advancing sustainable development between conflict and ... · development, some locals fear it is a...

APRIL 2018

Advancing Sustainable Developmentbetween Conflict and Peace inMyanmar

MONA CHRISTOPHERSEN AND SVEIN ERIK STAVE

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

MONA CHRISTOPHERSEN is a researcher at the FafoResearch Foundation (Oslo) and was a Senior Adviser atthe International Peace Institute.

SVEIN ERIK STAVE is a researcher at the Fafo ResearchFoundation (Oslo).

ABOUT THE PROJECT

IPI launched the SDGs4Peace project in 2016 tounderstand how the 2030 Agenda for SustainableDevelopment is being rooted at the national and locallevels and to support the implementation of theSustainable Development Goals (SDGs). In its preamble,the 2030 Agenda states, “There can be no sustainabledevelopment without peace and no peace without sustain-able development.” The SDGs4Peace project asks howcountries are operationalizing this link in practice to realizethe 2030 Agenda’s holistic vision.

The project focuses on five case studies: the Gambia,Greece, Guatemala, Lebanon, and Myanmar. Each of thesecase studies is based on fieldwork, including interviewswith representatives of governments, the private sector,academia, and civil society. While these countries are atdifferent levels of development, each is going through aperiod of internal transformation. Implementation of the2030 Agenda therefore provides them an opportunity notonly to buttress existing aspirations but also to build newpartnerships that transcend traditional approaches.

As many countries are only just starting to implement the2030 Agenda, this project also presents an opportunity tospread the word about the SDGs and why they matter tolocal leaders and communities. By bridging the local withthe global, it can highlight ways of working toward sharedgoals and adapting them to specific contexts.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors would like to thank all the people they met inMyanmar and elsewhere for generously sharing their timeand insights and contributing to this report. The authorswould further thank Jon Pedersen, research director atFafo, and Marte Nilsen, senior researcher at the PeaceResearch Institute Oslo (PRIO) specializing in politicalconflicts, ethnicity, religion, and nation building in Myanmar,for giving useful advice that contributed to improving thisreport.

Different views are presented and analyzed to the best ofour ability, yet we take responsibility for any misunder-standing and incoherence in the report.

IPI would like to thank the Fafo Research Foundation forco-funding the field research in Myanmar and for its contri-butions throughout the case study implementation.

Cover Photo: Karen refugee children

pay attention during a first-grade math

class in Mae La Oon refugee camp,

June 21, 2006. © UNHCR/J. Redfern

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this

paper represent those of the authors

and not necessarily those of the

International Peace Institute. IPI

welcomes consideration of a wide

range of perspectives in the pursuit of

a well-informed debate on critical

policies and issues in international

affairs.

IPI Publications

Adam Lupel, Vice President

Albert Trithart, Editor

Madeline Brennan, Associate Editor

Suggested Citation:

Mona Christophersen and Svein Erik

Stave, “Advancing Sustainable

Development between Conflict and

Peace in Myanmar,” New York:

International Peace Institute, April 2018.

© by International Peace Institute, 2018

All Rights Reserved

www.ipinst.org

CONTENTS

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

METHODS AND LIMITATIONS

Sustainable Development and Peace . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Implementation of the 2030 Agendain Myanmar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

THE SDGs AS A NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT TOOL

THE LINKS BETWEEN ENDING POVERTY ANDFOSTERING PEACE

DECENTRALIZATION: TOWARD MORE INCLUSIVEDECISION MAKING

MANAGEMENT OF LAND AND RESOURCES:A POLITICAL PROCESS BEYOND DEVELOPMENT

SUSTAINABLE ENERGY FOR ALL

EDUCATION AS A DRIVER OF COHESION ANDCONFLICT

CHANGING THE BUSINESS MODEL IN MYANMAR:A NEW APPROACH TO PARTNERSHIPS

Conclusions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Executive Summary

In recent years Myanmar has gone throughfundamental changes due to the reformsimplemented by the governments of Thein Seinand Aung San Suu Kyi. This transformationprovides Myanmar with a unique opportunity tobuild a peaceful and inclusive society and advanceon the path to sustainable development and peace.Yet Myanmar remains submerged in conflict andlacks national consensus on the future of the state.These disagreements fall along three main faultlines: the Bamar majority population representedby the central government, ethnic-minority groupsthat have signed cease-fire agreements with thegovernment, and ethnic-minority groups that arestill in conflict with the government. Perspectiveson issues of peace and development vary amongthese categories of stakeholders, as do theiropportunity and ability to implement and engagewith the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Developmentand its seventeen Sustainable Development Goals(SDGs).These fault lines underscore the centrality of the

nexus between peace and sustainable developmentto Myanmar’s implementation of the 2030 Agenda.Achieving this agenda will require a conflict-sensitive approach that includes assessing thepotential impact of development initiatives onconflict and on peace by analyzing both factors thatcould promote unity and drivers of particularconflicts. While the government has embarked onthe process of implementing the 2030 Agenda,implementation is more relevant for the centralareas of the country were the majority Bamarpopulation lives. In contrast, the goals are moredifficult to implement and, to some extent, lessrelevant in ethnic-minority areas, particularly thoseaffected by ongoing armed conflict. The divergentperspectives among these three groups manifestthemselves across many areas of sustainabledevelopment.Myanmar’s central government sees clear links

between poverty reduction and peace. In reality,however, processes generating poverty and drivingconflict are often complicated and include complexstructures of privilege and exclusion combinedwith local and traditional ways of organizing social,political, and economic life. As a result, the govern-ment’s efforts to reduce poverty might not reduce

levels of conflict as intended. Many ethnic-minority leaders, on the other hand, see sustainablepeace and stability as the most important andeffective way to improve the quality of life for theirpeople. However, peace agreements do notautomatically improve opportunities and liveli-hoods.Decentralization is another contested subject in

Myanmar. For the central government, decentral-ization entails delegating authority to a stateminister and local state institutions appointed bythe central government and operating as anextension of its authority. Local ethnic-minorityleaders, however, understand decentralization asdelegating decision-making authority to moreautonomous and preferably elected localgovernance bodies, giving ethnic minorities ameasure of self-determination. This touches uponone of the most challenging dilemmas facing thefuture development of the country: how tocombine building a common national identity withallowing for cultural and political diversity.One area in which the government’s decentral-

ization policy aims to give local stakeholders moreauthority is the management of land and resources.This is particularly important because many ofMyanmar’s natural resources are found in ethnic-minority areas where the government does nothave full control and where local land policies oftendiffer from those of the central government. Hereagain, the goals of the central government andethnic-minority groups differ. The government ispromoting large economic development projectsthat would generate revenue but also exacerbateecological destruction and displacement. Similartensions arise when it comes to addressingMyanmar’s electricity shortages, which the centralgovernment is seeking to address through largehydropower projects that would adversely affectthe local environment and people.Education, which Myanmar’s government is

addressing through a new strategy adopted in 2012,can be a driver of both cohesion and conflict inMyanmar. Nationwide, the country faceschallenges in improving access to and the quality ofeducation. These challenges are particularlypronounced in areas where people do not speakBamar, the language of the ethnic majority. Whenthe central government establishes new schools inethnic-minority areas in an effort to enhance

1

development, some locals fear it is a form ofcolonization, which can drive conflict.Nonetheless, the cooperation between the centralgovernment and ethnic-minority groups indesigning the education system in Mon state canserve as an example of how education can alsobuild peace and social cohesion.As part of its broader transition, Myanmar has

rapidly shifted from a state-centered economytoward a more open, market-oriented economy.One of the government’s strategies to make thistransition has been to form public-private partner-ships, particularly related to infrastructure. Thesepartnerships are often challenging, however, asMyanmar has a complex regulatory framework anda history of corporate social responsibility beingused as an instrument of corruption. Partnershipsthus need to be developed through a conflict-sensitive approach to ensure they promoteinclusive economic growth and fulfill the 2030Agenda’s promise to “leave no one behind.”The government of Myanmar has made impres-

sive progress since its adoption of the 2030 Agenda,which already underpins the work of all relevantministries, many of which have developed concreteplans intended to work toward the SDGs. Yet thiswork primarily represents the vision of the centralgovernment. A more challenging task is to createsynergies between the work on the SDGs and thevisions for peace and development of ethnic-minority groups, including the Rohingya, which iscurrently the country’s most persecuted group.Advancing on both sustaining peace and the 2030Agenda will require addressing more systemic andcross-ministerial challenges. The following aregeneral recommendations to address thesechallenges:1. Continue the development of national laws andregulatory frameworks according to interna-tional standards and national needs.

2. Use SDG-related development initiatives topromote inclusion and to re-establish trust innational governance, particularly among ethnic-minority groups.

3. Continue to develop governance capacity.4. Ensure a balance between economic growth andenvironmental sustainability.

5. Bring sustaining peace into the SDG agenda.

6. Ensure a cross-ministerial approach to theSDGs.

Introduction

Since Myanmar’s independence from Britain in1948, the country’s government has been fightingboth political and ethnic rebellions. While thepolitical insurgencies weakened over time, ethnicgroups continued to fight for self-determination.The ethnic groups claim some degree of autonomyto preserve their identity and cultural heritage, aswell as control over land and valuable resources.The conflict is complex and multifaceted, withmany armed ethnic groups engaged in separate andparallel conflicts, which is complicatinggovernance as well as prospects for peaceagreements.After decades of military rule, the first election in

Myanmar in nineteen years was held in 2010.However, the party of opposition leader Aung SanSuu Kyi, the National League for Democracy(NLD), did not participate in the election, and themilitary-supported Union Solidarity andDevelopment Party (USDP) won 77 percent of theseats in parliament and formed a civil governmentin March 2011. Despite its contested legitimacy, thenew government, led by President Thein Sein,implemented democratic and economic reformsand adopted a conciliatory approach toward theopposition and its leader. The government alsoinitiated a peace process with the ethnic armedorganizations, ordered the release of politicalprisoners, and eased restrictions on media and civilsociety, while the international communitysupported the process and lifted economicsanctions.Although challenges remain, particularly related

to the military’s willingness to move beyondlimited reforms toward real constitutional changesthat would reduce its guaranteed position of power,the positive developments nevertheless convincedthe NLD to participate in national politics,including the 2012 by-elections and the 2015general elections. After a landslide victory that tookmany in the military and others by surprise, theNLD won a majority in parliament and formed thecurrent government under the de facto leadershipof Aung San Suu Kyi. Yet most ethnic-minorityparties were marginalized in the process, and the

2 Mona Christophersen and Svein Erik Stave

ADVANCING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT BETWEEN CONFLICT AND PEACE IN MYANMAR 3

military is still constitutionally guaranteed 25percent of the parliamentary seats and control oversome strategic ministries. The reform processes and transition from

military rule toward democracy provide a historicopportunity for Myanmar to build a peaceful andinclusive society and advance on the path tosustainable development, a path that severalinterviewees claimed the country’s leaders hadembraced. Yet it is important to consider thatMyanmar remains submerged in conflict and lacksnational consensus on state formation and thefuture of the state. These disagreements fall alongthree main fault lines separating different groups,or “categories,”1 with particular perspectives orvisions for how the country should be organizedand developed. These categories and visionsemerge from many different groups’ specifichistorical and formative experience with conflict aswell as these groups’ relations to the centralgovernment. The three categories of stakeholderscan roughly be outlined as follows:1. The Bamar majority population represented bythe central government, mainly living in thecentral lowlands of Myanmar. Their vision forMyanmar mainly focuses on building peace andkeeping the union of states together as a nation.However, the central government is notcurrently a unified force in Myanmar due to theweak relationship between the democraticallyelected government and the military, which stillhas significant political and economic power.2

2. Ethnic-minority groups that have signed cease-fire agreements with the government underwhat is called the Nationwide CeasefireAgreement (NCA), mainly living in the hillyareas in the southeast of the country. Theirvision for Myanmar is a confederate state thatgives the ethnic states some degree of autonomyand control over natural resources.

3. Ethnic-minority groups that are still in conflictwith the government and have not signed theNCA, mainly living in the northern and westernhills of the country. These groups demand

autonomy and self-determination, which arenot yet included to their satisfaction in thecurrent negotiations for cease-fires.As a result, perspectives on issues of peace and

development vary among these categories ofstakeholders, as do their opportunity and ability toimplement and engage with the 2030 Agenda forSustainable Development and its seventeenSustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The 2030Agenda is most easily implemented in the Bamar-majority areas where the central government andlocal population largely share visions for develop-ment and the future of the country.In the areas covered by the cease-fire agreement,

implementation of the 2030 Agenda is somewhatpossible, because development is welcome inprinciple and increasingly possible because ofimproved stability under the cease-fire. However,as long as issues around autonomy and self-determination remain unresolved, developmentinitiatives will continue to be met with frequentsuspicion, as locals often question the motivesbehind government-led initiatives. Such obstaclescan be resolved through inclusive and consultativeprocesses that allow local involvement in the designand implementation of these initiatives.In the areas not yet covered by cease-fires,

implementation of the 2030 Agenda remains verydifficult to implement. Lack of security impedesplanning and strategy formulation on a larger scaleand limits development actors’ access to conflictareas. Further, should projects be implemented inthese conflict-affected areas, they would be high-risk and vulnerable to disruption and destruction.Yet the wide-ranging political and economic

reforms introduced since 2011 make Myanmar aparticularly interesting case for studying theimplementation of the 2030 Agenda, as the transi-tion sheds light on some of the core issues facingsustainable development efforts more broadly. Onechallenge is whether transition toward a marketeconomy can be reconciled with sustainabledevelopment. A related issue is environmentalchallenges, particularly forest degradation. Further,

1 The term “category” is more accurate in this context because the term “group” indicates some degree of belonging and self-definition, which is absent. Instead, thefocus here is on a vision loosely shared between different groups that otherwise have little in common. However, they do have a “stake” in how Myanmar isdeveloped, and therefore the term “stakeholders” will also be used in reference to the individuals within these categories for the purposes of this report.

2 The military often prioritizes what it defines as security over democratic development and thus impedes the government’s ambitions and ability to pursue bothdemocratic and peaceful development.


land rights are of particular concern in Myanmar,as land is frequently confiscated for developmentprojects with little or inadequate compensation.Another key dilemma is the relationship betweennew forms of economic development and outdatedregulatory frameworks and governance structures.The challenges of the country reflect the need toimplement integrated policies within the mindsetof the 2030 Agenda, which commits to “leave noone behind” and to make every life count.Myanmar ranks number 145 out of the 187

countries on the Human Development Indexdespite rapid, stable economic growth in recentyears and substantial foreign investment.3 Currentchallenges facing the country relate to most of theSDGs, including the need for inclusive economicgrowth (SDG 8), an end to poverty (SDG 1),improved infrastructure (SDG 9), greater employ-ment opportunities and a regulated labor market(SDGs 8 and 16), increased access to better-qualityeducation (SDG 4), stronger government institu-tions (SDG 16), gender equality (SDG 5), reducedinequality (SDG 10), and promotion of inclusionand human rights (SDG 16).Developing governance based on the rule of law

and democratic principles is another importanttask for the current government. After decades ofauthoritarian governance, there is a need totransform the legal system. The attorney-general’soffice is responsible for drafting new laws andproviding legal advice to the government on allmatters that require legal scrutiny, includingeducation, health, gender equality, and economics.A law on environmental protection was formulatedin 2011 by the newly established Ministry forEnvironmental Protection and passed thefollowing year. Myanmar has also developedinvestment laws to adapt to a market economy.

Another key challenge is the inclusion ofMyanmar’s 135 officially recognized ethnic-minority groups.4 The Bamar (Burman) majoritymakes up about two-thirds of the population,primarily resides in the central parts of the country,and is the most politically influential group. Theremaining ethnic-minority groups mainly reside inthe hilly and resource-rich border areas wheremany of them are engaged in decades-longstruggles for greater autonomy and self-determina-tion.There are growing concerns about the rights of

certain minority groups, particularly the RohingyaMuslims, a people numbering around 1 millionand living mainly in Rakhine state borderingBangladesh, where many more live as refugees.5The latest surge of violence in Rakhine state beganduring the summer and fall of 2017, following the“August 25th” incident where the Arkan RohingyaSalvation Army (ARSA) attacked army and policeoutposts. Shortly thereafter, reports of the armedforces of Myanmar raiding and burning Rohingyavillages started to emerge, claiming that as many as600,000 Rohingya had been forced to flee thecountry in search of refuge in neighboringBangladesh and beyond.6

The government’s failure to protect this minoritygroup has provoked concern among internationalactors, including the UN. In February 2017 the UNpublished a report that found that governmenttroops “very likely [committed] crimes againsthumanity” since renewed military crackdowns onthe Rohingya began in October 2016.7 Another UNreport released in September 2017 claimed that thelatest attacks on the Rohingya were part of asystematic plan not only to drive them from theirhomes, but also to prevent them from returning toMyanmar.8 International pressure has led to

3 UN Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Report 2016, available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/MMR .4 This number is contested by many ethnic groups that claim it is the result of a strategic decision by the military government rather than a reflection of realities on theground. Some ethnic groups claim to be miscategorized, and others claim to be purposefully excluded. The government’s failure to publish ethnic data from the 2014census has further fueled skepticism of these public figures. Some ethnic-minority leaders interviewed for this project said that official definitions of ethnic groups werea result of the army’s divide-and-rule policies because they do not follow important markers of group identity such as language, religion, or sense of belonging to agroup.

5 These numbers are disputed; the Rohingya lost their Burmese citizenship in 1982 and have since faced political persecution, resulting in repeated violent conflicts.6 Geoff Curfman, “ICC Jurisdiction and the Rohingya Crisis in Myanmar,” Just Security, January 9, 2018, available at www.justsecurity.org/50793/icc-jurisdiction-rohingya-crisis-myanmar/ ; Sergio Peçanha and Jeremy White, “Satellite Images Show More Than 200 Rohingya VillagesBurned in Myanmar,” New York Times, September 8, 2017, available at www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/09/18/world/asia/rohingya-villages.html?smid=pl-share .

7 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Flash Report: Interviews with Rohingyas Fleeing from Myanmar since 9 October 2016, February 3,2017, available at www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/MM/FlashReport3Feb2017.pdf .

8 OHCHR, Mission Report of OHCHR Rapid Response Mission to Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, September 13–24, 2017, available atwww.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/MM/CXBMissionSummaryFindingsOctober2017.pdf .


negotiations for repatriation of the refugees, and onNovember 23, 2017, an agreement was signedbetween Myanmar and Bangladesh to begin thereturn of some Rohingya.9

The continued persecution of the Rohingya hascaused new criticism of the country’s political andmilitary leaders and calls for accountability for thealleged atrocities.10 The violence against andmassive displacement of the Rohingya is puttingMyanmar at risk of being isolated once more. Howthis crisis is managed and resolved will have animpact on the process of state building as thecountry undergoes its democratic transition, aswell as on peace and sustainable development.All of Myanmar’s governments since independ-

ence in 1948 have claimed to make building peaceand unity among different ethnic groups a priority,though their understanding of how to do this hasvaried considerably. President Thein Sein’s govern-ment agreed on bilateral cease-fires with fifteenarmed groups between 2011 and 2013, whichcreated optimism for a nationwide cease-fireagreement planned to ensue in 2015. Yet concernsabout inclusivity and other political factors causedonly eight groups to sign the nationwide agreementin October 2015.11

When Aung San Suu Kyi took power in 2016, sheand her administration made the peace processtheir top priority and secured support from nearlyall the ethnic armed groups in a process called the21st Century Panglong Conferences. They did thisby making the process inclusive, being willing toaddress the root causes of the conflicts, andaspiring to build a federal democratic union for allpeople in Myanmar. The first Panglong conferencetook place in August 2016 and signified animportant step forward because of its broadinclusion of ethnic armed groups.12

However, this is only the start of a long anddifficult political process, and fundamental

challenges remain, such as how to organize thefederal state, how to share public revenues, and thefuture status of arms and armed groups.Disagreements over these issues fall along the linesbetween the categories of stakeholders representingthe three contradictory visions for the future ofMyanmar outlined above. The weak partnershipsbetween the civil government and military furthercomplicate this picture, as do ongoing conflicts andviolent clashes between government forces andethnic armed groups, which have recently occurredin several states, including Shan, Kachin, andRakhine.The second Panglong conference took place in

the country’s capital after a three-month delay inMay 2017. Expectations were low ahead of thedialogue, particularly as many central stakeholdersdid not attend, because they had either beenexcluded by the organizers or refused to partici-pate. Yet a last-minute deal facilitated by Chinabrought on board more ethnic armed groups thaninitially expected, and an agreement was reachedon the principles for a peace agreement based on afederal democracy. Still, there are severalunresolved concerns for the negotiations ahead.13

The nexus between peace and sustainabledevelopment will be central to Myanmar’simplementation of the 2030 Agenda. Achievingthis agenda will require a conflict-sensitiveapproach that includes assessing the potentialimpact of development initiatives on conflict andon peace by analyzing both factors that couldpromote unity and drivers of particular conflicts.Almost sixty years of authoritarian rule and yearsof international isolation have made Myanmarrelatively unprepared for the political opening andrapid change that started in 2011. Despite signifi-cant preparation by the military, including a quickupgrade of laws, regulations, and operationalframeworks, ways of thinking and doing things

9 “Myanmar Says Temporary Camp Will House 30,000 Rohingya Targeted for Repatriation,” Reuters, January 15, 2018, available at www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-bangladesh/myanmar-says-temporary-camp-will-house-30000-rohingya-targeted-for-repatriation-idUSKBN1F40SF .

10 At the time of writing this report, a UN resolution condemning the violence was in the process of being drafted. See Philippe Bolopion, “How Long Will UN SecurityCouncil Be Missing in Action on Burma?,” Human Rights Watch, November 1, 2017, available at www.hrw.org/news/2017/11/01/how-long-will-un-security-council-be-missing-action-burma .

11 International Crisis Group, “Myanmar’s Peace Process: Getting to a Political Dialogue,” Crisis Group Asia Briefing no. 149, October 19, 2016, available at www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/myanmar-s-peace-process-getting-political-dialogue .

12 Some call this the second Panglong conference, as former President Thein Sein organized a previous one shortly before he left office in 2016. That conference,however, was poorly attended by the armed ethnic groups in contrast to the conference of August 2016.

13 S. Chandrasekharan, “Myanmar: Panglong Conference—Mixed Results?,” Sri Lanka Guardian, June 23, 2017, available atwww.slguardian.org/myanmar-panglong-conference-mixed-results/ .


remain a challenge for modernization and forachieving the SDGs.The 2030 Agenda takes a holistic and multidi-

mensional view of peace. It includes peace not onlyas a separate goal in SDG 16, which calls for thepromotion of peaceful, just, and inclusive societies,but also as an issue cutting across all of theseventeen goals. It is thus an enabler that will drivethe achievement of the entire agenda. The 2030Agenda and subsequent resolutions on sustainingpeace adopted by the UN Security Council andGeneral Assembly provide a broaderunderstanding of peace. The report of the AdvisoryGroup of Experts of the UN’s peacebuildingarchitecture conveys how peacebuilding hastraditionally been “left as an afterthought: under-prioritized, under-resourced, and undertaken onlyafter the guns fall silent.”14 In the 2030 Agenda andsustaining peace resolutions, peace is a continuum,built every day by all, and its drivers need to be

constantly reinforced.Member states of the United Nations adopted the

following definition of sustaining peace in April2016:[It] should be broadly understood as a goal and aprocess to build a common vision of a society,ensuring that the needs of all segments of the popula-tion are taken into account, which encompassesactivities aimed at preventing the outbreak, escala-tion, continuation and recurrence of conflict,addressing root causes, assisting parties to conflict toend hostilities, ensuring national reconciliation andmoving towards recovery, reconstruction anddevelopment.15

This resolution addresses core challenges forMyanmar with its divided vision for futuredevelopment and state formation. Yet Myanmar isat a turning point as it approaches a peace processaiming to build a common vision for all people inthe country. A sustaining peace approach could

14 United Nations, Letter Dated 29 June 2015 from the Chair of the Secretary-General’s Advisory Group of Experts on the 2015 Review of the United NationsPeacebuilding Architecture Addressed to the Presidents of the Security Council and of the General Assembly, June 29, 2015, available atwww.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pdf/150630%20Report%20of%20the%20AGE%20on%20the%202015%20Peacebuilding%20Review%20FINAL.pdf .

15 UN General Assembly Resolution 70/262 (April 27, 2016), UN Doc. A/RES/70/262.

Figure 1. The seventeen SDGs

benefit the country in addressing delicate andchallenging matters concerning federalism,autonomy, and self-determination for thecountry’s many ethnic groups, including manage-ment of natural resources. This approach couldfurther help ensure that partnerships forged withlarge foreign investors benefit all people inMyanmar.METHODS AND LIMITATIONS

This report is based on the findings of an eighteen-day field study in Myanmar in May and June 2017,during which mostly semi-structured interviewswere conducted with a variety of sources involvedin planning, implementing, and analyzingMyanmar’s approach to the 2030 Agenda. Aimingfor a wide variety of sources, interviews wereconducted with government officials in differentministries, senior officials from various UNagencies, and representatives of NGOs, civil societygroups, and the private sector. While mostinterviews were conducted in the administrativecapital, Naypyidaw, and the commercial capital,Yangon, the methodology was designed also toinclude views from the “periphery” of the countryoutside of these centers. For this purpose we wentto Hpa-an, the capital of Kayin state, where wecould meet with ethnic Karen leaders and othersinvolved in development and peacebuilding.Myanmar’s ongoing conflicts, unfinished state

formation, and lack of a common vision for thefuture of the state have produced the three mainvisions outlined in this report. The main categoriesof stakeholders representing these visions are thegovernment and the majority Bamar population,ethnic groups in cease-fire agreements with thegovernment, and ethnic groups still engaged inarmed conflicts with the government. With noaccess to conflict zones, groups representing thelatter vision could not be interviewed for the study.Further, we could not cover all the ethnic groups insuch a vast and complex country. As a result, theresearch was unable to capture the views of manyimportant actors, a significant limitation consid-ering the comprehensive nature of the 2030Agenda. This report is thus a preliminary assess-ment of a long-term, ongoing process, not a

complete evaluation.The methodology used in the interviews was to

take a holistic view of the 2030 Agenda by focusingon how Myanmar is starting to integrate the SDGsinto its approach to development. Further, insteadof examining separate goals, the focus was onmapping the priorities and linkages across theSDGs and their targets. The project also took aconstructive approach, focusing on what thecountry has achieved so far in the sustainabledevelopment process and where its mainchallenges lie. Further, the research seeks todetermine whether there is learning potential forother countries struggling with similar dilemmas.

Sustainable Developmentand Peace

Over the last five years Myanmar has gone throughfundamental changes due to the reformsimplemented by the governments of Thein Seinand Aung San Suu Kyi. This transformationprovides Myanmar with a unique opportunity toadvance both sustainable development andsustaining peace. The main challenge forMyanmar, however, is that it is not yet peaceful,although some progress has been made on thepeace process. The country continues to experiencenumerous internal conflicts and lacks consensus ona vision for the future of the state. The three maincategories of stakeholders outlined above, eachwith a unique historical and current experience ofsocial organization, governance, and conflict, havedifferent perspectives on state formation, peace,and development. This will have implications forhow they approach implementation of the 2030Agenda, where they see opportunities, what theydefine as challenges, and how they address suchchallenges.The first category is the Bamar majority popula-

tion and the central government.16 As the formalauthority in the country, the central governmentenjoys a high degree of legitimacy due to thesupport it received in the elections. The govern-ment relates to peace and development primarilythrough formal institutions and processes, such as


16 In our analysis the military is included in this group as part of the formal power in the country, despite its weak partnership with the civil government and itssometimes conflicting interests with and independent actions vis-à-vis civilian parts of the government.

the Panglong peace conferences and relevantministries. The government will also work to meetthe obligations it has signed up to through formalinternational channels and will report on progresson these obligations to relevant UN agencies. In theBamar majority areas, the government can developplans and priorities and implement developmentpolicies in line with the SDGs because it enjoys ahigh degree of trust among the Bamar majority,and mainly shares their vision for the future of adeveloped and more prosperous Myanmar.The second category includes ethnic-minority

groups that have signed cease-fire agreements withthe government, such as the Karen National Unionin Kayin state (which was visited during thefieldwork for this report). Due to the cease-fireagreement with the government, these areas aremore peaceful and stable than before, and develop-ment is therefore possible to some extent. Yet therecontinues to be a lack of trust between the ethnicleaders and the central government. Ethnic groupsand their leaders are apprehensive of the govern-ment’s motives as it gains control and influenceover ethnic areas. Some ethnic leaders fear thatdevelopment is used by the government as a subtleform of occupation instead of a process supportingtheir vision of autonomy and a federal state. Thislack of trust is preventing development. Thus,although it is possible to use the SDGs to consoli-date a fragile peace process, this has not happened.The reality on the ground indicates that both peaceand sustainable development need a fundamentallydifferent and more inclusive approach to succeed.The key factor here is trust—trust between thecentral government, local government representa-tives, and local ethnic leaders and communities.This trust is fundamental to comprehensive andsustainable development.The third category is found in the conflict-

affected areas in the north of Myanmar, particu-larly in Shan and Kachin states. Many of these areasare beyond the reach of the central government,which cannot work on sustainable development inthem as long as they are controlled by competingethnic authorities. Similarly, in Rakhine state,which is experiencing violent clashes betweenRohingya insurgents and military forces with

devastating consequences for the civilian popula-tion, development is particularly difficult, if notimpossible. In all conflict-affected areas, peace andstability are the minimum prerequisites fordevelopment. The government and internationaldevelopment actors can only gain access when theyare offered some degree of security and stabilityfrom all the involved armed actors. This is a partic-ular challenge for the aim of “leaving no onebehind,” which is a core value underpinning all theSDGs.To recapitulate, although the government of

Myanmar has ambitions to bring peace andsustainable development to all parts of the country,it only has full authority and access to do so in thecentral areas of the country where the majority ofthe population is Bamar. The areas covered bycease-fire agreements need sustainable develop-ment to maintain a fragile peace, but lack of trustprevents effective interventions, whereas in theconflict-affected areas, peace is a prerequisite forstarting to implement development initiatives.Illustrating the different views on peace and

development among these three categories ofstakeholders, local leaders in Kayin state agreedthat Myanmar has seen fundamental changes inrecent years but emphasized that the mostimportant change to them is that internationalorganizations have brought development to theircommunities. Yet they think that much still needsto improve: “Many community development aid[programs] are coming, but even these interna-tional organizations, they wait and see, becausethey need a very strong peace.”17 This communityleader suggested that sustainable peace, greaterstability, and a more predictable security situationhad to come before the government and aidagencies could seriously develop infrastructure andimprove livelihoods for the local people.The community leader saw a connection between

challenges for development in ethnic areas and lackof trust of the central government, amplified by theunpredictable outcome of an eventual peaceagreement. It is still not clear what a federal statewill look like and how much autonomy the ethnicleaders will be granted in a future agreement. Inthis context of uncertainty, local leaders do not


17 Interview with local leader, Hpa-an, Myanmar, June 5, 2017.

trust the government, for example, to develop theirinfrastructure:Most of the people in the community, their liveli-hood is agricultural, so we need more support in thissector. Then it will be more sustainable and benefitus in the long run.… So they are already starting thepilot projects, for example, clean water and sanita-tion. And I think the infrastructure will be the last—it will come after peace.18

It is not easy to create the trust needed to buildinfrastructure after decades of war and militaryrule, even with a new government, and particularlywhen parts of the country continue to experiencewar. Contributing further to mistrust is the factthat the military governance structures remain inplace, with the military still controlling key parts ofthe government, giving it more power than itsshare of government positions suggests.Further, people in conflict-affected Karen

communities have lived through the world’slongest civil war and a military dictatorship formore than fifty years. This has basically taughtindividuals to keep their mouths shut in order tosurvive. People have not been encouraged to bepolitically active and to voice their concerns; on thecontrary, political activity remains illegal, and forthe most part people continue to avoid politicalengagement. That is not to say that people are notpolitically conscious, but rather that they have toengage with politics in a different way than theywould in an open, more democratic society.As a result, when the peace process and the

implementation of the 2030 Agenda call forinclusion and active citizenship, many people inMyanmar think it has nothing to do with them.The peace process is considered to be somethinggoing on between the armed groups and thegovernment, while development is considered to besomething done by development actors. So whengovernment representatives try to invest incommunity development, such as communityforestry initiatives, people in local communitiesoften lack the tools and experience needed toidentify and mobilize around their own concerns.Nonetheless, the experience of “land grabs” fordevelopment purposes has raised awareness of thenegative impacts of development practice in some

communities, such as in villages affected by theindustrial economic zone in Thilawa, south ofYangon. In Thilawa, the community organized tostand up for their rights and call for fair compensa-tion (see Box 1).Further, a growing civil society sector wants to

participate in the peace process but is striving tofind a space. Civil society organizations thus feelexcluded from the process, even though thegovernment has aimed for inclusiveness. Inclusionhas tended to focus on the armed actors or thewarring parties, while other groups with a stake inthe future peace deals continue to be excluded.During wartime, official service delivery often

breaks down quickly, compelling other actors to fillthe gap by providing services to the affectedpopulations. For the Karen people in Kayin state, itwas the Karen National Union (KNU) that took onthis role. The Karen communities used to receivesupport from across the border in Thailand. Thisaid was channeled through Karen organizations,allowing them to provide basic services to people inareas under rebel control. A local leader elaborated:KNU is probably the most developed [ethnic organi-zation], but [there are] different ethnic organizationswho are seen to have a fairly strong degree of legiti-macy in the eyes of the people. They have in theirsystems service providers who are doing…what youmight call development. And they want to be able tocontinue to sustain those systems and to provideservice to their communities. And in some areas, likeHpapun, in the Brigade Five area of the KNU,development coming from the government is seen asa threat. It is not that development is good andtherefore will bring us peace. It is: they aresupporting a school here—oh, it is a governmentschool. So there will be issues around language ofinstruction and whether it is the education thesepeople want, given narratives of identity issues in theconflict. And the school is the first thing. Then theywill set up a police post there, and they will build aroad to the school, and the next thing there aremilitary barracks—and now we [the Karen] have lostour military autonomy in this territory.19

When there is a cease-fire, it is far from a peaceagreement, which is one reason some KNU leadersperceive development coming from the govern-ment as a threat to their authority. They see it as a


18 Personal correspondence with government official, August 2017.19 Interview with local leader, Hpa-an, Myanmar, June 5, 2017.


20 Interview with government officials, Naypyidaw, Myanmar, May 22, 2017.

military strategy by the army to increase itsinfluence and to decrease the influence of theethnic armed organizations, which will make themmore vulnerable should the conflict start again. Forthis reason, ethnic-minority leaders claim it to be ofparamount importance for them to continue theirrole as service providers in areas under theircontrol or where they have influence. Despite thecease-fire agreement, they feel obliged to upholdtheir commitment to their people; otherwise theyfear being seen as facilitators of Bamar coloniza-tion. Failing to secure the needs and serve theinterests of their people has consequences for theirposition and authority, which is why developmentin Myanmar is interlinked with the overall politicalprocess and cannot be treated as a separate issue.Government officials in Naypyidaw interviewed

for this project impressed us with their knowledgeand eager efforts to make progress on bothdevelopment issues and the peace process. Theyspoke of inclusiveness, nondiscrimination,decentralization, and environmental protection.Yet they did not make the link between sustainabledevelopment efforts and the peace process in asignificant way. For them the peace process isessentially what happens at peace conferences,particularly the Panglong conferences, which arebasically a dialogue among armed actors thatexcludes other stakeholders.For this reason, many see the inclusiveness in the

peace process as a hollow commitment. Althoughthere are many social issues to be discussed in thepeace process, they have not yet been brought tothe core of the dialogues but remain on theperiphery of negotiations. Development, on theother hand, is mainly seen by these governmentofficials as social service delivery that can behandled outside the political process. It focuses on“the need of the people” from a social perspective,disregarding the political context and the need forpeople to be included in decision making onmatters that directly affect their lives.This inability to look holistically at peace and

development and consider how they are mutuallyinterlinked and dependent on each other to createa process that moves both areas forward is achallenge for Myanmar. Achieving sustainable

peace is a long-term process that goes beyondpeace negotiations among armed actors anddevelopment projects in destitute regions andareas. The core aim of this investment is to buildtrust among all the different people of Myanmarand the leaders who are supposed to representthem and serve their best interests. There is noquick fix to achieve this trust; it has to be built stepby step through conscious policies that give peoplethe experience of being included instead of leftbehind. Governance based on the rule of law,inclusion, transparency, and the accountability ofstate institutions is required, as called for in SDG16. These are all important elements needed tobuild long-term trust. Likewise, analysis of theimpact of political decisions and economic invest-ments on society, the environment, and conflictwill further strengthen a sense of inclusiveness andtrust.

Implementation of the2030 Agenda in Myanmar

THE SDGS AS A NATIONALDEVELOPMENT TOOL

In Myanmar, the statistics department in theMinistry of Planning and Finance serves as a focalpoint and coordinating body for implementation ofthe 2030 Agenda in the country. The rationale isthat statistics are crucial for monitoring progresson the SDGs, which will facilitate formulation oftargets and timelines according to availableresources. Reflecting this systematic approach,representatives from several ministries and fromcivil society organizations interviewed for thisproject demonstrated a high level of knowledge ofthe SDGs. This fact was also reflected by a largeSDG poster on the wall of one of the ministries’meeting rooms. An official remarked that theposter “is to remind us about our duty to meet allthese goals.”20

During its time in power, beginning in 1962,Myanmar’s military regime kept the countryincreasingly isolated due to international scrutinyof its oppression of any form of opposition. Thiseventually led to economic stagnation. Further, theUS and other countries imposed sanctions when


the military regime failed to recognize the results ofthe 1990 elections. Years of diplomatic andeconomic isolation from the West left Myanmarbehind in development, while the rest of SoutheastAsia was modernizing rapidly. When CycloneNargis hit Myanmar in 2008, the governmentreluctantly allowed access to international reliefassistance, but the country still did not fully adoptinternational development agendas before 2011.Today, Myanmar is a signatory to all the main

international commitments relating to develop-ment, including the 2030 Agenda. Domesticpolicies and plans are developed with strongreferences to these commitments. By taking part ininternational development efforts and agreements,the government seems to be motivated by thedesire to build international relations as well as toensure sustainable development at the nationallevel.Many of Myanmar’s existing national develop-

ment policies and plans predate the SDGframework due to political changes starting in 2011and would have been implemented regardless ofthe 2030 Agenda. Yet representatives from severalministries claimed that the SDG framework isuseful for Myanmar, particularly for planning andstrategy purposes. One official representativenoted,I think the goals are very useful for us because thesegoals are global goals, and also we can know whatother countries are doing and what the world isdoing…and it is a real implementation. People havedifferent ways to implement the SDGs, but the mainthings are that the…seventeen goals are the same forthe other countries.21

This universality gives the goals a fundamentallegitimacy that the national actors find useful.Officials also claimed that the goals’ requirement tobe inclusive encourages more collaboration amongministries than before. It also requires them towork more closely with local stakeholders atdifferent levels of the administration as well as withcivil society actors.Myanmar’s implementation of the 2030 Agenda

began with a gap assessment report, which wasimplemented with support from the UNDevelopment Programme (UNDP). As of May

2017, the Ministry of Planning and Finance hadorganized three SDG-awareness seminars to whichthey invited multiple stakeholders from govern-ment departments, ministries, the private sector,academia, and civil society. They also held thematicSDG workshops to which they invited targetedstakeholders. For example, one seminar focused onhow different goals relate to children. Based onthese discussions, they have developed a five-yearnational plan for both health and education. Thereare also ongoing discussions to develop a nationalsocial protection plan as well as an environmentalconservation plan, or a “green strategy” forMyanmar.The SDGs are comprehensive and complex,

creating a particular challenge for countries likeMyanmar that need to develop every sectorreferenced in the seventeen goals. While it isimpossible to do everything at once, all govern-ment representatives interviewed said that prioriti-zation was a challenge, particularly when resourcesare scarce. They were conscious that they not onlylacked economic and technical resources but alsofaced challenges in developing their humanresources. With regard to natural resources, muchof the country’s reserves are already depleted.Therefore, the focus is instead on resource manage-ment and restoration.Government representatives acknowledged that

the link between peace and sustainable develop-ment is important to an effective and comprehen-sive strategy for planning and implementing the2030 Agenda. For this reason, they have developedwhat they call a people-centered and inclusivestrategy cutting across regions and ethnic groups.This strategy emphasizes the importance of takinginto consideration all of these groups’ differentneeds and demands in order to promote peace andstability, which they see as a requirement fordevelopment.Yet in Kayin state, local leaders and NGO

representatives claimed to have seen little of thisinclusiveness and decentralization in practice.Instead, they claimed that most decisions,including those related to the SDGs and develop-ment, were still being made centrally in the capital.This grievance is closely linked to unresolved

21 Interview with government official, Naypyidaw, Myanmar, May 22, 2017.



conflicts, ethnic armed groups’ calls for moreformal autonomy in a federal state, and divergentviews on state formation. As discussed above, thethree main stakeholders in the conflicts—thegovernment and the majority population, theethnic-minority groups that have signed cease-fireswith the government, and those still experiencingviolent conflict with government forces—all havedifferent perspectives on how peace and develop-ment can be achieved in Myanmar.The result is that, while the government has

embarked on the process of implementing the 2030Agenda with adequate knowledge and tools toadvance on the goals, implementation continues tobe more relevant for the central areas of thecountry were the majority Bamar population lives.In contrast, the goals are more difficult toimplement and, to some extent, less relevant inethnic-minority areas (regardless of whether theyhave signed a cease-fire agreement or not), andeven more so in areas of ongoing armed conflict.THE LINKS BETWEEN ENDINGPOVERTY AND FOSTERING PEACE

Official representatives we spoke to saw clear linksbetween poverty reduction and peace. One of themsaid, “To increase the income of the household isfundamental for…ordinary people to have accessto…nutrition, food, and housing and shelter. So Ithink that these are fundamental human rights, andit is necessary to be fulfilled for all people.”22 Theofficial went on to explain how the satisfaction ofbasic needs is a prerequisite for comprehensive andsustainable peace.That poverty reduction will lead to peace is a

common assumption, but the causality is notalways straightforward. Instead, processes gene -rating poverty and driving conflict are oftencomplicated and include complex structures ofprivilege and exclusion combined with local andtraditional ways of organizing social, political, andeconomic life. Regardless, the government ofMyanmar sees poverty as a core factor contributingto the conflicts in the country and focuses much ofits attention on SDG 1 (ending poverty in all itsforms). In light of the three perspectives drawn upin this report, many ethnic-minority groups wouldfind this analysis of conflict drivers simplistic and

instead claim that lack of autonomy and self-determination are root causes of the conflicts.As a result, the government’s efforts to reduce

poverty might not reduce levels of conflict asintended. One reason is that many of the country’sresources are found in areas inhabited by ethnicminorities, and control over these resourcescontinues to be a main driver of conflict in thecountry. While the government considers itessential to manage and distribute all availableresources in an effort to lift its citizens out ofpoverty as a means to reach peace, ethnic armedgroups generally claim more autonomy over theseresources and the right to focus on ethnic identityas fundamental to a peace agreement.The work of the Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief

and Resettlement focuses on poverty reduction andresilience. The ministry has two departments: onefor relief and resettlement, the other for socialprotection of vulnerable groups. The departmentfor relief and resettlement is managing disaster riskreduction and resettlement of people internallydisplaced by conflict, currently calculated by theministry to be over 100,000. Although all of theSDGs are relevant for this ministry, it predomi-nantly focuses on SDG 1 (ending poverty) and SDG11 (sustainable communities). Myanmar is particu-larly prone to disasters such as cyclones, floods, anddroughts, which now occur more frequently andwith larger impact, heightening the risk of loss oflife, property, and livelihoods. Because disasters areoften directly related to hunger and poverty, theministry sees disaster risk management as crucialfor poverty reduction. It has developed seventeenguiding principles for reducing the risk of disasterand building resilience. Again, however, thisapproach might reflect the needs and views of themajority Bamar population living in flood- anddisaster-prone areas, rather than those of ethnicminorities in hillier regions who face a different setof challenges.The ministry’s other department is responsible

for social protection of vulnerable groups, definedas children, women, persons with disabilities, andthe elderly. It is working to improve services forthese groups, adopting a rights-based approach.But while a rights-based approach to protecting


23 The author encountered social workers and women’s groups in Israel and Palestine, countries that also have been exposed to high levels of conflict and violence,claiming a relationship between this exposure and high levels of domestic violence.

children does not meet any resistance, the sameapproach to reducing domestic violence is morecontroversial. This is because domestic violenceseems to be more accepted by society in general,which some of our interviewees suggested is relatedto a “Buddhist philosophy” that places the value ofwomen below that of men. A counterargument isthat domestic violence is just as prevalent in manyof the ethnic groups that are Christian. Anotherplausible explanation for high levels of domesticviolence is that decades of war expose people toregular violence, which can make violence moreacceptable as a method to solve conflicts, both insociety and domestically.23 Further, people we metin Myanmar claimed that there is a culturalexpectation to carry suffering with dignity andwithout complaint, making it challenging to use arights-based approach. Yet the Ministry of SocialWelfare has established several help-lines forvictims of domestic violence, sexual violence, childrape, and other abuses. These help-lines receivedmore than 100 cases in their first month ofoperation, revealing both the scale of the problemand the need to address it.The ministry’s definition of vulnerable groups

does not include other groups experiencing social,economic, and political exclusion, such as youth orethnic minorities. Yet it worked with a few ethnic-minority states and acknowledged the need to workon social cohesion to reach sustainable peace.Ministry officials claimed that the best way toachieve social cohesion is to focus on the needs ofethnic minorities and offer assistance throughdevelopment and education, including vocationaltraining.The ministry representatives presented examples

of how the ministry is working on povertyreduction by focusing on relief and social servicesfor groups it defines as vulnerable. It is taking whatcan be considered “a humanitarian approach,”which is reflected in its focus on the needs ofvulnerable groups and the way it claims to beneutral, nondiscriminatory, and inclusive of theneedy. This focus on impartiality is a fundamentalprinciple of humanitarian work, as demonstratedby important nongovernmental humanitarianactors such as the Red Cross and Doctors Without

Borders.However, humanitarian relief should not be

confused with a just and inclusive welfare policy.When the government offers assistance to alleviatepain and satisfy basic needs, it should not neglectits responsibility to change structures in societythat are producing and reproducing unfair distri-bution of opportunity, wealth, welfare, and health.Only by addressing these root causes can it reducethe number of people in need of assistance andrelief. The government’s help-lines can serve as anexample. While they are a positive and importantinitiative for victims of domestic violence, they arenot designed to reduce rates of domestic violenceor provide long-term solutions. Such “humani-tarian approaches” simply provide short-termrelief rather than political programs for long-termdevelopment.For governments, adopting a purely humani-

tarian approach can be problematic for peace anddevelopment if it does not address the root causesof the problem. If initiatives only focus on allevi-ating the suffering of victims but do not address thestructural and cultural frameworks that allow abuseand exploitation to happen in the first place, theydo not achieve real change. Targeted politicaldecisions are needed to go beyond just addressingthe symptoms of a malfunctioning system toachieve real change at a systemic level, such asreducing or putting an end to domestic violencerather than simply providing comfort to thevictims. In the case of assistance to internallydisplaced persons (IDPs), initiatives should addressthe conflicts driving displacement to reduce thenumber of people who have to leave their area andseek shelter and protection elsewhere.Nonetheless, many of the activities of the

Ministry of Social Welfare clearly focus onchallenges facing ethnic-minority areas, such asunemployment, the well-being of IDPs, andvictims of conflict. Further, the ministry has partic-ular programs for poor states and regions. In thisrespect, its activities might indirectly contribute tobuilding peace through their general focus onsocially and regionally marginalized people. Thatsaid, demands for self-determination continue tobe key for many ethnic-minority groups, which


claim to see little progress in this area.In Kayin state, the largest ethnic armed group,

the KNU, signed a preliminary cease-fire in 2012and became part of the Nationwide CeasefireAgreement in 2015. To gain local support for thepeace process, local leaders and other stakeholdersclaimed that it was urgent to create more and betterlivelihood opportunities for ordinary people.Ethnic-minority leaders suggested a pragmaticapproach focusing on creating opportunities forimproving income in the short term, for exampleby organizing local business more efficiently withregard to production procedures, management,and access to markets. As described above, thegovernment’s strategy for poverty reduction, on theother hand, focuses on disaster risk reduction andpreparedness, reflecting a more long-termapproach. While preventive, long-term initiativestend to be more sustainable, they can have theopposite effect in the context of fragility and lack oftrust. Rapidly improving living conditions can be astrategy to build the trust necessary for a peaceprocess and long-term development.Ethnic-minority leaders also claimed that the

most important and effective way to improve thequality of life for people in their area is to achievesustainable peace and stability. From this, theybelieve more economic opportunities will follow.In reality, however, this might not be the case.Experience from peace processes has shown thatthis is not a straightforward and causal process. Thecase study of Guatemala that will be produced aspart of this project can serve as an example:Guatemala signed a peace agreement with its localinsurgents twenty years ago, but economicdevelopment and prosperity did not follow.Instead, violence increased. When the insurgencystopped, trafficking of drugs and humans and theassociated corruption grew, keeping the country inthe grip of violence.24 Peace agreements thus do notautomatically improve opportunities and liveli-hoods for affected groups. Development has to beintentionally driven by political processes andconscious decision making.

DECENTRALIZATION: TOWARD MOREINCLUSIVE DECISION MAKING

One of the topics for the second Panglong peaceconference (convened at the end of May 2017) wasdecentralization. A committee was tasked withdiscussing the link between land use, the environ-ment, and peace. Preparatory meetings were heldwith ethnic-minority leaders and civil societyrepresentatives to discuss how each would like toshape the future of the country. One governmentofficial commented, “We are discussing the federaldemocratic state and decentralization of authorityfrom the central government to the local govern-ment.”25

The details of a future federal state with increasedautonomy for ethnic-minority states are central tothe conflicts in the country and to the peace negoti-ations. The government representatives inter -viewed for this report believed that the fact that thedifferent parties in the conflict were now sittingtogether and discussing these sensitive topics madethem better understand each other, which is apositive outcome in itself. Further, they claimed itcreated a mechanism for bringing messages fromlocal communities to the government and from thegovernment back to local communities.Yet the concept of decentralization appears to be

contested in Myanmar. For the central govern-ment, decentralization entails delegating authorityto a state minister and local state institutionsappointed by the central government and operatingas an extension of its authority. For local ethnic-minority leaders, decentralization is understood asdelegating decision-making authority to auto -nomous and preferably elected local governancebodies, giving ethnic minorities a measure of self-determination. As long as the state minister andother leaders are appointed rather than elected,they do not necessarily represent the views of thelocal people. Appointed officials instead representthe views of the central government that oftencontradict those of local leaders on developmentissues. Representation and authority is thus directly

24 Jimena Leiva Roesch and Mona Christophersen, “Does Peace Always Produce Development? Guatemala Offers Some Clues,” IPI Global Observatory, February 14,2017, available at https://theglobalobservatory.org/2017/02/guatemala-sustainable-development-goals-peace/ .

25 Interview with government official, Naypyidaw, Myanmar, May 23, 2017. He further claimed that annexes A, B, C, D, and E of the constitution are all related todecentralization of local authority.

related to the peace process, because it willcontinue to be contested as long as the visions forMyanmar’s state formation are divided amongwhat this report defines as the three main groups inthe conflicts.While each state in Myanmar has an elected

legislature with five-year mandates, the constitu-tion also gives the military control over 25 percentof the seats in these local parliaments.26 Further,these legislatures have limited decision-makingauthority and meager budgets for operation. Thereal decision-making authority in states remainswith the appointed state ministers and their localadministrations. This division of power isestablished by the constitution and cannot bechanged without constitutional amendments. Suchamendments are difficult to implement as long asthe constitution gives the military control over aminimum of 25 percent of the seats in parliamentand some strategic (central and local) ministries.As long as demands for autonomy and federalism

are unsatisfied, decentralization will continue to bea central matter in the conflict in Myanmar. Itrequires moving power from the government’sextended leadership at the state level to an electedstate parliament, a change that is obstructed by theconstitution. The weakness of the country’sdecentralization policies has also extended to thepeace process itself, which relates only to theappointed state minister and not to the local electedstate legislature. As a result, the leaders elected bythe people are excluded from the peace process.Yet from the government’s perspective,

decentralization has been a positive development.For example, decision making on foreign invest-ment was recently decentralized. Previously, suchinvestment needed permission from the centralgovernment. Now, however, an investor for aproject in a specific area can discuss it directly withlocal authorities. The local authorities can takedecisions on projects up to $50 million based ontheir own needs and priorities.27 This includes notonly business and infrastructure projects but alsoprojects related to education and health, allowinglocal authorities to recruit teachers and nurseswithout approval from the central government.

Expanded local authority to make decisions isbased on a strategic framework for the direction ofthe country, which has already been approved bythe central government. Local governments mustthen develop plans and strategies in line with thispolicy. The challenge nevertheless remains thatlocal authorities in ethnic-minority areas representthe interests of the central government rather thanthose of the ethnic-minority groups. This is whylocal ethnic-minority leaders do not see muchbenefit in the current framework for decentraliza-tion.Decentralization can, however, enable more

inclusion of and consultation with stakeholders atthe local level. Planning and implementationcommittees at the township level have beenestablished for this purpose. These committees areintended to have closer relationships with localpopulations and aim to consult with the elders ofthe community and with civil society. Thesecommittees can serve as a mechanism for a moreinclusive and consultative process before plans anddecisions are submitted to the central government.They can also provide local authorities with statis-tics and other information needed for planning andimplementation. In reality, however, theseplanning and implementation committees tend toconsult mainly their own constituency at the locallevel (the NLD and others loyal to the regime)instead of reaching out to build cooperativerelationships with ethnic-minority leaders andorganizations.Although the government’s focus on decentral-

ization may align with common ideas of inclusivedemocratic practices, the outcome can have theopposite effect in reality. Not only is decentraliza-tion designed to extend the authority of the govern-ment and disregard local ethnic-minority leaderswho might be more representative, but there is alsoa chronic lack of public sector capacity, frequentlymentioned by central ministries. Because thecentral ministries are more attractive employersand can recruit the most experienced and qualifiedpersonnel for their positions, local administrationscan struggle to secure economic and humanresources. In addition to having less education and


26 ConstitutionNet, “Constitutional Profile Myanmar,” available at www.constitutionnet.org/country/constitutional-profile-myanmar .27 We might have misheard the number, which may have been 15 million, the point being that some decision-making authority has been decentralized.


administrative experience, staff in local administra-tions can also be influenced by customary laws andpractices that are sometimes in conflict with officiallaws and regulations.Although in theory there is greater potential for

solving a problem when closer to its source due togreater access to knowledge of the problem and itscontext, if there is no real capacity to solve theproblem locally, decentralization can actuallyworsen local conditions and generate conflict,despite good intentions. Therefore, prior todecentralization, local institutions need to have thenecessary resources to improve the situationlocally. This includes attaining knowledge andbuilding capacity to avoid exposing local leaders tocriticism and blame for a policy that was destinedto fail.Strengthening local institutions is a central

component of SDG 16 (peace, justice, and stronginstitutions), and building capacity at the local levelis a prerequisite for a conflict-sensitive approach todecentralization. Yet if all the focus is on strength-ening local state institutions, the support onlybenefits one party to the conflict, and other institu-tions that are more locally cemented will beweakened in the process. If this is allowed tohappen, decentralization has the potential toexacerbate grievances and conflicts instead ofreducing them.Such concerns were expressed in regards to the

decentralization of decision making on foreigninvestment in the Directorate of Investment forCompanies, as mentioned above. One of ourinterviewees voiced concern that, instead ofimproving the situation, decentralization of thisinstitution could make things worse.28 The concernwas that, when decision making was delegated tothe local level, local leaders could renege onagreements the central government had alreadymade, thereby putting the country at risk of large-scale compensation claims from investors arguingthat their investments had adhered to laws andregulations in place at the time of the investment.Such lawsuits could potentially be very harmful tothe country’s economy.

Local leaders we interviewed agreed that therehad been major changes since government reformsstarted in 2011. Yet there was a general consensusthat the changes were unsatisfactory and that thelack of trust toward the army remained a bigchallenge: “The problem is that there is no trustwith the military part of the government. We knowthat the government has changed, but it is only atthe surface level, so…[the ethnic-minority leaders]cannot move forward.”29 Although Myanmar hashad two governments that have worked towardpeace and democracy, many interviewees observedthat the country continues to be predominantlyorganized around a military structure. As anexample, some claimed that, although the armywants some change, many of the laws and regula-tions are working in its favor. Too much change isthus unlikely because it could weaken militarypower.Indeed, the General Administrative Department,

which is under the Ministry of Interior and thusunder army control, is commonly understood to bethe main coordinator of all government activities,particularly at the local level. Although most localministries have civilian leaders and administra-tions, the General Administrative Departmentmanages administration at the township level,giving it a final say in all local decision making.This is why interviewees frequently claimed thatmost changes were superficial. Although the newgovernment has developed election processes forstate legislatures and village councils andappointed new chief ministers in the states, thesenew political bodies do not yet have the experience,power base, and influence to fully replace themilitary structures and authority. For example, aninterviewee stated that when fighting eruptsbetween a faction of the armed groups in Kayinstate and the army’s border-guard forces, thedecision to engage in violent action is madewithout even informing the chief minister of thestate.30

This ongoing military influence is at play in therenewed violence against the Rohingya in Rakhinestate. Decisions about military action are made

28 Interview with individual connected to Yangon’s business sector, Yangon, Myanmar, May 24, 2017.29 Interview with local leader, Hpa-an, Myanmar, June 5, 2017.30 Interview with local leader, Hpa-an, Myanmar, June 5, 2017.


without the need to ask the elected government forconsent. This lack of legislative authority, which isregulated by the constitution, is hard to grasp whenthe government is democratically elected. Theresult is that the government is blamed for themilitary’s actions. These examples show how defacto authority remains with the army, placingpower yet another step away from elected represen-tatives both at the central and local levels.At the same time, local ethnic groups face their

own challenges, such as lack of unity and organiza-tion. The Karen group, for example, is often associ-ated with its largest armed group, the KarenNational Union (KNU), which historicallycontrolled significant parts of Kayin state. Thiscontrol has been partly relinquished since cease-fire agreements with the government in 2012.However, the Karen people do not only live inKayin state; they are spread all over the country andspeak several different languages. This reflects thatthe Kayin state is a government constructioninvented by the majority-Bamar authorities as partof their divide-and-rule tactics. For this reason, thepurview of Karen leaders extends beyond theboundaries of Kayin state, as their people can alsobe found in large numbers in Bago and Mon states.At the moment, the Karen people are organizedinto five different political parties and four armedgroups. Over the last four to five years, they havestruggled to unify these groups to become betterorganized in relation to the central government, astheir previous lack of unity contributed to furthercomplicating an already complex conflict.As discussed above, decentralization is consid-

ered key to achieving peace in Myanmar. However,representatives from the government, NGOs, civilsociety organizations, ethnic groups, businesses,and the international community understand theconcept in different ways. The main divide isbetween government representatives and ethnic-minority representatives. Government representa-tives we talked with emphasized that decentraliza-tion is a process of transferring some economic andbudgetary power from the central authorities tolocal authorities, whom they had appointed.Government representatives largely rejectedethnic-minority representatives and local civilsociety organizations’ desire for including aspectsof cultural rights (including language of instructionin local schools) and political self-determination in

the understanding of decentralization.This divide follows the three main divergences in

views on state formation for Myanmar as outlinedin this report and touches upon one of the mostchallenging dilemmas facing the future develop-ment of the country: how to combine building acommon national identity with allowing forcultural and political diversity. These issues furtherfeed into one of the main challenges in the peaceprocesses: the level of autonomy and self-determi-nation in ethnic-minority areas and how this canbe aligned with a cohesive national state.MANAGEMENT OF LAND ANDRESOURCES: A POLITICAL PROCESSBEYOND DEVELOPMENT

While Myanmar has historically been known for itsvast teak forests, these forests have been largelydestroyed since the colonial era, and one of themain challenges today is to preserve what is left.For this reason, Myanmar has developed a policyfocusing on protection of forests and sustainableforest management through an inclusive approach,which also seeks to raise awareness. In 2001 thegovernment developed a thirty-year forest masterplan, which is in line with the SDGs, particularlySDG 15 (protect life on land). This plan decentral-ized forest management to the fourteen states andregions, which have each developed local manage-ment plans down to the district level, detailingefforts at conservation, forest restoration, and theprotection of ecosystems, endangered species, andnatural habitats. At present, 5.7 percent of theremaining forest is officially designated asprotected areas, and the government aims toincrease this to 10 percent in the long term.The forest department is under the Ministry of

Environmental Conservation and Forestry, whichis focusing on the SDGs related to the environ-ment. In particular, the ministry is focusing onresilience and sees the expansion of forests as animportant tool for addressing climate change,protecting biodiversity, reducing poverty, andbuilding resilience to natural disasters. It sees thisas the most challenging task for the coming yearsand highlights lack of financial, technical, andhuman resources as the main impediment toachieving its goals.One of the main challenges to this work is illegal

logging, which continues to threaten Myanmar’s


already depleted forests. Myanmar has the thirdhighest deforestation rate in the world, after Braziland Indonesia, and between 2010 and 2015 thecountry lost half a million hectares of forestannually.31 Despite the new government intro -ducing a ban on both logging and trade inchainsaws shortly after it came to power in 2016,illegal deforestation has continued, and is expectedto as long as the demand for Myanmar’s teak ishigh. Import statistics from neighboring countriessuch as China and India reveal that wood importsfrom Myanmar are twice as high as Myanmar’sofficial wood exports.32 Despite increased controlson the use and purchase of chainsaws, they remainsan efficient tool and give people the opportunity forrapid profit.Most illegal logging is undertaken by forest

inhabitants who depend on it for daily subsistence.They not only cut down trees for illegal sale but alsoclear land for agriculture and firewood. Thetraditional “shifting cultivation” that continues tobe practiced in several places in Myanmar isanother threat to the forest. This entails burningdown an area of forest to clear the land for agricul-ture. The land is used for two to three years beforenew land needs to be cleared. This practice is aserious contributor to deforestation. Further,endangered species are threatened by illegalhunting in these forests. These are all reasons forimproving the forest management system andmaking it more sustainable by introducing lawsand regulations for land use, while designatingparticular areas for agriculture using practices thatdo not further contribute to deforestation.While illegal logging and hunting is mainly a

“cottage industry,” undertaken by individualhouseholds as part of a livelihood strategy, thetimber trade is very lucrative and is organized bypeople with both wealth and power. Money andweapons are a central aspect of this trade, making itripe for corruption. Some interviewees evensuggested that the army itself is involved in illegallogging and distribution of its products, thoughthey refused to provide more specific details. What

is clear is that powerful actors make illegal loggingdifficult to stop and hard to control.The government is implementing assistance

programs for local communities dependent on theforest for their livelihood to counteract illegalexploitation of the forest. Initiatives include distri-bution of land free of charge to farmers who canuse it for agricultural purposes on the conditionthat they also plant trees on the land. The authori-ties then provide seedlings and seeds to encouragethis practice of tree restoration. An important partof this work is done through what the governmentcalls “people participation,” where the local forestcommittee arranges meetings and consultationswith people on matters related to the conservationof the forest. It is also establishing different kinds ofplantations and community forestry initiatives forplanting trees and enlarging the forest. Some ofthese plantations are also designated for producingfuel, aiming to facilitate and control households’collection of firewood for cooking.Much of the forest and many other natural

resources such as jade, gems, and minerals arefound in ethnic-minority areas where the govern-ment does not have full control. This makesprotecting and managing these resources particu-larly challenging. As one government official said:Even though it is a high-forest area, it is beyond ourcontrol because of security. If all local governmentscan manage [the forest] properly, we can effectivelymanage our natural resources. But somehow, becauseof that conflict we are far away from our sustainablemanagement of our forest resources. Even though wehave a very good system to manage it, we cannot,and even the law enforcement is weak.33

The challenge is not only that law enforcement isweak in conflict-affected areas but also that ethnicgroups often have land policies that differ fromthose of the government. Generally, local land usepraxis leans more on customary law and traditionsthat are not consistent with large-scale, policy-informed land management and land registration.Therefore, the challenge is to develop a nationalland-use policy that recognizes local practices.

31 Food and Agriculture Organization, “Global Forest Resources Assessment 2015: How Are the World’s Forests Changing?,” 2016, available at www.fao.org/3/a-i4793e.pdf .

32 Poppy McPherson, “Chain Saw Injuries in Myanmar Tied to Illegal Logging,” Mongabay, February 12, 2017, available athttps://news.mongabay.com/2017/02/chain-saw-injuries-in-myanmar-tied-to-illegal-logging/ .



34 Interview with civil society leader, Yangon, Myanmar, May 26, 2017.35 Interview with local leader, Hpa-an, Myanmar, June 5, 2017.

One example of customary practices related toland that contradict both national law and the SDGon gender equality (SDG 5) is the system of landinheritance in Chin state. According to localpractice, only men can inherit land, the onlyexception being when there are no men in the clan.When it comes to inheritance of material goods, adaughter is entitled to 50 percent of what a sonreceives, and the mother is entitled to 50 percent ofwhat a daughter receives. This gender bias in Chincustomary laws contradicts the government’s aimto end all forms of discrimination against womenand girls, in line with SDG 5. The challenge is thatlocal people have little trust in the police and othergovernment institutions, and customary practicetakes precedence.To address this bias, local NGOs are working on

raising awareness and developing campaigns toend discriminatory customs and practices as a partof broader efforts to reduce gender inequality inMyanmar, and in Chin state in particular.34 In acountry with a female head of state, genderinequality may not appear to be a major issue. Yetmost of the people we met during our fieldworkclaimed that discrimination against women andgirls was prevalent in many daily practices and thatthere is much still to be done before men andwomen have equal opportunities for education andfull economic and political participation inMyanmar.As a result, land use and land development is one

of the most sensitive topics in the peace talks.Government officials acknowledge that the defini-tion of land is different for central and localstakeholders, making it a crucial issue forsustaining peace. For this reason, they areimplementing a policy formulation process. Forexample, the government is developing its land-usepolicy by working together with differentstakeholders in a series of consultations. Thisinclusive process falls in line with the sustainingpeace approach recently adopted by UN memberstates.Tensions exist in local communities over

diverging land-use interests and ambiguousnational land-use frameworks. Several interviewees

also claimed that armed actors with economicinterests are seizing land and displacing people inorder to set up plantations, conduct miningoperations, or build resorts. These armed actors arelikely to threaten people’s access to land or theirability to manage land, which can generate conflict.Armed actors are often not held accountable forillegal activity due to the fragile nature of the peaceprocess. Explaining this, a local leader in Hpa-andrew attention to the cars on the streets, statingthat “all the cars here are not legal; people here canown them and drive them…, [but] because of thepeace agreement [the authorities] take no actionagainst them.” The local leader explained further:“When they buy a car they use the name of theethnic [armed] group, so [now] the governmentdoesn’t dare to take action against those groups, sobecause of that there is no rule of law.”35He claimedthat this illustrates how local leaders can hidebehind ethnic armed groups, because the authori-ties fear that any small local confrontation couldput the fragile cease-fire arrangement in jeopardy.This lack of accountability applies not only to

small offenses like purchasing an illegal car, butalso to more serious criminal activity such as drugtrafficking, which is a major problem in thecountry. In these instances, many different kinds ofarmed groups are involved, and taking actionagainst perpetrators can thus affect the entire peaceprocess. The same applies to illegal logging andextraction of natural resources such as jade.The government’s decentralization policy aims to

give local stakeholders more authority over landuse, including for plantations, industrial zones, orthe extension of residential areas. As previouslydiscussed, however, the concept of decentralizationis disputed, and the government and local ethnic-minority leaders have competing interests andambitions. For example, when an investor wants toestablish a forest plantation, the land is oftenalready being used by locals, generating conflicts ofinterest. Accordingly, the forest departmentintroduced the policy of community forestry tomitigate the ensuing conflicts with local farmers.The department claims that conflicts are evengreater in urban areas where there is pressure to


clear forest and agricultural land for residential orindustrial purposes.The government is promoting large economic

development projects like the seaport in Dawei anddeveloping several industrial economic zones. Bigforeign investors such as China and Japan areinvolved in these projects. China is interested inexpanding its new “Silk Road” (the “One Belt, OneRoad” initiative), a mega infrastructure project thatincludes railways, seaports, gas pipelines, and otherinfrastructure to facilitate trade and developmentin China as well as in the countries included in thisambitious plan.In line with the “Belt and Road” initiative, China

invested in the Myitsone dam project, though itwas suspended due to protests when detailsrevealed that 90 percent of the electricity producedwould go to China and that it would cause environ-mental destruction and mass displacement.Further, a railway line connecting China’s Yunnanprovince with Myanmar’s Rakhine state wasstopped after public protests. Yet for theKyaukphyu-Kunming oil pipeline, the centralgovernment rejected activists’ demands for a largershare of the revenues and for measures to protectagainst oil spills, permitting implementation of theproject. This demonstrates how the central govern-ment is balancing opportunities for developmentand prospects for profit with the protests and

36 This information draws from a field visit to the Thilawa Special Economic Zone and an interview with a social development group in Yangon, Myanmar, June 1,2017.

Box 1. Arbitrary compensation processes: The Thilawa Special Economic Zone36

In 2013 a large number of households, mainly fishermen and farmers, were requested to leave their land forthe creation of the Thilawa Special Economic Zone just south of Yangon. The zone was developed by thecentral government in collaboration with the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and severalJapanese and Burmese companies. According to the villagers, the households were not offered compensa-tion at the outset of the construction process. Following initial complaints, however, they were offeredsimple housing arrangements in a less attractive area with polluted water and few livelihood opportunities.The resulting disappointment led the affected communities to establish the Thilawa Social DevelopmentGroup (TSDG) to voice their grievances and ensure their concerns were addressed and that they wereprovided proper compensation.In 2014 a representative of TSDG made a visit to the JICA headquarters in Japan to discuss compensationissues. He claimed that, although JICA had initially stated that providing compensation was the responsi-bility of Myanmar’s government, the visit resulted in a mission and a report recommending standards andmeasures to improve the relocation process, including compensation. However, as there was no follow-upto the recommendations from the report, the TSDG representative made a second visit to Japan to presentthe situation once again and restate their compensation demands. This time the visit resulted in a relocationplan, which included measures to rebuild the livelihoods of the relocated households over a three-yearperiod. However, plans went ahead without further involvement of the local population.Interviewees in the affected area all claimed that, if compensation was fair and they were given the chanceto reestablish sustainable livelihoods elsewhere, they would not hesitate to be relocated. This sentiment wasshared by some of the ethnic-minority representatives interviewed during the field visit and in meetingswith NGOs working in ethnic-minority areas of the country. This suggests that, by standardizing andenforcing a national regulatory framework that ensures conflict-sensitive impact assessments and compen-sation for affected populations, many land and resource-related conflicts could be solved. Similarly, thiscould also help to reduce dilemmas between economic development and its social and environmentalconsequences in general. Large investments in countries affected by conflict will benefit from conflict-sensitive assessments that align with a sustaining peace approach and include communities in decision-making processes that will have an impact on their future.


demands of local stakeholders.Development projects such as the Myitsone dam

can generate electricity for China and some moneyfor Myanmar’s government, but they would alsocause ecological destruction and mass displace-ment, and the local people usually receive fewbenefits from these kinds of projects. Again, we canidentify categories of stakeholders with differentrealities and interests and different views andambitions for the future of Myanmar. This lack ofcoherence emphasizes the need to adopt aninclusive political process that assesses conflictdrivers as well as opportunities for building socialcohesion. Sustainable development entails lookingbeyond economic opportunity to the potentialimpact on society, the environment, and theconflicts.SUSTAINABLE ENERGY FOR ALL

Although Myanmar is rich in natural resources,SDG 7 on clean energy is another key challenge forthe country. This goal calls for sustainable andaffordable energy, but electricity shortages remaina challenge, particularly in rural areas. Only about30 percent of Myanmar’s households are connectedto the national electricity grid.37 Hydroelectricpower is the main source of energy, but althoughthis energy is clean and renewable, the powerplants needed to generate it require construction ofdams and power stations and are expensive todevelop. Further, dam projects such as theMyitsone dam usually have large environmentaland social impacts in the areas in which they arebuilt, which often creates conflict between thedeveloper and the local population (see Box 1). Theareas suitable for developing hydroelectric powerare mainly in hilly areas home to ethnic minorities,most of whom are already involved in armedconflicts over the use of natural resources as a partof their fight for greater autonomy.The development of sustainable energy thus

reflects the divisions among the three maincategories of stakeholders with their respectivevisions for Myanmar, as discussed above. Thecentral government has ambitions to develop largehydropower projects as part of an overall develop-ment strategy to provide clean and affordable

electricity for industrial and other purposes and togenerate income for the state by selling the energyabroad. Areas selected for hydroelectric powerdevelopment need to be within reach of the centralgovernment and thus are mainly in areas wherearmed actors have signed cease-fires with thegovernment.Yet people in these areas have protested against

the plants because they adversely impact theenvironment that the majority of local people relyon for daily subsistence. As a result, some large-scale projects have been stopped, while others(often smaller-scale) are continuing despite localprotest. In these areas, ethnic-minority leaders areincreasingly worried whether the outcome of thecease-fire will actually bring the self-determinationthey are aiming for. Further, some areas remain outof reach of the government’s developmentambitions because they are under ethnic-minoritygovernance and affected by violent conflict.Development of hydroelectric power is thus partic-ularly sensitive because the question of authority isunresolved among the three main categories ofstakeholders forming the fault lines in Myanmar.The energy sector could therefore benefit fromadopting extra precautions by being developedthrough a conflict-sensitive approach that is bothinclusive and that builds bridges to overcome theseconflicts of interest to avoid escalation of violence.Government officials further mentioned that

hydroelectric power in Myanmar is not sustainablethroughout the year. This is due to lack of water inthe dry season, while sometimes in the rainy seasonan overabundance of water decreases the ability touse the power potential efficiently. To safeguardstable energy for industrial development, thegovernment aims to develop an energy matrix thatcombines hydroelectric power with other sourcesof power such as gas and what the government calls“clean coal energy.” As potential coal mines willmostly also be located in ethnic-minority areas,such development also requires a conflict-sensitiveapproach to prevent any escalation of conflict. Tomake the energy sector more sustainable in general,regional autonomy combined with an inclusiveconsultative process is essential.

37 The electrification rate in Myanmar has increased from 16 percent in 2006 to approximately one-third in 2017 (and just 16 percent in rural areas). OxfordBusiness Group, “Infrastructure Upgrades in Myanmar Aim to Cover Gaps in Energy Sector,” 2017, available athttps://oxfordbusinessgroup.com/overview/charging-infrastructure-upgrades-aim-cover-gaps-energy-sector .


On a smaller scale, some local projects provideremote villages outside the public electric grid withbasic household electricity. These can be solarenergy projects, small hydroelectric plants, andsometimes generators producing electricity frompetrol. These energy sources are not suitable forlarger development projects such as industrialeconomic zones, which need energy at a muchlarger scale, but they can provide small communi-ties with basic electricity, enabling them to benefitfrom general development.One of the effects of the country’s energy

shortage is that many people in rural Myanmar donot have enough electricity or alternative energyfor daily cooking. This undermines efforts toprotect the forest and contributes to deforestationbecause families will resort to using firewood forcooking. The central authorities take this thereatvery seriously:We have one special department dealing with the[cooking energy challenge. It has developed] anefficient cooking stove that can reduce the use offirewood by 40 percent…, and we also encourage thevillages to establish what we call the fuel plantation.38

The efficient cooking stove is distributed tohouseholds at an affordable price, and the fuelplantations are usually established in villages aspart of a community forestry program.Although Myanmar has one of the lowest electri-

fication rates in the world, its government isactively working to build the energy sector. It hasintroduced an ambitious plan: the NationalElectrification Plan, developed in cooperation withthe World Bank and the UN in 2014.39 The planaims to give 50 percent of the population access toelectricity by 2020 and 100 percent by 2030. Anenergy mix combining hydropower, wind, solar,oil, and gas will be used, which will help Myanmaradvance on SDG 7.EDUCATION AS A DRIVER OFCOHESION AND CONFLICT

Myanmar developed a new national educationstrategy in 2012 and has since introduced severaleducational reforms, including reforming the

textbooks in 2017. Although the education strategypreceded the SDGs, its nine main focus areas arevery much aligned with SDG 4 (providing qualityeducation for all) and its forty-three targets.Myanmar’s Ministry of Education believes that“education plays a key role to reduce poverty, tobuild peace and sustainable development.”40 Inparticular, the plan calls for extending primary andsecondary education from eleven years ofschooling to a kindergarten-to-twelfth-gradeprogram by adding one year at each end of thecurrent cycle. The ministry is also taking furthersteps to improve training of teachers by extendingtraining from two to four years in order to improvethe quality of education.Authorities have high awareness of gender

balance in the education system, which is almost50:50 at the primary level. Yet, as in many otherparts of the world, girls outnumber boys when theyenter higher levels of education. At the secondarylevel, the ratio is 60:40 in favor of girls, and inhigher education 80 percent of the students aregirls. While creating an inverse gender disparity,this still presents a challenge, as it gives boys andgirls unequal opportunities for development andself-realization.Further, the gender disparity reflects high

dropout rates among boys, which the ministrysuggests is a serious issue for the country. Theministry claims that, of the approximately 11million young people of school age, only 9 millionare enrolled in school, meaning that 2 millionchildren are missing out on education. In response,the government has developed an alternativelearning program in cooperation with a number ofNGOs to offer education to those who havedropped out of the school system. Although this isa positive education strategy, alternative learningprograms do not yet have a mainstreamed certifica-tion procedure that allows their students to sit forpublic exams and be re-enrolled in the formaleducation system, for example to pursue highereducation.Beyond gender equality strategies, the govern-

ment also claimed that public schools were

38 Interview with the Ministry of Environment, Naypyidaw, Myanmar, May 23, 2017.39 World Bank, “Development of a Myanmar National Electrification Plan: Towards Universal Access 2015–2030,” available athttp://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/229931468062089047/pdf/904200WP0NEP0Q0A00Box385316B0PUBLIC0.pdf .

40 Interview with Ministry of Education, Naypyidaw, Myanmar, May 23, 2017.


following nondiscriminatory laws to protectindividuals with disabilities as well as ethnic andreligious minority groups. Yet individuals from theNGO sector have claimed that such discriminationexists, not only against students but also againstteachers. One interviewee claimed a notice put outby the teacher training college in Pathan warnedthat disabled students would not be accepted intheir courses:Anybody who is disabled, has a tattoo or long hair orsomething [will not be accepted as students at thetraining college]. And [in response] people said, youknow, I think this goes against the convention forpeople with disabilities, [and the] Myanmar law ondisability of 2015. And the follow-up to that [law]might well introduce a compulsory quota [fordisabled persons] in the workplace. So where are the[disabled] teachers [going] to come from if they arenot [allowed to be] trained?41

Having laws on nondiscrimination is one thing,but implementing inclusion in practice issomething entirely different.Lack of capacity is another challenge to

improving both general access to education and thequality of education. In addition to strengtheningteacher training, the government aims to improveeducation quality by increasing Internet access inschools and using “deep learning rather thansurface learning” to encourage critical thinking andinnovation rather than memorization and theory.42In line with this, the government believes thateducation should be more practical and adapted tothe needs of the labor market. Because these are notwell matched, many young people trying to enterthe workforce lack the skills needed to find jobs.This is a challenge both for vocational trainingcourses and for higher education at the universities.Myanmar lacks basic infrastructure for

education, including school buildings andequipment. For this reason, other actors such asmonasteries have been active in the educationsector by offering primary and lower-secondaryeducation to students who would otherwise nothave access to school. Monastery schools and mostprivate schools follow the same curriculum as thepublic schools and prepare students for the publicexams. For the higher-secondary level, some

parents prefer to send their children to privateschools because they have higher pass rates for thepublic exams, which is important for the prospectof higher education. Myanmar has about 2,000private schools, though it does not have a privateschool law and thus only accepts results fromschools following the national curriculum. It doesnot accept results from private internationalschools such as the International Baccalaureate (IB)Diploma Programme, which most countriesrecognize as a high-quality qualification.Building schools and increasing access in remote

areas is a priority for the government, and it claimsthat educational services are offered on a nondis-criminatory basis. However, textbooks andteachers in public schools mainly use Bamar, thelanguage of the ethnic majority in the country,despite the country having more than a hundredrecognized ethnic-minority groups, all with uniquecultural practices, and several groups speakingmultiple languages. This means that many childrenbegin school in a language they do not know orunderstand. Recognizing this challenge, theMinistry of Education has accepted forty-ninelanguages to be used in public schools and nowinvests in assistant teachers who can help childrenby translating textbook content as well as theteacher’s instructions in the classroom. However,children still have to learn the Bamar language tobe able to sit for the public exams, whichcontributes to high dropout rates, as many studentsgive up school, knowing they will fail the exam dueto weak language skills. In some areas, the ministryhas accepted calls to translate textbooks andemploy ethnic-minority teachers so children canlearn in their mother tongue at the lower levels ofeducation. However, the language used in publicexams remains an issue.In Kayin state there are three systems of

education. In the government-controlled areasthere are public schools that follow the curriculumof the Ministry of Education, which use Bamar asthe language of instruction. In the KNU-controlledareas the Karen group has its own educationdepartment that organizes education at theprimary and lower-secondary levels. As part of this,

41 Interview with NGO leader, Yangon, Myanmar, May 24, 2017.42 Interview with Ministry of Education, Naypyidaw, Myanmar, May 23, 2017


it has developed its own curriculum using Karen asa language of instruction. Some areas of Kayin statewere previously under full Karen control, butunder the cease-fire agreement they have openedup and are now under a shared administration.Negotiations to merge the Karen schools with thepublic education system are ongoing.When the government establishes schools in

these mixed-control areas, children face challengesbecause they do not know Bamar. While there arestill schools following the Karen system in thesemixed areas, the government does not recognizethe results from these schools, effectively barringstudents from pursuing higher education.Although the curriculum is said to bear a closeresemblance to the international system, thesestudents generally fail the national exams becausethey do not know the Bamar language. To address

this problem, three KNU-organized schools havebeen selected to teach in Bamar. This creates anopportunity for students to take the matriculationexam so that “after they pass high school, they cancontinue to study at government universities.[Afterwards] those youths can go back to their[Karen] community and try to develop theircommunity. [As it is now,] if they are notgraduated from the government universities, it isnot easy to get jobs as teachers and nurses.”43

This demonstrates that education is not only adevelopment issue, but also a political issue withroots in the conflict. A political issue cannot besolved through the adoption of a developmentresponse but has to be solved through a politicalprocess that is inclusive and conflict-sensitive. Theprocess has to identify factors that are driving theconflict and could potentially lead to more violence

43 Interview with local leader, Hpa-an, Myanmar, June 5, 2017.44 Interview with local leader, Hpa-an, Myanmar, June 5, 2017.

Box 2. Language of instruction as a barrier to inclusive education“Because we do not have political rights, we are always suppressed by the government. As Karen we cannotuse the Karen curriculum and we cannot have our own school language. We have to follow the centralgovernment’s curriculum. And because of that a lot of students are dropouts…. Because we Karen do notunderstand…. We [Karen] can speak [Bamar], but we cannot understand it correctly, so when we enter theexams, we always fail. Because of language, [Bamar] becomes a barrier for us to achieve education. Becauseof the language we cannot achieve our future.“But if we had the right to start studying in our mother tongue at the primary level and secondary level, it

would be easy for us Karen students to study. The Karen had a lot of [primary] schools, middle schools, andhigh schools in their area [the “Karen liberated zones”], but after the fall of the headquarters [after signingthe bilateral cease-fire agreement with the government in 2012] they lost many schools. After they signedthe bilateral agreement, the government tried to do what they call education development. But for us, wethink it is a kind of what we call a political tool to expand their territory through education. They went tothe KNU and asked the leaders to build a school there. And after that they brought the government teachersand make them teach there. And the existing system of community schools disappeared. So this is one ofthe things we are fighting for. Until now we did not get the chance to teach in our own language in theseschools.”44

By demonstrating how education has become a disputed issue, this Karen leader is illustrating the differ-ence in visions for the future of Myanmar. The government claims to have good intentions to develop a partof the country it considers to be stagnating and left behind after years of violent conflict. Yet ethnic-minorityleaders who do not trust the government’s intentions interpret this initiative as colonization. For the ethnic-minority leaders, this form of government development conflicts with their ambition for self-determination.As such, the country’s education system is threatening an already fragile peace instead of contributing tosustainable development. It is not that the Karen leaders do not want education and development, but theywant it with self-determination.


and work to overcome them to reach sustainablepeace.As a result, education in ethnic-minority groups’

mother tongue is one of the key issues in the peaceprocess. Ethnic-minority civil society groups areasking the government to allow minority languagesto be taught in schools. For the government,however, the education system is one of its maintools to build social cohesion and bring futurecitizens together under one national umbrella—atool to bridge the ethnic divisions of the country.Although ethnic-minority groups have already

been operating schools using ethnic-minoritylanguages of instruction in their “liberated zones,”the experience in Mon state can serve as anexample of possible cooperation between thecentral government and ethnic-minority leaders.When the New Mon State Party signed a cease-firewith the military government in 1995, it was able tonegotiate an expansion of its schools operating inthe “liberated zones” to the government-controlledareas where many Mon-speaking communitieslived. The New Mon State Party’s educationcommittee operated some schools, and others wereoperated jointly with the government. Primaryschools use Mon as the primary language ofinstruction, while the Bamar language isintroduced at the middle-school level in combina-tion with Mon, which is used for culture andhistory classes and classes in the Mon language. Atthe high-school level, the language of instructionhas been fully switched to Bamar, except for classesin English and the Mon language.45

Myanmar therefore already has a model forsolving the sensitive language issue in education,one that appears to work well. This model could bereplicated for other ethnic-minority groups as partof negotiations for self-determination in a federalstate. While education has the potential to driveconflict in Kayin, the opposite is happening inMon, where the education model is building peaceand social cohesion.A final point is that the education system is

closely related to the situation of youth. As a result

of the high dropout rate, many young people inKayin state have limited opportunities to secure alivelihood locally. Migration to Thailand issometimes the only option. As noted by a localleader, “So you will see that there are not so manypeople around [here] between the age of eighteenand forty. Kids are living with their grandparents,and there are a lot of people migrating to Thailandas unskilled labor.”46

The opportunities available to young individualsdepend mostly on their family and socioeconomicbackground—whether they are from a rural orurban household, a poor or a wealthy family, andso on. For example, while there are universities inHpa-an, drug abuse is considered an increasingproblem among youth in the area. While thesituation of youth was raised as an important issueby several interviewees, further elaboration on thistopic is beyond the main scope of this study.CHANGING THE BUSINESS MODEL INMYANMAR: A NEW APPROACH TOPARTNERSHIPS

The regime change in Myanmar in 2010 and theensuing reform process that began in 2011 led to aprofound change in economic policies; the countryshifted from a state-centered economy toward amore open, market-oriented economy. A govern-ment official described that “the new governmenthas changed strategy. The government is not aleader anymore; the government is a referee,especially in the economic field.… As a referee, thegovernment needs to develop the necessaryeconomic rules, laws, and regulations for fair playin the market.”47

Before this change, Myanmar’s economy mainlyconsisted of large state-owned enterprises. Whilesuch businesses give the government control overresources and the opportunity to offer employmentby creating public sector jobs, state-ownedenterprises can also have high costs and limitedprofits. Interviewees claimed that, since thereforms and the opening of the country, 98 percentof enterprises are now privately owned and small ormedium-sized. This reflects a historic economic

45 Marie Lall, “Mother Tongue Education: The Mon Model,” Myanmar Times, August 20, 2012, available at www.mmtimes.com/national-news/187-mother-tongue-education-the-mon-model.html?start=1 .

46 Interview with local leader, Hpa-an, Myanmar, June 5, 2017.47 Interview with government official, Naypyidaw, Myanmar, May 23, 2017.


shift from state-owned to privately ownedcompanies in a relatively short time. This unprece-dented growth of the private sector has required anupdate of laws and regulations to better adapt to amarket economy. As of June 2017, for example, thegovernment had finalized a new trading law and anew investment law. Laws on citizen investmentand foreign investment were approved in 2012, andin 2017 these two laws were combined to easeaccess for foreign investment.48

The government is further developing public-private partnerships as part of a strategy to meetsome of Myanmar’s urgent needs, particularly interms of infrastructure. While many urban areasneed upgrades to more modern infrastructure,many rural areas are still in need of basicinfrastructure such as roads and electricity.According to a representative of the businesscommunity interviewed in Yangon, a frameworkfor this public-private partnership strategy is stillunder development to attract not only domesticbut also foreign investment.49

Yet the government acknowledges that public-private partnerships can be a double-edged swordand sees the need to develop a technical frameworkthat is sensitive to the needs and interests of boththe government and other stakeholders and that isbound by rules and regulations. The sameinterviewee claimed that the current frameworkwas ambiguous and unpredictable.50 There is thus astrong need to develop standards, rules, and regula-tions for environmental and social impact assess-ments, as well as for conflict-sensitivity assessmentsin relation to investments.The country’s vice president has monthly

meetings with the chamber of commerce and otherbusiness organizations to discuss challenges in thebusiness sector. Together, they suggest recommen-dations for actions and measures needed tomitigate challenges that have been identified, suchas changes to laws and regulations. An intervieweeworking closely with the business sector was partic-ularly concerned about the nature and quality of

regulations for the private sector:We began thinking it is all about persuading

businesses to respect human rights and the UN guidingprinciples, so we opened up by saying a responsiblebusiness is based on law. And they said, you don’t knowhow difficult it is…, it just doesn’t work. The govern-ment here is thinking that they just have to do moreinvestment, by which it means going out to trade fairs,[while] investment promotion actually means overhaulof…its existing regulations.51

The government must therefore take a moreinclusive and consultative approach whendeveloping these regulations in order to make themmore fit for purpose. Some claim that the currentcomplex regulations are an impediment toeconomic growth; if a business wants to operatewith legal permits they often get stuck in a maze oflegal documents.Another challenge is the concept of corporate

social responsibility (CSR) and the perception thatbusinesses compose a “bottomless purse of philan-thropy.” When renegotiating the Letpadaungcopper mine investment in 2014, the governmentput forward as a prerequisite for official approval alegally binding clause that 2 percent of net profitswould go toward CSR. Some government advisershave suggested that this should become a standardpractice for investment in other sectors as well.52

According to an interviewee working on businesssector reform, there are several pitfalls related tothis recommendation. If, for example, the govern-ment asks a private company to provide money fora school or a hospital, the company is taking ongovernment responsibilities, making it unsustain-able when the company decides to leave thecountry. Further, the business might use CSR fundsto do what it should be doing anyway, such asputting in proper wastewater treatment to clean uphazardous spills. Instead, the company is supposedto integrate a strategy for social, environmental,and consumer concerns into its overall businessoperation by channeling funds into a communityin close collaboration with its stakeholders.

48 According to an interview with the attorney-general’s office in Naypyidaw, Myanmar, May 22, 2017.49 Interview with individual related to the business sector, Yangon, Myanmar, May 24, 2017.50 Ibid.51 Ibid.52 Vicky Bowman and the Inle Advisory Group, “Myanmar and CSR: Creating and Implementing Successful Strategy,” Myanmar Centre for Responsible Business,February 25, 2014, available at www.myanmar-responsiblebusiness.org/news/myanmar-and-csr-creating-and-implementing-successful-strategy.html .


CSR also sometimes gives companies anopportunity to leverage the money they donate tofulfill legal requirements. According to oneinterviewee, this could belike [giving] 10,000 [kyat] to each of the village headsaround their mine, so every month [the company] cansign off [on their social and environmental impactassessment] and say, yes, there is no problem with thismine, we [have] support [for] its continuation, [whichcan actually be] against the interest of the [people inthe] village who have been poisoned by [the mine’swastewater].53

As another example, CSR funds could be used topay a village leader’s uncle who has a constructioncompany that is building a school but not followingany regulations for tenders or transparency. Inexchange, the business leader who is paying off thelocals would be granted renewal of his permit andthe continuation of his profitable investments, butwithout checks and balances based on the rule oflaw.In this way, CSR can become an instrument of

corruption by granting legal permits and reducingaccountability for the adverse social and environ-mental impacts of business operations. As a result,it can drive conflict instead of contributing to thewell-being of the affected population andsupporting sustainable development. In thiscontext, CSR can be called “forced philanthropy” asopposed to a business model that creates sharedvalue and allows the community to be directlyinvolved in making decisions that will ultimatelyaffect them. This could involve a business stoppingpollution that is making people sick, or building aplayground to keep children off the streets toprevent them from being killed in car accidentswhen it has caused heavier traffic in a residentialarea.CSR requires that the government see businesses

as stakeholders rather than potential donors andfunders of social projects, but according tointerviewees, viewing them as the latter has been atradition in Myanmar, particularly throughout themilitary era. To do business in Myanmar duringmilitary rule, good relations with army leaders wereneeded. Today’s business “cronies” came to theirpositions because they did exactly what the military

leaders asked them to do, whether it was to build ahospital or a school or to do something else inreturn for important licenses. Several intervieweesclaimed that Myanmar’s rapid development madeit easy for these “cronies” to grab extensive controlover the private sector. They further hinted thatseveral of these people belonged to families withclose links to influential army leaders. In this way,the army has kept control over large parts ofMyanmar’s growing business sector, includinglarge businesses such as Myanmar Beer.Myanmar’s current rapid economic growth has

opened up new opportunities for corruption,adding to an already extensive problem in thecountry. One of the main challenges for thebusiness sector is to become more sensitive to thespecific context of conflicts in Myanmar byanalyzing how their activities can contribute to orcurb them. Such analyses can help developmentand business initiatives contribute to a comprehen-sive sustaining peace approach.In the tourist industry, for example, there is a

preference for big hotels and resorts. Further,guesthouses for foreigners are required to have aminimum of ten rooms,54 which excludes smalllocal investors from entering the market becausethey do not have enough capital to build ten roomsor more. Such regulations can thus drive conflictinstead of promoting development, becausewealthy investors from Yangon are the only oneswith sufficient capital to follow the regulation. Inthis way, the Ministry of Tourism is indirectlydiscriminating against locals by making their entryinto the market difficult. A local leader in Hpa-ancommented, “Because we the people do not havethe benefit of peace, maybe this crony or this richman got the benefit of the peace. A lot are owned bythem…. For example you can ask who owns thishotel [where the interview was conducted].”55

Airbnb and other businesses in the sharingeconomy have emerged as a way for local people ofmodest means to earn some money and counterthe prevalence of large tourist resorts funded bycronies. However, Airbnb is illegal in Myanmar,and the government is against it for two reasons.One is that the owners of big hotels do not want

53 Interview with individual related to the business sector, Yangon, Myanmar, May 24, 2017.54 The interviewee stated that the limit was around ten or twenty rooms and we were not able to confirm the exact number.55 A relatively big hotel of modest standards.

competition. The other is that it will reduce thegovernment’s control over this part of the touristindustry.56 In some parts of Kayin, locals have beenable to push for a community-driven approach tobed-and-breakfast accommodation, assisted byinternational NGOs pressuring the relevantministries. This experiment is fragile, however, dueto a delicate security situation in areas covered bycease-fire agreements. A central component of the 2030 Agenda is to

leave no one behind, and asking who benefitseconomically from peace and cease-fire agreementsis thus crucial. A more conflict-sensitive approachwould include analyzing how these regulations areplaying out on the ground, how they are distri -buting privileges and driving processes ofexclusion, how they are undermining orsupporting local business initiatives, and how theyare fueling or reducing conflict. SDG 17 calls for arenewed partnership, in which governments, theprivate sector, and civil society work together and“share knowledge, expertise, technology andfinancial resources to support the achievements ofthe SDGs.” It calls for an approach that is consciousof how inclusive growth can foster peace in amutual and symbiotic long-term process. Thisreport has further argued that responding to thecalls from Myanmar’s many ethnic minorities forpeace and self-determination will be fundamentalfor the country’s long-term sustainable develop-ment.

Conclusions

This report has argued that Myanmar lacksconsensus around a national vision for the future ofthe country and its path toward peace and develop-ment. There are at least three main perspectives onhow the country can develop, represented by threemain categories of stakeholders in the population,each relating to the country’s conflict in a partic-ular way.The first is the majority ethnic group, the Bamar,

represented by the central government. As part ofthe country’s overall reform process, the govern-ment is taking a foreign policy approach where it issigning international agreements such as the 2030Agenda. The government is committed to these

goals and is making plans and strategies for theirimplementation. Yet the government has anunsettled relationship with its armed forces, whichhave retained considerable formal and informalpower and sometimes display conflicts of interestwith the civil government, indicating conflictingvisions for the future of the state.The second perspective is found among ethnic-

minority actors that have signed cease-fires withthe government. They live in areas that aresomewhat available for development. Throughbilateral agreements, the central government canuse development and the process of implementingthe 2030 Agenda to consolidate the peaceprocesses. Yet lack of trust between ethnic-minority leaders and the central government is animpediment to the development process. Despitegood intentions from the central government,ethnic minorities view many development projectswith suspicion because they are not implementedthrough an inclusive and consultative process. Theexperiences of development initiatives that fail toconsider local opinions thus tend to create percep-tions of development as concealed colonization,which can intensify ethnic groups’ desire for self-determination and escalate conflicts.The third perspective is found among ethnic

armed groups engaged in continued violentconflict with Myanmar’s army. These groupscontrol swathes of land that are out of reach for thegovernment and other development actors, makingimplementation of the 2030 Agenda impossible.While local ethnic-minority leaders are providingsome services to people under their control, theseareas are falling behind on sustainable develop-ment.We were not able to meet representatives of the

third category for security reasons, but in generalthe people we met in Myanmar were optimisticabout the country’s future. The country has seenpositive reforms and fundamental change sinceemerging from decades of military dictatorship.There are many positive trends in terms ofdevelopment, particularly given that the countryhas opened its borders to allow foreign aid andinvestment. This process is likely to continue. Onereason is that the ineffectiveness of the military’s


56 Arguments elsewhere include how Airbnb can drive up rental prices, which can negatively impact local residents.

governance model convinced it to give up parts ofits power. Another reason is that democratic forceshave grown strong, and the open economy hascreated international interdependence and strongeconomic interests in Myanmar that are largelyreliant on continued democratization and peace.At the same time, however, the country faces bigchallenges when it comes to inclusive and sustain-able peace, which could counter these positivedevelopment trends.Myanmar is struggling with two transitions: the

transition from dictatorship to democracy and thetransition from war to peace. The first is linked tothe 2008 constitution, which was the key toopening up the country for these transitions.However, this constitution was created by themilitary and gives the military continued controlover key governmental institutions such as theMinistry of Interior and, by extension, the police.The military also kept control over the GeneralAdministration, which plays a decisive role indecision making at all levels of government.Further, the military retained control over theMinistry of Defense and Border Control. Thismeans that the coercive power of the state andcrucial ministries are controlled by people directlyappointed by the army chief of staff rather than thedemocratically elected government.The peace process is also moving forward at a

slower pace than initially anticipated after AungSan Suu Kyi came to power in 2016. At the time ofthe researchers’ field trip in May and June 2017,cease-fire agreements remained intact in thesoutheastern parts of the country, while in thenorth conflicts were escalating.57 The currentsituation is complex, involving the army and anumber of armed groups. Some of the armedgroups are militias operating under the military,while some remain independent. Among theindependent armed groups, some have signedcease-fires with the government and some havenot. All of the independent armed groups havedifferent political, economic, social, ethnic, andidentity-based grievances that will need to beaddressed in peace negotiations, and many will aimfor more autonomy and self-determination in a

future federal state. This emphasizes not only thecomplexity of the peace process in Myanmar butalso the need for all groups to be included in adevelopment process that is sensitive to the needsand grievances of each group and that addresseshow resources are allocated and distributed in ajust way, including for the country’s mostpersecuted group, the Rohingya.To achieve the goals set out in the 2030 Agenda

Myanmar must adopt an approach that is sensitiveto conflict dynamics, acknowledging that thecountry’s conflicts are fundamentally aboutcompetition over access to and control over landand resources, political authority, and self-determi-nation. An inclusive political process is required toachieve these ambitions. This approach wouldfurther take into consideration the many parallelconflicts that exist between ethnic-minority groupsand the Bamar majority, as well as between thecenter and the periphery within ethnic communi-ties, including the majority Bamar population.This approach will also require knowledge of the

drivers of conflict in the particular context selectedfor a development initiative, including factors thatcreate divisions and breed violence in thecommunity. But it is equally important tounderstand the factors that can bring peopletogether and curb violence and to draw on thesepositive opportunities to build bridges betweengroups divided by conflict. Only by knowing howthe intended development project will influencethese dividers and connectors can development besustainable, in line with the goals of the 2030Agenda. This knowledge and analysis is at the coreof the sustaining peace approach and afundamental principle underpinning the SDGs.Development should not just “do no harm,” itshould reinforce and foster peace. Lack of insightinto conflict dynamics leaves the principle of“doing no harm” to chance, which is not compat-ible with sustainable development.Sustaining peace is a process that builds a

common vision of society, drawing on the linksbetween peace, sustainable development, humanrights, rule of law, and inclusion, all of which areessential to building trust in society.58 For


57 In contrast, around ten years ago cease-fires were more or less holding in the north, while conflicts were mainly active in the southeast.58 Youssef Mahmoud and Andrea Ó Súilleabháin, “With New Resolutions, Sustaining Peace Sits at Heart of UN Architecture,” IPI Global Observatory, April 29,2016, available at https://theglobalobservatory.org/2016/04/sustaining-peace-peacebuilding-united-nations-sdg/ .

Myanmar, this new vision of society must unite theinterests of the three main categories ofstakeholders identified in this report. In doing so, ithas the potential to develop into a new socialcontract between the state and society, with thestate aiming to protect citizens by eradicatingviolence and offering public service to all, regard-less of their ethnic, religious, or political identity orsocioeconomic status. Such social contracts willonly be successful where there is a high level ofinclusion and trust in society, and this is whyinclusion and trust are at the core of both sustain-able development and peace.Interviews with officials responsible for SDGs

from different ministries revealed a tendency tofocus on and prioritize the SDGs that are mostrelevant to the ministry’s portfolio. There was lessfocus on the interdependency among all the SDGsand how change in one sector will influenceanother. The 2030 Agenda calls for a holisticapproach that appears to be absent from much ofMyanmar’s practical approach to the SDGs. SDG17 calls for “new partnerships,” or a new way ofdoing things, which remains a challenge.

Recommendations

The government of Myanmar has made impressiveprogress since its adoption of the 2030 Agenda forSustainable Development. The agenda alreadyunderpins the work of all relevant ministries, manyof which have developed concrete plans intendedto work toward the SDGs. As a result, the govern-ment’s implementation of the SDGs appears to beon track.Yet this work primarily represents the vision of

only one category of stakeholders in Myanmar: themajority Bamar population and the central govern-ment. A more challenging task is to create synergiesbetween work on the SDGs and the visions forpeace and development of the two other maincategories of stakeholders in the conflict: theethnic-minority groups that have signed cease-fireagreements with the government and those thathave not. This will require addressing moresystemic and cross-ministerial challenges,including achieving peace, transitioning fromautocratic to democratic power structures,including ethnic-minority populations in develop-ment and governance, and balancing economic

growth with environmental sustainability andsocial equality.The following are general recommendations to

address these systemic challenges:1. Continue developing national laws and regula-

tory frameworks in line with internationalstandards and national needs.The rule of law and equal access to justice arekey targets under SDG 16 (16.3). After decadesof isolation from the international community,Myanmar is in great need of updating its lawsand regulatory frameworks to meet newchallenges associated with its transitionalprocesses. Revisions to and development ofregulatory frameworks in the main policy areashave been underway since 2011, and new initia-tives are being taken in relation to foreigninvestments, privatization of education, publicservices, and other issues.At the same time, the development of regulatoryframeworks is instrumental to addressing thesystemic challenges mentioned above, includingcreating peace, ensuring land rights and fairdistribution of resources, and developing afunctioning democracy. Of particularimportance is the development of standardregulations for environmental and social impactassessments and for conflict-sensitivity assess-ments, particularly in relation to economicdevelopment in ethnic-minority areas.

2. Use SDG-related development initiatives topromote inclusion and to re-establish trust innational governance, particularly amongethnic-minority groups.One of the findings in this report is that there iswidespread mistrust toward the central govern-ment and government-led development activi-ties in ethnic-minority areas. This mistrust isrooted in decades of negative experiences withsuch activities, which have generally resulted inthe transfer of resources and power from ethnic-minority areas to the central areas of thecountry. Development has been used as a tool toundermine ethnic-minority organizations’authority, legitimacy, and ethnic identity. Theseexperiences constrain many well-intendeddevelopment initiatives in ethnic-minority areastoday, as the local populations perceive projectssuch as road construction, hydropower develop-


ment, and development of public services as aform of “colonization” rather than as initiativesthat will benefit them and improve their livingconditions. An important task will be to reversethe mistrust in the central government bydemonstrating how development initiatives inethnic-minority areas can lead to inclusivedevelopment according to the needs and wishesof the local populations, from planning throughto execution.This mistrust is also linked to the process ofdecentralization currently taking place inMyanmar. The understanding of “decentraliza-tion” varies among different groups in thecountry. While many see the process as mainly atransfer of power to central-governmentrepresentatives at the local level, ethnic-minority representatives advocate for inclusionof cultural and political aspects into the defini-tion of decentralization in order to develop amore pluralistic national society. Yet the consti-tution remains a barrier for transferring powerfrom the local state counselor’s office to theelected state parliament. Such transfer of poweris currently illegal, and constitutional reform isneeded to advance democratic development.Decentralization thus becomes linked toinclusion, or, in the case of Myanmar, lackthereof. Promoting inclusion also meansincluding nongovernmental actors ingovernance structures or processes, for exampleby including civil society actors in the peaceprocess.

3. Continue to develop governance capacity.Strengthening and developing well-functioning,responsible, and inclusive government institu-tions at all levels is another key target underSDG 16 (16.6, 16.7, and 16.16.A). Governancestructures in Myanmar need to adapt to newchallenges related to the country’s transitions.Many initiatives to build capacity are ongoing,and important steps have been taken by thegovernment to increase transparency ofgovernance and to end corruption. However,after decades of autocratic rule, this is a processthat needs to be developed further.

4. Ensure a balance between economic growthand environmental sustainability.

A key challenge to achieving sustainabledevelopment and many of the SDGs is findingthe balance between economic growth andsocioeconomic development, on the one hand,and environmental sustainability, on the other.Since 2011, Myanmar’s economy has becomemore open, which has resulted in high rates ofeconomic growth. However, economic growthin Myanmar has been associated with exploita-tion of natural resources, most of which takesplace in ethnic-minority areas.In spite of an increasing focus on thesedilemmas in the country’s development policiesand regulatory frameworks, the environmentaldegradation caused by the country’s currenteconomic development and transition is stillsevere. A key way to improve this situation is toput in place a regulatory framework that priori-tizes preserving the country’s natural resourcesfor future development, in line with the essenceof sustainable development.

5. Bring sustaining peace into the SDGs.A core perspective underpinning this report isthat sustaining peace and socioeconomicdevelopment, and hence the achievement of theSDGs, are highly interrelated. Currently there isa division in Myanmar between the peaceprocess and the development process, withseparate actors involved in each. Both peace andsustainable development would have betteroutcomes if these two processes were integrated.

6. Ensure a cross-ministerial approach to theSDGs.Although the government of Myanmar hasestablished cross-ministerial working groups forthe implementation of the 2030 Agenda, thereare signs that it is being implemented through a“siloed” approach. Individual ministries tend tofocus only on the SDGs directly related to theirown field and responsibility. Hence, cross-ministry communication and discussion of anydilemmas and trade-offs between the differentSDGs should be promoted. This could beachieved through designated mechanismsfocusing on the relationships among all of theSDGs, how they are influencing one another,and how these synergies can promote ministe-rial cooperation and cross-ministerial benefits.


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