum. This influenced,if not Neoplatonism itself, certain mystical and ‘esoteric’ movements in late Antiquity,in the middle ages and even later. The Corpus Hermeticum is as Festugière hasshown, for the greater part a popularized and syncretistic mixture of Plato, Aristotleand their disciples, not a spiritual tradition of ancient origin. These writings containstatements which are quite ‘Advaitic’, e.g.: kakía dè psukhēs agnōsia, ‘the evil ofthe soul is nescience’150 and toúnantíon dè aretḗ psukhēs gnōsis, ‘conversely thevirtue of the soul is knowledge’.151

According to Plotinus the noûs and the psukhḗ derive from the One and becomethemselves distinct but unseparated realities.152 When we ask how the nous comesinto being from the One, Plotinus answers: through a principle called heterótēs,‘difference’. The same principle is also responsible for the origination of the húlē.Plotinus describes the origination of the húlē from the One in an early153 treatise asfollows: heterótēs, ‘otherness: difference; novelty’ (one of the category-like mégistagénē, ‘greatest genera’ from the Sophistes),154 ‘makes’ (poîei)155 the húlē. Likewise,the nous comes into being through some kind of interaction between the One andheterótēs, for ‘otherness (is

147 V. 1.1.1-3: agnoēsai kaì heautàs kaì ekeînon.148 Ibid. 7-8.149 IV. 8.4.29-30.150 Corpus Hermeticum ed. A.D. Nock, transl. A.J. Festugière París, 1945, X. 8.6 (117.4).151 Ibid. X. 9.1 (117.10).152 Hegel would say: ungeschieden-unterschieden.153 We know the relative chronology of Plotinus' treatises because of Porphyry's biography.

Plotinus wrote in later life and most authors agree that it makes little sense to distinguishbetween an earlier and a latter period.

154 255. c.155 II. 4.5.29.


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needed) if there can be a distinction between the thinking (nooûn) and the thought(noouménon)’.156 This is in accordance with the fact that another entity in the realmof nous, the second hypostasis,157 is called húlē theîa ‘divine matter’158 or húlē noētḗ,‘intelligible matter’.159

The question arises as to which relation exists between the húlē and the húlē noētḗ.One might be inclined to assume that the same principle-heterótēs-through whichthe nous has come into being and which is a purely intelligible principle, does confersome degree of reality to the húlē. There can be no doubt about the reality of theheterótēs. It is one of the ‘categories of being’, i.e., it is as fundamental as beingitself and it is ‘given’ together with being. The question which naturally arises iswhether the húlē is real or not. If the húlē is unreal, it has come into ‘being’ throughsome kind of interaction between two perfectly real entities.

Plotinus repeatedly asserts that the húlē is unreal: it is a mḕ ón, ‘non-being.’ Heexplains this for instance as follows, speaking about our own being: ‘Leave thethus-ness of saying: ‘I am thus,’ and you become the all; for also previously youwere the all’ (note, as in the Upaniṣads, the superimposition: ‘I am thus’). ‘But in asfar as you were something different and extra beyond the all, you became, thoughit is due to a surplus, less: for this surplus is not due to being (nothing could beadded to it), but to non-being. You have become ‘somebody’ because of non-being:you are the universal entity, when you abandon this non-being.’160 if

156 V. 1.4.37.157 II. 4.1-5.158 II. 4.5.15.159 Ibid. 24; húlē noēté is a term from Aristotle, denoting spatial extension (Met 3. 1936 a 9; a 4;

K 1059 b 15). Cf. also Merlan o.c. 113-Plotinus' problem is the same as the Platonic problemin the Philebus. (cf. also Parmenides 144 esq.), i.e., whether the innnite occurs in the forms.

160 VI. 5.12.18-23 Cf. what someMuslimmystics said (who were influenced by Neoplatonic ideas,as H.S. Nyberg has shown with reference to Ibn 'Arabi): Man (Adam) comes from non-being('adam). Cf. also a proverb from Mecca mentioned by C. Snouck Hurgronje (MekkanischeSprichwörter und Redensarten, Haag 1886, 61), which can be interpreted philosophically (inwhich case there might have been Platonic influence: Plato was in the early middle agesbetter known to Muslims than to Christians): sumiya al-insān min an-nisjān, ‘man (insān)comes from forgetting (nisjān)‘.


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non-being is the same as māyā or avidyā (and the term itself points in that direction),Śaṅkara would subscribe to every word of this passage.

Elsewhere a like passage occurs, where non-being is replaced by húlē (this is roughlythe same as Sanskrit prakṛti): The húlē is for the soul the cause of its weakness andvice. The húlē is therefore bad and it is the first evil (principle). Being under influenceof the húlē the soul has produced becoming; through its association with it it hasbecome bad: húlē is the cause. The soul would not be engaged in becoming, butin being, if not because of the húlē’161

From these passages one is tempted to conclude that psukhḗ is not merely derivedfrom the second hypostasis, nous or being-as is generally said-but is the productof both the nous and the húlē, or of ón and of mḕ ón. Existing ontologically throughbeing and non-being is the same as both participating and not participating in being.The second clause in both expressions seems to bemeaningless if non-beingmeansactually non-being, i.e., if the húlē actually is not. Thus there are two possibilities:(1) either the húlē is not, and then the problem has to be envisaged, how it is possible(and feasible) to speak about something which is not; (2) or the húlē in some way,even in a very ‘feeble’ way, is. In the latter case again there are two possibilities:(a) either the húlē exists, independently of the three hypostases, or at any rate ofthe third, but originating from the One; or (b) the húlē is entirely independent fromeverything, with which supposition we are in dualism. These difficulties are akin tothe problems of Advaita, especially manifest amongst some later Advaitins, and inboth cases the danger of dualism hangs above the systems as a sword of Damocles.

That Plotinus wants to avoid dualism is clear from the fact that he combats thisdoctrine in the Gnostics.162 The only remain-

161 I. 8.14.49-54.162 II. 9. 12. 39 sq.-In: C.J. de Vogel, Het monisme van Plotinus Alg. Ned. Tijdschr. v. Wijsb. en

Psych. 49 (1956) 99-1123 esp. 107 sq. it is rightly said: ‘verstaat men onder dualisme: eenwereldverklaring uit twee beginselen, die zelfstandig en gelijkwaardig naast en tegenoverelkaar staan, dan was Plotinus geen dualist’.


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ing possibility is that the húlē originates from the One. In order to understand thisthe concept of húlē has to be analysed more closely. Though it has becomecustomary to translate húlē as ‘matter’, this is misleading since húlē denotes anentirely different entity from what we would call matter, be it in daily life or in physics.For Plotinus húlē is immaterial asōmatos.163 The same holds for the Platonic andAristotelian concept of húlē, which can sometimes be interpreted as ‘empty space’,as well as for the medieval materia.

The húlē is described in many ways. It is one of the theses of Plotinus that it is thesame as evil, kakón. It is stérēsis, ‘privation’,164, pseûdos, ‘a lie’ and eídōlon, ‘aphantom’.165 For these reasons Puech, a very reliable interpreter of Plotinus' thoughtwho is certainly not under the influence of ‘Indianizing’ interpretations, uses theterms ‘magical’ and ‘illusion’ to characterise the Plotinian third hypostasis. This isrelated to the magical character of sumpàtheia tōn hólōn (manifest for instance inthe influence of prayers). Puech says: ‘This sensible world is therefore mere illusion.And magical illusion in the true sense of the term’.166 The húlē is unqualified andresembles in this respect the One (see below): it is indivisible, infinite, undetermined,invisible, inactive, etc.167 In short it is non-being.168 Plotinus introduces an imaginaryopponent, a pūrvapakṣin who is shocked by this: ‘What? But if it is non-being thennothing would subsist!’ But Plotinus does not hesitate to draw this conclusion: ‘Notmore (would anything subsist) than the image subsists when the mirror is no longerthere.... the image is in something else and disappears necessarily when thatdisappears.’169 The conrparison with the mirror is only partly valid. If the imagesdisappear the mirror remains, ‘because it is a form‘; but the húlē would not subsistwithout beings, as it is not even a form.170 All these passages seem to lead to thecon-

163 II. 4.9.4; II. 7.2.30; III. 6.1.4,164 I. 8.1.19 etc.165 e.g. II. 5.5.22-23; III. 6.7.166 Puech, Position spirituelle....38: ‘Ce monde sensible n'est donc qu'illusion. Et illusion magique

au vrai sens du terme’.167 See e.g. III. 6.12-18; and Bréhier's Index s.v. ‘Matière’.168 II. 4.16; 5.4-5; III. 6.7.169 III. 6.14.1-4.170 III. 6.13.38-40.


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clusion that the húlē is indeed non-being, i.e., is not. We have to infer that only thethree divine hypostases subsast.

But there are other passages too. Śaṅkara avoids dualism by assuming that theāśraya ‘locus’ of adhyāsa can only be Brahman, Plotinus does the opposite: whatis more or less the Greek counterpart of āśraya, tò hupokeímenon, ‘the underlying’,the subjectum, is the same as the húlē: ‘All who have dealt with the matter agreethat the húlē is a hupokeímenon and hupodokhḗ ‘receptacle’, for the forms.’171 Andthere is more: Plotinus devotes several chapters to a proof that evil, which is thesame as húlē, actually exists.172 In one of these chapters we find an importantobservation concerning the term mḕ ón: ‘mḕ ón does not mean absolute non-being.It only denotes what is other than being. Moreover, I mean with ‘other’ not the wayin which movement and rest in a being are ‘other’ than that being; but the way inwhich the image of a being is ‘other’ than that being.’173 In that case that the húlē ismḕ ón does not mean that it is not, but merely that it is different from the ón of thesecond hypostasis. This also follows immediately from a previous conclusion, i.e.,that ón means qualified being. For mḕ ón means accordingly unqualified being(similar to ‘Seiendes’) and nobody would deny that the húlē is unqualified being. Inother words, the húlē is real, though of course a ‘lower’ entity, and Neoplatonism isin this rḗspect essentially different from Advaita.

Since two different modes of approach and two different sets of images anddescriptions occur, we must conclude that there are in Plotinus two incompatibletrends which blur the centre of his system. As the second and un-Advaitic trendclearly prevails the more Advaitic tendency is a ‘contrary tendency.’ This conclusionis in accordance with the conclusion of other authors, such as Merlan (who quotesin turn E. Schroeder), that Plotinus "has two alternatives: the ‘failing away’ from theOne, and the ‘overflowing of the One’, which are ‘mutually exclusive.’174 Also Merlanseems to be of the opinion that the second tendency is more important.

171 II. 4.1.1-3.172 I. 8.1-5.173 8.3. 6-8.174 Merlan, o.c. 114.


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If ón is ‘qualified being’, whereas both the One and ‘matter’ are unqualified beingand can be described only in negations, both entities have indeed many points incommon. To this ‘meeting of the extremes’175 Plotinus makes an allusion when hesays: ‘just as the One is haploûn, ‘simple’, the húlē is also simple’.176 The differencebetween the two is a difference in value, Proclus treated this more systematically,as he does almost all the Neoplatonic topics, in his Stoikheíōsis theologikḗ,Elementatio Theologica.-This book is set up logically like the ‘Elements’ (Stoikheîa)of Euclid and is in this respect a precursor of Spinoza's Ethica ‘more geometricodemonstrata.’ Proclus speaks about two kinds of mḕ ón: tó mḕ ón hōs kreîtton toûóntos, ‘the non-(qualified) being which is better than (qualified) being’ (i.e., the One);and tò mḕ ón hōs kreîtton toû óntos, ‘the non-(qualified) being which is worse than(qualified) being’ (i.e., the húlē).177 Also other topics dealt with above are treated byProclus, who is always more definite than Plotinus and nearer to conceptual clarity.He is not a mystic, but a scholar and a great commentator, Śaṅkara correspondsin certain respects to Plotinus and Proclus together.178 Proclus clearly says that thedivine is present everywhere, even in matter,179 and he derives matter immediately(unlike Plotinus) from the One,180 thus maintaining and safeguarding the purity ofmonism.

Also with regard to the húlē noētḗ, ‘intelligible matter,’ Proclus has explicit views.Only by conceiving the unlimited as dúnamis can this concept be applied to theforms which are by definition limiting factors.181 In Proclus, says Dodds,182 ‘it ismisleading to call Limit ‘the form of Infinitude’ or the Infinite ‘the Matter of Limit’....Forhim the essential character of infinitude is dúnamis....’.

Proclus solves in a particular way the conflict between a monism, which the ‘Advaitic’experience as well as human reason

175 ‘Les extrêmes se touchent’ holds here in the fullest sense.176 VI, 7.13.3-4.177 Elementatio Theologica, ed. E.R. Dodds, Oxford 1933, 122, 272.178 Cf the incompatible trends in Plotinus with the indistinctness of Śaṅkara's terminology according

to Hacker (see above II 14: 142, n. 475).179 Ed. Dodds, Commentary 231.180 Ibid. 68, 230-232, 239: ek toû hénos hupostâsa.181 Theologia Platonica 137-138.182 Ibid. Commentary 247.


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in general seem to demand, and a dualism, needed to explain the multiplicity of thephenomena. He places iminediately under the One a duality, which resembles thetwo concepts vikṣepa and āvaraṇa of later Advaita or the Sāṁkhya duality of puruṣaand prakṛti if interpreted in an Advaita manner.183 This duality consists of tò autóperasand hē autopeiría, the ultimate principles (arkhaí) corresponding to péras andapeiría.184 These are also identified with the cosmogonic principles of Orphism,aithḗr, ‘ether (akāśa)’, and kháos, ‘chaos’.185 In this way he gives traditional supportto the Neoplatonic doctrines.

Let us now examine whether the húlē, and hence the world, can be calledanirvacanīya. We know already that Plotinus calls his matter neither (absolute)non-being, nor ‘qualified’ being; but unqualified being. Without stressing theimportance of anirvacanīyatva as a principle, the unintelligibility of matter and of theOne is mentioned and results from the fact that both are outside the realm whereintelligibility reigns in particular, i.e., the kósmos nóētos of the nous. Matter is forinstance called ‘a shadow of reason’ and ‘a fall of reason.’186 Elsewhere, regardingthe third hypostasis, Plotinus speaks about the indeterminacy (aoristía) of the soul,to which a nescience (ágnoia) corresponds which is, however, not a completeabsence of knowledge (apousía,),187 just as avidyā is nevertheless something positivein Advaita.

That the whole sensible realm is anirvacanīya is a widespread idea in one importantaspect of Greek thought: the school of Elea. In Parmenides there are two kinds ofdoctrines, the 'one ontological, expressed with unambiguity in the first part of hispoem, and the other cosmogonical, expressed in the second part. The latter doctrineis dóxa, ‘appearance’, object of the dóxai, unreliable and ambiguous ‘opinions’, ofthe mortals. In this realm of dóxa there can only be obscurity. The Sophists wereinterested in such ambiguities. The main work of the Sophist Gorgias was calledPerì tēs phúseōs ḕ toû mḕ óntos, ‘Concerning nature or non-being.’ - For Plato thesensible world is unintelligible (the object of dóxa, ‘opi-

183 As in the Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha. Cf. also R. Guénon, L'homme et son devenir selon leVédānta, 48 and ibid., Introduction générale....243.

184 Ibid. 147.185 Ibid. n.l. Proclus In parm. 1121.26; In Tim. I 176.12.186 VI. 3.7.8-9.187 II. 4.10.12-13.


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nion’, ‘coniectura’188) and the world of ideas is mainly created in order to have aworld where everything is intelligible and transparent (the appropriate object ofepistǡmē, ‘science’). The ideas are intelligible factors abstracted from experienceof the sensible world; they are therefore akin to ‘mathematicals.’ In the only Platonicdialogue where a consistent attempt is made to deal with the universe and withphysics, the Timaeus (which has for centuries blocked the progress of physics), weare warned in advance: there can be no knowledge (epistḗmē) of the sensible worldas of the ideal world; it can be dealt with in a myth only. Such a myth cannot claimany absolute certainty, but only probability.189

Another tradition in Greek thought dealt especially with phúisis in a series of worksentitled Perì phúseōs, ‘About nature’. When Aristotle wrote his Physics, he tracedsome of his doctrines back to these. ‘But there is one view, Aristotle points out,which amounts to the abolition of natural philosophy - the view that reality is single,undivided and unchangeable’ (Ross).190 This is Eleaticism. It is constantly attackedby Aristotle in the historical parts of the Physics and Metaphysics. In this respectAristotle is the greatest precursor of modern science, which could never have comeinto being if nature were really anirvacanīya.191

5. Causation and change. The demiurge

The Eleatic trend of thought in Greek philosophy denies the reality of change andmovement. In Advaita and in Eleaticism

188 Cf. Cusanus189 Tim. 29 c-d.190 Aristotle 63.191 The Advaitic anirvacanīya has been compared with Heisenberg's principle of uncertainty. This

seems far-fetched for three reasons: (1) Heisenberg's principle results from observations andexperiments, while the Advaitic principle results from philosophic analysis. (2) Heisenberg'sprinciple does not describe nature but deals with our capacity for prediction. It starts with theobservation that we cannot perceive nature in the microcosmic realm without affecting it (thiscan at most be considered an experimental verification of philosophic idealism). (3)Heisenberg's principle is important as a quantitative principle which enables us to measure.It enunciates that the product of two uncertainties (e.g. mass and momentum) is alwaysconstant (i.e., h).


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alike the deepest reason fox this attitude is a denial of the reality of time and of itsimpact upon things. Psychologically this is connected with the desire that time mayhave no impact upon the continuation of our own personality, as for instance in thedesire for immortality. This viewmanifests itself, as we have remarked elsewhere,192among Indians in the problem of causation (satkārvāada, satkāraṇavāda,asatkāraṇavāda, pratītyasamutpādavāda) and among Greeks in the problem ofchange (Eleatic being versus Heraclitean becoming). The Indian thinkers asked:how can anything cause anything different from itself? The Greek thinkers asked:how can anything become anything different from itself? The attitude of ‘continuity’answered both questions by denying the difference of the second from the first(‘abhedavāda’).

For Parmenides the mḕ ón, stands for change and movement, which is not whereasthe immutable and unchanging ôn is. Zeno tried to show the same by a reductio adabsurdum of the opposite doctrine (e.g. ‘the arrow moves’). In Plato the alwayschanging sensible world is supplemented with an eternal and unchanging realm,the ideal world of forms. We can perfectly know this world and Plato thus interpretsand clarifies the ideas of the school of Elea: our thought demands unchangeablebeing in order to be able to affirm tò gàr autò esti noeîn tè kaì eînai, ‘for the sameis thinking and being’. The Heraclitean flux is difficult to assimilate for human thinkingor reasoning (before the infinitesimal calculus) but is more in accordance withexperience. Plato comes to care more for experience in the course of his life by anincreasing desire to ‘save the phenomena’, sōizein tà phainoména. This amountsto a gradual but fundamental change in Plato's thought. In the Sophistes, ‘at a certainstage193 of the argument, it is doubted whether all change in this world must reallybe denied as utterly unintelligible. The value of the thesis of ‘father Parmenides’ isdoubted, and, hesitatingly, it is concluded that non-being in some respect must be,and being in its turn in some way not be.194 This little fact of a very un-Eleatic opinionis only

192 Parmenides and Indian thought 97.193 We reproduce here and in the following, between quotation marks, some sentences from the

article mentioned in the previous note (99 sq.).194 241. d. 5-7. Further 249 a.sq.


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one out of many later passages, where the generally given image of Plato'smetaphysics is completely overturned We see how Plato introduces change in theworld of forms, stability in the sensible world, and through that makes the latter partlyknowable. So a certain knowledge of nature can arise.’195

Aristotle accepts change and attempts to refute the view that change is unreal. ‘But,as the phenomenon of change remains difficult for everyone, who wants tounderstand it in terms of Parmenidean, two-valued logic, he created a new logic;modal logic. With the help of the discrimination of necessary, contingent, possibleand impossible predicates, a certain kind of reasoning about change becomespossible. In order to become, actual, something must have been previously possible.That is called its potentiality (dúnamis). The pot exists potentially in the clay. Theclay Aristotle calls the material cause and the shape of the pot the formal cause.The change from potentiality into actuality needs the agency of something actual,which Aristotle calls the efficient cause. The efficient cause is in the first place aproducer of change in the thing changed. As fourth case, there is the final cause,the end or aim, that in the case of the clay-pot can be to carry water. The differentcauses can merge into another.196 It is also shown by Aristotle's analysis thattransformatory (pariṇāma) change cannot be explained without an efficient or a finalcause. Of Aristotle's four causes only the efficient cause corresponds to the modernmeaning of the term cause. Likewise, kāraṇa in satkāraṇavāda is not what we shouldcall cause’.

Plotinus foliowed Plato and introduced motion into the intelligible world.197 But theancient Eleatic doctrine is still much alive in the structure of his system. The entire‘evolution’ of the hypostases is not a change or a temporal process, but a logical-

195 For references to the texts see e.g. C.J. de Vogel, Examen critique de l'interpretationtraditionnelle du Platonisme. Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 56 (1951) 249-266.

196 The last cause is also the principle underlying the Sāṁkhya puruṣārthatā. The Sāṁkhyasconcepts of causality can he interpreted with the aid of Aristotle's four causes; the chain ofsatkāryavāda consists only of material and formal causes; puruṣārthatā is a kind of final causeand Īśvara the efficient cause.

197 See Enn. VI 2.


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ontological relation: ‘for every moving entīty there must be something towards whichit moves; as this is not the case for the One, we have to assume that it does notmove; and when an entity comes after it, it has necessarily to come into being whilealways turned towards itself. Becoming in time should not be a difficulty for us whenspeaking about eternal entities: in language we attribute becoming to them in orderto express their causal relation and their order’.198 Bréhier said therefore rightly: ‘thesuccession in which the hypostases are considered indicates only the order ofexpression, a logical and not a temporal order’.199 This is consistent with the viewthat the One is immutable and unchangeable and that becoming is exclusively dueto the húlē. Plato established this opposition in the Timaeus by distinguishing between‘that which always is and has no becoming’ and ‘that which is always becoming andnever is’,200 Proclus called the higher principles ónta, ‘beings’, and the lowerginómena, ‘products (of becoming)’.201

The unreality of becoming follows from the unreality of time and from the timelessnessof the One. Likewise the doctrine of cyclical time deprives any possible becomingof its meaning. A relative significance can be given to becoming in terms of thehierarchy of being: time and becoming are said to possess a ‘lower reality’, But asalways in connection with the Neoplatonic doctrine of the hierarchy of being, thereare difficulties inherent in the concept of ‘degrees’ of reality (Parmenides, therefore,excluded such formulations).

198 V. 1.6.15-22.199 Philosophie de Plotin, 39: ‘la succession dans laquelle on considère les hypostases n'est

qu'un ordre d'exposition, un ordre logique, non pas un ordre temporal’. Cf. R. Guénon, L'hommeet sen devenir, 63-64: ‘quand on parle de l'ordre de développement des posslbilités demanifestation, ou l'ordre dans laquelle doivent être énumérés les éléments qui correspondentaux différents phases de cette développement, il faut avoir bien soin de préciser qu'un telordre n'implique qu'une succession purement logique, traduisant d'ailleurs un enchaînementontologique réel, et qu'il ne saurait en aucune façon être question ici d'une successiontemporelle’.

200 Tim 27 e.201 Dodds: Commentary 232; cf. Theol. Plat. III 127-129 and In Tim I. 386. 25 sq., 437.2 sq.


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That creation is absent from the One follows from the immutable character of thishighest principle. But creation is mentioned or alluded to in contexts where anotherbeing occurs, i.e., the Demiurge, dēmiourgós, ‘the divine Craftsman’. In Plato theDemiurge occurs mainly, though not exclusively,202 in the dialogue where an attemptis made to provide a cosmogony, i.e., the Timaeus. The Greek term dēmionrgósdenotes craftsman, artisan, and occurs in that meaning in Plato.203 In the Timaeusthe Demiurge ‘took over all that is visible-not at rest, but in disordant and unorderedmotion-and brought it from disorder into order, since he judged that order was inevery way the better’.204 Therefore Ross says, also summarizing other texts: ‘Threethings existed already independently of him-the unchanging forms, the disorderedworld of becoming, and space, in which becoming takes place’.205 It is thus clearthat the Demiurge is not a creator out of nothing or, at least, ‘out of himself’, but aGod who gives shape and order to a chaotic preexistent mass, looking for inspirationupon the ideal world of forms as his example. Later his activity in connection withthe four elements206 is described as an evolving, developing or manifesting of‘rudimentary’ into ‘genuine’. This resembles (but with contrary evaluation: see below)the evolution from the avyākṛtam (rūpam) into the vyākṛtam (rūpam) or from the‘subtle’ into the ‘gross’ state. ‘By shapes and numbers’ the Demiurge shaped intogenuine fire, air, water and earth the rudimentary fire, air, water and earth, whichalone existed before he began his fashioning work’.207

One of the difficult problems of the interpretation of Plato is whether Plato lookedupon this Demiurge as a highest God. In the Republic another highest being occurs:the idea (form) of the Good. But we do not know the relation between the two andRoss declares: ‘There is no foundation, anywhere in Plato, for the

202 Also in the Republic, the Sophistes, the Politicus; see Ross, Plato's theory of Ideas, Oxford1951, 127-128.

203 e.g. Rep. 597 d. sq. where it is opposed to the deity, who is called phutourgós (see ed. Adam,Cambridge 1907 II 391 ad hoc).

204 Tim. 30 a 3-6, transl. Ross, o.c. 128.205 Tim. 51 e 6-52 b 5, ap. Ross ibid.206 In Greece there were four elements, fire, air, water and earth, as in some Indian schools,

while other schools in India added ether as a fifth.207 Tim. 53 a 7-b 5, ap. Ross, o.c. 61.


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view that the Demiurge is to be identified with the form of the good, or with the formstaken as a whole’.208

In Plotinus this Demiurge occurs and several of the Platonic texts dealing with himare quoted. As a whole the position in Plotinus is clearer than in Plato. There cannotbe the least doubt about the fact, that the Demiurge is lower than the One. Thisfollows immediately from the nature of the One. Moreover, Plotinus nus affirms itexplicitly: Plato's Demiurge is the nous.209 This identification follows from aNeoplatonic interpretation of Plato, as Bréhier210 has shown: in the Philebus thecause is identical with nous and the Demiurge is once spoken of as nous,‘intelligence’. In the Timaeus, on the other hand, the Demiurge produces the soul.211

Elsewhere Plotinus calls the Demiurge one of the two aspects of tò kosmoûn, ‘theordering principle’,212 and states that the Demiurge is an intemporal entity. ‘We mustentirely exclude from the Demiurge any thought of past and future and we mustattribute to him a life which is immutable (átreptos) and timeless (intemporal:ákhronos)’.213 Later it is again affirmed that ‘he remains immutable in himself whilecreating’.214 This ‘creation’, moreover, is not an act of will, but a natural and necessaryphenomenon: ‘it is wholly a natural phenomenon, and he does not make in a waywhich can be compared to craftsmen’.215 In short, there is essential differencebetween the Demiurge and any creator in the monotheistic sense. The Demiurgeis close to the impersonal and contemplating intelligence or nous. Plotinus makesthis very clear by reproaching the Gnostics as follows: ‘often they replace

208 Ross, o.c. 127.-There are, however, scholars who have argued that the Demiurge has to beplaced under the idea of the Good, e.g. J.H.M.M. Loenen.

209 V. 1.8.5; dēmiourgos gàr ho noûs autōi.210 Notice ad V, 1. 13.211 Elsewhere Plotinus, following a Platonic text, is more inclined towards an identification of the

Demiurge with nous, i.e. the soul (see Bréhier, ibid).212 IV. 4.10.1-2.213 Ibid. 4-6.214 IV. 4.12.32.215 II. 9.12.17.


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the contemplating nous by the creative, ‘demiurging’ (dēmioûrgousa) soul’.216

In conclusion there are two important parallels with Advaita and one importantdifference. The parallels are:

(1) Below the impersonal divine (Brahman; the One) there is a personal God (Īśvara;the Dēmiourgós).217 This distinction is one of the most interesting views which humanbeing, reflecting about the Divine, has produced. In both philosophies it has beenattempted to explain or at any rate to render less unintelligible, how human thoughtcould evolve such a doctrine. The reasons are partly the same and partly related toan analogous historical and social background. Without attempting to explainphilosophy from historical reasons a remark of R. Eisler, quoted by E.R. Curtius, isworth mentioning:218 ‘....almost everywhere original creation is characterised byheaviness and earthliness, by degradingmanual work and by the exertion of physical,‘demiurging’, activity....It cannot be denied, that for posterity the myth of creationlost much of its loftiness on account of this....’.

(2) The lower Demiurge or Īśvara is not a creator who creates out of nothing. Heorders in an impersonal and natural way pre-existent matter, or unfolds andmanifestswhat is virtually already present (in India analogously in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika).Tradition called the Demiurge also ‘dator formarum’, ‘bestower of forms’, and Bréhier‘the cause which rnakes that potential being becomes actual being.’218a Bothformulations could be very well applied to

216 II. 9.6.21-22.217 R. Guénon speaks about ‘the fundamental distinction...between Īśvara who is Being, and

Brahma, who is beyond Being’ (Introduction générale 248: ‘la distinction fondamentale....entreĪśuaras, qui est Etre, et Brahma qui est au dela de l'Etre’). He utilizes the Neoplatonic distinctionin order to present Advaita for which there seems to be no justification in the Advaitic texts.-Thisis a good example of how Westerners look with Neoplatonic eyes at Advaita.

218 R. Eisler, Weltenmantel und Himmelszelt, 1910, ap. E.R. Curtius, Europäische Literatur undlateinisches Mittelalter. Bern 1946, 530: "....fast überall ist die Urschöpfung mit derErdenschwere eines niedrigen Handwerkes, mit der Mühsal physischer Demiurgiebehaftes....Es ist nicht zu leugnen, dass die Schōpfungslegende dadurch in den Augen derSpäteren an Erhabenheit einbussen müsste....’

218a Philosophie de Plotin, Chap. VII ‘cause qui fait que l'être en puissance devient être en acte’.


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Īśvara. Both concepts of God pay very little attention to time and its possible impactupon God.

(3) The one important difference between Advaita and Neoplatonism is, that theDemiurge is always regarded as a real entity in itself, whereas Īśvara is only real inso far as he is identical with the Absolute. This is later specified as follows: the worldand the individual soul are in a different way related to Brahman. The first relationis bādha-sāmānādhikaraṇya, ‘apposition through sublation’, and the secondaikya-sāmānādhikaraṇya, ‘apposition through identity.’219 But what holds in thisrespect for the jīva, a fortiori holds for Īśvara. This is also expressed in the followingway: Īśvara himself is not illusory but the Īśvaratva through which he is different fromBrahman, is illusory. The Demiurge, on the other hand, is a real entity in itself.Moreover, the latter's work is, in accordance with this, valued positively, and notnegativelỸ as in Advaita: he introduces order ‘since he judged that order was inevery way better’, bringing thus the chaotic world of becoming nearer to the perfectionof the ideal world of forms. By the latter activity he imposes forms upon the world,which is a positive act as well (see next section).

At this stage we are in a position to formulate some of the characteristics of themonotheistic concept of God. In Judaism, Christianity and Islam the concept of Godis not only different from the Advaitic concept in that God is not the only reality; butit is also in addition different from the Neoplatonic concept, in that he is not a lowerentity but a personality and a creator who acts in time. The Neoplatonic position isbetween the monotheistic and the Advaitic position, but nearer to the latter.220 (Inone respect Advaita seems to be nearer to monotheism than Neoplatonism: for,though the vyāvahārika realm is ultimately not real, in this realm much attention ispaid to bhakti, to devotion and to prayer, which is not so in Plotinus).

219 Cf. also J.F, Staal, Correlations between language and logic in Indian thought. Bulletin of theSchool of Oriental and African Studies 23 (1960) 120.

220 It is not feasible to look upon Neoplatonism as a kind of monotheism, as was done by J. Wolf(Der Gottesbegriff Plotins, Leipzig 1927) and, to some extent, by A. Speiser (DerErlösungsbegriff bei Plotin, ERANOS-Jahrbuch 1937, Zürich 1938, 414). ‘Pantheism’ is anunfortunate term since it seems to denote a kind of theism rejected by monotheism.


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As far as the concept of God is concerned, there is another important aspect inwhich Christianity differs from Advaita, from Neoplatonism and from other forms ofmonotheism. In Christianity there is a God who once (not only in time but) in history,had becomeman, entirely and unreservedly. This is an incarnated God.221 Augustineconsidered this difference the most decisive in describing in the Confessiones hisconversion from Neoplatonism to Christianity.222

Modern philosophical consciousness is so much influenced by the Christian conceptof God, even if it is unreligious or atheistic, that we should have a clear picture ofthese differences. Since one is better aware of one's own position, if one knows itshistorical background, and some of the following developments are interesting inthemselves, and since they explain some later parallelisms between Advaita andWestern philosophy, this section will be concluded with a survey of some of thedevelopments resulting from the meeting of the Neoplatonic and Christian conceptsof godhead.

In the early Christian223 middle ages the influence of Neoplatonism was very greatand in the end there was once again a

221 Cf. the note on avatāra above II 14: 152, n. 519. Cf. also P. Masson-Oursel in:ERANOS-Jahrbuch 1936, Zürich 1937, 132 and: J.F. Staal, Plotinus and St. Augustine. Anote on the phenomenology of sage and saint in: A seminar on saints, Madras 1960, 340-55.

222 According to P. Henry (Plotin et l'Occident, Louvain 1934, 236) Augustine could have readin Plotinus, ‘que le Verbe était Dieu, et que toutes choses ont été créées par le Verbe, maisnon pas que 1e Verbe se soit fait chair, ni qu'il ait habité parmi nous’. Cf. Confessiones VII13 sq.

223 The following survey is limited to the Christian middle ages since they appear to have beenmore important in constituting modern philosophic consciousness. In the Muslim middle agesthere were at least three trends of thought expressed by philosophers, theologian and mystics.(1) The philosophers often reproduced Greek, in particular Aristotelian and Neoplatonic views(e.g. the eternity of the world in Ibn Rushd. (2) The theologians generally rejected andcondemned these, but also among them Neoplatonic doctrines occurred (e.g., al-Ghazzālī'sMushkāt al-anwār). (3) Some later mystics of the monistie school (wahdat al-wujūd; cf. aboveII 10: 113), especially Ibn 'Arabī and 'Abd al-Karīm al-Jīlī, set forth doctrines very similar toNeoplatonism and even Advaita. A later comparison was made by the prince Dara Shikoh(Majmā'al-bahrain; cf. L. Massignon et A.M. Kassim, Un essai de bloeit islamo-hindou auXVIIe siècle. Revue du Monde Musulman (1926) 1-14; Yusuf Husain; L'Inde mystique auMoyen Âge, Paris 1929, 183-6). The thesis of Indian influence on Muslim mysticism asdefended by M. Horten (Indische Strömungen in der islamischen Mystik I, Heidelberg 1927)is untenable according to L. Massignon. However the latter's arguments in connection withPatañjali's Yogasūtra (Essai sur les origines du lexique technique de la mystique musulmane,Paris 1954, 81-98) ought to be reconsidered. R.C. Zaehner adduces new evidence for thethesis of Hindu influence (Hindu and Muslim mysticism. London 1960, especially chap. V).


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great revival. The position of Christian thinkers regarding Neoplatonism can be easilyinferred from their views concerning the relation between God and being. The moreorthodox thinkers had to take into account the above mentioned scriptural statement‘I am that I am’, interpreted as the identity of God and being.224 Thus it is intelligiblethat in the Corpus Areopagiticum, which introduces such a large amount ofNeoplatonic thinking into medieval thought under the label of scriptural authority,225the author is at least in one respect more Christian than Platonic or Plotinian: hereplaces the One-above-being by the divinity who is ‘esse omnium’, ‘the being ofeverything’226 and (in contradistinction to the expression of Speusippus) oúteanoúsios, ‘not un-essential.227 But Scotus Eriugena, the earliest of the great medievalthinkers, returns again to the ineffable divinity of Neoplatonism. He says of God thathe ‘est qui plus quam esse est’ ‘is he who is more than being.’228

In the central and most creative period of medieval Christian thought, in the XlIIthcentury, when the writings of Aristotle and

224 Cf. also K. Jaspers, Philosophie III 67. - Analogously in Islam in the Qur'an Allah is calledal-qaiyūm, ‘he who exists through himself’ (2.256; 3.1) (Cf. svayambhū. IU 8). ‘Ataer derSeiende’, al-wājid, findet sich im Qur'an nicht obwohl es sehr gut vorkommen konnte" (D.B.Macdonald in: Handwŏrterbuch des Islam, Leiden 1941, 40 b).

225 Dionysius the Areopagite, one of the earliest Christians (see Acts 17.34), was erroneouslylooked upon as the author of the Corpus Areopagiticum ever since its first translator into Latinfrom Greek, Hilduin. How important this text was considered to be, can be gathered from thefact that during the middle ages it has been translated at least four times after Hilduin (byScotus Eriugena, Johannes Sarracenus, Robert Grosseteste and Embrogio Traversari).Erasmus doubted the authenticity, as he discerned the Neoplatonic character of these writings.Thomas Aquinas had also considered them authentic.

226 Gilson, o.c. 383.227 De Mystica Theologia IV.228 Gilson, o.c. 209.


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of the great Muslim philosophers have been translated and thoroughly assimilated,Thomas Aquinas gives a solution to the problem of the relation between God andbeing which was foreshadowed since Aristotle in the celebrated analogia entis. Inthis view neither is God's being identified with the being of the creatures (a viewtending towards pantheism),229 nor is God made inaccessible and wholly ineffableby being above being; but there is an analogy between our being (e.g., the modein which our attributes are in us), and God's being (e.g., the mode in which hisattributes are in him). This complex doctrine resembles the Advaitic laksaṇajñāna(e.g. in the Vedāntaparibhāṣā), especially studied by R. de Smet.230

With the last great medieval mystics we are once again back in the Neoplatonicatmosphere, which later re-appeared fully in the Italian Renascence of Neoplatonism(e.g. the Philosopher Marsilio Ficino, translator of the Enneads and of Dionysiusinto Latin). Gilson said about Meister Eckehart: ‘Not only one comes back to Eriugenaand Dionysius, but one comes back as if there had been no Thomas Aquinas orAlbertus Magnus in between.’231 The most striking characteristic of the Germanmystic is the doctrine of a impersonal deity (Gottheit), which manifests and revealsitself in a personal God (Gott); ‘“Gott” geht hervor aus der “gottgebarenden Gottheit”und verfliesst auch wieder in sie’: ‘“God” proceeds from the“Deity-who-gives-birth-to-God”, and merges again into it.’232 Accordingly Eckehartpreaches contemplation, a detachment of the human personality.233 The deity iscalled ‘aliquad altius ente’, ‘something higher than being.’234 It is not surprising thatthese doctrines were condemned by the Church in

229 Cf. for instance Arnaury de Bène (end Xllth century), of whom it was said: ‘dixit quod Deuserat ominia’, ‘he said that God was everything’ (Gilson, o.e. 383).

230 See above II 4: 61, n. 134.231 Gilson, o.c. 699; ‘Non seulement on revient à Erigène et à Denys, mais on y revient en dépit

de Thomas d'Aquin et d'Albert le Grand’.232 Meister Eckeharts Schriften und Predigten, übers. N. Buttner, Jena 1912, Einleitung li.233 Cf. the motto of A.K. Coomaraswamy, Hindouisme et Bouddhisme, Paris 1939.234 This is fully discussed in relation to the scriptural statement by Gilson, o.c. 695-696.


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the famous buil of 1329.235 It is more important that they were in general rejectedimplicitly by Western philosophical consciousness, of which the Christian conceptof God is an important constituent.

What does this last statement actually mean? It means, amongst other things, thatthe early Christians, when they evolved the concept of divine personality, partlydiscovered and partly created a structure of their own personality. Subsequently byreligious and secular imitatio Christi and through belief in the statement ‘God hascreated man in his image,’ Western philosophical consciousness increasinglyconsidered man in general as a being characterised in the same way as Christ wascharacterised in the beginning. This is a similar development as that from belief inimmortality of the Pharaoh to belief in immortality of each human being. The resultingdiscovery but also creation of important aspects of human being is philosophicallyspeaking the richest fruit of the doctrine of Christ's becoming man. This does notmean that Western culture as a whole is relativized and determined by particularand possibly limited religious views; but it shows how man, as in all religions,discovered and created his own characteristics by attributing them to the Divine.

What this means could be shown in greater detail by giving further examples(analogous ones will be mentioned in the next section). A few may be mentioned.That God was considered a personality has come to signify to the West that thepersonal is higher than the impersonal.236 That God was considered a creator outof nothing has come to signify to the West that the personality

235 H.W. Schomerus who compared the doctrines of Meister Eckehart and of the Tamil saintManikka-Vasagar, comes to the conclusion that the resemblance and parallels are striking,but rightly stresses the difference in the relation of both to their respective religious background:Manikka-Vasagar was a true Hindu in the tradition of the Upaniṣads, Meister Eckehart wasundoubtedly pious and sincere, but not a Christian (H.W. Schomerus, Meister Eckehart undManikka-vasagar: Mystik auf deutschen und indischen, Gütersloh 1936).

236 Goethe may be taken as representative:

‘Höchstes Glück der MenschenkinderIst doch die Personlichkeit’

‘the highest joy of human beings is personality’.


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of man implies that he can create freely and out of nothing,237 This applies not onlyto daily decisions but also to art, philosophy, the sciences and humanities, in short,to the culture which man has created himself and in which he lives more than innature. That God has created once, become man once, etc., (there are other‘unicities’ in Christianity and monotheism in general) has given to man his unicityand the conviction that he is irreplaceable. In this perspective unique importance isattached to this one life and reincarnation is rejected. That God has become manand has incarnated himself signifies that the human personality is considered a unityof spirit and body and not a soul ‘in’ the jail or grave of the body which can also existindependently. Thus there may be a struggle within the personality, against itself;but not of the soul against the body. Lastly, that God is free, has come to mean thatman is free. Freedom in philosophy has manifested itself as doubt, first methodical(Descartes) and then existential (Pascal).

6. Names and forms.

Both Īśvara and the Demiurge produce or evolve the manifold world of names andforms. In the former case this process is evaluated negatively, in the latter casepositively. We shall see that in Western culture names and forms are generallyevaluated highly, as a result of the inheritance of both Greek culture, which evaluatedthe formed more highly than the formless, and of the Christian religion, whichevaluated the named more highly than the nameless.

That the Demiurge as dator formarum ‘giver of forms’, does a positive work speaksfor itself in the Greek tradition, for, the main trend of Greek philosophy since thePythagoreans is to prefer the limited to the unlimited-for example cosmos to chaos.The Platonic theory of ideas placed above a chaotic and formless sensible world aperfect and ideal world of forms. In this connection it should not be forgotton thatthe Platonic term eídos means

237 As it is better, when seeking for implicit but widespread views, not only to look at the explicitstatements of philosophers, we may again quote Goethe, speaking about ‘that rigid way ofthinking: nothing can come to be except what already is’ (Compagne in Frankreich 1792,Weimar - ed, XXXIII, 196 sq.).


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form and is only conventionally translated as ‘idea’ (which is idea, another term forform). In the Republic the highest existing entity is a form, the form of the good. InAristotle the formal cause is more highly evaluated than the material cause. Aristotlealso discovered formal logic, and developed it to a very high degree.This evaluation pervades Greek culture in all its aspects. It is apparent in the

evaluation of the arts which are manifestations of human creativity where formsoccur in their utmost purity. The achievements of the arts were certainly not greateror more in one culture than in the other. But their place and function in culture andsociety was different, as can be seen in at least two important respects.

(1) Whereas the Greek philosophers, especially Plato, and, as we will see below,Plotinus, as well as for instance the Greek statesmen, attached a high value to thearts in the scale of human values and in the whole of society, none of the greatIndian thinkers in the Upaniṣadic or in the Buddhistic tradition and none of India'sspiritual leaders (with the possible exemption of Śrī Aurobindo) seem to have hadmuch regard for the arts which belong to the realm of forms. Greece stands heremore or less alone and what the modern West evaluates in the arts comes mainlyfrom the Greek legacy, since in Christianity also the arts were not as much favouredas in Greece. This applies especially to Protestantism and to the early Christians.238

(2) When we look at images which represent God, we have to make a similardistinction between Greece on the one side and India as well as the monotheisticreligions on the other side, though India is in this respect much nearer to Greece(cf. in general the abundance of images of Gods) than monotheism. The ancientGreeks represented their Gods as embodied in perfect and beautiful but naturalhuman bodies. The Jews, the Muslims and among Christians especially theProtestants did not allow any representation of God; therefore synagogues, mosquesand Protestant churches make the impression of emptiness when compared withHindu

238 Protestant puritanism, widespread and strong in Great Britain, travelled to India and joinedthe traditional Hindu ideal of the formless. to create a negative attitude towards the arts incontemporary India.


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temples and Catholic churches.239 Representation of the human being in general isnot much developed in strictly monotheistic cultures.240 Even in Roman Catholicismimages of God the father are relatively rare, though images of Christ, Mary, thesaints and apostles are common. In India the idea of the formless is especiallyexpressed in Buddhist art (also in Buddhism the concepts of nāmarūpe play a veryimportant role). In the stūpas there is no figuration and in early Buddhist art (e.g. inAmarāvatī) the central seat is not occupied by a Buddha image but is either emptyor occupied by a symbol (tree; cakra; etc.).

In Hinduism images of Gods are of course very frequent and create at first sight theimpression that forms are throughout attributed to all deities. But it has to be observedthat (a) The highest divine entity, Brahman, is never represented in such a way. (b)Images are mainly objects for concentration and meditation, from which the personwhomeditates has to ascend to the formless divine;241 accordingly images are judgedon iconographical, not on esthetic grounds (c) Symbolic representations arewidespread and often preferred: for example the liṅga, yantras such as śvī cakra,divine attributes, e.g.5 Viṣṇu's conch, etc, (d) Abundance of sculpture can beobserved on the outer walls of the temples or the garbha-gṛha, but never inside thelatter.242 (e) In general the manifoldness of divine forms tend to show the merelyrelative significance of each of them. (f) Special phenomena, e.g., the Naṭarāja-templeof Chidambaram, where on the left of the image there is a large screen, called theākāśa-liṅgam (also: ‘Chidam-bararahasyam’); etc. (g) Natural forms are transcendedand an attempt is made to go to the formless by disregarding the claims of nature.This partly explains images of Gods with many arms, legs or heads (this is not merelythe expression of supernatural

239 Cf. R. Otto, Das Heilige, München 1936, 87; the same, Aufsātze das Numinose betreffend,Gotha 1923, 103-13: ‘Das Leere in der Baukunst des Islam’; cf. ibid. 171-8.

240 Persian Muslim art underscores the resistance of ancient Iranian culture against Muslimpuritanism. In Islam the arts were regularly criticized by reformist movements, e.g., theWahabīya in Arabia. The Biblical prohibition favoured the development of abstract arts, e.g.calligraphy.

241 See especially H. Zimmer, Kunstform und Yoga im indischen Kultbild, Berlin 1926.242 See e.g. S. Kramrisch, The Hindu, Temple, Calcutta 1946, II, 299.


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power).243 (h) The images of Hindu Gods, even when represented in ‘regular’ humanbodies, do not make the impression of a natural human body but manifest a stylizedand abstract, unhuman form.244 These typical phenomena did not occur amongstthe Greeks (though it might be possible to find exceptions, e.g., the Nike ofSamothrace referred to by Coomaraswamy).

This shows that the Greeks attached more importance to (natural) forms than theIndians. In the West this is traceable almost everywhere outside the religious realm.As an example the German term Bildung may be referred to. This noun is derivedfrom the verb bilden, ‘to give shape, to form, to cast, to carve, to model’. Bild meansa painting, Bildnis a portrait, Bildner a sculptor. Bildung245 denotes the idealdevelopment of human personality: it means education, refinement, learning,erudition, and culture. The ideal human being, the counterpart of the British‘gentleman’, is the man who is gebildet (that German reality did not alwayscorrespond to the ideal need not occupy us here).

In Neoplatonism Plotinus accepts the Platonic world of forms in his secondhypostasis, the nous, as kósmos nóētos, ‘intelligible cosmos’. Though it is un-Hellenicon his part to call the One aneídeos, ‘formless’, this is an immediate consequenceof his metaphysical position, which culminates in the concept of the distinctionlessOne. But Plotinus does not maintain this distinction in the same manner throughouthis system and does not disregard his Greek background. In general, the forms areevaluated more highly than the formless. The paradox, arising on account of this isbest expressed in his doctrine that the divine is without form while everything elseis more divine, the more it possesses form and the more it limits itself. For exampie:‘The social virtues .... give order (katakosmoûsin) to us and make us better;

243 Cf. A.K. Coomaraswamy, The Dance of Siva, New York, London 1924, 67-71: ‘Indian imageswith many arms’. The author stresses the fact that art should not be looked upon as illustrationand that it is the inner unity, not the representation of natural forms, which creates a work ofart. This is perfectly true, but it does not explain the occurrence of un-natural forms.

244 Cf. H. Zimmer, Philosophies of India, London 1952, 205-17: ‘Jaina images’.245 Cf. saṁskṛta for the well-shaped, refined, cultured language.


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they limit (horízousai) and measure (metroûsai) our desires and all our passionsand take away our errors; because an entity becomes better by being limited andby being as such outside the realm of the unmeasured and the unlimited .... Butwhat is entirely measureless, the húlē, does not resemble God in any respect; themore a being participates in a form, the more it resembles the formless divine’.246

Again therefore there is resemblance between the highest and the lowest.247 Whilethe highest is formless, what comes immediately under it is the richest form andwhen we descend further we find increasing formlessness again. Therefore ‘theessence produced by the One is a form-it would be impossible to hold that the Onewould produce anything but a form. But this form is not particular, but universal, notleaving any other form outside itself: therefore the One itself is formless’.248 Thesupremacy of forms is traceable throughout the hierarchy of the hypostases. ‘Thenoûs dēmiourgós gives to the soul which is inferior to it forms of which there areagain traces in the realm of the third hypostasis’.249 From. the húlē we ascend to thehigher realities by imposing more forms: ‘Thus everything consists of the forms ofthe elements. Firstly the hûlē; upon these other forms are imposed, and then againothers. Thus it becomes difficult to discover the hûlē which is hidden under so manyforms’.250

Plotinus' theory of the beautiful accords an equally high place to the forms, while atthe summit the most beautiful is a form, ‘but shapeless’. ‘Therefore when one speaksabout beauty, one should not think about any particular shape (morphḗ) .... Theshapeless form (ámorphon eídos) is beautiful, because it is a form.’251 Beauty meansform, and hence ugliness, the absence of beauty in Plotinus' monistic opinion, means‘absence of form’ (eídous apousía).252 The One being formless, the beautiful is

246 I. 2.2. 13-22.247 See above III, 4: 194.248 V. 6. 1-5.249 II. 3.18. 15-16.250 V. 8.7. 18-22.251 VI. 7.33. 1-4.252 VI. 1.9.17. Cf. Pistorius, o.c. 149, who criticizes Inge for having held that ugliness was wrong

form: for form is never wrong and ugliness is only the absence of form.


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therefore subordinated to the One. The Good is beyond the beautiful,253 it is itself‘super-beautiful’ (hupérkalos),254 it is ‘more ancient than the beautiful and prior toit.’255 Though coming immediately after the One, the beautiful still plays a veryimportant part in Plotinus' thought as is for example visible in the celebrated treatise‘On beauty’.256

This highly Platonizing treatise, the first which Plotinus wrote,257 shows in acharacteristic way how Plotinus ascends from the sensible realm up to the One,combining the high evaluation of forms with the concept of the formless One. Hedescribes how the soul is attracted by ‘sensible’ beauty (tò en toîs sōmasi kalón,‘the beauty (residing) in the bodies’) and is repelled by ugliness. But this attractiontakes place on account of the ‘intelligible’ beauty which it remembers and discoversin itself. What constitutes the resemblance of beauty here (in the sensible realm)and there (in the intelligible realm)? ‘That is, we say, on account of participation ina form (metokhēi eídous). For everything shapeless is growing towards a shape,whereas a form(?) remains ugly outside the divine reason (lógos) when it possessesneither reason nor form; that would result in absolute ugliness’.258 Later he speaksabout sensible beauty arising on account of an ‘interior form’ (éndon eídos).259Henceforward the treatise deals with the higher forms of beauty, residing in theunseen, experienced by each soul but in particular by the loving soul.260 He speaksabout love and the beauty of man, the beauty of character and the beauty of virtue.Here beauty becomes reality (tà ónta),261 and the beautiful and the Good are one.262But having reached the highest Good and the One, it becomes clear how everythingis beautiful through its participation in the One. Whoever has seen the latter

253 I. 6.9. 37-38.254 I. 8.2.8.255 V. 5.12.18.256 I. G: Perí toû kaloû,257 Vita Plotini 4.22.258 I. 6.2. 1-13 (in paraphrase); 13-16 (in translation).259 Ibid. 3.8.260 Ibid., 4.19.261 Ibid., 6.21. Cf. Phaedrus 249 c.262 Ibid., 26.


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cannot but love it for its beauty.263 And descending again he sees how ‘all otherbeauties are acquired, mixed and not primary: they derive from the One’.264 Lastlyhe sees also the beauty in himself: ‘Turn towards yourself and look. And if you don'tsee your own beauty yet, do as the sculptor does of a statue, that should becomebeautiful. He removes a portion of the marble, he scrapes, he polishes and purifiesuntil the beautiful lineament manifests itseif in the marble. Like him, remove thesuperfluous, straighten the oblique, purify all that is dark in order to make it brilliantand do not pause modelling your own sculpture, until the divine splendour of virtuemanifests itself....’.265 Here one image displays the high regard for forms as well asthe one Plotinian trend which approaches Advaita, i.e., the view that the divinemanifests itself in the self and is not the product of a transformation but only of theremoval of obstacles. This is clear from the description of the sculptor, which is givenin a way as if the statue was preexistent in the rough stone and only discovered andmade manifest by removing what hid it.266 But the One, though formless, is at thesarae time the principle which gives form to everything else, or as Bréhier called it,‘the unconditioned, the measure, whose function it is to provide to beings theirlimits’.267

Wemay conclude, that in Plotinus form is higher than formless, although the highestprinciple itself is formless: preference of form to the formless is characteristicallyGreek. In India, on the other hand, the formless is, especially in the Upaniṣadic andthe Buddhist tradition (not in the Brāhmaṇas or in Pūrva Mīmāṁsā) consideredhigher than any form.

The second half of the above thesis must now be substantiated, i.e., that inChristianity and hence in the ChristianWest the name is evaluated more highly thanthe nameless,268 whereas the con-

263 Ibid., 7. 15-16.264 Ibid., 24-25.265 Ibid., 9. 7-14.266 Michelangelo described his modelling in similar terms, without stressing the positive, creative

aspect of it.267 Philosophie de Plotin. Chap. VII, referring to VI. 7. 35; ‘L'inconditionné, la mesure dont la

fonction est de donner leurs limites aux êtres’.268 It is possible that in both cases the evaluation of names can be related to an archaic mode

of thought which attaches excessive importance to name-giving. Cf. Adani's namiiig of animalsin Genesis 2.19 and the Hindu rite of nāmadheyakaraṇa (e.g., in A. Hillebrandt, Ritualliteratur,Strassburg 1897, 46-7; P.V. Kane, History of Dharmaśāstra II, Poona 1941, 238-54; the same,Naming a child or a person, Indian Historical Quarterly 14 (1938) 24-44). Cf. also J.F. Staal,Parmenides and Indian Thought 92. In order to study these relationships more anthropologicaland psychological evidence is needed.


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trary holds in the Upaniṣadic tradition.269 As this diverts from Greek philosophy afew indications must be sufficient. There are at least two kinds of contexts wherethis high evaluation of names in the West is given: (1) in the first the name of Godis looked upon as of high value; (2) in the second the activity of creation throughnames and forms. is evaluated positively.

(1) (a) Amongst the Jews it is customary to avoid pronouncing the name of God,which is considered exceptionally holy, when reading or reciting the Old Testament.When the unvocalised name JHWH occurs it is pronounced as ha-shem, ‘the name’,(b) The above mentioned words of God, ‘I am that I am’, are regarded as the longexpected revelation of the divine name: Moses said unto God .... ‘the children ofIsrael .... shall say to me: What is his name?’ .... And God said: ‘Thus shalt thou sayunto the children of Israel: I am hath sent me unto you....The Lord God of yourfathers, the God of Abraham, of Isaac and of Jacob .... this is my name for ever’.270Consequently the three monotheistic religions tended to object to calling God theineffable despite Negative Theology, which was often Neoplatonic in character. (c)The exceptional importance of the divine name continues to live in Christianity andIslam, where important statements of events are sanctified by pronouncing the words‘in the name of God’-‘bismillāhi’. (d) In Islam the ninety nine holy names of Allahcollected from the Qu'ran are considered very holy and play an important part inlater mystical speculation. The names of God have also been related to the anglesand the platonic forms (this is connected with the interpretation by Philo of Alexandriaof the Platonic forms as the thoughts of God).271 In Christian speculation angels andPlatonic forms were also identified. In Islam

269 See especially CU 6.1.4. Cf. above II, 12.270 Exodus 3.13-5.271 According to de Vogel traces of this identification go back to Plato's Sophistes and Timaeus

and to the first generation after Plato. See C.J. de Vogel. Â la recherche des étapes précisesentre Platon et le Néoplatonisme, Mnemosyne 1954, 111-122. This paper was not accessibleto me


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the exact counterpart, with contrary evaluation, of the nāmarūpe can be found.Though such enumerations of names have a close resemblance to Hindu lists ofdivine names, e.g. the Viṣṇusahasranāama there is in Islam no higher correctivesuch as the Upaniṣadic ‘that from which all words recoil....’272. (e) In the gospel ofSt. John Christ is conceived as the Logos, the creative divine word, which denotesboth the divine and the relation between God and the world.

These high evaluations do not occur in the pāramārthika realm of Advaita, but mightwell occur in other aspects of Hinduism, as we saw already from the instance of theViṣṇusahasranāma. Moreover, just as the Jews hesitated to pronounce the nameof God, the Bṛhadāranyaka says273 that the Gods are fond of the cryptic and indirect(parokṣapriyā iva hi devāh). The Gods prefer the indirect and cryptic name Indra tothe direct name Indha.274On the other hand, all over India the recitation of the divinename is considered beneficial. In a Purāṇic legend Rāma demonstrated to Hanumanthat the nameRāmawasmore powerful than he was himself. In Bengal Vaiṣṇavism,Chaitanya held that the name of the deity is identical with the deity itself. Thereforethe naming of the deity is the highest means for realizing the love of Kṛṣṇa.275

The Christian Logos is not dissimilar to the Indian śabda. The latter does not onlyapnear, however, in religious speculation, but has philosophical as well asgrammatical affiliations. In philosophy the relationship between śabda ‘word’ andartha ‘meaning’ is primarily discussed in Pūrva Mīmaṁhsā and in Nyāya.276. Thediscussions relating to the fourth pramāṇa (śabda) are partly logical, partlytheological. In Bhartṛhari's śabdādvaita metaphysical speculation is closely relatedto grammatical analysis.277

272 yato vāco nivartante....Tait. Up., 2.4.273 4.2.2. Cf. Śatapathabrāhmana 9.1.1.2; Mahadevan, Gauḍapāda 66, 97.274 In the Sāmaveda the stobhas and special svarūpa forms (e.g., bhakāraprayoga) hide the

syllables so that the chants are unintelligible for others than those for whom they are intended.Cf. E. Faddegon, Ritual Dadaism, Acta Orientalia 5 (1926) 177 sq;. and J.F. Staal, NambudiriVeda Recitation, 's-Gravenhage 1961, 28-30, 64 sq.

275 See N. Sanyal, Sree Chaitanya I, Madras 1933, 588, 601 and Index.276 See e.g., Jha, op. cit. chapts. XIV-XV.277 See e.g., D.S. Ruegg, Contributions à l'histoire de la philosophie linguistique indienne, Paris

1959, 57-93 (cf. J.F. Staal in Philosophy East and West 10 (1960) 53-7).


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(2) In Christianity the Logos embodies the creative forces of the divine. God createdthrough the Logos when he said: ‘Let there be light’-and there was light.278 In theQur'an the whole creation has come into being through the creative word ‘Be’! (‘Kun’)of Allah. The view of creation out of nothing tends to stress the value of the creativeword. In accordance with a low evaluation of words and names on the other hand,creation is denied and no actual change is supposed to take place, when namesare assigned to things.

The high evaluation of names and naming continues to live in the Western interestin linguistic expression. While this opposes the Advaitic ideal, which goes beyondnames and language, Advaita is in this respect an exception to the general Indianpattern. Few civilizations have paid as much attention to language and linguisticexpression as Indians did from the earliest times. As early as the Ṛgveda there isinterest in the creative power of the word in poetry and thought.279 This is transferredto the level of creation in the Brāhmaṇas where, according to Silburn, ‘the nāmarūpeare not the perishable forms regarded as inferior in the Upaniṣads’ but ‘the structurewhich orders the confusion inherent in the spontaneous activity of Prajāpati’.280Onlya very high evaluation of linguistic and literary expression can explain that vyākaraṇa(grammar), nirukta (etymology), chandas (the Science of metre), alaṁkāra (‘literaryomamentation’) and other branches of knowledge deal directly or indirectly withthese topics. Though these developments are more in the spirit of Pūrva Mīmāṁsā,both Pūrva and Uttara Mīmāṁsās are concerned with problems of linguisticinterpretation and adopt methods of interpretation used by the grammarians.281Though Advaita considers the formless superior to forms, the artistic experience

of forms is accepted in a special context. A work of art is effective through rasa andthis gives rise to a certain

278 Genesis, 1.3.279 See L. Renou, Les pouvoirs de la parole dans le Ṛgveda. E'tudes védiques et Pāninéennes

I, Paris 1955, 1-27.280 Silburn, Instant et cause 58.281 Cf. L, Renou, Connexions entre le rituel et la grammaire en sanskrit. Journal Asiatique 233

(1941-42) 105-65; the same, Grammaire et Védānta, Journal Asiatique 245 (1957) 121-33.


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joy in the experiencer (rasānanda). This joy has something in common with thehighest bliss, brahmānanda. Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka held ‘the esthetic experience to be akinto the mystic realization of Brahman’.282 According to the philosophers of Alaṁhārathe difference between the two was due to the fact that alaṁhāra, ‘egoity’, subsistedin rasānanda (though it was there of a pure, sāttvika type), whereas it haddisappeared in brahmānanda. Whether the latter value could conversely beincorporated in the theory of rasas was a much debated question. Those who deniedthat there could be any connection between mokṣsa and esthetic values, held thatśānta ought not to be incorporated amongst the rasas. In fact, Bharata gave eightrasas.283 But Abhinavagupta, his commentator, as Dr. V. Raghavan informs me,showed, that not only śānta is admissible as an esthetic sentiment, but that allesthetic experience is in essence of the nature of śānta. Later comes Bhoja with anew theory, in which only one rasa is recognised, i.e. śṛṄgāra, ‘love’. With referenceto Advaita, this is called, pāramārthika rasa, and it is distinct from vyāvahārika rasa.The most basic type of this rasa is mokṣa śṛṅgāra.284 Moreover the presence of thisfundamental rasa in a doctrine accepting only one rasa enabled the author of theSāhitya Mīmāṁsā to call Bhoja's new rasa theory ‘śṛṅgāra Advaita.’285The Logos theory occurs under a certain form in Plotinus too. The idea goes back

at least as far as Heraclitus, for whom logos was ‘common to all things’ (xunònpâsi).286 But ‘the logos according to which everything occurs’, says Jaeger,287 ‘is thedivine law itself’. For Philo of Alexandria the logos is the first intermediary betweenGod and man, and is assimilated to chance as well as to destiny. For Plotinus thelatter obtains as well,288 but in the Enneads the more important function of the logosis to

282 K.C. Pandey, Indian Aesthetics I, Banares 1950, 61283 See V. Raghavan, The number of rasas, Journal of Oriental Research, Madras, s.d.284 V. Raghavan, Bhoja's Śṛṅgāra Prakāśa, Bomhay s.d. I, 2, 486.285 161, ap. Raghavan, o.c. 482.286 Fragment B 113 (Diels).287 W. Jaeger, The theology of the early Greek philosophers, Oxford 1947, 116.288 See for this, and for the whole paragraph, Bréhier's Notice ad hoc III, 2-3, p. 18 sq.


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cause the conflict and harmony of contrary forces (tà enantía; dvandvas). It becomesthe principle of contrariety and equilibrium, and thereby a not very clear answer tothe difficult question of the theodicee or the parallel problem of the origin of multiplicityfrom unity. When we ask what is the place of logos in the architecture of thehypostases, we find no definite answer. The reason for this probably is that the logosworks on all levels and is a general concept of connection and relation.289

In conclusion, the pair of concepts, nāmarūpe occupying a low position in theUpaniṣadic tradition, and also in Advaita and Buddhism, but not in Indian thoughtas a whole (neither in the Brāhmaṇas, nor in Pūrva Mīmāmśā, nor in several laterschools of thought) is highly evaluated in the West.

7. Two levels and double truth

Though Plotinus does not make a distinction between a pāramārthika and avyāvahārika realm there are some indications which point in a similar direction.

Firstly, Plotinus is well aware of the fact that bis monism makes it very difficult tospeak a language which is essentially dualistic. He says: ‘if we have to use theseexpressions, though they are not correct, we have to realize that, correctly speaking,we cannot admit any duahty, not even a logical one...but we have to compromisein, our expressions’, and: ‘One has to excuse us when we, speaking about the One,use necessarily, in order to express our thought, words, which we don't want to usewhen speaking correctly (akribeíai). To each of them one has to add an ‘as if’(hoîion)290

Secondly, Plotinus often looks upon the popular Greek Gods as symbols for thehypostases of his system. He regards their representation in religion as exotericand himself gives an esoteric interpretation. For example, Zeus stands for the soul,Cronos for the nous and Ouranos for the One. Such esoteric interpretations wereapparently common in the syncretism of Alexandria, where even the Iliad andOdyssea underwent a consistently spiri-

289 Cf. Burnet who translated logos in Heraclitus as ‘measure’290 VI. 8.13. 1-5; 47-50.


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tual interpretation (Odysseus' journeys represent the wanderings of the human soulin its search for the divine). The same happened in later Hinduism to theMahābhārataand the Rāmāyana. The best example of allegorical interpretation occurs in thetreatise ‘On love’ or ‘On Eros’,291 where Cronos is the nous, Aphrodite the soul andEros the vision which the soul possesses when it turns towards the nous.292

Thirdly, Plotinus expresses his views concerning myths in general, in the last chapterof the same treatise. According to him, myths narrate in time and as a story thetimeless truth about timeless entities. ‘The myths, when they are really myths, haveto separate in time that about which they speak and make distinctions betweenmany things which are in fact simultaneous and only distinguishable in rank and inpotentiality. Moreover, even for him (i.e., Plato), myths deal with unoriginated entitiesin narrations and stories about origination, and they separate all that ought to betogether. But when we once know the manner in which myths teach, we are entitledto combine data which are actually dispersed’.293 Bréhier rightly remarks that theseviews concerning myths must have originated among Platonists who attempted toreconcile the eternity of the world with the description of its origination and creationin the Timaeūs (cf. the niṣprapañca and saprapañca views in the Upaniṣads). Butall truth about timeless entities is endowed with a temporal character or seen througha temporal veil when expressed in language, as language is a temporal phenomenon.Therefore Plotinus himself speaks often about the hypostases as originating fromeach other, whereas they are in fact timeless and only logically and ontologicallyconnected.294

Both Indians and Greeks professed the perpetuity of the World, Plotinus says forinstance: ‘To ask why the world has been created... .is the same as to ask why theDemiurge has produced. This is based however upon the assumption that therewere a beginning (arkhḗ) of that which has always been there (toû aeí).’295

291 III. 5: perî érōtos.292 See Bréhier Notice., ad hoc, 72.293 III. 5.9. 24-29294 Cf. above, III, 5; 199 with note 199.295 II. 9.8. 1-3.


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Several of the Arab philosophers, like Ibn Rushd (Averroes), accepted this, combiningit with monotheistic creation by characterizing the latter as a myth which symbolicallyand figuratively expounds in time the timeless truth of non-origination. Ibn Rushdtried to prove the perpetuity of the world by reasoning as follows: God is eternal;therefore a first instant does not exist; therefore time is eternal; therefore motion(which is, as in Aristotle, the cause of time) is eternal; therefore the sum total of allmotions, i.e., the world, is eternal. Or elsewhere, shortly: God is eternal; the worldis God's work; therefore the world is eternal.

Many Muslims (like al-Ghazzālī) and Christians rejected this. The difference inopinion has been very clearly expressed by the contemporary Protestant theologianKarl Barth. Whereas myths, says he, refer to eternal truth or truths (this in accordancewith Plotinus' view) creation as described in the Bible speaks about an ‘absolutebeginning’,296 so that one cannot speak about a myth of creation. ‘There is no mythof creation, as creation as such can never be described in a myth. In the Babylonianmyth of creation it is for instance evident that we are dealing with a myth of becomingand declining, which can principally not be related to Genesis 1 and 2.297 ...Theinteresting point of the biblical record of creation is exactly that it is closely relatedto the history of Israel.... This history begins according to the Old Testament withthe creation by God of heaven and earth’.298

In Roman Catholicism philosophers have been less uncompromising. ThomasAquinas understood that neither the eternity of the world, nor its contrary, could beproved (as respectively Ibn

296 ‘schlechthinige Anfang’.297 Whether this is historically true or the outcome of the Christian desire to prove the unicity of

Christianity, need not concern us here: we are interested in the Christian concept of creation.298 K. Barth, Dogmatik im Grundriss, Zürich 1947, 58-59; ‘Es gibt keinen Schöpfungsmythus,

weil die Schòpfung als solche eben den Mythus nicht zugānglich ist. So wird es beimbabylonischen Schöpfungsmythus z.B. ganz klar, dass es sich hier um einen Mythus vonWerden und Vergehen handelt, der mit Gen. 1 und 2 grundsätzlich nicht in Beziehung zusetzen ist...das ist ja das Merkwürdige der biblischen Schöpfungsgeschichten, dass sie imstrengen Zusammenhang mit der Geschichte Israels stehen...Diese Geschichte beginnt nachdem Alten Testament schon damit, dass Gott den Himmel und die Erde geschafEen hat’.


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Rushd and Bonaventura had attempted to do). We must, therefore, according tohim, resort to revelation (just as Śankara would do in the suprasensible realm),which teaches us in fact that the would has a beginning. This we must thereforebelieve though we are unable to prove it or know it properly.299 Other medievalphilosophers went much further and rejected altogether the unicity of creation. Inthe third century Plotinus' contemporary Origenes taught that everything comesback and that time is a kúklos, a ‘cycle’. Even the incarnation of Christ is a regularlyrecurrent phenomenon, thereby becoming an avatāra. Thousand years later, in thethirteenth century, Sigher of Brabant expounds the same view. Everything comesback, ‘the same laws, the same opinions, the same religions’. But taken aback byhis own speculation Sigher hastens to add: ‘We say this according to the opinion ofthe philosopher, without affirming that it is true’.300

At this point we have again arrived at our starting point. The last words seem toimply that there are two truths, a philosophical truth and a truth of ‘faith’. Sigher ofBrabant hesitates to accept the first. But his hesitation is heretical, because it seemsto incline to the notorious doctrine of ‘double truth’. This doctrine is ultimately basedupon the philosophical difficulty of how to reconcile God's creation of the world withthe world's everlastingness. A similar difficulty - i.e., how to interpret creationisticand theistic passages in śruti in the context of Advaita - led Śankara to the doctrinesof parabrahman and aparabrahman, and of paramārtha and vyavahāra.

The Western reaction to the Advaitic doctrine of two levels, must be understood inrelation to this so-called doctrine of double truth, which was criticised and condemnedthroughout the middle ages. The doctrine might have originated under the influenceof early attempts to interpret diffcult passages of the Quran in a figuratie sense. Itreached its greatest height in the twelfth century. in Ibn Rushd. The latter did notreally hold a doctrine of two truths, but divided humanity in three classes: firstly, thegreater part of human beings, the masses, which possess blind faith; next the ‘elite’,which follows reason in a strictly philo-

299 Mundum incoepisse est credibile, non autiem demonstrabile vel scibile.300 Gilson, o.c. 564-565.


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ssophical way. A third category of being follows theology, which is an unjustifiedand abnormal eristic occupation301 for which Ibn Rushd has nothing but contempt.That he did not look upon himself as exclusively belonging to the philosophical classfollows from the fact that he wished to remain a good Muslim. He therefore was ina position to hold the following opinion concerning the unity of the active intellect (atraditional Aristotelian problem): ‘On account of reason I conclude with necessity,that the intellect is one in number; but notwithstanding that I firmly hold the oppositeon account of faith’.302 Gilson remarks that here reason leads to necessity, but thatit is nowhere said that it leads to truth. What the Arab philosopher really thoughtremains ‘hidden in the secret of his conscience’.303

After Averroes a school of Averroists arose in Padua whose views were much moreunreasonable. According to them there can be two opposite truths concerning oneand the same dogmatical problem, one on account of faith and one on account ofreason. These two truths are contradictory, but nevertheless valid for every humanbeing.304 This Averroism was destined to become very unpopular. It explains whythe doctrine of ‘double truth’ did not only become one of the main heresies for themedieval church, but also an inadmissible mistake to all later philosophical thought.This is evident if it is remembered how strong the tradition of the Aristotelian doctrinesof the excluded third and contradiction were and to what extent logical as well asexistential choice was stressed in the West.305

These different doctrines of Averroist origin can be ultimately traced back toNeoplatonism or Platonism (or even Parmenides: see below) and are essentiallythe same as the Advaitic doctrine of two levels. The difference, namely that Śankaraultimately considered only the one, parāmāthika truth, can be explained

301 See L. Gauthier, Ibn, Rochd (Averroes), Paris 1948, 279; cf. the review by V. van Steenkiste,Tijdschrift voor Philosophie 12 (1950), 323-330.

302 Per rationem concludo de necessitate, quod intellectus est unus numero, firmiter tamen teneooppositum per fidem; ap. Gilson, o.c. 360,

303 Ibid.: ‘Cachée dans le secret de sa conscience’.-Gauthier does not seem to hold the sameview.

304 Gauthier, o.c. 277.305 See above I. 5.


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by the fact that the Roman Catholic church could never tolerate the denunciation ofits central doctrine of creation, whereas the less intolerant and less perfectlyorganized Hindu community could permit one trend of thought in śruti beingsubordinated in one of the Vedāntic systems. To the uncompromisingWestern mindŚaṅkara is almost only intelligible if the vyāvahārika aparavidyā truths are essentiallyrejected and not compromisingly allowed as possessing a kind of ‘relative’ truth.The opposition is less unbearable for the Indian mind, for we see authors speakingabout the vyāvahārika realm as if it were a reality. For the Western mind, it is at firstinconceivable that a true Advaitin is a bhākta as well - a relatively common situationin India. This might be explained by the unusually synthetical character of the Indianmind.

Islam and Christianity rejected the doctrine of Ibn Rushd also for another reason.The truth of the monotheistic religions is intended for everybody, without exception.No esotericism of an elite, posssesing its own higher or ultimate truth, has ever beentaken seriously in the monotheistic atmosphere. This is clear from Christ's ownteaching and holds for Muhammad as well (despite later mystics who attributed anearly Christian or Muslim306 origin to esoteric doctrines.). For the same reason theancient Greek democracy of the Pólis, the ‘city-state’, could become the leadingpolitical ideology of the Christian West. But against this democratie and ‘popular’view of ultimate truth there have always been aristocratic protests from people whowanted to keep truth to themselves and who felt on that account superior to others.307

While Islam and Christianity opposed esotericism, the same does neither hold forthe latest period of Greek civilization, nor for India. In Plotinus' days esotericalmovements were fashionable since confidence in the old religious truths haddisappeared and the latter came to be looked upon as popular. The same holds tosome extent at present. In India the caste-system is consistent with the idea thatspiritual truths are confined to an elite, who

306 The Shī'a claim that their sect possesses a secret revelation, whispered by Muhammad intothe ear of 'Alī.

307 Cf. the article quoted above, III. 5: 204, n. 221.


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must preserve the tradition (as a necessary in a circular view of time). This privilegedclass, consists of Brahmans who are entitled to study the Vedas. This situation,explained (away) by the doctrine of karman, was often openly denounced, e.g., inthe Bhāgavata: ‘One becomes a Brāhmana by his deeds and not by his family orbirth; even a Caṇḍāla is a Brāhmaṇa, if he is of pure character.’308 In Advaita everyonecan take saṁnyāsa and realise Brakman.

This is connected with the fact that Advaita started as a sect and took its followersfrom different castes. While the caste system is tolerant with regard to doctrineswhich caste members wish to adopt, it is exclusive as regards the people who canbe admitted. This situation is reversed in the sects. A sect is open to all castes butintolerant with regard to doctrines.309 In Advaita exclusiveness of caste is replacedby an exclusiveness of doctrine expressed in the view that only the liberated soulattains paravidyā while the others do not go beyond aparavidyā. The truth is confinedto an elite. In the Gītā, a similar view is expressed.310 In later Advaita considerationsof caste re-appear and the system becomes the traditional philosophy of a subcasteof South Indian Brahmans, the Aiyars.311 This does not prevent others from adoptingthe philosophy of Advaita. The Śaṅkarā. cārya of the Śrṅgeri Maṭha is at the sametime the head of orthodox Aiyar Brahmans and a saṁnyāsin who gives spiritualcounsel and teaches all who are interested in Advaita.

By incorporating the vyāvahārika realm Śaṅkara aceepted the relative validity of thecaste system. We do not have much information about the attitude to caste in earlyAdvaita, but Śaṅkara states in the great commentary,312 that śūdras are not allowedto

308 Cf. Mahadevan, Outlines of Hinduism, 72.309 See L. Dumont, World renunciation in Indian religions. Contributions to Indian sociology 4

(1960) 33-62. Cf. J.F. Staal in: Journal of the American Oriental Society 81 (1961) 147-9.310 7.3: ‘Among thousands of men only one strives for perfection, Even of those who strive and

are perfected only one knows me in truth’.311 Cf. J.F. Staal, Notes on some Brahmin communities of South India. Art and Letters. Journal

of the Royal India Pakistan and Ceylon Society 32 (1958) 1-7.312 BSB. 1.3.38.


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study the Vedas. The legend of Śiva appearing before him disguised as a Caṇḍālamust be of later origin.313

The above considerations suggest relationships, not causes, and do not lead tohistorical-materialistic explanations. One cannot explain a doctrine of higher andlower truth as the ideology of an intellectual or spiritual minority which wants to gainpower and supremacy. There are purely metaphysical reasons for this doctrine sothat it is likely that the social situation is a reflection of another reality. This can bemade plausible by lastly considering one Greek pbilosopher, in whose doctrine thetwo-level theory stands out very clearly and who is as such the precursor of all similartheories in the West: i.e., Parmenides.314

Parmenides' famous poem consisted of two parts: the first dealing with truth, thesecond with dóxa, ‘appearance’, ‘opinion’. The significance of this second part hasbeen variously interpreted, but increasingly in a manner by which it becomescomparable to the Advaita vyāvahārika level. Diels originally held it to contain anenumeration of cosmologies alien to Parmenides' own views. Von Wilamowitz andKranz considered it a probable hypothesis about the origin of the world.315Reinhardthowever316 has convincingly refuted these two theories and has shown that thesecond part of Parmenides' poem explains the origin of the illusory world ofappearance (dóxa) and the origin of the erroneous opinions (dóxai) of the mortalsabout it at the same time and unseparated. Verdenius has in particular shown thatthe world of dóxa is a world of lower level, to which a lower and only relativeknowledge corresponds.

This is in all probability the oldest form in which the two level theory was known inEurope.

8. Freedom

The concept of freedom is central also in Neoplatonism. As one of the best Plotinusscholars, P. Henry, devoted a series of

313 Maniṣapañcaka. Cf. Belvalkar op. cit, 237.314 Cf. the author's Parmenides and Indian thought, 85, 93.315 Cf. the Timaeus.316 In: Permenides und die Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie.


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three articles to his question,317 we shall first restate some of his conclusions in thepresent context.

Plotinus calls the individual soul free (eleutliéra) when it is ‘master of itself’ (kuriōtátēhautēs), ‘separated from the body’ (àneu sōmatos) and ‘outside all cosmical causality’(kosmikēs aitías éxō).318 This is the kind of freedom which Śaṅkara calls mokṣa orrelease from the ‘cosmic causality’ of karman, whether separated from the body(videhamukti) or ‘while embodieḍ’ (jīvanmukti). Plotinus speaks about the latterpossibility as one admitting a less high degree of freedom,319 but he does notdenounce it as for instance Rāmānuja did.

The freedom of release or mokṣa is different from our own and typically humanfreedom; i.e., the freedom of choice. In Advaita, in the vyāvahārika realm souls arefree to act and create good or bad karma. In Neoplatonism, Plotinus believed thatman is free; this is shown by Henry.320 But Plato had taught that evil is involuntary.Therefore Plotinus concludes, in the form of a syllogism from the premises ‘we arefree’ and ’we do not choose evil freely’ that ‘we choose the good freely’.321Wheneverwe are free we choose the good. When we choose between a good and a badpossibility, we can choose the good freely, but not the bad. But this can only meanthat the choice itself is not free. Freedom of choice is therefore for Plotinus a lowerfreedom. In the highest freedom one is no longer able to choose: ‘the ability tochoose between opposites (antikeímena) denotes an inability to remain on the mostperfect level’.322 By rejecting choice and preferring divine perfection, Plotinus rejectslimitation (which is inherent in choice) and prefers the unlimited (which is also herethe potentially unlimited).323

This most perfect level is a divine level and human freedom does not occur there.Human freedom exists only when there is

317 P. Henry, La problème de la liberté chez Plotin, Revue néoscolastique de philosophie 33(1931) 50-79; 180-215; 318-339.

318 III. 1.8. 9-10.319 Ibid., 11.320 o.c., 210.321 o.c. 214.322 VI. 8.21. 5-7 ap. Henry, o.c. 324, 335. Henry says; ‘Ils sont rares les penseurs qui atteignent

ces sommets’.323 Cf. above III. 3.


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also a possibility of choosing evil. The above divine freedom, which is according toPlotinus the human goal, therefore deifies man and makes him perfect, but takeshis human freedom of choice away. This is in accordance with the fact that for manyof the ancient Greeks the Gods were blessed, blissful (the mákares theoí of Homer),but subject to Fate (Moîra) and to Necessity (Anágkē); whereas man can choosefreely, but is subject to pleasure and pain, to bliss and misfortune. Goethe describedthe ancient idea of man and his relation to the divine as follows:

‘The infinite Gods give everything,To their favourites unreservedly.All joys infinite,All pains infinite,Unreservedly’.324

The Neoplatonic idea of the deification and perfection of man reverses this traditionand takes man's freedom of choice away; it bestows in its place upon him divinebliss. The same holds for the jīvanmukta, who has attained the status of Īśvara: heacts in accordance with the good, automatically and freely in as far as this means‘perfectly’. But he is not free to act either according to the good or according to evil:he does not possess the freedom of choice. The latter holds in Advaita only for thesoul who is in bondage, the saṁsārī: he can freely act in the right or wrong way. Forthat reason he is in bondage.

There are several difficulties underlying these ideas. If the individual soul is free tochoose also evil and if this choice is real, the evil choice must be as real as the rightchoice and thus evil itself as real as good. Alternatively if choice is really free,something entirely new and not previously determined or even expected may comeinto being. In both cases, the universe cannot be a unity in the sense of a plenum,a plērés, a pūrnam. While divine freedom or the freedom of mokṣa, which is thesame for all who have realized it, does not affect the unity of the universe, freedomof choice for each individual destroys the unity and continuity of the whole.Philosophers who accept individual freedom are therefore generally pluralists. Doesthis imply that Advaita and

324 These lines form a kind of Leitmotiv in the novel of Thomas Mann, Doctor Faustus.


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Neoplatonism cannot explain human freedom, despite the fact that they accept itsexistence?

In the case of Advaita the answer can be easily given. (1) In the vyāvahārika realmhuman freedom exists and if this contradicts the unity and plenitude of the universe,this is only interpreted as one of the manifestations of the anirvacanīyatva of thisworld: this dūṣana is a bhūṣana. (2) In the pāramārthika realm human freedom doesnot exist, not in the sense that there would be determinism, but in the sense thatseparate individuality does not exist so that the problem vanishes.

In the case of Plotinus the solution is less conspicuous. He is well aware of thedangerous consequences of the determinism of a unified universe, i.e., abolition ofhuman freedom. If one principle, says he, would connect everything or if everythingwere guided by one universal soul, and if also the effect of each cause werepredetermined, freedom would be ‘a mere word’ (ónoma mónon).325 Plotinus isanxious to preserve reality, when it is in danger of becoming a ‘mere word’, whereasŚaṅkara denounces it exactly because it is ‘a mere word’ (nāma eva). But for Plotinusit becomes difficult to explain freedom when at the same time he aims at maintainingthe unity of being. If choice of evil is involuntary human freedom is inexplicable.

Despite these ‘technical’ difficulties the existential intention of both Plotinus andŚaṅkara is clear: it is to transcend the level of human freedom and to go beyond tothe divine perfection, where choice of an evil possibility is no longer realizable. Thisis at the same time good (agathón) and bliss (ānanda), but not the pleasure ofheaven, for pleasure is linked up with pain and belongs to the realm of human choiceand karman. Thus there is accord in interpretation, but difrerence in evaluation,between the traditional Greek view on the one hand and the Neoplatonic and Advaiticview on the other. In the first, human being accepts pleasure and is free, but has toaccept pain and is neither perfect nor blessed; in the second human being sacrificeshis personal freedom and pleasures, thereby conquering all possible suffering aswell, and thus becomes perfect and blissful. The last solution was

325 III. 1.7.15.


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clearly presented by the Buddha as the means for abolishing suffering: who doesnot want to suffer, has to sacrifice pleasure.

The modern concept of freedom is different from Plotinus' concept of freedom. Theformer is essentially a freedom of the human personality and individuality, the lattera state of perfection which is divine and which is in fact the same as the freedom ofthe One. The several denotations of the concept of divine freedom in Plotinus havebeen enumerated by Henry.326 They are: not being subject to contingency or change;absence of (external) force; transcendence; power over itself (but not power tochoose); being for itself; omnipotence (but inability to choose evil); selfcreativity.

Henry has also pointed out that there is no freedom of creation for the Plotiniandivine.327 The One produces according to its will. But this will is reasonable, leavesnothing to chance and is even necessary: the production takes place ‘as it ought tobe’ (hōs édei). Thus the will of the One is no free will in the usual sense and canhardly be called a will. Similarly Īśvara does not freely act when creating a newuniverse, but is led by the (subtle forms of) good and bad karman of a previousuniverse. This is in accordance with the fact that creation has a very subordinateplace in Neoplatonism as well as in Advaita.

Modern Western consciousness stresses free creativity in consequence of themonotheistic idea of a God, who created once at a special time according to his willand pleasure. In the monotheistic religions divine freedom always assumed a certainkind of arbitrariness inaccessible to reasoning and the rational expectations ofmankind. This God decided the time and place where he wished to reveal himself,preferred (according to some) one race to others or forgave according to others thesins of some while condernning others.

Such an unreasonable divine personality would be a strange and troublesome bodyin the well ordered systems of Advaita and Neoplatonism - and this holds for humanfreedom too: for while it is unexplained by Neoplatonism, it is inexplicable accordingto Advaita.

326 o.c. 336.327 o.c. 338-339.


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Conclusion

Although there are many other philosophical problems connected with Advaita andNeoplatonism, the main and characteristic trends of thought in both systems havebeen considered here. Undoubtedly both philosophies have much in common andmany of their differences result from the different traditions from which each aroseand to which each belongs. The main trend of thought of each of these philosophiesis the secondary trend in the other. The main Neoplatonic theme is that there is ahierarchy of being, at the summit of which is the One, the most perfect and highlyevaluated entity. In Plotinus there is also a tendency which stresses the perfectionof the One to such a degree that the rest of the universe is nothing in comparisonwith it. In Advaita, on the other hand, the main tendency is to absolutely anduncompromisingly deny the reality of anything apart from the absolute Brahman.Here the complementary tendency is the acceptance of a vyāvahārika realm, whichis, as avidyā itself, neither real nor unreal but anirvacanīya. It actually plays a veryimportant role both in the theory and practice of Advaita. Therefore Neoplatonismis the more world-negating and Advaita the more worldaffirming of the two.

The historical success of Advaita lies more in its acceptance of the vyāvahārikarealm including all philosophical and religious views as well as ritual and socialpractices, than in its teaching the non-dual Absolute with which the soul is essentiallyand eternally identical. This practical and synthesizing tendency of Advaita alsoexplains its present claim of being a philosophy opposed to no other system ofthought and therefore in the present age a solution for conflicting world views.

However below the surface of this universalistic outlook the purely philosophicalgenius of Śaṅkara continues to live. He conceived the idea of the nirguṇa brahman,which is our own self but which cannot be reached by any active effort. It can onlybe suddenly realized as eternally existing with the disappearance of avidyā whichis responsible for our belief in our own and in a divine personality. To the West thisdoctrine implies in the first


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place impersonalism. But impersonalism existed in Western thought in many forms.Among these Neoplatonism was the most highly developed and came closest toAdvaita. This impersonalist tradition was a recurrent reaction against thecharacteristic personalism of the West which rejected and condemned the formerrepeatedly. This personalism, together with its kindred anthropocentrism (evenChristianity is at least as anthropocentric as it is theocentric), tended consistenly toevaluate the personal more highly than the impersonal. Such personalism ismisunderstood when it is subordinated as an aspect, level, or possibility within animpersonalist synthesis. What is most unintelligible to the impersonalist is preciselythat the idea of the personal excludes the possibility of a superior impersonal aboveit. Both personalism and impersonalism consider real what they evaluate most highly.

A modern form of Neoplatonism in the West is the reaction against religiouspersonalism, expressed as the loss of belief in a personal God. According to manycontemporary Westerners the monotheistic personal God contradicts much that isvalued as rationalism and progress. In the West this amounts to atheism, while inIndia it would be consistent with Advaita. This explains the spread of Advaita andespecially of Buddhism inWestern countries. In theseWestern adaptations attentionis confined to the pāramārthika realm, since the vyāvahārika realm is more closelyconnected with purely Indian developments. But such adaptations are bound to failunless it is realized that in Advaita not only is the divine personality devaluated, butalso the human personality. If Western atheism implies the absence of belief in bothhuman and divine personalities it can go along with Advaita. But if the divinepersonality is rejected, while the human personality is retained, the result isinconsistent with Advaita.

Thus the West will be disappointed if it expects to lose itself and its personaldifficulties in Advaitic impersonalism. On the contrary, Advaita will show the Westits true self. It teaches again the old Greek admonition: Gnōthi seautón, Know thyself.With Advaita the West may also learn that self-knowledge is more important andessential than any karman.

In a simple conversation one of the most representative Advaitins of this century,the 34th Jagadguru of the Śṛṅgeri Pīṭha, Chandraśekhara Bhāratī Swāmigal, hastold the West that it need


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not adopt Advaita, but realize self-knowledge, the most profound aim of Advaitaitself.

‘Why must it be’, impatiently demanded an earnest American tourist, ‘that you willnot convert other peoples to Hinduism? You have such a beautiful religion, and yetyou keep so many struggling souls out of it. If you say “yes” I will be the first tobecome a Hindu’.

‘But why’, came the counter-question, ‘do you want to change your religion? Whatis wrong with Christianity?’

Taken aback, but not daunted, the tourist said, ‘I cannot say what is wrong, but ithas not given me satisfaction’.

‘Indeed, it is unfortunate’, was the reply, ‘but tell me honestly whether you havegiven it a real chance. Have you fully understood the religion of Christ and livedaccording to it? Have you been a true Christian and yet found the religion wanting?’

‘I am afraid I cannot say that, Sir’.

‘Then we advise you to go and be a true Christian first; live truly by the word of theLord, and even if then you feel unfulfilled, it will be time to consider what should bedone’.1

The self-knowledge which the Ācārya recommends need not only apply in a religiouscontext but has a universal philosophical connotation. Advaita encourages us tounderstand ourselves. If studied in a comparative spirit it increases the awarenessof one's own habits of thought and thereby paves the way for an adequateunderstanding of other types of thought.

1 Dialogues of the guru, Chap. I. Also quoted in Mahadevan, Outlines of Hinduism 296-7.


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AppendixThe problem of Indian Influence on Neoplatonism

According to Porphyry, Plotinus once ‘sought to learn directly the philosophy practisedamong the Persians and that which is held in esteem among the people of India’.1The theory that some aspect of Neoplatonism was infruenced by ‘Indian thought’,has repeatedly been discussed and has found many learned advocates andopponents. As it seems that research on the subject has been done while scholarswere unaware of the fact that the same subject was dealt with by others, we proposeto contribute to a possible solution of the problem by giving a critical review of theexisting literature in chronological order. In this way one can easily see what arethe main arguments which can be brought forward, and which of these have beenrefuted. Of the work done before Bréhier's book of 1938 mention is made only ofthe article by Müller of 1914; after 1938, we hope that our enumeration is completeas far as articles which deal principally with the subject are concerned. Casualreferences in monographs touching upon the subject have not been discussed.

Critical remarks are based upon the methodological considerations mentioned inthe first part2 and the method which has been formulated by Koster in dealing withthe problem of Oriental influence on Plato; we need only read Plotinus where hesays Plato: ‘There is only one method which leads to an adequate understandingof the doctrine of Plato. This is the method requiring the commentator wheninterpreting a passage first to ask whether this passage can be explained by whatPlato teaches elsewhere or by what he taught previously; next whether the samecan be done with the help of what is left of nis Greek predecessors; and lastly whetherthe interpreter has not forgotten to take the creative imagination and the personallogic of his author into account; this last consideration is not the least important. Inshort,

1 Vita Plotini 3, 15-17.2 See above I, 6: 22-4.


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he has to deal with Plato as with Homer: explain him by himself. The person whostudies Plato has to be led by one rule: first of all tòn Plátōna ed toû Plátōnossaphēnízein.3

H.K. Müller, Orientalisches bei Plotinos? Hermes 49 (1914) 70-80.

The author has convincingly shown that Plotinus is not influenced by the Orientalcults and creeds which were current in the Roman empire during the third century,Plotinus disagrees with the idea of salvation through an intermediary and objectsto widespread forms of ordinary devotion.

With this article the thesis of Iranian influence seems refuted, but the possibility ofIndian influence remains. One more article has been written since then arguing aninfluence from Iran: M. Techert, Iranische religiöse Elemente in dem Begriff derPsuche bei Plotin, Egyetemes Philologiai Közlöny 53 (1929) 65-160. The authorsays that the idea of the fall of the soul is typically Iranian. For a discussion of thistopic refer to the review of the article by Szabó, below p. 354.

E. Bréhier, La phitosophie de Plotin, Paris 1938, chapitre VII: L'orientalisme dePlotin, 107-133.

A.N. Armstrong, Plotinus and India, Classical Quarterly 30 (1936) 22-28.

Almost none of the (mainly French) scholars who based their investigations uponthe famous thesis of Bréhier seem to know that the main points made by Bréhierwere convincingly refuted by Armstrong.We have therefore grouped the two together.

Armstrong correctly summarized themain arguments for Bréhier's thesis that Plotinusmust have undergone influence from Indian thought and particularly from theUpaniṣads, as follows. There are two elements in Plotinus which cannot be explainedagainst the Greek background: (1) the infinity of the One and of the intelligible world,which contradicts the traditional Greek, rationalistic idea of the world as a closedand well defined cosmos;

3 W.J.W. Koster, Le mythe de Platon, de Zarathoustra et des Chaldéens, Etude critique surles relations intellectuelles entre Platon et l'Orīnt, Leiden 1951. 84.


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(2) the absence of a clear distinction and separation of the individual ego from thedivine principle, connected with the identification of subject and object in the levelof the nous. Both doctrines occur in the Upaniṣads. Influence, which is on historicalgrounds possible, is therefore likely.

Armstrong has criticised these arguments as follows:(1) Anaximander's principle of everything was already called ápeiron,

‘the in(de)finite’.(a)

(b) Heraclitus deals with this topic in the following fragment: ‘You willnot be able to find the boundaries (peírata) of the soul, whateverway you go; such a deep lógos she has’, - ‘Here we have somethingremarkably like the infinite self of Plotinus’.

(c) In V.7. 3 the infinity of the intelligible world is connected with thedoctrine that there are also forms of individuals. This is related tothe individualism of the Stoa.

(2) The Pre-Socratics did not attribute clear-cut boundaries to the soul.(a)

(b) In the noûs khōristós of Aristotle (De Anima III 5) and in the daímōnektòs ōn of Plutarch (De genio Socratis 591 e) the idea is expressedthat the highest part of the human soul is independent,supra-personal and identical for all human beings.

Armstrong's arguments may be accepted and can be supplemented by the following.Ad(1)

Also the Eleatic philosopher Melissos calls being ápeiron (Diels 20 A 14.2.3)and Anaxagoras calls his principle, the noûs, ápeiron (Diels 46 B 12). Moreoverwhile the idea of cosmos is a traditionally Greek idea, this applies also to theidea of chaos (e.g. Hesiodus, Theogonia 116 and 123). Since the cosmosdevelops out of chaos, the latter concept, could very well lead to thephilosophical idea of a primordial infinite, which may not have been evaluatedhighly, but nevertheless regarded as divine. Lastly, we may note that theUpaniṣadic infinite is actual


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while the Neoplatonic is potential4 as is foreshadowed in the fragment ofHeraclitus quoted by Armstrong.

Ad(2)

Pure reasoning, in Advaita as well as in Neoplatonism, leads from theassumption of non-dual reality and from the rejection of the reality of changeto the thesis, that our own self cannot transform into the Absolute, but is identicalwith it.

The same two authors expressed a number of years later again their opinion withregard to the same subject. Bréhier is less definite, but Armstrong has retained hisview. Armstrong adds that the doctrine of divine infinity is alien to Plato, but thisdoes not affect his former arguments. The statements are as follows:

During a meeting in Paris in 1948 Jean Baruzi asked Bréhier whether he retainedhis opinion of 1938. The latter answered: ‘I put forward the question. I could notanswer it. I thought at the time that it might interest those who deal with India. I havefound a number of very definite relations between the Neoplatonists and India. ButI have found nobody who is interested and the problem remains to be studied’.5

Armstrong wrote in 1958: ‘Plotinus ....never in fact established any sort of contactwith Eastern thinkers; and there is no good evidence, internal or external, to showthat he ever acquired any knowledge of Indian philosophy.’6 And concerning therelation with Plato: ‘But the placing of the ideas in the Divine mind, the emphasis onlife and the organic view of reality, the doctrine that there are ideas of individuals,and the doctrine of the Divine Infinity, all seem to belong to ways of thinking quitedifferent from Plato's... ’7 The forms were first conceived as divine thoughts by Philoof Alexandria and this innovation, which was fruitful for medieval thought, occursagain in Albinus. The empha-

4 See above III. 3.5 ‘J'ai posé la question. Je n'ai pas pu la résoudre. Je pensais à ce moment-là que cela pouvait

intéresser ceux qui s'occupent de L'Inde. J'ai trouvé nombre de relations très certaines entreles neoplatoniciens et l'Inde. Mais je n'ai trouvé personne que cela intéresse, et la questionreste à étudier; E. Bréhier, in Etudes Bergsoniennes II, Paris 1949; Images plotiniennesimages bergsoniennes, 105-128, 215-222; 223.

6 A.H. Armstrong, Plotinus, London, 1953, 13.7 Id. 22.


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sis on life and the organic view of reality may be related to the Stoa and does at anyrate not remind us of India. The doctrine that there are ideas of individuals is relatedto Stoic individualism, as Armstrong has pointed out himself. The above argumentsremain valid with regard to divine infinity.

J. Przyluski, Les trois hypostases dans l'Inde et à Alexandria Mélanges Cumont II,Bruxelles 1936, 925-933.

The author argues that there is an analogy between; (1) the three hypostases ofPlotinus; (2) the three bodies of the Buddha; (3) trinitary Christologies in Gnosticism;(4) the Christian trinity. As there are possibilities of historical contact, severalinfluences have to be assumed.

The article proves little and is very unconvincing. Not even the similarities, whichare referred to, exist. In the Gnosis and in Buddhism the middle entity is anintermediary between human and divine. But it is characteristic for Plotinus that herejects any such intermediaries.8 Moreover with regard to Buddhism there is achronological difficulty: though, according to de la Vallée Poussin, the germs of adoctrine of three bodies exist already in Theravāda, a definite trinity is, accordingto Suzuki, available only since Asaṅga (i.e., according to Jacobi,9 during the middleof the IVth century A.D.)10 The analogy between the three hypostases and theChristian trinity is superficial, though it was noticed amongst some early Christians11

(even the Cambridge Platonist Cudworth spoke about ‘The Trinity of Plato’)12 andthough it was again defended by Pistorius.13We have refuted this thesis elsewhere.14

J. Przyluski, Indian influence onWestern thought before and during the third centuryA.D., Journal of the Greater Indian Society I.

8 Bréhier, Philosophie de Plotin, 113 sq.9 See S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, London - New York 1931, II, 36, note.10 Renou-Filliozat, L'Inde classique II, 566-567.11 See Inge, Philosophy of Plotinus I, 210-211.12 See the article of de Vogel, quoted below 247, 44, n. 3.13 Plotinus and Neoplatonism, Cambridge 1953.14 In: Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte en Psychologie 46 (1953) 48-51.


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A.B. Keith, Plotinus and Indian thought, Indian Culture 2 (1935-1936), 125-130.

These two articles are again grouped together, as the first is refuted by the second.Przyluski presents two new arguments: (1) the influence must have taken placethrough the examples of Indians, e.g., the impassibility of Indian ascetics or theirsuicide by voluntarily ascending the funeral pile; (2) Indian influence must have beentransmitted through Mani, who was in India, and Manicheism.

Keith has convincingly refuted these arguments as follows; (1) the Greekcontemporary explanations of these phenomena do not at all entitle us to think thatthey were philosophically interpreted in a Neoplatonic sense; (2) (a) the doctrinesof Mani are dualistic and Przyluski would have to assume that in order to reject themthe ‘luminous spirit (of Plotinus) was able to separate the dualistic tenets and toretain only the mysticism, peculiarly Indian’. This assumption is very improbable andit is difficult to believe that a monistic tradition influences through a dualistic traditionanother philosophy which has very strong monistic tenets. (b) Moreover, there arechronological difficulties. Instead of summarizing Keith's calculations, we may referto the opinion of one of the foremost scholars on Manicheism: ‘It seems impossiblethat Manicheism could have reached Egypt before 244, at the earliest’.15 But Plotinusleft Alexandria for Rome in the same year, 244 (and not in 248 as Keith says), andwe may ask with Keith why he did not remain in the East ‘in order to be in touch withthe new religion of which he is supposed to have learnt while in Egypt’. (c) Maniwent to India in order to preach, not in order to study Indian thought.

A. Szabó, Indische Elemente in Plotinischen Neuplatonismus, Scholastik 13 (1938),57-96.

This article has no connection with any of the others and is based on an independenttrain of thought. It is interesting in so far as it takes up another aspect of Plotinus'metaphysics and relates it to another system of Indian thought. This may show that

15 H.-Ch. Puech, Le manichéisme, Paris 1949, 134, n. 191.


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the Western mind anyhow associates Neoplatonism with Oriental thought.

According to the author, there is no fall of the soul in Plotinus, but the soul sendsan image (eídōlon) of itself into the material world and its ‘return’ is the disappearanceof this image. ‘Thus the qualitative change of the soul is replaced by an appearanceand its fall by an illusion about its essence’ (cf. I 1.12). This contradicts the traditionalGreek concepts of the fall of the soul (Pythagoreans; Empedocles, Heraclitus, Plato;mysteries). The same idea occurs in the Sāṁkhya system, in which there is anessential difference between matter and soul and where there is no change of thesoul but a mixture (saṁyoga; míxis) of soul and matter.

This thesis will be discussed under three headings: (1) the interpretation of Plotinus;(2) the traditional Greek view; (3) the chronology of the Sāṁkhya system.

(1) It is true that the soul does not ‘fall’ according to Plotinus. But the reason is thatthe soul is a divine entity and therefore not subject to change. It is also true that itcan be called a mixture between the nous and the húlē, between being andnon-being. But the latter two entities are not mutally independent, and Plotinus wascertainly not a dualist.16 Lastly, the occurrence of ideas like an image, appearanceor illusion result from the character of the húlē, which is non-being and privation.This results in turn from the desire to avoid dualism. Thus Plotinus can be easilyexplained by Plotinus. We will nevertheless consider the other points.

(2) The doctrine of the fall of the soul is, for instance in Plato, not a philosophicaldoctrine but a mythological way of expression and a popular image17 - unlike, forexample the Christian metaphysical doctrine of the fall of man. The philosophicaldoctrine of Plato concerning the soul, on the other hand, deals with the differentparts of the soul, as introduced in the Republic.18 In the Timaeus, ‘the intellect’, whichis of divine origin, is opposed to the body as well as to the lower parts of the soul.The body, in which it penetrates, is for the soul a prison, a place of exile, or a

16 See above, III, 4: 191. sq.17 e.g., Phadrus 246 a; Phaedo 61 e.18 Cf. L. Robin, La pensée grecque, Paris 1928, 236.


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‘vehicle, which transports the soul but is separate from it.’19 Moreover, thePythagoreans already spoke of a rational (logikón) and an irrational (álogon) partof the soul.20 Analogous views occur in Aristotle. Thus traditional Greek doctrinesare closely related to Plotinus' ideas.

(3) For Sāṁkhya, Szabó refers to two texts; ‘Vacaspati Misra Karika’ and ‘Sūtra’.But these texts are both later than Plotinus: the first the Sāṁkhyatattvakaumudī ofVācaspati Miśra is a commentary of the IXth century upon the Sāṁkhyakārikā ofthe IVth century. The second, the Sāṁkhyasūtra, cannot be older than the Xthcentury and was even attributed to the XVth century by Garbe.21Wewould thereforehave to assume that the doctrines which are expressed in these works, are mucholder- which is of course possible as Sāṁkhya is a very old system. But we do notknow how Plotinus could have known these earlier doctrines.

Thus Szabó's thesis is unconvincing for three independent reasons.

J. Filliozat, Book-review of: A.J. Festugière, La révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste I,Paris 1944. Journal Asiatique 234 (1943-1945), 349-354.

With Filliozat we enter a new phase of research on the early relations between Indiaand Greece, where standards of scholarship are higher, statements more definiteand precise and where the need for proof is more recognized. Filliozat and severalother contemporary scholars in France provide a refutation for Bréhier's surprisingstatement of 1948, that he could not find anybody who was interested in the relationsbetween Neoplatonism and Indian thought.

The present book-review, especially of the second chapter of Festugière's book,entitled ‘Les prophètes de l'orient’, is not especially concerned with Neoplatonismbut is interesting in as far as it gives a survey of several detailed similarities betweenGreek and Indian phenomena which were recently discovered. In

19 Timée, ed. et trad. A Rivand, Paris 1949, Notice 93,20 H. Diels, Doxograph graeci, Berlin 1879, 389 sq,21 Renou-Filliozat, L'Inde classique II, 36-37.


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several cases familiarity of the Greeks with Indian culture is apparent.Firstly elements of Vedic origin seems traceable in Philostratus' Life of Appolonius

of Tyana: there is a reference to the aśvamedha22 and reference to Vedic rites andto yogic powers.23 The duration of Heraclitus ‘great year’ according to Consorimus,10.8 years, is a decimal fraction of the result of Indian calculations. The Hippocraticaltreatise ‘On winds’ resembles the more ancient Indian doctrine of prāṇa. A medicaltheory in Plato's Timaeus resembles Indian medical theories. It should be observed,that these last cases have to be studied much more closely before they can becalled decisive.

Concerning the probability of actual communications, the author rightly points to thefact that the Persian empire comprised, during the Achaemenids (a period duringwhich many Greek as well as Indian doctrines originated), the Panjab and the IndusValley, whereas many Greeks lived in the empire, which was governed, from theNile to the Indus, by one class of Aramaic speaking administrators. Moreover actualmeetings have been recorded between Greeks and Indians.24

Wemay conclude from this survey that there were actual contacts between Greeceand India, before and during the third century. This need not imply that Plotinus wasinfluenced by Indian thought. We come much nearer to this problem, however, withthe help of the following very important and interesting article of the same author.

J. Filliozat, La doctrine des brahmanes d'apres saint Hippolyte, Revue de l'Histoiredes Religions 130 (1945) 59-91 (announced in: Journal Asiatique 234 (1943-1945)451).

Shortly before 324 A.D., i.e. at least ten years before Plotinus came to Rome, theChristian saint Hippolytus wrote his Refutation

22 R. Goossens, Un texte grec relatif a l'aśvamedha, Journal Asiatique (1930) 280.23 P. Meile, Appolonius de Tyane et les rites védiques, Journal Asiatique 234, (1943-1945), 451.24 R. Festugière, Trois rencontres entre la Grèce et l'Inde, Revue de l'Histoire des Religions 125

(1942-1943), 32-57; 130 (1945) 29-41.


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of all heresies in which some passages are devoted to the ‘Brahmanas’ amongstthe Indians. Filliozat has shown that these passages presuppose a quite detailedknowledge of Upaniṣadic doctrines as expounded in the Maitri Upaniṣad. Thisknowledge cannot result from records of companions or historians of Alexander theGreat, as there is an unambiguous reference to South India: the Brahmanas aresaid to drink the water of the river ‘Tagabena’ which must be identified with the riverTuṅgaveṇā mentioned in the Mahābhārata and which is no other than the Tunga.Since Śṛṅgeri is the only well known holy spot on the banks of this river, it may havebeen a place of importance long before Śaṅkara, who according to tradition foundedhis first maṭha there.

The argument of Filliozat is rich in information and suggestions and cannot be easilysummarized. We will therefore discuss only those passages of Hippolytus' workreferring to philosophical ideas which occur in Plotinus as well as in the Upaniṣads,or which seem to occur in both traditions. We should not suppose, however, thatPlotinus could have known about Upaniṣadic thought only from Hippolytus' notice:for it is too short and lacunary. But it is certainly possible that he knew the sourcefrom which Hippolytus collected his information. Since this source is lost, we haveto confine ourselves to Hippolytus' record.

According to Hippolytus, the God of the Brahmanas is ‘not the articulated, but theone of the knowledge (gnōsis)’ and ’the Brahmanas say, that only they know it,because only they have rejected the vain opinion (kenodoxía) which is the lastgarment (khiton) of the soul’. Filliozat has convincingly argued that the reference tothe ‘God’ of the Brahmanas, can only refer to Brahman, which is the metaphysicalcounterpart of the Christian God. That Brahman is knowledge is a widespreaddoctrine in the Upaniṣads. But we have to note that the term gnosis, characteristicfor the Gnostics and probably for the Corpus Areopagiticum, is not preponderant inPlotinus. More specific in the reference to ‘vain opinion’ and Filliozat reminds. us ofUpaniṣadic passages, where the view that the Self is the body, is rejected; the bodyis only a sheath (kośa) of the Self. This points in two directions:

(1) Kenodoxía is the same as abhimāna ‘delusion’. Filliozat has defended the viewthat the Greek term actually goes back to


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this Indian term. It is interesting to observe that the Greek dóxa, e.g. in Parmenidesand since in Plato and Plotinus, has almost the same philosophical significance asthe Sanskrit avidyā which is again the same as abhimāna. (2) The several sheaths(kośas) which cover the Self form a well-known topic of the Upaniṣads, especiallyof the Taittirīya. The Maitri Upaniṣad stresses that we have to destroy our abhimānaand get rid of the sheaths hiding the Self. Though the latter idea does not occur inPlotinus, it is interesting to note that it is connected with the doctrine of abhimāna,which does exist in Plotinus as dóxa. The fact that it plays in Parmenides a moreimportant roie than in Plotinus shows that it is superflous to assume Upaniṣadicinfluence on Plotinus in this respect. But there can have been a concordance ofinfluences and it is possible that Plotinus discovered Indian confirmation of theancient Greek legacy. He may also have come to a somewhat Indianizinginterpretation of the lacunary expression of Parmenides.

There are other examples, e.g. that according to Hippolytus the Brahmanas describedthe divine as the sun. We need not argue that Plotinus might have taken this fromthe same source, since this comparison is familiar to all readers of Plato.

Filliozat is right in stressing that a Roman of the third century interested in India,e.g., Plotinus, could have a quite detailed and not inadequate knowledge ofUpaniṣadic doctrines. However before we can speak of a definite influence ofUpaniṣadic doctrines upon Plotinus, we must first show that certain features cannotbe traced back to Greek sources. This does not seem to be so.

This leads again to a consideration of the Greek background of Plotinus' thought.Moreover the susceptibility to undergo influence has to be explained with the helpof the Greek background. In this context Festugière has shown, as Filliozat mentions(in the above book-review), that the interest in the Orient since the second centuryhas to be explained against the background of the decline of Greek rationalism,which is an internal development of the Greek tradition. But Filliozat is right instressing that any Oriental influence would be impossible without adequateinformation.

O. Lacombe, A note on Plotinus and Indian thought, Silver Jubilee Commemorationvolume of the Indian Philosophical Con-


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gress, II, Calcutta 1950, 45-54 (a French version was published during the sameyear in Paris).

The starting point of this study is the research of Filliozat. The author remarks rightlythat, if knowledge of Indian thought was as accurate in Rome as Filliozat has shown,it must have been at least as good in Alexandria. But he unfortunately follows Bréhierin making the wrong assumption that ‘the section of Plotinus’ thought which suggestsa relationship with Vedāntic Brahmanism is the very section which cannot be easilyexplained on the basis of the pure philosophical tradition of Hellenism’. Accordingly,Lacombe exaggerates the importance of the Advaitic trend in Plotinus' thought,which we have characterised as a contrary tendency. Similarly, he regards the infiniteof Plotinus as an actual infinite like the Upaniṣadic plenitude. Combining those‘intrinsic similarities’ with the results of Filliozat's studies, he comes to the followingconclusion: ‘Plotinus stands at the junction of two currents of influence-Greek andIndian’. That this is an exaggeration is clear in the light of the above.

But the author himself also does not interpret this conclusion literally: he describeslater the Indian influence as ‘only slight’ and as a ‘stimulus, leading to independentdevelopment and the active assimilation of a new contribution in accord with thefundamental assumptions of the thinker subject to the “influence”.’ Such a kind ofinfluence cannot be excluded, even if it cannot be proved.

Lastly the author makes an important remark, which is not correct but which pointsto a fact which future research on the question of Indian influence on Plotinus willhave to consider: ‘Lastly, it should be remembered that, to a very large extent, thehistory of Hellenistic philosophy in the period immediately before Plotinus has stillto be written, and our ignorance of that matter may account for the difficulty we findin bridging the spiritual gap between the Enneads and classical Hellenism’.

In fact we are not so ignorant about the history of Greek philosophy, and especiallyof the Platonic schools, immediately before Plotinus, as Lacombe thinks. For thiswe should not look at the Work of Orientalists, but at that of Greek scholars. Weshall com-


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plete this critical review with a reference to two important recent contributions in thisfield. These two contributions refer to other literature on the subject.

C.J. de Vogel, On the Neoplatonic character of Platonism and the Platonic characterof Neoplatonism, Mind 62 (1953), 43-64,

The author discusses her thesis, which is programmatically announced in the title,under three headings: (1) the direct predecessors of Plotinus; (2) the interpretationof later Platonism; (3) the intermediate stages. As a wealth of important informationis given, we will record under each heading only a few points connected with topicsdiscussed in this thesis.

(1) There are many precursors of the Plotinian doctrine of an ineffable divine principlebelow which there is a divine craftsman - the parallel of the Advaitic nirguṇabrahmanand Īśvara. In the middle-Platonism of the first century there is a highest transcendentDeity and a Logos or mediator which occupies the intermediate place between thisDeity and man, and which is called ‘second God’. Philo of Alexandria called thehighest divine entity ‘the God’ and called the Logos ‘god’. Numenius called the firstGod an ‘inactive king’ and the second ‘craftsman (demiurge)’. In the CorpusHermeticum the first place is occupied by a spirit (nous) which is God and Father;but there is a ‘second spirit’ which is ‘demiurge’. Apart from these differentmanifestations of the same idea, it can be said that Platonism was since the firstcentury interpreted as teaching a hierarchy of being.

(2) If we pay attention to Aristotle's accounts of the doctrines of the last years ofPlato's life, as has been done by L. Robin, W.D. Ross, and others, we have toconclude that Plato in his later years taught a system of philosophy which wasmarked by the doctrine of a hierarchy of being. The later dialogues also containindications pointing in this direction. Especially the difficult dialogue Parmenidesseems easily to give rise to a Neoplatonic interpretation.

(3) Between Plato and the Platonism of the first centuries Antiochus of Ascalonintroduced the idea of a ‘philosophy of synthesis’ and at the same time a kind oftraditionalism, which did not wish to break the authority of the ‘ancients’ but on thecontrary to restore the ‘old doctrine’ by a synthesis of Plato, Aristotle and the Stoa.


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Even in the Aristotelian Porch Posidonius of Apamea admitted Platonic elementsinto his doctrine. Lastly, in the early Academy itself, Speusippus and Xenocrates,adopting the Master's doctrine of first principles, taught a certain hierarchy of being.

In the light of these results it is clear, that anyone who claims that there are elementsin Plotinus which are of Indian origin because they cannot be ‘easily explained onthe basis of the pure philosophical tradition of Hellenism’, will have to investigatecarefully and in great detail whether the so called ‘empty’ six centuries betweenPlato and Plotinus do not provide material showing how history bridged the gapbetween Platonism and Neoplatonism.

The same results follow from the materials dealt with in the following work.

P. Merlan, From Platonism to Neoplatonism, The Hague 1953.

This stimulating book does not only provide much, partly new, material (theinterpretation of which is partly discussed in a book review by A.H. Armstrong)25 butconstitutes itself an interesting philosophical study. The author shows in hisintroduction as also de Vogel does how history has almost always looked uponPlatonism and Neoplatonism as having a very close connection or as being virtuallyidentical. The differences were stressed since the XIXth century, but during the lastdecades there is again a tendency among scholars to bridge the gap.

We will mention three points dealt with in this book which are of special interest inthe present context.

(1) The Neoplatonic idea of deriving the entire universe from the One is a naturaldevelopment of the systems of Plato's pupils Speusippus and Xenocrates as wellas (according to Aristotle), of Plato himself. ‘Themost striking feature of this derivativesystemwas the derivation of physicals, i.e. sensibles, from the anterior, non-sensible,unextended, timeless spheres’. An example is the way in which physical propertiesand even the atoms themselves were derived from mathematical entities.26

25 Mind 64 (1955), 273-274.26 See 173, n. 1.


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(2) One of the two main principles of Speusippus, as known from a newly discoveredfragment, is above being and thus ‘strictly comparable to the One of Plotinus andother Neoplatonists’. ‘The particular originality of Speusippus seems to consist inhis having described the second principle as above nonbeing’.27

(3) The meaning of the notion of ‘being as such’, ‘being qua being’ (ón ḕi ón) inAristotle's Metaphysics has to be reinterpreted. In this interpretation, the subjectmatter of Aristotle's Metaphysics becomes indeterminate being, ‘which, because itis indeterminate, is unrestricted and therefore first and fully being’. It is thereforejustified to speak about an Aristoteles Neoplatonicus, This indeterminate being leadsagain to the Neoplatonic One.28

Our general conclusion is that it will be the task of future research on the questionof Indian influence on Neoplatonism to find aspects of Neoplatonism which cannotbe understood against the background of the Greek tradition. In the light of recentresearch, however, where the six centuries between Plato and Plotinus are no longerneglected, it seems unlikely that such aspects can be found. If they will benevertheless found and if they are derivable from ideas occurring in the Upaniṣads,it will, in the light of the research of Filliozat, be very likely that the Upaniṣadsinfluenced Plotinus. Apart from this it remains very well possible that Plotinus knewsomething of Upaniṣadic doctrines and was aware of their similarity to his own ideas.

Another question, with which we have not occupied ourselves, is, whether Plotinus'Greek predecessors, and thus he himself indirectly, were influenced by any aspectsof Indian thought. In the case of Plato this is at any rate very unlikely.29 But in thecase of the Pre-Socratics it is possible, though we can at present not say anythingmore definite about it.30

27 Cf. Schelling: 117.28 Cf. above, III, 4: 194 and III, 3: 185.29 Indian influence is never seriously defended. Cf. for Iranian and Egyptian influence Koster's

book, quoted above 236, n. 330 Cf. G.P. Conger, Did India influence early Greek Philosophies? Philosophy East and West,

2 (1952), 102-128.


251

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255

UPANISHADSChāndogyopaniṣad.Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad.Aitareyopaniṣad.Kauṣītakī Brāhmaṇopaniṣad.Kaṭhopaniṣad.Muṇḍakopaniṣad.Māṇḍukyopaniṣad.Taittirīyopaniṣad.VACASPATI MISRA, Bhāmatī (catussūtrī), ed. and transl. S.S. SuryanarayanaSastri and C. Kunhan Raja, Madras 1933.C.J. de Vogel, Examen critique de l'interprétation traditionnelle du platonisme,Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 56 (1951) 249-68.Id. On the Neoplatonis character of Platonism and the Platonic character ofNeoplatonism, Mind 62 (1953) 43-64.Id. Het monisme van Plotinus, Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voorWijsbegeerte en Psychologie 48 (1956) 99-112.R.C. Zaehner, Hindu and Muslim mysticism, London 1960.H. Zimmer, Kunstform und Yoga im indischen Kultbild, Berlin 1926.Id. Philosophies of India, London 1952.

Abbreviations

Abbreviations of the form III, 5: 199" refer to this book (i.e., Part III, section 5,page 199),Abbreviations of the form ‘4.1.13’ refer to the Brahmasūtra-(bhāṣya) (i.e., 4thadhyāya, 1st pāda, 13th sūtra).Abbreviations of the form ‘II 4.5.15’ refer to the Enneads (i.e., second ennead,4th treatise, 5th chapter, 15th line (of the edition of Bréhier). )

AitareyopaniṣadAit. Up.BṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣadBAUBhagavad GītāBGBrahmasūtra-(bhāṣya)BS(B)ChāndogyopaniṣadCUEnneadsEnn.ĪśopaniṣadIUMetaphysicaMet.MuṇḍakopaniṣadMuṇḍ. Up.ParmenidesParm.PhaedoPhaed.PhaedrusPhaedr.Res PublicaRep.


TaittirīyopanṣadTait. Up.TimaeusTim.UpaniṣadUp.


257

Index of names

'Abd al-Karīm al-Jīlī, 204.Abhinavagupta, 218.Adam, J., 200.Aitareyāraṇyaka, 73.Aitareyopaniṣad, 44, 255.Alexander Aphrodisias, 134.Alexander the Great, 244.'Alī, 224.Amelius, 167.Ānandagiri, 34.Anaximander, 237.Angelus Silesius, 113.Appayya Dikṣita, see Siddhāntaleśasaṁgraha.Aristotle, 20-1, 134-5, 163-4, 170-2, 175-7, 181-2, 185, 189-90, 196, 198, 209,237, 247-9, 251, 253.Armstrong, A.H., 236-9, 248, 251.Arnaury de Bène, 206.Arnou, R., 168, 186, 251.Augustine, 7, 27, 204.Ayer, A.J., 10.

Bādarāyaṇa, 93, 105.Barth, K, 221.Basilides, 186.Belvalkar, S.K., 33, 140, 226, 251.Bense, M., 27.Bergson, H., 160, 169.Bertholet, 47.Bertling, C. Tj., 24.Bhagavadgītā, 6, 50, 63, 86, 95-7, 123, 133-4, 139, 154, 225, 251-2.Bhāmatī, 81, 94-5, 117, 121, 255.Bharata Iyer, K.B., 104.Bhartṛhari, 32.Bhartṛprapañca, 137.Bhattacharya Sastri, A., 30, 102, 104-5, 119, 121, 124, 251.Bhattacharyya, K.C., 127-8, 133-4, 138, 143, 145-6, 149, 150, 156-7, 177, 251.Bhoja, 218.Bocheński I.M., 68.Bodhāyana, 92.Boehtlingk, O., 52.Bonaventura, 222.Bosch, F.D.K., 40.Brahmadatta, 93.Bréhier, E., 27, 164, 166-7, 170, 175, 178-80, 185, 187, 192, 199, 201-2, 218,220, 235-8, 246, 251, 253.Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad, 7, 49, 53, 57-60, 68, 95-6, 99, 106-8, 113, 127, 137,153, 156, 216, 255.Brouwer, L.E.J., 20, 120.Bruno, G., 47.


Buddha, 135, 239.Buddhaghosa, 48.Burckhardt, J., 12.Burnet, J., 219.Burtt, E.A., 22.

Chaitanya, 216.Chāndogyopaniṣad, 5, 36, 38-9, 42, 49, 56, 59, 63, 73-5, 85, 96, 105, 108,125, 128-9, 133, 152, 156-7, 215, 255.Chandraśekhara Bhāratī, 232-3.Chari, C.T.K., 20.Chrysippus, 167.Citsukha, 104.Cohen, H., 124.Conger, G.P., 249, 251.Consorimus, 243.Coomaraswamy, A.K., 39, 53, 108, 188, 206, 211, 251.Cowell, E.B., 75.Cudworth, R., 239.Cullmann, O., 14.Curtius, E.R., 202.

Damascius, 161, 186.Daumal, R., 34.Dara Shikoh, 204.Dasgupta, S.N., 13, 46, 56, 62, 82, 88, 93-4, 98, 120, 150, 188, 251.Descartes, R., 42, 135, 208.Deussen, P., 27-8, 30-1, 47, 50, 106, 156, 251.


258

Dharmarāja, see Vedāntaparibhāṣā.Diels, H., 165, 218, 226, 237, 242.Dietz, P., 99.Dilthey, W., 12, 19.Dodds, E.R., 178, 186, 194, 199, 251.Dostoievski, F., 21.Dumont, L., 225, 251.

Edgerton, F., 96, 251.Eisler, R., 202.Eliade, M., 14, 131.Eliot, C., 47, 251.Empedocles, 165, 241.Erasmus, D., 205.Exodus, 186, 215.

Faddegon, B., 95, 216, 251.Festugière, A.J., 189, 242-3, 245.Ficino, M., 206.Filliozat, J., 35-6, 41, 44, 46, 56, 61-3, 71, 73, 131, 239, 242-6, 249, 251.Freud, S., 43, 57.

Gandhi, M.K., 55.Gauḍapāda, 33-4, 86, 130, 136, 156, 216, 253.Gauthier, L., 223, 251.Geldner, K.F., 52, 73.Genesis, 214, 217, 221.al-Ghazzālī, 204, 221.Ghate, V.S., 34-5, 96, 251.Gilson, E., 184, 205-6, 22-3, 251.Goethe, J.W. von, 18, 47, 182, 207-8, 228.Gonda, J., 44, 55, 87, 122, 152, 252.Goossens, R., 243.Gorgias, 195.Grosseteste, R., 205.Guénon, R., 37, 50, 156, 165, 177, 195, 199, 252.Guitton, J., 14, 183.

Hacker, P., 42, 116, 118-9, 124-5, 136, 142-4, 147, 149, 194, 252.Harder, 47.Heesterman, J.C., 41, 57.Hegel, G.W.F., 19, 22, 27, 135.Heidegger, M., 10-1, 15, 19, 31, 45, 65-7, 69-70, 121, 135, 153-5, 252.Heimann, B., 40, 42, 44, 56, 60, 62, 152, 156-7, 252.Heisenberg, W., 196.Helmont, J.B. van, 47.Henry, P., 178, 184, 204, 226-7, 230, 252.Heraclitus, 197, 218-9, 237-8, 241, 243.Hermodorus, 182.Hesiodus, 164, 237.Hilduin, 205.


Hillebrandt, A., 215.Hippolytus, 243-5, 251.Hiriyanna, M., 13, 36, 71, 77-8, 90, 92-4, 100, 103, 124, 137, 143, 150, 252.Homer, 219, 228.Horten, M., 205.Hubert, H., 61.Husain, Y., 204.Husserl, E., 10, 154.

Ibn 'Arabī, 27, 113, 190, 204.Ibn Rushd, 134, 204, 221-3.Ibn Taimīya, 27.Ibsen, H., 47.Ingalls, D.H.H., 9, 120, 123, 137, 252.Inge, W.R., 186, 212, 239, 252.

Jacob, G.A., 98.Jacobi, H., 239.Jaeger, W., 218, 252.Jaimini, 38, 80, 93, 143.Jaspers, K., 4, 134,-5, 159, 205.Jha, G.N., 65, 73, 92, 108, 145-6, 150, 153, 216, 252, 254.Jung, C.G., 43, 46, 67, 157.

Kaṇāda, 32.Kane, P.V., 215.Kant, I., 28, 30, 42, 47, 117, 123-4, 165.Kapali Sastri, T.V., 36.Kapila 32, 106.Kassim, A.M., 204.Kaṭhopaniṣad, 58, 86, 94, 96, 255.Kauṣītakī Brāhmaṇopaniṣad, 75, 77, 255;Keith, A.B., 51, 62, 72, 240, 252.Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya, 30, 60.Kierkegaard, S., 18, 22, 27.Klibansky, R., 180, 252.


259

Koster, W.J.W., 235-6, 249, 252.Kramrisch, S., 210.Kranz, W., 226.Kraus, P., 187, 252.Krishnaswami Aiyar, R., 232-3, 252.Krishnaswami, V., 37.Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, 77, 93.Kuppuswami Sastri, S., 59, 94.

Lacombe, O., 31-2, 59-60, 101, 106, 110, 113, 119, 155, 246-7, 252,Lauffer, S., 165.Lavater, J.K., 47.Law, B.C, 47, 252.Lessing, G.E., 47.Lichtenberg, 47.Litt, T., 19.Loenen, J.H.M.M., 174, 201.Loewith, K., 12.

Macdonald, D.B., 205.Macdonell, A.A., 51.Madhavananda, Swami, 57, 59, 100, 107, 137, 254.Madhva, 37, 97, 135.Mahadeva Sastri, A., 50, 253-4.Mahadevan, T.M.P., 27, 32-4, 57-8, 70, 74-6, 84, 87, 89, 91, 95, 102-3, 105,108, 111, 120, 130-2, 143, 147, 150, 153, 156-7, 216, 225, 233, 252-3.Mahānnidesa, 48.Maitrāyaṇopaniṣad, 44.Maitryupaniṣad, 36, 244-5.Maṇḍana Miśra, 93-4.Māṇḍukyopaniṣad, 156, 255.Mani, 240.Mānikka-Vāsagar, 217, 254.Mann, Th., 228.Manusmṛti, 30.Mariën, B., 183.Massignon, L., 9, 204-5.Masson-Oursel, P., 1, 152, 204.Masui, J., 34.Mauss, M., 61.McTaggart, 47.Mehta, J.L., 70, 153.Meile, P., 243.Meister Eckehart, 27, 206-7, 254.Melissos, 237.Merlan, P., 162, 186, 190, 192-3, 248-9, 253.Michelangelo, 214.Milindapanha, 49.Mitra, R.R., 75.Mohanty, J.N., 160, 253.Monier-Williams, M., 39, 46.


Moore, C.A., 22.Muḥammad, 224.Müller, H.K., 235-6, 253.Muṇḍakopaniṣad, 44, 76, 91, 96, 105, 131, 141, 176, 255.Murti, T.R.V., 48-9, 70, 102, 123, 137, 142, 253.

Nāgārjuna, 136.Nārāyaṇānanda Sarasvatī, 129.Natorp, P., 124.Neumann, E., 40, 43-4, 60, 67.Nietzsche, F., 13-15, 17, 26, 135, 163.Nikhilananda, Swami, 71.Nirukta, 34.Nock, A.D., 189.Northrop, F.C.S., 22.Numenius, 247.Nyberg, H.S., 25-7, 190.

Oldenberg, H., 43-4, 52, 54-5, 62, 72, 253.Otto, R., 98, 182-3, 210, 253.

Padmapāda, 84.Pañcaviṁśa BrāhmaǤa, 72.Pandey, K.C., 218.Parmenides, 19, 28, 169, 197, 199, 226.Pascal, B., 7, 18, 22, 208.Patañjali, 81, 205.Philo of Alexandria, 215, 218, 247.Philostratus, 243.Pistorius, P.V., 178, 212, 239.Plato, 28, 39, 116, 124, 135, 162-6, 172, 174-5, 179-81, 184, 189-90, 197-201,208-9, 213, 220, 226-7, 238-9, 241, 243, 245, 247-9, 253.Plotinus, passim.Plutarch, 237.Polybius, 165.


260

Porphyry, 162, 167, 177, 189, 213, 235, 253.Posidonius of Apamea, 248.Pott, P.H., 58.Prabhākara, 145.Prakāśānanda, 120.Proclus, 161, 180, 194-5, 199, 253.Przyluski, J., 239-40, 253.Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita, 180, 184, 205, 244, 247.Puech, H.C., 14, 175, 183, 192, 240, 253.Pythagoras, 165.

Qur'ān, 205, 215, 217, 222.

Radhakrishnan, S., 30, 122, 239, 253.Raghavan, V., 218.Rāmānuja, 37, 82, 92, 97, 120, 135, 141, 160, 188.Ranade, R.D. 51-2, 71, 75-6, 253.Ratnaprabhā, 81, 87, 91.Reinhardt, K., 167, 226.Renou, L., 35-6, 41-2, 44, 46, 52, 56, 61-3, 71, 73, 81, 86, 90-2, 131, 137, 217,239, 242, 251, 253-4.Rivaud, A., 241.Robin, L., 247.Roer, E., 76.Ross, W.D., 134, 171-2, 176, 181, 184, 196, 200-1, 247, 253.Roth, 52.Ruben, W., 42, 55.Rueg, D.S., 216.

Śabara, 80.Sadānanda, 253; see Vedāntasāra.Sālikanātha Miśra, 65, 145.Śaṅkara, passim,Śaṅkaradigvijaya, 139.Sanyal, N., 216.Sarracenus, J., 205.Sartre, J.P., 41, 68, 155.Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha, 195.Śatapatha Āraṇyaka, 73.Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, 54-6, 62, 76, 216.Schelling, F.W.J., 159.Schomerus, H.W., 207, 254.Schopenhauer, A., 27-8, 124.Schroeder, E., 193.Schuon, F., 165.Scotus Eriugena, 205.Senart, E., 38, 56, 73.Sengupta, B.K., 95, 254.Sextus Empiricus, 182.Siddhāntaleśasaṃgraha, 111, 130, 147.Siddhesvarananda, Swami, 254.


Silburn, 40, 69, 216, 254.Simplicius, 182.Smet, R. de, 61, 107, 206, 254.Snouck Hurgronje, C., 190.Speiser, A., 203.Speusippus, 186, 205, 248-9.Śrī Aurobindo, 22, 35-6, 101, 134-5, 137, 160, 209.Srinivasachari, P.N., 82, 92, 98, 254.Śrutisārasamuddharaṇa, 136.Staal, J.F., 14, 32, 35, 40, 55, 61, 63, 79, 95, 139, 153, 162, 164, 197, 203-4,215-6, 225-6, 239, 254.Steenkiste, C. van, 223.Śuka, 37.Sureśvara, 57, 84, 86, 91, 94-5, 116, 149, 254.Suryanarayana Sastri, S.S., 95.Suzuki, 239.Svetāśvataropaniṣad, 36, 99, 122, 138.Swedenborg, E. von, 47.Szabó, A. 236, 240-2, 254.

Taittirīya Brāhmana, 43.Taittirīya Saṁhita, 51, 72, 77.Taittirīyopaniṣad, 43-4, 58-9, 105-6, 125, 216, 245, 255.Tāṇḍya Brāhmana, 77.Techert, M., 236.Thibaut, G., 32-3, 77, 80-1, 83, 86, 96, 108-9, 117, 133, 137-8, 141, 144.Thomas Aquinas, 134, 140, 171, 205, 221.Thucydides, 165.Traversari, E., 205.

Vācaspati Miśra, see Bhāmatī.Vallabha, 153.Vallee Poussin, L. de la, 239Vaśiṣṭa, 35.


261

Vedāntaparibhāṣā, 6, 30, 35, 60, 95, 105-6, 251.Vedāntasāra, 6, 71, 100, 103, 143, 150.Veṅkaṭanātha, 82.Venkataramiah, D., 84-5, 94, 105, 253-4.Verdenius, W.J., 226.Vidyāraṇya, 102-3, 141, 143.Viśvāmitra, 35.Viśvasāratantra, 58.Vogel, C.J. de, 191, 198, 215, 239, 247-8, 255.Vyāsatīrtha, 82.

Wadia, A.R., 151.Waelhens, A. de, 65-6.Wahl, J., 186.Warren, H.C., 49.Wilamowitz, U von, 226.Wittgenstein. L., 159.Wolf, J., 203.Woodroffe, Sir J., 9.Wundt, H., 186.

Xenocrates, 248.

Zaehner, R.C., 97, 152, 205, 255.Zeno, 197.Zimmer, H., 55, 71, 140, 210-1, 255.Zoetmulder, P.J., 24.

Errata

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262

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advaita and neoplatonism

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