after pax americana
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After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration, and the Sources of a StableMultipolarityAuthor(s): Charles A. KupchanSource: International Security, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Autumn, 1998), pp. 40-79Published by: The MIT PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539379
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After
ax
Americana
Charles . Kupchan
Benign Power, Regional Integration, nd
the Sources of a StableMultipolarity
I
An era of unprece-
dented peace appears to
be
at hand
as the
twenty-firstentury raws
near.
The
world's major powers enjoy cooperative
relations, emocracy s takingroot n
many countries hathave long suffered
nderauthoritarian ule, nd the world
economy s becoming ncreasingly
iberalized
and
integrated. ontrary
o the
dire
predictions
f a
return o a Hobbesian
world,
the end of the Cold War has
not been accompanied by the fragmentationf international rder and the
emergenceof rivalry mong
atomisticnational
units.1
A sobering reality,however,must temper optimism about the emerging
international andscape. The peace and prosperity
f
the current ra rely too
heavily on a single ngredient:American
power. The United States serves as a
critical xtraregional
alancer
in
Europe
and
East
Asia,
is the
catalyst
behind
multilateral fforts
o
combat aggression
and peacefullyresolve ong-standing
disputes,
and is the
engine
behind the
iberalization
f the world
economy.
But
America's preponderance and
its will to underwrite nternational rder
will
not last indefinitely.ven if theU.S. economy grows at a healthyrate,Amer-
ica's share of world product and its global
influencewill decline as other arge
countriesdevelop and become
less enamored
of
following
America's lead.2
Charles
A.
Kutpchan
s Associate
r-ofessorf
nternational
elations
t
Georgetozvwnniversity
nd
Senior
Fellow t theCouincil n Foreign elationis.
The author would
like
to thank
participants
n
seminars
at the
following nstitutions
or their
thoughtful omments:Hebrew University, olumbia
University, niversity f California t San
Diego, Council on ForeignRelations,GeorgetownUniversity, niversity fCalifornia t Berkeley,
Harvard University, kazaki Institute Tokyo), the American Center (Tokyo), and the Danish
Institute
f
International
Affairs
Copenhagen).
The critiquesof Michael Barnett,RichardBetts,
Albert
Fishlow,Gary Hufbauer,Clifford upchan,
JosephLepgold,GideonRose, Peter Trubowitz,
Ole
Waever,
Fareed
Zakaria,
and the
reviewers
of nternational
ecuri-ity
ere
particularly elpful.
For research ssistance,
would like
to
thank
JasonDavidson, Delphine Park,
and Mira
Sucharov.
1. See, for xample, John
J.Mearsheimer, Back to theFuture: nstabilityn Europe after
he Cold
War,
nternational
ecuirity,
ol. 15, No.
1
(Summer
1990), pp. 5-56.
2. For general analysis of
the secular processes throughwhich the locus of preponderant
power
changes over time, see
Robert Gilpin,
War and
Change
n World olitics
Cambridge,
U.K.: Cam-
bridge University ress, 1981). During the second half
of the twentieth entury, .S.
economic
output has fallenfrom oughly ne-half oone-quarter fgross world product.See Jeffreyrankel,
Regioncal radiniglocs
in the World
conomnicystem Washington,
.C.: Institute or
nternational
Economics, 1997), p. 6.
Ioteoiiatioinal
Seciiritiy,
ol. 23, No. 2 (Fall 1998), pp. 40-79
?
1998 by the President
nd
Fellows of
Harvard
College
and the Massachusetts nstitute
f Technology.
40
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After
ax
Americana 41
Furthermore,he
American electoratewill tireof a foreign olicy that
saddles
the
United Stateswith such a disproportionate
hare of
the burden
ofmanag-
ingthe
nternational ystem.America's
unipolar moment
will
not last long.
To
assume that
nternational
rder
can indefinitelyest
on
American
hegemony
is both illusory nd
dangerous.
How should the
prospect of waning American power affect heconduct
of
American grandstrategy?3 everal prominent chools of thought uggestthat
the
decline ofAmerican hegemony need not
be cause for concern;peace will
outlast American
preponderance.
The
optimists ontend that democracy,
lo-
balization, thespread of international
nstitutions,nd changes in the
sources
of
state power are
eroding
national
boundaries
and
making warfare
n obso-
lete
tool of statecraft.4he end of the twentieth
entury, owever,
s n6t the
first
ime
n
history hat students
of
international olitics have proclaimed an
end to war.
In
the
years leading up to
World
War
I
and again during
the
interwar
period, scholars and
diplomats
alike
argued
that economic interde-
pendence,technological nnovation, nd societalaversion to thehorrors f war
were making armed conflict historical rtifact.5
f
today's optimists rove
to
be
as wrong as
yesterday's,
here
is
good
reason to
be
worried about
the
potentialconsequences
of
a relativedecline
in
U.S.
power.6
Even iftheoptimists re right hat
nternational oliticshave entered more
peaceful era,
the
waning
of
American
hegemony
till
provides
cause
for larm.
3. Even if American hegemony asts for decades more, debate about crafting posthegemonic
order should take place now, while U.S. preponderance s still sufficient o maintain the status
quo. It is farmore prudent o put in place the foundation f a durable orderby design than simply
to wait until current rrangements nravel. Many analysts gree thatU.S. preponderancewill not
last, but few have given thought o how the prospectof decline should affect .S. grand strategy.
One exception s Christopher ayne. Layne calls for U.S. grand strategy f offshore alancing to
conserve U.S. resources and to help protect he United States fromgettingdragged into distant
conflicts. e failsto address, however,how to promotepeace as the United States withdraws
from
existing ommitments.nstead, he makes the case that he United States should simply
tand
aloof
from he regional conflicts ikely o emerge n the wake of
an
American retrenchment.ee Layne,
From Preponderance to OffshoreBalancing: America's Future Grand Strategy, nter-inatioinal
Security,
ol.
22,
No.
1
(Summer 1997), pp.
86-124.
4.
On the democratic
peace, see Bruce Russett,Grasping
the
Democratic
eace
(Princeton,N.J.:
PrincetonUniversity ress, 1993); and Michael Doyle, Liberalismand WorldPolitics, American
Political cienceReviezv, ol. 80, No.
4
(December 1986), pp. 1151-1169.
On
the decliningutility
f
warfare, ee Richard Rosecrance,The Rise of theTradinigtate New York: Basic Books, 1986); and
JohnMueller,Retr-eatroin oomsday: he ObsolescencefMajor
War
New
York:
Basic Books, 1989).
5.
See,
for
xample,
Norman
Angell,
The Great lliusion
New
York:
G.P.
Putnam's
Sons, 1911).
6. Importantcritiques of the democraticpeace hypothesishave been collected
in
two edited
volumes: Michael E. Brown, ean
M.
Lynn-Jones,
nd Steven
E.
Miller, ds., Debating
he
Demnocratic
Peace (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996); and Miriam Fendius Elman, ed., Paths to Peace: Is
Democracy he
Answver?
Cambridge,Mass.: MIT Press, 1997).
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Internationalecurity 3:2 | 42
Although scholars disagree about whetherbipolar or multipolar ystemsare
more stable, most agree that both are less stable than unipolar systems.7 he
end of America'sunipolarmoment nd
thereturn o
multipolarityhusthreaten
to trigger tructural ources
of
competition
that
may
well override
other
sources of peace. Indeed,
the
ongoing
debate between realists nd institution-
alists of various stripes essentially
revolves
around
pitting
tructural ources
of competition gainst ideational and institutional ourcesofcooperation.8
Structure, owever, may
be the
solution,
not an endemic source
of
rivalry
thatmust be overcomeby antidotes such as democracy,globalization,and
international nstitutions.
f
order devolved from tructure
tself,
ather han
fromefforts o tame systemicforces, hat order would be more durable and
self-sustaining.
he
prospect
ofthe end of American
hegemony
thus raises a
crucial
question:
Is it
possible
to construct stable
multipolarity?
I
argue
thatthe United States should
prepare
for
he
nevitabledecline of ts
preponderanceby encouragingtheemergenceof regional unipolarity n each
of theworld's three areas of industrial nd military ower-North America,
Europe, and East Asia. Unipolarity t
the
regional
level will
offset hrough
structural orces
the
fragmentation
nd
rivalry
that
otherwise
would
likely
accompany
the decline of American
hegemony.
Because
even
global
wars start
at the regional level, securing peace
within
regionsis an essential first tep
toward
securingpeace globally.
I
introduce
the notion
of
benign unipolarity
o
map
out the
logic upon
which
my analysis rests. Benign unipolarity efers o a hierarchical tructure
in
which a preponderantgeographic core establishes a hub-spoke patternof
influence ver a weaker periphery. s in an empire, he core exerts powerful
centripetal
orce
ver the
periphery y
virtue f
ts uncontested
reponderance
and
the
size and
scope
of its
economy.
In
contrast
to a
classical empire,
however,regional order emerges from consensual bargain between core and
periphery,
ot from oercion.
The
core
engages
in
self-restraintnd agrees to
subject
the exercise of its
preponderant power
to
a
set of
rules
and
norms
7.
On the greater tability
f
bipolarity, ee KennethN. Waltz, The Stability f a Bipolar World,
Daedalus,Vol. 93, No. 3 (Summer 1964), pp. 881-909; and Mearsheimer, Back to the Future. For
arguments n favor of multipolarity,ee Karl Deutsch and J. David Singer, Multipolar Power
Systems and International tability, World olitics,Vol. 16, No. 3 (April 1964), pp. 390-406. For
general discussion of polarity and stability, ee Stephen Van Evera, Primed for Peace: Europe
after he Cold War, nternationalecurity, ol. 15,
No. 3
(Winter 990/91),pp. 5-57; and Michael
Mastanduno, Preservingthe Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy fter
the Cold War, nternationalecurity, ol. 21,No.
4
(Spring 1997), pp. 49-88.
8. See the exchange between JohnMearsheimer
and
his critics
n
Promises, Promises: Can
Institutions eliver? Internationalecurity, ol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 39-93.
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After ax Americana 43
arrived at through multilateralnegotiation. n return, he periphery
enters
willingly nto the core's zone of nfluence.Regional spheres of nfluence gain
become the main ordering formations n the international ystem,but these
spheres are based on voluntary, ot forced,participation. urthermore, rder
emerges preciselybecause of the withholding nd moderation of power, not
its unfetteredxercise.Benign unipolarity hus holds promise fordampening
competition mong regions as well as withinthem.
I argue that consensual unipolar formations re already emerging n North
America, Europe, and (to a lesser degree) East Asia, but that scholars and
policymakersneed to understand more fully heir ttributes nd take explicit
steps
to
encourage
their
further evelopment. The challenges ahead vary
considerably cross
these three
regions.
North America has long been unipolar. Unipolarity ame about through
willful ct of structural ransformation-the malgamationof the United States
into
a unitary tate. Since America's rise as a great power, ts preponderance
has been a key factor n preventingmajor nterstatewar in the region.Because
the
uncontestedpower of the United States now endows North America with
a natural
unipolarity,
he
key challenge is taming
the
unilateralism
made
possible by preponderance and deepening the consensual character f
Amer-
ica's relationshipwith ts neighbors.
Europe has long been multipolar-and suffered he consequences. Since the
close of World
War II, however,
Western
Europe has pursued an
ambitious
experiment imed at eliminating he
ll
effects f multipolarity y transforming
its structure o unipolarity. he vehicle for doing so has been European inte-
gration and the construction f the European Union (EU), a process that has
succeeded in
establishing preponderant ranco-German ore at
the center f
a consensual
regionalformation.
With the
help
of
America'sprotectiveguar-
antees, Europe's
core
engages
in
strategic estraint
nd exercises ts
power
in
a
benignmanner.
n
return, urope's smallerpowers
have
willingly
ntered
the
regional
formation. ot
only
has interstate
ivalry
een
all
but
eliminated,
but the
core exerts
powerfulmagnetic ttraction
ver the
periphery, reating
an effective
hub-spoke pattern
of
governance. Indeed,
the
continent's
new
democraciesarenow clamoring tthegatetobecome part of Europe's unipolar
construction.The key challenges ahead are to ensure the integrity f the
Franco-German oalition and Europe's unipolarity ven as American power
wanes and Europe's border moves eastward.
East Asia has long been, and remains,multipolar.America's military res-
ence
continues
to
hold
in
abeyance the competitive ockeying that would
otherwise
merge.
Unlike
Europe, however,
East Asia has not taken
advantage
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International
ecurity
3:2 | 44
of the luxuryprovided by an extraregional alancer
to
proceed
with its
own
political ntegration. ostwar
Germany ntegrated
nto
Europe
even
as
Europe
integrated nto the West.
n
contrast, ostwar Japan
was
deeply integrated
nto
the
community
f
capitalistdemocracies,
but its
ntegration
nto
East Asia has
been shallow and only economic
n form. he
region'smajor
stateshave
strong
political ties to the United
States,
but not to one another.
In
this
sense,
America's presence,althoughit keeps the peace fornow, also stands in the
way
of the
intraregionalntegration
needed to
ensure
stability
n
the after-
math
of
American hegemony. East Asia has a long way to go
if it
is to
construct consensual
regional
formation
apable
of
overcoming
ts
danger-
ous
multipolarity.
An effort o bridge realistand idealist approaches to the preservationof
peace guides this
exploration
nto the
construction
f
a
new
international rder.
I recognizethepervasive
role
that
power
will
continue o play in international
affairs nd
the extent o which
power asymmetries
will
serve as
inescapable
determinants f order.It is no accident that
empires
have been the most
pervasive provider
of
orderthroughouthistory
At the
same time, profound
material nd ideational
changes
over the
course
of
the
twentieth
entury
ave
made classical empires
obsolete,
established consensual
politics
as
an interna-
tional norm,
and removed
many
of
the
traditional ncentives
o coercive and
predatorybehavior. The notion ofbenign unipolarity ests not on the denial
of
power realities,
but
on the
opportunity
o channel
through
willful
agency
the
manner
n
which, and
the
ends
to
which, power
is exercised.
n
addition,
I
am seeking
to
help break down
the
barriers
between
security
tudies
and
international oliticaleconomy by bringinggeopoliticsback into the study of
regionalism.
n
the pages thatfollow, explorethestrategic mplications f an
internationalandscape
increasingly haped by
flows of trade
and capital and
the economic
implications
of
an international tructurencreasingly harac-
terizedby regional concentrationsf
power.9
9. The limitations f current hinking bout the emerging nternational ystem tem n part from
the high disciplinarywalls that still stand between international olitical economy and security
studies. The study of regionalism nd institutions uch as the EU, the North AtlanticFree Trade
Agreement NAFTA), and the Asia PacificEconomic Cooperation forum APEC) remainsprimarily
the domain of economists and political economists trained to think bout exchange and wealth
creation. The study of geopolitics,polarity,
nd
institutions uch as the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization NATO), the Organizationfor ecurity
nd
Cooperation
n
Europe, and the Associa-
tion of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) remainsprimarily he domain of security pecialists.
A
limiteddegree of fertilizationcross these disciplinary arriers s occurring, owever. Theoretical
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After ax Americana 45
I begin by
laying out
the
logic of benign unipolarity. then discuss the
descriptive and
prescriptive mplications of the notion for North America,
Europe, and East Asia. In the final ection,
theorize about the dynamics that
would
characterize nternational olitics n a worldof benign unipolar regions,
exploringhow to effect heir nternal ohesion as
well as cooperative relations
among
them.
The Logic of
BenignUnipolarity
The promotionofintraregional eace is the
logical starting oint of efforts o
construct stable
nternational rder to follow
Americanhegemony.10
f
neigh-
bors are at peace with each other, hey are
likely to
be
at peace with-states
further
field.
f
neighbors re at war with each
other,
tates
further
field
are
likely to become
involved,
both to
contain
the war
and
to
prevent
the emer-
gence
of
a powerfulvictor
with
extraregional
mbition.
Regionalunipolarity rovides orderand stability hrough ower asymmetry
and the structural ierarchy hatfollowsfrom t. The
preponderance
of the
leading regional
statediscourages othersfrom
alancing against
t
and enables
the eader to underwrite he
nstitutions nd norms of regional
order.
Whereas
roughlyequivalent power produces balancing
and contestation ver leader-
ship, asymmetry roduceshierarchy
nd a
core-periphery attern
f
relations.
perspectives traditionally eserved for the study
of economic bodies are being used to
study
securitybodies.
See, for example, John Duffield, Explaining the Long Peace in Europe: The
Contributions f Regional SecurityRegimes, Review f nternationaltuidies,ol. 20, No. 4 (October
1994), pp. 369-399. And theoretical erspectives
raditionally eservedfor he study of geopolitics
and security re being applied to groupings uch
as the EU. See, for xample, Ole Waever's work
on European integration,n particular, Europe's Three Empires:A Watsonian nterpretationf
Post-WallEuropean Security, n Rick Fawn and Jeremy arkins, ds., Internationalociety fter he
Cold War New York: St. Martin'sPress, 1996), pp. 220-260.
I
am
indebted
to Waever for
nitially
inspiringme to apply the logic of empires to the
EU and, consequently, o otherregional bodies
traditionally iewed primarily s trade groupings.
For a contemporary erspective
on
the geopo-
litical mportance f regional ones of nfluence,ee Charles WilliamMaynes,
A
WorkableClinton
Doctrine, Foreign
olicy,
No. 93 (Winter 993),pp. 3-21.
For more general works
on
contemporary
regionalism, ome of which do touch on
geopolitical concerns, ee Peter Katzenstein nd Takashi
Shiraishi, ds., Netzvorkozver: apan
nd
Asia (Ithaca,N.Y.: Cornell University ress, 1997);
Edward
Mansfield and Helen Milner, eds., The Political
Economnyf Regionalism New York: Columbia
University ress, 1997); David Lake and PatrickMorgan, eds., RegionalOrders:Butildingecuirityn
a
NezvWorld University ark: Pennsylvania StatePress, 1997); Jeffreyrankel and Miles Kahler,
eds., Regionalismiind Rivalry:Japan nd the United
States
n
PacificAsia (Chicago: University
f
Chicago Press, 1993);
and Louise
Fawcett
and Andrew
Hurrell, ds., Regionalismn
n
World olitics:
RegionalOrganizationnd International rder
Oxford,U.K.: OxfordUniversity ress, 1995).
10. On promoting egionalpeace as a pathway to
global stability,ee Joseph . Nye, Peace nParts:
Integrationnd Conflictn Regional
Organizationi
Boston: Little,Brown, 1971).
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Internationalecurity 3:2 | 46
Asymmetry y itself
oes not preventbalancing,however.The
character f the
leading state and the
manner nwhich t wields its power also
determinehow
other states react
to preponderance.Cores that engage
in
self-binding nd
exercise theirpower
in a
benign
manner are unlikely to trigger alancing.11
Indeed, the benign exercise
of
power
gives rise to
the
trust, hared interests
and identities,
nd international
nstitutions ssential to
escaping anarchy
nd
fostering community
f states
within
which
the
rules
of
self-help
ompetition
no longer apply.12
In contrast, tates that
exercise unfettered ower and that
engage
in
predatory
nd exploitativebehavior are likely to
trigger alancing
coalitions
and
strategic ivalry. ocking
n
regional peace
means getting ight
both the structure
nd the character fpower.13
11. I define the terms benign and self-binding s follows. Self-binding s
the mechanism
throughwhich states render theirpower benign. Self-binding as quantitative, ualitative, and
proceduralcomponents. n quantitative erms, elf-binding ntails state'swillingness o withhold
power, to refrain rom ully xercising
ts resources nd influence.This
strategic
estraint
may
be
codified, as
in
the cases of contemporaryGermany
and
Japan,
or it
may
be
embodied only
in
practice.The qualitative omponent f self-binding oncerns he ends to which power is exercised.
Benign states
seek to
manage
rather
han maximize
power,
to
promote oint gains
rather han to
behave in an extractive nd exploitativemanner, nd to erectorders based upon the notion that
the spread of shared norms and identities nd the formation f community t the international
level can overcome competitive elations mong atomistic tate units. The procedural component
of self-binding ntails a preference
or
multilateral ver
unilateral nitiative.
Benign states favor
consensual governance, nd resort o unilateraldecisionmaking nlywhenmultilateralismailsto
produce
an
acceptable
outcome.
12. The.notion that great powers have character nd pursue differentypes of behavior has firm
roots
n
classical realism.Classical realists egularly istinguish etween revisionist
nd
status quo
powers. See,
for
example,
Arnold
Wolfers,
The Balance of Power
in
Theory
and
Practice,
n
Wolfers, d.,Discord nd Collaboration:ssays n nternationaloliticsBaltimore,Md.: JohnsHopkins
University ress, 1962);
Randall
Schweller, Tripolarity
nd the
Second World
War,
nternational
Studies
Quarterly,
ol.
37,
No.
1
(March 1993), pp. 73-103; Schweller, Neorealism's Status-Quo
Bias: What Security Dilemma? Security tudies,Vol. 5, No.
3
(Spring 1996), pp. 90-121; and
Mastanduno, Preserving he Unipolar Moment.
am
extending
his
typology o include benign
powers.
Revisionist
tates
seek
to
overturn he
prevailing ystem hrough cquisitive
and
preda-
tory trategies. tatus quo states seek to preserve the prevailing ystemby pursuing competitive,
but not
acquisitive, trategies. enign states
eek not
ust
to
preserve he status quo,
but
to deepen
its stability nd cooperative character y reassuring ther tates and fostering onsensual govern-
ance through he withholding s well as theexerciseofpower.Thekey difference etweena status
quo stateand
a
benign tate tems from iverging onceptions
f
the sources
of
order
nd
stability.
Stability
n a
world
of
status quo states
stems from the
absence
of
strategic rivalry among
satisfied-but atomistic
nd
self-regarding-state
nits
still
residing
n
an
anarchic environment.
The security ilemma does not operate because no revisionist tate exists to trigger t. Stabilityn
a
world of benign states
stems from uccessful
efforts
o carve out nonanarchic
pace through
promoting ooperation, rust,
nd
shared values
and
identities.The securitydilemma does
not
operate
because states
no
longer
reside
in an
anarchic, elf-help etting.
13. Consider how important oth the structure nd character f power are to the stability f the
current nternational ystem.
The
asymmetry
ssociated
with
American
preponderance
creates
structural
hierarchy.
ther
major
states are not
balancing against
U.S.
preponderance
in
part
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After
ax
Americana 47
Benign unipolarity
epresents means of
combining he right tructure ith
the
right haracter. he
structural ierarchy hat
ccompanies power asymme-
try s a potent peace-causing
agent. Hierarchy
lone is not enough,however;
the
emergence of a stable orderalso depends on
the benign character f the
core and its willingnessto
forge consensualbargainwith theperiphery. he
core
agrees
to
engage in self-binding.n return, he
periphery andwagons and
agrees to enter
nto the core's sphere of influence.
This bargain provides the
core with
what
it
wants-a
regional
order
to its
liking at low cost. It also
provides the peripherywith
what it wants-the tamingof the core's
power by
exposing it to the moderating nfluences f a
multilateral ramework.
ower
asymmetries reatehierarchy, ut order
emergesbecause power is withheld t
the
same time that t is exercised. This bargain also
sets
in
motion a gradual
process
throughwhich individual states come to
equate their
own
interests
and
identity
with
the nterests nd
identity
f the
region
as
a whole.
Regional
cohesion thenrestsnot
only
on
a coincidence
of
separate national
nterests,
ut
also on a nascentsocial character nd sense of
community.14
Daniel Deudney's concept
of negarchy provides furthernsight
nto the
logic of
benignunipolarity.15Consensual regional formations
rovide
order
by
mixing
traditionalhierarchy
with
elements of
negarchy-order
that
emerges
through elf-binding, hrough
he
constraint
nd moderationof
power
rather
than ts
unfettered
xercise.Like the
U.S.
Constitution,
which
uses
particular
configurations f
negatives
and
an
elaborate
system
of
power-constraint
devices
to establish domesticorder,benign
unipolarity
elies on
a
system
of
negotiated hecks and
balances to establish nternational rder. t s thisnotion
of mixing empowermentwith disempowerment, f hierarchywith mecha-
nisms that check the
advantages of
preponderance,
that
is at
the
heart of
benignunipolarity nd the
conception
of
regional
order thatfollows from t.16
because of stark power
asymmetry,
ut also because they view U.S.
intentions
s
benign, not as
exploitative
or
predatory.Were
U.S.
behavior
to become
predatory,
ts
preponderance would
trigger he
formation
f balancing coalitions, uch as those formed gainst
Germany nd Japan
n
the 1930s.
14. See Ole Waever, Integration as Security, n Charles A. Kupchan,
ed., Atlantic
Security:
Contending isions New York:Council on ForeignRelationsPress, 1998);
and PeterJ. atzenstein,
United Germany
n
an Integrating urope,
in
Katzenstein, d.,
Tamed ower:
Germany
n
Europe
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University ress, 1997).
15. Daniel Deudney, The PhiladelphianSystem: overeignty, rmsControl,
nd Balance
of
Power
in
the American States-Union, irca 1787-1861, nternational rganization, ol.
49,
No.
2
(Spring
1995), pp. 191-228.
16. It is the power-checking uality of benign unipolaritythat distinguishes t from ts main
conceptual competitor-hegemony. According to hegemonic stability
theory,
he
stronger
he
hegemon and the more able it is to provide public goods, the more stable the order.See Robert
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Internationalecurity 3:2 | 48
The power-constraint
evices that
work togetherwith asymmetry
o pro-
duce benignunipolarity
ake two forms.First, ore
states erect nternalrules
and
institutions hat check
their xternal
power.
Societal
norms
against coer-
cive intervention,
hecks and balances
among branches of government,
nd
constitutional
imitson the use of force
re
examples.
Second,
core stateserect
external
rules and institutions
hat bind themselvesto other
states.17For
ex-
ample, the institutionshatgovernthe Franco-German oalition, nd theEU
more generally,
heckthe power
of ndividual states, stablishmechanisms
for
collectivedecisionmaking
and
initiative,
nd
promote
the
spread
of
region-
wide interests
nd identities.18
Keohane, After
egemnony
Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversity ress,
1984), pp. 31-32. In contrast,
benign unipolarity merges
not
from he hegemon's mposition
oforder, ut throughnegotiation
between the core
and its
surroundingperiphery.
he result s
a hierarchical rder that s more
multilateral n spirit nd practice han
that
envisaged
in
hegemonic tability heory. urthermore,
order emerges through
the
withholding
of
power
as well as its
application.
In
this
sense,
and
contrary o hegemonic tability heory, weaker core and one that xercises elf-restraintill lead
to
a more
cohesive
and durable
regional
formation
han will a
stronger
nd
domineering
ne. The
less preponderant nd the more benign the core, the more t relieson bargains to establishorder
and the
ess fearful maller states are
of
exploitation esulting
rom
gross power asymmetries.
The differences etween hegemony nd benign unipolarity elp resolve
a long-standing uzzle:
why regional
nstitutions
n
Europe
are
far
more
developed
than n North
America or East Asia.
If
power asymmetry
lone were the main determinant
f
institutionalized egional order, the
reverse should be true. The United States and Japan have been more preponderant
n
their
respective egions
than has
been eitherGermany
or the Franco-German oalition.For measures of
the
relativepreponderance
of the United
States,Japan,
nd Germany
n
theirrespectiveregions,
see Josteph rieco, Systemic
Sources of Variation
n
Regional
Institutionalization
n
Western
Europe, East Asia,
and
the Americas,
n
Mansfield nd Milner,
hePolitical conomy fRegionalism,
pp. 173-175.
The notionof benign unipolarity xplains why regionalism n Europe is the most advanced.
Europe's less stark symmetries ngender greater eliance
on
consensual
governance. f Europe is
to construct
nipolarity,
t must
do so
throughnegotiation
between core and periphery.North
America's unipolarity omes without trying ecause of U.S. preponderance.
As a result, nstitu-
tionalized governance s emerging nly gradually, s the United Statesrecognizes the advantages
associated
with
withholding ower
and
playing by
the rules of
multilateralism.
n
Asia as well, a
combination
of
starkasymmetries
nd fear about whether
the core
will
exercise ts power
in
a
benign
manner
has
inhibited he
emergence
of nstitutionalized
egional
order.Power asymmetry
must
be pronounced enough
to establish
hierarchy,
ut not so pronounced that it inhibits a
consensual regional
formation. or a similar
argument
bout the extent o whichless hegemony
may produce more regionalism, ee Donald Crone, Does HegemonyMatter?The Reorganization
of
the
PacificPolitical
Economy,
World
olitics,
Vol.
45,
No.
4
(July
993), pp. 501-525.
17.
I
include
both forms
f
power
constraint
n
the notion
of
self-bindingntroduced bove. Daniel
Deudney and John kenberry se the term co-binding to refer xclusively to externalpower-
constraintdevices
in
which
states
bind one another.
See
Deudney
and
Ikenberry,
Structural
Liberalism: The Nature
and
Sources
of Postwar
Western
Political
Order,
Review
of
nternational
Studies
forthcoming).
18. The
power-constraint
evices thatmoderate external elations
mong
EU
members re not as
robust as
those that
govern
nternal
politics
within
the United
States,
but
they
are based
on
the
same
underlying ogic. Indeed,
were
European integration
o
deepen considerably
n
the
years
ahead and lead to
a
federal
union,
the
power-constraint
evices
that now
operate among its
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After ax Americana 49
These power-checkingdevices endow contemporary
nipolar
formations
with
quite differentttributes han theirhistorical
ntecedents-empires. To-
day's cores
will
exercise nfluence ver theirperipheries hroughmore subtle
and less coercive
means
than n
previous eras.
Multilateral
nstitutions
nd the
indirect
nfluence
f
markets, apital flows,
nd information ave
replaced
the
direct ntrusions f colonial rule. n addition, ores will rely
more on the spread
of shared values and identitiesto facilitategovernance and engender cohe-
sion.19
urthermore, oth core and periphery
will
be morecost-sensitive han
in the past. Consensual participationmeans that the
periphery an exit f t is
no longer reaping benefits r deems that the core is nothonoring ts commit-
ment to self-binding. ore states too
will
be more cost-sensitive han
during
previous eras, tendingto see foreign ommitments s liabilities
rather
han
as
assets.20 his
strategic tinginess
means that
ontemporary
nipolar
formations
will
not fall prey to overextension, s
did
many classical empires.21
On the
contrary, hey
will
be
exclusive groupings of
the
wealthy
and soon-to-be
wealthy. Whereas imperial cores used to extend their reach over far-flung
possessions of littleeconomic
or
strategicvalue, today's have-nots are
likely
simply
to be
ignored.
CONSTRUCTING
POLARITY AND THE
SOURCES
OF STRATEGIC RESTRAINT
The notion of benign unipolarity requires two conceptual amendments
to
conventional ccounts of
polarity
nd structure. he first tems from he claim
that
polarity can be willfullyconstructedrather
than
being
an immutable
product of the distribution f power among nation-states.22 o call for the
individual states would be transformed nto constitutional hecks operating within a single,
amalgamated polity
19. See G. John kenberry nd Charles A. Kupchan, Socialization and
Hegemonic Power,
nter-
iationalOrganization, ol. 44, No. 2 (Summer 1990), pp. 283-315.
20. Recenthistory as played an important ole n bringing bout this reevaluation f the benefits
of maintaining extensive external commitments.The colonial empires of the early twentieth
century ollapsed
in
partbecause thecores became unable to supportthe
wide
range
of commit-
ments theyhad acquired. So too were both great powers of the late twentieth
entury hastened
by costly nd futile ttempts o maintainorder n theirrespectiveperipheries.
21.
See Paul
M.
Kennedy,
The
Rise and
Fall
of theGreatPowers New
York:Random House, 1987);
Jack nyder,Myths fEmpire Ithaca,
N.Y.:
CornellUniversity ress,
1991); and Charles
A.
Kupchan,
TheVutlnerabilityfEmpire Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University ress, 1994).
22. A
mildly constructivist erspective nforms he analysis throughout
his article.
A
starting
assumption
s that nternational tructure an be
shaped by
willful
gency
and practice
nd is not
simply
n
immutableproductof the distribution f materialpoweramong
stateunits.
Cooperative
interaction mong statescan shape identities nd interests,
n
turn
reating
hared understandings
of structure hat
diverge
from
raditionalnotions of
self-help
nd competitive narchy. ee Alex-
anderWendt, Anarchy s What StatesMake of t, nternationalr-ganization,
ol.
46,
No.
2
(Spring
1992), pp. 391-425. My analysis differs romWendt's
n
an important espect.
Wendt s a structu-
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Internationalecurity 3:2 | 50
construction
f
regional unipolarity
ssumes that
agents
have considerable
control
ver structure. his claim does
not
represent
s radical
a
departure
s
it initially ppears. History provides many examples of
willful
processes of
integration nd amalgamation that transformed tructure. he United States
once consisted
of
separate
and
competitive
tate units.
t
became a
single pole
through federation.
About
one
hundred
years later,Germany
overcame its
multipolarity hrough ts own process of unification. urope is now
in
the
midst of a similartransformation.
t
is
not
becoming
a
single pole,
but the
EU
is
endowing Europe
with a
unipolar
structure
hrough
he
establishment
f
a
preponderantFranco-German oalition-what
I
call a pluralisticcore -that
governs
n
a
hub-spoke pattern
ver
its
periphery.23
hese instances
of
geopo-
litical engineering ake time,
but
theyhave succeeded in producing structural
transformation.
The second conceptual amendment stems fromthe claim thatpoles have
character
and that the manner
in
which
they
exercise their
power shapes
relationswiththeir maller neighbors s well as withotherpoles. The attrib-
utes
of international
tructure re determined
by polarity,
ut
also
by
the
character
f
the
poles. Self-regarding
nd
competitive
ehavior s
not endemic.
Indeed, my analysis rests on the
claim
that strategic estraint nd the
with-
holding of power are becoming embedded features f contemporary nterna-
tional politics. Because
a core's
willingness
to
engage
in
self-binding, ot ust
its preponderance, s central
o
the peace-causing effects
f
benign unipolarity,
justifying
his
claim is
necessary
to
complete
the
logical
foundation of
my
argument.
Core states are exercising their power in a more benign fashion than in
previous historical ras forfivemain reasons.24 irst, hanges
n
the sources of
ralist nd takes sovereign tates
to be the
key
unit of
analysis. nteraction etween states can alter
how statesunderstand heattributesf a given structure,utpracticedoes not change structure-
as definedby the distribution f materialpower.
In
contrast, am arguingthatcertain tates-
France and Germany are prime examples-engage
in
practices that pool sovereignty nd,
in
so
doing,
transform he units that constitute
tructure,
ot
ust
the attributes f a
given
structure.
23. AlthoughFrance and Germanymaintain eparate national governments nd capitals,they re
engaging
n
practices jointdecisionmaking, single
market nd
currency,
nd
jointmilitary orces)
that
pool sovereignty, ive
the
coalition attributes
f
unitarygovernance,
nd therefore ndow it
withaspects of constituting single pole. I am relying n the notionof a pluralistic ore to capture
the
type
of
political
unit
represented y the
Franco-German
oalition.
24. An
intellectual ension dmittedly xistsbetween my claim
that
trategic estraint
s
becoming
an embedded feature f nternational olitics
nd
my nsistence
n
the
need for
tructural ources
of
stability.Why bother
with
constructing
rder based on structural
ierarchy
f
the exercise of
strategic
estraint
ill
itselfmoderate
competition?
tructural ources of
stability
ortwo
reasons
remain mportant
ven
in
a
world
of
benign
states.
First, lthough benign great powers
refrain
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After ax
Americana 51
state power have diminished the returns o predatorybehavior. Technology,
information,nd productivity ave replaced land and labor as the key deter-
minants of wealth, making trade and investment ar more effective ools of
statecrafthan territorialonquest.25Nuclear weapons and the proliferation
f
sophisticated onventionalweapons also make conquest more difficult.
iber-
ating wealth creation from questions of territorial ontrol enables core and
periphery o pursue joint gains through ooperative strategiesmore regularly
than
during previous eras. In addition, economic and technological ransfor-
mation gives core states considerable nfluence ver their maller neighbors.26
In sum, core states can get what they want and thinkthey deserve without
resorting o overt forms f coercion.
Second, changesin prevailing nternational orms encourage benign behav-
ior.Were a regionalpower to attempt o coerce ts neighbors nto a hierarchical
order,
both
its victims
nd
extraregional tates would resist.So too might
ts
own
population oppose
such
coercive
behavior. Order that
emerges through
consensus is thus likely to be cheaper and more durable than order that
emerges through
coercion.
Accordingly, ores face normative-and,
conse-
from redatory ehavior, hey tillexpect the advantages, nfluence, nd prestige hat accompany
superiority. o take seriouslythe notion of carvingout nonanarchic pace does not mean denying
that power still matters great deal. Germany, or xample, exercises elf-restraintn Europe and
works hard to embed the national state n a supranationalpolitical pace, but nonetheless xpects
to be the EU's most influential ctor.To pretendotherwise nd resist he hierarchy hat devolves
frompower asymmetrieswould only alienate major states and provide incentivesfor them to
diverge from enign behavior.Second, structural ources of stability rovide nsurance gainst the
breakdown of unit-level ources that are more prone to unforeseen hock and rapid change. The
Concert
of
Europe, for xample, functioned moothly s long as the governing egimes
n
its five
members adhered to agreed norms of behavior. The revolutionsof 1848, however, ed to wide-
spread domesticupheavals thatunderminedtheConcert, apidly bringing ompetitive alancing
back
to
a multipolarEurope. Had structural ources of stability lso been operative, European
peace may well have weathered the unit-level hanges that caused the Concert to unravel. See
Charles
A.
Kupchan and
CliffordA.
Kupchan, Concerts, Collective Security,
nd the Future of
Europe, Internationalecurity, ol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 114-161. On the revolutions
f
1848and the end of the Concert, ee pp. 142-143,n. 81.
25. See,
for
xample, Rosecrance,The Rise of
the
Trading tate; nd Van Evera, Primed
for
Peace,
pp. 14-16. For a contrary iew arguing thatconquest stillpays in the contemporary ra, see Peter
Liberman,Does Conquest ay? (Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversity ress, 1996).For a critiqueof
Liberman's arguments, ee Charles Kupchan's review of his book
in American
olitical
Science
Review, ol. 91,No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 1008-1009.
26. Consider the effect f preparations for monetary union on the political economies of EU
member states or the extent
to
which the international ommunity's ntervention
n the Asian
economic crisis
has affected omestic politics
and
business practices
n
the region.
n
addition,
peripheral
states
usually
need to meet certain
political criteria
o
gain
access to
contemporary
regional formations,nducing them to carryout domestic reforms. onsider the powerful effect
that prospectivemembership
n
the EU and
NATO
has had on
reform
n
Central Europe.
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Internationalecurity 3:2 | 52
quently, nstrumental-incentives
o
self-bind ven when preponderancepro-
vides them the option of resorting o coercive
behavior.
Third, the spread of democracy makes more likely the benign exercise of
power. Cores ruled by democraticregimes tend
to
pursue
moderate
foreign
policies
toward other democracies
for
both
institutional nd normativerea-
sons.
On the nstitutional
ide,
the checks and balances associated withdemoc-
racy constrain he conduct of foreignpolicy and limitthe resourcesthat the
state allocates
to
foreign engagement. Open
debate also
tends to
produce
centrist
olicies.
On the normative
ide,
democracies
develop
a mutual
respect
based on
their hared commitment o
the
rule
of law and
consensual
politics.
Conflictsof interestbetween them are therefore ettled through peaceful
means.27 n addition, common domestic norms nurture a shared sense of
community, elping
to
forge
transnational
pace
in
which the rules
of
self-
help competitionno longer apply.
Fourth, ngoing processes of integration re normalizing nd institutional-
izing self-binding ractices.Forexample, pluralistic ores coresthatconsistof
more
than one
state) produce
an intrinsic
inding
effect
hat
extends nto the
core's
relationship
with
ts
periphery. ustaining
the coherence of the
Franco-
German coalition
requires bargaining
and self-limitation
n
behalf
of both
parties,
which
n turn
moderate the nfluence
hat
he coalition
wields
over the
periphery.
The
EU
as
a
whole,
because
it
institutionalizes
ower-constraint
devices
internationallyust
as
a
constitution
oes
so
domestically,
nd be-
cause
it
promotes regionwide
nterests nd
identities,
einforces
elf-binding
practices.
Fifth,manyofthe world's leading regional powers have undergone moder-
ating social transformations.
he
political and social legacy of WorldWar II
reinforces
elf-binding
n
Germany
and
Japan. Societal aversion to war and a
commitment
o
wielding
nfluence
hrough ther hanmilitarymeans continue
to
limit
the scope
of external mbition n
both countries.28 ven
in
the United
States,
whose
territory
as not been
subjected
to the
devastation
of
war since
the
nineteenth entury,
version to the use of force
nd the potential oss of
life
runs strong.29
27. See Russett,
Grasping
heDemocratic
eace; and Doyle, Liberalism and World Politics.
28. See PeterJ.
Katzenstein,
CulturalNorms nd National
Security: olice and Militaryn
Postwar
Japan Ithaca,
N.Y.:
Cornell University ress, 1996); and Thomas U.
Berger, Norms,
Identity,
nd
National Security, n
PeterJ.Katzenstein, d.,
The Culture
fNationalSecurity: orms nd
Identity
in World oliticsNew York: Columbia
University ress,1996), pp. 317-356.
29. JohnMueller argues
in
Retreat rom oomsday hat this social transformationas
been
driven
by moral change;
war has become unthinkable. dward Luttwak blames declining
birthrates nd
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After ax Americana 53
RELATIONS BETWEEN BENIGN POLES
Even if benign unipolaritypromotes regional
order in the manner outlined
above, theformation f unipolar regionswould be undesirable
f the resultant
blocs ended up in a security
ompetitionwithone another.My prescription
would then constitute recipe for triggering
onflict mong regional behe-
moths, not for securingglobal stability. or four
reasons,
however,
benign
unipolaritywould make for more peaceful relationsnot just within regions,
but also between them.
First, recisely ecause benign unipolar formations
re instruments or
man-
aging rather than accumulatingpower, they
would dampen, not stimulate,
interregional ivalry. he
self-binding nd consensual
bargaining hat
onstrain
the exercise of power
within regions would also operate between regions;
power
that
s checked
at
the regional level
will
be
similarly
hecked
at the
extraregional evel. Benign regional formations
y theirverynature
turn heir
energies inward ratherthan outward, seeking
to hold power
at
bay,
not to
project t. The European Union provides an excellent llustration. he EU is
often riticized or
ts failure o forge commondefensepolicy
and
its
unwill-
ingness to assume a greater
defense role beyond its boundaries,
but thepur-
pose
of the EU
is
tomanage power within,
not
outside, Europe.
Accordingly,
it
has been designed
with
a host
of
checks
and balances
that moderate com-
petitive
behavior among
its members and
that
constrain
ts
ability
to
project
power externally.
hat
the
EU
is
inwardly
focused s evidence that
ts
experi-
ment n geopolitical
engineering
s
working
well. Consensual unipolar
forma-
tions are-and would be seen by actors
in
other regions as-providers
of
security nd stability, otblocs withpredatory ntent.30
Second, interregional elations
would benefit rom
he
deeper intraregional
integration ssociated
with benign unipolarity.Relations
between
regions
would be moderated because
relations
within hemwould be
cooperative
and
consensual. Consider
the cases
of
Europe
and
East Asia.
European integration
has to some extent come at
the
expense
of Europe's
external
ties,31
ut
the
the resultant
eluctance o lose children
n
battle s a major
factor
hanging
ttitudes oward war.
See Luttwak Where Are
the Great Powers? ForeignAffairs,
ol. 73,
No. 4 (July/August 994),
pp. 23-28.
30. Compare
Russia's indifference
oward the prospect fEU enlargement
o ts staunch
opposition
to NATO enlargement. espite
the aggregateeconomicand
military ower of
EU member tates,
Russia sees
the EU as a benign formation hat
does not threaten
ts security.How regional
groupingsperceive
the character
f each other'spower
will
be
farmore mportant
han
capability
itself n determining
he tenorof nterregional
elations.
31. The Common Agricultural
olicy and othertariff nd nontariff
arriershave discriminated
against extraregional
tates,but they have been
central
to
the
political deals struck n orderto
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Internationalecurity
3:2 | 54
internalpeace and stability hat ntegration as engenderedhave contributed
to Europe's abilityto sustain cooperative relations
withoutside powers. As a
result, Europe is set to enjoy internal stability nd hence cordial external
relations ven as the
United States retracts
he
protective
mbrella
that
nitially
made possible European integration.
n
contrast,East Asia
has
been well
integrated nto the global economy,
but in
a way that has stunted ts own
political ntegration. ngoing intraregional ivalries
nd
competitive ockeying
complicate
ts relations
with
outside
powers.
Absent America'sprotective
m-
brella, these rivalries
would
likely ntensify,mbroiling
East Asia in conflict
and
jeopardizing
ts
engagement
with
other
regions.
Puttingregional ntegra-
tion beforeglobal integration
will
help construct enign
unipolarity n each of
the
world's
three
main areas
of
military
nd industrial
power,
in turn
aying
the
groundwork
for
peaceful nterregional
elations.32
Third, the constraints
n
political centralization
nherent n a unipolar re-
gional formationwould check the concentration f power under a single
authority, ecreasing
the ikelihoodthat t would evolve intoa unitary egional
behemoth.
Benign regional
formations
re
more than
groupings
of
national
stateseach of
which
retains he traditional
rerogatives
f
sovereignty,
ut less
than federations
hat
centralize governance
and sublimate the autonomy of
theirconstituent nits.
And
although these formations
ave a nascent social
character that is rooted
in
a sense
of
community
nd
shared identity, his
deepen integration nd create a
unipolar
structure.
ntraregional rade as a percentage
of
total
trade
s
higher
n
Europe
than n North
America and East Asia.
As
of 1990,
ntraregional xports
as a percentage ftotalexports tood at roughly 0 percentforEurope and roughly 0 percentfor
North America and East Asia. See
Grieco, Systemic Sources
of
Variation, p. 172. Interestingly,
the United States during the earlypost-WorldWar
I
years did not object to
European protection-
ism, preciselybecause Washington
ppreciated the geopolitical significance ffostering egional
integration. ee Frankel,Regional
Trading locs,p.
5.
32. My argument estson theassumption that an increase n commercial ivalry
etween regions
would not result n security
ompetition.This assumption
in turn
rests on the
hypothesis
that
commercial ivalries ecome
security ivalries nly
when for
therreasons thepartiescome to see
each other as
geopolitical
rivals. For
example, economic competitionbetween Britain and the
United
States could
today
lead to a
security
dilemma
only
if for
reasons other than commercial
rivalry he two partiesno longerheld
benign images
of
each other.
A
perceptionof threat nd
malign ntent s necessary o transform
conomic competition nto strategic ivalry. ow commer-
cial
rivalries volve
into violent conflict as received
nsufficientttention
n
the
scholarly itera-
ture.Forthoughtful nalysis of one case study and initialhypotheses, ee JackLevy and Salvatore
Ali, From CommercialCompetition o
StrategicRivalry o War: The Rise ofAnglo-DutchRivalry,
1609-1652,
n
Paul Diehl, ed., TheDynamics fEnduring ivalriesChampaign:
University f llinois
Press, 1988), pp. 29-63. The argument hat
benign
states tend to
pursue absolute,
as opposed to
relative,
ains
with
each other
s of direct
relevance here.
See
Duncan
Snidal,
Relative Gains and
the Pattern
f
nternational ooperation, American
olitical cience
Reviezv,ol. 85,No.
3
(Septem-
ber 1991), pp.
701-726.
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After ax Americana 55
identity oexists with distinct
ultural and linguisticdifferences hat serve as
barriers o centralization nd thetransfer f political oyalties to an authority
beyond the nation-state.33ven as regionsevolve into unipolar structures,hey
are not likely to amalgamate into
single poles of power under a central
authority.34
Finally, onsensual regional
formations re unlikely o evolve into predatory
behemoths because they would
unravel fromwithin f they sought to do so.
For reasons just outlined, the
separate national units in regional formations
will
retain a significant egree of
autonomy and will not amalgamate into a
unitary ederal tructure. ccordingly,
f core statewere to develop predatory
ambition and
pursue aggressivebehavior, ts immediate neighborswould
be
the most threatened.The pursuit of such ambition and the explicit massing
of
power
it
would entail would thus constitute violation of the consensual
bargain
at
the heart of benign
unipolarity.Were France,
for
example,
to
act
upon its rhetoricand seek to turn
the
EU
into a global imperial power,
Germany tself nd France's smallerneighborswould be thefirst o resist.The
return f geopolitical ambition to Europe would therefore e far more likely
to trigger ntra-European alancing and
the end of the Franco-German oali-
tion than
it
would the emergence
of
the EU
as
a
global power. Regional
multipolarity, ot an aggressiveregional unipole, would be the result.
The
Rise
ofBenign nipolarityn North
merica,urope,
and EastAsia
My aim in this section s to demonstrate hat benign unipolarity s not ust a
theoretical
construct,
but a
geopolitical
formation hat holds considerable
promise
of
becoming a reality. provide evidence thatbenign unipolar regions
are
in
fact
taking shape
and
are
having
a
powerful mpact
on
the
emerging
international rder.
33. For discussion of ascriptive, inguistic, nd cultural barriers to amalgamation, see Ernest
Gellner,
Nations
nd
NationalismIthaca, N.Y.: Cornell University ress, 1983), pp. 64-73.
34. As Fareed Zakaria has recentlydocumented, the United States did not pursue ambitious
external policies until the locus of authority hifted from the individual states to the federal
government nd fromCongress to the executive branch. See Zakaria, From Wealth
o Power:The
Unusual Origins f America'sWorldRole (Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversity ress, 1998). Even
though regional blocs would contain enormous power capabilities, their decentralized nature
would limit heir bility o projectpower externally.n this respect, he federal spirations oming
from some quarters in Europe~ hould be discouraged because their fulfillment ould trigger
external mbition nd foster nterregional ecurity ompetition.
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Internationalecurity 3:2 | 56
NORTH
AMERICA
North
America has
enjoyed
a
relatively eacefulcentury
nd has
been
spared
the greathegemonicwars
that ost so
many
ives
in
Europe and East Asia. The
reason is straightforward:
orth America
has been
unipolar.
ts
major states
have not fought for supremacybecause American
preponderance naturally
establishes regional
hierarchy.
he United Stateshas
throughout
he
century
enjoyed
an
uncontested dvantage
in
economic and
military ower. Today
U.S.
gross domestic product
(GDP) is eight times that of Canada
and
Mexico
combined,
while U.S.
military xpenditure
s
twenty-seven
imes
hatof
ts
two
neighbors.35
Mexico
and
Canada
send some 70
percent
of their
xports
to the
United
States,
while
the United States sends
in
return
nly
25
percent
of its
exports.36
he
power
of the U.S. market nd
the
threat r
reality
of
military
intervention ave long
ensured thatNorth America,
Central America, nd the
Caribbean
fall
within
America's
sphere
of
military
nd economic dominance.37
That unipolarity omes
so easilyto NorthAmericahas
in
factworked against
the establishment f more formal nstitutions f regionalgovernance. nstead,
U.S.
preponderance
creates
a de
facto core
and a
surroundingperiphery.
A
hub-spoke patternof intraregional elationshas evolved
largely throughthe
operation
of the market nd America's unilateral
fforts-including
irect nd
indirectmilitary ntervention-to
create a security nvironment o its liking.38
Since
the
mid-1980s,
rder based on de facto
power asymmetries
as
given
way to a regional formation xhibiting
he de
jure
characteristics f benign
unipolarity.39he North
AmericanFree Trade
Agreement
NAFTA) institution-
alized a
regional
order based
on
consensual bargaining between core and
35. International nstitutefor StrategicStudies (IISS), The MilitaryBalance, 1997-1998 (London:
OxfordUniversity ress, 1997), pp. 18, 37,
221. In
1990 U.S.
GDP
was fivetimesthatofall of Latin
America combined. See Peter Smith,Talons f theEagle: Dynamics f
U.S.-Latin
American
elations
(New York: OxfordUniversity ress, 1996), p.
224.
36.
Andrew Wyatt-Walter,Regionalism,Globalization, and
World
Economic Order,
n
Fawcett
and
Hurrell,Regionalistn
n World
olitics, .
101.
37. For a succinct verview of the history f American nvolvement n Central nd South
America,
see
Smith,
Talons
f
the
Eagle.
38. Steady increases n intraregional lows of trade and investmentwere largely
market-driven,
with nstitutions ollowingfrom nd not preceding high evels of economic nterdependence.
ee
Albert Fishlow and Stephan Haggard, The United States and the Regionalization of the
World
Economy (Paris: Organization forEconomic Cooperation and Development, 1992), pp. 17,32.
39. The United States to some degree engaged in the quantitative nd qualitative components
of
self-binding
well beforethe 1980s. Had
it
not,
ts
preponderance
would
likely
have
triggered
ar
more
balancing
in
the
periphery.
t
was not until the
1980s, however,
that
the United States
also
began
to
practice procedural self-binding-that s,
to
prefer
multilateral o unilateral nitiative.
American power was thus exercised
n
a relatively enign manner with some notableexceptions)
well before
he
1980s,
but
became
more
benign
with the
shift oward regional multilateralism.
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After
ax
Americana 57
periphery
nd a
new American
willingness
o
subjectthe exerciseof ts
power
to a multilateral
ramework.40he original dea
for, nd impetus behind, the
agreement
ame from
Canada and Mexico.
Both
countries ould do
nothing
o
change the
asymmetriesn their
relationshipwiththe United
States,but they
could make a deal to
subject U.S.
policy to the constraints f a
multilateral
framework.As Stephan
Haggard and Albert
Fishlow put it,
NAFTA reflected
the effortsy weakercountries obind the UnitedStates to clear
rules. '41 he
agreement
n
many
respectsrepresents he
periphery'sdecision
to
structure
and control
de facto
power asymmetries y
design, ratherthan to let them
operate by default.42
The United States was
attracted o the deal in part
foreconomic
reasons:
to
gain marketaccess and
cheaper labor and to use
the threat
of
hemispheric
regionalism
o
encourage
Japan
and
Europe
to
move
forward n
the
Uruguay
Round trade
negotiations.43 ashington lso
used
NAFTA to
pursue
a
host of
order-relatedbjectives.NAFTA was to
lock
in
political
and economic reforms
inMexico,strengtheniberal politicalforces ywidening themiddle class, and
attract
oreign apital
to
Mexico, which would bolster
the economy
and
pro-
mote
politicalstability.44
conomic growth nd political reform
would in turn
help
stem
the tide
of
illegal immigration
nd
facilitate
fforts
o limit
drug
trafficking.he
agreement lso contains
measures for environmental
leanup
and
protection.
The
United States was thususing a
host of subtle formsof
penetration o
promote
stability n its periphery.45
ooking outward from he
core,
NAFTA
40. For discussion of the
evolution of consensual
strains
n U.S.
policy,
ee
Augusto
Varas,
From
Coercionto
Partnership:
A
New Paradigm for
Security
Cooperation n
the
Western
Hemisphere,
in
Jonathan
Hartlyn,
Lars
Schoultz,
and
Augusto Varas, eds.,
The
Unlited
tates nd
Latin
Amnerica
in the
990s: Beyond heCold
War Chapel Hill:
University fNorthCarolina
Press, 1993), pp. 46-63.
41.
Fishlow
and
Haggard, The
United States
and
the
Regionalization of the World
Economy,
pp. 8,
23.
42.
Canada
and
Mexico have not
always
dealt
with U.S.
preponderance
by willingly
ubmitting
to
American power and seeking
to modify tsconduct.
During
the
Cold
War,
n
part
because
U.S.
attention nd power were
concentrated
lsewhere,Canada in
particular ttempted omix
balanc-
ing and
bandwagoningand to
resistU.S. influence
y developing linkages
to extraregional tates
and
multilateral orums.NAFTA
represents considered
shift o
a
policy
of
bandwagoning
in
which
both Canada and
Mexico have decided
to seek
leverage over U.S. power rather han
to
resist t. See AndrewHurrell, Regionalism n theAmericas, n Fawcett and Hurrell,Regionialism
in
Wor-ld
olitics, p.
269-273.
43.
Wyatt-Walter,
Regionalism,Globalization, nd
WorldEconomic Order,
p.
85.
44.
For
a
concise summary of the
motivationsbehind
NAFTA,
see
Hurrell, Regionalism
n the
Americas, pp. 269-273; and
Smith,Talons f theEagle,pp.
245-260.
45.
The Clinton
administration'sescue of the
plunging peso in 1994-95,
forexample,resulted n
an
extraordinary
egree ofAmerican
nterventionn the Mexican
economy.
n
return orU.S. and
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Internationalecurity 3:2 | 58
representedmuch more than a trade agreementand was
to
a
considerable
extent vehicle
for
recastingMexico's political economy
n America's
image.
As Andrew Hurrell remarks, nstitutionalized egionalism
n North
America
is
part
of a broader
rethinking
f relations
.
.
which has
important trategic
and
geopolitical mplications. 46
n
effect,
AFTA resulted
from
deal struck
between a periphery ooking to tame and moderatethe behavior
of
the core
and a core ookingtoenhance tsability o shape regionalorder.47 nd despite
the core's reluctance to extend this bargain further
outh-Congress
denied
President
Bill Clinton fast-track
egotiating uthority
n
1997-other states
n
the Americas
are
pressing
for
entry
nto the club.
EUROPE
Europe has long suffered
he
effects f multipolarity.
he
Napoleonic
Wars,
he
Crimean
War, he
wars
of
German
unification,
nd
the
two
world wars
are
all
testimony
o
the destructivepotential
of
rivalry mong proximatepoles
of
power.Since 1945Europe has pursued a novel solution to its structural nsta-
bility:replacing multipolarity
with
unipolarity.
Most
Europeans would object
to the notion that the EU
is
an instrument or endowingEurope withunipo-
larity; onventionalwisdom holds that ntegration s meant
to banish power
politics
fromthe
continent,
ot recast
t.
Nevertheless,
European integration
has
from
he outset
had
potent geopolitical objectives.
n the words of
Robert
Schuman,
a
founding
ather
f
European integration,
Because
Europe
was
not
united, we have had war.... The action to be takenmust
first f all concern
France and
Germany.
his
proposal [for coal and steel
community]will create
thefirst oncretefoundationfor European federationwhich is so indispens-
able for the
preservation
of
peace. 48 Europe's smallerpowers came to wel-
International
MonetaryFund assistance,Mexico was obligated to deposit its oil export
revenue at
the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York and to introduce stabilizationplan that
covered fiscal
and monetary
olicy,banking reform, nd social
programs.
46.
Hurrell, Regionalism
n the
Americas, p. 272.
47. Regionalism n
North America lacks the explicit dentity-buildinggenda found in
Europe.
The scope and character f Americanpreponderance n
part explains why. n light f thepowerful
cultural magnetism
of
the
United States, asserting distinctive
dentity nd preserving ultural
autonomyremain
ssues of considerablepolitical aliency nboth Canada and Mexico.
Despite the
fearof America's cultural mperialism nd theabsence of more overt dentity-buildingnstru-
ments, urveydata
reveal that he attitudes fAmericans,Mexicans, nd Canadians are
converging
around
a
set of core values. See Ronald
L.
Inglehart,Neil
Nevitte,
nd
Miguel Basanfez,
he North
American
rajectory:ultural, coniomic,
nd
Political
Ties
mong
he
United
tates, anada,
nd Mexico
(New York:Aldine de
Gruyter, 996).
48.
Schuman
quoted
in
Gregory Treverton, merica,
ermany,
nd the
uture
fEuropePrinceton,
N.J.:Princeton
University ress, 1992), p.
104. Even scholars who have
focused
primarily
n the
economicimplicationsof the EU acknowledge that
the overridingmotivation ehind
the foun-
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After
ax
Americana 59
come
this
effort o renderbenign the
continent's ower center, ven
if
partici-
pation in
Europe meant entering regional
order craftedprincipallyby the
Franco-German
oalition.
The United Statesplayed a central ole in
enabling Europe to
pursue unipo-
larity.America'smilitary resence
essentially ook securityssues off he Euro-
pean agenda, buying time for
economic and political ntegration o
proceed.49
The process of integrationhas produced an effective nipolarity that has
succeeded not only in
eliminating ompetitive alancing
among Europe's ma-
jor
powers; the EU also exerts powerful
entripetal orce
cross the continent,
with most currentmembers ager to
participate n the nnercircleof monetary
union and many ofEurope's new
democracies waiting mpatiently or dmis-
sion
to
the
club.
Constructed,
s
opposed to
natural,unipolarity,
nd a
pluralistic
ather han
an
amalgamated core, endow Europe
with a center that has
quite different
attributes han that of North America.
Although more unwieldy than an
amalgamated core, a pluralistic ore encourages consensual formsof politics
because the
pulling
and
hauling
of
coalition
management
act as
an
internal
check and
make negotiation nd
compromise centralfeature
f
governance.
Compromise
within
the core
encourages
compromise
between the core
and
the
periphery. ore
self-binding
s
also far moredeeply
ingrained
n
societal
attitudes n
Germanythan
it
is in
the United
States.
Germany
s as
averse
to
unilateral
ction as
theUnited States s fond of t. A
large part
of
the reason is
the extent
o
which
Germanyhas come
to
equate its own interestsnd
identity
with
those of a
broader
European
construction.
n
the words of
Peter Katzen-
stein,German interests, ursued through ower and bargaining,werefunda-
mentally haped by the institutional
ontext f Europe and the
Europeaniza-
tion
of
the
identity
f
the German state. 50
The
power asymmetry etween core and
periphery
n
Europe
is
also less
stark
than
it is
in North America.
The GDP
of
the Franco-German
oalition s
about 80
percent
of the
GDP
of all
other EU members combined.
Franco-
German defense
spending represents
oughly
85
percent
of
that of
all
other
dation of the European Economic
Communitywas to bind Germany o France so that here
would
never be a repeat of the threewars that heyhad fought ver the precedingcentury. ee Frankel,
Regional
Trading
locs,p. 241.
49.
Some analysts contend
that
theprocess of integration emains dependent on
a
U.S. presence
and
that the
EU
would
be
unable to sustain its political coherence were America's strategic ole
on the continent o wane. See
Joseph
Joffe,Europe's American Pacifier, oreign olicy,No. 54
(Spring 1984), pp. 64-82; and Robert
Art, Why WesternEurope Needs the United States and
NATO, Political cienceQuarterly, ol. 111,No.
1
(Spring 1996), pp. 1-39.
50. Katzenstein, United Germany n
an Integrating urope, p. 15.
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Internationalecurity 3:2 | 60
EU members
ombined.51
Furthermore,symmetries n defense capability re
temperedby Germany'scontinued reluctance
o
assume defense responsibili-
ties commensuratewith its size because
of
the legacy of
World War II
and
because America's presence
n
Europe
obviates
the
need for
greaterGerman
role. Again, ess stark symmetry
orks
to
the
advantage
of
regional
cohesion.
The core does not have sufficient reponderance orelyon unilateral nitiative
and thus depends more heavilyon compromisewiththe periphery,n turn ein-
forcing he consensual bargain at the heartof Europe's constructed nipolarity.
Europe's unipolar structures reflectedn its patterns
f
governance.Despite
formal nstitutions
hat
seek
to
diffuse
uthority
cross
member
states,
most
decisions withinthe EU arise
from
agreementsstruckbetween France and
Germany.
The union's
major
initiatives-the
single market,monetaryunion,
and enlargement-have
emanated
primarily
romParis and
Bonn,
not from
other European capitals
or from
the
EU
bureaucracy
n
Brussels.52
his
core
draws the periphery owardthecenter hrough oth nducement therewards
ofinclusion)and threat the punishment fexclusion).
The prospect
of material
gain
has
ostensibly
een the EU's
drivingforce,
ut
geopolitical objectives
ie
just
beneath
the surface.
ndeed,
the evolution
of
the
EU is to a large extent he story f consensual bargaining mong member tates
over the construction
f
benign unipolarity.
onstitutionalized
elf-binding
n
Germany,
he checks
and
balances
intrinsic o the
Franco-German
oalition,
he
institutional iffusion f power across member states-these are
all
mecha-
nisnts
that
serve
to mix
empowerment
nd
disempowerment,
o
create order
throughpower asymmetry,
ut also
through
he core's
willingness
to
reduce
the benefits fpreponderanceand engage in consensual bargaining.
European monetary
nion
(EMU)
is
only
the most
recent
xample. Germany
will
voluntarily
ind
its
power by handing
over
control
f
ts
monetary olicy
to
a
supranational uthority
hat
governs through
onsensus and that s
politi-
cally ndependent.53
ther
European
states will
have
greater nput
nto
mone-
tary ssues,
and the
euro,
not the
deutsche
mark,
will
be
Europe's
dominant
51. IISS, TheMilitary alance, 997-1998,pp. 46-100.
52. Katzenstein, United Germany n an Integrating urope, pp. 26-27, 42-43. On decisionmak-
ing and the evolutionof EU institutions,ee RobertKeohane
and
StanleyHoffmann, ds.,
The
New
European onmmunity:ecisionmakingnd nstitutionalhange Boulder,Colo.:WestviewPress,1991);
Alberta Sbragia, ed., Euro-Politics:nstitutionsnd Policymakingn the New EuropeanCommunity
(Washington,
D.C.:
Brookings nstitution, 992);
and Andrew
Moravcsik, ed.,
Centralization
r
Fragmentation?: urope before he Challenges f Deepening,Diversity, nd Democracy New
York:
Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1998).
53.
On European monetary union,
see
Peter
Kenen,
Economic
nd
Monetary
Union
in
Europe
(Cambridge,U.K.: Cambridge University ress, 1995);
and
BarryEichengreen nd Jeffreyrieden,
eds., The Political conomy fEuropeanMonetary nificationBoulder,
Colo.:
Westview Press,1994).
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After
ax Americana
61
currency. t the same time,however,
Germany s effectivelyxporting ts own
monetary policy to its neighbors;
ultimately, he EU will have a political
economy
crafted
n
Germany's mage.Moreover,
he
primary mpetus behind
EMU came not fromministries f
financeor firms oing business in Europe,
but from oliticians oncerned bout
the geopolitical tructure f Europe. EMU
is first nd foremost bout
embedding the German state inside a broader
Europe and preventing the returnof national rivalries, not about wealth
creation. As Chancellor Helmut
Kohl has stated, In reality, he policy of
European integration omes down to
the question of whetherwe have war or
peace
in
the
twenty-firstentury. 54
lthoughthe economic benefits o smaller
powers remain unclear,they play along because the deal deepens a unipolar
structure hat
moderates and renders more
benign the behavior
of
Europe's
power
center.55
Europe exhibitsmany of theattributes f a benign unipolar formation. he
core's
nfluence ver
the periphery peratesthrough ormal nstitutions
s
well
as a host of subtle mechanisms-the market, he allure of entry nto Europe's
dominant
political formation, nd
the propagation of a sense
of
community
and common
identity.56
t
the same time, inguistic nd cultural differences
constitute
atural
barriers
o
centralization
nd
political malgamation, eaving
the EU
straddling
the national and
supranational realms. Europe's
core
also
exhibits the
cost
sensitivity
nd
strategic
restraint hat
are
characteristic
f
benign unipolarity. he EU's inability o make progress n forging
common
foreign
nd
security olicy and itsfailed efforts
o
address on its own the
war
in Bosnia
illustrate hat the union suffersmore from the underprovisionof
external ngagement han from heoverprovision nd overcommitmenthar-
acteristic
f
previous
eras.
7
Finally,
he EU
promises
to remain a club
for
the
54.
Helmut
Kohl, speech at the University f Louvain, Belgium,February , 1996, s cited
n
Kohl
Issues New Warning o Britain ver EU Reform, Agence France-Presse, ebruary , 1996. On the
motivations behind monetary union, see also Wayne Sandholtz, Choosing Union: Monetary
Politics and
Maastricht, nternationzalOrganization,
ol.
47,
No. 1
(1993), pp. 1-40;
and
Joseph
Grieco, State Interests nd InternationalRule Trajectories:
A
Neorealist Interpretation f the
Maastricht
Treaty
nd
European Economic and Monetary Union, Security tudies, ol. 5, No.
3
(Spring 1996), pp.
176-222.
55. For an analysis suggesting that poorer economies in Europe's south do not stand to benefit
economicallyfrommonetary nion, see ErikJones, Economic and MonetaryUnion: Playing with
Money, nMoravcsik,CentralizationrFragmentation?;nd Lloyd Gruber, Power Politics nd the
Transformationf European MonetaryRelations, paper presented at the annual meetingof
the
American Political Science Association,San Francisco,August 1996.
56.
The
EU has
deployed a host of community-building echanisms, ncluding flag
and
soon
a
common currency, ultural, ducational, and media programs, nd a European parliament.
57.
The
incorporation f France s partof a pluralistic uropean power center acilitates ermany's
ability o
be an
underprovider f security. ermany nd France have arrived t a division of abor
in which
Bonn serves as the engine behind economic integrationwhile Paris focuses more on
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International
ecurity 3:2
| 62
wealthy nd soon-to-be-wealthy,
xcluding the poorer statesto Europe's south
and east.58
EAST ASIA
East Asia today resembles
Europe prior
to its
successful experiment
with
constructedunipolarity.59 uspicion
and
political cleavage
still
characterize
relations among the area's major
powers. Many East Asian states are in the
midstof rapid political nd economic
change,producingdifferencesn domes-
tic structure
nd
wide disparities
n growthrates across the region-the same
volatile
mix that
riggered
war in
Europe twice
this
century.60 keydifference,
however,distinguishes oday's
East Asia from
yesterday's urope:
a
peacetime
American presence.Whereas
Europe fellprey
to
destructive ivalry uring ts
era
of
multipolarity,
merica's
role as
an
extraregional
alancer
keeps
in check
the competitive ockeying
hat
mightotherwise rigger
war
in
East Asia.
Although
America's
presence
in East Asia is
indispensable,
the
particular
nature
of
U.S. engagement
also has
high
costs:
it
impedes
the
intraregional
political-militaryssues.
France's
force-projectionapabilities,
ts
willingness
to use
them,
nd its
nuclear weapons make it well suited to this role. Nevertheless,
rance
demonstratesmore nterest
in flexing ts muscles in former olonial areas
in
the Middle East
and
Africa han
in
working to
deepen the EU's ability o manage security
within
Europe.
The
EU's power
center
hus promises
to continue ts strategic tinginess nd to remainreluctant o take on increased commitments.
ee
Philip
H.
Gordon, Europe's Uncommon Foreign Policy,
nternational
ecurity, ol. 22,
No. 3
(Winter 997/98),pp.
74-100.
58. Although the EU
has
formalized ts economic relationship
with
Turkey
nd
has
developed
a
set of informal ies with states
in
North
Africa and the
Middle East, these statesare not likely
candidatesformembership.
59. Japan's economic preponderance
has
in
recent
decades
endowed
Asia with
aspects
of
unipo-
larity. n 1990 Japan's GDP representedover 70 percent of East Asia's total GDP. See Grieco,
Systemic Sources of Variation, p.
174.
Japan's economic preponderance does not, however,
produce effective egional unipolarity orthreereasons. First,Japan
does
not
maintain
military
establishment ommensurate
with ts
economic
capability
nd in fact
huns
regional eadership
n
the securityrealm. It relies almost entirely n the United States to manage regional security.
Second, the legacy of World War
II
and the absence of reconciliationwith former dversaries,
including China,
mean that
Japan
is
not
viewed as
a
benign power
within
the region. Japan's
commitment o self-binding herefore
oes not have the
same reassuring
effect s
Germany's.
Accordingly,were Japan to pursue
a
more ambitious regional role,
its
neighbors would likely
engage
in
balancing
ratherthan
bandwagoning. Third,
China's rise and the absence
of
a Sino-
Japanese coalition ncreasingly
ilute
Japan's
economic
predominance.
On
China's
growing
eco-
nomic power and its effect n regional patterns f nfluence, ee MarkSelden, China, Japan, nd
the Regional Political Economy of
East
Asia, 1945-1995,
n
Katzenstein
and
Shiraishi,
Network
Power, p. 306-340.
60.
For
discussion
of the
potential
ources of
nstability
n East
Asia,
see
Aaron
L.
Friedberg, Ripe
for
Rivalry:Prospects
forPeace
in a
MultipolarAsia,
International
ecurity,
ol.
18,
No.
3
(Winter
1993/94),pp. 5-33;
and RichardK.
Betts, Wealth,Power,
nd
Instability:
ast Asia
and
the United
States
after he Cold
War,
nternational
ecurity,
ol.
18,
No. 3
(Winter 993/94),pp.
34-77.
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After ax Americana 63
integration ssential to long-term
tability.American might and diplomacy
prevent conflict,
ut
they do
so
by
keeping apart the parties
that
must
ulti-
mately earn to live comfortably longside each other
f
regional stability
s to
endure.
A
comparisonwithEurope is again
instructive. hroughout
heCold
War,Europe took advantage of the
security rovided by America's protective
umbrella o redress he nstabilityntrinsic
o its multipolar tructure. ermany
addressed its darkerpast and soughtreconciliationwith tsneighbors.Europe
integrated tself nternally t the same
time that it was integrated nto the
Atlantic ommunity.
In contrast, sia has not taken
advantage
of
the peace afforded y America's
presence to pursue its own political
ntegration.61Individual countrieshave
bilateral security lliances with the
United States, but not with each other.62
Indeed, Washingtonhas generally
discouraged regional forums that do not
include the United States. Furthermore,
apan's unwillingnessto
confront ts
behavior during World War
II
and to seek reconciliationwith its former
adversaries continues to stand in the way of more cooperative intraregional
relations. The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum has formalized an
agenda
for
conomic ntegration
n
theAsia
Pacific
egion,
ut
the driving
orce
behind APEC
is
the United
States, gain making
order n East Asia
dependent
on an extraregional ctor.This arrangement
may be good
for he nternational
economybecause
it
encourages open
trade across
the
Pacific. t
may
also
be
good
for
the United States because
it
enhances American
influence
n
the
Pacificregion. It is bad forEast Asia in
the long run, however, because
it
impedes the consolidation
of a
hierarchical
egionalordercapable of providing
stabilityn the aftermathfAmericanhegemony.63
61. Peter Katzenstein ontendsthatregional ntegrationin Asia has proceeded much further han
meets the eye; the absence of visible forms f nterstate ooperation s in part a product of social
and political norms that favor informalpolitical and economic networks over European-style
institutions.ee Introduction: sian Regionalism n ComparativePerspective, n Katzenstein nd
Shiraishi,Netzvorkouwer, p. 1-44. I agree with Katzenstein hat tate-society elations nd political
norms
in
East Asia are quite different romthose in Europe. Regional integration
n East
Asia
therefore ollows ts own path
and
would likely be less institutionalized han
in
Europe even
if
further long. But I maintain that political ntegration n the region s still at a very ow level in
relative terms, argely because of tensions and rivalries mong East Asia's major states and the
extent o which the United States remains the main conduit forcontact mong them.
62. ASEAN is a clear exception, ut it does not nclude, and indeed was formed n part to balance
against,theregion's major powers.
63. It is of
course impossible to prove
the
counterfactual:
hat
regional ntegration
n East
Asia
would have proceeded much furtherf the United States had not discouraged it and insisted on
creating hub-spoke pattern f relations
with
Washington t
the
center.Available evidence makes
clear,however,
hat American
opposition played
a
significant
ole
in
dissuading Japan
and other
regionalstatesfrompursuing Asia-only multilateral orums.On the evolution of this hub-spoke
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Internationalecurity 3:2 | 64
If
the benign unipolarity
that
has
brought peace
to North America
and
Europe is to emerge
in East Asia, the region must focus
on
its
own internal
integration, ot
on its integrationnto an American-led
global order.The first
step would be
the consolidationof a Sino-Japanese
coalition.Were a Sino-
Japanese power
center
to
cohere,
t
would
enjoy
uncontested
preponderance
in East Asia. The combined GDP
of China and Japan s today close
to three
timesthatof all otherEast Asian states.Defense expenditures n Japanand
China
amount to
1.4
times
what
other regional
states combined spend
on
defense.64 hese
asymmetries
will
only increase
in
coming years
as Chinese
economic
and
militarygrowth
continues.
Although
a distant
prospect,
the
formation f a pluralisticpower
centerof China and Japan is
the essential
starting oint
for
constructing
stableregionalhierarchy.65
s
long
as balanc-
ing rather hanconsensual bargaining
characterizes
he relationshipbetween
East Asia's two most powerful tates,
cooperativeregional order
will
remain
out of reach.66
Inasmuch as economic ntegrationaid the foundationforEurope's political
integration, ast
Asia is beginning
o head in the rightdirection.
ntraregional
economic
integration
ncreased
dramatically
fter he marked
appreciation
of
the yen nthemid-1980s, iving
rise
to
a hub-spoke
pattern f trade and capital
flows with
Japan
at
the center.67 nlike
in
Europe,
however,political
ntegra-
patternof security elations
nd
Washington's fforts o
maintain t, see Bruce Cumings, Japan
and NortheastAsia into the
Twenty-firstentury, p. 136-168,
and
Susume Yamakage, Japan's
National Security
nd
Asia-Pacific'sRegional
Institutionsn the Post-Cold War Era, pp. 275-305,
both n Katzenstein nd Shiraishi,
Network ower;Frankel,Regional
rading
locs,pp. 266-267; and
Edward Lincoln,Japan'sNewGlobalRole Washington, .C.: Brookings nstitution, 993), pp. 186-
191. For evidence thatfearofU.S. disengagement eads to greater
ooperationbetween Japan and
Korea, see VictorCha, Alignmenet
espiteAntagonism:he
ULited
tates-Korea-Japaniecuirityriangle
(Stanford,
alif.:
StanfordUniversity
ress, forthcoming).
64.
Data from
ISS,
The
Military alance, 997-1998,pp.
173-198. included
in these
comparisons
all Asian members of APEC,
including Australia and New Zealand. Hong Kong's GDP was
counted as part of China's,
while Taiwan's GDP and defensespendingwere included as part of
the aggregate periphery.
65.
I
ask
skeptical
readers to think ack
to 1945 and
question
how
likely
t
then eemed thatFrance
and Germany would form
coalitionthatwould become the core of
a
peaceful
and
integrated
Europe. To be sure, France and
Germanybenefited rom onditionsnot present n Asia: a common
external hreat nd
similar
evels of economic
and
politicaldevelopment.Nevertheless,
s
China
continuesto modernize, ts economy and domestic political
environmentre likely to followthe
same trajectory s other developing states in East Asia. Moreover,as the Concert of Europe
demonstrated, imilarity f domestic regime type
is
not necessary
for great power cooperation.
Britain nd France were developing parliamentarynstitutions,
hile
Prussia, Russia,
and Austria
were
staunch
defenders f monarchy.
66. See
Susan
Shirk,
Asia-PacificRegional Security:
Balance of Power
or
Concert
of
Powers?
in
Lake and Morgan, Regional
Orders, p. 245-270.
67.
On
the
degree
to
which,
and the
mechanisms throughwhich, ntraregional
rade and invest-
ment flows have positioned Japan
at the centerof
a
regionaleconomy, ee Frankel
and
Kahler,
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After ax Americana 65
tionhas not followed
fromdeeper economic ntegration.
ncreasing rade and
investmentwithinEast Asia were driven
principally y the
market nd prox-
imity; multilateral
ystem f management APEC) followed from,
ather han
preceded,
de
facto ntegration.68
ome members
of APEC
have
attempted
o
institutionalize he forum
nd to expand thescope of ts dialogue
beyond trade
liberalization o includepolitical and security
ssues,69 ut efforts
o put secu-
ritymatters n itsagenda have thus farbeen futile.The Associationof South-
east
Asian
Nations and
the
ASEAN
Regional Forum
(ARF)
have had
more
success in addressing
security ssues.70They
have, however,focused primarily
on
resolvingdisputes
among Asia's smaller tates nd on pursuing
confidence-
building measures,not
on forging cooperative security egimefor
he region
as a
whole. And the recent economic turmoil in East
Asia has distracted
attention rom
hesecurity genda.
The main obstacle
to
deeper political ntegrations
thatbalancingcontinues
to
predominateover
bandwagoning,
thus
preventing
oth intracore nd core-
peripherycohesion. It is the quality of power, not the quantity, hat is the
problem.The
asymmetries ecessary
o
construct hierarchical rder
exist,
ut
states n the regionare not
yet confident hatpower asymmetries
will
manifest
themselves
in
a
benign
manner and that a
regional order,
f
one were
to
emerge,
would be
consensual. America's
presence
holds
more overt formsof
balancing
and
competition
n
abeyance,
but it
does not
repairpolitical
and
ideological cleavages-a
task only regional
statesthemselves
an
perform.
or
now, historical
memories nd the absence of reconciliation ontinue o
fuel
fear
of a more
assertive
Japan. n addition,
China's
repressiveregime
and confron-
tational rhetoric aise appropriate questions about the purposes to which it
will
put
its
increasing power. Indeed, ASEAN
countries resisted
the
estab-
lishment of APEC and continue to oppose
its institutionalization recisely
Regionalismind Rivalry; nd the
chapters by T.J.Pempel, Takashi Shiraishi,Richard
Doner,
and
Mark Selden in Katzenstein nd
Shiraishi,
Network ower.
68. See RobertGilpin, APEC in a
New International rder, n Donald Hellmann
and Kenneth
Pyle, eds.,
From
APEC
to
Xanadu
(Armonk,N.Y: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), pp. 30-34. For a thorough
description f APEC, see Yoichi
Funabashi, Asia Pacific usion:Japan'sRole n APEC
(Washington,
D.C.: Institute or nternational
conomics, 1995).
69.
Hadi Soesastro, The Institutional ramework for APEC: An ASEAN
Perspective,
n
Chia
Siow Yue, ed., APEC: Challenges ndOpportunitiesSingapore: nstitute f SoutheastAsian Studies,
1994).
70.
ASEAN foreignministers egan in 1994 to host consultationswith their
ounterparts
rom he
United
States, Japan, Canada, the EU, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand,
Russia, China,
Vietnam,Laos, and Papua New Guinea. This multilateral orumbecame known as the
ARF. India
and Burma
became members
6f
the ARF in 1996. See Yuen Foong Khong,
Evolving Regional
Security nd Economic nstitutions,
outheast sian Affairs995 (Singapore: nstitute fSoutheast
Asian Studies, 1995), pp. 48-60.
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Internationalecurity3:2 | 66
because of
fear
that t could become a vehicle
for
East Asia's
dominant
powers
to impose a regional order
of theirown making.71
Peace within enign
UnipolarRegions
Benign unipolarity
s
in
the midst of
takingshape
in
North
America and
Europe. It is a more distant vision in East
Asia.
If
regionalunipolarity s to
develop
and serve as a
source
of structural
tability
s American
hegemony
wanes, policymakers nd
scholars alike need to
think
hroughhow
to encour-
age
the construction nd maintenance
f
consensual
regional
formations.
What
variables
will
affect heir nternal ohesion and determine
whether
heypros-
per
and
deepen
or
lose
momentum nd
unravel?
THE CHARACTER AND
COHERENCE
OF REGIONAL
CORES
The
trajectory
f
regional
cores
will
be the most
mportant
eterminant
f
the
evolution of regional formations.
Regional
cores must exercise
power
and
leadership sufficientosustain unipolarity. t the
same time, hey
must engage
in
self-binding
nd withhold
power to ensure that
symmetry
roduces
band-
wagoning
rather han
balancing.
The power centers of North
America,
Europe,
and East
Asia each face a
differentet ofchallenges.That North
America's
core
consistsof
a
preponder-
ant,
unitary
tateboth enhances
and
impedes
cohesion. North
America
enjoys
natural
unipolarity
and the
stability
that
accompanies
it. In
addition,
the
United States
provides
a level of consistent
eadership
that a
pluralistic
ore
cannot. But thescope of Americanpreponderancemeans thatthecorewill be
less
inclined to governthroughdeal-making;
tarkasymmetries
iminish the
need for
negotiated outcomes.
Moreover,peripheral states,
preciselybecause
they
fear
exposure to
the
core's unchecked
power,
still
face
incentives
to
balance
against
rather han
bandwagon
with the
United States.
n
this
sense,
the
unitarynature
of
American
power
and
purpose paradoxically tands
n
the
way
of consensual integration
n
North
America,
nd
may
ultimately
eave the
region
with more
fragile
nd less
developed
institutions f
governance
than
those
n
Europe
and East Asia.72
Especially
because the United States acks the
societal commitment o self-binding resent nGermany nd Japan, tselected
71.
Soesastro, The Institutional ramework orAPEC,
pp.
46-47.
See also Fishlow and Haggard,
The United States
and the Regionalizationof the WorldEconomy, pp. 29-33.
72.
This
is
an
important nd counterintuitive oint. Pluralisticcores, preciselybecause
power
resources nd authority re divided between two (or
more) separate states,may be more
conducive
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After ax Americana
67
leaders must consciously
resist the unilateralist option made possible by
American preponderance and rely on consensual bargaining to deepen re-
gional order.
The main challenge facing
Europe's core is preserving he Franco-German
coalition even as the Cold War
recedes into the past
and
France
and
Germany
confront host of domestic
challenges. The most immediate problem stems
from agging economicperformance.As the austerity ccompanyingprepara-
tion for
monetary nion continues nd as high unemployment ersists, ebate
over structural
djustment nd reform
f
the welfare ystem
will
intensify,nd
French nd German eliteswill
be tempted o blame Europe and each otherfor
the dislocation. Unless both
sides resist this temptation, ot only the single
currency,ut also theintegrity
f
the
Franco-German oalition,
will
be
put
at
risk.73
Generational
change
will
also
pose increasing problems
for the Franco-
German
coupling.
For
youngerGermans and French,who have lived through
neither the horrors of World War II nor the formidable task of patching
together Europe at peace,
escaping
the
past
will
no longer
serve to
legitimate
the
European enterprise.74urope's current eaders
must
therefore enerate
new
arguments o ensure that he nextgeneration etains n abiding apprecia-
tion of the
Franco-German coalition.
The
adaptation
to
global
economic
change,
the
inclusion
n
Europe
of the continent's
mergingdemocracies,
nd
the construction f a new political
space
that
allows
the
national
state
to
exist
comfortably longside
a
supranational union
must now
provide
the
impetus
behind
integration.
ut the
Germans and
the
French also need to
arrive at a
common vision ofwherethe EU is headed, a processthatwillbe more difficult
than t
appears.
than amalgamated cores to the cohesion and durability f regional formations. he states that
comprise pluralistic ore need to strike bargain
with
each other
bout
power sharing,
nd
thus
will be more inclined to negotiate with the periphery bout regional governance.
n
addition,
peripheral tates will be less likelyto balance against the core because neither ts resourcesnor ts
authority re concentrated n a unitary tate.
73. See Roger C. Altman and Charles A. Kupchan, Arresting he Decline of Europe, World olicy
Journal, ol. 14, No.
4
(Winter1997/98), pp. 1-9. For a pessimistic ssessment of the long-term
consequences of a single currency,ee MartinFeldstein, EMU and International onflict, oreign
Affairs, ol. 76, No. 6 (November/December 1997), pp. 60-73.
74.
YoungerGermans, ncludingBundestag membersfromKohl's own party, ave made clear that
they are more at ease with the national state and less intenton sublimatingGermany nside a
broader
Europe. So
too are
younger French ess fearful
f
rivalry
with
Germany
and thus less
intent n holding theirneighbors n a tight mbrace. See One Europe, Up to a Point, Economist,
September 4, 1996,p. 48; and AAdyPollak, The Attitude o Europe Is Hard-Headed Acceptance,
Irish
Times,May 20, 1996, p. 10.
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Internationalecurity 3:2
| 68
French and German
leaders
in
fact hold incompatibleconceptions
of the
ultimate objectives
and characterof the
union. For Germany,Europe
is a
construct
ormoderating
nd
managing
power-for ensuring
that the conti-
nent never
again falls prey
to the destructiveforces of
national rivalry. or
France,theEU is more about
amassing and projecting ower,
aggregating he
union's
military nd
economic resources
so that t can assert tself s a global
player.The EU is to do for
Europe what the national state
s no longerstrong
enough
to do forFrance.
Meldingthese competing
visions ofEurope
will
requirecompromise
by both
parties.
The Germans
will need to assume
greater
defense
responsibilities
withinEurope, and
the French
will
have to realize thattheirvision of
the EU
is not only
politicallyunattainable,
ut also strategically
ndesirable.Pressing
the EU to focus
on
projecting ower
externally
ather han
managing
power
internally
isks
triggering
oth discord
within
Europe
and
competition
be-
tween
Europe and otherregions.
Paris should
instead seek to strengthenhe
ability
of the Franco-German
ore
to
manage security
n
Europe
as America's
role on the continent radually
diminishes.75
Effecting
he coherence of a pluralistic
core
in
East Asia is a far
more
formidable
task than
in
Europe.76
China and
Japan
have
yet
to
engage
in
a
substantive
ilateral
dialogue
thatcould
serve as a basis forreconciliation nd
partnership;
oth
prefer
o deal
with the United States rather han
with
each
other.77
he
key challenge
ahead is to nurture new coalition between China
and
Japan
hat nables them
o construct nd
manage
collectively
hierarchical
75. The Labour Party's 1997 victory
n
Britainraises the novel possibility
hat London mightbe
able to help
Paris and Bonn
forge compromise
vision. Prime MinisterTony Blair appears to be
pushing Britain oward much deeper
engagement
n
the EU. The first rip f
Blair'sforeignminister
was to Paris and Bonn, not Brussels or Washington, nd the Labour government
s far more
receptivethan ts predecessor to Britain's
ventual participation n monetary nion. It is at least
conceivable
thatBritainwill over timetake on a guidingrole
n
the evolutionof the EU. The British
share Germany'sperception
f the EU as an instrument or
binding
and managing power,but also
share
France's
appreciation
of the
mportance
f
power projection.
n
addition,
Britain ould
help
define a middle road between
Germany'sdesire to embed the national state
in
a supranational
union and France's Gaullist nsistence
n preserving strongnational state.
76.
For a sober assessment
of the
trajectory
f Sino-Japanese elations uring he 1990s, ee Michael
Greenand BenjaminSelf, Japan'sChanging
China
Policy:
From
Commercial
Realism toReluctant
Realism, Survival,Vol. 38, No. 2 (Summer1996), pp. 35-58.
77.
As one indicator f
these
preferences,
he number of Chinese and
Japanese
students
tudying
in the United States faroutweighsthe
number
studying
n
each
other's
ountries.
The number of
Japanese
students
n the United States
outweighs
the number
n
China
by
almost
six
times.
The
numberof Chinese students
n
the
United
States outweighs
the number
n
Japan
by ustover three
times.UNESCO,
Statistical
earbook,
996
(Lanham,
Md.:
UNESCO Publishing
and Bernan
Press,
1997), section 3, pp.
397-402.
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After ax Americana 69
regional order
n
East Asia.78 fthe European experience s any indication, his
task
will
requiredecades ofdeliberate ffortoovercomethepastand construct
the habits and institutions f
partnership.
APEC provides a useful starting oint, but only that; America's role is too
prominent. nstead,
Washington should explicitly eek to facilitate more
substantive
Sino-Japanese
dialogue. Even if it comes at the expense of trade
flows across the Pacific or of American nfluence n East Asia, the formation
of
a
Sino-Japanese
oalition
is
essential if
regional integration
s to
advance
beyond
the
economic realm.
The United States should stay engaged militarily
to
buy
time
for
this
regional power center to cohere, but Washingtonmust
ensure
that
t no
longeropposes or stands
n
the way of direct ontactbetween
East Asia's two main
powers. Furthermore,Washington should welcome
China's call for
pan-regional
forum hat
does
not
include
the
United States-
as
long
as the
body
serves
as
a
vehicle
for
regional ntegration, otbalancing
against
U.S.
power.79
Two factorswill play particularly mportant oles in shaping Sino-Japanese
relations.The first oncernsJapan'swillingnessto confrontts past in order to
close
the
enormous
gap
thatremains
betweenJapanesebehavior
and
regional
perceptionsof Japanese ntentions.
Although Japan's
constitution estricts
he
use
of force to self-defense
missions and Tokyo actively
shuns international
leadership and diplomaticunilateralism, eighboring tatesremaindistrustful
of
Japan.80
his
gap
between
behavior
and
perception
s
largely
the
result of
Japan's
failure o
address
its
wartime ctions and to
pursue
reconciliationwith
the victims
of
its
aggression.81 The
benign effects f Japan's self-binding
will
continue obe diluteduntiltheJapanese rereadyto hold themselves ccount-
able for their behavior.
So too
will
recent
talk of
an Asian way and
the
emergence
of
a
regional
dentity
mean
little
until
the
Japanese
are
prepared
to
78. For
a
similar view
of
the
importance
of
Sino-Japanese partnership, ee Robert Manning,
Haunted by a Bitter ast, Impact 1 (December 1996), pp. 10-13; and Manning, Burdens of the
Past, Dilemmas of the Future: Sino-JapaneseRelations
in
the Emerging nternational ystem,
Washington uarterly, ol. 17, No. 1 (Winter 994), pp. 45-58. See also Akira Iriye,China nd
Japan
in
the
Global ettingCambridge,Mass.: Harvard University ress, 1992); and Mark Selden, China,
Japan,
nd the
Regional Political Economy of East Asia, 1945-1995,
n
Katzenstein nd Shiraishi,
Networkower, p. 306-340.
79.
See JamesKynge China to Embrace ASEAN in Pursuitof New Order, inancialTimes, ugust
25, 1997, p.
3.
80. Thomas U.
Berger,
From Sword to
Chrysanthemum:Japan's
Culture
of Anti-militarism,
Internationalecurity, ol. 17, No.
4
(Spring 1993), pp. 119-150.
81. For
a
thoughtful reatment f the different ays in which Germany nd Japan have dealt with
their espectivepasts, see Ian Buruma, The Wages f Guilt New York:Meridian, 1994).
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International
ecurity 3:2 | 70
acknowledge
that their
ast attempt
t
community-building-theGreaterEast
82
Asia
Coprosperity
phere-was
part
of a darker and
predatorypast.
The second key determinant f
whether a
pluralisticcore coheres
in
East
Asia is the manner in which China exercises its increasing power. Chinese
behavior
will
to some extent e
shaped by
its external
nvironment. s China's
power rises,
ts
neighbors hould
seek to strike he same
deal that
EU
members
struckwithGermany: greater ay forChina in shapingthe termsofregional
order
n return or
elf-binding
nd China's
willingness
o
play by
the rules of
multilateralism. rawing China into the core of a hierarchical egional
order,
even
if
Beijing's ntentions re still somewhat uncertain,promises to expose
China to
the same
processesof
moderation nd
liberalization hatotherdevel-
oping economies
face
as they
enter the
global
market.
The gradual and cau-
tious embrace
of
China
in
a
multilateral
ystem
f
regional governance
will
by
no means ensurethatChina exercises tsgrowing power in a benign manner.
It
will,however, ncourage self-binding y giving
China
a voice commensurate
with tspower. twill also facilitate conomicopenness, strengtheniberalizing
coalitions,
and nurture
moderating
middle class-all of which make
more
likely China's peaceful ascendance and the gradual formationof a Sino-
Japanese partnership.83
SUSTAINING
THE BARGAIN BETWEEN CORE AND
PERIPHERY
Benign unipolar
formations
ely
on
a sustained
consensus between core and
periphery,
ot
ust
on an initial
bargain.
Each side
must
hold up
its
end of
this
bargain
and remain satisfiedwith the other's
performance. ore, periphery,r
both can otherwise exit. Existing iterature n regionalismunderscores the
extent
o which
economic ncentive nd sustained
growthoftenfacilitate nte-
gration nd regional cohesion.84
n
thisrespect, herecent conomic downturn
in East Asia
represents substantial etback.85
What
are theothermain chal-
lenges to the cohesion of unipolar formations?
82.
For discussion of an
emerging
Asian
identity,
ee Yoichi
Funabashi, The Asianization of Asia,
ForeignAffairs, ol. 72, No. 5 (November/December1993), pp. 75-85.
83. On the ability f economic openness to foster olitical nd economic reformn China, see Susan
Shirk, Internationalizationnd China's Economic Reforms, n RobertKeohane and Helen Milner,
eds., Internationalizationnd Domestic olitics Cambridge,U.K.: Cambridge University ress, 1996),
pp. 186-206. On the relationship etween iberal domesticcoalitions nd regional cooperation, ee
Etel
Solingen, Democracy, Economic Reform,
nd
Regional Cooperation, Journal f Theoretical
Politics, ol. 8, No. 1 (January 996), pp. 79-114.
84. See,
for
example, Ippei Yamazawa,
On
Pacific
Economic
Integration, conomic ournal, ol.
102, No. 415 (November 1992), pp. 1519-1529.
85. Because
of the domestic
reforms eing mplemented
n the wake of
the crisis nd because East
Asia enjoys savings
and
investment ates
that are
50 percent higherthan those
in
Europe and
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After ax Americana 71
THE DURABILITY OF SELF-BINDING.
Unlike classical empires, which often
foundered as a result of revolts from
periphery eeking greater utonomy,
benign unipolar formations re farmore likelyto fall prey to revoltsfrom he
core. t s now the core that
ccepts
imits n
its
behavior by exercising trategic
restraint nd subjecting tself o the
constraints f a multilateral ramework.
Self-binding an therefore o only so
far beforecore states
will
calculate that
the gains of sustaining benign unipolarityno longer outweigh the costs of
diminished autonomy.This insight
calls into question the conventionalwis-
dom that ntegrationmust keep moving
forward fregionalformations re not
to unravel.86
It
is hard to imagine, for example,
that France and Germany would as a
matter f course submit to the
will
oftheir maller partners
n
the EU should
Paris and Bonn regularly e outvotedon matters f central oncern.
n
North
America, taming the unilateralist
rges of the United States is a far greater
challenge
to
regional integration
han
is encouragingtheparticipation f
the
periphery.ndeed, in Europe and NorthAmerica alike,an expectantperiphery
presses for entrywhile core statesequivocate, fearful f new obligations and
constraints.
And
China's
willingness
to moderate the
scope
and character f
its regional ambition s the single most important eterminant fwhethera
consensual
hierarchy
volves
in
East
Asia. As
policymakers hape regional
structures f
governance, they should seek an equilibrium point along
the
spectrumof integration-one sufficient
o commit
the
core
to
engage
in
self-
binding,
but not
so ambitious that t nduces
the
core to
renege
on the
bargain
thatunderpins regional order.
SECURITY.
During past eras, core states oftenfell prey to their excessive
concern bout
security
n
their
peripheries.
n
contrast, oday's major
states
re
more likelyto exhibit
nsufficient
oncern about security
n
the
periphery.87
Whethercontemporary nipolar formations ace
unraveling
because of
the
underprovisionof securitydepends
primarily
on the evolution of
strategic
thinking
within
respectivecores.
Three main
pathways
exist
through
which
NorthAmerica,many analystsforesee return o robust
growth
or he
region.
See Steven Radelet
and Jeffreyachs, Asia's Reemergence, ForeignAffairs, ol. 76, No. 6 (November/December
1997), pp. 44-59. Reformof the Japanese economy and the expansion of domestic demand are
particularlymportant o Asia's
recovery. ncreased Japanese mports rom ts weakened neighbors
will not only help stimulate
growth, ut also deepen regional economic ntegration.
86. See, forexample, Waever,
Integration s Security.
87.
Compare recent
with
earlier developments
in the
Balkans. At the opening
of this
century,
Europe's great powers raced to carve up the region,oftendecreasing theirown security hrough
excessive engagement.At the
close of this century, urope's powers did theirbest to stay out of
the Balkans, decreasing theirown security hrough oo little ngagement.
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Internationalecurity 3:2 | 72
core statescould, over time, dopt a moreexpansivedefinition f their ecurity
interests.
First,economic interdependencebetween
core and
periphery
could reach
levels sufficiento induce cores to make deeper sacrifices
n
meeting trategic
challenges
in the
periphery. uring
the 1994-95 economic turmoil n Mexico
and the 1997-98 turmoil
n
East
Asia,
for
xample,
the nternational
ommunity
pursued extraordinary
measures to
prevent
more
widespread
financial risis.
In this respect,
t
is not unimaginable thateconomic nterests
would
be strong
enough
to warrant
military
ntervention
n
the
periphery
should
financial
stability
e threatened
y
revolt
or
internal haos.
Increasing
evels of nterna-
tional trade and investment
s
well
as
considerable sensitivity mong the
globe's main financialmarkets
will
put pressure
on
core
states to
run
the
risks
associated
with
maintaining
economic
stability
n
their
respective
zones of
influence.
Second, as contemporary egional
formationsmature
and
core states
sink
further osts nto their
development,
order-relatednterests
may
come
to
play
a more dominant role
in
motivating
core behavior.
If
regional
formations
continue to evolve into
order-providing nipolar structures,
heir
leading
members
will
have a greater
nterest
n
making
the
sacrificesnecessary to
maintainthem.88
Finally, he process
of
community-buildingould lead
to
a sense of shared
identity ufficient o contribute o core-periphery ohesion and broaden con-
cept's
of
self-interest.he
history
f classical
empires
s
replete
with
examples
of the
ability
f socialization nd
ideational
convergence
o
undergird mperial
management.89 o too have shared identity lements been strongenough to
induce states to come to one another's assistance for emotive rather than
strategic
reasons.90
Elites
and
publics
in
contemporary egional
formations
88. NATO members, or xample, eventuallyfound the will to intervene
n
Bosnia with sufficient
force
not
because the ntrinsic osts of the conflict rew ntolerable, ut argelybecause theyfeared
that continued paralysis would have corrosive effects n NATO and transatlantic elations.See
speech by President William Clinton, Peace in Bosnia: A Dividend of American Leadership,
December 6, 1995, delivered to the Committeefor American Leadership in Bosnia, Washington,
D.C., U.S. Department of State, Dispatch Supplement, ol. 6, No. 5 (December 1995), p. 22; and
WilliamOdom, PuttingOut the Balkan Fire, Foreign ffairs, ol. 74, No. 6 (November/December
1995), pp. 152-153.
89. See Ikenberry nd Kupchan, Socialization and Hegemonic Power.
90. During the 1930s,for xample, the
French
ame
to
view
the
oss of
certain
mperialpossessions
as tantamountto losing metropolitan erritory.
t
was
emotive attachment,however,
not the
intrinsic trategic alue of thepossessions,that haped these attitudes. ee Kupchan,
The Vulner-
ability fEmpire, . 258.
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After ax
Americana
73
might develop
similar extraterritorialllegiances, endowing these
groupings
with more cohesion and durabilitythan
would be predicted by a narrow
calculation of
materialcosts and benefits.
Peace
among
BenignUnipolarRegions
My analysis
should not be interpreted s a call for the end of
American
hegemony and
the deliberate devolution of
the international ystemfrom
unipolarity to tripolarity.nstead, I take the
eventual waning of American
hegemonyto be
inevitable,making t
unavoidable that the internationalom-
munitywill have
to choose between striving or benign tripolarity y
design
or
settling
for a
competitivemultipolarity y
default.91
he
case
for
benign
tripolarity
ests in
part on the arguments,outlined
above,
as
to
why
the
formation f three
regional
blocs
would
not
trigger
he
security ompetition
traditionally scribed
to tripolarity: he
three
regional formations
would
be
instrumentsfor managing power, not amassing it; interregionalrelations
would benefit rom ntraregional eace;
cultural nd linguistic arrierswould
inhibit the
political centralizationneeded to
project power externally; nd
regions would
unravel fromwithin
f
theircore states developed
predatory
intent.92 t the
same time, the management of
interregional
elationswould
rise in
importance and necessitate the
following amendments
to the
policy
agenda.
REGIONALISM
VERSUS GLOBAL MULTILATERALISM
CurrentU.S. policy is guided by the conventionalwisdom thatglobal multi-
lateralism
should take precedence over regionalism.The more open
regions
are to
one
another,
he betterrelations
will
be
among
them.
Regional
trade
arrangements
re
therefore esirable
only
if
they
do not come at the
expense
of
global
trade.93
My analysis challenges
head-on
this
conventional
wisdom:
91. Christopher ayne argues in
favor of multipolarity y default, ontending hat the return f
multipolar ompetition mongEurasia's major powers will embroilthose states n
regional rival-
ries,reducing heir bility nd
inclination o engage in security ompetitionwiththe United States.
Layne does not provide compelling rguments, owever, s to why the United States would find
major wars in Europe and East
Asia any less threatening o its national security han
n
the past.
See
Layne,
From
Preponderance
to Offshore alancing.
92. For discussion of thepotential
or stable tripolarity,ee Schweller, Tripolarity nd
the Second
World
War, esp. pp. 80, 99-100.
93.
See, for xample,JagdishBhagwati,The World rading ystem t Risk Princeton,
.J.:
Princeton
University ress, 1991); RobertHormats, Making Regionalism Safe, Foreign
Affairs,
ol.
73,
No.
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Internationalecurity 3:2 |
74
according
to
the
logic
of
benign unipolarity, egionalism
should
take
prece-
dence over global multilateralism. conomic and political integration t the
regional evel are essential buildingblocks ofglobal integration. lobal multi-
lateralism s therefore esirable only
if
it does not come at the expense of
regional ntegration nd the construction f
stable
regionalorders.APEC might
ensure vibranttrans-Pacific
rade,
but
it
does not serve
the interests
f
inter-
national stability
f
putting
America at
the
center
of
East Asia's
only inclusive
multilateral tructure mpedes the consolidation of a self-sustaining egional
order.The same
logic applies
in
reverse
to
the EU. The EU's
protective
ariffs
may create an irritant
n
transatlantic elations,but they are well worth this
cost
if
they
contribute o
the
coherence of
a
stable
unipolarity
n
Europe.
Contemporary egional
formations re
geopolitical structures,
ot mere
trade
groupings.
The
obsession of policymakers
with
global multilateralism hould
accordinglygive way
to
a new
emphasis
on
regionalism.94
INTERREGIONAL INSTITUTIONS
As policymakers nd scholars devote increasing ttention o deepening and
managing regional formations, hey
will
also need to
recast institutions or
governing
relations
mong regional
blocs. Bodies such as the
Group
of
Seven
(G-7),
the
UN
SecurityCouncil,
and the World Trade
Organization provide
potential
forums or
ddressing
an
interregional genda,
but
they
end
to
focus
on
resolving
hort-term
isputes
rather han on
facilitatingong-term oopera-
tion.
Accordingly,
directorateof
core
countries should be established to
develop
a
set of rules
of
the
road
and
a common vision of
how regional
groupingswill fit ntoglobal structures. his directorate,which mightreplace
the
G-7,
would
consist of
the United
States, France, Germany,Japan,China,
and
perhaps
Russia
(for
reasons
discussed
below).
The
body
would
serve as a
global concert of major powers, monitoring
nd
coordinatingrelationsboth
within
nd
among regional groupings.
2 (March/April 1994), pp.
97-108;
Fred
Bergsten,
APEC and
World Trade, ForeignAffairs, ol.
73, No.
3
(May/June 994),pp.
20-26;
and
Frankel,Regional rading
locs.Frankel
nalyzes
in
detail
the circumstances nder whichregional trading rrangements acilitate lobal liberalization.
94. Recent experience suggests that greateremphasis on regional trade would not lead to sig-
nificant ecreases in
interregional rade. Economic ntegration
within
East Asia, forexample, has
not come at the expense of its
extraregional
rade. Between 1970 and
1990, East Asia's share of
world trade doubled,
while
its intraregional
rade
grew
from
0 to
41
percentof its total trade.
See Peter Petri, The East
Asian Trading
Bloc: An
Analytic History,
n
Frankel and Kahler,
Regionalism nd Rivalry, . 42.
See also T.J.Pempel, Transpacific orii:Japan and the Emerging
Asian
Regionalism,
n
Katzenstein
nd
Shiraishi,
Network
ower, p.
81-82.
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After ax Americana 75
ECONOMIC STRAINS AND THE ALLURE OF PROTECTIONISM
As regional formations eepen and their political saliency n memberstates
rises, the risk ncreases that economic shock or prolonged periods of
lagging
performance
will
lead to protectionism nd interregional ivalry.When
politi-
cal leaders turn
to protectionism o cordon off heirnational economies
from
marketdisturbances nd find short-termix o lagging performance,
hey re
likely to favor intraregional ver interregional ies, especially if theyhave
already codified regional trade agreements,have high levels of interdepend-
ence with their
neighbors, nd have sunk costs in the maintenanceof intrare-
gional cohesion.95 Precisely because the logic of my argumentprivileges
regional over global trade arrangements,members of consensual regional
formations
will
have to take special precautionsto guard against
retreat
nto
protected trade blocs. A directorate f core countries could
accordinglybe
tasked with
monitoring nterregional ariffsnd flowsof trade and investment.
THE
GEOPOLITICS
OF
EXCLUSION
A
major
weakness
of
an
international rder based
on
benign
unipolarity
n
North
America,Europe, and East Asia is its effect n excluded
actors.
Contem-
porary regional formations re clubs for successful states,
not failed or
poor
ones. As a
result, hey exclude those areas of the globe
that are most
in
need
of
integrationntoglobal markets nd councils.The proliferation
f
weapons
technology
s
also raising the stakes of instability
n
developing regions.
The
recentnuclear tests
n
India and Pakistan underscorethe potentialfor
danger-
ous arms
racingamong developingstates.And assumingthatrelations
mong
the world's major powers remain cooperative,revisionist tates n thedevel-
oping world, especially
those armed
with
weapons
of mass destruction nd
those
whose size and
population make them locally
dominant
powers,
will
emerge
as the
principal challengers
o the status
quo.96
Cordoning
off
privileged regional formations rom nstability
n
the devel-
oping world,
from
rogue states,
nd from he effects
f
collapsing
states will
be ineffective
nd may well backfire.Exclusion tends only
to make matters
worse by exacerbating economic duress and by breeding resentment nd
95. The experienceof
the 1930s provides ample evidence of the
allure of retreatingnto exclusive
trading zones in
response to external economic shock. The collapse of an open trading order
contributed oth to thedomestic dislocationthatfueled fascism nd
to the go-it-alone ttitudes
that undermined ecurity ooperation among the democracies.
96.
See RobertChase, Emily Hill, and Paul M. Kennedy, Pivotal
States
and U.S. Grand
Strategy,
ForeignAffairs, ol. 75,
No. 1 (January/February996), pp. 33-51.
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Internationalecurity 3:2
| 76
insecurity.
t also reinforces
he sense of solation
that
fuels
revisionist
egimes
and their
laims of encirclement.97nstead,
regional formations
hould seek
to
include such states
n their espective
ones of nfluence,
eekingto draw them
into the
nternationalommunity
hrough he same centripetal
orce
hatpulls
the periphery
oward the
center.98 regional
division
of
abor makes the
most
sense over
the ongterm,
with North
Americanstates
focusing
n Central
and
SouthAmerica,European countries oncentratingn the Middle East, Africa,
and Southwest Asia,
and
East Asian states
focusing
on
South and Southeast
Asia.
The
potentially
negative consequences
of exclusion
also
apply to
Russia,
which is falling nto
a geopoliticalno-man's-land
between
a risingEast Asia
and a Europe
that s expanding
toward
Russia's
borders.
Two courses
of action
deserve
consideration. irst,
Russia could
be
encouraged
to
reconstruct
ts own
regionalformation y
deepening the Commonwealth
of
IndependentStates.
The key
problem
s that this formationmay prove
to
be
coercive rather
han
consensual in character.fexcluded frompreponderantformations o its east
and west,
Russia
may
well construct union aimed at
power
accretion
ather
than
power
management.
The
preferable
lternative s forthe EU and
NATO
to open
theirdoors to
Russia and seek to incorporate he
former oviet
Union
into a
broaderEuropean construction.99
t
present,
neither he EU nor
NATO
is keen to extend its
reach beyond Central
Europe. Both institutions
ear the
dilution
and diminishing
ffectiveness
hat
accompany
large membership.100
97. On the foreign olicies
of revolutionary tates nd how outside powers should deal
with them,
see StephenM. Walt,Revolutionnd War Ithaca,N.Y.: Cornell University ress,1996).
98. Isolating
revisionist tates
may
be
appropriate
n
certain
cases, especiallywhen the state
in
question is deliberately ttempting
o export nstabilityhrough errorism r overt
acts of aggres-
sion against
its
neighbors.
As recent
experiences
with
Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Cuba demonstrate,
however,diplomatic solation
and
economic sanctions
have not proved effectivenbringing bout
regime change.
99. IncludingRussia in NATO would further ransform
t
from collectivedefense
to a collective
security rganization.
This transformations
in turnnecessary to ensure that NATO's continuing
enlargement
oes not
draw
new
dividing ines
and trigger alancing among excluded states.For
further iscussionof Russia's inclusion
n
a broader
Europe, see JamesGoodby,EuropeUndivided:
The New
Logicof
Peace
n U.S.-Russian
Relations
Washington,
.C.:
United
States nstitute f Peace
Press, 1998).
100. In addition, a Europe
that ncludes Russia would
find tselfwith two noncontiguouspower
centers-a Franco-German oalition and Russia. At least on deductive grounds,this formation
could
trigger
ntercore alancing
as
opposed to cooperation.
A pluralistic ore of contiguous states
should
be more stable than one of
noncontiguous
states.
Contiguity
forces
powerfulstates
to
extremes-either
o move
in
lockstep o avoid competition
r to be
rivals
n
a searchfor uperiority.
Core statesthat re
separated
by
an
expanse
of and are more ikely o
have mixed
relations.They
will
likelycompete for
dominance
n
the area between
them. But
this expanse
of and also serves
as a
buffer,making
t
unnecessary
for the
parties
to
choose between close
partnership
nd open
rivalry.
rom
this perspective,
Russia's inclusion n Europe would not
lead
to the
union's
unrav-
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After ax Americana
77
Nevertheless, nsuring
that Russia is included
in
Europe
should
be
a central
item on the agenda as core states seek to address and redress the geopolitics
ofexclusion.
Conclusion
America at present rguablyhas more nfluence ver nternational olitics han
any
other
great power
in
history. ccordingly,
t
may seem paradoxical
to
call
upon the United States to begin preparingfor the demise of Pax Americana.
However,
t is
precisely
because of ts
preponderantpower
and the
stability
t
affords hat the United States has the ability and the luxury to look beyond
the horizon.
Preparing
for
the future ntails neither
he retrenchment or the
disengagement
of
American power. On the contrary,
he United States should
sustain
global hegemony foras long
as it
can.
But
in
the meantime,
t should
follow three guidelines to ensure that American unipolarity,
when
its
time
comes, peacefullygives way to a benign tripolarity.
First,the United States must deepen its commitment o self-binding nd
ensure that t exercises ts
preponderantpower
with restraint nd moderation.
Doing so means strengthening ultilateral nstitutions nd relianceon consen-
sual
forms
f
international overnance.As the leading state
n
the
world,
the
United
States, through hebenignexercise of itspower,
will
both
enable and
encourage through
emulation others to do the same.
More
important,
he
United States needs to buy more time forunipolar regional formations o
develop. Behavior that nduces balancing against U.S. power would
lead to the
untimely emise ofAmericanunipolarity,n turn nterruptingheprocesses of
regional ntegrationmade possible by America'sbenign eadership.The United
States must therefore void unilateralismand
overbearing behavior,
which
promise only to squander Americanpreponderance
nd
precipitate remature
return o a competitivemultipolarity.101
eling,
but it
would impair ts coherenceby diluting ts core.
It is
also
worth
notingthatunipolar
formations ave existed without geographically ixed core.
The
Carolingian Empire established
by Charlemagne in the late eighth
century,
or example, was ruled from court that
traveled
throughout he imperial realm. It is at least conceivable that Brussels could one day become
Europe's effective ower center r thatEurope could be governed by a mobile core,circumventing
some of the problems involved in including Russia in a broader Europe. On the
Carolingian
Empire, ee Louis Halphen, Charlemagnend theCarolingian mpire, rans.Giselle de Niee
(Amster-
dam: North-Holland,1977); and Heinrich Fichtenau, The Carolingian mpire New York:
Harper
and
Row, 1964).
101. On the mportance f basing U.S. grand strategy n multilateralism,ee JohnGerard
Ruggie,
Winning
hePeace:
America nd WorldOrder n theNew Era (New York:Columbia University
ress,
1996).
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Internationalecurity 3:2 | 78
Second, the
United
States should
make the
consolidation
of
pluralistic ores
in Europe and East Asia a top priority. ven
if
Washington oses some of its
leverage abroad as a result,
t s
in
America's ong-term
nterest o foster
enign
centersof power
in
both
regions.
The United States should
help strengthen
Europe's core by dealing with France and Germany collectivelyratherthan
individually.A Paris-Bonn-Washingtonialogue could
be formalized
hrough
regularministerialmeetings.102The United States should also encourage nitia-
tives such as the ointvisit to Moscow
in
March 1998 of German Chancellor
Helmut Kohl and FrenchPresidentJacques
Chirac. And
to
the extent
ossible,
Washington hould encourage greaterFranco-German ooperationand activ-
ism in managing European security.
Moving
China
and
Japan
toward
partnership
s a far
more
complicated
task.
The United States must begin simplyby making
clear that
t
supports
a
much
more dense
and
independent
bilateral
relationship
etween
Beijing
nd
Tokyo.
The United States needs to remain engaged
to
reassure both parties,
but
must
no longer stand in the way of a Sino-Japanese approchement.n this respect,
the United States should make clear
to
Japan
that ts
strategic ependence
on
American power
is not a viable
solution
to its
security
needs
over the long
term. To
help pave
the
way
for a
regional alternative,Washington
should
encourage Japan
to
address
openly
its wartime
behavior,
the
only lasting
antidote
to the historical memories that continue to
poison Sino-Japanese
relations. The
United
States should simultaneously press hard
to
initiate a
meaningful ecurity ialogue
between
Beijing
and
Tokyo.
The
agenda
should
include regular sharing of information, xchange of militarypersonnel and
politicians,and joint exercises,as well as discussion of territorial isputes,
theatermissiledefense, nd disposal
of
chemicalweapons. The UnitedStates
should also facilitate
ncreasing economic cooperation between China and
Japan, particularly
n
the areas of
transportation
nd
energy nfrastructure.
Again, the United States should
serve
as
a
catalyst
for
bilateralprogramsthat
then
proceed
under theirown
steam.
Third,
the United States needs to
give regionalismprecedence over global
multilateralism-even at the
expense
of
global
trade flows-and
pay greater
heed tothe geopolitical mplications fregional ntegration. he success of U.S.
policies in theAmericas, Europe, and East Asia should be measured not by
their
bility
to maximize American
nfluence,
ut
by their bilityto promote
102. Should Britain ontinue to deepen its engagement
n
the EU, London mightbe included
in
this dialogue as well as in the global directoratementioned bove.
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After ax Americana 79
self-sustainingnd peaceful regional orders. PresidentClinton is
right
that
America s the world's indispensable nation. But the United States
must use
that unique stationto make itselfdispensable and to erectregionalstructures
of order
capable
of
withstanding
he demise of
Americanpreponderance.
The
days ofPax Americanaare numbered.Now is the timeto ensure that
he global
stability nd prosperitythas fostered re not.