© PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 22

WORKING DRAFT – V3

Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics Population/Popular SupportInfrastructure, Economy, & ServicesGovernmentAfghanistan Security ForcesInsurgentsCrime and NarcoticsCoalition Forces & ActionsPhysical Environment

Neutral/OnPopulation

Ins. StrategicCommun/IO

& Affiliation w/Population

Gov'tWorkforce

Skill & Avail

CoalitionDev.Ops-

Infrastructure,Services,

Econ.Advisory

& Aid

ANSFAppropriateUse of Force

Relative WOMMessage

AmplificationGov’t vs Ins

CoalitionAvg COINExperience

& Skill

Gov'tProfessionalismPolicy Quality

& Fairness

CoalitionStrategic

Commun./IO

Private SectorWorkforce

Skill & Avail

Likelihood of

for Payment

Ties toNarcotics &

Other CriminalFunding

InsurgentCapacity,

Priorities &Effectiveness

Strength ofReligious

Ideology &Tribal

Structures

Gov'tIntegration ofLocal TribalStructures

Gov't TrainingMentoring,Vetting, and

Hiring

Overall Gov'tReach,

ExecutionCapacity &Investment

Breadth ofCoalition &

Support

ResourceLevels

(Mil. & Civ.Forces,

Aid Levels)

CoalitionAdjustmentof Approachto Fit Afghan

CoalitionKnowledge& Underst.

of SocialStructures

Coalition‘COIN

Support’Strategy &

Unity

Recognition/Engagement to

IntegrateTribal

Structures&Beliefs

ProvideHumanitarian

Relief

Infr, Services, Econ.Policy & Execution/Perceived Fairness

InfrastructureDev. Adequacy& Sustainment

Legit EconomicActivity,Trade &

Employment

CivilianServices(SWET,

Healthcare,Education)

Private SectorCapital Mgmt., Investment &

Spending

Expectationsfor Security,Services, &Employment

Perception ofInsurgentStrength &

Intent

WesternAffiliationBacklash Perception of

Coalition Intent& Commitment

RelativeMessage

Impact Gov’tvs Ins

Fear of Ins.Attack/

Repercussions

Legit vs. IllegitRelative

EconomicOpportunity

PopulationBasic Needs

Service Levels& Employment

Fraction ofWorkforceAnd Agric.Legit vsIllegit

IllegitAgricProduction,

Trade &Employment

Narcotics& Criminal

ActivityLevels

InsurgentRecruiting,Retention,Manpower

& ISR

Counter- Narcotics/Crime Ops

Ins.Leadership,

Training, Skill& Experience

Ins. ProvisionOf Gov’t &Services

Ins.Offensives &

Presence(Clear & Hold)

Fear ofGov’ t/ANSF/

CoalitionRepercussions

Ins. Damages& Casualties

Gov't/ANSFStrategicCommun/

IO

PerceivedDamages &Use of Force

by Ins.

RelativeMessageQuality

Gov’ ’t vs Ins.Coalition/HomelandAcceptance of

Afghan Methods

Gov'tSecurityPolicy

Quality &Investment

R.O.L. Policy,Execution &PerceivedFairnessANSF

FundingAdequacy

CoalitionDev. Ops-

ANSFAdvisory

& Aid

ANSFInstitutional &

ExecutionCapacity

ANSFTraining &Mentoring

ANSF Avg.ProfessionalismSkill, Discipline,

& Morale

ANSFManpower

Recruiting &Retention

ANSF UnitLeadership& TacticalCapacity

TotalSecurityForce

Capacity &Focus

ISR / OpenSource Ops

CoalitionDev. Ops-

Gov’tAdvisory

& Aid

ANSFCorruption &

TribalFavoritism

ANSFCapacity,

Priorities & Effectiveness

ANSF &CoalitionDamages/Casualties

PopulationActively

SupportingGov’t & SF

Sympathizingw/ Gov’t

the FencePopulation

Sympathizingw/ Insurgents

PopulationActively

SupportingInsurgency

Ethnic/TribalRivalry

CoalitionExecutionCapacity &Priorities

TerrainHarshness& Breadth

Duration ofOperation

US DomesticPerceived

Cost/Benefit& Support

CoalitionVisibility toPopulation

US Domestic/Int'l Strategic

Commun.& Diplomacy

US Gov'tSupport forOperation

CoalitionAppropriateBalance of

Effort &Force

Gov'tFunding

Adequacy

Central Gov'tInstitutional &

ExecutionCapacity

Gov't/Contractor

Corruption &Tribal Favoritism

TaxRevenues

OutsideSupport/

Enablementof Ins.

Policing &Security Ops

(Hold)

TargetedStrikes

CoordinationAmong Ins.

FactionsInsurgentTerrain

Advantage

PerceivedDamages/Use

of Force byGov’ t & Coalition

PerceivedSecurity

AverageConnectednessof Population

PotentialAttractiveness

of Gov’t vs.Insurgent Path

Visible GainsIn Security,Services &

Employment

Satisfactionw/ Gains in

Security, Services& Employment

PerceptionOf Gov’tStrength& Intent

Ability toReconcileReligiousIdeology,

TribalStructuresw/ Gov’t

Path

Ins. TargetedAttacks onProgress/Supportfor Gov’t

Criminal/TraffickingCapability &

Coercion

Legit AgricProduction

Ability toMove

People& GoodsRapidly

Legit OtherProduction& ServicesNon-Agric

Transparencyof Gov’t

Processes &Investments

MediaSensationalism

BiasCultural Erosion/

Displacement

Durationof

Operation

Sweep Ops(Clear)

RelativePopularSupport/ /ToleranceGov’t vs

Insurgents

Funding &Material

Support to Insurgents

Territory NotUnder Gov’t

Control (Afghan & Pakistan)

Havens / Ability to Operate

Significant Delay=

Significant Delay=

Crime/Violence /Ins. Support

POPULAR SUPPORT

INSURGENTS

INFRASTRUCTURE, SERVICES & ECONOMY

NARCOTICS

POPULATION CONDITIONS & BELIEFS

COALITION DOMESTIC SUPPORT

ANSF TACTICAL

TRIBAL GOVERNANCE

OVERALL GOVERNMENT CAPACITY

ANSF INSTITUTIONAL

COALITION CAPACITY & PRIORITIES

OUTSIDE SUPPORT TO INSURGENT FACTIONS

CENTRAL GOV’T