This article was downloaded by: [University of Connecticut]On: 29 October 2014, At: 03:55Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number:1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street,London W1T 3JH, UK

The Journal of NorthAfrican StudiesPublication details, including instructionsfor authors and subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fnas20

After Qadhafi:prospects for politicalparty formation anddemocratisation in LibyaJohn Barger aa Graduate of the Center for ContemporaryArab Studies , Georgetown University ,WashingtonPublished online: 26 Apr 2007.

To cite this article: John Barger (1999) After Qadhafi: prospects for politicalparty formation and democratisation in Libya, The Journal of North AfricanStudies, 4:1, 62-77, DOI: 10.1080/13629389908718350

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13629389908718350

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy ofall the information (the “Content”) contained in the publicationson our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and ourlicensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to theaccuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content.Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinionsand views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed byTaylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be reliedupon and should be independently verified with primary sources of

information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses,actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages,and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directlyor indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the useof the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private studypurposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution,reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in anyform to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of accessand use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f C

onne

ctic

ut]

at 0

3:55

29

Oct

ober

201

4

After Qadhafi: Prospects for Political PartyFormation and Democratisation in Libya

JOHN BARGER

Libya has received little attention from scholars analysing democratic potential inNorth Africa and the Middle East in recent years. The era of the Jamahiriyya createdby Colonel Qadhafi and based on his 'Third Universal Theory' is, however, drawingto a close and attention should be given to the potential for democratic change after heleaves the political scene. The outlook for such potential is very limited since there arefew indigenous institutions to foster it, nor do the secular or Islamist oppositionmovements offer much chance of a successful democratic transition.

In recent years studies of democratisation, liberalisation (political andeconomic) and civil society have proliferated into a virtually distinct sub-discipline of political science. Like other areas of the Arab world theMaghreb has received its fair share of attention in these studies, as well itshould, given that the transformations which have occurred in North Africaare arguably the most dramatic of the whole MENA region. Algeria'sbreathtaking experience of political pluralism during the early 1990s andsubsequent collapse into civil war, Morocco's revitalised electoral politicsand Tunisia's descent into authoritarianism since Ben Ali's constitutionalcoup all testify that unparalleled change - of an often contradictory nature- is afoot in Arab North Africa. The democratisation studies which havebeen devoted to the Algerian crisis and to events in neighbouring Moroccoand Tunisia acknowledge that profound regional changes are taking placewhose outcome is as yet highly uncertain.

As has so often been the case however, Libya stands apart from itsMaghrebi neighbours. Though vulnerable to some of the same political andeconomic forces which have compelled change in the rest of the region,Libya's unique political system and continuing high oil revenue haveallowed the country to steer a relatively even course as the rest of NorthAfrica has been transformed (at times for the better and at times for theworse). Reasonably economically stable and with an entrenched regime,Libya has generally not been subject to the eager democratisation studies

John Barger is a graduate of the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University,Washington.

The Journal of North African Studies, Vol.4, No.1 (Spring 1999) pp.62-77PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f C

onne

ctic

ut]

at 0

3:55

29

Oct

ober

201

4

AFTER QADHAFI 63

directed at other countries of the Maghreb and wider Arab world. Wherescholars have chosen to write on democracy in Libya the results have falleninto one of two categories: analyses of the token political liberalisation (andfailed economic reforms) of the late 1980s,1 or increasingly redundantexplanations of the principles of Qadhafi's 'democratic' Third UniversalTheory.

Yet there is an increasing need for scholarly attention to democratisationin Libya. This is a question distinct from democratisation under Qadhafi,since anything deserving of the name 'democratisation' will never happenso long as Qadhafi remains in power. For nearly thirty years the Libyanleader has shown his political colours and they clearly reveal that one of thefew constants in his thinking is a hostility to democracy, if by democracyone means the toleration of any institution not under the firm and exclusivecontrol of the Libyan state. Those who optimistically predict real reformunder Qadhafi are bound to be disappointed,2 as are opposition leaders whohave believed that dialogue with the regime can lead to compromise andpolitical accommodation. Mansour Kikhia learned this lesson at the cost ofhis life.3 At a minimum democratisation will require Qadhafi's departurefrom the scene, and will also likely require a break with the Jamahiriyyapolitical system he has built since the 1969 revolution.

Indeed Qadhafi's era is drawing to a close. Around 56 years old, Qadhafihas been in power in Libya since 1969. While he has demonstratedremarkable staying power in the face of sometimes great adversity(including any number of coup and assassination attempts), and maypersevere well into the next decade or beyond, time is not on Qadhafi's side.His own advancing age and the increasing challenges to his regime meanthat his days are numbered, even if the collapse of his government is notnecessarily imminent. While Qadhafi's departure may not herald in a periodof significant change (since the transition to his successor might be asmooth one), one has to consider the possibility of genuine Libyandemocratisation as being among the other conceivable succession scenarios:maintenance of the status quo Jamahiriyya system, military dictatorship, orimplosion of the country along regional and tribal lines, for example.

There is therefore reason to study the forces which might bring about apotential democratisation in Libya's future, after Qadhafi's departure. Asrecent Algerian history has demonstrated, sudden political opening canunleash latent forces within civil society - even a previously oppressed civilsociety — capable of acting as enthusiastic democratisers. Obviously there isno guarantee that any of the obstacles to democratisation in Libya will beremoved at all after Qadhafi; if and when they are removed it is impossibleto say how this will happen. It is therefore fruitful neither to predict changenor to say what course it will take if it occurs. If there is any possibility

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f C

onne

ctic

ut]

at 0

3:55

29

Oct

ober

201

4

64 THE JOURNAL OF NORTH AFRICAN STUDIES

however that the post-Qadhafi future will foster a political opening inLibya, observers of North Africa would do well to have some understandingof the forces in Libyan society which might work towards democratisationand how effective they can be expected to be. A speculatory exploration ofsuch questions is the purpose of this article.

Here the definition of democratisation offered by Brynen, Korany andNoble will be employed. Political democratisation, they write, 'entails anexpansion of political participation in such a way as to provide citizens witha degree of real and meaningful collective control over public policy.'4 Yetwhat kinds of institutions are best suited to facilitate such politicalparticipation? The literature on democratisation strongly affirms the variousorgans of civil society as the surest guarantors of democracy, both byproviding an active and independent base of political and economic activityto prevent state monopolisation of political space and acting as a checkagainst government infringement on civilian rights. Civil society itself is theamalgam of different kinds of institutions such as political parties,professional associations, trade unions, voluntary organisations, humanrights groups, religious groups and others which exist independently of thestate and which lobby governments in their own interests, rather than thoseof the state. While a strong argument can naturally be made for the genuinecontributions of each and every one of these types of institutions todemocratisation, political parties will be the focus of the present study.Unlike some other elements of civil society, parties do vie for directparticipation in government and so arguably are best poised to attain'meaningful collective control over public policy.'

I. William Zartman enumerates four criteria which must be met for aparty to function viably in a pluralistic political system: financial support,patronage, state neutrality and an interest clientele.5 Since the precise natureof any future Libyan political system — particularly one which allows forsome measure of political pluralism - is obviously unforeseeable, it isimpossible to address questions of state neutrality and the type of patronagefuture Libyan parties might be able to dispense. Furthermore, while variousLibyan political actors such as exiled opposition groups and Islamistsreceive funding from various sources, little is known about this fundingeven at the present time (it is, after all, clandestine money given toclandestine organisations). It is impossible to say how the securing ofrevenue, either its size or sources, might change as organisations currentlyon the margins of Libyan politics attempt to move toward the centre andrecast themselves as political parties. It is possible, however, on the basis ofwhat is presently known about Libyan political actors, to speculativelyassess their potential to develop the fourth of Zartman's criteria for asuccessful political party: an interest clientele. As he writes, 'parties need to

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f C

onne

ctic

ut]

at 0

3:55

29

Oct

ober

201

4

AFTER QADHAFI 65

be able to claim representation of a defined sector of interests as well as aspecific program.'6 The question then is how well various Libyan politicalforces might be expected to accomplish this.

This article assumes that present day Libyan political actors, all of whichcurrently exist on the fringes of Libyan politics (that is to say, generallyoutlawed or operating in exile), have at least the potential to undergo atransformation into parties in the context of a hypothetical political openingfollowing upon the end of the Qadhafi era. Some of these forces haveopenly declared their intent to institute a system of liberal democracy inLibya, the central features of which include a multi-party system andcontested elections. Assessing the viability as parties of these and otherpolitical actors will help to anticipate the prospects for successfuldemocratisation in Libya. The discussion below will focus briefly oninstitutions of civil society inside Libya, and will then extensively discussQadhafi's exiled opposition and clandestine Islamists inside theJamahiriyya.

Contemporary Libyan Politics: Organisational and InstitutionalDevelopment

It has long been the Libyan leader's claim that his system of 'directdemocracy' is the truest means of mobilising popular participation, and thatas such the Libyan Arab Popular and Socialist Jamahiriyya is the vanguardof world democracy. A survey of the country's civil society as it exists after30 years of revolution however not only belies this claim but provides scantencouragement that these various social or political groupings will or evencould coalesce into operable political parties in the post-Qadhafi era.

Independent political activity in Libya has been proscribed from the firstdays of the revolution as divisive and threatening to national unity, and thustreasonous. The stipulation of the December 1969 Decision on theProtection of the Revolution - that independent political activity is a crime- has remained a governing principle of the state for nearly three decades.Political parties were banned during the first days of the revolution, and infact had been banned throughout most of the monarchical era. There istherefore little precedent in Libya for political activity independent ofgovernment control or capable of addressing itself to anything other thannon-contentious matters of local administration.

Though other associational organisations normally identified with civilsociety have been allowed to exist in Libya at various times, they havealways been under the exclusive control of a domineering state apparatussuch as the Arab Socialist Union or the Revolutionary Committees. Thecontrols placed over civil society in Libya - its direct management by the

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f C

onne

ctic

ut]

at 0

3:55

29

Oct

ober

201

4

66 THE JOURNAL OF NORTH AFRICAN STUDIES

government and its being denied a political role of any kind - haveconstrained everything from trade unions and professional syndicates to theChamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture as well as student andwomen's groups. In some cases professional syndicates have been dissolvedaltogether, as happened to the legal profession with the 1977 proclamationof revolutionary justice, which resulted in the compelling of 'all lawyers tobecome state employees and [the] removing [of] the last traces of anindependent bar.'7 In any case, whatever the legal status of these types oforganisations, they have often shown a high degree of apathy even for theminor roles allowed them by the Libyan state. After three decades ofinstitutionalised passivity it is questionable that interest groups will becapable of assuming politically active - or at least effective - roles in the erawhich follows upon Qadhafi's departure.

If the religious establishment (ulama) has never been completely co-opted by the state in Qadhafi's Libya, it has been marginalised through suchmeasures as the nationalisation of waqf properties and the removal of qadisfrom their traditional role of handing down judgments in shari'a courts.8 AsJoffe writes, under Qadhafi the ulama became 'state employees in all butname and had lost their political and cultural autonomy.'9 Without a powerbase independent of government control, and in competition with Qadhafi'spersonal (and officially sanctioned) interpretation of Islam, the ulama havenever effectively politically organised. The question of Libyan Islamism asa possible future party organisation will be addressed below.

As Lisa Anderson has noted, the systematic dismantling of civil societyhas left Libya with few to no institutions capable of mobilising individualsfor mass political action and in fact has had the opposite effect ofdemobilising the population:

Typically, business groups, labor unions, literary societies,professional associations and sports clubs spring up to facilitateinterchange among people with common interests. In Libya, however,very little of this took place. The regime's single-minded devotion tothe ideological template of the Jamahiriyya soon combined with itsobsessive concern for its own security to discourage - indeed, prohibit- virtually all manifestations of spontaneous social interaction.10

The result, writes Anderson, is that Libyans have 'found themselves onceagain reliant upon kinship ties for much of their social intercourse,economic welfare and political identity."1 A profound apathy has set in onthe part of many Libyans whose attitude towards government is bestdescribed as cynical after three decades of civil society under siege andfailed efforts at revolutionary mobilisation of the masses. The implicationsof a disenfranchised, apathetic population for future political participation

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f C

onne

ctic

ut]

at 0

3:55

29

Oct

ober

201

4

AFTER QADHAFI 67

are obvious, and naturally invite a consideration of actors politically activeoutside the country as possible initiators of future party formation.

The Libyan Opposition in Exile

Organised opposition to the Qadhafi government has been operating in exilesince at least the early 1980s and has grown steadily ever since. Muhammedal-Megariaf's National Front for the Salvation of Libya (NFSL) (founded inOctober 1981) is the best known of such movements, but there are a numberof others. Each of these organisations has been very vocal over the years indocumenting human rights abuses inside the Jamahiriyya and in reportingclashes between the regime and internal opposition. They have also beenactively involved in attempted coups d'etat against Qadhafi's government(most notably in 1984 and, reportedly, in 199312). Operating in the relativefreedom which exile permits them, these movements are better organisedthan internal opposition groups which face constant harassment by theregime. Since exiled opposition groups have definite plans for involvementin Libyan politics after Qadhafi, and since many have pledged themselvesto the establishment of democracy in Libya, it is important to understandtheir potential role in the country's future democratisation.

If developments in the post-Qadhafi era allow Libyan exiles to return totheir country, then in all likelihood the external opposition organisations canbe viewed as something like nascent political parties. Indeed several arealready organised in ways which resemble party organisation. The NFSL forexample conducts periodic congresses (in Agadir in 1982, Baghdad in 1985,Dallas in 1992 and Atlanta in 1995) and has published a political platformof policy positions and governmental organisation for the post-Qadhafi era.This platform reads like a manifesto of liberal democracy and shows theobvious influence of the Western nations in which the leaders of the NFSLhave resided over the years. Central to the NFSL's proposed political systemis the restoration of constitutional government and the right of all Libyansto form and belong to political parties as well as 'special interest groups,pressure groups, and lobbying groups... "3 That the NFSL seems to envisionitself as one such party or interest group is clear.

Other exiled opposition groups are organised like political parties aswell, including the Libyan Movement for Change and Reform (formed byformer NFSL members in 1994), the Organisation for the Coordination ofPatriotic and Democratic Libyan Forces and the Libyan National Alliance.Like the NFSL, each of these groups bases its political aspirations for thepost Qadhafi era on a democratic and generally secular model. The LibyanMovement for Change and Reform for example has also published a shortpolitical platform for Libya's future,14 and it reads very much like that of the

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f C

onne

ctic

ut]

at 0

3:55

29

Oct

ober

201

4

68 THE JOURNAL OF NORTH AFRICAN STUDIES

NFSL, from whose ranks its members have emerged. Most of the majorexiled opposition groups conduct their business through forums such asconsultative committees, 'party' congresses and so on, indicating theirpotential for one day evolving into active political parties inside Libya uponreturning to the country.

In their status as organisations returning from abroad during a time ofpolitical upheaval, today's exile opposition groups very much resemble theyoung political parties of Libya's only historical era of democraticopenness. This era, lasting from the end of the Second World War to theestablishment of the monarchy in 1951, witnessed a flowering of politicalactivity as parties were formed by returning elites to address the greatquestions of the day: independence from Italy, the nature of the nascentLibyan state and others. A comparison between the post-war Libyanpolitical parties and today's exiled opposition groups is thereforeinstructive in ascertaining the prospects for organisations like the NFSLand others to affect democratisation in Libya after Qadhafi. Thecomparison is further strengthened by the fact that today's exiledopposition groups arguably share many of the same shortcomings of thepolitical parties of the post-war era. These shortcomings may conceivablydoom them to having only the same, limited influence on future Libyanpolitical development.

Like today's opposition leaders operating abroad, the leaders of the post-war Libyan parties were exiles. They were able to return to their countryonly after the Italy's defeat in the war brought an end to the colonialadministration which had for three decades denied Libyans the right topolitical association.15 The post-war leaders returned to a Libya withoutstructured political institutions (with the exception of the Sanusiadministration in Cyrenaica).16 This is very much how contemporary Libyais likely to look if and when the patrimonial Jamahiriyya system implodesin the absence of its one and only unifying factor: the person of Qadhafi.Into an anarchic atmosphere where feudal and tribal loyalties remaineddominant the post-war leaders returned and established political parties, justas the current exiled opposition groups can be expected to attempt to do inthe disorder which may follow upon Qadhafi's departure.

As Khadduri points out however, the post-war political parties failed tocoordinate among themselves as they vied for influence in the politicaldiscord of Libya's post-war era.'7 Similarly, by most accounts the variousopposition groups today are often at odds with one another, not so much onthe general direction that Libya should take but more on questions ofleadership style and disposition toward the Qadhafi regime. For example, in1993 Colonel Khalifah Abul Kassem Haftar, who since 1988 hadcommanded the military wing of the NFSL, departed to form the Libyan

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f C

onne

ctic

ut]

at 0

3:55

29

Oct

ober

201

4

AFTER QADHAFI 69

Movement for Change and Reform (LMCR). Haftar was followed by mostof the NFSL's military leadership. His stated reasons for establishing theLMCR were:

1'absence de democratic, de liberte d'expression et de participationdans la prise de decision politique au sein du Front [NFSL], d'unepart; et la monopolisation des relations internationales du NFSL parson secretaire general, Mohammed al-Megariaf, d'autre part.18

The defection of Haftar and accusations of autocracy against Megariafexpose some of the divisions in the exile opposition. The sheer plurality ofopposition groups suggests a certain incapacity to coordinate leadership andindicates that strategic differences might well surface among them in thecontext of the new political challenges brought on by Qadhafi's departure.Given this disorganisation and mutual antagonism, it is questionable thattoday's exile opposition will be able to work cooperatively in an adverseenvironment any more effectively than were their predecessors after theSecond World War.

Furthermore, there is reason to doubt that the exiled opposition groupscommand any sort of widespread influence inside Libya, despite theclaims of their leaders. This is an extremely important point, since a partywithout a rank-and-file will be a party of diminished, even negligible,effectiveness.

As a final point in the analogy, the post-war Libyan parties had narrowpolitical objectives which were intently focused almost exclusively onsecuring independence from Italian rule. Khadduri summarises thecollective objectives of the post-war political leadership as (1) completeindependence for Libya, (2) the uniting of the three provinces into onenation, and (3) membership in the Arab League." On most other issues,including leadership of the country (particularly the question of Sanusiascendancy over all of Libya), the various parties remained divided. It isstriking then that today's exile groups seem to manifest a similar narrownessof focus in their political goals. As El-Roz and Jalkh write:

En depit des divergences partielles entre elles, qu'elles soient d'ordreideologique ou pratique, les formations composant 1'opposition ont unseul et meme objectif: provoquer un changement politique en Libye,permettre aux Libyens d'exprimer leur volonte et edifier un pouvoirdemocratique qui garantirait les libertes et les droits fondamentauxdes citoyens.20

While intended as an affirmation of their common resolve, this statementhighlights what is perhaps a fundamental weakness in the exiled opposition:its singular concentration on removing Qadhafi from power, with less

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f C

onne

ctic

ut]

at 0

3:55

29

Oct

ober

201

4

70 THE JOURNAL OF NORTH AFRICAN STUDIES

attention toward which direction to take once this is accomplished. Thewords of Mansour El-Kikhia, written as a historical reference to the post-war Libyan parties, may be uncannily prophetic:

It is interesting that most of the country's political parties, whichspontaneously emerged after the war and were in large partresponsible for the shaping of the national political system, eitherdissolved themselves or, having failed to formulate new principlesthat appealed to the public, were forced to disappear. All the parties,not yet characterised by any real ideological differences, emerged tomeet specific goals: total independence, the unity of the threeprovinces, and membership in the Arab League. These goals wereachieved in the early 1950s, and the parties were expected to fade intoobscurity.21

Certainly all of today's exiled opposition groups envision a democratic andpluralistic Libya once Qadhafi has departed. Yet aside from expressing thisresolve there seems to be little attention (and even less consensus) on how toaddress the specific challenges which will be inherent in the transition todemocracy and a liberal order. What most stands to undermine theeffectiveness of any parties formed by returning exiles is that their veryreturn to Libya presupposes that their major political goal - the removal ofQadhafi from power - will already have occurred. This being the case, andconsidering the divisions between them, their ability to substantiallycontribute to the institutionalisation of Libyan democracy is questionable.

Well intentioned proposals, such as those of the NFSL, to establish ademocratic political order in Libya may be of little use in addressing themost formidable obstacles of the post-Qadhafi era. Such obstacles includedismantling the Jamahiriyya system, mobilising a politically disenfranchisedpopulation, overcoming persistent regionalism and cohabitating politicalspace with an Islamist constituency which may have little sympathy for thepolitical ideals of the returning exiles. A significant means of predicting theexiles' prospects for success is the degree of their attention to the hindrancesthey will actually face, as opposed to mere affirmations of the idealiseddemocratic system they envision. The NFSL, for example, sees anobligation for the new Libyan state to compensate persons whose propertiesand businesses have been expropriated or ruined by statist meddling underQadhafi.22 Attention to this issue is certainly a step in the right direction, butit is only the beginning and is the only such plank evident in the NFSL'splatform. It is unfortunate that the political programmes of the NFSL andother exile organisations show little attention to the specific and highlycontentious challenges - the 'facts on the ground,' as it were - they will facein reordering Libyan politics after Qadhafi.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f C

onne

ctic

ut]

at 0

3:55

29

Oct

ober

201

4

AFTER QADHAFI 71

Such challenges are numerous. What to do, for example, with theGeneral People's Congress, Basic People's Congresses and otherinstitutions of the Qadhafi era which are in some sense participatory bodies,and whose leaders may have a vested interest in resisting change? How tocheck potential latent tendencies toward regionalism and tribalism whichmay prove so centrifugal as to undermine any attempts at building a newcentralised state? How to handle the very sensitive question of thedistributive functions of the state which Qadhafi built? If the newdemocratic Libya is not to be a socialist state (and, aside from the NFSL'spledge to establish universal health care,23 there is no indication that exiledleaders intend it to be), how will a new government persuade a populationrendered dependent and passive by decades of state paternalism to accepttaxation, or to forswear government handouts? How to address theinclinations of a population which has for over three decades lived underand imbibed Qadhafi's populist rhetoric? Libyans may still implicitlyaccord legitimacy to some of his ideals, which are at odds with the liberaldemocratic models that exile groups are proposing. Finally, how tocompromise and share political space with Libya's Islamists, who by allaccounts command a substantial following and who may prove very hostileto a political programme not based directly on Islam? Unless these and otherequally pressing questions are addressed by the opposition in exile, thesegroups may find themselves facing the new Libya with good intentions butwith little strategy for how to proceed.

Political Islam in Libya

The question of political Islam is an important one, as it is a force to bereckoned with in Libya. Any successful future political settlement in Libyawill have to include the Islamists who, through their sustained insurgencyagainst the Qadhafi regime, have demonstrated their ability to disrupt anypolitical order of which they do not approve. Considering that Libya'sIslamists probably command as much (if not more) influence andlegitimacy inside the country as the opposition parties operating from exile,an accommodation between the two seems crucial to the success ofdemocratic reform. Though the coalition of members of the NFSL, forexample, includes persons of an Islamist bent,24 many Islamist organisationsinside the country have no relations with the NFSL and may hold politicalideas antithetical to it. It is therefore notable and discouraging that there islittle indication of any sort of ongoing dialogue between the Islamists andthe exiled opposition. Little is known about the inclination of Libya'sIslamists to endorse democratic principles such as those contained in theNFSL's political platform, and thus they and the exile opposition groups are

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f C

onne

ctic

ut]

at 0

3:55

29

Oct

ober

201

4

72 THE JOURNAL OF NORTH AFRICAN STUDIES

potential antagonists in negotiating the country's post-Qadhafi politicalorder. The outcome of any conflict between the two is unpredictable.

Detailed information on political Islam in Libya is exceedingly difficultto come by, save for brief news reports (which abound) in various mediarecounting clashes between Islamists and the regime's security services. Allthat is known with any reliability about Libya's Islamists is that theirmovement is concentrated around Benghazi and is able to mobilisedisaffected youth against the regime (according to one 1996 report scores ofIslamists and Libyan soldiers were being killed daily in skirmishes25).Libyan Islamism is given identity through the emergence of a number ofsmall and disorganised groups - the Muslim Brotherhood, Hezbollah, theMovement of Islamic Martyrs, the Group of the Followers of God, theMilitant Islamic Group and others - with varying degrees of associationwith co-religionists in such places as Sudan, Egypt and Algeria. Surveyingthe activities of Libya's Islamists recalls the words of Lisa Anderson,writing in 1986 on Qadhafi's exiled opposition:

Since much of the political opposition is necessarily clandestine,many of the groups said to be opposing Qadhdhafi are more'organised' in theory than in practice, coming and going, merging anddividing as time goes on. Thus, the very existence, to say nothing ofthe funding, membership and ideological inclination, of somereported groups is open to question.26

Accounts sometimes conflict as to the activities of the groups, with someobservers reporting the eradication of a given organisation within Libyaonly for other observers to subsequently report the same organisation to beactive inside the country. Little substantial communication with the outsideworld is initiated by Libya's Islamists (aside from claims of responsibilityfor attacks against the regime). One exception is the external branch of theMuslim Brotherhood, which intermittently publishes the journal al-Muslimin London.27 Even with these occasional publications, however, the LibyanIslamists differ from the exiled, secular opposition in having failed toproduce a political platform of any kind. What George Joffe wrote a decadeago still holds generally true today, that 'apart from the fragmentaryevidence of their existence supplied by the regime when it extracts itsrevenge upon them [the Islamists], there is virtually no other evidence oftheir beliefs, objectives or activities.'28

Despite the current lack of reliable information on the Islamists or theirpolitical intentions (aside from their obvious goal of bringing downQadhafi) a key question can be asked about them in regard to Libya's future.Hypothetically discounting a smooth leadership succession or a newmilitary take-over, might events following Qadhafi's departure come to

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f C

onne

ctic

ut]

at 0

3:55

29

Oct

ober

201

4

AFTER QADHAFI 73

resemble the Algerian political opening of the late 1980s and thereby allowthe Islamists to organise politically? Might the Libyan Islamists be in aposition from which to take advantage of such a development, as did the FISby declaring itself a political party in February of 1989? The prospectswould seem mixed.

On the one hand the situations in pre-1988 Algeria and Qadhafi's Libyaseem comparable. Whether civil society languished under strict one partyrule (as in Algeria) or under a statist system denying the legitimacy ofparties altogether (as in Libya) seems of little importance. The ultimateeffect was the persecution of Islamist (and other) organisations which,however suppressed by the state, never ceased to articulate powerfulpolitical and social currents in society. Given the influence of Islam as anideology over both Libyans and Algerians, a future period of politicalopening, in which the platform 'Islam is the solution' can be freelypropagated, might bring Libyan Islamists the same kind of mass appeal thatwas enjoyed by the FIS prior to January 1992. This might be even more soif there is a backlash in Libya against the unconventional (even heretical)interpretation of Islam which has been forced upon the country by Qadhafisince the 1970s.

This however is where the similarities between the FIS and LibyanIslamists end. If measured in terms of toleration by the state, the histories ofIslamism in Algeria prior to 1988 and in Libya under Qadhafi are strikinglydifferent. Though both the Algerian government and Qadhafi tried to co-optand thus control the powerful current of Islamism, in Libya the statebrooked absolutely no dissent while the Algerian government tolerated acertain amount of independence on the part of the country's Islamists. TheAlgerian FLN government attempted to prevent independent Islamistactivity through such measures as laws against unauthorised publicassociation, and it attempted to co-opt Islamism by capitulating to Islamistdemands in passing the Family Code of 1984 and enshrining an'establishment' Islam to bless the policies of the state.29 Algerian Islamistscircumvented such measures however, practising civil disobedience byconstructing private mosques which became pulpits for independent andoften anti-government preaching. The government made no decisive movesagainst these mosques — which were said to number nearly 10,000 — andwhile individual preachers were at times arrested, only those Islamists (suchas Mustapha Bouyali and his followers) who took up arms against the statefaced violent reprisal.

While Algerian Islamists were constructing independent mosquenetworks and attacking the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of theirfollowers, Islamists in neighbouring Libya were facing the full wrath of thestate. In large measure they lost the battle. Claiming for itself the mantle of

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f C

onne

ctic

ut]

at 0

3:55

29

Oct

ober

201

4

74 THE JOURNAL OF NORTH AFRICAN STUDIES

Islamic leadership, the state under Qadhafi early on nationalised the waqfproperties of the traditional ulama class, thereby dismantling their powerbase. Faced with criticism from the ulama, Qadhafi set the state propagandamachine loose in an attack on the legitimacy of traditional Sunni Islam,pronouncing the hadith, the sunna of the Prophet and other aspects oforthodox Islam to be shirk. By declaring the principle of individual ijtihadto be sacrosanct, Qadhafi undermined the function of the ulama as a classof religious authorities whose interpretation of divine law had played aninstitutional role in Libyan society.

The Libyan state was equally unforgiving in its treatment of individualMuslim leaders whose activities transgressed boundaries laid down by theregime. Libyan Muslim leaders had for a time played a role in articulatingpopular frustration with the regime's arrogation to itself of the exclusiveright to interpret religious doctrine (often in the most heterodox of ways).As in Algeria, popular urban mosques once acted as a forum in whichMuslim leaders expressed opposition to Qadhafi and the regime:

One of the most influential of them was a Tripoline preacher, Sheikhal-Bishti. He was considered by large segments of urban youth to bea modernising theologian in the salafi tradition and was extremelypopular, with large crowds attending Friday prayers whenever he gavethe khutba.30

Unlike in Algeria, however, such activity was not tolerated for long, andsuch leaders as Sheikh al-Bishti were not left eventually to organise, as thepredecessors of the FIS leadership had done:

Inevitably, because of the unrestrained attack by the regime on theulama after 1978, his [al-Bishti's] khutbas were increasingly viewedby the authorities as a breach of a 1975 decree that prohibited publicdiscussion of political matters by religious bodies. Eventually, in1980, he disappeared, an obvious victim of the Qaddafi regime'sintolerance. The efficiency of the Libyan security services ensuredthat there was no popular response. Other religious figures have beenthreatened since his disappearance and the result is that the role of themosque as commentator on social and political matters has now beencompletely destroyed in Libya.31

The contrast with Algeria is striking, where independent mosque networksplayed a crucial - and largely unchecked - role in cultivating publicsentiment against the government right up to the 1988 riots which led topolitical opening and the formation of the FIS as a formidable oppositionparty. If the cases of Sheikh al-Bishti and Algerian Islamists like AbbasiMadani and Ali Belhadj are compared analogously it is clear that Libyan

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f C

onne

ctic

ut]

at 0

3:55

29

Oct

ober

201

4

AFTER QADHAFI 75

Islamism lacks what its Algerian counterpart enjoyed and exploited: aperiod of independent existence, tolerated by the state, which allowed it todevelop an organisational structure for mass mobilisation. The LibyanIslamists are not likely to emerge from the Qadhafi era able to mobiliselarge numbers of Libyans in a party format as did the FIS; they will likelynot be, as James Ciment has written of the FIS in 1988, a 'ready-madepolitical power.'32

Conclusion

Qadhafi's era is drawing to a close. Though the end of his rule may still besome time away, it is time that scholars of North Africa begin to devoteattention to possible scenarios of transition to the post-Qadhafi era. Onesuch scenario might be a rapid political opening which would allow formeaningful democratisation. Certainly there are Libyans watching Libyawith a keen eye who intend to establish a liberal, democratic order in thecountry, an order characterised by electoral competition among multiplepolitical parties. However, whether it be the exiled opposition whoseexplicit intent is to establish political parties, or Islamist organisations whomight conceivably follow an FIS-inspired path to prominence, the prospectsfor successful institutionalisation of political pluralism are not encouraging.

Like their post-war forebears returning to Libya after three decades ofItalian rule, today's exiled opposition leaders will face a number ofobstacles in trying to reshape Libyan politics after three decades (or more)of Qadhafi's rule. Like the post-war parties, today's returning exiles willlikely find their effectiveness limited by their disorganisation, lack ofindigenous support, mutual discord between them, the narrowness of theirpolitical goals and the fact that Libya lacks the political institutions tocompliment multi-party politics. Above all they seem to have no strategywhatsoever for confronting the difficulties of dismantling the politicalsystem which Qadhafi has constructed and pacifying its beneficiaries.

Though Libya's Islamists might ostensibly seem well placed to takeadvantage of a sudden political opening and organise into a party structure,as did the FIS in Algeria after 1988, there are important differences betweenAlgerian Islamists and their Libyan counterparts. In Algeria independentIslamism was largely tolerated (and at times even exploited) by thegovernment, allowing it to build the organisational networks andinstitutions which the FIS in turn so effectively employed upon itslegalisation as a party. Libyan Islamists have had no such fortune, havingbeen effectively persecuted since the late 1970s. Mosque preachers are notallowed to openly question or criticise the state, influential leaders havebeen eliminated and the security services do not allow for the emergence of

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f C

onne

ctic

ut]

at 0

3:55

29

Oct

ober

201

4

76 THE JOURNAL OF NORTH AFRICAN STUDIES

the kind of independent political networks formerly maintained by AlgerianIslamists. Finally, Libyan Islamists have far fewer economic and socialfrustrations on which to capitalise than did their co-religionists in Algeria.As a result of these factors, Islamism in Libya probably cannot be expectedto 'burst onto the scene' as it did in Algeria.

Predicting the future is always a risky business, but a glance at Libyatoday suggests that with regards to returning exiled opposition leadershistory is likely to repeat itself. By contrast, history will likely not do so asregards political Islam (if compared to neighbouring Algeria). On bothcounts therefore the prospects for the institutionalisation of politicalpluralism and parties as viable organisations in Libya seem dim. Whetherevents will even allow an experiment in multi party politics to take place -however likely its failure - of course remains to be seen. Political openingor no political opening, the future of democratisation in Libya after Qadhafiseems anything but promising.

NOTES

1. Dirk Vandewalle, 'Qadhafi's "Perestroika": Economic and Political Liberalization in Libya',Middle East Journal, 45/2 (Spring 1991) pp.216-231.

2. Moncef Djaziri, 'Creating a New State: Libya's Political Institutions', in Dirk Vandewalle(ed.) Qadhafi's Libya, 1969-1994 (New York: St. Martin's Press 1995) p.197.

3. FBIS-NES-98-028, 28 Jan 1998.4. Rex Brynen, Bahgat Korany and Paul Noble, 'Theoretical Perspectives on Arab

Liberalization and Democratization', in Brynen, Korany and Noble (eds.) PoliticalLiberalization and Democratization in the Arab World, Volume I (Boulder and London:Lynne Rienner Publishers 1995) p.3.

5. I. William Zartman, 'The Challenge of Democratic Alternatives in the Maghrib', in JohnRuedy (ed.) Islamism and Secularism in North Africa (New York: St. Martin's Press 1994)p.215.

6. Ibid, p.216.7. Ann Elizabeth Mayer, 'In Search of Sacred Law: The Meandering Course of Qadhafi's Legal

Policy', in Dirk Vandewalle (ed.) (note 2) p.118.8. George Joffe\ 'Qadhafi's Islam in Local Historical Perspective', in Dirk Vandewalle (ed.)

(note 2) pp.147-49.9. Ibid. p. 148.

10. Lisa Anderson, 'Qadhafi's Legacy: An Evaluation of a Political Experiment', in DirkVandewalle (ed.) (note2) p.229.

11. Ibid, pp.229-30.12. 'Major Opposition Group Breaks Up', Middle East Reporter Weekly 72/771 (26 Feb. 1994)

p.7.13. National Front for the Salvation of Libya, Libya Under Gaddafi and the NFSL Challenge:

An Anthology of Articles and Documents from the National Front for the Salvation of Libya(Chicago: National Front for the Salvation of Libya, 1992) p.307.

14. 'Splinter Opposition Group Former, Bares Program', Middle East Reporter Weekly 72/775(26 March 1994) p.1415.

15. Majid Khadduri, Modem Libya: A Study in Political Development (Baltimore: The JohnsHopkins University Press 1963) p.84.

16. Ibid, pp.84-5.17. Ibid. p.85.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f C

onne

ctic

ut]

at 0

3:55

29

Oct

ober

201

4

AFTER QADHAFI 77

18. Ali El-Roz and Antoine Jalkh, 'Les Anti-Kadhafi de A a Z', Arables (October 1995) p.26.(translation: the absence of democracy, liberty of expression and participation in the politicaldecision making process within the Front [NFSL] on the one hand; and monopolisation ofthe international relations of the NFSL by its secretary-general, Mohammed al-Megariaf, onthe other).

19. Khadduri, 1963, p.87.20. El-Roz and Jalkh, 1995, p.31. (translation: 'Despite the partial divisions between them, be

they of an ideological or practical nature, the organisations which make up the oppositionhave but one and the same objective: to provoke a political change in Libya, to permitLibyans to express their will and construct a democratic order which will guarantee thefundamental liberties and rights of citizens').

21. Mansour O. El-Kikhia, Libya's Qaddafi: The Politics of Contradiction (Gainesville:University of Florida Press 1997) pp.31-2.

22. National Front for the Salvation of Libya (note 13) p.314.23. Ibid, p.311.24. Marius K. Deeb, 'Militant Islam and its Critics: The Case of Libya', in John Ruedy (ed.)

Islamism and Secularism in North Africa (New York: St. Martin's Press 1994) p. 194; GeorgeJoffe, 'Islamic Opposition in Libya', Third World Quarterly Mill (April 1988) p.628.

25. 'Libya Polities', International Country Risk Guide: Middle East and North Africa (1 Dec.1996) pp. 1-7.

26. Lisa Anderson, 'Qadhdhafi and his Opposition', Middle East Journal 40/2 (Spring 1986)p.226.

27. El-Roz and Jalkh (note 18) p.27.28. Joffe, 1988, p.627.29. Robert Mortimer, 'Islam and Multiparty Politics in Algeria', Middle East Journal 45/4

(Autumn 1991) p.578.30. JofftJ (note 8) p.626.31. Ibid.32. James Ciment, Algeria:The Fundamentalist Challenge (New York: Facts on File, Inc. 1997)

p.22.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f C

onne

ctic

ut]

at 0

3:55

29

Oct

ober

201

4