affidavit in support of introductionfiles.courthousenews.com/2016/05/11/calipatria affidavit.pdf ·...

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AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF

APPLICATION FOR SEARCH WARRANT

I, Jeff White, being duly sworn, hereby depose and state as follows:

INTRODUCTION

5 1. This affidavit is in support of an application by the United. States of

6 America for a search warrant to search the following locations:

·7 a. A residence -located at 1242 Boyden Street, Lancaster, CA 93534

8 ("Subject Residence 1"), located in the Central District of California. As described in

9 greater detail below, Subject Residence 1 is the primary residence of Brittney Turner

1 O ("Turner"). See Attachment A for Re~idence 1, incorporat~d herein by reference.1

11 b. A residence located at 2649 Fenmead R~ad,_ yvest_ <;oyjna_. CA_ r ,

12 91792 ("Subject Residence 2"), lOcated in the\ . . l

13 described in greater detail below, Subject Resid\

14 Myesha Walters ("Walters"). See Attachment A ft·-

15 by reference.2 . There is probable cause to beli~, -

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16 ~nvolved in a conspiracy to illegally smuggle contd1

17 Collectively, Subje~t . Residence 1 and Subj~~----------:-_,,-~~ 18 Residences".

19 2. The facts set forth in this affidavit are based on my knowledge;

20 knowledge obtained from other individu~ls during my participation in this '

21 investigation, including other law enforcement officers; my review of documents and

22 computer records related to this investigation; communications with others who have

23 personal or other knowledge ·of the events, information and circumstances described

24 herein; and information gained _through my training _(both formal and informal) and

25 experience.

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27 1 Pursuant to a web search, utilizing Google Maps, for "1242 Boyden Street, Lancaster, CA 93534", the residence 28 . depicted in the photograph in Attachment A (for Residence 1) is Resi_dence 1. _ · ·

· 2 Pursuant to a web search, utilizirig Google Maps, for ''2649 Fenm~ad Road; West Covina, CA 91792'', the residence depicted in the photograph in Attachment A (for Residence 2) is Residence 2.

1 3. Because this affidavit is submitted for the limited purpose of establishing

2 prob~ble cause in support of the application for a search warrant(s), it does not set

3 forth each · and every fact that I or others have learned during the course of this

4 investigation. Unless specifically indicated otherwise, · all conv·ersations and ·

5 statements described in this affidavit are related iri substance and in part only.

6 B. EXPERIENCE & TRAINING

7 4. I am a federal "Law Enforcement Officer of the United States" within the

8 meaning of Title 18, United States Code, Sect~on 2510(7), who is empowered by law

9 to conduct investigations of, and to make arrests for, offenses enumerated in Title 18,

10 United States Code, Section 2516. I have been a SpeCial Agent with the Federal

11 . Bureau of Investigation ("FBI'~) since February 2016. I am presently' assigned to the

12 FBl' s West Covina Resident Agency.

13 5. I am a retired Major from the United States Marine Corps with twenty

14 years of military experience to include two combat tours in Iiaq and Afghanistan. I am 15 also a graduate of the FBI Academy. located in Quantico, Virginia.· As a federal law

16 enforcement officer for approximately two months, I have received formal training, as

17 well as on-the-job training, relative to the investigation of federal crimes involving .

18 stolen antiquities, fraud, controlled substances, counter intelligence and counter

19 terrorism.

20 6. While participating in these and other criminal investigations, I have

21 executed search warrants on residences, email accounts, and vehicles. I have assisted·

22 in controlled substance, public corruption and wire fraud investigations. During that

23 time, I have conducted and participated in searches, seizures, and arrests. I have also

24 . worked. and consulted with numerous law enforcement officers experienced in public .

25 corruption and narcotics/controlled substance investigations.

26 7. Based on my training and experience, as, well as information from more

27 experienced narcotics investigators, I know that illegal drug operations often depend.

28 AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION FOR SEARCH WARRANT

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1 upon maintaining their extensive contacts throughout the state or country'. This is done

2 to maintain contact, concerning· the sources of their narcotics and for distribution and

3 marketing of said drugs. It is essential that organized. significant drug trafficking

4 operations maintain contact with one another and utilize expedient means of .

. 5 communication. To do this, . continueQ. access to telephone communication 1s

6 necessary. By "telephone," I mean a. cellular .communication device, -which includes

7 cellular telephones, I-Phones, Blackberries, and similar hand-held devices that can

8 receive and send telephone calls, text messages,· instant messages, etc. The use of

9 telephones is essential in maintaining timely long distance and local contacts with the

10 original suppliers and those down the ·organizational chain to the local traffickers. The ;

· · 11 telephone enables the . dtug dealer to -maintain contact with drug. associates, drug , !

12 suppliers, ·and drug customers. I am aware that' those involved in iHegal drug

13 operations often list their telephones, and cellular telephones in the names of others to

14 conceal their identities and illegalpurposes. It is likewise essential that such organized

15 groups meet to formulate plans concerning controlled substances or· other illegal . ____ , 16 activities, and to divide their illegal proceeds.· I am also familiar with how drug

17 traffickers speak to each other and generally conduet business. For example, I am

18 aware that drug traffickers often use teJephones to discuss, plan and coordinate drug

19 distribution activities. This training, information and experience forms, . in part, the

20 basis for my opinions expressed below.

21 8. During the course of this investigation and during the drafting of this

22 affidavit, I have consult~d ·with, among others, FBI Special Agent_ ("SA") Ryan Bim,

23 San Diego/Imperial County Resident Agency, who is the case agent for the

24 investigation of Turner, Walters and their conspirators .. For the last several months,

25 SA Bim has investigated Turner, Walters, and their conspirators ,for the conduct·

26 described herein.

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9. Pursuant to my discussions with SA Bim, I learned that based upon past:

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION FOR SEARCH WARRANT

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1 investigations involving corrupt California Department of Corrections and

_ 2 Rehabilitation ("CDCR") employees, that such employees are often enticed or

3 induced to violate their duties by, inter alia, cash payments/bribes, lavish gifts/favors

4 and/or sexual favors. I also. learned that such monetary bribes come in many forms;

5 most are generally designed to be anonymous or to not appear facially suspicious.

6 Such monetary bribes include, but are not limited to, direct cash payments, structured

7 cash deposits, deposits or transfers made via commercial wire transfer services, such

8 as Pay Pal, MoneyGram, Western Union or Green Dot, and money orders.

9 10. During the instant investigation, I have -been informed by SA ~irn that

10 CDCR inmates often possess cellular telephones while in custody. According to

11 California Penal Code Section 4575, :CDCR inmates are prohibited from possessing

12 any cellular telephones .while in CDCR custody. Nevertheless, with examples

13 described in greater detail .below, inmates often use contraband cellular telephones to

14 communicate with at-large criminal associates who are out of custody in order to

15 facilitate criminal activity. These at-large associates ~re often directed by inmates to,

16 inter alia, meet with corrupt CDCR employees for the purpose of providing the

17 CDCR employee with. contraband for the purpose of introducing it into a CDCR

18 custodial ·facility. Moreover, based on SA Birn's .training and experience, these at-

19 large associates are often directed by inmates to compensate the corrupt CDCR

20 employee. SA Birn further related thatsuch communications between inmates and at-

21 large associates are often documented by their cellular telephones in the form of saved

22 call logs and saved electronic commlinications (e.g. text messages and/or video chat-

23 communications).

24 11. Based on the information contained above and below, I have probable

25 cause to believe that the requested search of Residences 1 and 2 and seizure of the

26 items in Attachment B will lead to:

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a. Evidence of a crime,

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION. FOR SEARCH WARRANT

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b. Contraband, fruits of a crime, or other items illegally possessed, and

c. Property designed for use, intended for use, or used to commit crime,

3 namely, violations of Title 21, United States Code, sections 841(a)(l), 846 -

4· Conspiracy to Distribute Controlled Substances; Title 18, United States Code, sections

5 1343, 1346 - Wire Fraud, Honest Services Wire Fraud; and Section 1956 Conspiracy

6 to Launder Monetary Instruments, as well as to the identification of additional

7 individuals who are engaged in the commission of these offenses.3

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STATEMENT OF PROBABLE CAUSE

Introduction of Angela Carr

12. Angela Carr ("Carr"), was a supervisory Substance Abuse Counselor ~ ' '

11 who worked at Calapatria State Prison ("CAL"); a State custodial facility within the i.:

12 Southern District of California operated by CDCR.

13 13. As described in greater detail below, at the direction of inmates Ryan

14 Hawes ("Hawes"), Nathaniel Frazier ("Frazier") and D'Mondo Juice Bums ("Bums"),

15 Carr traveled to and met with Turner, Tameika Watts ("Watts"), and Walters, all at-

16 large associates of the aforementioned inmates. These at-large associates would

17 provide Carr with contraband which Carr smuggled into CAL. Once the contraband

].8 was in CAL, Carr would place the contraband in a trash can which inmate custodian

19 Anthony BroW11 ("Brown") would retrieve and convey to Hawes, Frazier, Bums, and

20 ll 3 "In the case of drug dealers, evidence is likely to be found where the dealers live." United States v.

Angulo-Lopez, 791 F.2d 1394, 1399 (9th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted). "[E]vidence discovered by[] officers 22 linking the defendants to a drug scheme provide[s] 'more than a sufficient showing for obtaining the warrant

to search [their] ... residence."' United States v. Fannin, 817 F.2d 1379, 1382 (9th Cir. 1987) (quotation and 23 citation omitted). Also an unpublished decision refers to this common-sense principle as the "residency

presumption." United States. v. Crowell, 1993 WL 493743, *2 (9th Cir. 1993) (unpublished). Moreover, the 24 presumption applies not only to drug traffickers' personal residence but to other residences used by others

assisting in or facilitating the offense: "The fact that there are multiple residences does not necessarily mean 25 that there is any less of a "fair probability" that the relevant evidence would be found at any one of them, for

the rationale behind the presumption is that drug dealing is the type of crime committed out of covert private 26 locations." Id.; see also id. (holding that the defense argument "mistakenly assumes that the affidavit is

invalid unless it establishes that the place to be searched is [the trafficker's] exclusive residence·. We have 2 7 previously held that the residency rule applies in the case of a residence associated with an assistant as well as

a ringleader."). This case law was provided by AUSA J. Mark Childs. 28 . . 5


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1 inmate Brandon Carroll ("Carroll").

· 2 August 7, 2015 Seizure of Contraba11d

3 14. On August 7, 2015, at approximately 9:00, a.m., Carr entered the Staff

4 Entrance for processing and admittance into the secure perimeter of CAL. At this . '

5 time, CDCR Lieutenant -E. Silva ("Silva") smelled the strong odor of marijuana

6 coming from Carr's direction. As Silva approached Carr, the odor of marijuana

7 became strong enough that Silva was able to tell .that it was coming from ·a large bag

8 that Carr had in her possession. This large bag appeared to contain several smaller

9 individual sized packages of potato chips.· However, as described in greater detail

10 below, this large bag actually carried several other items of contraband. Silva asked

11 Carr if the large bag· belonged to her and Carr responded affirmatively. Silva then

12 asked Carr if she had any contraband and Carr said, "Yes." Carr then made the

13 following spontaneous statement, "I have marijuana, cell phones and probably more

14 drugs .. .," Silva took possession of the large bag and all of the other bags Carr had in

15 her possession.

16 15. During a subsequent un-recorded. post-Miranda interview, when asked '

17 about the items Carr attempted to bring into CAL, Carr admitted to knowingly,

18 bringing the various items of contraband into CAL for the ·purpose of distribution to

19 the inmate population. Carr also state.cl that she was initially working in concert with

20 CAL inmates Hawes and Brown.

21 16. The contraband found in Carr's possession on August 7, 2015 is listed

22 and depicted below (gross weights are approximate):

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2,025.5 grams of marijuana;

331.1 grams of methainphetamine;

109.5 grams ofheroin;

40 Cellufar telephones;

212.5 grams of tobacco;


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409 tablets-S·oma, Xanax, Valium, & Norco;

1 travel size bottle of Crown Royal alcohol; and

4 bottles of suspected cough syrup approximately 2.5 oz. each.

12 1 7. CDCR Investigators also conducted a search of Carr's vehicle which was

13 parked at a CAL parking space. Carr provided written consent to search her vehicle,

14 and her cellular telephones by signing a "Department of Corrections . and

15 Rehabilitation Office of Internal Affairs Consent to Search" form.

16 18. Within Carr's vehicle~ pursuant to a consent search, CDCR investigators

17 located, a white LG cellular phone {"Carr TI# 1 "), and a Sprint Blackberry cellular

18 telephone ("Carr TT#2'').

19 Carr's Second Post Arrest Interview

20 19. During another post-Miranda interview, Carr stated that for the last year

21 she worked in CAL's Substance Abuse Program ("SAP"). Carr stated that Hawes

22 befriended her when Hawes was in the SAP program. According to Carr, Hawes

23 asked if she [Carr] needed some "extra cash." Hawes also asked for the number for ·

24 Carr's cellular telephone. According to Carr, Carr gave Hawes the telephone.number

25 for her cellular telephone. Carr then explained that a couple of weeks later Hawes sent

26 text messages to Carr. Thereafter, Hawes and Carr regularly com.nlunicated to each

27 other via text messages. Shortly after developing a relationship with Hawes, Carr also

28 AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION

FORSEARCH WARRANT

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1 developed relationships with inmates Frazier and Bums. The search of the two

2 cellular telephones of Carr is described in detail below.

3 Search of Hawes' Cell

. 4 20. Thereafter, CDCR investi.gators conducted a search of Hawes' cell.

5 Located within Hawes' cell, CDCR investigators located a contraband LG cellular

6 teiephone · ("Hawes TT#3") .. As described ·in greater detail beiow, Hawes TT#3

7 contained incriminating text messages with Carr and others, as well as additional

8 photographic evidence. Per the California Penal Code, it is illegal for inmates, such as

9 Hawes, to possess a cellular telephone.

10 a. for exaniple, on' August 6, 2015,. via a saved electronic message , :;

11 over Hawes TT#3, Hawes gave Tut;ner [using 661-429-6306] Carr's telephone

12 number, "9513496689" [Carr TT#l]. Thereafter, according to toll records, there were

13 two unrecorded v:oice calls between Carr and Turner. Then, via a saved electronic

14 message over Carr TT#l, Carr told Turner, "Just made Palmdale." Thereafter,

15 according to toll records, there were four additional unrecorded calls between Carr

16 and Turner. Finally, approximately twelve minutes after the last call between Carr

17 and Tµ.rnet, .Carr (using Carr TT#l) sent a text message to Hawes (using Hawes

18 TT#3) stating, "Alright pickup was successful." Hawes responded over Hawes TT#3,

19 "Supa ... we gotta make sure t~a stuff [contraband] separate an put together in a

20 smioth way to bring it in [into CAL]."

21 21. CDCR investigators also interviewed Hawes.· During an

22 UNMIRANDIZED interview, Hawes acknowledged that his cell was searched and that

23 a cellular telephone was located within his cell. Hawes also admitted possessing and

24 using a cellular telephone while in custody at CAL. However, when the questioning

25 focused upon Carr and the August 7, 2015 drug load, Hawes made repeated efforts to

26 distance himself from Hawes TT#3.

27 · Search of Hawes' Cellular Telephone [Hawes TT#3]


:FOR SEARCHW ARRANT

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1 22. A federal search warrant issued on August 31, 2015 by the Honorable

2 · Peter C. Lewis, United States Magistrate Judge in the United States District Court for

3 · the Southern District of California, authorized. law enforcement to review and extract

· 4 certain data··from Hawes TT#3 .. During the search of Hawes TT#3, conducted

5 pursuant to the federal warrant, agents discovered many . saved electronic

6 communications . for "conversations~' between ·Hawes apd several conspirators,

7 including Carr, Turner~ Carroll and Frazier. (See paragraph 20 above) Additionally,

8 agents discovered several incrin;iinating photographs of contraband. For example, on

9 the evening of August 6, 2015; after meeting With Turner, Carr [using Carr TT#l]

10 sent Hawes [using Haw~s.·TT#] a photograph of the contraband she received from :·1~

11 Turner. : Similarly, on August 6, 2015, · while discussing the . price of . '. 1

12 methamphetamine . in CAL, Hawes [using Hawes. TT#3] sent Carroll photographs of

13 methamphetamine and marijuana. Based on the evidence taken from Hawes TT#3,

14 discussed ip greater detail below, it is clear that Hawes used Hawes TT#3 and Turne:r

15 used 661-429-6306 to facilitate the distribution of controlled substances into and

16 throughout CAL.

17 Searcko/Carr's Two Cellular Telephones [Carr TT#l and Carr TT#2]

18. 23. Two additional federal sear.ch wa1Tants, is.sued on August 31, 2015 by the

19 Honorable Peter C. ·Lewis, United States Magistrate Judge in the United States

20 District Court for the Southern District of California, authorized law enforcement to

21 review and extract data from Carr TT#l and .Carr TT#2. During the search of Carr

22 TT# 1 and Carr TT#2, agents discovered many saved text messages for

23 "conv'ersations" between Carr and other coconspirators, including, Hawes, Turner,

24 Burns, Watts, Walters and Frazier. For example, Carr's cellular telephones contained

25 saved electronic communications between Carr and Turner as well as between Carr

. 26 and Walters. Specifically, there were saved electronic communications between Carr

21· [using Carr TT#l] and J'urlier [using 661-429-6306], from August 6, 2015, when

2,8 9 AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF APPLiCATION FOR SEARCH WARRANT

1 Carr met with Turner in Palmdale, CA to retrieve contraband for Hawes. Similarly,

2 there were also saved electronic communications between Carr [using Carr TT# 1] and

3 Walters [using 626-502-2208] when Carr met Walters in Moreno Valley CA to

4 retrieve contraband for Bums. Based on the evidence taken from these cellular

5 telephones, as described in greater detail below, it is clear that Carr used Carr Tt#l

6 and Carr TT#2 and Walters used 626-502-2208 to facilitate the acquisition of

7 controlled substances for distribution within CAL.

8 Third Recorded Interview. of Carr

9 24. On September 3, 2015, at Carr's residence, agents re-interviewed Carr.

10 During this recorded, UNMIRANDIZEDinterview, Carr admitted that the contraband

11 smuggled into CAL on August 7, 2015, was acquired and smuggled at the direction of

12 Hawes, Frazier and Bums. Moreover, Carr explained how she met with, and received

13 contraband from, Turner, Watts and Walters. Carr identified photographs of Hawes, )

14 Frazier, Bums Watts and Walters. Carr did not identify a photograph of Turner

15 because agents did not have a picture of Turner available during this particular ----t

16 interview. Nevertheless, Carr indicated that she would have no problem identifying

17 Turner.: Carr claimed to not know Carroll~

18 25. On February 18, 2016, during a debriefing with investigating agents, Carr

19 identified a picture of Turner as a person from ".Vhom she received contraband, which

20 was smug&led into·prison.

21 Discovery of Frazier TT#4, Carroll TT#5, and Carroll tT#6

22 26. On September 4, 2015, C:QCR investigators searched Frazier's cell and

23 discove,red a contraband cellular telephone ("Frazier TT#4"). Similarly, on September ·

24 4, 2015 CDCR investigators also searched Carroll's cell and discovered two cellular

25 telephones - a dark grey-LG H81 l ("Carroll TT#5") and a white Samsung SM-G360T i.

26 (''Carroll TT#6").

27 27. Three additionalfederal search warrants, issued on September 18, 2015 ·

is 10 . AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION FOR SEARCH WARRANT

1 by the Honorable Peter C. Lewis, United States Magistrate Judge in the United States

2 District Court for the Southern District of California, authorized law enforcement to

3 review and extract data from Frazier TT#4, Carroll TT#5, and Carroll TT#6.

4 28. Frazier TT#4 was an encrypted Apple iPhone and agents were unable to

5 extract any data from the internal memory of Frazier TT#4. However, using service

6 provider records [T-Mobile], agents were able to determine the dial number [213-820-

7 4103] for Frazier TT#4 by information contained upon Frazier TT#4's removable SIM

8 card. This telephone number for Frazier TT#4 [213-820-4103] was the same number

9 that Carr used to communicate with Frazier. The link between Carr and Frazier is

1 O demonstrated ,by saved electronic communications between Carr [using Carr TT#2]

· 11 and Watts [using 323-286"'8829] from August 2, 2015 where Watts stated, ·"He

12 [Frazier] said hit him [contact him] When you [Carr] get a chance at 2138204103

13 [Sham's/Frazier's number]."

14 29. The search of Carroll TT#5 and Carroll TT#6 revealed saved electronic

15 communications between Carroll [using Carroll TT#5 and Carroll TT#6] and Walters ---1

16 [using 626-502-2208]. For example, on September 2, 2015, Carroll [using Carroll

17 TT#5] sent Walters [using [626-502-2208] a text message where Carroll and Walters

18 discussed the distribution of money. Specifically, Carroll stated, "I need to order a

19 laptop off that fingerhut account, its important, also so u don't have the stress of

20 opening the business account, let me know when I can have somebody come grab all

21 the paperwork so I can get it done, that way u don't have to anything but receive your

22 cut, less for u to have to worry about u feel me ... " Similarly, on August 6, 2015, as

23 discussed in greater detail below, Carroll [using Carroll TT#5] electronically

24 communicated with Hawes [using Hawes TT#3] about the price of methamphetamine

25 in CAL. Specifically, after receiving a picture of what appears to be

26 methamphetamine, Carroll stated "Glass [methamphetamine] looks gd." Carrol then

27 asked, "U say 4k [$4,000.00] get u what bacx." Hawes responded, "15" [$15,000.00].


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1 Shortly thereafter, Hawes sent Carrol the second picture of methamphetamine.

2 Introduction to th.e Structure of the Conspiracy

3 30. · According to Carr and saved communications from Carr's cellular

4 telephones, Carr used Carr TT# 1 and Carr TT#2 to communicate with her inmate co-

5 · conspirators and her inmate coconspirator's at-large associates. Carr stated that

6 typically, at an inmate co~conspiratot' s direction,· Carr would travel to, and meet with,

7 an inmate's at-large [out-of-custody] associate.· This at-:-large ·associate would :ineet

8 with Carr and ·give Carr various 'items of contraband. Carr would then import the

9 contraband into CAL for her inmat~ co-conspirators.

10 31. As' described· in g~~ater detail below, the following chart illustrates which

11 CAL inmate was directly-link~;d to which particular.At-large Co-conspirator. Based

12 on the review of telephone records, seized telephones, and interviews of Carr, Turner

i3 was acting at the direction of and/or because of association with inmate Hawes; and

14 Walters was acting at the direction of and/or because of association with inmates

--~1~5-1- Carroll and Bums. Moreover, the chart also illustrates which telephone lines were

16 linked to which conspirator.

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Carr. Using: Carr TT#l, and

CarrTT#2

Inniate Co-conspirator At:-large Co-conspirator

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Hawes; Turner and Hawes' U$e of Hawes TT#3


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1 32~ During her third post arrest interview, Carr explained that Hawes

2 possessed a cellular telephone [Hawes TT#3] while in custody. A subsequent search -

3 of Hawes' cell led to the discovery and seizure of Hawes TT#3. Moreover, the saved

4 contacts list from Hawes TT#3 contained the telephone numbers for Laurel Hawes

5 [Hawes' sister], Turner [the suspected mother of Hawes' child(ren)], "Sham"

6 [Frazier], "40" [Carroll], "Supa Coo" and "C" [Carr]. Haw-es TT#3 also contained

7 numerous photographs/selfies of Hawes. Search warrant information from Carr TT#l

8 revealed that Carr TT# 1 contained a screen capture photograph/selfy of Hawes.

9 Regarding Turner, Carr stated that she personally m_et with Turner on numerous

1 O occasions to retrieve contraband intended for Hawes. Carr has since identified a

11 photograph of Turner as the person she met with at a Walmart parking lot in

12 Palmdale, CA to retrieve contraband including the controlled substances found on

13 August 7, 2015.

14 33. In addition to Hawes TT#3 independently establishing that Hawes was

15 the person communicating with Carr [over Carr TT# 1 and Carr TT#2], an additional

16 link between Carr and Hawes can be ·established via the substance and context of the

17 saved text messages. On August 4, 2015, via saved electronic communications

18 between Hawes TT#3 and Carr TT#l, Hawes gave Carr an e-mail address - - . . , - . : ..

19 [[email protected]] for co-conspirator Turner who would send cash to

20 Carr via PayPal. Specifically, Hawes stated, "[email protected] ... S~nd a

21 friend request so tha$$$ can go straight thtu ... to you." According to PayPal records,

22 [email protected] is an account registered to "Brittney Turner" with an

23 address of 1242 Boyden Avenue, Lancaster [Subject Residence 1] and

24 [email protected] is an account registered to "Angela Carr." PayPal records

25 revealed that on July 25, 2015, Carr [[email protected]] received a money transfer

26 from Turner [[email protected]] in the amount of$300.00.

27 34. [email protected] is also linked with a publically viewable


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1 · Facebook account belonging to "Missthang-Youmadornah." This Facebook account

2 also had a photograph of a Los Angeles jail deposit receipt which listed the

3 depositor's name as "Brittney Turner" and a partial CDL #301028. California DMV

4 records reveal that CDL # D7301028 belonged to a "Brittney Eleise Turner" who

5 lived at 1242 Boyden Avenue, Lancaster [Subject R¢sidence 1]. "Brittney Eleise

6 Turner's" CDL photograph was ide'utified by Carr as the at-large associate who

7 worked with Hawes. Moreover, on August 5, 2015, over Hawes TT#3, an electronic

8 message was sent from Hawes to FNU LNU, aka "G man" which stated, without

9 context~ "Brittney Turner Lancaster Ca."

JW 3 5. Carr stated that she, a:t the direction of Hawes, met With Turner on

11 August 6, 2015 at the parking lot of a Walmart Located in Palmdale; CA, to retrieve.

12 contraband from Turner that was to be delivered by Carr to Hawes. On August 6,

13 2015, :over Hawes TT#3, Hawes sent an electronic message to Carr [using Carr TT#l],

14 stating, "We .got thangs. goin on today we need shit. [contraband] to be raped up rite

15 [wrapped up well]." Carr responded stating, "U bettr tell em [co-conspirators] to wrap

16 .it [contraband] up good ... " Later that same day, via an electronic message over

17 Hawes TT#3, Hawes gave Turner [using 661-429-6306] Carr's telephone number,

18 "95l3496689" [Carr TT#ll Thereafter, according to toll records, there were two

19 unrecorded voice calls between Carr and Turner. Then, via an electronic message

20 over Carr TT#l, Carr told Turner, "Just made Palmdale." Thereafter, there were four

21 additional unrecorded calls between Carr and Turner. Finally, approximately twelve

22 minutes after the last call between Carr and Turner, Carr (using Carr TT#l) sent a

23 text message to Hawes (using Hawes .TT#3) stating, "Alright pickup was successful."

24 Hawes responded~ "Supa ... ·we gotta make sure th~ stuff [contraband] separate an put

25 together in a smioth way to bring it in [into CAL]." Carr responded, "i know I already

26 have what I'm putting it in." Later that same evening, over Carr TT#l, Carr sent a ' .

27. photograph to Hawes (using Hawes TT#3) which contained the caption, "here is ur ·


14

-1 I : !

'. '

1 stuff." This photograph depicted a large bag of chips and a packag~ of Oreo cookies,

2 all of which were l~ter found, on August 7, 2015, to contain rriethamphetamine.

3

4

5

6

8

9

10

11

12

13

. August 7; 20)5 .dn1g load . August 7, 2015 drug load

Frazier, Watts and Frazier's use of Frazier TT#4

36. Carr also. identified a photograph of Frazier and stated that she would

14 communicate with Frazier over a -cellular telephone possessed by Frazier. A

.15

subsequent search of Frazier's cell led to the dis·covery of a contraband Apple iPhone .

16 cellular telephone ("Frazier TT#4" .. Because PCR mvestlgators 1 not ave t e

17 access code to Frazier TT#4, Frazier TT#4 remains locked and ·encrypted. Although

18 Frazier TT#4 is encrypted, . service provider records for. this communication f~cility

. .

reveal that the dial number assigned to Frazier TT#4 was in fact in contact with Garr. 19

20 3 7. In addition to service provider recor4s affirmatively demonstrating that

. 21

Frazier (using Frazier TT#4) communicated with Carr, saved text messages from Carr

22 TT# 1 and Carr TT#2 also establish that Carr was communicating with Frazier. Carr's

23 telephone's contact list listed the telephone number for Frazier under the name "Sham

24 Deuce" ("Sham"). According to Carr, Carr would meet with Watts, Frazier'.s wife, for

25 the purpose of receiving contraband intended for Frazier. This link was corroborated

26 by saved text messages from Watts (using 323-286.,.8829) to Carr (using Carr TT#2)

27 where Watts told Carr that Frazier was trying to c·ontact Carr. Specifically, Watts ·

28 AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION FOR'SEARCH WARRANT

15

'I· ..

. 1 stated, "He [Frazier] said hit him [contact him] When you [Carr] get a chance at

2 2138204103 [Sham's/Frazier's number]." Moreover, on August 1, 2015, Carr sent an

3 electronic message to Watts asking, "Are we doing any bizness [providing contraband

4 to Carr] today[?]" Watts responded by stating, "Yea let me call hubby [Frazier] and

5 see what to bring. "4

6 38. On August 4, 2015, according to saved text messages over Carr TT#2,

7 Carr and Watts coordinated a face-to-face meeting at a shopping center located in

8 Riverside County. According to Carr, this was for the purpose of retrieving

9 contraband intended for Frazier. The following day, August 5, 2015, due to

10 heightened security checks, Carr [using Carr TT#2] sent a text message to Watts

11 [using 323-286~8829]stating, "Just wasn't.a good time to bring it in. Checking bags

12 and dogs." Carr then told Watts that she would, "Bring the stuff [contraband] on

13 Friday [August 7, 2015]." Carr has since identified a photograph of Watts.

14 39. On August 6, 2015, according to Carr and saved text messages from

15 Carr's cellular telephones, Carr [using Carr TT#2] and Watts [using 323-286-8829] ____ , 16 discussed the contraband intended for Frazier. Specifically, Carr stated that " ... He

17 . [Frazier] will get it [contraband] tomorrow [August 7, 2015]?" Watts theri stated, "It

18 will be his [Frazier's] stuff [contraband] right not oh boy [Hawes'] stuff too?" Carr

19 responded, "It will be both [Frazier's and Hawes'], but I have it [contraband] all

20 separated and the other person [possibly Brown] knows whos is what." Watts then

21 stated, "Ok I definitely may not tell my husband5 [Frazier] that cause he gone be hot

22 as fish grease [really very angry]." Later that same day, Carr [using Carr TT#2] sent a

23 picture of a green Club Crackers box to Frazier [using Frazier TT#4] stating, "All it

24 stuff." Frazier responded. stating, "cool." Frazier later stated, "Real talk ... I'm ready

25 4 This August 1, 2015 exchange between Watts and Carr were over two Facebook accounts - Carr's

26 account (100000102394084/ Nasciere31) is an account which Carr identified as belonging to her. Watts' account (100000379431399/meiko.dabadone) references a Facebook account with numerous

27 "selfies" of Watts, photos of Watts and Frazier, and a list~d birthday of April 46, 1987 [Watts' birthday]. . . . . : . . . . . 5 Frazier and Watts were married m CAL as confirmed by their Cahforma marriage certificate.

28 . . 16 AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION FOR SEARCH WARRANT

1 to take care of your end ·[pay Carr for bringing in contraband] whatever way is best for

2 you."

3

4

5

6

7

8

9 . From August ?'\ 2015 Drug Load

10 A

11 40. After sending the above photograph to Frazier, c·arr then sent it to Watts

12 stating, "U see his [Frazier's]· stuff. I sent him [Frazier] a photo." A green Club

13 Crackers box, seized on August 7, 2015, contained heroin, marijuana and ten cellular

14 telephones.

15 ~~~-1-1-~~BuFn~alleFS,baFFOll-ana~U!.s-u-se-oFbli¥1¥)l~T-T-m,~~~~~~~~~•

16 (

41. During Carr's third recorded interview, CJirr identified photographs of 17

Burris and of Walters. Carr explained that Burns directed her to me_et with Walters 18

on at least two prior occasions where Walters gave Carr contraband intended for 19

Bums. These prior ;meetings occurred at the parking lot of a bowling alley in Moreno 20

Valley, CA. Unbeknownst to Carr, described in greater detail below, investigating 21 '

agents discovered that Walters was also giving Carr contraband intended for Carroll. 22

23

24

25

26

27

28.

42. Carr also stated that she used her two cellular telephones [Carr TT#l and

Carr TT#2] to communicate with Bums via a cellular telephone [323-206-8434]

which Bums possessed while he was in custody. Carr also ·provided agents with the

telephone number she used to contact Walters [626-502-2208]. Both 323-206-8434

[Bums] and 626-502-2208 [Walters] were listed in Carr's contacts. A subsequent

search of Bums' cell did not lead to the discovery of any cellular telephones

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION FOR SEARCB WARRANT

17

i ..

1 attributable to Bums.6 According to service provider records· [T-Mobile], "Myesha

2 Walters" [Walters] is the subscriber of 626-502-2208.

3 43. During a series of text messages between Carr (using Carr TT#2) and

4 Bums (using 323-206-8434), Bums gave Carr the telephone number for Walters. · . .

5 Specifically, on August 2, 2015, Bums sent the following ~ext message, "626-502-

6 2208'' [Walter's cellular telephone number]. According to toll;records for Carr TT#2,

7 Carr placed a call to Walters less than two minutes after Bums gave Carr Walters'

· 8 telephone number. After speaking with Walters, Carr sent the following messages to

9 Bums, "U slo ass ... Got plans intact ... The meet up [with Walters] is in tact."

10 Bums responded, "Oh ok ... we on [Walters and Bums] and u [Carr] on too grl." Carr

11 then sent, "smh= )" [shaking my head and "= )" is a smiley face]. Bums responded,

12 "Shake yo head all u want u gone b shaken yo asz [ass] wen u counten [counting] dis

13 money.;'

14 44. Bums can also be tied to Carr's August 7, 2015 drug load by virtue of a

15 series of electronic communications where Carr [using Carr TT# 1] and Bums [using ----· 16 323-206-8434] discussed the contraband intended for Bums. Specifically, on August

17 6, 2015, the day before Carr's arrest, Carr sent Bums a picture of a red Folgers Coffee

18 container with a black top.

19

20

21

22

23

24 Coffee can pie to Burns from Carr

. i~ .

' . .

25 45. . Carr then stated, "Enjoy ur coffee." Bums asked, "Do they [CDCR entry

26

27 6 According to service provider records for [323-206-8434], this particular cellular telephone is still

28. being used -presumably by unidentified CAL inmates.

. 18 AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION FOR SEARCH WARRANT

1 staff] chezk <lat." Carr responded, "No u only getting what's inside." Bums then

2 stated, "Watu mean by <lat .. .im only getting wats inside wat ha coffee??? ... So does

3 allmy shyt [all my contraband] I gave u fit in tha coffee [coffee can]." Carr responded

4 affirmatively, "Just about." Bums theri asked, "So \vat u plan on <loin wit tha stuff

.5 [contraband] <lat dnt just about fit [that didn't just about fit] lol." Carr responded by

. 6 sending Bums a photograph of a package of Oreo Cookies.

7 I

8

9

13

10

11

12 46. Thereafter, Bums stated, "Lol yo asz is wit tha shyt [your ass is with that

shit] hahah." Carr responded, "Don't fucc with me Mr bums haha I got ... I been 14

doing this." Bums then stated, "Lol I see nigga." The aforementioned coffee can 15

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

coritraband.

From August ih, .2015 Drug Load From A~gust 71\ 2015. Drug Load

. . .47. According to CDCR records, from March 20, 2015 until August 21,

u . 2015~ Bums was enrolled in CAL's SAP, a program once supervised by Carr. Also as

25

26

27

28

a counselor in the SAP, Carr had one-to-one access to inmates in the program;

including Hawes, Bums and Frazier. According to the same CDCR records, Bums

was a designated SAP Mentor who would assist new SAP inmates. This fact further


. 19

1 links Burns as the user of 323-206-8434 by virtue of July 29, 2015 text messages

2 between Bums (using 323-206-8434) and Carr (using Carr TT#2) where Carr stated,

3 ''Make sure u [Bums] erase every text message from ur [Bums'] phone:" Bums

4 responded stating, "Caine on nw i.am a mentor .... i knw dis lol. give me more credit

5 then <lat ima virgo member[?]" Similarly, on August 6, 2015, when Carr was away

6 from CAL on leave, Carr (using Carr TT#l) asked Bums (using 323-206-8434), ' . . .

7 "what happened in prgrm [in SAP]." Bums responded, "Nothen same shyt different

8 day." Carr then asked, "Was rush there [Carr's SAP supervisor][?]" Bums ultimately

9 responded, "rush or waters wasnt dare [there at the SAP]."

to-- · 48. Saved messages from Carr TT#l, reveal that Carr met with Walters on ' :.}-:~ '

Jl ·August 6, 2015 for the purpose of retrieving contraband intended for Bums/Carroll.

12 Specifically, Walters (using 626-502-2208) told Carr, "25 minutes." Carr then asked,

13 "Till u get here or when it leaving[?]" Walters responded, "Until I get to the mall .

14 [meeting place]." A short time later, over the same telephones, Walters sent a

___ 1_5_·,. message to Carr, "I'm here by round 1" Carr responded stating, "k on my way." Later

i6 that same evening, during a series of text messages between Carr (using Carr TT#l)

1.7 and Bums (using 626-502-2208), Carr and Bums discussed the contraband delivered

':'-. '1.s. hy-w~lt~r~. Speciflcally, Carr compl~ined, "U. had her -[W~lters] add more." Bums

19 responded; "Yu say <lat/' Bums explained, "It just tha 5 phns [5 cellular telephones]

20 and tha 8 balloons pf weed and some pills .. .i tossed some pills in cause they small."

21 Bums then stated, "Wow she [Walters] said she wanted to suprise me cause its my

22 bday on tha 30th7 and put some hennessey in dare im on tha phn wit her [Walters]

23 nw .. .is <lat too much." Carr ultimately responded. " ... Putting it ·an in the coffee ... "

24 A short time later, Carr sent Bums a photograph of multi colored balloons filled with

25 a then unidentified substances. These same balloons were discovered ih a red F olgers

· 26 Coffee container with a biack lid possessed by Carr on August 7, 2015.

27

28 1 According to CDCR records Burns' birthday is August 30, 1989 ..

. . 20 AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION FOR SEARCH WARRANT

1 49. During the course of the investigation, agents learned that Walters· was

2 not a registered visitor of Bums. Rather, Walters was a CDCR approved visi~or for

3 · Carroll. Based on this diScovery, CDCR investigators searched Carroll's cell ·and

4 located two contraband cellular telephones [Carroll TT#5 and Carroll TT#6]. Through

5 the use of federal search warrants, agents were· able to extract evidence implicating

6 Carroll as one of the recipients of Carr's Augus~ 7, 2015 drug load. Spedfically,

7 Carroll TT#5 contained an August 2, .2015 screenshot of a Skype video conference

8 between Carrol and Walters.8 Within this screen shot, Walters is holding up a

9 Quaker oatmeal box while Carroll is smiling. Two identical Quaker oatmeal boxes

10 were in Carr's August 7, 2015 drug load containing methamphetamine and marijuana.

11 In fact, the aforementioned oatmeal screenshot was taken approximately two hours

· 12 before Carr met with Walters to retrieve contraband for the August 7, 2015. drug load.

13 r-:.-_·:::·

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

.,. ' ,•. - ', I • ,., ' • ''•

August 7, 2015 drug load

August 7, 2015

drug load

21 50. Additionally, saved text messages taken from Hawes TT#3, reveal that

22 Hawes (using Hawes TT#3) and Carroll (using ·Carroll TT#4) were_ distributing

23 methamphetamine in CAL. Specifically, during the evening of August 6, 2015, Hawes

24 sent Carrol the following photographs:

25

26

27 8 According tO saved text messages from Carr TT#l and Carr TT#2, Cart met with Walters on two

28 occasions prior to bringing iii the August 7, 2015 drug load. . -.

' 21 AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION FOR SEARCH WARRANT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8 51. During a series of subsequent electronic communications, Carroll stated,

9 "Shoot that pie." Hawes sent the first picture of methamphetamine. Carroll questioned

10 the quality by asking, "Whats that green shit." Hawes responded, "Nuthin. Carroll

11 then stated, "Glass [methamphetamine] looks gd." Carrol then asked about the

12 potential drug revenue that could be derived from a $4,00_0.00 purchase. Specifically,

13 Carroll asked, "U- say_ 4k get u what bacx." Hawes responded, "15" [$15,000.00].

14 Shortly thereafter Hawes sent Carrol the second picture of methamphetamine.

15 52. Although Carroll did not have any known -communications with Carr, -----I

16 Carroll had a photograph of Carr's residence on Carrol TT#5. At the very least, this

17 photograph indicates that Carroll was aware of Carr.

18 Establishing ResidelJCY at the Subject Residences __

19 53. Subject Residence 1 -As recently as May 6, 2016, DMV records listed

20 Subject Residence 1 as the primary residence for Turner. Moreover, currently, -

21 Turner's California Driver License lists Subject Residence 1 as Turner's residence.

22 On November 9, 2015, at approximately 9:30 a.m., surveillance agents observed

23 Turner exit Subject Residence 1 and ent_er a vehicle parked on the street in front of

24 Subject Residence 1. Again, on April 12, 2016, at approximately 7:30 a.m.,

25 surveillance, agents observed Turner exit Subject Residence 1 and enter a vehicle

26 parked in front of Subject Location 1. On each of these occasions surveillance agents

27 identified that the person who exited Subject Residence 1 was the same person


22

1 ~depicted in. the photograph identified by Carr as Turner - the person she met to

2 retrieve contraband intended for Hawes. Moreover, PayPal records from November

3 10, 2015, list Subject Residence 1 as Turner's primary residence.

4 54. Subject Residence 2 - As recently as May 6, ·2016, DMV records listed

5 · Subject Residence 2 as the primary residence for Walters. Additionally, the

6 .LexisNexis· database lists "Myesha Walters" [Walters] at Subject Residence ·2 as the

7 residence of the user of [626-502-2208]. In addition, telephone company records for

8 626-502-2208 state that the subscriber of the aforementioned phoi:e number resides at

9 Residence 2. Specifically, toll records for 626-502-2208 lists "Myesha S Walters"

10 · [Walters] ad~ress 2649 E Fenmead St, West Covina, CA 91792 (Subject Residence

11 2) as of November 24, 2015, as the subscriber. On November 6; 2015, during the

12 · course of surveillance, agents observed Walters enter Subject Residence 2 through

13 the front door without knocking. Then, on April 12, 2016, at 7:30 a.m., agents

14 observed Walters exit Subject Residence 2 and enter a 2008 Black BMW 328i

--~1=5-1. ("Black BMW") that was parked in the drive way of Subject Residence 2. According____

16 to DMW Records, the Black BMW was registered to Walters. Surveillance agents

17 identified that the person seen at S11bject Residence 2 on November 6, 2015 and

18 April 12, 2016 was Walters, who was the same person. depicted in the ·photograph

19 identified by Carr as the person she met to retrieve contraband intended for Bums. On

20 May 9, 2016, at approximately, 7:00 a.m. to 7:30 a.m., I personally observed the

21 Black BMW in the driveway of Subject Residence 2.

22 D. METHODOLOGY

23 · 5 5. Based upon my expenence, training, consultation with other law

24 enforcement officers. experienced in drug, corruption, and· financial investigations, and

25 ~ll the facts and opinions set forth in this affidavit, I know that, as described in

26 Attachment B hereto (which is incorporated by reference):

27 a. Documents Related to Distribution - Individuals involved m

28 23 . . AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION

FORSEARCH WARRANT

l drug trafficking often maintain at their residence(s) records and ledgers evidencing

2 their distribution activities in order to keep track of the ordering, acquisition,

3 purchasing, storage, distribution and transportation of drugs. At times, the drugs may

4 be distributed, but documentary records and ledgers often remain for long periods of

5 time (e.g. in excess of one year) to memorialize ,past transactions, the status of

6 accounts receivable and accounts payable, and the names and telephone numbers of

7 · suppliers, customers and coconspirators.

8 b. Evidence of . Coconspitators Individuals involved m drug

9 trafficking must often rely on others to obtain the drugs and to help them market and

.10 distribute the drugs and·evidence of the identities ofthese criminal associates is often

11 maintained at their residence and/or place of business ..

12 ·a. Telepb.ones as Evidence of Distribution - Individuals involve4 in

13 drug trafficking utilize mobile telephones to maintain contact with co-conspirators and

14 .to conduct their criminal activity. As described above, co-conspirators used their

___ 1_5_·,. cellular telephone to keep in contact with. Carr and with one another. Cellular .

16 telephones used in this fashion often contain data concerning telephonic contact with

17 co-conspirators as well as phone books containing telephone numbers for col.

18 conspirators. Therefore, I request authorization to seize .· all cellular telephones

19 belonging· to or used by Turner and Walters that are found at the Subject

20 Residences and to search the t~lephones' electronic phone books, date books, and

21 records of telephonic ·contacts, including text and voice messages, to include all

22 mobile telephone accessories, in_cluding, but not limited to, batteries and phone

23 chargers, SIM. cards, and pre-paid phone cards. In addition, cellular telephones

24 .iiltroduced as contraband to CDCR inmates are eviderwe of Honest Ser-vices Wire

. 25 Fraud in that such cellular telephones are not available to CDCR inmates and must be

26 introduced by someone who is corruptly providing CDCR inmates with cellular

27 telephones. Cellular telephones used in the furtherance of criminal activity (e.g. ·


24

1 Honest Services Wire Fraud) often contain data concerning telephonic contact with

2 co-conspirators as · well · as phone books containing telephone numbers for co-

3 conspirators. Therefore, I request authorization· to seize all cellular telephones

4 belonging or suspected of belonging Turner at Subject Residence 1, and Walters at

5 Subje~t Residence 2. and to search these cellular telephones' electronic phone books,

· 6 date books, and records of telephonic contacts, including text and voice messages. In

7 order to power the cellular phones, I request Attachment B include all mobile

8 telephone accessories, including, but not limited to, batteries and phone ·chargers, SIM

9 cards, and pre-paid phone cards.

10 c. Evidence of Dominion and Control - Based on prior searches of :1

11 premises used by individuals involved in drug trafficking, I believe I will find articles

12 of personal property evidencing the identity of persons ocQupying, possessing,

13 residing in, owning, frequenting or controlling the premises or property therein.

14 · d. Search of Vehicles on. Premises - Individuals involved in drug

15 trafficking will often conceal evidence of their drug dealing in vehicles outside their

16 residence in order to prevent detection and seizure by officers conducting search

17 warrants at the residence. Therefore, I am requesting permission to search all vehicles

18 located on the premises. . . .

19 · e. Presence .of Cash - Individuals involved in drug trafficking earn

20 large sums of money in the form of U.S. ·currency and often try to legitimize these

21 profits. In order to do this they attempt to secrete, transfer and conceal the money by,

22 among other ways: (1) placing assets in names other than their own to avoid detection

23 while maintaining control; (2) laundering the money through what appears to be a

24 legitimate business or businesses;' (3) hiding money in their homes, business locations,

25 safes and safoty deposit boxes; or (4) using the money to buy ass·ets which are hard to

26 trace. Records of these transactions are often found at their residence.

27 56. It is also my opinion and belief that the above-described documents are

28 AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION FOR SEARCH WARRANT.

25

1 often permanently possessed by drug traffickers much the same way a legitimate

· 2 business will maintain records and tools of its trade whether or not the business has a

3 particular item in inventory on a given date. These documents are kept by drug

4 traffickers whether or not the trafficker is in possession of any drugs at any given ·

5 moment. I believe that the se!zure of such documents will provide evidence of the

6 events set forth in this affidavit andthat such documents can be found in the Subject ·

7 Residences to be searched despite any lapse of the time betwee~ the events described

8 and the anticipated search pursuant to this warrant.

9 57. I also know that; based upon my training and experience, that individuals

10 involved in corrupt introduction of contraband (including, . but are not limited to,

11 controlled substances, contraband tobacco products,. food .products, alcohol, DVDs,

12 CDs, and cellular telephones) into correctional facilities often maintain at their

13 residence(s) [Subject Residences] records and ledgers evidencing their trafficking

14 corrupt introduction of contraband activities in order to keep track of the ordering,

15 acquisition, purchasing, storage, distribution and transportation of drugs . and/or

16 contraband. Although, the contraband may be transferred or distributed, documentary

17 records and ledgers often remain for long perio~s of time to memorialize past

18 transactions, the status of accounts receivable and accounts payable, and the names

19 and telephone numbers of suppliers~ customers and coconspirators. I . '

20 58. Based upon my experience and training, consultation with other law

21 enforcement officers experienced in drug, corruption and financial investigations, and

22 all the facts and opinions set forth in this affidavit, I know that the following items

23 will likely be found at the Subject Residences:

24 a. Bank and. Financial Statements and Records - Statements and

25 records for bank or financial accounts at domestic or·foreign banks, savings and loans,

26 credit unions, securities brokers, or other financial· institutions under any name. Such

27 records include cancelled checks, check registers,. deposit and withdrawal slips,


26

1 certificates of deposit, letters of credit, money orders, cashier's checks, bank checks,~

2 receipts, confirmation slips, and any documents related to the origin of deposited

3 items for deposits, debit and credit memos, and documents related to wire transfers.

4 b. Documents related to dominion and control or involvement ..

5 Documents and articles of personal property evidencing the identity of persons with

6 dominion and control over the items to be seized or the location to be searched. These

7 documents include rental agreements, PO Box records, lease records, property

8 acquisition records, utility and telephone bills and/or rece1.pts, keys, mail envelopes,

9 certified mail receipts, correspondence, passports, and safety deposit records. this

10 also inclµdes documents or records related to dominion and control of the Subject

11 Residences:·

12 c. Cash and Related Documents - U.S. currency and books,

13 records, documents, or receipts evidencing the receipt or disbursement of cash, such

14 as credit card statements · and receipts, invoices, bank reconciliations, records of

15 commercial storage, and corresponding records.

16 d. Use of Commercial Wire Transfer Services - books, records,

17 documents, statements or receipts evidencing the transfer, receipt or disbursement of

: 1

' .

18 tJ.S. currency, including but not limited to Pay Pal, MoneyGram, Western Union and ; ·;

19 Green Dot.

20 e. Evidence of Gifts - Retail gift cards and receipts and

21 correspondence related to purchases or returns of or made with gift ·cards. Or any

22 evidence of the receipt of luxury or excessively lavish gifts.

23 f. Evidence of Specific Exchanges .. Records relating to any money,

24 checks, gifts, or items of value exchanged between or made to any CDCR inmate or

25 in~ividuals associated with any CDCR inmates.

26 g. Photographs ~ Corrupt CDCR employees who have the ability to

27 introduce contraband to CDCR inmates who violate their duties in exchange for cash


27

1 payme!lts/bribes, lavish gifts/favors and/or sexual favors often keep photographs of

2 these items exchanged for their corrupt services. Moreover, as described in greater

3 detail above, Carr would electronically send photographs of contraband as proof of

4 their readiness for ·delivery. Therefore, I am requesting permission to search the

5 Subject Residences for such photographs and to seize photographs that relate to any

6 quid pro quo exchange for cash payments/bribes, lavish gifts/favors and/or sexual

7 favors.

8 h. · Packaging Materials· - Any and all items pertaining to the

9 packaging of contraband for delivery to in-custody inmates.

10 i. ;; : Cellular Telephone Packaging - ·Any and all commercial

11 packaging/boxes related to the purchase or storage of cellular telephoneS'.

12 Any Cellular phones Found at the Subject Residences . ·

13 59. Based upon my experience and training, consultation with other law

· 14 enforcement officers experienced in controlled substances investigations, corruption

15 investigations and financial investigations, and all the facts and opinions set forth in ----l

16 this affidavit, I know that the cellular telephones used by those who facilitate drug

17 trafficking, and by those corrupt CDCR employees who have the ability to introduce

'18 c.ontraband · to CDCR inmat~s; who corruptly •violate their duties ·for cash

19 payments/bribes, lavish gifts/favors and/or sexual favors, often contain

20 communications, records, or data including but not limited to ·e-mail messages, text

21 messages, photographs, audio files, videos, or location data:

22 a. Which ·tend to indicate efforts· related to the inducement of CDCR

23 employees to corruptly violate their duties by virtue· · of, inter alia, cash

24 payments/bribes, lavish gifts/favors and/or sexual favors;

25 b. Which tend to identify other facilities, storage devices.,' or services such

26 as e mail .addresses, IP addresses, telephone numbers that may contain electronic

27 evidence which also tend to indicate activities consistent ·with a quid pro quo

2.8 AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION . .

FOR SEARCH WARRANT

.[

1 relationship with corrupt CDCR employees who have the ability to introduce

2 contraband to CDCR inmates;

3 c. Which tend to identify co-conspirators, criminal associates, or others

4 involved in a quid pro quo relationship with a CDCR· employees who have the ability

5 to introduce contraband to CDCR inmate_s;

6 d. Which tend to identify travel to ·or presence at locations involved in a

7 quid pro quo relationship with CDCR employees who have the ability . to introduce

8 contraband to CDCR inmates ;

9 e. Which tend to identify the user of, or persons with control over or access

1 O to, the particular telephone; or

11 f. Which tend to place in context, identify the creator or recipient of, or

12 establish the time of creation or receipt of communications, records, or data above.

13 TRAINING AND EXPERIENCE ON DIGITAL DEVICES

14 60. As for "digital devices", _I only seek to seize and review cellular

telephones.. As used herein, the term "digital device" mean cellular telephones, 15

16 -mvbile-te-lephones-,-Bl-aek-berri-es;-+-Ph0nes;-Samsttng--6al-ax-1e~-art-phones--- ---

17 found at the Subject Residences. Based on my knowledge, training, and experience,

18 as well as information related to me by agents and others involved in th_e forensic

19 examination of digital devices, I know that data in digital forrri can be stored on a I

20 variety of digital devices and that during the search of a premises it is not always

21 possible to search digital devices for digital data for a number of reasons, including

22 the following:

23 a. Searching digital devices can be a highly technical process that

24 requires specific expertise and specialized equipment. There are so many types of

25 digital qevices and software programs in use today that it is impossible to bring to the

26 search site all of the necessary technical manuals and specialized ·equipment necessary

27 to conduct a thorough search. In addition, it may be necessary to consult with


29

1 specially traine_d personnel who have specific expertise in the types of digital devices,

2 operating systems, or software applications that are being searched.

3 b. . Digital data is particularly vulnerable to inadvertent or intentional

4 modification or destruction. ·Searching digital devices can require the use of precise,

5 scientific procedures that are designed to maintain the integrity of digital data and to

6 recover "hidden," erased, compressed, encrypted, or password-protected data. As a

7 result, a controlled environment, such as a law enforcement laboratory or similar

8 facility, is essential to conducting a complete and accurate analysis of data stored on

9 digital devices.

10 c. The volume of data stored on many digital devices will typically

11 be so large that it will be highly impractical-to search _for data during the -physical

12 search of the premises. A single megabyte of storage space is the equivalent of 500

13 double-spaced pages of text. A single gigabyte of storage space, or 1,000 megabytes,

14 is the equivalent of 500,000 double-spaced pages of text. Storage devices capable of

; ,, ; j ~ :

15 storing 500 or more gigabytes are now commonplace.

---1-6-i.i------a,-1-.--E1-e-ctronicfrle-s-orremrrants-of-sucfriiles-carr-be-recuvere-dl1Iontl~rn~-·---

17 or even years after they have been downloaded onto a hard drive, deleted, or viewed

18 via the Internet. Electronic files saved to a hard drive can be stored for years with

19 little or no cost. Even when such files have been deleted, they can be recovered

20 months or years later using readily-available forensics tools. Normally, when a person

21 deletes a file on a computer, the data contained in the file does not actually disappear;

22 rather, that data remains on the hard drive until· it is overwritten by new data.

23 Therefore, deleted files, or remnants of deleted files, may reside in free space or slack

24 space, i.e., space on a hard drive that is not allocated to an active file or that is unused

25 after a file has been allocated to a set block of storage space, for long periods of time

26 before they are overwritten. In addition, a computer's operating system may also keep

27 a record of deleted data in a swap or recovery file. Similarly, files that have been

28 AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION FORSEARCH WARRANT

30

1 viewed on the Internet are often automatically downloaded into a temporary directory

2 or cache. The browser typically maintains a fix~d amount of hard drive space devoted

3 to these files, and the files are only overwritten as they are. replaced with more

4 recently downloaded or viewed content. ,Thus, the ability to retrieve residue of an

5 electronic file from a hard drive depends· less on when the file was downloaded or

6 viewed than on a particular user's operating system, storage capacity, and computer

7 habits. Recovery of residue of electronic files from a hard drive requires specialized

8 tools and a controlled laboratory environment. ·Recovery also can require substantial

9 time.

10 61. Although some of the records called for by this warrant might be found

11 in the form of user-generated documents (such as word processing, picture, and movie

12 files), digital devices can contain other forms of electronic evidence as well. In

13. particular, records of how a digital device has been used, what it has been used for,

. 14 who has used it, and who has been responsible for creating or maintaining records,

15 documents, programs, applications and materials contained on the digital devices are,

.: "

16 . -as-describetl--fartherirrtlre-attachments, called forby-this warram:-'fhose-recurds--wilJ:-- -. -

17 ·not always be found in digital data that is neatly segregable from the hard drive image

18 as a whole. Digital qata on the hard drive not currently associated with any. file can

19 provide evidence of a file that-was once on the hard drive but has since been deleted

20 or edited, or of a deleted portion of a file (such as a paragraph that has been deleted

21 from a word processing file). Virtual memory paging systems can leave digital data ,

22 on the hard drive that show what tasks and processes on the computer were recently

23 used. Web browsers, e-mail programs, and chat programs often store configuration

24 data on the hard drive that can reveal information·. such as online nicknames and

25 passwords. Operating systems can record additional data, such as the attachment of .

26 peripherals, the attachment of USB flash .storage devices, and the times the computer

27 was in use. Comp~ter file systems can record data about the dates files were created.


31

1 and the sequence in which they were created. This data can be evidence of a crime,

2 indicate the identity of the user of the digital device, or point toward the existence of

3 evidence in other locations. Recovery of this data requires specialized tools and a

4 controlled laboratory environment, and also can require substantial time.

5 62. Further, evidence of how a digital ~evice has been used, what it has been

6 used for, and who has used it, may be the absence of particular data on a digital

7 device. For example, to rebut a claim that the owner of a digital device was not

8 responsible for a particular use because the device was being controlled remotely by

9 malicious software, it may be necessary to show that malicious software that allows

10 someone else to control the digital device remotely is not present on the digital device.

11 Evidence of the absence of pa~icular data on a digital device is· not segregable from

12 . the digital device. Analysis of the digital device as a whole to demonstrate the

13 absence of particular data requires specialized· tools and a controlled laboratory

14 environment, and can require substantial time.

15 63. As discussed herein, based on my training and experience I beiieve that

16 ·-digital devices wit!be founaduring the searcn.--t know f1om my training ancl __ _

17 experience and my review of publicly available materials that Apple Inc., Motorola,

18 HTC, and Samsung, among other companies, produce devices that can be unlocked by

19 the user. with a numerical or an alpha-numerical password, or, for some newer

20 versions of the devices, with a fingerprint placed on a fingerprint sensor. Each

21 company has a different name for its fingerprint sensor feature; for example, Apple's

22 is called "Touch ID." Once a user has set up the fingerprint sensor feature in the

23 security settings of the device, the user can unlock the device by placing a finger or

24 thumb on the device's fingerprint sensor. If that sensor recognizes the fingerprint or

25 thumbprint, the device unlocks. Most devices can be set up to recognize multiple

26 prints, so that different prints, not necessarily from the same person, will unlock the

27 device. In my training and experience, users of devices with a fingerprint sensor.


FOR SEARCH WARRANT

32

1 feature often enable that feature, because it unlocks the phone more quickly than the

2 entry of a passcode or password but still offers a layer of security.

3 64. In some circumstances, fingerprint sensors will not work, and a

4 passcode must be entered to unlock the device. For example, with Apple, Touch ID·

5 will not work i( (1) more than A8 hours have passed since the device has been

6 unlocked, (2) the device has been turned on or restarted, (3) the device has received a

7 remote lock command, or ( 4) five attempts to match a fingerprint have been

8 unsuccessful. Other brands have similar restrictions. I do not know the passcodes of

9 the devices likely to be found at, the Subject Residences.

10 65. For these reasons, while executing the warrant, agents will likely need to

11 ~se the fingerprints or .thumbprints ·of any user(s) of any fingerprint sens.or-enabled

12 device( s) · to attempt to gain access to that device while, executing the search

warr·ant. The warrant seeks the authority to compel the use of the fingerprint and/or Tu~~Al!lD/prLWACr~ · .

thumbprint of.svery penmn who is located at the Subject Residences during the · aY'.t......

execution of the search and whoS reasonably belieV;ed by law enforcement to be a

¥--------!· userof a fingerprint-sensor=enabfod-device that-is-located· at the S-rrbject-ResidlllCC~--t--

17 and falls within the scope of the warrant. The government may not be able to obtain

18 the contents of the devices if those fingerprints are not used to access the devices by

19 depressing them against the fingerprint sensor at the time of the search. Although I do

20 not know which of the fingers are authorized to access on any given device, I know

21 based on my training and experience that it is common for people to use one of their

22 thumbs or index fingers for fingerprint sensors, and in any event all that would result

23 from successive failed attempts is the requirement to use the authorized passcode or

24 · password.

25 66. It is not possible to determine, merely by knowing a cellular telephone's

26 make, model and serial number, the nature and types of services to which the device is

27 subscribed and the nature of the data stored on the device. Cellular devices today can


33

.,

1 . be simple cellular telephones and text message devices, can include cameras, can

serve as personal digital assistants and have functions such as calendars and full 2

3 address books and can be mini-computers allowing for electronic mail services, web

4 services and rudimentary word processing. An increasing number of cellular service

5 providers now allow for their subscribers to access their device over the internet and

6 remotely destroy all of the data contained on the device. For that reason, the device

7 may only be powered in a secure environment or, if possible, started in "flight mode"

8 which disables access to the network. Unlike typical computers, many cellular

9 telephones do not have hard drives or hard drive equivalents and store information in

10 volatile memory within the device or in memory cards inserted into the ·device.

11 Current technology provides some solutions for acquiring some of the data.stored in

. 12 some cellular telephone models using forensic hardware and software. Even if some

l3 of the stored information on the device may be acquired forensically, not all of the

14 data subject to seizure may be so acquired. For devices that are not subject to·forensic

15 data acquisition or that ·have potentially relevan~ data stored that is not subject to such

16 cquisition; . he devic-e-manmrliTfilTCl-recunI-iireimJcess and

17 the results using digital photography. This process is time and labor intensive and

. 18 may take weeks or longer. Other than what has been described herein, to my

19 knowledge, the United States has not attempted to obtain this data by other means. '

20 67. Moreover, regarding digital devices, investigating agents are seeking

21 authorization to seize and search cellular telephones. Agents do not seek

22 authorization to seize and search computers, tablets or any other digital devices that is

23 not a cellular telephone.

24 68. Following the issuaµce of this warrant, law enforcement will collect any

25 cellular telephones found in the respective Subject Residences that belong to Turner

26 at Subject Residence l;, and.Walters at Subject Residence 2 and subject them to

27 analysis. All forensic analysis of the data contained within these cellular telephones . ·


34

1 and their memory cards will employ search protocols directed exclusively to the

2 identification and extraction of data within the scope of this warrant in Attachment B,

3 which is incorporated by reference.

4 69. Based on the foregoing, identifying and extracting data subject to seizure

5 pursuant to this warrant may require a range of data analysis techniques, including

6 manual . review, and, consequently, may take weeks or months. The personnel

7 conducting the identification and extraction of data will complete the analysis within

8 one hundred and twenty ("120") days, absent further application to a federal court.

9 E. CONCLUSION

10 70. Based on the foregoing reasons, I believe this is probable cause to believe

11 the items identified in Attachment B, which is incorporated herein by reference, have

12 been used in the commission of a crime · and constitute evidence, fruits, and

13 instrumentalities of violations of Title 21, United States Code, sections 841(a)(l), 846

14 - Conspiracy to Distribute· Controlled Substances; Title 18, United States Code,

15 sections 1343, 1.346 - Wire Fraud, Honest Services Wire Fraud; and 1956 Conspiracy

16 to Launder Monetary Instruments, and wiTfbe found on the property to be searched as

17 provided in Attachment A.

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FOR SEARCH WARRANT

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... . _ ...

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5 Subscr~d to and sworn before me 6 this$: day ofMay, 2016. ,

7

t. -..:: T HONORABLE NL. STEVENSON _:-9

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE ~

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FOR SEARCH WARRANT

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1te Special Agent, Federal Bureau of Investigation

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