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African Socialism vs. Scientific Socialism

A Cross-National Comparative Study

Trevor Dean Myers

CPO3204 – African Politics

Section 2706

Fall 2010

Professor Ashley Leinweber

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Introduction and Literature Review

Socialism is defined as a political theory advocating state ownership of industry. During

the Cold War, foreign donors prioritized strategic considerations and the spread of their political

influence in sub-Saharan Africa (Dunning 2004). The Soviet Union established bases, provided

aid, and distributed weapons to countries that would show their support. Western governments

and pro-Western regimes in Africa had some apprehension about the influence the Soviet Union

was exerting on the continent and many thought their goal was to make a Soviet “satellite” of the

whole region at the West’s expense (Nolutshungu 1985). The Soviets brought with them ideas of

socialism and communism that they spread onto states such as Angola, Mozambique, Somalia,

Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa. From there, Socialism spread to other parts of

Africa and rapidly developed into two ideology sects: Scientific Socialism and African

Socialism, an ideology tailored specifically to Africa based on the African historical experience.

All in all, this paper will examine the differences between African Socialism in Tanzania

and Senegal, and Scientific Socialism in Ethiopia and Angola by comparing its effects between

the two countries it was implemented in and the reasons behind its ultimate downfall. We will

find that the primary reason for its failure has to do with the fall of the Soviet Union, the main

source and support for socialistic implementation, in addition to the inability of a socialist

structure to provide for the masse and increased pressures by the West to democratize. The

significance of this research is to bring to highlight how socialism, in whatever form it may be

in, could not provide a sufficient enough political and economic model for African advancement.

To this day, significant research by scholars has already concluded as to why socialism as

a whole failed on the African continent. Pitcher and Askew argue that in the 1980’s, socialist

systems worldwide were unable to respond to the challenges from within and without to their

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attempted monopolization of economic and political power, so they succumbed to processes of

structural adjustment, economic liberalization and political pluralism (Pitcher and Askew 2006).

Also, false promises have shown a path to failure. Richard Skylar argues that socialists

promised to construct an efficient, humane, and just social order; with equal conviction,

proponents of capitalism hold that no alternative economic system produces as large a volume of

goods, jobs, and other material benefits for as high a percentage of the population; that social

inequality is inevitable, regardless of the property system in effect or the organisation of

economic production; and that justice, in any case, is always individual, never ‘social’ (Skylar

2008). Davidson argues that socialism in any of its statist forms in Africa has certainly failed

wherever one or other of such forms has been applied beyond the mere verbiage of propaganda,

and there may be a true sense in which history, in this dimension, has indeed ended (Davidson

1992).

In addition, the end of Socialism could have been triggered by resistance from gangs and

other opponents of the political ideology. Davidson states that the applications of socialism,

whether of one sort or another, whether 'scientific' or simply well-intended, were small or short-

winded, or in any case destroyed by the handy AK47 of this or that gang of bandits (sometimes

home-grown, sometimes not) (Davidson 1992).

African Socialism: Tanzania and Senegal

By definition, African Socialism is defined as the belief of sharing economic resources in a

“traditional” African way. Julius Nyerere, the first President of Tanzania and an African Socialist,

argues that European socialism was born of the Agrarian Revolution and the Industrial

Revolution, which created the ‘landed’ and the ‘landless’ classes in society; this eventually

produced the modern capitalist and the industrial proletariat (Nyerere 1962). These two

revolutions planted the seeds of conflict within society. However, African socialism did not have

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the ‘benefit’ of the Agrarian Revolution or the Industrial Revolution; it did not start from the

existence of conflicting ‘classes’ in society (Nyerere 1962). The foundation and objective of

African socialism is the extended family: “The true African socialist does not look on one class

of men as his brethren and another as his natural enemies; he does not form an alliance with the

‘brethren’ for the extermination of the ‘non-brethren.” (Nyerere 1962).

Similarly, Léopold Sédar Senghor, the first President of Senegal, believed that socialism

offered the most promising approach to progressive development and that it was imperative that

relevant values found in traditional African society be fused in the modern African society; “The

methods and means recommended by Marx,” noted Senghor, were relevant to the nineteenth

century, but not the reality of emerging Africa (LeMelle 1965). Léopold Sédar Senghor lived a

life that spanned nearly the entire twentieth century. Combining memories of his childhood in

coastal Senegal, where he was born in 1906, with the discipline of his classical French education,

a passion for African proverbs and rhythms, he made unique literary, philosophical, and political

contributions to the world (Rosette 2002). Léopold Sédar Senghor, who above all has contributed

most to the inspiration and vitalization of voie africaine du socialism; According to Senghor, it

was about “integrating socialism with Negritude”; a conciliation of values obviating total

rejection of the best of Negro Africa as well as total acceptance of incompatible and undesirable

Western methods, specifically related to Africa’s own societal values (LeMelle 1965).

Tanzania, formerly known as Tanganyika, was granted independence in 1961. The

country had one political party – TANU – which had won all the parties in the National

Assembly; it was truly a genuine mass party that had built its strengths in the course of the

country struggling for independence (Barkan 1994). Likewise, in Senegal, Senghor had

established a one-party state and founded the Socialist Party in 1966; initially known as the

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Senegalese Progressive Union (UPS), the party had dominated Senegalese politics until the late

1980s (Galvin 2001).

As Tanzania’s leader, Julius Neyerere was definitely a party man and was never under

the same pressure as other African leaders to satisfy patronage expectations among his followers

after independence; he made his socialist aspirations quite clear from the beginning (Barkan

1994). For political, if not economic models, Nyerere had looked more to communist nations

than to Western Democracies. He appeared to have been less impressed by the political than by

the economic aspects of the communist systems, but he often made statements that implied his

admiration for their achievements (Barkan 1994). In the first years after independence in

Senegal, the primary challenge facing the Socialist Party was the personal and political rivalry

between President Senghor and Prime Minister Mamadou Dia. The conflict culminated in a 1962

coup attempt, for which Dia accepted blame and was imprisoned (Galvan 2001).

In addition, Neyerere, besides such factors as a Puritan strand in his personality or the

persuasive example of rural communes he visited while in China, realized the political

advantages of having control of the economy (Barkan 1994). He held a firm belief that people’s

social needs must be satisfied in order to make them more productive and for much of the 1970’s

and the rest of the world was ready to invest in Neyerere’s approach to development (Barkan

1994). He could cash in on generous flows of foreign aid that further boosted his resource base;

however, as he continued to push his socialist measures with fewer apparent successes, his

friends in the international community began to get cold feet (Barkan 1994). In spite of

declining foreign aid and demands from the IMF and World Bank that he deregulate the

country’s economy, Nyerere never conceded defeat and did not abandon his socialist policies

until almost all economic activities of any significance had been brought under political control

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(Barkan 1994). Neyerere’s ability to bring the economy under direct party control through a

series of decrees gave him an unlimited scope for dispensing patronage (Barkan 1994).

In contrast, despite the domination of the Socialist Party, Senegal remained one of the

most liberal and open societies in Africa; press freedom, although restricted, was never entirely

eliminated (Galvin 2001). Intellectuals, artists, labor and civic activists enjoyed a range of

freedoms of expression, despite the government's efforts to incorporate them within Senghor's

vaguely democratic-corporatist vision of one-party rule (Galvin 2001).

In the 1960’s, Democracy and the developmental state of the country were on a collision

course in Senegal. Within the context of economic stagnation, Senghor's drift into single-party

rule prevented an overt crisis and ensured social stability in Senegal (Galvin 2001). However, in

Tanzania, Nyerere let his strategy run full course by the time he stepped down as head of state in

1985; the country’s economy was at a low ebb (Barkan 1994). There was virtually no foreign

exchange left, and manufacturing and service enterprises were suffering from the shortage;

agricultural production had gone down and the physical infrastructure was in poor shape. Above

all, Tanzanians had suffered a serious decline in real per capita income (Barkan 1994). In spite

of this decay, Tanzanians did not respond by demonstrating in the streets or by taking action

hostile to the state, one reason being that they were indoctrinated to believe that the cause of their

difficulties was external, not domestic (Barkan 1994).

The African continent and socialist regimes around the world were taken by surprise

when communism in Eastern Europe fell in late 1989. Neyerere knew that this would be a

serious challenge for African countries, so in 1990, he encourage multi-party debate was at least

in part a response to this external; he preempted such a move by taking the initiative,

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engendering greater openness and the possibility of a calm transition to democracy (Barkan

1994).

In 1978, Senghor ran for reelection, but was soundly defeated by PDS (Socialist Party)

leader Abdoulaye Wade. Two years later, Senghor resigned from office, becoming the first

African head of state to retire voluntarily; his gracious exit bestowed incalculable legitimacy and

public support on his handpicked successor (Galvan 2001). He owed much of his success as

president to the wave of popular support he received following Senghor's retirement, and he

enhanced his popularity by lifting the remaining restrictions on opposition political parties in

1981. On 19 March 2000, Senegal reclaimed its cherished status as Africa's most "advanced"

democracy as a result of the end of a 19 year rule by the Socialist Party (Galvan 2001).

On that day, Abdoulaye Wade, Senegal's dominant political opposition figure for the last

quarter-century and a five-time presidential candidate, defeated 19-year incumbent Abdou Diouf

of the Socialist Party in the second round of the presidential election (Galvan 2001). Despite a

long tradition of electoral self-rule, Africa's most vibrant free press, and open party competition,

Senegal's democratic credentials had been called into question for at least a decade by the

apparent impossibility of removing the Socialist Party from office. (Galvan 2001). Since then,

religious institutions, in the form of Muslim Sufi orders, have been an integral feature of

Senegal's stable and relatively democratic socio-political system (Villalon 1999). Over the

course of the 1990s, this system has experienced strains due to two factors: generational changes

and a crisis of legitimacy of the political system (Villalon 1999). This has resulted in three

potentially significant types of phenomena: 1) the growing (though still limited) appeal of

reformist Islamic ideology; 2) contestatory movements for leadership of the orders; and 3)

succession struggles within religious families (Villalon 1999).

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Scientific Socialism: Ethiopia and Angola

The implementation of Scientific Socialism in Ethiopia and Angola has many clear

distinctions between its sister ideology in Tanzania and Senegal. In Ethiopia, Leninism provided

a means to consolidate and extend the power of the state, while divorcing it from the bankrupt

formula of absolute monarchy which had previously been used to maintain it (Clapham1989).

Though the outcome of the revolution, mentioned further below, was at one level the result of

bloody power struggles between contending groups and individuals, it also represented an

effective synthesis of the Marxist-Leninist ideologies promoted by a wide range of Ethiopian

intellectuals, and the military's determination to maintain state power and national integrity

(Clapham 1989).

In 1974, Ethiopia was torn by a class struggle which erupted suddenly, matured swiftly

and generated a powerful momentum for a socialist solution to a society just emerging from

feudalism (Markakis 1979). The struggle began with a spontaneous popular uprising, followed

by a coup d’état carried out by a military force radicalized (Markakis 1979). The first successful

general strike by the Ethiopian proletariat paralyzed all activities of the country, thereby proving

the importance of the working class in any struggle against the ruling powers (Special

Correspondent 1978). Workers, peasants, students, and women had intensified their struggle

against feudalism and imperialism; peasants grabbed land by force, students marched in the

cities, women chanted slogans of equality, the oppressed religious sects marched for religious

equality and the proletariat used its own weapon of struggle, the strike (Special Correspondent

1978).

In Ethiopia, the Military Committee announced, two months after taking power, that it

would attempt to turn Ethiopia into a socialist state, eradicating the feudal system which

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permitted the exploitation of man by man, and would construct a society based on “equality, the

right to guide one’s own destiny, and the right to work and earn (Schwab 1976). Since Socialists

believe that institutions have been constructed by individuals and therefore can be destroyed by

them, they know that harsh measures must be taken against those vested interests and

organizations which are opposed to the creation of a new order, such as the Orthodox Church,

Government, Imperial Family, and landlords have kept peasants and tenant farmers oppressed for

centuries (Schwab 1976).

However, Angola was one of the hot spots of Cold War confrontation in the late 1970s

and through-out the 1980s. The brutal Angolan war, fuelled by intervention from South Africa,

the Soviet Union, Cuba, and the United States, halted economic and social development in

Angola (Pycroft 1994). What is shocking about Angola is that it presents a paradox: It is a land

of rich potential, yet most of its population barely survives, some frequently die and only a very

tiny minority accumulates the benefits of marketing the country's valuable raw materials

(Munslow 1990). Oil and diamonds are the twin pillars of the country's wealth and the reason for

its poverty. Internal conflict, economic policy failure and corruption combine to make Angola a

case study in the politics of unsustainable development (Munslow 1990).

What makes Ethiopia unique, unlike Angola, is that the socialist states sanctioned a

military regime's claim, and appeared to have accepted its contention that the armed forces there

are the appropriate social agent to lead the progressive forces at this stage of the class struggle;

both in theory and in practice, this is an unfamiliar role for the military, and it is not clear that it

is the proper role for them in Ethiopia (Markakis 1979). However, the military regime was

unable to cope with its enemies, domestic or foreign; timely, massive assistance provided by

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several socialist states and orchestrated by the Soviet Union preserved the territorial integrity of

Ethiopia, and propped up a government that seemed on the verge of collapse (Markakis 1979).

The objectives and means by which Ethiopia implemented their socialist agenda are quite

different than that of Angola. The general objectives of Ethiopian socialism include: non-

discrimination on the basis of sex, religion, or nationality and the creation of equality; the

"restoration" of local powers of self-administration with the assistance of the central government;

respect for the dignity of work and its central importance to the welfare of the community as well

as the individual; self-reliance; and above all, the unity of Ethiopia as a sacred faith of all our

people (Harbeson 1977).

Though the military regime's overriding goal is the maintenance and extension of a

centralized Ethiopian state, the revolutionary transformation of the means to achieve this consist

of three interlocking elements: first, the creation of a new structure of institutional control;

second, the drastic reorganization of the economic basis of state power; and third, a selective

widening of the base for political representation (Clapham 1989). All of these ends were

systematically and (for the most part) sincerely pursued, and contributed to the vast extension of

state power and effectiveness which has taken place since the revolution. However, it contained

flaws which put the Ethiopian state into crisis (Clapham 1989).

In addition, in Ethiopia, the wholesale nationalization of foreign capital was made easier

by the fact that there was not much of it anyhow, and in particular there was virtually no mineral

extraction; multinational investment was largely restricted to commerce, plantation agriculture

(notably sugar and cotton), and a little industry (Clapham 1987). Foreign capital has thus been

more decisively restricted than in Angola, which continues to rely on multinationals for mineral

extraction. Plantations and commercial farms, which then accounted only for some one per cent

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of cultivated land, were directly taken over as state farms, a gain without compensation; by far

the greater part of the cultivated area was evenly distributed between the peasants who farmed it,

and all rents, dues and share-cropping arrangements were abolished (Clapham 1987).

Also, unlike Ethiopia, Angola has had an ongoing civil war between two of the country’s

political parties, the MPLA and UNITA. The MPLA's post-independence traditions have been

those of Marxism-Leninism and democratic centralism, a transition made from its former stature

as a national liberation movement soon after independence; UNITA has similarly shown little

tolerance for democratic politics (Munslow 1999). It refused to accept the verdict of the first

democratic national elections held in September 1992, which were deemed to have been free and

fair by the international community. UNITA returned to war and was primarily responsible for

the breakdown of the democratic initiative and the peace process at that time (Munslow 1999).

Ethiopia has since 1974, and especially since the creation of the Workers' Party of

Ethiopia (WPE) in 1984, made the most sustained attempt by any African state to create a

Marxist-Leninist structure of government along broadly Soviet lines (Clapham 1989). Today,

after more than a decade and a half of devastating civil war, a dramatic turn of events took place

in Ethiopia in May 1991, culminating the ouster of former Marxist leader Mengistu and his

regime (Engedayehu 1993). Rebel forces, originating from the provinces of Tigre and Eritrea,

drove him from power; In the midst of euphoria following Mengistu’s ouster has come the trying

task of rebuilding a war-torn economy that has been in shambles for more than fifty years, and

creating a political formula acceptable to the country’s former rebel forces and numerous

political groups (Engedayehu 1993). The ideological, political, and ethnic differences of these

groups have made it a monumental task to develop a long-lasting political framework

(Engedayehu 1993).

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In Angola today, NGO’s play an important role. It centralized power and patronage

which has kept a lid on dissent thus far within the capital city, where probably over 40% of the

total population now live. Yet in the 1990s there is no denying that some space was opening up

for NGOS, churches, community groups and the private sector to take more initiatives;

unfortunately it was taking place without the active partnership of the state (Munslow 1999). The

massively distorted macroeconomic context, with high inflation and derisory pay for civil

servants, created an ineffectual public sector. Many of the best people left for the private sector

and NGO’s, for any avenues which offered a viable livelihood and greater personal job

satisfaction. (Munslow 1999).

Conclusion

Socialism on the African continent proved to be ineffective in handling the problems that

African nations faced, and began a rapid decline in influence after the fall of the Soviet Union.

African Socialism, as seen in Tanzania and Senegal, showed similarities in that both were led by

influential President’s after independence that held firm beliefs that the political ideology

implemented contain special considerations related to Africa’s history. In addition, the political

parties that stood behind these powerful men remained the most powerful parties, if not the only

legal party in Tanzania and Senegal.

However, they differed in that Neyerere, the President of Tanzania, advocated for multi-

party elections after the fall of the Soviet Union, knowing full well that Tanzania wouldn’t be

able to sustain a one-party state after its fall. Senghor voluntarily stepped down after defeat,

becoming the first African president to do so; a member of the Socialist Party continued a reign

for the next nineteen years. Today, Tanzania is a multi-party unitary presidential democratic

republic while Senegal is semi-presidential, liberal democratic republic.

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In the case of Scientific Socialism, Ethiopia and Angola present far more differences than

similarities. Socialism in Ethiopia was taken on by a military regime, which was surprisingly

legitimized by external socialist states despite the skepticism that a military regime could not

effectively run a successful socialist country. In Angola, two main political parties have been the

driving force behind socialism in the country. Today, Ethiopia is a federal parliamentary republic

and Angola is a presidential republic.

All in all, the fall of the Soviet Union, along with increased pressures by the West to

democratize and socialist structures not delivering what it had promised for the masses,

contributed to the fall of socialism on the African continent. As a result, all four countries are

now more democratic as a direct result of this. Although many of the democracies are still

consolidating and nowhere near perfect on the African continent, we can only hope that as we

continue on into the next decade that prosperous, consolidated democratic African states will

emerge and guide it to its full potential where the continent is not just beneficial for external

sources, but to the citizens of each of its respective countries.

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