AFF

Threat

Yes ThreatNorth Korea is a threat – chance of preemptive strikesFifield 16, Anna – Bureau Chief in Tokyo for Washington Post, previously worked for the Financial Times in Seoul, Washington D.C., Sydney, London, and the Middle East, 2016 (“North Korea’s making a lot of threats these days. How worried should we be,” Washington Post, March 11, 2016, accessible online at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/03/11/north-koreas-making-a-lot-of-threats-these-days-how-worried-should-we-be/, accessed July 5, 2016//AW)

. “I don’t think war is imminent, but certainly it raises tensions ,” said Joel Wit, a former U.S. negotiator with North Korea who is now

at the U.S.-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies. “North Korea is building nuclear weapons and missiles to defend itself against militarily superior countries.” But one thing has changed in the past couple of years to make people take these threats more seriously. North Korea , which had always referred to its nuclear weapons as a deterrent, has increasingly talked about a preemptive strike . “There’s a pattern to North Korea’s expressions. Now, the threat of a preemptive strike is part of its template , ” said Snyder of CFR. “It’s hard to tell whether it’s representing a heightened likelihood of attack or whether the propaganda writers just found a new word in the dictionary.”

North Korea threatens relations in the Peninsula – miscalculation, hacking, and escalating tensionsFifield 16, Anna – Bureau Chief in Tokyo for Washington Post, previously worked for the Financial Times in Seoul, Washington D.C., Sydney, London, and the Middle East, 2016 (“North Korea’s making a lot of threats these days. How worried should we be,” Washington Post, March 11, 2016, accessible online at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/03/11/north-koreas-making-a-lot-of-threats-these-days-how-worried-should-we-be/, accessed July 5, 2016//AW)

Well, you’re right not to breathe a sigh of relief. As Suh Choo-suk, an analyst at the South’s Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, points out,

there’s a risk of miscalculation. “The chances of North Korea conducting military provocations are low during the South Korean-United States joint

drills, but small clashes or conflicts could occur in this highly tense time ,” he said. “And small clashes could have a bigger impact because of the high tensions.” There are also plenty of a lternatives to conventional attacks — such as hacking , something North Korea has gotten pretty good at . “The North could try to attack South Korea in cyberspace or stage a provocation but make it hard to trace the offender. It could declare a quasi-state of war like last August to have an impact on the South Korean economy,” says Cheong of the Sejong Institute. And the tensions are likely to continue for some time to come.

North Korea will never give their nukes – they’re key to Un stabilityLukin 1/7 - Artyom Lukin Professor Far Eastern Federal University at Vladivostok, Russia. January 07, 2016 Why Russia and China Won’t Curb North Korea Any More Than the U.S. Will Curb Saudi Arabia http://www.huffingtonpost.com/artyom-lukin/russia-china-north-korea-saudi-us_b_8931672.html Accessed 07-04-2016

NKorea Is to China and Russia as Saudi Is to the U.S.

As an aside, Russia’s and China’s stances on N orth K orea are not so much different from how the U nited States

treats Saudi Arabia — a brutal regime sponsoring the ideology of violent jihadism, but one with which Washington needs to maintain friendship for realpolitik reasons.

With China and Russia unwilling to crank up pressure on North Korea, the U nited States and its allies have

only one option left: engaging Pyongyang diplomatically in search of a mutually acceptable settlement. This means abandoning the policy of “ strategic patience ” toward the DPRK that the Obama administration has

pursued since 2009. The policy centers on the insistence that Pyongyang commit to denuclearization as a precondition for direct talks. However, it is becoming increasingly clear that North Korea will never agree to completely give up its nuclear arsenal . Pyongyang sees the nukes as the ultimate guarantee of its security and will not exchange them for any amount of agreements and assurances from Washington . And the North Korean leaders have learned the sad lesson of Libya’s Gaddafi, who abandoned a nuclear program in

an agreement with the West only to meet his horrible end at the hands of Western-supported rebels soon afterwards.

North Korean leaders have learned the sad lesson of Libya’s Gaddafi , who abandoned a nuclear program

only to meet his horrible end at the hands of Western-supported rebels soon afterwards.

Nukes k2 Kim regime – will make more. Mizokami, 15

Kyle, a defense and national security writer based in San Francisco who has appeared in The Diplomat, Foreign Policy, War is Boring and The Daily Beast. In 2009 he cofounded the defense and security blog Japan Security Watch, 2015 (“Welcome to north Korean Nuclear Weapons 101,” The National Intrest, September 26, 2015, Accessible Online at: http://nationalinterest.org/feature/welcome-north-korean-nuclear-weapons-101-13940, Accessed on 7/5/16, DSF)

5. Giving away nukes would probably end the Kim regime

Nuclear weapons have become the guarantor of the Kim dynasty . But by pushing so hard for nuclear weapons, the Kims may have fallen into a trap of their own making.

North Korea has long maintained that it preserves the “real” spirit of the Korean people. It safeguards this gem of Koreanness from the imperialist United States and the puppet government in Seoul. That’s the whole point of heavily arming itself and cutting itself off from the outside world.

The Kim dynasty has defined the U nited S tates as the antithesis of Koreanness . The Yankee imperialist enemy has helped legitimize multi-generational rule by the Kim family , as well as justify repressive security measures, harsh living conditions, lack of economic progress and the generally low level of prosperity.

If Kim Jong Un were to cut a deal with the United States and other powers to relinquish his nuclear weapons , he would be acknowledging that the existential threat no longer exists . And if there’s no longer a threat to North Korea, why should the people tolerate deprivation , sacrifice and the Kims ?

North Korea’s nuclear arsenal is not going away anytime soon. It will likely continue to grow. Getting to the bottom about the many uncertainties about Pyongyang’s nuclear program will help the rest of the world deal with as ever more dangerous and complex situation. Ambiguity may conceal weakness. It may also conceal strength.

Kim learned from Libya – won’t relinquish nukesKaplan and Baker, 13

Robert D. and Rodger, Kaplan is Stratfor's Chief Geopolitical Analyst from March 2012 through December 2014. He is currently a Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security in Washington, D.C., and has been a foreign correspondent and contributing editor at The Atlantic, where his work has appeared for three decades. In 2009, he was appointed to the Pentagon's Defense Policy Board, which advised former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates on key issues. Mr. Kaplan served on the board through 2011. From 2006 to 2008, he was the Class of 1960 Distinguished Visiting Professor in National Security at the U.S. Naval Academy. Rodger Baker leads Stratfor's analysis of Asia Pacific and South Asia and guides the company's forecasting process. A Stratfor analyst since 1997, he has played a pivotal role in developing and refining the company's analytical process, internal training programs and geopolitical framework., 2013 (“

North Korea would have to be crazy to give up its nuclear capability. Why? Because of one word: Libya . American behavior toward Libya over the past decade may have convinced North Korea’s ruling elite never to negotiate away its nukes. And that is true no matter what the Iranians may do.

In December 2003, nine months after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, a time when the invasion was still being viewed as a triumph of American power, Libyan dictator Moammar Gadhafi announced that he was giving up his nuclear and chemical weapons programs — his entire weapons of mass destruction capacity, in fact — and would open up his territory to international inspections, in order to ascertain his compliance. True, the Libyan nuclear program was not exactly dynamic, not nearly to the degree of the Iranian one . Yet, it existed . In any case, Gadhafi kept his word and the U nited S tates went on to normalize relations with Libya following decades of the latter’s partial diplomatic isolation . For good measure, Gadhafi ensured that his intelligence services helped the Americans where they could in the Greater Middle East.

Then in early 2011 the so-called Arab Spring toppled regimes in neighboring Tunisia and Egypt. The moment anti-regime unrest surfaced in Libya , the U nited S tates deserted Gadhafi, encouraged his enemies , and , under pressure from humanitarians, intervened militarily along with NATO to aid the Libyan rebels. The intervention, by its choice of targets, had the undeclared aim of assassinating Gadhafi. As it happened, Gadhafi’s grisly death was the upshot of a NATO attack on his convoy, leading him to be captured by rebels. Such was the thanks he received from Washington for voluntarily giving up his WMD. While Gadhafi’s WMD program might not have posed a significant threat, its very existence was highly symbolic. Libya has since fallen into partial chaos — chaos that has further destabilized regimes in the nearby Sahel region.

The lesson in this story for Kim Jong Un is clear: that while his safety with nuclear weapons is clearly uncertain , he would be even less safe if he gave them up . After all, had Gadhafi kept building his WMD capacity throughout the years following the American invasion of Iraq, however slowly, the Americans might have hesitated a bit more before backing the Libyan rebels . There are just fewer risks to toppling a regime without WMD than trying to topple one with them . One of the reasons the Obama administration hesitated in trying to topple the Syrian regime was the fear of the regime’s chemical weapons arsenal falling into rebel hands. And the Bush administration toppled Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq in order to prevent it from acquiring what it thought might be nuclear weapons.

EscalatesNuclear escalation likely – miscalc, uncertaintyMizokami, 15

Kyle, a defense and national security writer based in San Francisco who has appeared in The Diplomat, Foreign Policy, War is Boring and The Daily Beast. In 2009 he cofounded the defense and security blog Japan Security Watch, 2015 (“Welcome to north Korean Nuclear Weapons 101,” The National Intrest, September 26, 2015, Accessible Online at: http://nationalinterest.org/feature/welcome-north-korean-nuclear-weapons-101-13940, Accessed on 7/5/16, DSF)

4. The North’s nuclear doctrine is unknown

Under what circumstances would North Korea use nuclear weapons? Does it have a “no first use” policy? Does it consider nukes offensive or defensive weapons ? Maybe both? Are Pyongyang’s nukes strategic or tactical?

Outsiders — which is everyone outside of North Korea — have no firm answers, a disturbing notion since understanding under what circumstances North Korea would use a nuclear weapon is essential to avoiding a nuclear war.

Other countries are more explicit. China and India, for example, have both made a pledge of “no first use” of nuclear weapons. Neither will use nuclear weapons unless they are nuked first. It’s an admirable policy of restraint and pre-tension signaling. North Korea, not surprisingly, has taken a different tack and nuclear ambiguity has become an essential part of the Kim’s nuclear strategy.

Not understanding the terms under which North Korea will use nukes has a chilling effect on any potential military action . Tit-for-tat artillery exchanges in retaliation for bombarding So uth Ko rean territory might potentially trigger a nuclear war . Rolling the combined might of the South Korean and U.S. armies up to the entrance of the Ryugyong Hotel might not trigger nuclear war. We really don’t know .

Which just might be the whole point.

North Korea has tested a hydrogen bomb – uncertainty is presentPanda 1/6 - Ankit Panda is an editor at The Diplomat. He writes on security, politics, economics, and culture, 1-6-16(“North Korea Tests Nuclear Device, Claims Successful Thermonuclear Detonation,” The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2016/01/north-korea-tests-nuclear-device-claims-successful-thermonuclear-detonation/, Accessed 7-5-16, BK)

At approximately 10:00 a.m. local time on Wednesday, January 6, No rth Ko rea detonated a nuclear device of an unknown yield. In an announcement on state television, the North Korean regime claimed that the device was a hydrogen bomb and that the test was successful. The test was conducted at 41.326°N 129.010°E, near the location of North Korea’s last test in February 2013, which was conducted at 41.302°N 129.066°E. Both test sites are a short distance from the North Korean nuclear facility at Punggye-ri. According to the European Mediterranean Seismological Center, the epicenter of the detonation was approximately 2 kilometers underground.

In announcing the test, the North Korean government emphasized that the device was to protect against powers hostile to the country. The timing of the attack is somewhat surprising as Kim Jong-un’s New Year’s address was less focused on the country’s military and the nuclear program than it was on economic issues. However, January 8 marks Kim’s birthday, suggesting that the nuclear test was something of a preemptive birthday celebration for the North Korean leader who took over after his father Kim Jong-il died in 2011. This is the second test on Kim Jong-un’s watch.

Independent verification of North Korea’s claims will take time , but initial impressions suggest that the device detonated was not a thermonuclear device, otherwise known as an H-bomb or hydrogen bomb. The measured seismic yield of the detonation was reported as 4.9 by China’s Earthquake Networks Center and as 5.1 by the U.S. Geological Survey. Both estimates suggest a yield similar to the device detonated in February 2013, which was the last nuclear test carried out by North Korea and involved a non-thermonuclear device.

I’d recommend reading Jeffrey Lewis’ recent article on the plausibility of North Korea having successfully developed a thermonuclear device. Lewis, commenting via Twitter, noted that the North Korean claims are likely exaggerated. At best, the device could have been boosted, but was “ definitely not a successful staged device,” Lewis said.

Independent verification of the test by experts will be crucial. The United States is reportedly looking into Wednesday’s event. The U.S. Air Force has WC-135 Constant Phoenix aircraft stationed at Kadena Air Force Base in Okinawa, Japan that will likely conduct atmospheric analysis to detect radioactive material–this will help better ascertain the nature of the device that was detonated on Wednesday.

Additionally, the C omprehensive T est- B an T reaty Organization will conduct its own analysis and provide an estimate of the device’s yield. According to James Acton, a nuclear expert and senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the seismic measurements from Wednesday’s test suggest that the yield of the device was in the range of 10 kilotons , similar to the February 2013 detonation.

Escalation likely – US and soko provocations in response to noko test Gady 1/11 – Franz-Stefan Gady, Associate Editor with the Diplomat, 1-11-16(“US Sends B-52 Bomber Over South Korea in Response to Pyongyang’s Nuclear Test,” The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2016/01/us-sends-b-52-bomber-over-south-korea-in-response-to-pyongyangs-nuclear-test/, Accessed 7-5-16, BK)

On January 9, the United States dispatched a B-52 bomber from Andersen Air Force base in Guam to fly over South Korea as a sign of resolve and solidarity with Seoul in response to a recent nuclear test by North Korea.(See: video of the low-level flight near Osan Air Base, located about 48 kilometers south of Seoul.)

“This was a demonstration of the ironclad U.S. commitment to our allies in South Korea, in Japan, and to the defense of the American homeland,” said Admiral Harry B. Harris Jr., commander U.S. Pacific Command, according to a press release. “North Korea’s nuclear test is a blatant violation of its international obligations. U.S . joint military forces in the Indo-Asia-Pacific will continue to work with all of our regional allies and partners to maintain stability and security .”

According to the U.S. Pacific Command, the B-52 Stratofortress was accompanied on its flight by two Republic of Korea Air Force F-15K Slam Eagles and two U.S. Air Force F-16 Fighting Falcons. Upon completion of the flight, which took place in the vicinity of Osan Air Base around noon on January 9, the B-52 returned to the island of Guam.

The B-52 Stratofortress, a long-range, heavy bomber that can fly up to 15,200 meters (50,000 feet) and has the capability to carry 31,000 kilogram (70,000 pounds) of nuclear or precision guided conventional ordnance, was armed with nuclear missiles and “bunker buster” bombs while crossing South Korean territory.The B-52 remains the backbone of America’s airborne nuclear deterrent.

As I reported previously (See: “US B-52 Bomber to Get New Long-Range Cruise Missile”), the B-52 can perform strategic attack, close-air support, air interdiction, offensive counter-air and maritime operations, according to the U.S. Air Force website. The aircraft, with an unrefueled combat range in excess of 8,800 miles (14,080 kilometers), is expected to remain in service at least until the 2040 when it will be replaced by the new Long-Range Strike Bomber (LRS-B).

The B-52 flight time from Guman to South Korea was around 4 hours. “The speedier-than-expected deployment could indicate signs of the U.S.’ intention that it will retaliate severely if the North makes further provocations,” a South Korean defense official told Yonhap news agency.

The flight “demonstrates one of the many alliance capabilities available for the defense of the Republic of Korea,” Lieutenant General Terrence O’Shaughnessy, United States Forces Korea deputy commander and U.S. Seventh Air Force commander, said after the flight.

Yonhap also reports that the United States is considering dispatching the USS Ronald Reagan, a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, based in Yokosuka, Japan , off the coastline of the Korean peninsula, in addition to a nuclear submarine and F-22 Raptor aircraft. However, U.S. Forces Korea could not confirm the dispatch of U.S. military assets, according to Reuters.

Seoul and Washington are also considering moving a joint naval exercise to an earlier date South Korean media reports. According to the official newspaper of the Workers’ Party of Korea, the United States is “is going crazy with its military exercises in Korean waters using aircraft carriers and nuclear-armed submarines that are aimed at conquering Pyongyang . ” In early 2013, the United States last dispatched B-52s and F-22s aircraft close to North Korea’s southern border as a show of force.

Tensions HighSoko-noko tensions high – new generation of nationalists ensures war Older population had sentiments for noko b/c the war split families and ppl in soko have family in noko. Younger population doesn’t feel that pull and they just see noko as another nation who’s is a threat Soko isn’t a backwater like it used to be – it’s a middle power so people have pride in their developed country

Denny 1/16 - Steven Denney is a doctoral student in the department of political science at the University of Toronto, 1-16-16(“Young South Koreans’ RealPolitik Attitude Towards the North” The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2016/01/young-south-koreans-realpolitik-attitude-towards-the-north/, Accessed 7-5-16, BK)More recent survey work suggests this trend is more than transitory. A January 2015 Asan Public Opinion Report on “South Korean Attitudes toward North Korea and Reunification” between 2010 and 2014 highlights “youth detachment from North Korea” as “perhaps the most important recurring theme in public opinion data” over the period considered. Notably, the report finds the 20s age cohort as “conservative on hard security issues” (e.g., North Korea) and “ far more conservative when it comes to North Korea than are those currently in their thirties and forties.”

With regards to security issues, additional data suggest the 20s age cohort aligns with the most conservative cohort in Korean society (the 60s+ group). While these cohorts diverge significantly with regard to presidential approval and other wedge issues (e.g., the recent Japan-South Korea comfort women agreement), what unites them is their realpolitik attitude toward foreign affairs, especially regarding North Korea.The attitudes may align, but the reasons for aligning are likely very different. Older South Koreans, some of who actually experienced national division and civil war, were recipients of a strong anti-communist education under contentious, politically unstable conditions. Young people today, while still subjected to some degree of anti-communist propaganda, are coming of age under relatively liberal, pluralistic political conditions in times of material abundance and political stability.Further, young people today are becoming politically conscious at a time when South Korea is economically powerful and an influential actor internationally — a “middle power,” as certain IR discourses would have it. It means something to be distinctively South Korean today, a sense of identity with the Republic that didn’t exist in times past. Indeed, those in their 20s seem to have little sympathy for pan-Korean nationalism, a sentiment easily found in older generations. Replacing it is a sense of South Korean nationalism — a new nationalism . With a new nationalism come new attitudes, especially regarding North Korea. Thus, the events of 2010 can be seen as having a relatively more powerful, constitutive effect on the attitudes of young South Koreans vis-à-vis the other age cohorts.Others agree. In a August 2015 article on rising patriotism among those in their 20s, professor of sociology at Seoul National University Kim Seok-ho is quoted as saying, “People in their 20s did not receive an anti-communist education and are politically apathetic. But because they experienced the sinking of the Navy corvette Cheonan and shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in their teens or early adulthood, they may have developed conservative and nationalistic views.”The observed attitudes are certainly conservative, and the professor is right to point this out. But they are no less nationalistic than pan-Korean attitudes. Nationalism isn’t a new phenomenon in South Korea today; it’s simply different than before. The difference is that one type of nationalism is driven by an ethnic affinity (to the pan-Korean nation) and the other an affinity for South Korea.The latest nuclear test may not have significantly impacted attitudes toward North Korea. But don’t let ambivalence toward one event blur the bigger picture ; more fundamental changes have already taken place. For many young Koreans, the well is already spoiled. With a generational decrease in support for national reunification coupled with a waning of ethnic nationalism , North Korea is increasingly just

“ another country .” And when another country acts in violent or threatening ways, negative attitudes tend to follow.

Relations

Sino-NK Relations IncreasingRecent meeting shows Sino-NK relations reboundingSchwarz, 16 Tim Schwarz, CNN's Beijing bureau chief. He regularly travels to North Korea., 2016 (“Friends, foes or frenemies? North Korea and China appear to patch things up” CNN Beijing, June 2nd, 2016, Available Online at http://www.cnn.com/2016/06/02/asia/north-korea-china-friends/index.html, Accessed 6/20/16, DSF)

According to official media reports, the Workers' Party of Korea delegation headed by Ri Su Yong, delivered a message from North Korea's supreme leader Kim Jong Un. It expressed "the hope to strengthen and develop bilateral friendship and to maintain peace and stability in the region. " Ri also reaffirmed that North Korea would continue its 'two front lines policy" of developing nuclear weaponry in tandem with reinvigorating its isolated and stagnating economy. Xi, in turn, called on all relevant sides to stay calm, exercise restraint and enhance communication and dialog to safeguard regional peace and security . Xinhua, China's official news agency gave few details, but the landmark meeting can be interpreted as a slight thawing in the frosty relations between historical and ideological friends . North Korea knows that China's cooperation is essential if it is to carry out the economic side of its 'two front' policy -- China is its biggest international trading partner and a major supplier of aid. By receiving the North Korean delegation in Beijing , like the emperors of old receiving visits from tributary states, China is demonstrating to Pyongyang its senior status, with the power to grant or deny . But with the Shangri-La Dialogue, Asia's biggest security summit starting this weekend in Singapore, Beijing is also sending a message to the U.S. and South Korea that , despite misgivings, it is not abandoning its old ally and all parties are going to have to get used to that.

China Key to US-NK RelationsChina serves as a key intermediary between the US and NK - empiricsSnyder, 16 Scott A. Snyder, Senior Fellow for Korea Studies and Director of the Program on U.S.-Korea Policy, 2016 (“Will China Change Its North Korea Policy?,” CFR, March 31, 2016, Available Online at http://www.cfr.org/north-korea/china-change-its-north-korea-policy/p37717, Accessed 6/20/16, DSF)

For more than a decade, China has been viewed simultaneously as a crucial partner to achieve North Korea’s denuclearization, as an enabler (witting or unwitting) of North Korea’s nuclear development, and as the guarantor of the regime’s survival. These multiple roles that Beijing has taken on are driven by its three sometimes conflicting interests with regard to North Korea: no war, no instability, and no nukes. The Beijing-hosted Six Party Talks , a diplomatic forum aimed at North Korea’s denuclearization, served as a bridge enabling China to facilitate U .S.-North Korea talks during the George W. Bush administration. Within this framework, the September 2005 Six Party Joint Statement proved to be the high-water mark for multilateral diplomacy toward North Korea in which the United States, China, Japan, Russia, and the two Koreas agreed to principles that linked denuclearization to diplomatic normalization, economic development, and peace objectives based on an “action-for-action” framework.

No SanctionsNo enforcement – China has historically protected North Korea – past sanction fail because China doesn’t enforce them – they’re all rhetoricAlbert 2/8 – Columnist and writer at the Council of Foreign Relations. She specializes in the International Affairs and is associated with Fudan University February 08, 2016. The China-North Korea Relationship http://www.cfr.org/china/china-north-korea-relationship/p11097Introduction

China is North Korea’s most important ally, biggest trading partner , and main source of food , arms, and energy. It has helped sustain Kim Jong-un’s regime, and has historically opposed harsh international sanctions on

North Korea in the hope of avoiding regime collapse and a refugee influx across their 870-mile border. Pyongyang’s fourth

nuclear test as well as a ballistic missile launch in early 2016 have complicated its relationship with Beijing, which has

continued to advocate for the resumption of the Six Party Talks, the multilateral framework aimed at denuclearizing North Korea. A purge of top North Korean officials since its young leader came to power also

spurred renewed concern from China about the stability and direction of North Korean leadership. Furthermore,

some experts say that an anticipated thawing of relations between China and South Korea could shift the geopolitical dynamic in East Asia and undermine China-North Korea ties. Yet despite North Korea’s successive nuclear tests, China’s policies toward its neighbor have hardly shifted.

Alliance Under Stress

China's support for North Korea dates back to the Korean War (1950-1953), when its troops flooded the Korean Peninsula to aid its northern ally. Since the war, China has lent political and economic backing to North Korea's

leaders: Kim Il-sung (estimated 1948-1994), Kim Jong-il (roughly 1994-2011), and Kim Jong-un (2011-). But strains in the relationship

began to surface when Pyongyang tested a nuclear weapon in October 2006 and Beijing supported UN Security Council Resolution 1718, which imposed sanctions on Pyongyang. With this resolution and others (UNSC Resolution 1874

(PDF) and 2094 (PDF)), Beijing signaled a shift in tone from diplomacy to punishment. Following North Korea’s third nuclear test in

February 2013, China summoned the North Korean ambassador, implemented new trade sanctions, reduced energy

supplies to North Korea, and called for denuclearization talks . However , Beijing has continued to have wide- ranging ties with Pyongyang , including economic exchanges and high-level state trips such as senior Chinese Communisty Party member Li Yunshan's visit to attend the seventieth anniversary of North Korea’s ruling party in October 2015.

China makes it possible for NK to circumvent sanctions Snyder, 16 Scott A. Snyder, Senior Fellow for Korea Studies and Director of the Program on U.S.-Korea Policy, 2016 (“Will China Change Its North Korea Policy?,” CFR, March 31, 2016, Available Online at http://www.cfr.org/north-korea/china-change-its-north-korea-policy/p37717, Accessed 6/20/16, DSF)

The December 2013 execution of Jang Song-thaek emerged as a further roadblock to the advance of China-North Korea relations under Kim Jong-un. Jang, a special envoy to China, had been the primary North Korean counterpart in the establishment of two major economic development zones at Hwanggeumpyong and Rason along the China-North Korea border. Jang’s execution represented a shock and setback to Sino-North Korean political cooperation. Yet while diplomatic ties between the neighbors cooled, economic exchanges continued . Official bilateral trade peaked in 2014 at $6.87 billion. China announced restrictions on North Korean financial relationships in May 2013, but China’s sporadic implementation of sanctions has done little to prevent North Korean state-owned enterprises from

embedding themselves in Chinese supply chains , which has been an effective means to evade UN sanctions and to secure materials for nuclear and missile development .

Yes China Influence Over NKNorth Korea backs down from pressure against ChinaAlbert 2/8 – Columnist and writer at the Council of Foreign Relations. She specializes in the International Affairs and is associated with Fudan University February 08, 2016. The China-North Korea Relationship http://www.cfr.org/china/china-north-korea-relationship/p11097

Separately, China has stymied international punitive action against North Korea over human rights violations. China criticized a February 2014 UN report that detailed human rights abuses in North Korea, including

torture, forced starvation, and crimes against humanity, and attempted to block UN Security Council sessions held

in December 2014 and 2015 on the country’s human rights status. In March 2010, China refused to take a stance against North Korea , despite conclusive evidence that showed Pyongyang’s involvement in sinking a South Korean naval vessel.

Even China’s punitive steps have been restrained. Beijing only agreed to UN Resolution 1718 after revisions

removed requirements for tough economic sanctions beyond those targeting luxury goods. It did agree to further sanctions, some

of which called for inspections of suspected nuclear or missile trade, but Western officials and experts doubt how committed China is to implementing trade restrictions.

China–North Korea trade has also steadily increased in recent years : in 2014 trade between the two countries hit $6.86 billion , up from about $500 million in 2000, according to figures from the Seoul-based Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency. Recent reports indicate that bilateral trade dropped by almost 15 percent in 2015, though it is unclear whether the dip is a result of chilled ties between Beijing and Pyongyang or China’s economic slowdown.

Nevertheless, “there is no reason to think that political risks emanating from North Korea will lead China to withdraw its economic safety net for North Korea any time soon,” writes CFR Senior Fellow Scott Snyder.

North Korea is dependent on China – aid transfers and trade deficitsAlbert 2/8 – Columnist and writer at the Council of Foreign Relations. She specializes in the International Affairs and is associated with Fudan University February 08, 2016. The China-North Korea Relationship http://www.cfr.org/china/china-north-korea-relationship/p11097

Aid and Trade for Pyongyang

China provides North Korea with most of its food and energy supplies and accounts for more than 70 percent of North Korea's total trade volume (PDF). “China is currently North Korea’s only economic backer of any

importance,” writes Nicholas Eberstadt, senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. In September 2015, the two countries opened a bulk cargo and container shipping route to boost North Korea’s export of coal to China and China established a high-speed rail route between the Chinese border city of Dandong and Shenyang, the provincial

capital of China’s northeastern Liaoning province. In October 2015, the Guomenwan border trade zone opened in Dandong with the intention of boosting bilateral economic linkages, much like the Rason economic zone and the

Sinujiu special administrative zone established in North Korea in the early 1990s and 2002, respectively. Dandong is a critical hub for trade, investment, and tourism for the two neighbors—exchanges with North Korea make up 40 percent of the

city’s total trade. Due to North Korea’s increasing isolation, its dependence on China continues to grow , as

indicated by the significant trade imbalance between the two countries. Some experts see the trade deficit as an indirect Chinese subsidy, given that North Korea cannot finance its trade deficit through borrowing.

Beijing also provides aid (PDF) directly to Pyongyang, primarily in food and energy assistance. China, Japan, South Korea, and the United States have provided more than 75 percent of food aid to North Korea since 1995, but donations from all countries except for China have shrunk significantly since the collapse of the Six Party

Talks in 2009. North Korea, whose famine in the 1990s killed between 800,000 to 2.4 million people , reported its worst drought in decades in June 2015, with harvests sustaining serious damage. UN agencies designated up to 70 percent of the population as food insecure. There is also concern about the distribution of aid in North Korea, particularly since

China has no system (PDF) to monitor shipment s. Recently, however, “Beijing has been trying to wean Pyongyang off pure aid in favor of more commercially viable ties ,” University of Sydney’s James Reilly writes.

Yes US-China CoopChina and Japan are scared of North Korea- The US is willing to join in the fightTiezzi 16 is Editor at The Diplomat.Her main focus is on China, and she writes on China’s foreign relations, domestic politics, and economy. Shannon previously served as a research associate at the U.S.-China Policy Foundation, where she hosted the weekly television show China Forum. She received her A.M. from Harvard University and her B.A. from The College of William and Mary. Shannon has also studied at Tsinghua University in Beijing.4/16/16“China, US Discuss North Korea” http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/china-us-discuss-north-korea/ )ski

The U.S. and Chinese special representatives for North Korean policy are meeting in the U.S. this week. Glyn Davies is hosting his Chinese counterpart Wu Dawei for a series of discussions in New York City and Washington DC. Meetings took place in New York Monday and Tuesday, with discussions expected to wrap up in DC on Friday, according to the U.S. State Department.The ongoing talks over North Korea come after Pyongyang threatened to carry out a “new form” of nuclear test . The statement from North Korea tied its threat to condemnation of its recent missile tests from the UN Security Council. Pyongyang

fired two mid-range ballistic missiles in late March of this year, a move that the United States called “ a troubling and provocative escalation.” For its part, North Korea said the missile tests were themselves a response to provocations from the U.S. and South Korea, namely, their bilateral annual military exercises recently conducted on the Korean Peninsula. Meanwhile, two rudimentary North Korean drones crashed in South Korean territory in early April.China has been watching the rise in Korean tensions with concern. On Tuesday, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying fielded a general question on the Korean Peninsula, possibly as a way to provide an official Chinese statement on the issue while Wu is in the United States. “To safeguard peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia and push forward denuclearization serves the common interests of all parties concerned ,” Hua said. In this context, China denounced both “joint military drills and the threat of nuclear tests ,” effectively laying equal blame on North Korea and the U.S.-South Korea alliance.Hua also made it clear several times in her brief statement what China sees as the solution: China encourages “ all parties to hold peace talks.” China has been specifically pushing for a return to the Six Party Talks, a negotiation framework involving China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, the U.S. and North Korea. Accordingly, Chinese officials have been busy of late talking with their counterparts. Glyn Davies was in Beijing in January for talks with Wu Dawei and other Chinese officials. Vice Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin traveled to Pyongyang and Seoul in February, and Wu Dawei made his own visit to Pyongyang in March. A few days later, China hosted Choe Son-hui, North Korea’s deputy chief to the Six Party Talks. And last week, Wu Dawei welcomed his South Korean counterpart, Hwang Joon-kook, to Beijing.If these efforts have made any headway, it’s been minimal. In fact, North Korea launched two Rodong-class missiles while Choe was in Beijing, undermining any conciliatory messages Choe might have been carrying. At the same time, a diplomatic source told Yonhap News Agency that there has been little progress on reopening the Six Party Talks “as North Korea shows no signs of abandoning its nuclear program.” The U.S. has made it clear it will not consider a return to the now-defunct negotiating platform unless North Korea takes concrete steps to end its nuclear program.With regards to the latest round of discussions, the U.S. State Department said in a statement that the talks between Davies and Wu so far have been “productive.” “The United States and China agree on the fundamental importance of a denuclearized North Korea,” the statement said. However, the U.S. and China have always agreed on this basic point — and yet there’s been no progress in actually denuclearizing North Korea. Recently, there has been speculation that South Korea and the U.S. might be willing to loosen the preconditions for the Six Party Talks. However, it remains unclear if North Korea will accept any preconditions at allOver at 38 North, Jeffrey Lewis of the Monterey Institute of International Studies writes that North Korea’s nuclear program may be approaching a tipping point in terms of the amount of fissile materials it has acquired. This in turn could lead to a sharp upswing in the number of nuclear tests, coupled with more rapid development of Pyongyang’s nuclear program. “The current rate of one nuclear test every three or four years is unpleasant, but manageable … What if North Korea conducts a nuclear test, or even two, on an annual basis?” Indeed, if North Korea does make good on its threat to conduct another nuclear test, it would be the first time Pyongyang has done

so in consecutive years (the only previous tests were held in 2006 and 2009).U.S. President Barack Obama will head to South Korea and Japan as part of his Asia tour later this month. The recent flurry of diplomatic activity may be an attempt to come up with a united strategy for dealing with North Korea in advance of Obama’s arrival. The U.S. and its allies will likely be able to present a united front in response to Pyongyang’s next steps — the

question is whether that position will also be palatable enough (or whether North Korea’s provocations will be dire enough) for China to join in .

US and China agreed at the NSS to partner up agesnt North Koreas nuclear agenda Tiezzi 16 is Editor at The Diplomat.Her main focus is on China, and she writes on China’s foreign relations, domestic politics, and economy. Shannon previously served as a research associate at the U.S.-China Policy Foundation, where she hosted the weekly television show China Forum. She received her A.M. from Harvard University and her B.A. from The College of William and Mary. Shannon has also studied at Tsinghua University in Beijing.4/1/16 “Obama, Xi Put Positive Spin on US-China Relations” http://thediplomat.com/2016/04/obama-xi-put-positive-spin-on-us-china-relations/ )ski

Chinese President X i Jinping is currently in the United States to attend the Nuclear Security Summit, a long with a host of global figures (including top leaders from India, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and Thailand). While the theme of the summit is focused on securing nuclear materials and nuclear non-proliferation, Xi’s presence in the U.S. capital recalled the growing list of friction points between Washington and Beijing, from the South China Sea to cyber issue s .¶ On Thursday, Obama and Xi had their first bilateral meeting this year, the latest face-to-face since talks on the sidelines of the UN Climate Change Conference in Paris four months ago.¶ Obama began his remarks with Xi by repeating the long-standing position that “the United States welcomes the rise of a peaceful, stable, and prosperous China.” Xi, meanwhile, reiterated that “it is a priority for China’s foreign policy to work with the United States to build a new model of major country relations, and to realize no conflicts or confrontation, mutual respect and win-win cooperatio n. ” Both those oft-repeated statements have worn rather thin, thanks in part to increasingly assertive moves in the disputed waters of the South China Sea from Beijing, and increasingly barbed verbal responses from U.S. military officials.¶ Still, the two sides could — and did — point to some positive progress on nuclear security. In a joint statement on nuclear security cooperation , the U.S. and China pledged to deepen cooperation and coordination to prevent nuclear smuggling and increase the security of nuclear materials. At a press briefing , Laura Holgate, added that Washington was “really quite encouraged by the leadership that China is beginning to show in the nuclear security realm.” ¶ In another positive step, a new nuclear security Center of Excellence opened in China earlier this month, at a ceremony attended by U.S. Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz. Moniz described the new center, the result of close U.S.-China collaboration, as “a world-class facility for Chinese, regional, and international nuclear security training and technical exchanges .”¶ Meanwhile, White House officials were also quick to note China’s cooperation over the North Korean nuclear issue. Deputy National Security Advisor Ben Rhodes pointed out that the recent UN Security Council sanctions – “the toughest sanctions that have ever been imposed on North Korea” – would not have been possible “without China’s cooperation and support.”¶ “ So we’ve seen China step up in many ways in terms of applying pressure,” Rhodes told reporters in a press briefing on Wednesday. “The fact is, it has to over time affect the calculus of the North Korean leadership.” ¶ Despite the upbeat tone, questions remain about just how coordinated China and the United States are in their approach toward North Korea. Beijing strongly favors negotiations – including peace treaty negotiations on a separate track from denuclearization talks – over sanctions, while the United States continues to emphasize the use of pressure to eventually bring North Korea to the table. Daniel Kritenbrink, the senior

director for Asia on the National Security Council, called the North Korea question “one of the most important issues that President Obama and President Xi [will] discuss.”¶ During his remarks with Xi, Obama noted that “President Xi and I are both committed to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the full implementation of UN sanctions.” He said the bilateral meeting would include discussions on how to discourage provocations like missile tests.¶ In another symbol of U.S.-China cooperation on global issues, Obama and Xi will also gather together Thursday, along with the other leaders of the P5+1, to review progress on implementing the nuclear deal reached with Iran last year .¶ Meanwhile, climate change continues to provide a bright spot for U.S.-China cooperation. In a joint statement , Obama and Xi announced that the United States and China will both sign the Paris climate change agreement on April 22, and committed to completing the domestic processes to join the agreement “as early as possible this year.” The statement also proclaimed that “climate change has become a pillar of the U.S.-China bilateral relationship” and called cooperation in this field “an enduring legacy of the partnership between our two countries.” ¶ The feel-good vibes on climate change might help to somewhat mitigate what Obama predicted would be a “candid exchange” with Xi over human rights, cyber, and maritime issues. However, White House officials appeared to be trying to downplay the South China Sea issue after weeks of sharp exchanges between the U.S. and China. Obama didn’t mention the South China Sea in his brief remarks with Xi; he did not even repeat standard U.S. nods to the importance of freedom of navigation and peaceful settlement of disputes.¶ In a press briefing prior to the Obama-Xi meeting, Rhodes tried to emphasize that U.S. insistence on principles such as non-militarization and resolving disputes in accordance with international law was “not to single out China.” Rhodes explained that non-militarization of the South China Sea, in particular, is “a principle that we would support as it relates to any country.”¶ U.S.-China bilateral meetings generally try to stay positive – thus the issuance of a joint statement on climate change, and more optimistic evaluations than usual on thorny issues like North Korea. Still, while handshakes and sunny joint statements can’t paper over growing tensions, holding the meeting at all was a small victory. After all, Xi could have chosen to follow the example of Russian President Vladimir Putin and skip the summit altogether.

US and China coop is key to determinate a North Korean Nuclear war Franz-Stefan 16.His interests include civil-military relations, revolution in military affairs, and cyber diplomacy.He also is a Senior Fellow with the EastWest Institute where he edits the Policy Innovation Blog. Franz-Stefan has reported from a wide range of countries and conflict zones including Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan. His writing and photos have appeared in The International New York Times, BBC News, Foreign Affairs Magazine, Foreign Policy Magazine, The National Interest, Vice News, The Middle East Eye, The Christian Science Monitor, Profil, Der Standard, and Die Presse among other publications.Franz-Stefan also has provided expert commentary for Asia News Weekly, Al Jazeera America, Channel News Asia, CCTV, The Financial Times, PBS, Voice of America, Radio France, SCPR, and ORF among others.3/19/16“Sino-US Cooperation Over North Korea Is Now More Important Than Ever “ http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/sino-us-cooperation-over-north-korea-is-now-more-important-than-ever/ )ski

China and the United States share the same short-term interests on the Korean Peninsula , perhaps best summarized in Beijing’s long-standing policy vis-à-vis North Korea of “ no war, no instability, no nukes .” Neither side is interested in a military solution to ongoing tensions between North and South Korea.

Neither party, despite US rhetoric to the contrary, wants to topple the Kim Jong-un regime and see the North descend into chaos amid a succession or unification crisis. And neither Beijing nor Washington desire a nuclear-armed North Korea further fueling tensions in an already volatile region of Asia.China and the United States continue to disagree on the right tactical approach to achieving these three objectives—the former preferring quiet diplomacy and continuous engagement with Pyongyang, the latter favoring publicly pressuring the regime with sanctions to change its behavior— and both countries also pursue markedly different long-term strategic goals on the Korean Peninsula. However, the Obama administration’s policy of “strategic patience” (putting pressure on the regime while calling for North Korea to return to the Six-Party Talks) is a de facto acceptance of the unlikelihood of the reunification of North and South Korea in the near future. As a consequence, there will be no way around Kim Jong-un in the years ahead, and Beijing and Washington will

have to find a way to deal with the regime, no matter how distasteful.Apart from this apparent confluence of Chinese and US interests, there are three reasons why both countries need to cooperate more tightly than ever on managing the ongoing crisis on the Korean Peninsula. First, given the Republic of Korea ( ROK) government’s uncompromising stance with respect to North Korean provocations, there will be an increased chance of more severe inter-Korean crises occurring over the next two years. (There will be little chance of a Korean-led détente initiative until the end of the presidency of Park Geun-hye in 2018, given the government’s current policies.) Second, notwithstanding repeated calls for putting a “military option” back on the table, a large-scale joint US-ROK military operation against North Korea is increasingly becoming less realistic. Third, ongoing tensions on the Korean Peninsula have the potential to undermine trust and increase military competition between China and the United States, a development that is set to detrimentally affect overall Sino-US relations and cannot be in the interest of either part y. Seoul, under the government of Park Geun-hye and after repeated provocations from the North, has abandoned engagement and stepped up its bellicose rhetoric and uncompromising stance against North Korea. Over the last decades, both sides have mastered the game of bringing tensions to the precipice and then pulling back. However, as tensions rise, there is less and less flexibility in this perennial brinkmanship with both sides in danger of losing control during a future confrontation as martial propaganda and provocations will reach unprecedented heights. In addition, there is little understanding how much control Kim Jong-un genuinely exercises over the military and the party and whether they would stand down in the face of South Korean provocations when given the order by the supreme leader.Certain South Korean policies have also helped to further fuel tensions. For example, ever since 2010, South Korea has implemented a “disproportional response” theory of deterrence. As John Delury, a professor at Yonsei University, explained in an interview with The Diplomat: “Seoul has proclaimed that for every one shot fired by the North, the South will hit back with 3 to 5 times greater force. That principle for deterring the North along the contested maritime border seems to apply to the DMZ [Demilitarized Zone] as well.” This concept of deterrence increases the chance of an escalating spiral of attacks and counter-attacks that could eventually lead to full-scale war.A military confrontation on the Korean Peninsula has the potential to once more draw in both the United States and China. Beijing is committed to the defense of the North under the 1961 Sino-North Korean Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, whereas the United States and South Korea have kept a mutual defense treaty since 1953. However, China has repeatedly said that in a conflict provoked by the North, it would not uphold its

treaty obligations. (Indeed, according to a US scholar, China has tried to have the clause requiring it to defend North Korea revoked.)Any type of large-scale military operation on the Korean Peninsula will almost certainly involve large-scale destruction of human life and property . As the commander of US forces in South Korea , General Curtis Scaparrotti recently testified: “ Given the size of the forces and the weaponry involved, this would be more akin to the Korean War and World War II–very complex, probably high casualty.” North Korean artillery could shell Seoul with thousands of rounds within the first hour of a full-scale war.

US-NK coop necessaryUS Coop with North Korea is key to check there Nuke programns Bandow 16 Doug Bandow is a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and served as a Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan. He also is a columnist with Forbes online and frequent contributor to National Interest online and American Spectator online. Formerly a columnist for antiwar.com, a nationally syndicated columnist with Copley News Service, and editor of the monthly political magazine Inquiry, he has been widely published in such periodicals as Time, Newsweek, and Fortune, as well as leading newspapers including the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, and Washington Post. He has written several books, including Foreign Follies: America's New Global Empire (Xulon Press), The Korean Conundrum: America's Troubled Relations with North and South Korea (co-author, Palgrave/Macmillan), and Tripwire: Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World (Cato Institute).1/29/16 “U.S. Should Engage Rather Than Isolate North Korea “http://www.huffingtonpost.com/doug-bandow/us-should-engage-rather-t_b_9109952.html )ski

¶ Under the Obama administration, U.S. policy toward North Korea largely has devolved into the president sitting in the Oval Office, closing his eyes, and hoping the nuclear monsters will go away. Alas, it hasn’t worked. Pyongyang has staged its 4th nuclear test and may well be working on the hydrogen bomb that it falsely claimed to have tested this time.¶ After the test President Barack Obama seemed to close his eyes and hope that Beijing will make the nuclear monsters go away . Alas, that isn’t likely to

work either. Without a change in approach, a nuclear North is here to stay. Announced North Korea’s Foreign Ministry: “The U.S. should be accustomed to the status of the DPRK as a nuclear weapons state whether it likes it or not.” ¶ The administration’s frustration in dealing with the DPRK is understandable. Nothing seems to have worked . The latest member of the ruling Kim dynasty is unlikely to abandon his nation’s nuclear pretensions. In fact, the latest test came amid evidence of warming ties with the People’s Republic of China and reports of a possible invitation to Kim Jong-un to visit Beijing . Evidently Pyongyang cares no more about its ally’s than America’s opinion on the issue.¶ North Korea remains the land of no good options. Two decades ago Defense Secretary Ashton Carter helped prepare plans for striking the North’s nuclear facilities. However, triggering the Second Korean War would be a poor legacy for President Obama.¶ Washington is pressing the UN Security Council to approve additional sanctions; the House has passed legislation to impose additional unilateral economic penalties. But the Kims never have let their people’s suffering influence policy, t he North’s economy remains largely isolated except for trade with China, and so far Beijing, though professing to support a “necessary response” by the UN, has refused to apply sufficient pressure to threaten the Kim regime’s survival.¶ I f the PRC did so the U.S., its allies South Korea and Japan, and China all might regret getting what they wished for. An abrupt and violent regime collapse could yield civil disorder, factional combat, loose nukes, and refugee tides. The consequences would overflow the DPRK’s boundaries . ¶ That could lead to Chinese military intervention to stabilize a new, pro-PRC government in Pyongyang. Then the Republic of Korea would face a renewed and likely permanent division of the peninsula.¶ The administration could continue its “close one’s eyes and hope for the best” approach. Yet that almost certainly means continued North Korean development of nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. Including eventual development of submarine-launched missiles and hydrogen bombs. Even more could be in store so long as Pyongyang subordinates its people’s welfare to weapons development.¶ The only other alternative? What Beijing has advocated all along: engagement with the North.¶ Obviously, there’s no guarantee that this approach will work either. Nevertheless, it offers what the North most wants—direct contact with America. The Obama administration’s insistence that Pyongyang take steps toward denuclearization first is a non-starter. Talking will be necessary before any concessions can be

gained.¶ Negotiations also seem essential to winning greater Chinese support in dealing with the DPRK. In Beijing’s view the U.S. is responsible for creating a hostile security environment for the North. Indeed, after recent administration criticism of the PRC’s policy toward North Korea, the Chinese Foreign Ministry insisted that China was neither the cause nor the solution to the crisis on the peninsul a .¶ Understandably, the PRC is unlikely to risk its political and economic position in the North as well as the ill consequences of a North Korean implosion if Washington does not do its part. Although Beijing does not want a nuclear North, so far stability appears more important than denuclearization on the Korean peninsula.¶ Moreover, negotiations offer the opportunity to resolve subsidiary issues and improve security even short of achieving full denuclearization . There’s no particular reason to believe that the Kim regime ever will agree to abandon nuclear weapons which have delivered prestige, deterred attack, and enabled extortion. But there may be opportunities to cap the nuclear program and limit weapons development. Perhaps there are trade-offs to be made between military exercises in the South and advanced positioning of military units in the North. Or something else. ¶ An ongoing dialogue, no matter how limited, offers additional opportunities. If Pyongyang is ever going to talk about human rights, it will do so only after it feels more secure. If there is any hope for evolutionary change within the North, such a process will be advanced by greater cultural and economic cooperation.¶ Nor should the Obama administration leave the problem for the next president. If so, Pyongyang will be another year along in its nuclear development. China will have spent another year blaming America more than North Korea. South Korea will be another year toward its next presidential election, discouraging action by Seoul.¶ Moreover, a Republican successor to Obama—certainly as possible as not—would be less inclined to give diplomacy a chance. At least the new GOP president might choose prudence over rhetoric if a negotiating process was underway. However, almost all of the Republican candidates, and all of the leading contenders at present, seem reluctant to appear “weak” by doing anything other than attempting to dictate to America’s foes. Which would be a bust in dealing with both the DPRK and China.¶ North Korea’s latest nuclear test is bad news, though hardly a surprise. Indeed, it’s probably the inevitable outcome of a policy which continues to confront Pyongyang militarily without engaging it diplomatically. If Washington wants a different result, it will have to employ a different approach. Which means engagement.¶ Doing so still might not make the North’s nuclear monsters go away. Nevertheless, the lesson of the DPRK’s latest nuclear test is that talking to North Korea offers a better hope of success than ignoring it. But then, that’s what Beijing has been telling the U.S. for a long time.

NEG

A2 Threat

No ThreatMultiple international checks on North KoreaO’Carroll 16, Chad – journalist for North Korea News since 2010, writes between London and Seoul , 2016 (“Russia warns North Korea over threats of nuclear strike,” The Guardian, March 8, 2016, accessible online at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/08/russia-warns-north-korea-nuclear-strike, accessed July 5, 2016//AW)

Russia has warned North Korea that threats to deliver “preventive nuclear strikes” could create a legal basis for the use of military force against the country, suggesting that even Pyongyang’s few remaining friends are growing concerned about its increasingly confrontational stance. The Russian foreign ministry statement, which follows a North Korean threat to “annihilate” the US and South Korea, also criticises Washington and Seoul for launching the

largest joint military drills yet to be held on the peninsula. “We consider it to be absolutely impermissible to make public statements containing threats to deliver some ‘preventive nuclear strikes’ against opponents ,” the Russian foreign ministry said in response to North Korea’s threats. “Pyongyang should be aware of the fact that in this way the DPRK will become fully opposed to the international community and will create international legal grounds for using military force against itself in accordance with the right of a state to self-defense enshrined in the United Nations Charter,” continued the statement, translated by Itar Tass news agency.

Washington and Seoul launched their annual joint military exercises on the peninsula on Monday, stepping up the manoeuvres in response to North Korea’s fourth nuclear test in January and rocket launch in February.

NK Prolif GoodNK prolif good for US-Sino cooperation.

Snyder, 16 Scott A. Snyder, Senior Fellow for Korea Studies and Director of the Program on U.S.-Korea Policy, 2016 (“Will China Change Its North Korea Policy?,” CFR, March 31, 2016, Available Online at http://www.cfr.org/north-korea/china-change-its-north-korea-policy/p37717, Accessed 6/20/16, DSF)

This year’s Nuclear Security Summit offers a fresh opportunity for Chinese President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Barack Obama to discuss the most serious global threat to nuclear security: North Korea’s nuclear defiance. North Korea’s fourth nuclear test in January and long-range missile launch in February have catalyzed Chinese cooperation with the United States to pass a stronger-than-expected UN Security Council resolution condemning North Korea for its nuclear development efforts. A long-standing strategic interest in stability on the Korean peninsula has remained China’s primary consideration in maintaining close ties with Pyongyang and occasionally countering international efforts to punish the regime for its nuclear activities. But this year's summit occurs at a time of growing Chinese resentment at North Korea’s willingness to take Chinese support for granted and put Chinese strategic interests at risk.

A2 Relations

Sino-NK Relations DecreasingSino-NK relations chafe on the topic of nukesSnyder, 16 Scott A. Snyder, Senior Fellow for Korea Studies and Director of the Program on U.S.-Korea Policy, 2016 (“Will China Change Its North Korea Policy?,” CFR, March 31, 2016, Available Online at http://www.cfr.org/north-korea/china-change-its-north-korea-policy/p37717, Accessed 6/20/16, DSF)

After the North’s third nuclear test, Xi supported a tougher-than-expected UN Security Council resolution , took a harsher stance on China’s long-standing provision of energy to North Korea, and authorized China’s implementation of UN sanctions. Xi then traveled to Sunnylands, California, for a bilateral summit with Obama in the summer of 2013 where he was willing to explore Sino-U.S. cooperation on North Korea. He stated clearly that denuclearization of North Korea was a priority for China , alongside the maintenance of stability on the Korean peninsula. Xi told Obama that China and the United States were “the same in their positions and objectives .” However, China’s overall stance toward North Korea, remained constant as it jointly pursued “peace and stability, denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.”

Xi has shown his displeasure with Kim Jong-un by abandoning efforts to maintain a special relationship with North Korea’s founding and ruling Workers’ Party. The bilateral relationship was downgraded in 2013 to “normal relations between states.” Xi has also met South Korean President Park Geun-hye six times despite not yet personally m eeting with Kim Jong-un. Xi has insisted on North Korean commitments to denuclearization as a precondition for resuming top leadership exchanges with Pyongyang.

Sino-NK relations trending towards decline – econ and nukesSchwarz, 16 Tim Schwarz, CNN's Beijing bureau chief. He regularly travels to North Korea., 2016 (“Friends, foes or frenemies? North Korea and China appear to patch things up” CNN Beijing, June 2nd, 2016, Available Online at http://www.cnn.com/2016/06/02/asia/north-korea-china-friends/index.html, Accessed 6/20/16, DSF)

A high level North Korean delegation turned up in Beijing unannounced this week and met with Chinese President Xi Jinping -- the first time a North Korean official has met China's leader since 2013. The meeting between top North Korean diplomat Ri Su Yong and Xi caught North Korea watchers by surprise. On paper, China is North Korea's closest and most powerful ally but it's is no secret that relations between Beijing and Pyongyang have been at a low point in recent years. North Korea has continued to push ahead with its nuclear weapons and missile programs; ignoring China's calls for restraint. Pyongyang's latest nuclear test in February this year, was particularly needling for Beijing . Xi's travel schedule seemed to indicate that North Korea and its young leader Kim Jong Un had fallen out of favor. In 2014, President Xi traveled to North Korea's arch enemy South Korea and again met the South's president Park Geun-Hye in Beijing in 2015. He has never met North Korea's supreme leader Kim Jong Un . Much of the world sees China as the only country with the means to force North Korea to curb its nuclear ambitions. And China, previously considered to have been lax in implementing UN sanctions against North Korea, appears to be enforcing the current round quite thoroughly . Pyongyang , however,

has said that it will not give into pressure, and will continue its current course whatever the economic cost .

China prioritizes NK’s denuclearization before regional stability

Snyder, 16 Scott A. Snyder, Senior Fellow for Korea Studies and Director of the Program on U.S.-Korea Policy, 2016 (“Will China Change Its North Korea Policy?,” CFR, March 31, 2016, Available Online at http://www.cfr.org/north-korea/china-change-its-north-korea-policy/p37717, Accessed 6/20/16, DSF)

Finally, Chinese scholars debate whether China's security treaty with North Korea is an asset. Following the sinking of a South Korean vessel and the shelling of a South Korean island in 2010, the Chinese government reportedly informed North Korea that China would not support it if it provokes war with its neighbors . In a sign of possible change, China's new President Xi Jinping met with North Korea's top genera l Choe Ryong-hae last month and placed denuclearization ahead of stability as China's top policy priority toward North Korea.

Not ResilientRelations are usually resilient but North Korea’s weapons are different – they spur multilateral pressure Mu 3/10 - Mu Chunshan is a Beijing-based journalist. Previously, Mu was part of an Education Ministry-backed research project investigating the influence of foreign media in shaping China’s image. He has previously reported from the Middle East, Africa, Russia and from around Asia. March 10, 2016. Why China-North Korea Relations Can’t Be Broken Despite North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, its ties with China have been remarkably stable — and will remain that way. http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/why-china-north-korea-relations-cant-be-broken/ Accessed 07-04-16

North Korea’s nuclear development has been all over the headlines lately. Accordingly, some Western media and Chinese observers seem to believe that it would be within China’s strategic interests to cool down, or even break off, its relationship with North Korea. In view of their real

national interests, however, China and North Korea will not turn away from each other , despite their cooling relations. From a long-term, historical viewpoint, ties between the two countries will eventually stabilize and strengthen, but under one condition – North Korea’s nuclear impasse must not drag on forever.

Among all of China’s diplomatic ties with its various neighbors in Northeast Asia, relations between China and North Korea have been relatively stable, with plenty of flexibility . Geographic proximity, a condition neither party is able to change, makes

it unrealistic for the two sides to break off relations. As part of his foreign policy, President Xi Jinping has been vigorously

looking for allies among China’s neighbors, and has even approached Japan and the Philippines in order to bridge differences.

Why should he abandon North Korea and create a large flashpoint right along China’s northeast border?

The significance of China-North Korean relations can be better appreciated when one looks at China’s relations with the Asia-Pacific powers. China and the United States disagree in many areas – Internet security, human rights, trade, and the South China Sea, just to name a few. China is in dispute with Japan over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands and the interpretation of history (symbolized by Yasukuni Shrine). China and South Korea have thorny issues between them as well, such as competing claims over Ieodo/Suyan Rock, the U.S. military presence in South Korea, and defectors from North Korea.

No major bilateral flashpoint exists between China and North Korea. The exception is North Korea’s nuclear and missile development , which is actually a multilateral dispute that goes beyond bilateral ties between

China and North Korea and involves South Korea and the United States as well. China is aware that North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons would severely threaten the security environment of China and all of Northeast Asia. Thus, as North Korea’s closest friend, Beijing proposed the six-party talks to allow the parties involved to negotiate and resolve the dispute . The six-party talks are in fact China’s attempt at “testing the water” as a responsible player in regional and international affairs. The West is aware of this . This is why every time the Korean nuclear issue rears its head, the United States points fingers at China.

Historically, however, China-North Korean relations have never been significantly affected by North Korea’s nuclear programs. When North Korea launched the Taepodong-1 missile in 1998, an international outcry for sanctions ensued. Less than two years later, Kim Jong-il visited China in secret. Chinese President Jiang Zemin paid a reciprocal visit to Pyongyang in 2001, and was received by Kim with great ceremony.

When North Korea dropped out of the N uclear Non-Proliferation Treaty* in 2003 and was determined to develop nuclear

weapons, China promptly hosted a six-party talk . In October of that same year, National People’s Congress Standing Committee

Chairman Wu Bangguo visited North Korea and was welcomed with unchanging hospitalit y . This was followed by another visit by Kim Jong-il to China in April 2004.

President Hu Jintao’s state visit to Pyongyang in 2006, one year prior to a North Korean nuclear test, was not only an endorsement of the friendly and positive relations between the two countries, but also intended to

show concern over the escalation of North Korea’s nuclear program. Confidential diplomatic talks between China and North Korea continued after the nuclear test, with Beijing becoming the de-facto key to engaging North Korea. Kim Jong-il visited Beijing again in secret in January 2006, three months after Hu’s state visit. In October 2006, North Korea detonated a nuclear device.

Yes SanctionsChina approves the North Korean sanctionsTiezzi 2/26 - Shannon Tiezzi is Managing Editor at The Diplomat, 2-26-16(“China Gives Nod to New UN Sanctions on North Korea,” The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/china-gives-nod-to-new-un-sanctions-on-north-korea/, Accessed 7/5/16, BK)

The U nited S tates presented a draft resolution on No rth Ko rea to the United Nations Security Council on

Thursday. The resolution, which would tighten sanctions on Pyongyang, represents the culmination of nearly two months of negotiations between the United States and China, beginning just after North Korea’s nuclear test on January 6. As The Diplomat reported

previously, final agreement on the resolution came during Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s trip to Washington, D.C . this week, where he met with Secretary of State John Kerry, National Security Advisor Susan Rice, and President Barack Obama.

Reuters has details on the new draft, which is expected to go to a vote this weekend . Notably, the new draft would require mandatory inspections of all cargo en route to or from North Korea; ban all military sales to

Pyongyang (including both weapons and items with dual-use potential); and ban the sale of aviation or rocket fuel to North Korea.However, David Feith, writing in an op-ed for the Wall Street Journal, points out that Beijing’s agreeing to the sanctions doesn’t necessarily mean much. After all, China doesn’t have a good track record of actually enforcing UN sanctions.In other China-North Korea news, the South Korean paper Dong-A Ilbo reported this week that several Chinese banks in

Dandong, near the North Korean border, “have suspended cash deposit and transfer services for accounts owned by North Korean s since December last year.” The timing means the reported suspension (which has not been officially confirmed by China) pre-dates Pyongyang’s nuclear test.Meanwhile, China’s Defense Ministry held its monthly press conference yesterday. While most of the focus was on the

South China Sea and the possibility of THAAD deployment on South Korea, there was one new announcement of particular note.

Spokesperson Wu Qian announced that China has started construction of its new military facility in Djibouti: “Currently,

construction of infrastructure for the support facilities has started, and the Chinese side has dispatched personnel to Djibouti for relevant work.”

US increasing Sanctions will lead to greater reform and be the most successful way to solve for North Korea Mazumdaru 16

Journalist and Editor2/22/16 “Can the latest US sanctions against North Korea work?” http://www.dw.com/en/can-the-latest-us-sanctions-against-north-korea-work/a-19065845)ski

The US recently unleashed a new set of measures aimed at reining in Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program. DW examines how effective the latest restrictions will likely be in curbing the North's nuclear activities. US President Barack Obama last week slapped new unilateral sanctions on North Korea as part of the US government's latest attempt to curb the reclusive East Asian nation's controversial nuclear weapons program.

The measures came weeks after Pyongyang fired a long-range rocket and conducted its fourth nuclear test, in violation of a UN Security Council

resolution. The US sanctions target those importing goods related to weapons of mass destruction into North Korea, or those who knowingly engage in human rights abu ses. It also aims to prevent the North Korean regime from accessing the money it needs to advance the nation's weapons program.Furthermore, the legislation grants some $50 million over the next five years to fund radio broadcasts into the North, purchase communications equipment

and support humanitarian assistance programs.More tool The latest measures also provide more tools to US officials to make current non-proliferation sanctions more effective by leveling so-called secondary sanctions -

restrictions imposed on third-party countries on doing business with Pyongyang."While the US Treasury was thus far only able to ban companies from operating in the US, the law now gives them the authority to target third parties abroad and block assets as well as property if deemed necessary," said Bernt Berger, head of Asia Program at the Stockholm-based Institute for Security &

Development Program (ISDP). In this context, Mark Tokola, vice president of the Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI), a Washington-based think tank, says the new sanctions "show the utmost seriousness" with which the US views North Korea's nuclear and missile programs, and its crimes against humanity. "These measures are important as part of a broader international effort to at least slow if not stop North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons," he told DW.However, it is unclear whether the new measures will succeed in compelling the communist regime into giving up its nuclear ambitions. Even prior to the latest US decision, the East Asian nation was already one of the most heavily sanctioned in the world. And experts believe the new measures are unlikely to have an impact on Pyongyang's course of action."Sanctions have not worked with regard to the North and additional sanctions, too, will likely not produce the desired results. And North Korea will continue with its nuclear, missile and rocket programs, further advancing its capabilities over time," Tariq Rauf, director of the Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Program at the Stockholm International

Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), told DW.'An unabated pursuit'Analysts point to a multitude of reasons behind the sanctions' limited effectiveness. ISDP expert Berger says the North has remained steadfast in developing its nuclear arms program which it regards as crucial for its national security. Besides, an effective deterrent would provide the North with not only a security guarantee, but also a better bargaining position vis-à-vis the US and South Korea, Berger told DW. This view is shared by Andrea Berger, deputy director of the Proliferation and Nuclear Policy program at the Royal United Services Institute for

Defense and Security Studies (RUSI). Berger argues that North Korea's development of nuclear weapons is motivated by a complex mixture of insecurity and a desire for perceived prestige." The country's leaders have painted the program's 'success' as part of their personal and collective legacies, as well as a symbol of national defiance of international restrictions imposed against the North Korean people," she told DW.In this context, she underlines, previous rounds of sanctions appear to only have hardened North Korean resolve, even though they may have

slowed the nuclear program in practice. "It is therefore improbable that new sanctions will change this dynamic, especially the very complicated calculation that leads the regime to continue its unabated pursuit of a nuclear deterrent."Buying timAt the same time, KEI analyst Tokola points out that the young leader Kim Jong Un, who took over the country's reins in 2012, is using external threats and the technological feats of nuclear and missile tests to try to consolidate his power.And that, he contends, makes it unlikely that negotiations to curb the North's nuclear activities will succeed in the short run. It is nevertheless important for the US and other countries to show Pyongyang that its actions have negative consequences, he added."The sanctions are also intended to buy time for diplomacy to work by slowing down North Korea's weapons programs. It is worth noting that economic sanctions always appear to be failing,

until they work," Tokola noted.Unlike previous measures, the economic sanctions imposed this time around create the legal scope for the US to sanction a wide range of foreign individuals or entities engaged in listed, proscribed activities with North Ko rea. Experts say this opens the possibility for Washington to impose unilateral sanctions on foreign firms, particularly Chinese ones, operating in North Korea.

A2 China Influence Over NKChina can’t influence north Korea – their historical ties have died Johnson 14 – Reuben F. Johnson is a political affairs and defense technology correspondent for The Weekly Standard in Washington and IHS Jane’s Defense Weekly in London. He writes frequently on events in Russia and the former USSR, Poland and the PRC. February 24, 2014 12:40 pm Chinese Influence Over North Korea Waning: Communication between the two countries has nearly disappeared http://freebeacon.com/national-security/chinese-influence-over-north-korea-waning/ Accessed 07-04-16

BEIJING—The People’s Republic of China (PRC) remains the chief benefactor of the neighboring D emocratic P eople’s R epublic of K orea , but as North Korea’s dependence on China increases, China’s influence over the country appears to be decreasing. U.S. envoy for the DPRK Glyn Davies traveled to Beijing the week of Jan. 26 in order to try to convince the Chinese to put pressure on the North to abandon its nuclear weapons and missile programs. However, Washington may be less than satisfied with the willingness or ability of the PRC to affect change in the DPRK’s behavior . Being the “iron lung” that keeps the North from collapsing—as one Beijing-based analyst of the DPRK described it— in the form of food aid , energy assistance , and political support does not translate into a more authoritative Chinese say in the country’s affairs. Observers of Pyongyang in China say the North Korea is becoming a “closed box ” in terms of understanding who is in charge and how decisions are being made by the leadership . “No one here really knows what is going on in the DPRK,” said one analyst. “And there is

increasing skepticism that this young kid (current dictator, Kim Jong-un) is really calling the shots. Meanwhile, the linkages that the PRC used to have with the North have almost all disappeared and there are almost no opportunities to re-engage along some other level.” Military ties between the two communist states that dated back to the Korean War are virtually gone . That older generation of military leaders who fought alongside one another and continued to cooperate long after the war was over has gradually died off. There is very little engagement and even less trust today within the current generation ranks of the two military establishments. The December 2013 purging and execution of Kim’s once all-powerful uncle Jang Song-thaek caught Beijing completely

off-guard. The ousting of Jang also underscored the lengths to which the regime in Pyongyang will go to keep the PRC guessing and otherwise in the dark about what is really happening inside the closed state. Beijing lost

the one individual in the DPRK leadership with which it had a close, working relationship. Jang also had control over the growing businesses along the border with PRC that are located in the DPRK’s special economic zones.

Chinese intelligence had missed – or chose to ignore – the warning signs that Jang’s downfall was imminent .

China can’t check North Korea – lack of tiesSnyder 16, Scott – Senior Fellow for Korea Studies and Director of the Program on U.S.-Korea Policy, previously a senior associate in the international relations program of The Asia Foundation, editor of various works including “China's Rise and the Two Koreas: Politics, Economics, Security” (2009), and “Paved With Good Intentions: The NGO Experience in North Korea,” (2003), 2016 (“Why North Korean threat is a more urgent issue for next U.S. President,” CNN News, April 26, 2016, accessible online at http://www.cnn.com/2016/04/26/opinions/north-korea-nuclear-strike-race-snyder/, accessed July 5, 2016//AW)

Seoul (CNN) – Kim Jong Un has been intensifying his efforts to develop a long-range nuclear strike capability since the beginning of 2016 . The more vulnerable he feels atop a weakening North Korea, the more he seeks a silver bullet to ensure the regime's long-term survival . This dynamic has been in play for decades, especially as North Korea pursued nuc lear weapon s to compensate for the loss of its powerful patrons in Moscow and Beijing and fell further behind a far more prosperous South Korea. But Pyongyang's insecurity has

intensified even more under Kim , who, since coming to power in 2012, declared his father's bequest of a nuclear program as a crowning achievement, changed the constitution to declare North Korea a nuclear state, and declared nuclear and economic development as his twin priorities .

China won’t check North Korea – fear of refugee flood and changing power dynamics in AsiaBeeson 16, Mark – Professor of International Politics at the University of Western Australia, author of several books including “Institutions of the Asia-Pacific: ASEAN, APEC and Beyond” (2009) and co-authoring “Regionalism and Globalization in East Asia: Politics, Security and Economic Development” (2014) , 2016 (“Why does China continue to protect North Korea? It has a lot less to do with communism than you’d think,” The Independent, February 8, 2016, accessible online at http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/why-does-china-continue-to-protect-north-korea-it-has-a-lot-less-to-do-with-communism-than-you-d-a6860881.html, accessed July 5, 2016//AW)

And yet North Korea has one very powerful and influential friend. One reason that China and North Korea are so close is because of their shared revolutionary history and their joint struggle against the Americans during the Korean War. Perhaps 250,000 North Koreans and 100,000 Chinese were killed in this conflict, something that created strong bonds between the two communist powers. But while North Korea remains a fossilized reminder of a bygone era, China has been completely transformed. Whatever China is these days its plainly not a communist state, much less a revolutionary one of the sort it was during the Cold

War. The question is why , when North Korea has become such an unpredictable actor and seemingly impervious even to Chinese influence, does China continue to give it support , even if it is increasingly grudging? One reason is that any sudden collapse of the North Korea would in itself have destabilizing and unpredictable consequences. It might trigger a flood of unwanted refugees into China . Even more importantly, perhaps, it could fundamentally transform the existing balance of power in northeast Asia. If the two Koreas were unified , as we assume they would be, this would create a formidable new power in the region . More importantly from a Chinese perspective perhaps, the North Korean buffer zone would disappear and China would find itself with – yet another – potentially hostile power on its borders. Even more significantly, unless the US withdrew its forces from the South, China would also have to contend with an American military presence in its own back yard.

China won’t influence North Korea – political and economic self-interestLankov 16, Andrei – professor of Korean Studies at Kookmin University, Seoul, author of "The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinist Utopia,” 2016 (“Don't expect China to ice North Korea,” Al Jazeera, January 29, 2016, accessible online at http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/01/don-expect-china-ice-north-korea-160128061357218.html, accessed July 5, 2016//AW)

That said, such emotional matters usually have little bearing on relations between the two countries. Ultimately, state interests - and security most of all - takes precedence . In this regard, it seems that Chinese state interests demand a softer approach to North Korea 's international misbehaviour . China is far from happy about North Korea's nuclear ambitions. For

the past three years, the Chinese put a remarkable level of pressure on North Korea. However, things have changed. The reason becomes obvious from talks I had in the Chinese capital - a significant intensification of the Sino-US imperial rivalry. Indeed, if China follows US suggestions and introduces comprehensive economic sanctions against North Korea, it might virtually knock the economy out cold because roughly three quarters of North Korea's economic exchanges are now with China. Even the decision to stop subsidised trade - above

all, the shipment of oil to North Korea at artificially low prices - will deal a serious blow to Pyongyang. China can take such measures, but why would they? After all, the North Korean state is not well known for caring about its level of economic development. Sanctions have to be strong enough to seriously endanger North Korea's domestic political stability . However, China would clearly not welcome a political crisis on the northern half of the Korean peninsula. If North Korea is to plunge into Syria-style domestic chaos, China is likely to be hit hardest.

China can’t influence North Korea – waning influence under Kim’s ruleKim 15, William – VOA journalist with focus on Cambodia and North Korea, 2015, (“US Officials Warn of China’s Waning Influence on N. Korea,” VOA, September 18, 2015, accessible online at http://www.voanews.com/content/united-states-warns-china-waning-influence-north-korea/2969867.html, accessed July 5, 2016//AW)

“I think that China’s influence on North Korea is waning, or China doesn’t have the influence on North Korea that it had in the

past. So that is also an area of concern,” Harris said. Shear said China’s influence on North Korea had lessened, particularly under Kim Jong Un’s rule. “The Chinese reiterated to me , as they have in the past, that their influence with North Korea is limited, particularly under the new regime ,” he said. Shear cited, as an example, the recent military standoff between the two Koreas. "It wasn’t clear to us that the Chinese had a lot of contact with North Koreans or were able to significantly influence them ,” he said. Harris described North Korea as

the “greatest threat” that the United States is facing in the Pacific. “I think that y ou have a leader in North Korea who has nuclear weapons and is seeking the means to miniaturize them and deliver them intercontinentally ,” he

said. Relations between China and North Korea have cooled since Kim’s rise to power in late 2011. In March 2013, China joined in adopting a U.N. Security Council resolution tightening sanctions against its ally for conducting a nuclear test. Relations deteriorated further after North Korea executed Jang Song Thaek, Kim’s uncle, who had close ties to China .

China won’t risk regional instabilityYork, quoting Zhang, 15, Rob – Chief Editor of NK News, previously spent four years at The Korea Herald reporting on topics including North Korean affairs, Liangui – Professor of international strategic research at the at the Communist Party’s central party school, 2015 (“Expert survey: Is China’s pull over North Korea exaggerated,” NK News, October 14, 2015, accessible online at https://www.nknews.org/2015/10/expert-survey-is-chinas-pull-over-north-korea-exaggerated/, accessed July 5, 2016//AW)

North Korea is a sovereign country . And due to its Juche ideology, it hardly takes advice from any other countries . As a result, China has always been cautious, and generally avoided offering suggestions to Pyongyang. China has indeed provided aid to North Korea for years, which has contributed significantly to North Korea’s stability. Now , unless there are some significant shifts, China is not willing to make any change s to the current policy. A significant shift would mean North Korea aggressively escalating tensions on the Korea Peninsula, including aggressively pushing for its nuclear weapons plan and jeopardizing regional stability. China disagreed with the escalations in August (of this year) and March 2013, in which Pyongyang escalated tensions by (temporarily) abolishing the Armistice Agreement. It is not in China’s interest for there to be any war . China would reconsider aid should there be another Fatherland Liberation War (North Korea’s name for the Korean War).

China won’t pressure North Korea – regional stability is their focusYork, quoting Tsai, 15, Rob – Chief Editor of NK News, previously spent four years at The Korea Herald reporting on topics including North Korean affairs, Jian – Professor at The Fudan University in Shanghai , 2015 (“Expert survey: Is China’s pull over North Korea exaggerated,” NK News, October 14, 2015, accessible online at https://www.nknews.org/2015/10/expert-survey-is-chinas-pull-over-north-korea-exaggerated/, accessed July 5, 2016//AW)

However, some (People’s Liberation Army) forces have advocated revising the alliance accord lately. This would not happen easily, even now.

Revising or abolishing the accord would leave North Korea to counter Western countries alone, which would lead to instability or regime collapse – this would damage China’s strategic interests . Economically,

China is almost North Korea’s sole supporter. International society thinks North Korea would surrender once China halts the economic exchanges and supplies, but China’s strategy is not about making North Korea surrender. China prefers to maintain regional stability and balance , which matters most to China . By looking

at the current relationships in the Asia-Pacific, the U.S. has created a lot of pressure on China by implementing its

“Pivot to Asia.” China is not that interested in altering the status quo. To China, the prime concern in dealing with the issue of North Korea ’s nuclear weapons is stability and peace, but stability comes first . Therefore, since any economic sanctions could lead to North Korean instability, China’s implementation of the UN sanctions is quite limited. We have seen the UN’s passage of several rounds of sanctions, but China hasn’t effectively implemented them. We are always worried about possible chaos in North Korea. China indeed has two major tools to punish North Korea, but would not use them readily. China has been more actively cooperating with South Korea economically and implementing the sanctions more aggressively since President Xi (Jinping) took power, but all these efforts are limited . In doing so, China is trying to convey it dissatisfaction with North Korea’s risky policy, but China also doesn’t want to create too much pressure, beyond Pyongyang’s threshold of tolerance . It is China’s dilemma.

Chinese pressure is ineffectiveLin 16, Ping – Radio Free Asia reporter in Mandarin, 2016 (“Beijing 'Lacks Influence' Over Pyongyang: Analysts,” Radio Free Asia, January 8, 2016, accessible online at http://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/china-korea-01082016123410.html, accessed July 5, 2016//AW)

" Even if China steps up pressure on North Korea, this won't necessarily be effective ," Ran said. "I f it doesn't put pressure on North Korea, it will itself come under huge pressure from the international community ." "At the same time, Beijing doesn't want to see North Korea develop its nuc lear weapon s either , so the current situation has left China stuck between a rock and a hard place , " he said. Yang Liyu, retired professor

of East Asian Studies at Seton Hall University in New Jersey, agreed, saying Beijing lacks any real influence over Kim Jung Un, whose mind is on other things. " Kim Jung Un is deliberately provoking China right now, while he has at the same time been showing goodwill towards Russia ," Yang said. " It seems he is trying to draw Russia into conflict with China ." "That's why I don't think China can do anything about North Korea any more ," he said.

China won’t risk Korean unification – North Korea is a key buffer stateFriedman 16, George – founded Geopolitical Futures and the geopolitical intelligence firm Stratfor, 2016 (“China's Perspective on North Korea,” republished in Real Clear World from Geopolitical Futures, June 3, 2016, accessible online at http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2016/06/03/chinas_perspective_on_north_korea_111891.html, accessed July 5, 2016//AW)

For China, the Korean Peninsula poses a substantial threat, particularly with U.S. troops deployed there . Therefore, North Korea is a critical buffer state for China. Its survival as an independent state – with a substantial military and hostile to the U nited S tates and South Korea – is important to protect China’s periphery. From this perspective, China wants to preserve North Korea exactly as it is. So regardless of how strange and

unpredictable North Korea is, the Chinese will do what they can to prevent Korean unification and maintain the current character of the regime. The possibility of a U.S.-South Korean invasion northward is remote, to say the least. But from the Chinese point

of view, the consequences of miscalculation are high. Maintaining the status quo makes sense .

North Korea is a key point of leverage for China against the USFriedman 16, George – founded Geopolitical Futures and the geopolitical intelligence firm Stratfor, 2016 (“China's Perspective on North Korea,” republished in Real Clear World from Geopolitical Futures, June 3, 2016, accessible online at http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2016/06/03/chinas_perspective_on_north_korea_111891.html, accessed July 5, 2016//AW)

There is, however, a more immediate value in maintaining relations with the North Koreans. North Korea deflects the United States’ attention and increases U.S. dependence on China. The U.S. has a fixation with nuclear programs, especially programs developed by unpredictable countries like North Korea. The North Koreans periodically explode a test device, sink a South Korean ship or engage in some other apparently irrational behavior. This triggers a crisis with the U nited S tates. Having no diplomatic leverage in North

Korea, the Americans approach the Chinese to intercede with the North Koreans. North Korea desists. The United States must be grateful to China. Therefore, the U.S. must put aside some bilateral issues with the Chinese for the time being , given China’s willingness to use its influence in North Korea to avoid a crisis. North Korea is perceived as an uncontrollable threat. China is perceived as the only agent that can control North Korea. The United States wants to avoid exacerbating a crisis. China solves the problem. In this way, North Korea is an important tool for China in managing its relations with the United States . Managing Pyongyang is the one

thing the Chinese can do for the Americans that they really care about, and it costs China very little. From China’s point of view, North Korea’s escapades give China leverage with the U nited S tates.

North Korea doesn’t respond to current incentivesPennington 16, Matthew – reporter on U S-Asian affairs for the Associated Press, 2016 (“China may be the only one who can curb North Korea’s nuclear program,” Global News, January 6, 2016, accessible online at http://globalnews.ca/news/2437571/china-may-be-the-only-one-who-can-curb-north-koreas-nuclear-program/, accessed July 5, 2016//AW)

But North Korea has proved adept at circumventing existing restrictions and at using its indigenous capabilities to develop its weapons . Because of its international isolation, the North is less susceptible to financial sanctions than a major economy like Iran. Incentives haven’t worked either. Three U.S. administrations, going back to President Bill Clinton, have coaxed the North to disarm in exchange for aid, but each effort has eventually failed . And taking a tougher military stance against Pyongyang means unpalatable risks. An American attack could put U.S. ally South Korea in the firing line of the world’s fifth-largest army, which could launch a massive artillery barrage on the capital, Seoul.

China won’t influence North Korea but hates their nuclear programAlbert 2/8 – Columnist and writer at the Council of Foreign Relations. She specializes in the International Affairs and is associated with Fudan University February 08, 2016. The China-North Korea Relationship http://www.cfr.org/china/china-north-korea-relationship/p11097

Looking Forward

“North Korea is in a category all its own ,” writes the Brookings Institution’s Jonathan Pollack. “The North Korean leadership has thus convinced itself (if not others) that its existence as an autonomous state derives directly from its possession of nuclear weapons .” Though China may be unhappy about North Korea’s nuclear brinkmanship, analysts say it will avoid moves that could cause a sudden regime collapse.

A Japanese media outlet leaked alleged Chinese military contingency plans in 2014, but Beijing denied the validity of the documents. “It’s clear

that the Chinese have enormous leverage over North Korea in many respects ,” says Stanford’s Sneider. “But can China actually try to exercise that influence without destabilizing the regime? Probably not.”

For now, policy failure on the peninsula has dampened hopes for a de-escalation of regional tensions. Though

Beijing, Seoul, and Washington have voiced apparent solidarity (PDF) for a denuclearized North Korea, differences remain over how best to strip the country of its nuclear threat. But “there’s an increasing understanding that North Korea does not provide the kind of stable neighbor and element of the neighborhood that China like s , ” says

former U.S. ambassador to South Korea and Six Party Talk negotiator Christopher R. Hill. Still, “China’s strategic interests in stability and

the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula will require Beijing to improve ties with Pyongyang in order to restore its leverage,” adds CFR’s Snyder.

Sino-NK Trade DecreasingChina will pressure North Korea – trade blocking proves Rogin 6/4 - Josh Rogin is a former Bloomberg View columnist. He has served under newspapers like CNN and the Washington Post. July 3rd, 2016. Satellite imagery suggests China is secretly punishing North Korea http://news.nationalpost.com/news/world/satellite-imagery-suggests-china-is-secretly-punishing-north-korea Accessed 07-04-16 Is China secretly punishing Kim Jong Un for his nuclear mischief? Following North Korea’s latest nuclear test, in January, trade over the China-North Korea border dropped dramatically, according to newly released satellite imagery. The revelation has led experts to conclude that Beijing has been quietly punishing Kim by cutting off the flow of funds to his regime. There’s no question that the China-North Korea relationship has been strained since Kim assumed power in 2011. Against Beijing’s wishes, the young leader has revved up North Korea’s pace of missile tests and detonated two nuclear devices, one in 2013 and then again this January. In 2013, Kim executed his uncle Jang Song Thaek, who had been China’s main contact in Pyongyang . After the latest nuclear explosion, which Pyongyang claimed was a hydrogen bomb, Secretary of State John F. Kerry publicly called on China to end “business as usual” with North Korea. Publicly, Beijing rejected being told by the United States how to handle its client state. Behind the scenes, it appears Beijing was doing just that. “It is apparent that shortly after North Korea did the fourth nuclear test in January , China took unilateral measures to drastically curtail trade interaction along their border,” said Victor Cha, director for Asian affairs at the National Security Council during the George W. Bush administration. Cha, now at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), led a team of researchers that procured and analyzed the new satellite imagery as part of their project Beyond Parallel, a website and database dedicated to demystifying what’s going on inside the world’s most secretive state. The project launched Thursday. Cha’s conclusion, that Beijing decided to punish North Korea after the nuclear test but didn’t disclose that to the world, is backed up by anecdotal reports of Chinese officials telling Western interlocutors that President Xi Jinping had decided to “take action ” against the Kim regime , behind the scenes, out of anger over the nuke test. “It shows that China pursues things in their own way when it comes to North Korea, not because the U.S. or the U.N. tells them to,” said Cha. “The good news is that they are squeezing them more than we were led to expect.”

Satellite data proves China decrease in trade with North Korea Rogin 6/4 - Josh Rogin is a former Bloomberg View columnist. He has served under newspapers like CNN and the Washington Post. July 3rd, 2016. Satellite imagery suggests China is secretly punishing North Korea http://news.nationalpost.com/news/world/satellite-imagery-suggests-china-is-secretly-punishing-north-korea Accessed 07-04-16 CSIS worked with imagery analysts at the commercial satellite firm DigitalGlobe to collect and examine satellite photos of several key trade- related areas on both sides of the China-North Korea border, including the Sinuiju railroad station and customs area on the North Korean side, the Dandong railroad station and customs area on the Chinese side, and the Sino-Korean Friendship Bridge that links the two countries. They compared activity at the sites year over year, first by examining imagery from January and March of 2015 and then comparing that with imagery collected this February, just after the latest nuclear test. The images showed a “substantive reduction of economic activity on the Sino-North Korean border” as evidenced by a huge drop in the number of railcars at the stations, trucks in customs areas, trucks on the bridge and undocked boats in the Yalu River. At the Sinuiju rail station, most of the train cars appeared to be in storage early this year, with no engines attached to the freight cars. In the Sinuiju customs area, there were 111 trucks shown in the satellite image from January 2015, but in the February 2016 image , there were only five . On the Chinese side, there were 32 trucks spotted in the Dandong customs area in March 2015, but by this Februarythere were only six. Official trade data regarding North Korea is notoriously unreliable, and Cha

said comprehensive data on economic activity over the China-North Korea border does not really exist. But his team has been briefing U.S. and South Korean government agencies on what they found, and he said both governments have shown interest in pursuing the research . In March, China signed on to a new United Nations Security Council resolution imposing fresh sanctions on North Korea in response to the January nuclear test, showing that Beijing was in fact upset with Kim’s actions . But the new data may show that Xi was much more upset than he let on and more than he wanted the rest of the world to know.

A2 US-China CoopTurn – US pushes to create coop with China over North Korea only harms relations.Bandow 16 Doug Bandow is a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and served as a Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan. He also is a columnist with Forbes online and frequent contributor to National Interest online and American Spectator online. Formerly a columnist for antiwar.com, a nationally syndicated columnist with Copley News Service, and editor of the monthly political magazine Inquiry, he has been widely published in such periodicals as Time, Newsweek, and Fortune, as well as leading newspapers including the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, and Washington Post. He has written several books, including Foreign Follies: America's New Global Empire (Xulon Press), The Korean Conundrum: America's Troubled Relations with North and South Korea (co-author, Palgrave/Macmillan), and Tripwire: Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World (Cato Institute).1/29/16 “U.S. should stop lecturing China about North Korea“http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2016/02/19/commentary/world-commentary/u-s-stop-lecturing-china-north-korea/#.V3vzKOYrLBI)ski

WASHINGTON – U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry went to Beijing to again l ecture his hosts a bou t the need for China to pressure North Korea o ver the latter’s nuclear program. As expected, Kerry’s mission failed. The Xi government again proved unwilling to threaten the survival of the Kim dynasty.Immediately after Pyongyang’s fourth nuclear test Kerry attacked Beijing’s policy: it “has not worked and we cannot continue business as usual.” While visiting China he went into rhetorical overdrive. The North — a small, impoverished nation far distant from the United States — “poses an overt threat, a declared threat, to the world.”Even before Kerry arrived, China made clear it disagreed. “The origin and crux of the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula has never been China ,” said a Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokeswoman: “The key to solving the problem is not China.”While he was in Beijing she cited the behavior of other parties as “one major reason why the denuclearization process on the peninsula has run into difficulties.” Beijing officialdom has shown plenty of irritation with North Korea, but C hina has demonstrated it h as yet to be convinced to destroy its own ally and strengthen America’s position in Northeast Asia.Kerry made the best of an embarrassing situation when he announced that the two sides agreed to an “accelerated effort” by the U.N. Security Council to approve a “strong resolution that introduces significant new measures” against the North. No one should hold their breath as to the nature of those “measures,” however.Foreign Minister Wang Yi echoed Kerry in supporting passage of “a new resolution,” but added the devastating caveat: “In the meantime, we must point out that the new resolution should not provoke new tensions in the situation, still less destabilize the Korean Peninsula.” Wang explained that “Sanctions are not an end in themselves” but should encourage negotiation, not punish.Indeed, Xinhua, the state-run Chinese news agency, said what Wang would not. It is “unrealistic to rely merely on China to press the North to abandon its nuclear program as long as the U.S. continues an antagonistic approach wrought from a Cold War mentality.” Moreover, noted Xinhua, “China-DPRK ties should not be understood as a top-down relationship where the latter follows every bit of advice offered by the former.”If Kerry wants the Chinese to follow U.S. priorities, he must convince them that America’s proposals advance Chinese interests. Which means explain to them why they should risk destroying their one military ally in the region, with the possibility of creating chaos and conflict next door and adding the entire peninsula to America’s anti-China alliance network.Good luck.Beijing’s position is understandable, indeed, reasonable from China’s standpoint, even if thoroughly unwelcome to Washington .In 1950, China went to war with the U.S. to preserve the North Korean state and prevent American forces from advancing to the Yalu River. Even today Beijing wants to see a united Korea allied with Washington about as much as it desires to have a nuclear North Korea.Indeed, even without a U.S. garrison a more powerful South Korea would pose a challenge to China. Moreover, Beijing’s favored economic position in the North would disappear as South Korean money swept away Chinese concessions.

China and US agree on North Korea but disagree on the approach Albert 2/8 – Columnist and writer at the Council of Foreign Relations. She specializes in the International Affairs and is associated with Fudan University February 08, 2016. The China-North Korea Relationship http://www.cfr.org/china/china-north-korea-relationship/p11097

Washington’s Role

The United States has pushed North Korea to irreversibly give up its nuclear weapons program in return for aid, diplomatic benefits, and

normalization of relations. But experts say Washington and Beijing, while sharing the goal of denuclearizing North Korea, have different views on how to reach it. “Washington believes in using pressure to influence North Korea to change its behavior, while Chinese diplomats and scholars have a much more negative view of sanctions and pressure tactics ,” says the International Crisis Group’s Daniel Pinkston (PDF). “They tend to see public measures as humiliating and counterproductive .” The United States has also tried to pressure China to lean more heavily on North Korea. U.S. presidential executive orders (PDF) and congressional moves impose sanctions on countries, firms, or individuals contributing to North Korea’s ability to finance nuclear and missile development; some measures passed in 2005 targeted North Korean funds in Chinese banks, while more recent ones focus on its mineral and metal export industries, which

make up an important part of trade with China. Washington has also been in talks with Seoul to deploy a missile defense system (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, also known as THAAD) to boost regional security, though Beijing strongly condemns its potential deployment and sees it as a threat to Chinese national security.

“There’s an increasing understanding that North Korea does not provide the kind of stable neighbor and element of the

neighborhood that China likes.”—former U.S. ambassador to South Korea and Six Party Talk negotiator Christopher R. Hill

There were expectations in the United States at the start of Obama’s first term in 2009 that it might pursue direct talks with North Korea, but Pyongyang’s subsequent rocket tests dimmed such hopes. Washington later settled on an approach that U.S. diplomats described as “strategic

patience (PDF).” A 2016 report by the nonpartisan U.S. Congressional Research Service described the policy as designed to pressure the regime in Pyongyang while “insisting that [it] commit to steps toward denuclearization as previously promised in

the Six-Party Talks; closely coordinating with treaty allies Japan and South Korea ; attempting to convince China to take a tougher line on North Korea; and applying pressure on Pyongyang through arms interdictions and

sanctions.” Despite pursuing rounds of dialogue either bilaterally or under the auspices of the Six Party Talks, such efforts have been fruitless .

US and China are not going coop to deal with North Korea- They have two different Ideology’sSynders 16 Scott is Senior Fellow for Korea Studies and Director of the Program on U.S.-Korea Policy. This post appears courtesy of CFR.org and Forbes Asia. 1/9/16“Where China and the United States Disagree on North Korea “ http://thediplomat.com/2016/01/where-china-

and-the-united-states-disagree-on-north-korea/ )ski

The “artificial earthquake” in North Korea caused by its fourth nuclear test has set off geopolitical tremors in U.S.-China relations , exposing the underlying gap between the two countries that has long been papered over by their common rhetorical commitment to Korean denuclearization . At their Sunnylands summit in June of 2013, Presidents Xi Jinping and Barack Obama vowed to work together on North Korea. Last September in Washington, the two leaders underscored the unacceptability of a North Korean nuclear test.¶ But Secretary of State John Kerry stated in his January 7 conversation with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi that previous approaches

to the North Korean problem have not worked and that “ we cannot continue business as usual .” The Global Times, a mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party, responded by stating that “[t]here is no hope to put an end to the North Korean nuclear conundrum if the U.S., South Korea, and Japan do not change their policies toward Pyongyang. Solely depending on Beijing’s pressure to force the North to give up its nuclear plan is an illusion.”¶ The now exposed Sino-U.S. gap over North Korea runs deep and extends to at least four critical dimensions:¶ Influence: Since China controls the food and fuel lifelines to North Korea, Western analysts see Beijing holding Pyongyang’s fate in its hand s. Yet, North Korea snubbed China and exposed its lack of influence by going ahead with a nuclear test that Xi Jinping had opposed publicly and privately. North Korea has taken Chinese support for granted by assuming that Beijing’s geopolitical interests in stability will not permit China to pull the plug. Washington is now pressing Beijing to move in that direction.¶ Ideology: It is particularly hard for China to turn on its last ally despite the clear economic and strategic divergences that have weakened the Sino-North Korean relationship for decades. It appears even harder for China to give up the idea that, despite four North Korean nuclear tests, U.S. enmity toward Pyongyang is the root cause of peninsular hostility. This view persists despite U.S.-North Korea negotiations leading to agreements such as the Agreed Framework, forbearance despite continued North Korean double-dealing and renewed negotiation efforts through Six Party Talks even despite North Korea’s first nuclear test, and even seeming indifference to Pyongyang’s provocations under the moniker of “strategic patience” during the Obama administration.¶ Instruments: The record of diplomacy with North Korea shows that neither incentives nor efforts at coercion have been successful in inducing North Korean cooperation. Neither has U.S. signaling (in the form of nuclear-capable B-2 and B-52 overflights of the Korean peninsula) worked to draw a line designed to contain North Korean provocations. But China fears that additional pressure will lead to peninsular instability and has moved too slowly to ratchet up pressure on Pyongyang.¶ End state: Underlying surface agreement on the necessity of denuclearization is a yawning gap over the type of Korean peninsula that would be acceptable if, as more and more Americans have concluded, the only way to get rid of North Korea’s nuclear weapons is to get rid of the Kim Jong-un regime. China opposes a unified Korea allied with the United States, preferring to maintain a security buffer on the Korean peninsula against U.S. forces. The broader impact of rising competition from the U .S. rebalance and Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea has begun to inhibit prospects for Sino-U.S. cooperation on North Korea. North Korea to date has counted on Sino-U.S. geopolitical mistrust to secure space for its survival.¶ North Korea’s underlying assumption behind its nuclear gambit is that it can survive and perhaps even benefit from an open geopolitical rift between the United States and China. Sino-U.S. cooperation is costly to North Korea, while a failure to cooperate on Pyongyang would severely exacerbate Sino-U.S. friction and competition. However, if North Korea cannot exploit geostrategic mistrust between China and the United States for its own gain, the assumption behind Pyongyang’s man-made tremors may lead to fatal consequences for the Kim regime.

China does not want to deal with US-North Korea Sanction because they would only mean an advance in the Nuclear Arms programMazumdaru 16

Journalist and Editor2/22/16 “Can the latest US sanctions against North Korea work?” http://www.dw.com/en/can-the-latest-us-sanctions-against-north-korea-work/a-19065845)ski

China is North Korea's biggest and most important trading partner , and a large number of goods flow into the country from Chinese private companies who do business with the regim e. Moreover, Chinese financial institutions have been key to th e North's international transactions . ISDP's Bernt Berger argues that while US agencies cannot enforce asset freezes inside China, they can definitely target Chinese companies' assets abroad.The latest US legislation lists trade with North Korea in significant quantities of certain metals or minerals as "sanctionable conduct ," says RUSI analyst Berger. "But while the legal scope to sanction them may

exist, whether the US Treasury chooses to use that ability in its fullness remains to be seen," she said.SIPRI expert Rauf is skeptical about the US' ability to enforce sanctions on this front. "China has already stated that it will not support additional sanctions against the North," he noted, underlining that for China this is "a political-military issue, and not a commercial issue."" China does not want the economic collapse of North Korea and the burden of bailing out a collapsed North. Also, a unified Korea may not be in China's strategic interest," he said."Sanctions and pressure will not yield the desired results in North Korea, only negotiations can produce a desirable outcome - in fact, continued sanctions will ensure Pyongyang will advance its nuclear and missile programs ," Rauf warned.

No China Coop- Incident with THAAD frightens China Tiezzi 16 (is Editor at The Diplomat.Her main focus is on China, and she writes on China’s foreign relations, domestic politics, and economy. Shannon previously served as a research associate at the U.S.-China Policy Foundation, where she hosted the weekly television show China Forum. She received her A.M. from Harvard University and her B.A. from The College of William and Mary. Shannon has also studied at Tsinghua University in Beijing.2/9/16“After North Korea Rocket Launch, China Pushes Back Against THAAD“http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/after-north-korea-rocket-launch-china-pushes-back-against-thaad/ )ski

North Korea conducted a rocket launch o n February 7, a day before the beginning of the February 8-25

timeframe it had originally provided for the launch. With diplomats from around the world scrambling to come up with a unified response, South Korea and the United States have already decided on one bilateral move: formally beginning talks over the deployment of the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system. That, in turn, has reignited hand wringing in China about the threat THAAD poses to Chinese national security.¶ In fact, official statements from the Chinese Foreign Ministry on THAAD deployment were more severe than its statements responding to the North Korean launch. Spokesperson Hua Chunying said China had “noted” and “regrets” the launch; meanwhile, in a separate statement, Hua said China was “deeply concerned” about the start of THAAD talks. Deploying THAAD in South Korea “will not help maintain regional peace and stability, nor will it lead to a proper settlement of the current situation,” Hua cautioned.¶ As a sign of China’s concern, Vice Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin lodged representations over the issue with South Korea’s ambassador to China, Kim Jang-soo. Liu also summoned North Korea’s ambassador to l odge China’s protest over the

rocket launch, implying once again that China sees THAAD as at least as threatening to Beijing’s interests as

North Korea’s actions.¶ China’s Spring Festival began on Monday, and with most of the country on holiday,

official responses will be muted for the next week. However, Chinese state-owned media is filling in the gap with

its own arguments against THAAD deployment, which were raised repeatedly last year. Beijing believes that

deploying THAAD in neighboring South Korea means the system would be aimed at China as much as at North

Korea, constraining China’s military options in the event of a conflict. Its repeated response to the THAAD

question has been, as Hua said on Saturday, that “no country shall undermine other countries’ security interests

while pursuing its own

Politics

Plan Helps TrumpPlan gives trump momentumLee, 16 MJ Lee, CNN Politics Reporter, 2016 (“Trump: North Korea is China’s Problem to Fix,” CNN, January 6, 2016, Available Online at http://www.cnn.com/2016/01/06/politics/donald-trump-north-korea-china-ted-cruz-immigration/index.html, Accessed 6/20/16, DSF)

Donald Trump says he's sick and tired of the United States acting as the world's policeman . The day after North Korea claimed that it had conducted its first-ever successful hydrogen bomb test, the Republican presidential front-runner pointed the finger at China . His message: Pyongyang is Beijing's problem to fix. "China should solve that problem and we should put pressure on China to solve the problem," Trump said in a wide-ranging interview with CNN's Wolf Blitze r on "The Situation Room" Wednesday at Trump Tower in midtown Manhattan. "If they don't solve that problem, we should be very tough on them on trade -- meaning, start charging them tax or start cutting them off. You'd have China collapse in about two minutes."

NK MattersNorth Korea must be a priority for the next presidentSnyder 16, Scott – Senior Fellow for Korea Studies and Director of the Program on U.S.-Korea Policy, previously a senior associate in the international relations program of The Asia Foundation, editor of various works including “China's Rise and the Two Koreas: Politics, Economics, Security” (2009), and “Paved With Good Intentions: The NGO Experience in North Korea,” (2003), 2016 (“Why North Korean threat is a more urgent issue for next U.S. President,” CNN News, April 26, 2016, accessible online at http://www.cnn.com/2016/04/26/opinions/north-korea-nuclear-strike-race-snyder/, accessed July 5, 2016//AW)

But the next U.S. administration is likely to see the North Korean threat as a more urgent priority because the North may indeed develop a long-range nuclear strike capability within the next four years. Such a development will enhance North Korea's leverage and demands for talks but will also generate greater pressure on the next U.S. President to consider decisive action , possibly including military options. This prospect provides Kim with an incentive to pursue a nuclear sprint, both to lock in capabilities that will enhance North Korea's deterrent against the United States and to seal North Korea's status as a nuclear power in any future international negotiations, such as the North's proposal for peace talks in exchange for cessation of military exercises -- but not in exchange for denuclearization.