Asian Survey, Vol. 49, Issue 6, pp. 1092–1114, ISSN 0004-4687, electronic ISSN 1533-838X. © 2009by The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permis- sion to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Press’s Rights and Permissions website, at http://www.ucpressjournals.com/reprintInfo.asp. DOI: AS.2009.49.6.1092.

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PUSHTUN ETHNONATIONALISM AND THE TALIBAN INSURGENCY IN THE NORTH WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE OF PAKISTAN

Nasreen Ghufran

AbstractThis article examines the rise and contemporary dynamics of the Taliban in-surgency in the NWFP and FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Area) regions of Pakistan. It argues that the Taliban insurgency is not necessarily a product or reflective of Pushtun ethnonationalism. Instead, it is based on a particular interpretation of Islam, irrespective of ethnic or linguistic demarcations. U.S. and NATO military intervention along the Afghan-Pakistan border since 2001 has exacerbated the Taliban insurgency in Pakistan.

Keywords: Pushtun ethnonationalism, Tehrik Taliban Pakistan, insurgency, FATA

IntroductionThis article examines insurgency in the North West

Frontier Province (NWFP)1 of Pakistan and its adjacent tribal areas,2 and analyzes the rise of the Taliban (an Arabic term for students seeking

Nasreen Ghufran is Associate Professor, Department of International Relations, University of Peshawar, NWFP, Pakistan. Email: <nasreenghufran@yahoo.com>.

1. The NWFP is the smallest in area of the four provinces of Pakistan. The other three are Punjab, Sind, and Balochistan. The NWFP is home to a majority of Pushtuns in Pakistan. However, there are other ethnic minorities living in the province as well, such as Hindkuwans, Gujars, Chitralis, and Kohistanis. They have their own ethnic identity and culture. For details, see National Democratic Consultative Process (NDCP), Pukhtunkwa: A Development Frame-work, May 2003, pp. 17–19. Also refer to Mululika Banarjee, The Pathan Unarmed: Opposi-tion and Memory in the North West Frontier (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 21.

2. The term “tribal areas” refers to Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the Provincially Administered Areas (PATA) of Pakistan. Different Pushtun tribes inhabit the

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religious knowledge, also used in Pashto for “students”) in Pushtun-domi-nated areas of the region.3 The article argues that the Taliban are not Pushtun ethnonationalists per se but rather represent an ideological move-ment based on a specific interpretation of Islam that has taken root in seg-ments of Pushtun society. The current insurgency in the NWFP of Pakistan and adjoining areas is largely a reaction to the U.S. and NATO (North At-lantic Treaty Organization) intrusion into the border areas between Afghan-istan and Pakistan to eliminate extremists and al-Qaeda operatives since 2001, and the Pakistani army’s subsequent operations on its side of the bor-der. In contrast to the militant umbrella group called Tehrik-i-Taliban Paki-stan (TTP, The Movement of Taliban in Pakistan),4 the main Pushtun ethnonationalist political parties in Pakistan—the Awami National Party (ANP) and Pukthunkhwa Milli Awami Party (PkMAP)—do not support the ongoing insurgency in the NWFP or subscribe to its ideology.5

The fact that the Taliban insurgency in Pakistan is not organized exclu-sively along ethnic or linguistic lines adds credence to the argument that the movement is not simply ethnonationalist in character. The majority of the TTP members are said to be Pushtuns, but no studies exist that pro-vide statistics regarding the percentage of Pushtuns, Punjabis, or other ethnic groups in the TTP. The existence of Punjabi Taliban and Taliban of Central Asian descent brings into question the often-assumed strictly Pushtun identity of the movement. Punjabi Taliban in fact have connections with TTP and support each other in military operations. The growing nexus

area. These territories had a unique position prior to the creation of Pakistan, and their rela-tionship with the British crown rested on treaties and agreements these tribes had executed with the government of India. Upon independence in 1947, Pakistan inherited these tribal areas alongside settled areas. Tribal areas are governed through regulations rather than laws, while the settled areas are governed through laws. For details, consult <http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/part12.ch3.html>, accessed November 15, 2009.

3. Pushtun and Pukhtun are used synonymously with varying dialects of the Pushto language.

4. The madrasa (seminary)-educated Taliban serve as the core of the Pakistani Taliban, while jihadi fighters affiliated to a diverse group of militant organizations are their allies. While the Islamist militants operating in the NWFP include both Taliban and non-Taliban forces, the Taliban militants are much larger in number and have significantly more influence in the area. See Rahimullah Yusufzai’s online article, “The Taliban Primer,” <http://kabulpress.org/my/spip.php?article3214>, accessed March 2009.

5. The ANP is a secular nationalist party representing the main strand of Pushtun ethno-nationalism in NWFP. In contrast, the PkMAP mainly represents the Pushtun nationalists in the province of Balochistan. The ANP is clearly present in all of the FATA, whereas the Pk-MAP has some presence only in Waziristan. For a discussion, see Ijaz Khan, “Pashtuns in the Crossfire: Pashtun Politics in the Shadow of War against Terrorism,” Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU) (UK), Brief, no. 19 (September 5, 2007), <http://www.airra.org>, ac-cessed August 19, 2008.

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between Pushtun and Punjabi Taliban is becoming alarming for law en-forcement agencies. For example, the banned militant sectarian groups based in Punjab, such as the Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan (Soldiers of the Companions of the Prophet, SSP); lashkar-i-Jhangvi (Army of Jhangvi, leJ); and Jaysh-i-Mohammad (Army of Mohammed, JeM) have been re-sponsible for terrorist attacks in Punjab’s major cities such as lahore, Rawalpindi, and Islamabad.6

The Taliban are Muslims, but they have killed moderate Muslim clerics, who opposed their strict interpretation of Islam. The goals espoused by the Taliban include the implementation of strict shariah (Islamic) law in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the expulsion of foreign (e.g., NATO and American) troops from the region. The former goal obviously neces-sitates overthrowing the secular, democratically elected governments in Kabul and Islamabad. Even though the Taliban do not necessarily claim to be fighting for the rights or interests of the Pushtuns, they have none-theless attracted large numbers of Pushtun followers into their ranks by propagating that it is their religious duty to engage in a violent jihad (struggle) against all those forces in the region assisting the U.S. interven-tion in Afghanistan. After all, as the Taliban argue, this foreign interven-tion has spilled the blood of Pushtuns on both sides of the border.

Taliban insurgents have resorted to violent acts of killing military per-sonnel, policemen, and intelligence officials; bombing military installa-tions; and carrying out deadly suicide attacks in urban parts of Pakistan. Suicide bombings in Islamabad, lahore, Karachi, and Quetta reflect the growing menace of Taliban terrorism in Pakistan. There were an estimated 2,148 terrorist and insurgent attacks in Pakistan in 2008, a dramatic 746% increase since 2005, killing 2,267 people and injuring an estimated 4,500.7 Most of these attacks have been in NWFP and the tribal regions, but mili-tancy is not confined to only the Pushtun belt.

The seeds of present Taliban militancy were actually sown during the 1980s, when the U.S. and Pakistan supported the Afghan mujahideen (holy warriors) in their successful attempt to oust the Soviets from Afghanistan. The mountainous terrain along Afghanistan’s eastern border with Paki-stan made it an ideal sanctuary for Afghan mujahideen guerrillas. During this period, many Islamist radicals from various Muslim countries came to Afghanistan to fight along the mujahideen. Madrasas mushroomed in Pakistan, becoming reservoirs of future jihadis and militants. As the civil

6. Hasan Abbas, “Defining the Punjabi Taliban Network,” CTC Sentinel 2:4 (April 2009), pp. 1–4, at <http://wwwbelfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu>, accessed May 15, 2008.

7. International Crisis Group, “Pakistan: The Militant Jihadi Challenge,” Asia Report, no. 164 (March 13, 2009), p. 3, <http://www.crisisgroup.org>, accessed April 20, 2008.

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war continued without an end in sight, a new force, the Taliban, emerged with political support from Pakistan and the U.S. Pakistan saw in them a new strategic partner to assert itself in the region, while the U.S. consid-ered it an anti-Iranian, pro-Western force. This led to the quick victory of the Taliban over the mujahideen, the former allies of both the U.S. and Pakistan. Taliban rule was short lived, because their strict social and reli-gious policies isolated them internationally. Pakistan was one of three countries8 that recognized the Taliban government and backed them until 2001. The 9/11 terrorist attacks on the U.S. in 2001 led to its military inter-vention in Afghanistan in November, and a subsequent U-turn in Pakistan’s policy abandoned the Taliban, leading to the demise of their government. Pakistan became an ally in the “War on Terror” against the Taliban and their al-Qaeda associates.9 Afghan Taliban and al-Qaeda operatives fled and took refuge across the border in Pakistan. As a result the NWFP and its adjoining tribal areas became the frontline in the so-called global War on Terror.

This paper seeks to examine the on-going insurgency in the NWFP and tribal areas of Pakistan. In particular, it attempts to answer questions such as the following: How is the Taliban movement different from the historical Pushtun ethnonationalist movement led by Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan dur-ing the colonial period of British rule? What caused the Taliban insurgency to erupt in the post-2001 period? Why don’t the mainstream Pushtun na-tionalist parties—the ANP and PkMAP—support the cause? And, finally, why has the insurgency not been resolved? Answers to these types of ques-tions are important to understand the Taliban and demonstrate how its movement is not based simply on Pushtun ethnonationalism.

Pushtun Ethnonationalism in the Colonial Period

Pakistan is a multi-ethnic and multi-lingual country with different ethnic groups living in its four provinces. Pushtuns, the major ethnic group in the NWFP, have a history of an active ethnonationalist movement before in-dependence in 1947. Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, commonly known as “Bacha Khan” (King Khan) started the Khudai Khidmatgar (Servants of God) Movement (KKM) in 1929. He propagated the notion that Push-tuns, being Muslims, were expected to serve God, and that the best way to do so was to serve each other without self-interest. The KKM was both a

8. The other two being Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.9. Julie Sirrs, “Has the War Been Won?” in The Anatomy of a Conflict: Afghanistan and

9/11, eds. Riffat Hussain and J. N. Dixit (New Delhi: The lotus Collection, 2002), p. 250.

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social reformist and also political resistance movement of the Pushtuns during the colonial era.

Regarding the former, the KKM struggled to reform inequalities and social evils, such as badala (the common practice of revenge for settling scores), in Pushtun society through education and social justice.10 The ma-jority of his followers were peasants and the poor, who felt exploited by the feudal landlords and burdened by the imperial revenue system. Politi-cally, Ghaffar Khan believed in Pushtunwali (a cultural code of ethics and behavior of Pushtuns) but wanted to reform it along modern democratic principles.11 Freedom of the individual was an integral part of the code but living a colonized life, according to Ghaffar Khan, was in contradic-tion to it. Thus, the KKM tried to awaken the political consciousness of Pushtuns against the British colonial rule, but strictly following the princi-ples of non-violence. Members of his movement known as Khudai Khid-matagars asked Pushtuns to boycott British institutions of law and order, and replace them with traditional Pushtun institutions such as jirgas (assemblies/councils of elders) for settling both civil and criminal cases.12 Khudai Khidmatagars received strict training along military lines, wore a red uniform, and had military ranks, thereby making them a force without arms and weapons.13 Ghaffar Khan eventually earned the title of “Frontier Gandhi” for initiating a “non-violent” resistance movement against British rule in the NWFP.

The KKM in the NWFP took place parallel to the Indian independence movement and the demand by some Muslims for a separate homeland. Ghaffar Khan, along with his followers, did not favor the partition of India. This stance earned him a negative image among critics, including the Muslim league, who considered him to be an ally and close associate of Mahatma Gandhi and the Indian National Congress. There were cer-tainly ideological commonalities between the two leaders: both believed in non-violence and civil disobedience against the British and also in a united India. Organizationally, both the KKM and Congress benefited from having an alliance with each other. The Congress offered the Khudai Khidmatagars powerful national allies against the British, and the Khudai

10. Abdul Ghaffar Khan, My Life and Struggle (Delhi: Hind Pocket Books, 1969), pp. 96–97.

11. Pushtunwali is the cultural and tribal code of honor of the Pushtuns. It refers to vari-ous customs and conduct, historically adopted by the Pushtuns and persisting even today. See NDCP, Pukhtunkwa: A Development Framework, p. 11. For more information about these cus-toms, see Dr. Sultan I. Rom, Pukhtu: The Code of Life (Swat, Pakistan), <http://www.valleyswat.net/literature/papers/Pukhto.pdf>, accessed March 2008.

12. NDCP, Pukhtunkwa: A Development Framework, p. 11. 13. Banerjee, The Pathan Unarmed, p. 84.

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Khidmatagars provided the Congress with support for its independence movement in the NWFP region. In contrast, many mullahs (local Islamic religious leaders) in the NWFP region did not favor the non-violence strategy, instead believing that violent jihad was essential to end colonialism. The KKM actually could not effectively penetrate into the tribal areas that played the paradoxical role of serving as a physical bridge between Push-tuns in Afghanistan and Pakistan and a buffer zone separating the two Pushtun areas.14 Thus, the social and political impact of the KKM re-mained minimal in these areas.15

Ghaffar Khan interacted with a variety of political and religious groups, including the Khilafat Movement,16 the Indian National Congress, and the Muslim league. Ghaffar Khan realized that cooperation with the Muslim league was difficult because of its initial pro-British tilt, though it claimed to be the sole representative of Indian Muslims. The British, in fact, supported the Muslim league in the NWFP to weaken the KKM by patronizing the “big khans” (rich landlords) of the region through land grants and subsidies. This was consistent with the well-developed British policy of supporting local landed elites in the provinces to maintain peace and order, not to mention loyalty to the British crown. These “khans” became active members of the Muslim league, and carried out propaganda against the pro-Congress policy of the Khudai Khidmatagars.17 When the Mus-lim league favored an independent homeland for Indian Muslims to be called “Pakistan,” the Pushtuns became torn between two opposite politi-cal forces—one favoring partition and the other a united India. With-drawal of the British and partition actually became imminent with the end of World War Two in 1945.

Pushtun Ethnonationalism after 1947Upon the creation of Pakistan, Pushtun nationalists of the KKM, fearing Punjabi domination in the new country, started demanding an indepen-dent state to be called “Pushtunistan.” Ghaffar Khan also felt betrayed by the Congress, when it accepted partition without adequate consultation with the Khudai Khidmatagars. Thus, a new national identity was con-ceived, one that shared a past with Afghanistan but did not want a future

14. Ibid., p. 12.15. Ibid., p. 43.16. The Khilafat Movement, a pan-Islamist movement, was launched in India and led by

Maulana Mohammed Ali Johar to support the caliphate (khilafat) of the Ottoman empire, the most important Islamic institution for Muslims, which was threatened after its defeat in World War One. The caliph (khalifa) was considered the spiritual leader of the Muslims.

17. Banjeree, The Pathan Unarmed, pp. 120–21.

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with it.18 After realizing that “Pushtunistan” was an unworkable demand, Ghaffar Khan began shifting focus from demanding an independent state to, instead, demanding increased autonomy for the province. The incom-ing post-colonial government of Pakistan had serious misgivings about even this moderated demand, especially considering Ghaffar Khan’s previ-ous close relationship with the Indian National Congress. For the post-colonial Pakistani central government, the real danger was not only Pushtun nationalism but also the suspected support it was getting from both India and Afghanistan.

The NWFP officially became part of Pakistan through a referendum in July 1947. The Khudai Khidmatagars boycotted this referendum because it did not include the option of either an independent Pushtunistan or joining with Afghanistan. Instead, the only two options were accession to either India or Pakistan upon independence. In contrast, the Muslim league, which participated in the referendum, supported accession to Pakistan. Congress accepted the result of the referendum, thereby acknowledging the NWFP as part of the new state. The result of the July 1947 referendum was a major blow to Pushtun nationalists and their Congress allies.19 The Khu-dai Khidmatagars had never been in favor of dividing India and, instead, probably would have preferred the NWFP to be a semi-autonomous part of India.

Ghaffar Khan felt that partition of India and the NWFP referendum betrayed everything that he had promised his Pushtun followers. However, he accepted the results of the referendum and pledged loyalty to Pakistan, having few other options. The KKM nationalists subsequently officially redefined their demand for an independent “Pushtunistan,” for a notion of “Pushtunistan” consisting of the right of Pushtuns to manage their own affairs as a provincial unit within Pakistan. This was a deliberate ges-ture for reconciliation, but the new provincial government led by the Mus-lim league continued to distrust the Khudai Khidmatagars, terming them as being “friends of Gandhi and Nehru” and traitors to Pakistan.20 In June 1948, the KKM was banned by the provincial government and its leaders imprisoned.21 Nonetheless, the movement continued to operate through the early and mid-1950s. Ghaffar Khan was periodically impris-oned during this period for opposing the government’s policies. He was, in fact, a vocal critic of the One Unit System, designed to integrate the whole

18. Adeel Khan, “Pukhtun Nationalism: From Separation to Integration,” Asian Ethnic-ity 4:1 (February 2003), pp. 67–83.

19. lawrence Ziring, Pakistan in the Twentieth Century: A Political History (Karachi: Ox-ford University Press, 1997), pp. 84–85.

20. Banjeree, The Pathan Unarmed, pp. 189–90.21. Ibid.

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of West Pakistan into one administrative unit.22 In July 1957, Ghaffar Khan, Abdul Hameed Khan Bashani (a Bengali political leader), and G. M. Syed (a Sindhi nationalist)23 formed the National Awami Party (NAP) in Dhaka.24 This party was a merger of several leftist and progressive parties, who favored provincial autonomy and increased rights for ethnic minorities. Khan Abdul Wali Khan (commonly known as Wali Khan), son of Ghaffar Khan, also joined the party. The NAP subsequently split in 1967 into the pro-Soviet NAP headed by Muzaffar Ahmed along with Wali Khan and the pro-Chinese NAP led by Maulana Bashani, a Bengali leader. This break co-incided with the Russo-Chinese split, highlighting the personal and ideolog-ical rivalries of the two groups, as they took separate positions, one siding with the Soviet Union while the other allied with China.

The KKM gradually began to lose its earlier support and dynamism as its followers became actively involved in conventional politics in Pakistan. This resulted in the increased integration of the Pushtuns into the Pakistani politi-cal and administrative systems through the 1960s.25 Wali Khan struggled to follow in his father’s footsteps and continue the KKM’s mission, but failed because he lacked his father’s charisma. The political environment had also drastically changed. In 1972, the NAP formed a coalition government with Jamiat Ulema Islam (JUI) in NWFP, reflecting its growing political pragma-tism. Bhutto had dissolved the provincial government in Balochistan in 1975, which led to a nationwide campaign by NAP against the central government for suppressing provincial autonomy and nationalists. The NAP was banned in 1975 by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto for destabilizing the country, and Wali Khan eventually took up the leadership of the National Democratic Party (NDP) in 1984, which in turn merged into the ANP in 1986.26 Thus, the political

22. The One Unit System, established in September 1955, was a merger of four provinces of then West Pakistan into one unit, in order to counterbalance the numerical advantage of then East Pakistan (now Bangladesh).

23. Ghulam Murtaza Shah Syed, commonly known as G. M. Syed, was a Sindhi national-ist (Pakistan).

24. Dr. Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, <www.bachakhantrust.org/AbdulGhaffarKhan/pdf>, accessed July 7, 2009.

25. NDCP, Pukhtunkwa: A Development Framework, p. 33. Also, see Khan, “Pukhtun Nationalism,” pp. 67–83.

26. Joshua T. White, Pakistan’s Islamist Frontier: Islamic Politics and U.S. Policy in Paki-stan North West Frontier, Center on Faith and International Affairs at the Institute for Global Engagement, U.S. (November 2008), p. 96, available at <http://www.cfia.org/go/frontier>, ac-cessed August 28, 2008. In 1986, the country’s four nationalist and progressive parties—namely, the NDP, the Pakistan National Party (PNP), the Afzal Bangash faction of the Mazdoor Kissan Party (Worker and Peasant Party), and the Awami Tehrik (People’s Move-ment)—merged to form the ANP. Abdul Wali Khan was elected its first president. For details, see <www.awaminationalparty.org/>, accessed August 28, 2009.

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activism of KKM had clearly come to end, even though Ghaffar Khan lived until 1988. The antecedents of the KKM also took on an overtly leftist ideological bent.

The tribal areas also became part of Pakistan in 1947. These “tribal areas” have a special constitutional status with their own legal and admin-istrative systems. They are administered directly by the federal govern-ment through the governor of the NWFP. The tribal lands currently have representatives in the national assembly, but not in the provincial assembly of the NWFP. Real power in the tribal agencies has historically rested with their respective “political agent,” who is a representative of the fed-eral government and maintains control through the Frontier Crimes Reg-ulations (FCR). These regulations allow the political agent to impose collective punishment for crimes committed by an individual and to de-liver prison sentences without due process or right of appeal. Maliks (tribal elders) have often been bribed by political agents in exchange for their loy-alty and assistance in maintaining political stability in their regions.27 These areas, with a population of 3.18 million, have remained socioeconomically deprived and culturally isolated in contrast to “settled” (i.e., non-tribal) parts of the region.28

The competition for a more equitable distribution of resources among the provinces has continued. Pushtun nationalists feel that without in-creased autonomy, resentment among the smaller provinces will grow, putting at risk the very survival of the state. Punjab, the largest populated province, has the major share in the resources and services of the country, which other provinces consider discriminatory. The Pushtun nationalists demand renaming the province as “Pukhtunkhwa” (land of Pukhtuns).29 Some Pushtun nationalists, in fact, already refer to the province by this name. In the 2008 elections, the ANP won a majority of seats in the NWFP and established coalition governments with the PPP (Pakistan People’s Party) in the NWFP and the center. As a coalition partner, the PPP ac-cepted the Pushtuns’ demand for renaming the province. The government

27. Carin Zissis and Jayshree Bajoria, “Pakistan’s Tribal Areas,” Council on Foreign Rela-tions (October 26, 2007), available at <www.cfr.org>, accessed August 2, 2008.

28. Population of FATA taken from the 1998 census, available at <www.fata.org>, ac-cessed August 20, 2008.

29. The alliance between ANP and PkMAP was announced on July 25, 2007. This alli-ance’s initial demands included the creation of a separate province for Pushtuns. This pro-posal calls for including the whole of the NWFP, the Mianwali and Attock Districts of Punjab, and 11 districts of Balochistan (Chaman, Quetta, Zhob, Sibi, Pishin, Qila Abdullah, Qila Saifullah, Musakhel, loralai, Balarkan, and Ziarat) in a new province to be called “Pakh-tunkhwah.” Owais Mughal, “ANP-PkMAP Alliance and the Rise of Regional Politics,” Au-gust 1, 2007, available at <www.pakistaniat.com>, accessed August 2, 2008.

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acceded to this demand but, so far, the province is still officially referred to as NWFP. The ANP is currently in power in the NWFP and opposed to the Taliban.

Having discussed the KKM, it is easy to discern the differences between it and the present Taliban movement. First, the KKM was more clearly a Pushtun ethnonationalist movement, whereas the Taliban movement, even though it has significant support within the Pushtun community, is based more on religious ideology. The Taliban, whether in Pakistan or Af-ghanistan, have never proclaimed themselves to be representing Pushtun nationalism, unlike the KKM, which did earlier. Second, the KKM was a non-violent movement, whereas the Taliban movement has espoused vio-lent, often brutal, tactics including beheadings and suicide bombings. Third, the KKM was a progressive movement favoring female education as a ve-hicle for social progress within the Pushtun community.30 In contrast, the Taliban movement is a reactionary one, known for its opposition to the participation of women in public life and for destroying female schools. The Taliban prefer only Islamic education for both girls and boys and do not approve the present Western system of education in Pakistan. The dif-ferences aside, some scholars have opined that the Taliban may have begun coopting their own brand of Pushtun ethnonationalism,31 but this is a view with which secular Pushtun nationalists, such as the ANP, vehemently disagree. At minimum, the Taliban insurgency has disguised the simmering dissatisfaction of Pushtuns with the poor delivery of public goods, the in-equitable distribution of resources, and the general lack of provincial au-tonomy under the garb of religious fanaticism in Pakistan.

Pushtun Ethnonationalism and Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations

Since Pakistan’s independence, successive Afghan regimes have periodi-cally expressed their support for the demand for Pushtunistan and redraw-ing the Durand line, which Pakistan considers final.32 Yet, this issue lost significance when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979 and Pakistan’s

30. It should be noted that the KKM actually failed to bring about a major change in this realm because of the societal entrenchment of Pushtun culture and traditions not favoring girls’ education or women’s emancipation.

31. See Rahul Mukand and Sushmit A. Nath, “Pakistan Will Remain Unstable,” Dur Desh South Asian News, February 8, 2008, available at <www.durdesh.net>, accessed on August 2, 2008.

32. Afghan rulers have on and off demanded that the Pushtun-speaking groups who in-habit territories along the Durand line should either become part of Afghanistan or an inde-pendent Pushtunistan. For details, see Rasul Baksh Rais, War without Winners: Afghanistan’s Uncertain Transition after the Cold War (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 21.

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western border regions began hosting Afghan mujahideen and refugees. An estimated three million Afghan refugees, mostly Pushtuns, entered Pakistan, and most of them went to the NWFP. The government of Paki-stan used religion to justify its decision to grant refugee status to these Af-ghans. According to then Pakistani President Zia ul-Haq, “Pakistan was carved out of the Indian sub-continent as a homeland for Muslims, so we feel that Pakistan must be the home to any Muslim anywhere in the world. If 3 million refugees have come from Afghanistan we feel it is our moral, re-ligious, and national duty to look after them.”33 The flight of Prophet Mo-hammed and his companions to Medina from Mecca in 622 A.D., known as hijrat (migration), set the example for this treatment of refugees. The people of Medina not only welcomed them but also helped them in vari-ous ways. This religious dimension appealed to many Pushtuns and was consistent with their own ethnic and tribal customs. According to Push-tunwali, “It had long been accepted that those who oppose a government can seek asylum on the other side of the border if their efforts fail.” Fur-thermore, Pushtuns are obliged to offer milmestia (hospitality) and panah (refuge) to fellow Muslims.34 By placing the Afghan refugees in the con-text of religious duty, Pakistanis hosted them without much reservation.

Pakistan’s geostrategic significance increased significantly during the Cold War and especially after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It re-ceived massive economic and military assistance from the U.S. after 1979, making it a “frontline” state against the expansion of Soviet communism. The Pakistani government actively supported the Afghan mujahideen re-sistance movement with safe haven, logistical support, and arms. In con-trast to the central Pakistani leadership, the ANP was an open critic of Pakistan’s Afghan policy during this period, and condemned Zia ul-Haq’s cozy relations with the U.S. and his support for the mujahideen.35 Wali Khan criticized the General Zia regime for allowing the mujahideen to use Pakistani soil to operate against the socialist regime of Babrak Karmal and its Soviet supporters. In contrast, the left-leaning ANP wanted to have friendly ties with Karmal’s government. Although the termination of direct Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan removed the major threat to Pakistan’s security in February 1989, an unfinished Afghan civil war continued among the mujahideen.

33. Stephen John Stedman and Fred Tanner (eds.), Refugee Manipulation: War, Politics, and the Abuse of Human Suffering (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), p. 69.

34. Nasreen Ghufran, The Politics of Repatriation: A Case of Afghan Refugee Repatriation from Pakistan, 1989–2003, unpublished Ph.D. diss., University of Peshawar, NWFP, 2005, p. 46.

35. Aqeel Yusufzai, “Terrorism: Militants Target ANP in NWFP and FATA” (February 2008), available at <www.khyberwatch.com>, accessed June 2009.

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In 1996, the Taliban assumed power in Afghanistan after defeating the mujahideen with the political support of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.36 The Taliban renamed their country “Amarat-e-Islami Afghanistan” (Islamic State of Afghanistan). The Taliban were mostly created in Pakistani refugee camps, educated in madrasas with an emphasis on a strict version of Islam particularly in NWFP and Baloch-istan, and learned their fighting skills from the mujahideen.37 The Paki-stani government never officially admitted to having housed and trained the Taliban, but its support was based on a couple of primary reasons. First, Pakistan believed that the Taliban would recognize the Durand line.38 Second, the Taliban’s anti-Shia and anti-India stance gave Pakistan an edge over other regional powers to achieve its long desired objective of “strategic depth.”39

links between the Afghan Taliban and Sunni extremists in Pakistan deepened with the tacit support of the Pakistani government, which calcu-lated that the Taliban would help curb Pushtun nationalism in NWFP and provide an outlet for Pakistan’s Islamic radicals, thus preventing a radical Islamist movement at home.40 This calculation proved misplaced as ex-tremist groups mushroomed during this period across the Pushtun tribal areas of the NWFP and Balochistan. They eventually began targeting the secular Pakistani establishment. As early as 1995, Maulana Sufi Moham-med had led his Tehreek-E-Nifaz Shariat Mohammadi (Movement for the Enforcement of Islamic laws, TNSM) in the area known as the Bajuar Agency, in an uprising demanding implementation of shariah law in the country. This revolt was joined in by hundreds of Afghan and Pakistani Taliban before it was crushed by the army. The Tehreek’s leaders subse-quently sought refuge in Afghanistan.41

As earlier remarked, during the period from 1994 to 1996 the Taliban in Afghanistan were politically supported by the U.S. through its allies Paki-stan and Saudi Arabia, because Washington viewed the Taliban as being

36. The Wahabi ulema (group of Muslim scholars) in Saudi Arabia influenced the royal family to support the Taliban. They play a leading advisory role to the Saudi monarch, and support the export of Wahabism throughout the Muslim world. Wahabis are the followers of Saudi scholar Abdul Wahab (1703–92), who began the movement to “cleanse” the Arabs from the influence of Sufism. He preached a puritan Islam. For further details, see Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Islam, Oil, and the New Great Game in Central Asia (New York: I. B. Tauris Pub., 2000), pp. 201–02.

37. Ibid., p. 185.38. This actually did not happen during Taliban rule. The border remained exceptionally

permeable with easy movement of people across it to and from Afghanistan and Pakistan. 39. A proactive defense policy of Pakistan in Afghanistan vis-à-vis India. 40. Rashid, Taliban, p. 187.41. Ibid., p. 194.

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anti-Iranian and pro-Western.42 The U.S. was also interested in seeing the materialization of the Unocal project, in which the American company proposed to construct a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan across Afghanistan to Pakistan. For these reasons, it was willing to tolerate, if not support, the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Yet, U.S. policy toward the Taliban began to change in 1998 after the latter continued to protect Osama Bin laden and refused to go ahead with the Unocal venture.43

The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks completely transformed the U.S. relationship with the Taliban regime and also affected its relationship with Pakistan. The main battlefield in the so-called War on Terror became Afghanistan and its border regions along Pakistan. The main targets of the “War on Terror” were al-Qaeda operatives who were suspected of hav-ing carried out the 9/11 attacks and their Taliban hosts, who refused to give them up. Pakistan’s policy toward Taliban also changed at this junc-ture, and it also joined the U.S.-led “War on Terror.” Islamabad aban-doned the Taliban regime in order to preserve its strategic assets and national sovereignty in the wake of intense U.S. pressure.44 The fallout of this shift in Pakistan’s policy has been increasing militancy and insurgency within its own borders ever since because most Afghan Taliban who fled the war sought refuge in the neighboring tribal areas of Pakistan. Con-tinued U.S. and NATO military operations in Afghanistan and along the Afghan-Pakistan border, not to mention unmanned U.S. drone attacks within Pakistan itself, have exacerbated the Islamists sense of anger to-ward both the West and its perceived ally—the Pakistani government.

Post-2001 Insurgency in PakistanThe Rise of the Pakistani Taliban and Creation of the TTP

FATA is strategically located between the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and the settled areas of NWFP (see Map 1). Administratively, FATA is di-vided into seven political agencies: Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, Orakazi, Kurram, North and South Waziristan; and six frontier regions (FR): Pe-shawar FR, Kohat FR, Bannu FR, Dera Ismail Khan FR, Tank FR, and lakki Marwat FR. In addition, the Malakand Agency is a PATA.45 FATA’s 400-kilometer long border with Afghanistan is porous with multiple

42. Ibid., p. 176.43. For details, see ibid., pp. 157–82. 44. Shireen M. Mazari, “Pakistan in the Post 9/11 Milieu,” Strategic Studies 22:3 (Autumn

2002), Institute of Strategic Studies (Islamabad, Pakistan), p. 2.45. It is administered by NWFP, unlike FATA, which is administered by the federal

government.

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map 1 FATA and the Frontier Regions of NWFP

SOURCE: <www.fata.org.pk>.

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unchecked crossing points. The tribal links between the people on either side of the border have made it virtually impossible to effectively monitor cross border movement. There are many tribes and sub-tribes in FATA, some of them spreading into the adjoining settled districts as well as across the Durand line into Afghanistan. The major tribes include the Yusafzais in Malakand and Bajaur Agency; Mohmands in Mohmand Agency; Afri-dis and Shinwaris in the Khyber, Peshawar, and Kohat Agencies; Orakazis in Orakazi Agency; Turis and Bangash in Kurram Agency; Wazirs in North Waziristan Agency; and Mahsuds in South Waziristan Agency.46

Before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the tribes in FATA and the Pakistani government had generally coexisted peacefully, but the Soviet invasion fractured their traditional socioeconomic and power struc-tures, resulting in an imbalance that was utilized by the jihadis for gaining influence in these areas. These jihadis (Afghan mujahideen and non-Afghans including Arabs, Central Asians, Pakistanis, etc.) disrupted the tribal system as massive funding and weapon supplies from external sources and locals began to change the structure. Mullahs who had earlier lacked much power in traditional Pushtun society became the new actors and allies to wage jihad. Maliks lost their power to conservative mullahs who opened up many madrasas in the tribal areas, thereby contributing to the change. The area had also received huge influxes of Afghan refugees, which began to affect the tribal economy. After the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, these jihadi elements kept a low profile and gained the sympathy of locals until they became strong enough to threaten the existing traditional power structure.

FATA has been one of Pakistan’s most neglected regions. The Pakistani government’s failure to provide the people of FATA desperately needed socioeconomic  resources—including basic facilities in health, education, and communications—made it easier for Taliban militants to gain a foot-hold in the area. Furthermore, the government’s inability to initiate both political and administrative reforms contributed to a vacuum in vital ser-vices that has been filled by Taliban and their supporters.

The emergence and consolidation of the Pakistani Taliban in FATA oc-curred when the Pakistani military were fighting “foreign” (i.e., non-Paki-stani) Taliban elements and, in the process, ignored the transition of the indigenous elements from being only Taliban sympathizers to becoming their active supporters during 2001–07. The Taliban creatively made space for themselves to establish their authority in these areas of Pakistan by

46. Government of Pakistan, 1998 Census Report of FATA, Census Publication No. 152 (Islamabad: Population Census Organization, Statistics Division, March 2001), p. 1.

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periodically engaging in military attacks while, at other times, cutting deals with the Pakistani government to forestall doing so.47 For example, between 2004 and 2006, the Pakistani central government entered into a series of peace agreements with various local Taliban factions belonging to Wazir tribes: the Shakai peace agreement with Ahmadzai Wazir (April 2004), the Sararogha peace agreement with Baitullah Mehsud (February 2005), and the North Waziristan agreement with Uthmanzai Wazir (Sep-tember 2006). The terms of these agreements were generally that the tribes would not provide sanctuary to foreign militants, they would cease all cross-border armed activity in Afghanistan and militancy in settled districts of NWFP, and would accept the writ of the government. None of these peace deals lasted long and were, in fact, quite often breached. This resulted in the gradual spread of the Taliban and their ideology through the tribal areas and NWFP.48

During this process, the Pakistani Taliban effectively established them-selves as an alternative source of leadership to the traditional tribal elders. The Taliban actually killed approximately 200 tribal elders on charges of being Pakistani and American spies. These developments led to the forma-tion of the TTP.49 On December 14, 2007, a shura (assembly) of 40 senior Taliban leaders established the TTP headed by Baituallah Mehsud as an umbrella organization of various Taliban-oriented groups. The TTP con-sisted of Taliban representatives from the seven tribal agencies (North Waziristan, South Waziristan, Khyber, Orakazi, Bajaur, Mohmand, and Kurram) as well as the settled districts of Swat, Bannu, Tank, lakki Mar-wat, Dera Ismail Khan, Kohistan and Buner, and the Malakand division. Hafiz Gul Bahadur and Maulana Faqir Muhammad were made regional commanders in North Waziristan and the Bajaur Agency, respectively. In Swat, Maulana Fazlullah led the TTP movement.50

The TTP demanded an immediate end to military operations by the Pakistani army and the withdrawal of troops from their tribal areas. The organization also declared a stepped-up jihad against both U.S. and NATO forces in neighboring Afghanistan. Baitullah’s spokesman, Maulvi Omar,

47. Hassan Abbas, “A Profile of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan,” CTC Sentinel 1:2 (January 2008), pp. 1–4, available at <http://ctstudies.com>, accessed August 13, 2008.

48. Arabinda Acharya, Syed Adnan Ali Shah, and Sadia Suleiman, “Making Money in the Mayhem: Funding Taliban Insurrection in Tribal Areas of Pakistan,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 32 (Routledge 2009), p. 98, available at <http://www.c-cft.org/publication/pdf/MakingMoneyInTheMayhem.pdf>, accessed August 2009.

49. Hassan Abbas, “A Profile of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan.”50. vree Mathew, “Tribal Pakistan: Who Is in Control?” available at <www.pbs.org/front-

lineworld/stories/pakistan802/>, accessed June 15, 2009.

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declared that the Taliban wanted to avenge the people killed in Pakistani military operations, including those who perished in alleged indiscrimi-nate bombings. The TTP in 2007 also gave an ultimatum to the govern-ment to release Imam Maulana Abdul Aziz Ghazi, imam (leader) of the lal Masjid (Red Mosque), or face an insurgency.51 The TTP also declared its goal to enforce shariah law in the areas under its influence. While many Pushtuns belong to the TTP, Pushtun ethnonationalism has not been spe-cifically and systematically used by the TTP to build support and gain re-cruits. After all, doing so would deprive the organization of other (e.g., Saudi, Uzbek, Turkmen, etc.) sources of financial, military, and political support.

The Taliban insurgency began accelerating precipitously after 2006. The Taliban kidnapped over 1,000 security force personnel and state officials in Pakistan in 2007, and, in return, the government released more than 500 militants that year.52 The Taliban have also imposed jazia (a tax on non-Muslims) in certain areas under their control, prompting harsh criti-cism from secular Pushtun nationalists.53 Periodic fighting between Tal-iban militants and government security forces throughout the region has resulted in an estimated 300,000 internal refugees in 2009, housed mostly in government-run camps.54

Complexities of Pushtun Identity and Taliban Insurgency at the Local Level

Pushtun ethnic identity has become highly fractionalized as a result of the rise of the Taliban and their ideology. According to one prominent scholar, the political/religious orientation of Pushtuns can be placed into the follow-ing categories: nationalists, traditionalists, and Islamists (which are further subdivided into Islamized Pushtuns and Pushtunized Islamists).55 Islamized Pushtuns are pro-Jamaat-e-Islami (Islamic Bloc, JI), whose ideology is more in line with pan-Islamist movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood, the Hizbut Tehrir, etc. The JI is a party of urban middle class Islamists, which

51. Mushtaq Yusufzai, “Militants Seek End to Army Operations,” News International, December 17, 2007.

52. Amir Rana, “Taliban Insurgency in Pakistan: A Counterinsurgency Perspective,” Con-flict and Peace Studies 2:2 (April-June 2009), Pakistan Insitute for Peace Studies (Islamabad), p. 15.

53. For example, see Behroz Khan, “History’s Hostages,” May 4, 2009, <www.outlookindia.com>, accessed June 15, 2009.

54. Mushtaq Yusufzai, “A Different Kind of Homecoming,” News International, August 31, 2008.

55. Ijaz Khan, “Pashtuns in the Crossfire.”

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made some inroads into the rural Pushtun areas during the Afghan jihad against the Soviets. Pushtunized Islamists refer to the local, rural-based religious leaders graduating mainly from madrasas. They are pro-JUI.

The so-called “Talibanization” of Pushtun culture and society has been resented by secular nationalist Pushtuns, including the left-leaning ANP, which points out that the Taliban are not the outgrowths of traditional Pushtun ethnonationalism.56 The ANP has, in fact, openly condemned the Pakistani security services for nurturing the Taliban movement over the past few decades. In the words of the present head of the ANP Asfandiyar Wali, “Pashtuns [i.e., Pushtuns] stand united for peace, but the fire of war is burning our land and we have to find the means to extinguish it. We are caught in the middle of warmongers, extremists, and militants.”57

It should be noted that while the TTP has a large presence in all agen-cies, it is not the only Islamist group operating in these areas. In fact, the dynamics of insurgency are much more complicated at the local level with some groups operating independently of the TTP but, nonetheless, still contributing to the multi-faceted violence. For example, the lashkar-e-Islam (Army of Islam) led by Mangal Bagh58 is a militant organization that has attempted to impose its own brand of Islam on the residents of the Khyber Agency, while concurrently fighting against a local rival group, the Ansar-ul-Islam (Supporters of Islam) in the far-flung Tirah valley of the agency. Both groups have Pushtun leadership, but their organiza-tional aims differ. lashkar-e-Islam took upon itself to provide security to the local population, while Ansar ul-Islam aimed to implement shariah. In the words of Mangal Bagh, “We have rid Bara of drug traffickers, gamblers, kidnappers, car snatchers and other criminals and we want to cleanse Jam-rud and all of Peshawar of those selling drugs and liquor and running gam-bling dens.”59

The TTP showed its presence in the Khyber Agency in June 2008 as well by attacking three security check posts along the Peshawar-Torkham high-way, the main supply route for international forces in Afghanistan. The TTP also intensified its patrolling of the area, and threatened to disrupt oil and aid supplies to NATO forces across the border. TTP operatives dis-tributed pamphlets even as far as Karachi, warning truck drivers to stop

56. Ahmed Rashid, “Pushtuns Want an Image Change,” December 2, 2006, <www.afgha.com>, accessed August 12, 2008.

57. Ibid.58. lashkar-e-Islam is influenced by the Deobandi school of thought, while Ansar-ul Is-

lam reflects the Barelvi school. Both these groups say they are not part of the TTP. For details, see Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi, “A Profile of Mangal Bagh,” <http://www.longwarjournal.org/multimedia/Mangal-Bagh-Profile.pdf>, accessed November 16, 2009.

59. Dr. Farrukh Saleem, “Emir Mangal Bagh,” News International, August 3, 2008.

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transporting supplies to international forces in Afghanistan through Paki-stan or face deadly consequences.60 The operatives have destroyed hun-dreds of NATO containers and attacked several container terminals on the outskirts of Peshawar. Suspected TTP militants also kidnapped 28 Christians from Peshawar in June 2008.61 The provincial government came under heavy criticism when it failed to recover them, but the Christian hostages were eventually rescued by men loyal to Mangal Bagh.

In a different pattern, insurgency and violence in Kurram Agency is attributed to intra-Muslim sectarianism. It is the only tribal agency that has a significant Shia population. Yet, the influx of Afghan refugees to the area during the 1980s significantly increased the number of Sunnis residing there. Both extremist Shias and Sunnis who are Pushtuns (and fighting each other) have resorted to violence in parts of the agency. The rival Bangash and Turi tribes, the former mostly Sunni and the latter ex-clusively Shia, have been engaged in fierce fighting, resulting in hundreds of deaths. local Taliban have aggravated the situation by supporting Sun-nis against Shias. For their part, the Shias have gotten support from the local Mehdi Militia and local Hizbollah. Government authorities have failed to end this fighting between Shia and Sunni tribes. Even military convoys trying to supply basic food and health products have come under attack from militants. This has led to severe food shortages in the upper Kurram area. violence between these Shia and Sunni tribes continues with short-lived ceasefires resulting in temporary lulls before inevitable subsequent escalations.62

Strategies to Control the Taliban InsurgencyThe Taliban insurgency in Pakistan continues unabated and, in fact, is escalating. Amir Haider Hoti, the present chief minister of the NWFP belonging to the ANP, has pressed the Pakistani federal government to re-view its Afghan policy and help build confidence between the two coun-tries as a means of ameliorating the violence. As he said, “Unfortunately, our rulers imposed others war on its own people and killed its own citi-zens for others. We have not been given mandate to shed blood of our own people but to protect them.” Furthermore he opined that “the restoration of peace in the NWFP is linked with the peace in FATA,” suggesting that the government needs to bring about drastic changes in its policies to en-sure basic rights to tribal people and to provide them equal rights so that

60. Sayed G. B. Shah Bokhari, “The Dangers of Appeasing the Taliban,” ibid., July 4, 2008.

61. Ibid.62. Yusuf Ali, “Third-Party Politics,” ibid., July 6, 2008.

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they could feel as equal citizens of the country.63 The ANP has been a major critic of American unmanned drone attacks in FATA, but such statements have not won it much popularity among non-nationalist Push-tuns. The ANP is, in fact, currently cooperating with the government in the military and political operations against the insurgents.

These overarching suggestions by the ANP aside, the government of Pakistan has actually implemented several specific policies to try to con-front and control the Taliban insurgency within its borders, but with only limited success. First, the Pakistani government has deployed around 100,000 troops in the tribal areas. As part of a “multi-pronged” military strategy, Pakistan has also erected fences in select areas along its border with Afghanistan and set up 1,000 checkpoints in an effort to prevent in-surgents from using its territorial areas to launch attacks inside Afghani-stan.64 The Pakistani army has been assisted by the Frontier Corps (FC), a paramilitary force comprising tribal Pushtuns who have the advantage of knowing the language and culture of the area. Before the current opera-tions, the FC was largely assigned the responsibility of protecting the frontier with Afghanistan and ensuring the security of the tribal people. However, the FC’s presence in FATA has prompted constant American criticism that the conventional Pakistan military is not doing enough to evict Taliban and al-Qaeda operatives from the tribal areas. A report by the Rand Corporation even accused the FC of helping the Taliban insur-gents cross the border and track the movement of U.S.-led coalition forces in Afghanistan.65 FC personnel, however, have been heavily targeted by the Taliban, and many have lost their lives while carrying out their duties.

Another counterinsurgency strategy that has received significant media attention has been the formation of anti-Taliban lashkars (squads), com-prising volunteers in both the settled and tribal areas of NWFP. The kid-napping and murders of anti-tribal jirgas and elders who played a pivotal role in formation of these lashkars have occurred, thus slowing the cre-ation of additional such counterinsurgency forces. The attack in Salarzai Tehsil of the Bajaur Agency on November 6, 2008, killed more than 20 tribal elders including Malik Fazal Karim Baro, the head of the tribal lashkars. Another 100 tribesmen were injured. The government has not been able to extend full support to these anti-Taliban lashkars despite

63. Syed Bukhar Shah, “Hoti Asks Islamabad to Review Afghan Policy,” ibid., June 24, 2008.

64. “Musharraf: Bin ladin Not Being Hunted,” Associated Press, January 23, 2008, avail-able at <http://www.military.com>, accessed March 20, 2008.

65. Rahimullah Yusufzai, “Shock and Awe in Mohmand Agency,” News International, June 14, 2008.

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claims to the contrary. They need additional military training in order to effectively combat the militants in their respective locales.66

Peace deals are another strategy being used to try to control the insur-gency. Peace agreements have, however, been criticized by NATO and the U.S. and termed as being a policy of appeasement, adversely affecting the security of the foreign troops in Afghanistan. NATO has, in fact, attributed the rise in insurgent attacks to these peace deals made by the Pakistan gov-ernment with indigenous Taliban-oriented groups.67 Former Pakistan Presi-dent Pervez Musharraf emphasized that the threat from militants needed careful handling. He realized that military operations were not yielding positive results but were rather alienating the local population and contrib-uting to the regrouping of the Taliban and other militant elements. There-fore, he authorized peace agreements with tribal leaders in Waziristan, in which Pakistani forces agreed to suspend military operations in return for efforts by tribal leaders to prevent the use of FATA by the Taliban as a stag-ing area for military operations in Afghanistan.68 The results, as with other counterinsurgency efforts, have been mixed.

The peace deal between the provincial government of NWFP and Sufi Mohammad of the TNSM in February 2009 has received criticism from within and outside the country. Many Pakistani politicians and political analysts voiced their concerns that the government was failing to bring lasting peace and actually appeasing the Taliban to temporarily restore the writ of the government. They also pointed out that the previous such peace deals had not worked, except in the short run.69 The U.S. and its al-lies have expressed reservations about whether the deal will make the re-gion a safe haven for extremists. Moreover, they are critical because of past peace deals that failed to bring about comprehensive peace. Despite all this skepticism, the common people of Malakand District, which includes Swat, initially welcomed the peace agreement. Adnan Aurangzeb, whose grandfather was the last ruler of Swat before it joined Pakistan in 1969, stated, “For the people of Swat, it’s a sigh of relief, as of right now.”70

66. Yusuf Ali, “Tribal lashkars Need Government Support” (November 2008), Pak In-stitute for Peace Studies, Islamabad, <www.san-pips.com/>, accessed June 12, 2009.

67. Selig S. Harrison, “Pushtunistan: The Challenge of Pakistan and Afghanistan,” Ideas––The Newsletter of Pashtun Peace Forum (Canada) 1:1 (July 1, 2008), <www.pashtunpeaceforum.com>, accessed August 15, 2008.

68. Ibid. 69. Sherin Zada, “NATO Cautions Truce with Taliban,” Associated Press, February 18,

2009, in The Guardian, <http://www.guardian.co.uk>, accessed April 12, 2009. 70. Kim Barker, “Swat valley Peace Deal Is a Hope for Stabilizing volatile Region of Pak-

istan,” March 22, 2009, Chicago Tribune, <http://archives.chicagotribune.com/2009/mar/22/nation>, accessed November 16, 2009.

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Dubbed the “Shariah for peace” accord, the deal entailed the enforce-ment of shariah in Swat and seven other districts including Shangla, Buner, Malakand Agency, Upper Dir, lower Dir, and Chitral in Malakand Divi-sion, and Kohistan in Hazara Division. It also provided for the Nizam-e-Adal (Justice System) announced by the government on April 15, 2009, to ensure speedy justice for the people of the area.71 Under the terms of the February peace accord, the Taliban were to lay down their arms in return for the imposition of shariah. Instead, the militants used Swat as a base to launch attacks into surrounding districts such as Dir and Buner. In a move to counter these activities, the Pakistan army started a military operation in April to destroy Taliban strongholds, leading to the demise of the peace deal.

The killing of Baituallah Mehsud, the TTP leader, in a drone attack on August 7 in Zangara, South Waziristan, has dealt a major blow to the Tal-iban movement. However, it is too soon to consider it as the beginning of the end of the Taliban insurgency. The Pakistan army and FC launched the much awaited military offensive in October against the TTP in South Waziristan. At the time of writing, the operation continues with casualties on both sides. The TTP is putting up stiff resistance under the new leader, Hakimullah. The army claims to have uprooted most of them from their forward positions. However, Taliban have reacted strongly by increasing suicide bombings particularly in NWFP. This new wave of suicide attacks has resulted in heavy losses, targeting markets, police stations, regional headquarters of the powerful ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence agency) in Pe-shawar, officials, etc. Normal life has come to a standstill as the province struggles to cope with the violence and terrorist acts of the TTP.

ConclusionThe Taliban insurgency in Pakistan spearheaded by the TTP is not in-spired by Pushtun ethnonationalism; rather, it stresses religious identity. However, because the majority of the insurgents are Pushtuns, they attract more Pushtun followers. Taliban insurgents do not highlight their ethnic-ity: this would deny them the aid of non-Pushtun jihadis. The insurgency continues unabated despite the huge military presence on both sides of the Durand line. The peace deals concluded by the government with the Tal-iban have failed; the military option is being tested in an attempt to curb the insurgency. Pushtun nationalists, such as those in the ANP, have condemned the TTP and do not support its ongoing insurgency in the NWFP. They re-alize that the situation is complex and there are numerous actors. Secular

71. Daud Khattak, “Governor Promises Nizam-e-Adal Regulation,” News International, April 16, 2009.

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Pushtun nationalists believe that all actors have to take responsibility for what is happening.

The Pakistani leadership is responsible for its own lack of adequate de-velopment in the NWFP and tribal regions, its flawed Afghan policy, and for previously allowing the mujahideen to operate from its territory. The Afghan government, for its part, is accountable for the continuing war in its own country and its failure to contain the insurgents through either po-litical or military means. The U.S. and its allies have also failed to bring about peace in Afghanistan despite their huge military presence since 2001. The U.S. and NATO must understand that the local Taliban insur-gency can never be curbed by foreign forces. Nor can these outside actors strengthen indigenous political leadership if it lacks support from its own populace. The unmanned American drone attacks in FATA are not win-ning the U.S. any friends among the Pushtuns. On the contrary, these at-tacks are used by the Taliban to justify continuing their violent jihad against the U.S. and NATO forces, not to mention against the Pakistani state. Therefore, current military options should be revisited in order to find vi-able solutions to the insurgencies in both Pakistan and Afghanistan.

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