against the panzers

United States Infantry versus German Tanks, 1944-1945

Against the Panzers

AGAINST THE PANZERS

United States Infantry versus German Tanks, 1944-1945

A HISTORY OF EIGHT BATTLES TOLD THROUGH DIARIES,

UNIT HISTORIES AND INTERVIEWS

by ALLYN R. VANNOY and

JAY KARAMALES

with a foreword by T. N. D U P U Y

McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers Jefferson, North Carolina, and London

Copyright © 1996 Allyn R. Jannoy and Jay Karamales

Printed by special arrangement with McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, Jefferson, North Carolina.

ISBN 0-7864-0129-X

No part of this book, specifically including the table of contents and index, may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying or recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.

Manufactured in the United States of America

To the women who got us through the writing of this book and without whose support and understanding

none of this would have been possible:

Cynthia Vannoy Maureen Karamales

Kathryn Vannoy

Acknowledgments

This book is the culmination of several years of research, which included countless hours going through archives, numerous letters to and interviews with veterans and experts, and trips across the United States to tap into official sources of information. In order to clarify our understanding of the actions we were study-ing, and to absorb that undefinable flavor of a battle that can only come from walk-ing the ground, we also made a trip to France and Belgium to visit the battlefields of Mortain and the northern half of the Battle of the Bulge. This also allowed us to access European collections of documents and artifacts and to talk with a num-ber of Belgian citizens who had lived through the fighting that ravaged their home-towns. In a sense, then, this book represents a joint effort by an enormous and diverse group of people to reconstruct clashes between U.S. infantrymen and Ger-man panzers.

We would like to thank the coauthors of SAIC's Anti-Armor Defense Data (A2D2) study—Dr. Charles M. Baily, Victoria Young, and Joyce Boykin—for set-ting the stage for this book and for their professionalism and dedication in col-lecting an enormous amount of data regarding the battles at St. Barthelmy, Krinkelt-Rocherath, and Dom Bütgenbach. Albert Mcjoynt drafted many of the original maps from which our maps in these chapters are derived. Dr. Arthur Volz, a noted researcher and expert on German artillery from Bammental, Germany, pro-vided very useful information and made several trips to the Bundesarchiv in Freiburg for the A2D2 project. And our chapter on Mortain would have been impossible without the contributions of Lawson Neel, George Greene, Thomas Springfield, Dean Noble, Sid Eichen, Travis Brewer, and Clair Farley, all of the 823d Tank Destroyer Battalion. We owe special thanks to Messrs. Greene and Springfield for allowing us to fly them to Virginia for interviews and to Lawson Neel and his wife Josie for inviting us into their home and patiently granting a lengthy interview.

Our sincere thanks to the many veterans of the 5th, 28th, 80th, 94th, and 104th Infantry Divisions—the infantrymen, tankers, medics, artillerymen, cannon-eers, tank-destroyer crewmen, antitank gun crews, and engineers—who provided assistance and contributions: Ralph R. Cupelli, Stanley Hays (Colonel, U.S. Army, retired), Charles S. Holtz, Thomas Tucker, Wilfred Haughey, Jr., Earl Waldron, Julius Beers, Frank V. Langfitt, Jr., Jack Davis, Harold Storey, Charles (Charlie)

viii Acknowledgments

Marks, Randolph C. Dickens (Major General, U.S. Army, retired), Fred Gage, Martin F. Loughlin, Jim Hardy ("Red Devils," 702dTank Bn. Association), Charles (Charlie) W. Brown, M. C. (Woody) Chitwood, W. Edmund Tyler, Lou Kalita, Carl W. Pape, Charles. R. Good, James H. Hayes (Colonel, U.S. Army, retired), Fred E. Mikolowsky, Jr., Anthony A. Scacco, Milton Bartelt, Charles Brodeur, George E. Burns, Versel Case, Jr., Thomas R. Cheatham, Roger Pendleton (104th Infantry Division Association), Thomas Danowski, Charles Davis, Henry A. Ducat, Tom Raney and Bruce Crissinger of the 823rd Tank Destroyer Battalion, Howard Meyer and John J. Stevenson of the 202d Engineer Combat Battalion, Frank Hal-lahan, and Charles F. Shotts. Without their help and personal accounts this book would have been much less interesting.

We want to acknowledge Charles B. MacDonald and Sidney T. Mathews' excellent book, Three Battles, which provided the basis for our chapters on Arna-ville and Schmidt. Additional sources, i.e., veterans' accounts and archival records, helped us add further details and correct some omissions and errors.

Since the Battle of the Bulge is such a thoroughly studied topic, there is a plethora of kind people to thank for their cooperation. Robert Phillips, veteran of the Twenty-eighth Division's stand in front of Bastogne and author of the book To Save Bastogne, was helpful in reviewing the chapter on Hosingen. Jack Flana-gan of the 612th Tank Destroyer Battalion cheerfully provided a wealth of infor-mation and contacts about his unit's operations with the 99th Division, and graciously invited us to several reunions of the Battalion to discuss the Bulge and the SS atrocities at Honsfeld. The monographs of Thomas Rivette and Donald Gendron laid the foundation for the Dom Bütgenbach chapter. Special thanks are due Richard Byers of the 99th Division for his assistance and for providing us with copies of his correspondence with former Colonel Wilhelm Osterhold.

Material related to the actions of KG Peiper would have been impossible without the patient and generous assistance of General Michael F. Reynolds, CB, probably the greatest living expert on Peiper's exploits in the Ardennes and author of the final word on the subject, the book The Devil's Adjutant: Jochen Peiper, Panzer Leader. To be led along Peiper's route by General Reynolds is to make a voyage of discovery, not only of one of the most fascinating chapters of military history, but also of the hospitality of the Belgian people. Among these, we would like to thank Edouard and Marie-Berthe de Harenne for kindly giving us lodging in their home, the stately Chateau Vaulx-Renard, and showering us with kindness while regaling us with history. We would also like to express our appreciation to Gerard and Marie-France Gregoire, respectively the founder and caretaker of the December 1944 Museum in La Gleize. Marie-France, aside from giving us the run of the museum after hours, also kindly consented to drive us along Peiper's route for two days while General Reynolds narrated and we filmed and scrawled notes. We would also like to thank the de Harennes of "the big house" (Chateau Froid-Cour) for graciously allowing us into their home and introducing us to Orval beer; Georges and Susie Balaes, for hours in their jolly company and wine on the ter-race of their dacha overlooking La Gleize; and Joseph Dejardin and his wife of Stavelot, who helped make the Christmas of 1994 a special one for those of us

Acknowledgments IX

wondering what the Christmas of 1944 had been like. A special note of thanks is due to Jack Bauseman, author of The Malmédy Massacre, traveling companion, his-torian, and Southern gentleman.

No historical research would be possible without the dedication of the archi-vists and librarians who guard the country's troves of documents, journals, and official records. We would particularly like to thank Richard Boylan and Victoria Washington of the Federal Records Center in Suitland, Maryland; Harry Riley and Robin Cookson of the Foreign Military Studies section of the National Archives, Washington, D.C.; David Holt, curator of the Armor School Museum, Fort Knox, Kentucky; the staff of the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.; of the U.S. Mil-itary History Institute, Carlisle, Pennsylvania; the Pentagon Library, Arlington, Vir-ginia; and the Office of the Chief of Military History (OCMH), Washington, D.C., for their assistance and advice in tracking down relevant records and doc-uments.

We have endeavored to present, as much as possible, an accurate and schol-arly account of the events in this book, but inevitably eyewitnesses' recollections differ, or official documents contain errors. In such cases historians must make informed guesses, based on their experience and knowledge of the battle, units, and people involved. Many of these guesses turn out to be wrong. In a number of cases, mistakes we have made have been corrected by the witnesses, experts, and friends named above, and it is to their credit that this book is as accurate as it is. As the price we pay for getting to put our names on the cover of such a collabo-rative effort, we, the authors, must bear all responsibility for any errors contained in the text, and we apologize for any consternation or confusion that may ensue. It is our sincere hope that we have made some small contribution to the reputa-tion of the units and men that paid a much higher price as they wrote their names into the pages of history long before we put pen to paper.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgments vii

Foreword by T. N. Dupuy 1

Preface 3

1 Infantry Against Armor 5

2 Test of Courage: Mortain, France, 7 - 1 2 August 1944 19

3 Second Chance Crossing: Arnaville, France,

10 - 15 September 1944 45

4 "Blutiger Eimer" Schmidt and Kommerscheidt: Germany,

2 - 8 November 1944 87

5 Night Assault with Bayonets and Grenades: Lucherberg, Germany, 3 - 5 December 1944 149

6 The Iron Division: Hosingen, Luxembourg,

16 December 1944 189

7 Battle for the Twin Villages: Krinkelt/Rocherath, Belgium,

16 - 19 December 1944 2 1 5

8 We Fight and Die Here: Dom Bütgenbach, Belgium,

1 8 - 2 1 December 1944 2 7 3

9 Fight It Out to the Finish: Butzdorf/Tettingen, Germany,

18 January 1945 305

Bibliography 323

Index of Military Units 337

General Index 341

Key to Military Symbols

Unit Size = Section

= Squad

= Platoon

= Company

= Battalion

= Regiment

= Brigade/Kampfgruppe/CC

= Division

= Corps

= Regimental Combat Team (RCT)

A heavy vertical bar at the left of a unit symbol denotes "heavy" or "heavy weapons" variety of that unit; e.g.,

= Infantry Heavy Weapons (mortars and machine guns)

= Infantry

= Armor

= Mechanized Infantry

= Artillery

= Self-Propelled Artillery

= Cavalry/Reconnaissance

= Armored Cavalry/Recon

= Parachute Infantry

= Engineer

= Tank Destroyer (Towed)

= Tank Destroyer (SP)

= Antitank (Towed)

= Antitank (SP)

= Cannon

= Mortar

= Chemical Mortar

= Anti-Aircraft Artillery

= Rocket Artillery

Machine G u n

Military Police

Ammo & Pioneer

Medical

Signals

Maintenance

Quartermaster

Service

Transport

= American

= German

Nationality/Branch

Unit Type

Foreword

Allyn R. Vannoy and Jay Karamales have converted a relatively routine research contract task into a dramatic, action-packed book. They were members of a research team of the Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) assigned to work on a study for the United States Army of the performance of American infantry against German armor in World War II. The purpose of their research was to employ a methodology similar to one I had pioneered a few years earlier in order to derive quantifiable patterns from the data of a large number of combat engagements. Presumably they were successful in this endeavor although the book does not—and is not intended to—focus on their research objectives or results.

Rather, these two authors saw in the variety of documents they examined in their research the outlines of a number of tales of human drama of frightened men, struggling to overcome fear and do their duty, in the deadly environment of battle. In their preface they describe these documents as "official U.S. Army records," but it is obvious from the accounts that their sources included some Ger-man records and postwar narratives of German participants in the battles they were researching. Furthermore, the presentation is remarkably evenhanded. It is obvious to the reader that the authors realize that there is nothing to choose—in terms of heroism, courage, and devotion to duty—between the American and Ger-man soldiers fighting in World War II.

The authors use the records well. And they translate the often plodding and dull reports into coherent and graphic tales of battlefield action. The engagements all come from the year-long operations of American and German forces opposing each other in northwestern Europe from June 1944 to May 1945. Actually the first of their battle selections is from the Battle of Mortain, in Normandy, in August 1944; the last is in mid-January 1945 in the Saar region of western Germany.

About forty percent of the book is devoted to engagements during the Ger-man Ardennes Offensive of December 1944-January 1945: the Battle of the Bulge. Interestingly—but not surprisingly, in light of the purpose of the initial research— the three widely spread (geographically) Bulge engagements they describe are con-centrated in time between December 16 and 21,1944. This, of course, is when the Germans, with a heavy preponderance of armored forces, struck against mainly infantry units of the American V and VIII Corps.

2 Against the Panzers

Vannoy and Karamales are to be congratulated for giving us good, solid history, presented in fascinating, fast-paced yarns of men struggling—sometimes successfully, sometimes in vain, but always heroically—against machines.

Col. Trevor Dupuy served in Burma in World War II as an artillery o f f i c e r . After the war he became one of America's foremost military historians, authoring more than 80 books. He also founded the Dupuy Institute for military studies, and developed the Quantified Judgment Method of combat modeling.

T. N. DUPUY COL., U.S.A., RET.

Preface

Every great battle or campaign is made up of many small, individual battles-warfare, at its core, is a series of fights between individuals or small groups. To those involved the relationship of the small actions to the bigger picture is seldom clear. One cannot visualize the larger operation without getting down to compa-nies, platoons, and even individuals. The advantage of looking at the "little pic-ture" is that things are more concrete, more realistic; it underscores the noblest part of the story (if any part of combat can be said to be noble)—the struggle of the individual soldier—whether an engineer straining to throw a bridge across a dark swirling river, a member of a wire team fumbling in the snow to repair a bro-ken line, a rifleman scrambling through the shattered streets of a village or advanc-ing through minefields and killing with the desperation that comes in the heat of a firefight.

This book was the outgrowth of a study by the Science Applications Inter-national Corporation for the U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency on American infantry versus German armor during the Second World War. While doing research for the book it became clear that our focus needed to be widened, that the armies of World War II fought as combined arms teams—infantry, tanks, artillery, tank destroyers, antitank guns, and engineers. In selecting the engagements to be cov-ered, we attempted to identify actions where the Americans were usually facing a superior German attacking (or counterattacking) force.

It was our intention to place incidents in their larger perspective while mak-ing the situations more understandable—to clear away some of the fog of battle without dehumanizing the stories and to show the impact a single soldier, an indi-vidual, can have on larger events and on the lives of others.

In the engagements researched, we found a certain amount of mystery. Here were men, just average Joes, ordinary, yet extraordinary, caught up in events out of all proportion to their regular lives back home. Willing to place their lives in danger, yet, more than that, demonstrating through their deeds that they could overcome the deadliest and most terrible weapons of their time.

These accounts are based on official U.S. Army records from the National Archives and the U.S. Army Military History Institute-daily journals, unit diaries, journal files, unit histories, and after action reports—and on personal diaries, inter-views, and correspondence with veterans.


In Chapt cr 1 we have tried to make the seemingly complex organizations of the U.S. and German armies more understandable and provide some background on their weapons and battlefield tactics. We have attempted to select a mix of actions—river crossings, meeting engagements, defensive operations, assaults on towns; a cross section of actions from the Normandy breakout, operations in Lor-raine, the Huertgen Forest, and the Ardennes. Covered are operations from August 1944 to January 1945—a period of rapid advances and intense combat, starting with Chapter 2-Mortain, France, 7 August 1944, where, supported by a platoon of four antitank guns, a battalion of infantry of the 30th Infantry Division lay in the path of an attacking panzer division. Chapter 3 describes a river crossing operation dur-ing September 1944: the 10th and 11th Infantry Regiments, 5th Infantry Division, at Arnaville, France. Chapter 4 covers the terrible ordeal of the 112th Infantry Reg-iment in the Huertgen Forest from November 2 to 8, 1944. Chapter 5 details a daring night assault on the small German village of Lucherberg, 2 -5 December 1944, by elements of the 145th Infantry.

Included are a series of actions from the Battle of the Bulge beginning with the infantry of the Twenty-eighth Division at Hosingen, Luxembourg, on 16 December 1944 (Chapter 6); vignettes surrounding actions of the Second and Ninety-ninth Infantry Divisions at Krinkelt-Rocherath, Belgium, from 16 to 19 December 1944 (Chapter 7). Chapter 8 covers the bloody defense of a Belgian manor house by the Twenty-sixth Infantry Regiment against the full weight of the 12th SS Panzer Division at Dom Bütgenbach, 18 to 21 December 1944. And finally (Chapter 9), we describe American efforts to bait the Germans into throwing the panzers and panzer grenadiers of the Eleventh Panzer Division at the waiting guns of the Ninety-fourth Infantry Division at the villages of Butzdorf and Tettingen, Germany, on 18 January 1945.

The American soldier (and his German counterpart) was a fierce fighter, coura-geous, willing to put his life on the line to achieve his assigned mission or protect the lives of his comrades. But like anyone faced with the unknown, the brutality of war, and the knowledge of his own mortality, he was given to fear from time to time. Many were the acts of individual courage in combat by GIs, men willing to risk everything, willing to pay the ultimate price that came with duty against the enemy—against the panzers.

Infantry Against Armor

Organization of American Forces

During World War II the American army operated three main types of divi-sions—infantry, armored, and airborne. Of the eighty-nine divisions in existence at the end of the war, sixty-six were infantry (all but one seeing combat), sixteen armored, five airborne, one mountain, and one cavalry (mechanized). The group-ing together of nondivisional (those units not organized into divisions) infantry and artillery units would have amounted to another six infantry divisions and that of independent armored units to an additional twenty armored divisions. Each of the basic types of divisions was usually reinforced or supplemented by the attach-ment of other (nondivisional) units in order to ensure that the division could fulfill its assigned mission. Such attachments might include tanks, tank destroyers, anti-aircraft artillery, chemical weapons companies, truck companies, engineer bridge companies, field hospitals, ambulance companies, and counterintelligence and POW interrogation teams.

By the end of the war, 317 regiments of infantry (most assigned to divisions) of various kinds had been formed. A new and specialized type of infantry was cre-ated during the war, intended as the dismounted element of the armored divisions-armored infantry. Armored infantry differed from standard infantry only in that it had sufficient transport of its own to move its entire force in one trip and in that its vehicles (half-tracks—predecessors of modern armored personnel carriers or APCs) had cross-country capability and light armor and were thus able to keep pace with and support the tanks.

Within the infantry regiment the smallest subunit was the rifle squad of twelve men (armed with ten Ml .30-caliber Garand rifles, one Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR, pronounced as if spelling it) and one M1903 Springfield sniper's rifle). Three squads plus a command element formed a rifle platoon, and three rifle platoons, one weapons platoon, and a company headquarters (HQ) composed a rifle com-pany. The weapons platoon had two air-cooled .30-caliber light machine guns (LMGS), three 60mm mortars, three bazookas, and a water-cooled .30-cal or air-cooled ,50-cal heavy machine gun (HMGs).

The key fighting element of the American army was the battalion. A battal-ion was comprised of three rifle companies, a headquarters company, and a heavy


weapons company with six 81mm mortars, eight LMGs, seven bazookas, and three HMGs. A battalion numbered 871 officers and enlisted men.

The battalion's HQ company included an antitank platoon of three 57mm antitank guns. The battalion's headquarters section operated the battalion's com-mand post (CP) and was the nerve center of the battalion-where the battalion commander and his staff did their work. The HQ section also manned the bat-talion observation posts (OPs), which were the eyes and ears of the battalion. Each company also had its own CP and OP.

A battalion communication platoon consisted of a headquarters, message cen-ter section, wire section, and radio/visual section. It laid wire to the OPs, to the CP of the AT platoon, to the CP of the Ammunition and Pioneer (A&P) platoon, or to the battalion ammunition supply point. Wire was also laid to the company CPs and to the CP of the battalion on the right flank. The communication pla-toon also manned the SCR694 radio that linked the battalion to the regimental command net. A battalion radio command net was established by distributing SCR300s to the battalion OPs, the CPs of the AT platoon and the rifle and heavy weapons companies. Another SCR300 and operator went with the commanding officer when he left the CP so that he could stay in contact.

The battalion's A&P platoon was composed of a headquarters and three squads of ten men each. The pioneers ran the battalion ammunition supply point. Ammu-nition moved forward from there to the company area. The A&P platoon could also perform light engineering tasks, such as bridging small ditches and streams, improving roads and trails, the demolition of fortifications and obstacles and the laying, locating, and removal of mines. In a pinch, the pioneers could fill in on the line as riflemen.

The infantry regiment (3,118 personnel) held three battalions along with a HQ and HQ company, a cannon company (six 105mm howitzers), an antitank company (twelve 57mm AT guns and a mine-laying platoon), and a service com-pany in charge of transporting supplies.

Cavalry (mechanized) units served as the eyes of armored and infantry divisions, performing reconnaissance missions by employing infiltration tactics, fire, and maneu-ver. As a general rule, cavalry was to engage in combat only to the extent necessary to accomplish reconnaissance or to perform screening missions. Each U.S. mecha-nized cavalry squadron (the counterpart to the infantry battalion) comprised a head-quarters and HQ troop, with three reconnaissance or cavalry troops (comparable to an infantry company) and supporting elements, i.e., a light tank company and an assault gun troop. During the war more than one hundred divisional cavalry units were formed—an armored reconnaissance battalion in each armored division and a cavalry reconnaissance troop in each infantry division. Despite their stated role, only three percent of their assignments were concerned with pure recon-naissance tasks. Other types of missions included defensive operations (33% of assignments), acting as a mobile reserve (29%), security missions involving block-ing, screening, protecting flanks (25%), and offensive operations (10%).

One of the responses of the U.S. Army to the early war successes of the Ger-man blitzkrieg was to investigate ways of stopping armor. American planners

Infantry Against Armor

Table of Organization and Equipment: US Infantry Division, 15 July 1943

concluded that it was impractical to equip infantry divisions with enough anti-tank guns to stop such attacks although each division was outfitted with sixty-three towed AT guns. The War Department's planners decided that the answer was to use fast moving, high velocity guns en masse. Tactically, a few would be sited in static defensive positions, but the majority would be held as a mobile reserve ready to "seek, strike, and destroy" enemy armor. These new mobile antitank bat-talions were called tank destroyers (TD) as opposed to antitank, in order to empha-size their aggressive role even though the two types of units might use the same equipment. Thus an infantry division could have antitank (AT) units outfitted with towed 57mm antitank guns as well as a tank destroyer battalion that was also equipped with 57mm guns. The TD force grew to eighty battalions, each having thirty-six guns. About half the battalions were equipped with self-propelled (SP)

7


guns, the rest with towed pieces. Many battalions were converted from towed to self-propelled guns as the war progressed, reflecting the hard-won knowledge that towed pieces were at a severe disadvantage on a changing battlefield. The self-pro-pelled TDs were lightly armored, open-turret vehicles mounting high velocity guns. The principles of the use of self-propelled TDs were never very well defined, but in many cases the infantry commanders to whom they were attached used them like tanks—their effect on the morale of the infantry being similar to that of tanks.

Essentially a supporting arm, field artillery, which included light pack (75mm), medium(105 and 155mm), and heavy weapons (240mm), was able to give close and continuous fire support to the combat troops. It also provided counter-battery fire and fire on enemy reserves; it restricted the enemy's movement in rear areas and disrupted his command and communications. The quality of American artillery was augmented by the development of the fire direction center and the wide use of forward observers and spotter aircraft. The use of spotter planes was standard in every division.

Antiaircraft artillery (AA or AAA) battalions were independently organized and then attached to divisions. They served not only to defend ground forces from enemy planes but also provided devastating fire in support of ground operations with their quad-50s (e.g., quad [4-gun mount] ,50-cal machine guns mounted on half-tracks).

Among the army ground forces the engineers filled a range of roles: heavy and light pontoon battalions, maintenance and depot companies, camouflage bat-talions and companies, combat regiments and battalions. Front-line engineers were employed to clear and construct obstacles, lay and clear mine fields, ferry troops across rivers, and build bridges. Those engineers behind the front or in the rear operated saw mills, built shelters, roads, ports, and airfields. By June 1945, there were 89 divisional combat engineer battalions, 204 nondivisional combat engi-neer battalions, 79 general service regiments, and 36 construction battalions.

Divisional engineers provided road repair and bridge building services. A reconnaissance section was attached to the engineer battalion HQ and service com-pany, so that the commanding officer could formulate his own estimates for bridg-ing or road repairs. Heavy engineering assets (i.e., pontoon bridging) were held at higher levels (corps groups) and were used to supplement divisional engineers as necessary.

Tactics

The power of the weapons used in ground operations required units to come up with solutions when under enemy fire. The primary answer was to disperse forces. This placed a heavy burden on the ingenuity and skill of small unit lead-ers as well as on the individual soldier. As a result the use of communications equipment increased. For the first time in general warfare the elements of a com-pany could communicate with each other by radio. By the end of the war there were eight radios included in the equipment set of the U.S. Army's rifle company.

Infantry Against Armor 9

In addition, by using sound powered telephones, the Americans added telephone communication even on the platoon and squad level. During offensive operations radios served as the communications workhorse in forward areas. Here the Americans held an advantage because they had a good intracompany radio system using an amplitude modulated (AM) set, the SCR-536, or handie-talkie. One of the communications mainstays of the war was the SCR-300, the walkie-talkie, an FM set, used primarily at company and battalion levels. German sets, all of which were AM, were subject to interference by the sheer volume of their own numbers as well as by Allied radio traffic. Perhaps because of the lack of intercompany wire or radio, the Germans used visual signals, such as colored lights and pyrotechnics, more often than the Americans did. When telephone lines were destroyed or dis-rupted by enemy artillery fire, U.S. artillery radios nets were often pressed into service as the sole means of communications between forward companies and CPs.

The basic mode of combat operations on both sides of the front was "fire and maneuver." The tactic was quite simple. Once the defender's force was located, the attacker would attempt to pin down the defender with long-range weapons (machine guns, mortars, and artillery). While the defender was thus occupied, the attacker would send in forward maneuver forces, usually infantry with tanks or self-propelled guns. If the defender was not too occupied with keeping his head down, the attacker was likely to get shot to pieces. If the maneuver force survived, it would "close in and capture or destroy the enemy." Smaller combat elements operating without long-range support would split into two groups and advance in leap-frog fashion, with one group providing cover fire while the other advanced. This tactic had numerous variations but remained essentially "fire and maneuver." For defensive purposes, the "maneuver" force would remain stationary and direct fire on the advancing enemy.

Fire superiority, brought about by the effective use of infantry and armored weapons in combination with artillery and air support, was the key to success in both attack and defense. Without fire superiority neither maneuvering against an enemy force in defensive positions nor repelling a well-executed assault were pos-sible. U.S. combat strategy reflected a heavy reliance on artillery support.

Initially, basic infantry assault tactics were the ones that had emerged in the final phases of World War I. Each twelve-man rifle squad included a squad leader, a two-man scout section, a four-man fire section (with a BAR providing the main source of the squad's firepower) and a five-man maneuver and assault section. The scouts, accompanied by the squad leader, were to locate the enemy. The squad leader would then call on the fire section to give covering fire while the maneuver and assault section advanced and positioned itself to eliminate the enemy threat.

When necessary the infantry squad would turn to the tanks and tank destroy-ers for help. For this reason it became the norm to assign armor to all sizable infantry formations. Tanks and TDs were also of major importance when dealing with enemy armored and fixed emplacements, e.g., concrete pillboxes. A favorite method of attack was to use an infantry company supported by a platoon of tanks (three to seven vehicles). Sometimes the tanks would advance first, sometimes the tanks would be preceded by an infantry skirmish line, sometimes the infantry rode


on the tanks. The tanks took on the enemy strongholds, while the infantry dealt with antitank weapons.

Generally, the axiom of combat was, and still is, that the artillery does the killing while the infantry does the dying. Fragmentation weapons (bombs and shells) inflicted between eighty and ninety percent of the wounds in battle while the infantry suffered over eighty percent of the casualties. In 1944-45 the Amer-icans relied heavily on artillery superiority. If solid artillery support was available, the Americans could hold out against almost any odds, but without it, they did not fare as well.

As a standard rule, an infantry battalion could defend one to five kilometers of frontage, depending on how it was deployed. Spread across five kilometers, it defended by using a series of nonsupporting (independent) strongholds. With somewhat less frontage to cover, the strongholds (manned in platoon or company strength) would be within sight and small arms range of one another. Thus they could cover and support each other in the event of an attack. If the front was smaller still (one kilometer or less), it would then be possible to hold a continu-ous line. Even in this case, the defense consisted of strongholds, but they were placed closer together. A maneuver force, mobile and armored if possible, would be held in reserve to meet any enemy breakthroughs. The strongholds would be placed so as to cover vital areas such as roads, defiles, and river crossings.

To prevent the enemy from obtaining information or intelligence, each side would establish a "security zone" between itself and the enemy. This zone, vary-ing in width from a few hundred meters to a few kilometers, would be patrolled constantly as both sides sought to collect information and prevent the opponent from doing so. The extended nature (i.e., thin line of defenses) of the American positions in the Ardennes allowed the Germans to cross this security zone largely unopposed.

Up until 1945 most American units, caught in situations where tactics counted for more than firepower, had been tested severely. This was particularly true of offensive situations in terrain suitable only for infantry (e.g., Huertgen Forest). American tactics depended to a large extent on the well-executed application of superior firepower in the same way that the German Army in 1939-42 had depended on its superior mobility (motorization) in its blitzkrieg.

The success or failure of a German attack could be foretold by the respon-siveness of American fire support. German attacks during daylight hours—with or without tanks—against established veteran infantrymen with an operating com-munications net were defeated in nearly every case. If the Germans chose to attack at night, under conditions that limited visibility, or if the American artillery was moving or in disarray, then the Germans stood a chance of success.

Rarely did the threat of tanks break an American line supported by artillery. Normally, any accompanying German infantry support would be stripped from the tanks by concentrated small arms fire, then the tanks would be knocked out with bazookas and AT guns. Often, concentrated artillery fire was enough to break up a German attack.

The Americans learned how to get the most out of their "material superiority."


By 1944 the war had turned into one of attrition, where the application of firepower prevailed. The American units had the firepower and knew how to use it. They had the guns, the ammunition, and the most advanced fire control systems (for both field artillery and air to ground support operations) developed during the war. In a slugfest, American firepower would triumph.

The Opposition

By 1944-45 the German army was well past its prime. The struggle in Nor-mandy, followed by the Allied breakout and drive across France, had resulted in a tremendous battering of the German forces—divisions sustaining heavy losses of men and equipment. However, most of the losses were in the front line forces, the infantry and panzers while the supporting services managed to retain most of their strength and experienced personnel, and the artillery mostly retained its old, battle-proven subordinate officers and men. However, the artillery suffered from ill-assorted equipment, a limited number of guns, and an increasing shortage of communications equipment and ammunition. Moreover, losses of experienced artillery liaison officers (forward observers) in the front line units reached critical stages.

A common German defensive tactic in the face of a major enemy offensive was that of a flexible or "mobile defense." A number of panzer or panzer grenadier units (in division strength if available) were to be maintained ten to twenty miles behind the front line in order to be ready to launch immediate counterattacks against enemy penetration. However, as time wore on, the lack of fuel and short-age of equipment limited this option. In addition, as these forces dwindled, they had to cover a wider frontage and deal with more and greater crises. The concen-tration of panzer forces could not be carried out as mobile forces often became tied down; even if local successes might be achieved, recovery of lost ground was usually not possible.

The heavy drain of the war had forced the German army early in 1944 to reduce the strength of its standard infantry division from just over seventeen thou-sand men to just under thirteen thousand men. This was done in part by elimi-nating one of the battalions from each of the infantry division's three regiments, a reduction from nine to six battalions, although a fusilier or pionier (engineer) bat-talion was normally employed as a seventh infantry battalion. At slightly over four-teen thousand men, the basic American infantry division thus had a thousand more men than its German counterpart. To offset the manpower cuts, the Germans increased the number of individual automatic weapons in their divisions by adding a machine pistol known as the Schmeisser, whose high cyclic rate of fire made a b-r-r-r-r-r-p sound, which led the Americans to dub it "burp gun."

In spite of the German army's manpower reductions in 1944 neither the Panzergrenadier divisions nor the German parachute division had to take the same sharp reductions imposed on the infantry (Landsers) or Volksgrenadiers ("peoples" divisions—an honorary title for units called up in the final draft of the war). Thus,


both types of divisions still had nine battalions of infantry. The parachute divisions, controlled by the Luftwaffe, were considered an elite, and in months long past they had been made up almost entirely of volunteers. However, after heavy losses in the airborne assault on the Greek island of Crete in 1941, Hitler had become disen-chanted with airborne troops and airborne training virtually ceased. The title of parachute division had become nothing more than honorary.

The Wehrmacht (regular German army) panzer (armored) and Waffen-SS panzer divisions were composed of a panzer regiment with two panzer battalions, a self-propelled tank destroyer (Panzerjäger) battalion, and two panzer grenadier (mechanized infantry mounted in half-tracks) regiments, plus artillery and service elements. By late 1944, a full-strength panzer division was supposed to have about 130 tanks and tank destroyers or self-propelled guns. However, due to equipment shortages, the panzer battalions rarely had the full number of tanks, and in some divisions only one of the panzer grenadier regiments was armored (mounted on half-tracks), the others were either riding in trucks or walking.

The infantry of both Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS panzer grenadier divisions was organized into four panzer grenadier battalions in the army division, six in the SS division. The Wehrmacht's panzer grenadier division was to have thirteen thousand men and the SS division half again as many to a total of twenty thou-sand. All the SS divisions were given special treatment as they were supported by an attached tank or self-propelled gun battalion, a Nebelwerfer battalion, and a heavy 170mm artillery battery.

The one major advantage of the Germans was the quality of their tanks vis-à-vis those of the Americans. The American TO&E (Table of Organization and Equipment) for armored divisions still included seventy-seven light tanks for use in reconnaissance units, even though their armor was absurdly thin and their 37mm main gun was of little value except against infantry and light or unarmored vehi-cles. The standard American tank was the 33-ton M4 Sherman; most of them were still equipped with the short-barreled 75mm gun although some had an improved long-barreled 76mm high-velocity piece (M4A1). By December 1944, the Sher-man was considered by many to be virtually obsolete, its only advantages over Ger-man tanks being a greater rate of fire (a result of the gun's gyro-stabilizer and the turret's power traverse), its somewhat greater mobility, and mechanical reliability. As a drawback, the Sherman used regular gasoline rather than diesel fuel and was thus easily set on fire; some of its crews called it the Ronson after a popular ciga-rette lighter. American heavy tanks did not reach the battlefield until 1945. But the Shermans were plentiful, and when operating in rough terrain or in the streets of the many villages and towns that dotted the European countryside, they could gain an equal footing with their larger and tougher German counterparts.

The workhorses of the German Wehrmacht panzer and SS panzer divisions were medium tanks: the 24-ton Mark IV (Panz e rkamp fwag en ) mounting a long-barreled 75mm gun and the 45.5 ton Panther (Mark V), which also mounted a 75mm gun but had much thicker armor than either the Mark IV or the Sherman. Although the Shermans fought on equal terms with the Mark IV, they could knock out a Panther only if they managed to hit the side or rear of the vehicle.


Table of Organization and Equipment: German SS-Panzer Division, 1944

Total Author ized Personnel Strength: 6 0 6 O f f i c e r s 3 , 9 3 1 N C O S 1 3 , 2 7 2 E M

1 7 , 8 0 9 t o t a l

Total Author ized C o m b a t Strength: 5 1 2 O f f i c e r s 3 , 5 3 4 N C O s 1 1 , 2 7 3 E M

1 5 , 3 1 9 t o t a l

Author ized W e a p o n Strengths: 7 9 x M k P a n t h e r 1 0 1 x M k I V p a n z e r 3 x Mk III p a n z e r 39 x PzJg IV Jagdpanzer 1 2 x W e s p e 1 0 5 m m S P G u n 6 x H u m m e l 1 5 0 m m SP G u n 63 x l ight h a l f - t r a c k s 2 4 1 x h e a v y ha l f t r a c k s 8 x 3 7 m m SP F lak 1 8 x 8 8 m m t o w e d F lak 9 x 3 7 m m t o w e d F lak 10 x q u a d - 2 0 m m SP F lak 5 0 x 2 0 m m F lak 1 2 x 1 0 5 m m S P G u n / H o w (sIG) 2 , 0 0 0 x Panzerfausts 68 x f l a m e t h r o w e r s 6 2 x l ight m o r t a r s ( 8 0 m m ) 2 6 x h e a v y m o r t a r s ( 1 2 0 m m ) I , 1 0 2 L M G s 1 0 2 H M G s I I , 6 8 5 rifles 1 , 7 1 2 m a c h i n e pistols 4 , 3 6 2 pistols

The Germans also had a 55-ton Mark VI, a behemoth known as the Tiger and a 68 to 75 ton King Tiger (Panzerkampfwagen VI Ausf. B Königstiger, also known as Tiger II or Royal Tiger among the Allies), both of which were heavily armored and mounted a deadly 88mm gun. Although many reports by American soldiers referred to Tiger tanks, they were the minority among German armored forces along the front and were employed in independent battalions of about forty-five vehicles each. The only American weapon that could consistently be counted on to knock out a Tiger was an American tank destroyer equipped with a 90mm gun, which had been developed originally as an antiaircraft weapon (like the famed


German "88"). The TDs, on the other hand, were too thin-skinned to be deployed against a Tiger.

The Germans also had a vast array of assault guns, tank destroyers, and tank hunters, varying in quality from French and Czech converted equipment to the outstanding 45-ton Jagdpanther mounting an 88mm main gun. This dispersion of effort into variants and experimental vehicles to some extent diluted the effective-ness of the German armored forces, especially because supplying and repairing the bewildering number of models became increasingly difficult.

Weapons

The American counterparts to the burp gun included the .45-caliber Thomp-son submachine gun and the M3 "grease gun," but they were not issued in such large numbers as were the German machine pistols. The other small arms of the two antagonists were roughly similar. The basic shoulder weapon in the U.S. Army, the Ml Garand, a semiautomatic .30-caliber rifle, gave the Americans some fire-power advantage over the German Mauser bolt-action 7.92mm piece, but wide-spread use of machine-pistols by the Germans lessened that advantage. Also widely used in American units was the stocky, semiautomatic .30-caliber Ml carbine, especially among officers. The U.S. rifle squad's main source of firepower came pri-marily from a World War 1 weapon, the .30-caliber Browning Automatic Rifle, the BAR. The firepower of the BAR proved so important to the infantrymen that a second authorized weapon was added to the rifle squad later in the war (and even a third, "unauthorized," BAR could be found in some squads).

Light air-cooled machine guns were comparable on both sides, but the Ger-man piece (the 7.92mm MG-42) had a much higher cyclic rate of fire, which pro-duced such rapid fire that the German soldiers called it the Hitler-Sage (Hitler's saw). The Americans used both a ,30-pal light machine gun and a heavy machine gun (,50-cal). In both armies the machine gun was an integral part of the infantry company though the heavier versions were usually found in the heavy weapons Company within the rifle battalion.

In both the German and American armies the basic mortar was the 80mm and 81mm tube, respectively. The American soldiers also placed considerable faith in the 60mm mortar; the Germans having abandoned their less effective 50mm by 1944. On the American side there was a limited number of a much more pow-erful weapon, the 4.2-inch (106.68mm) mortar, designed and initially deployed for firing chemical shells but also effective with high explosive and white phos-phorus (WP) rounds. The Germans used heavier mortars (i.e., 120mm) in increas-ing numbers in 1944 to supplement their depleted artillery.

In the offense, the American battalion base of fire was to be provided by the eight heavy machine guns and six 81mm mortars of the battalion heavy weapons company, supplemented by the cannon company and field artillery. As the attack echelon neared the assault line, these weapons would be forced to lift and shift to other targets. Just before that happened, the light machine guns (air-cooled


.30-caliber) and 60mm mortars were supposed to join in and fill the ensuing gap. After the enemy position had been taken, the LMGs and the 60mm mortars were to rush forward to help repel the inevitable counterattack. In a formal defense, the L M G S reinforced the fire of the heavy machine guns on the final protective line. The mortars covered the dead space in the fields of machine gun fire.

« The Germans supplemented their artillery with a six-barrel 150mm rocket launcher and mortar, the Nebelwerfer, which was mounted on a carriage and fired electrically. Though the projectiles (all six fired in unison) of the Nebelwerfer made a terrifying sound while in flight, which earned it the nickname "Screaming Meemie," it was an "area weapon" due to its inaccuracy. Its shells also had little fragmentation effect. The Americans had their own area-effect weapon in the 4.5-inch (114.3mm) multiple rocket launcher.

Two other widely used weapons were hand grenades and close-range antitank weapons. The Americans had two fragmentation hand grenades (the M2A1 "pine-apple" and the cylindrical M3A1) while the Germans used their "potato masher" concussion grenade, which had changed little since World War 1. Both sides had individual infantry antitank weapons, firing rockets employing a shaped charge; these were rocket-propelled warheads with an explosive charge shaped to create a focused burst of energy, or plasma jet, that could penetrate the steel plate of a tank or armored vehicle. The Americans had a 2.36-inch (59.94mm) rocket launcher, the bazooka (named after a makeshift musical instrument played by the hillbilly radio comedian Bob Burns), while the Germans had a one-shot 88mm Panzer-faust (mailed fist) and the Panzerschreck, a weapon patterned after U.S. bazookas captured in North Africa. The Americans also had an antitank rifle grenade, but it was not widely used because it was too cumbersome.

American crew-served antitank weapons included a towed 57mm piece, which was standard issue until later in the war. Even though the towed antitank guns were considered to have a number of liabilities—lack of mobility and limited pen-etrating power—they were frequently the GIs' primary antitank defense. The Ger-man infantry division employed eighteen self-propelled assault guns (Stu rm-geschütz) mounting a 75mm main gun, which were normally used as close support for attacking infantry but were also effective against tanks. If any German weapon can be said to have impressed the American soldiers, it was the "88," a high-veloc-ity, dual-purpose 88mm antiaircraft and antitank gun. Though widely used, the 88 was not nearly as ubiquitous as the American soldiers believed.

The basic artillery pieces of both combatants were light and medium how-itzers of similar caliber and performance. In both German and American infantry divisions, tables of organization called for one medium battalion of twelve how-itzers (150mm for the Germans, 155mm for the Americans) and three light artillery battalions (twelve 105mm howitzers in each), supplemented by additional units controlled at corps and army levels. Usually, one light artillery battalion was assigned to provide direct support to each of the division's three infantry regi-ments, and the medium battalion remained in general support for the entire divi-sion, using its fire power to deal with the most important missions or crises. Both German and American artillery in infantry divisions were, in theory, motor-towed,


but due to fuel and equipment shortages the Germans increasingly had to turn to horse-drawn guns. To supplement American division artillery, each infantry reg-iment had six towed, short-barreled 105mm howitzers in a cannon company. In practice the howitzers of the regimental cannon companies were usually directed by the division in order to add to its firepower. American armored divisions (and German panzer divisions to some extent) were supported by self-propelled artillery pieces that could keep pace with the division's armored units.

Lessons Learned

The Germans were struck by the seemingly inexhaustible supply of Ameri-can arms and ammunition. They were also particularly impressed with the fragile little American liaison or artillery spotter planes. This light aircraft was invaluable for adjusting artillery fire and for spotting German artillery behind the lines. The Germans also had considerable respect for the efficiency of American communi-cations equipment and the way it made possible the rapid calling up and adjust-ment of artillery fire.

The American troops augmented their firepower and their chances of sur-vival by picking up extra weapons and equipment to fill a perceived need. This resulted in veteran units having a few extra machine guns, bazookas, and even a truck or two. Some units even managed to acquire light artillery pieces, tank destroyers, and the occasional tank. Such equipment was usually "found" in vary-ing states of disrepair on the battlefield and became an "unofficial" part of the unit, or it was acquired by drawing supplies from understanding supply person-nel.

To provide increased direct fire support for the infantry and better antitank defense, it had become standard practice by the fall of 1944 to attach to each Amer-ican infantry division a tank battalion and a tank destroyer battalion. The tank battalion had a company of light tanks (thirteen M5 or M5A1 Stuarts) and three companies of medium tanks (fifty-three M4 or M4A1 Shermans). Some battalions had an assault gun platoon with six armored, tracked vehicles mounting a 105mm howitzer (i.e., a Sherman mounting a 105). The tank destroyer battalions evolved throughout the war from towed 57mm or towed 3-inch (76.2mm) (the latter so designated because it was a copy of a naval weapon) guns to 29-ton GMC (gun motor carriage) M10 "Wolverines" mounting a 3-inch gun, the M18 ("Hellcat") with a 76mm gun and weighing 18 tons, and by late in 1944 the 28-ton M36 with its hard hitting, high velocity 90mm gun.

One of the major differences between the opposing forces was the presence of American fighter-bomber aircraft. By September 1944 the Luftwaffe had virtu-ally ceased to exist as a tactical ground support element. The Americans came to depend so heavily on air support that their planning and operations were greatly impacted_by adverse weather. Each American field army had one tactical air com-mand (TAC) assigned for support. A TAC usually controlled six fighter-bomber groups, with a group normally having three squadrons of twenty-five planes each,


either P-38 Lightnings, P-47 Thunderbolts, or P-51 Mustangs. Requests for air support usually came from frontline divisions through an air section at corps head-quarters, but since air targets could not always be anticipated, a fighter group often was assigned to a specific corps or division for an entire day to take advantage of "targets of opportunity."

The air support behind the Allied armies was tremendously powerful. In close support of the ground troops were the TACs, but eleven groups of medium and light bombers (B-26 Marauders, A-20 Havocs, and A-26 Invaders) of the Ninth U.S. Air Force and other mediums under British control were also available. On occasion, the devastating heavy bombers of the U.S. Eighth Air Force (B-17 Fly-ing Fortresses and B-24 Liberators) and the Royal Air Force Bomber Command could be called in. Not counting Allied aircraft based in Italy, the Allies could muster more than 17,500 first-line combat aircraft.

The attachment of additional units to American infantry divisions made them considerably stronger and at least equal to a full-strength German panzergrenadier division (i.e., mechanized infantry), which had organic medium tank and tank destroyer battalions and a contingent of half-tracks for transporting its grenadiers (motorized infantry). Since American divisions had a wealth of motor vehicles as well as attached tanks and tank destroyers, they were as mobile as the panzer-grenadier divisions and more so by the time they met in western Europe, given the shortages of fuel and vehicles affecting the German army.

American infantry divisions employed their infantry regiments as combined arms teams (regimental combat teams, RCT) formed to operate independently, with additional elements, such as a battalion of 105mm howitzers, a company of engineers, and a company each of tanks and tank destroyers. The RCT was identified by its regimental number (e.g., the 317th Infantry Regiment and sup-port units being identified as the 317th RCT).

In order to carry out specific missions or operations the Americans copied the basic principles of the German Kampfgruppe (combat group) and organized small, independent combat groups, known as task forces. Various parts of a divi-sion or regiment were drawn on to form a task force, which was usually a tempo-rary organization composed of select combat units or elements. A task force might be built around a tank battalion by attaching a company each of infantry and engi-neers (a tank-heavy force) or by placing a battery of howitzers and a platoon of tanks and tank destroyers under the direction of an infantry company (an infantry-heavy force). Once the objective was taken or the mission completed, the task force was dissolved or reorganized.

Both sides had specialized units such as signal, quartermaster, ordnance, engi-neers, and the like, but the German army's units were inferior in both numbers and quality. The Germans suffered from critical shortages, for example, of tank recovery vehicles. Even late in the war several of their engineer battalions had yet to erect their first bridge. The American units, on the other hand, were usually at full strength and thoroughly trained in the use of their equipment. American engi-neer battalions, in addition to their engineering training, were trained to fight as infantry, and thus provided an additional or emergency reserve force. American


units also had a built-in "tinker-factor": the average American soldier was more likely to have come from civilian life with a knowledge of basic vehicle mechan-ics than was the average German Landser. Thus, the American soldier was often able to repair his vehicle by himself which in turn reduced the burden on the divi-sion's maintenance section.

As the American infantry and antitank forces came into contact with the Ger-man panzers, the Americans were tested to their limits.

Test of Courage

On 25 July 1944 the U.S. Army launched Operation Cobra to penetrate the strong German defenses that had kept the Allies in the Normandy hedgerows since D-Day. Preceded by a bombing raid by over two thousand bombers and fighter-bombers dropping over four thousand tons of bombs and napalm on the German positions, the attack tore a hole in the German lines through which several U.S. divisions quickly advanced. Encountering generally weak resistance in the bombed area, the U.S. breakthrough turned into a breakout under the aggressive leader-ship of American commanders like General J. Lawton Collins of the VII Corps, who thrust his armored divisions far south through the gap. Within a week of the opening of the American offensive, the VIII Corps had driven down the Atlantic coast toward Brittany, capturing the important road center of Avranches. In the next week the advance continued as some U.S. forces turned west down the length of the Brittany .Peninsula toward Brest while even larger formations continued south and east, spilling into lightly garrisoned areas of France well behind the main German lines.

The situation was critical for the Germans. The American capture of Avranches had unhinged their left flank, which had been anchored on the Atlantic coast, and their flanks were being bent back to form a deep pocket pointing west-ward. In a desperate bid to regain the initiative in France, Hitler ordered a coun-teroffensive through the tip of this pocket with the objective of retaking Avranches and thus cutting off General George S. Patton's Third Army in the south. After rebuilding a strong northward-facing defensive line and destroying the Third Army, the Germans could then turn their full attention again toward the First Army of General Omar Bradley and drive the Allies back into the sea. The first phase of this grandiose scheme, the counterattack to retake Avranches, was given the code-name Operation Lüttich (Liege); to the Americans it would become known as the Mortain counterattack.

German Forces at Mortain

Under Hitler's auspices the commander of Army Group B (all German forces in the west), Field Marshal Gunther von Kluge, assembled four panzer divisions


and the remnants of a panzer grenadier (mechanized infantry) division to hurl against the Allies. He placed these divisions under the control of the XLVII Panzer Korps, commanded by General Hans Freiherr von Funck. The XLVII Panzer Korps assembled a few kilometers east of the town of Mortain, which the U.S. First Infantry Division had snatched from the reconnaissance battalion of the Second Panzer Division on 3 August.

The German High Command scheduled the attack to begin on 6 August even though Hitler had wanted to delay the counterattack until additional units from southern France had arrived to reinforce the assault. But von Kluge saw his left flank collapsing and knew that he had to attack immediately or risk being com-pletely surrounded by the almost uncontested American advance to the south and east. On 6 August, the German attack force consisted of two Wehrmacht panzer divisions, the Second (Viennese) Panzer Division and the 116th (Windhund) Panzer Division, and two SS panzer divisions, the First SS Panzer Division ("Leibstan-darte Adolf Hitler") and the Second SS Panzer Division ("Das Reich"). Attached to the Second SS Panzer Division were the remnants of the Seventeenth SS Panz-ergrenadier Division ("Götz von Berlichingen"), which amounted to about a reg-iment's worth of men and equipment. In any event, the 116th Panzer Division did not participate in the attack because its commander, Lt. Gen. Gerhard Graf von Schwerin, refused to commit his men to what he believed to be a futile and sui-cidal attack. He was relieved of his command, but this came too late to affect the battle.

The German plan was essentially to make a two-pronged drive toward Avranches. The attack would be made between the Seé River to the north and the Selune River to the south, providing excellent natural protection for the flanks of the corps as it advanced into the American rear. The Second SS Panzer Division in the south was to recapture Mortain and the high ground to the east and then move on toward St. Hilaire while the Second Panzer Division in the north would attack in the little village of St. Barthelmy, through which ran the main highway from Mortain to Avranches. Once these initial forces had broken through the American defenses, the First SS Panzer Division was to drive through the gap and push its way into Avranches.

The American Forces

The target of this onslaught was a single U.S. division, the Thirtieth Infantry, attached to VII Corps. The Thirtieth was in the process of relieving the First Divi-sion around Mortain on 6 August. Most of the division's component units did not bother establishing well-prepared defensive positions, expecting to continue the offensive after a brief respite.

The 117th Infantry Regiment, one of the Thirtieth's three regiments, was assigned to move into the sector around St. Barthelmy. Company A would cover the north and northeastern approaches to the village while Company C to its right would be on the southeast and southern edges of the town. Company B was

Test of Courage 21

deployed about 600 meters to the northwest around the crossroads at Le Fantay. The regimental command post was set up in some houses in an orchard about one kilometer to the west, a spot known locally as La Rossaye. Later, the Amer-icans would come to know it as "Chateau Nebelwerfer." Arriving at St. Barthelmy in the late morning of 6 August from the division's former assignment with the XIX Corps near Tessy, the 117th occupied the positions of the departing First Division men, who told them that the only significant German forces in the area were some armored reconnaissance elements, or "cavalry," to the northeast. They also said that "there wasn't a German within a hundred miles of there who wanted to fight"—a statement that the men of the 117th wanted to believe. As they set-tled into their positions covering the highway and the approaches to the town, the GIs of the 117th were looking forward to resting a day or two before resum-ing their advance.

A few miles away, the German advance was having trouble getting started. Allied air attacks made ground movement during daylight hours all but impossi-ble, and the Germans were suffering from a shortage of motorized vehicles. Many of their units were forced to march to their assembly areas on foot at night. In addition, the First SS Panzer Division was late moving into its assembly area, and with its units strung out along the roads, it was late moving out. As a result, the Panzergrenadier Regiment "Der Führer" of the Second SS Panzer Division, which was behind it, was also late in arriving. Because of these delays, von Kluge post-poned the jump-off time for the attack first to the evening of August 6 and then to midnight. The Second Panzer Division's assault on St. Barthelmy, however, had

The German Counterattack

at Mortain Aiifu«t 1944


to wait for a battalion of tanks from the First SS Panzer Regt., and that attack would ultimately not start off until 0500 on 7 August.

As a matter of practice, elements of the American 823d Tank Destroyer Bat-talion provided antitank support for the Thirtieth Division's component regiments. Company B of the 823d was attached to the 117th Regiment. The Third Platoon of Company B, commanded by Lt. George Greene who had been with the outfit only five weeks, received orders to establish defensive positions within St. Barthelmy. The First and Second Platoons took up positions farther west toward Juvigny on the Mortain-Avranches road.

Moving from the Thirtieth Division's previous area at Tessy, Greene's TD platoon arrived in the city of Mortain about midday on 6 August. Together with two other GIs, Lt. Greene drove north in a jeep to evaluate positions for his pla-toon's towed 3-inch guns in St. Barthelmy. As they exited the north end of the suburb l'Abbaye-Blanche, Greene and his men came under mortar fire from well-placed German observation posts on Hill 314, about 2 kilometers northeast of St. Barthelmy. To escape the German fire, Greene pulled off the main road at the Grande la Dainie crossroads and onto a sunken trail that paralleled the main road about 100 yards to the east. The high hedgerows with thick vegetation on either side of this trail provided total cover from the German observation posts, and Greene decided that this would be the best route for his platoon's prime movers and antitank guns when they moved to St. Barthelmy.

When he reached St. Barthelmy, Greene was disappointed to learn that the tank destroyers that supported the First Division and whose positions he had hoped to use for his guns, had been self-propelled M10 TDs, so there were no suitable prepared defensive positions for his towed guns and no time to build new ones before dark.

The Mortain Counterattack

7 Augus t 1 944

Test of Courage 23

Greene's guns arrived between 2130 and 2200 that evening, moving up the covered sunken trail. The Germans on Hill 314 fired their mortars blindly at the vehicle noises but hit nothing. As the American gun crews began to set up their pieces to cover the likely approaches into the village, it became apparent that many of the sites with the best fields of fire were not suited for the unwieldy 3-inch guns. Some of them were in gardens or cabbage patches where the ground was very soft and had been churned up by the treads of the First Division's M10s, making it impossible to move or reorient the guns quickly in case of a German attack. With night falling, however (during the summer at that latitude it does not get fully dark until almost midnight), Greene was forced to leave the guns in their hastily set up positions on the edge of the town. Of the four guns in Greene's platoon, two (guns #1 and #2) were deployed on the south edge of town, covering the main road from Mortain. Guns #3 and #4 were set up in the northeast section of town, from where they could cover the main crossroads in the town as well as a trail enter-ing the town from the northeast. The gun crews dug in the wheels of the guns in order to lower their silhouettes but were unable to make any other defensive prepa-rations because they had to rely on moonlight only. They were also unable to coor-dinate their positions with the nearby infantry of Companies A and C, 117th Infantry. Greene's security squad, commanded by Sgt. Higgins, provided the only infantry support. Although only two or three men were available to cover each gun, their effect was enhanced by their having picked up five extra Browning Auto-matic Rifles (BARs) in the Normandy fighting, which they used instead of the Ml carbines they had been issued. Since all the GIs in St. Barthelmy expected to con-tinue the drive across France in a day or two, they were not concerned about the overall lack of. defensive preparation.

Meanwhile, in the early afternoon of 6 August, Company B's Third Platoon had set up a roadblock at the crossroads between le Bois du Pare and le Fantay, consisting of two 57mm antitank guns, two heavy machine guns, one BAR team, two bazookas, and the infantrymen of the First Squad. Just to the southwest, Sec-ond and Third Squads deployed on either side of the road behind the roadblock to provide cover in case the roadblock was forced to withdraw. Not long after this position was set up, around 1645, a dozen German infantrymen approached the roadblock, probably to test its strength. The Company B men fired on the Ger-mans, who withdrew back to the northeast from where they had come. At about the same time, Company A sent some men to establish an outpost at the cross-roads at la Sablonniere, and Company C sent a detachment to Grande la Dainie. Each of these teams consisted of a squad of infantry and a bazooka team.

At about 1600 on 6 August, the Germans began a sporadic artillery shelling of St. Barthelmy. This desultory bombardment caused no damage or casualties but was apparently intended to harass and unnerve the American defenders. If so, it failed miserably. After the intense combat around the Vire Canal in July, the men of the Thirtieth must have considered the St. Barthelmy area to be practically a rest camp.

St. Barthelmy was relatively quiet, except for the occasional German shell, until about 2030, when three German Kettenkrad (half-tracked motorcycles) came


around the curve in the road in front of the roadblock at le Bois du Pare. The Americans fired their 57mm guns and small arms at the Germans, who promptly turned around and scooted back around the bend. As the motorcyclists left, the GIs could hear the squeaking of tank treads in the distance to the northeast. After about 90 minutes German tanks appeared in the fading light on the same road on which the Kettenkrads had come. They stopped just after rounding the bend, not firing their guns, but just waiting. The roadblock crew, knowing their 57mm guns were of dubious value against the frontal armor of the panzers, held their fire so as not to provoke the Germans, who seemed unaware of their presence. The Amer-ican roadblock commander, Lt. Bookter, sent a gunner from the machine gun sec-tion back up the hill to the Third Platoon CP to ask the platoon leader, Lt. Cush-man, to call for artillery fire on the tanks. Cushman radioed in his request, but no reply was received.

At midnight, the Battle of Mortain began. German mortar rounds began falling around the roadblock at le Bois du Parc. At the same time, the panzers sit-ting in front of the roadblock suddenly lurched forward and, accompanied by infantry, headed straight down the road. The American gun crews, commanded by Sgt. Renshaw, fired ten 57mm armor-piercing rounds at the behemoths in the first moments of the attack. As expected, the shells merely ricocheted off the panz-ers' armor. The gunners also fired five rounds of high explosive at the German grenadiers, hoping to drop enough of them to make the tanks stop for lack of infantry support. However, the panzers quickly destroyed one of the two antitank guns while the German infantrymen were moving to outflank and overwhelm the roadblock. German small arms and bazooka fire had already killed two men and wounded two others. The machine gun section soon reported that it was running out of ammunition. At that point, Lt. Bookter ordered a withdrawal. The entire firefight had lasted about ten minutes. As they withdrew up the hill, the men of Third Platoon could hear American artillery rounds finally begin to hit around the roadblock. Inexplicably, the Germans did not follow up their attack but remained in the roadblock area for several hours. They may not have been informed until after they had started their attack that the other half of their division had been delayed by the tardiness of First SS Panzer Division's panzer battalion, so after

Upon reaching the Company B CP, the retreating Third Platoon was ordered to retake the le Bois du Parc roadblock. Lt. Cushman led his men back to the area of the roadblock, but the German force gathering there was obviously too strong to be driven off, so they remained concealed and observed the Germans for a while.

The men garrisoning St. Barthelmy did not hear the firing at le Bois du Pare. They had no inkling of the impending German attack. At around 0200, the Ger-man shelling ceased, but about twenty-five minutes later an undetermined num-ber of German Ju-88 and Do-17 bombers began dropping flares and bombs in the Thirtieth Division's sector. The raid lasted about twenty minutes and was focused

taking the roadblock they halted in place and waited. Unfortunately, the Americans saw this as merely a local counterattack, so the uncoordinated German jump-off time did not keep the later German attacks from achieving tactical surprise.

Test of Courage 25

on the areas west and northwest of Mortain. Some of the bombs hit in the St. Barthelmy area but did little damage since they were small plastic bomblets.

By 0300, the TD gun crews of Lt. Greene's platoon in St. Barthelmy could hear German troops and vehicles moving in the darkness east of town. What they heard were fifty tanks of the First SS Panzer Regt., attached to the Second Panzer Division and accompanied by the infantry of the Second SS Panzergrenadier Regt., finally moving out of their assembly areas. The infantry commanders in St. Barthelmy passed orders to wake up all sleeping men, and by 0430 all the Amer-icans in the village were alert and manning their posts. At about the same time, a 57mm gun and its ten-man crew from the 117th's regimental Antitank Company was moving on orders from the regimental commander to a position just south of Greene's #1 and #2 guns at the north end of the sunken road. There they dug in their antitank gun. Neither they nor Greene knew of the Third Platoon, Com-pany B, TD guns behind them.

A dense fog had arisen in the night, covering the whole area. This was a nor-mal occurrence in the region during the summer, as it was located between two rivers. The Germans were counting on this fog to last throughout the coming day and shield them from Allied air attacks; their weathermen had predicted linger-ing fog for August 6 and 7, which was one of the reasons for scheduling the attack for August 6. At the first lightening of the eastern sky, Lt. Greene realized just how precarious his guns' positions were. Due to the drop off the hill on which St. Barthelmy sat, his #1 and #2 gun crews on the south edge of town could see only about 50 meters down the Mortain road under the best of conditions. The thick fog on the morning of August 7, however, cut their visibility to only 4.5 to 6 meters. Greene also saw that a long section of the Mortain road was blocked from #2's line of sight by a hedgerow. That gun would not be able to aim at any targets coming up that road until they were at point-blank range.

At around 0500, while the regimental AT company gun crew was still set-ting up its gun south of St. Barthelmy in the eerie silence, the German artillery barrage resumed, this time in full force. The Germans' aim was off, and most of the rounds hit only in the northern part of town. Greene's TD crews suffered no casualties, but the men of the 117th's Company A were discomfited. The Ameri-cans recognized the barrage as the precursor to a German attack, and Lt. Greene ordered his trucks and prime movers out of town to keep them out of harm's way. Of course, this also meant that the guns could not be pulled out of town should the defenders suffer a reverse in the coming fight. Obviously, neither Greene nor any of the other American commanders expected the Germans to be capable of serious offensive action.

The bombardment lasted for forty-five minutes, during which the infantry and gunners huddled in their foxholes. Sgt. Higgins's security men had dug some slit trenches near the 3-inch guns during the night, and the gun crews sought shel-ter there or made use of some old German fighting holes that were not far from their guns.

As the German artillery pounded St. Barthelmy, at around 0530 Lt. Cush-man came to the conclusion that his small contingent was incapable of recaptur-


ing the le Bois du Pare roadblock position, and he once again led his men back up the hill to the Company B CP. Communicating by radio with the First Bn., 117th Infantry, battalion commander, Lt. Col. Robert Frankland, Cushman explained the situation. Frankland agreed that a counterattack would be futile and ordered Cushman to deploy his platoon along the southwest side of a trail that ran between La Rossaye and la Foulelaye and bisected the Mortain-Avranches road. There, Cushman was to hold against the expected attack of the German tanks and other vehicles that were arrayed north of Le Fantay.

The men of the AT Company set up their 57mm gun south of St. Barthelmy along the trail and listened apprehensively to the German artillery hitting the vil-lage behind them. They were glad not to be under that bombardment, but they knew it presaged a German attack and felt vulnerable in their unsupported posi-tion.

Once the gun was in position around 0545, just as the sky was getting light, the leader of the detachment decided to send a small group of his men to scout around and hopefully make contact with friendly troops. Sgt. Sam Hardy and three privates, Arthur Jentsch, G. Dean Noble, and Alfred Ericsson, set off south-ward down the sunken trail, taking with them their small arms and a single bazooka as well as a dozen rockets distributed among the four men. The noise of the artillery bombardment and the muffling effect of the thick fog concealed from them the fact that less than 100 meters away the bulk of the First SS Panzer Division was moving in the opposite direction on the parallel road to St. Barthelmy.

After the German artillery barrage on St. Barthelmy had ceased at 0545, the American infantry and gun crews crawled out of their holes and trenches to man their weapons again. Five minutes later, the outpost at la Sablonniere reported a force of about fifty German tanks rumbling northwest along the road to St. Barthelmy. That outpost was not heard from again. At the same time, the outpost at Grande la Dainie called in to report nine panzers fanning out around the road junction there. At the south end of the village, Greene and his TD gunners could hear the sound of German tanks moving toward them in the thick fog. They could even hear the German officers shouting to their men, but the murky fog prevented them from seeing anything.

On the other side of the village, at about 0600 German panzers also appeared before the Company A positions, driving down the trail to the northeast and down the road from the northwest in the direction of the overrun roadblock at le Bois du Pare—the Germans were attacking St. Barthelmy from three directions at once.

The strongest attack seemed to come from the south, in the area of Com-pany C and Greene's #1 and #2 guns. The first to be hit was the Third Squad, First Platoon, Company C, deployed in a lightly wooded strip on the southwest edge of the village. Two panzers, accompanied by sixteen infantrymen who "appeared to be drunk,"* charged the positions, the infantry wielding fixed bayonets rather than firing their weapons. Under withering machine gun fire from the tanks, Second Squad, First Platoon, Company C, led by Sgt. Berg, began to withdraw into the

*Thirtieth ID Combat Interviews, GL-347/3, p. 2.

Test of Courage 27

vi l lage even though Pvts. Barrias and Shi le r of Lt . Greene's TD pla toon had knocked

ou t one of the tanks w i th f ive rounds f r o m a bazooka . At the s ame t ime , the lead

German tanks of the First SS Panzer Reg t . a p p r o a c h e d the #1 a n d #2 TD guns

a long the southern road. Greene had r ad ioed in a request for a r t i l l e ry f i re to be

b rought down on the road, but th is w a s d e n i e d s ince the fog prevented h i m f rom

ad jus t ing the rounds . T h e lead G e r m a n t ank , a M a r k V Panther , drove up the road,

spray ing f i r e w i th its h u l l - m o u n t e d m a c h i n e g u n ( u n d o u b t e d l y the t ank c rew w a s

hav ing as m u c h d i f f i cu l ty see ing as the GIs) . A l t h o u g h the t ank i tse lf was st i l l

invis ib le in the fog, the TD gunne r s c o u l d c l ea r l y see the m a c h i n e g u n f l a shes . Sgt .

Char l e s M a r t i n , the p la toon sergeant a n d c o m m a n d e r o f g u n # 1 , ordered his g u n -

ner, C p l . Wa l t e r Chr i s t i anson , to a i m for these f l a shes a n d pul l the f i r ing l anya rd .

T h e an t i t ank gun j u m p e d backward in recoil a s the t a n k s u d d e n l y s lued s ideways a n d

sl id to a hal t , on f i re and b lock ing the road . T h e 3 - i n c h AP shel l h ad p robab l y

e i ther penet ra ted the mach ine g u n bal l or h i t the g u n m a n t l e s ince these were the

o n l y two places on the front of a Panther vu lne r ab l e to a 3 - i n c h round (a h i t on

the g u n m a n t l e cou ld cause the shell to r i coche t d o w n th rough the vehicle 's th in

upper a rmor and into the hu l l ) .

On the nor th end of town, G e r m a n t anks f a n n i n g out in the f i e lds to the

nor theas t s t ruck be tween First a n d T h i r d S q u a d s , First P l a toon , C o m p a n y A .

Ano the r German force, d r iv ing be tween S e c o n d a n d T h i r d P la toons , spread out ,

one prong of the a t t ack dr iv ing b e h i n d S e c o n d P la toon , w h i c h was su r rounded

and captured . T h e other prong s t ruck a t the T h i r d P la toon pos i t ions f rom the rear.

T h e m e n o f T h i r d P la toon tr ied to f i gh t the i r w a y o u t by c o u n t e r a t t a c k i n g to the

German Attacks on

St. Barthelmy

7 August 1 9 4 4


northwest, hoping to find safety with the Company B positions at le Fantay. Instead they ran into more Germans at the northwest end of town. Only five men from the platoon got out of St. Barthelmy; the rest were killed, wounded, or cap-tured.

In front of Greene's guns, the Germans seemed to have been thrown into confusion by the presence of his TD guns. The German observers on Hill 314 had seen the M10s of First Division pull out the previous day, but they had not seen the towed 3-inch guns move into town, thanks to Greene's use of the sunken road and their deployment during the night. To add to the Germans' confusion, Sgt. Martin at gun #1 fired two high explosive (HE) rounds blindly into the fog, hop-ing to disrupt the German operations. Apparently this had the desired effect. For the next half hour or so, Greene could hear the Germans shouting commands through the fog and moving vehicles around as they worked to recover the knocked-out Panther and clear the road. He could also hear a commotion farther south down the road, caused by another unpleasant surprise sprung on the Germans: Sgt. Hardy's four-man patrol.

After walking about 300 meters down the trail, Hardy's men halted to get their bearings. The artillery barrage had stopped, and they could hear the noise of tank tracks and motors off to their right (west). Sgt. Hardy crawled up a shrub-covered embankment and, peering over the top into the fog, he saw a field about 70 meters wide. On the other side was a hedgerow parallel to his own, and imme-diately on the other side of that, the Mortain-Avranches road. Three large Ger-man tanks sat motionless on the road, their gun barrels pointing north, toward St. Barthelmy. The tank crews stood together outside the tanks, talking noisily over the din of the battle to the north. Apparently, they were waiting for the burning Panther to be removed from the road so they could resume their advance and had gotten out of their tanks to discuss the situation. They could not proceed cross-country because of the restricting hedgerows lining the road; forced to stick to the road, they had to wait about forty minutes while it was being cleared.

Sgt. Hardy watched the Germans for about five minutes, barely able to see them through the dense fog. He and his men could hear the tank motors idling and, as reported of the grenadiers attacking St. Barthelmy, the crews sounded as if they were drunk. Finally, Sgt. Hardy decided that since their job was to shoot at Germans, they might never have a better chance. Pvt. Ericsson, a Norwegian who had fled the Nazi invasion of his country in 1940 and who "had no love for Germans,'" climbed to the top of the hedgerow with his bazooka. He fired his first round into the middle of the group of panzer crewmen, who quickly scattered. Apparently none or few of them manned their tanks, since the tanks did not return fire. The Germans probably did not know where the rocket had come from. Sgt. Hardy then ordered Pvt. Ericsson to shoot the tanks, which were probably Mark V Panthers. Ericsson hit two of the tanks in their engine compartments, which stopped the motors and set the vehicles on fire. The third tank was probably also

*Telephone interview with G. Dean Noble, 6 February 1990.

Test of Courage 29

hit, but just where and how badly was uncertain. Ericsson fired a total of four or five rounds, all of which hit. Smoke from the burning tanks quickly thickened the dense fog.

Sgt. Hardy, deciding that they had done enough damage for one morning, led the patrol back up the trail to the 57mm gun position as the Germans began to search for their assailants. When the Americans returned to the gun position, however, the gun, crew, and truck were gone.

The situation inside St. Barthelmy was worsening. On the north end, the German armored thrust up the hill and through the hedgerow, behind which the First Platoon of Company A had been stationed, had cut off the First Squad from the rest of the platoon. Led by Sgt. Jenkins, the squad fought its way north out of the encirclement. In the process all but five men were lost to German machine gun fire. The men of the light machine gun section of Company A, who were fac-ing northwest and covering the road to le Fantay, realized that they were also cut off. They split up and tried to make their way back to friendly lines. One group was captured; the other, suffering casualties from German fire, headed north into a wooded draw. Two men returned alive, waiting until nightfall to sneak back to friendly territory. A German tank blew a hole in the hedgerow in front of the Third Squad's position, persuading those men to retreat also. The Germans con-tinued across the road, surrounding and capturing the Company A command post and all its personnel. The five remaining men of Sgt. Jenkins's First Squad of First Platoon, Company A, had almost reached le Fantay when they came across a tank on the trail. Thinking it to be friendly, they approached it with some relief, but when the tank turned its turret toward them and trained the barrel of its main gun on them, they fled.

By now, Lt. Col. Frankland was calling the regimental headquarters at la Rossaye from his CP on the west edge of St. Barthelmy, asking for help. He reported at least nine German tanks inside St. Barthelmy. At the same time, the Company C roadblock at Grande la Dainie reported that the German tanks that deployed at the crossroads had overrun the outpost and were headed up the road toward St. Barthelmy. Resistance in the northern half of the town was crumbling, and more attackers were on the way from the south.

By about 0700 the SS panzer troops on the main road from Mortain had removed the burning Panther and resumed their approach. More wary now of TD fire, the lead tank advanced in fits and starts, firing its machine gun as it performed reconnaissance by fire. Sgt. Martin at gun #1 repeated his successful tactic of firing at the flashes, and was again rewarded with a loud explosion and another burning Panther, although this one had gotten about 20 meters closer than the first and was only about 35 meters from the gun itself. Gun #2 had been unable to fire at either German tank because of the hedgerow blocking its view of the road. The German attack at the south end of town was stalled again as the panzers were afraid to expose themselves to the murderous fire of Sgt. Martin's gun. The Ger-mans used this interim to direct a stream of blind small arms fire at the suspected location of the gun.

The men of the First SS Panzer Division were dismayed at the resistance


encountered in what should have been an easy drive through a French village. According to the attack plan, the town was supposed to have been taken by Sec-ond Panzer Division earlier in the morning; the SS men had expected to be able to simply motor through the town without meeting any resistance until much fur-ther west, perhaps around Juvigny. In actuality, the two divisions had begun their attacks at the same time, the Second Panzer Division hitting the north side of the town with the Mark IV tanks of the Third Panzer Regt. and the Jagdpanzers (self-propelled tank destroyers) of the Thirty-eighth Panzerjäger Regiment while the Mark IVs and Vs of the First SS Panzer Regt., on loan to the Second Panzer Divi-sion, hit the village from the south. In fact, the American tank destroyer fire from Greene's guns had been so effective that the Germans reported they were facing 90mm guns, not 3-inchers (76mm).

In the Company A sector, the fog was rising and falling intermittently. At 0800 the crew of Greene's #3 TD gun saw a German tank rolling across the field to their front, headed for the village church. The tank had come down the trail from the northeast but swung west before entering the town. The TD crew tra-versed the gun and hit the panzer in the side with a shot from a distance of 50 meters, knocking it out and killing the crew. On the other side of town, the same scene was being played out in front of the #2 gun, which fired its first round of the day at a panzer approaching from the southeast, about 60 meters away. The armor-piercing (AP) shell struck the tank on the starboard hull above the track, stopping the tank dead. The TD crew quickly fired a second AP round into the hull for insurance. The vehicle's crew was not seen to bail out.

German artillery fire now resumed, falling dangerously close to Greene's TD gun positions. The reply from the regimental S-3 to Lt. Col. Frankland's appeal for help was the amazing order to let the German tanks pass through his battal-ion's positions—which was already happening.

More Germans from the Second Panzer Division were hitting Company B's positions now. Their fire quickly knocked out the 57mm AT gun at le Fantay, prompting the Second Platoon, led by T. Sgt. Workman, to withdraw. Six of his men stayed behind, however, hiding in the brush for nine hours until they were able to return to American lines.

Some reports reaching the Thirtieth Division's headquarters by this time claimed that St. Barthelmy had already fallen, but in fact the fighting there was just reaching a crescendo. German small arms fire was beginning to take its toll on the TD gun crews, not because of its accuracy but because its sheer volume insured an occasional casualty. Lt. Col. Frankland was growing increasingly doubt-ful about the ability of the First Bn., 117th Infantry, to hold the town, and he ordered Lt. Lawson Neel, platoon leader of First Platoon, Company B, 823d TD Bn., which was stationed about 2 km farther west toward Juvigny, to take one of his 3-inch guns into the west end of St. Barthelmy to reinforce Greene. Neel and his driver drove cautiously to the west edge of town in a jeep and, seeing no Ger-mans, but hearing the raging combat inside the town, found a suitable position for the towed piece. Neel returned to the First Platoon's position and brought for-ward a 3-inch gun, towed by its half-track prime mover. He sited the gun at the

Test of Courage 31

Y-intersection at the northwest corner of the town, where he could fire down either of the two roads emerging from the hamlet. There was a low wall all along the southwest side of the road, so Neel was forced to set the gun up in a gate in the wall and to leave the half-track with the gun's ammunition across the street by a house. While setting up the gun, the crew discovered that the break in the wall was not wide enough for them to fully spread the gun's trails. Therefore, they could not fully traverse the gun to the right lest it tip over when fired. Meanwhile, one of the crewmen had gone across the street to begin fetching ammunition to the gun. He only had time to carry two AP rounds to the gun and return across the street before the first Panther arrived, rumbling down the northernmost of the two streets forming the Y-intersection. He and two other crewmen sought shelter in the corner house where the half-track was parked and found there some infantry-men from Company A.

Neel's gun was already pointed directly at the tank, which had been obscured by the houses lining the street. He gave the order to fire, yelling "Shoot, damn it!" as the Panther traversed its turret toward him." The tank was only 15 or 20 meters away, close enough for Neel to hear the commander shouting orders to his crew inside the vehicle. The shell penetrated the tank's port sponson, wrecking the tank. The crew bailed out, taking cover in the nearby houses.

Almost simultaneously, the panzer grenadiers accompanying the tank opened fire on Neel's gun. The bullets bounced off the 3/4-inch thick gunshield "like a stream of water from a hose,"+ and the Germans were even close enough to try

'Interview with L. Lawson Neel, 1 December 1989. †ibid.

T h e B a t t l e f o r St . B a r t h e l m y

7 August 1044


rolling hand grenades under the gunshield. Neel ordered his crew to abandon the gun. After removing the firing pin to disable the piece, the men withdrew cross-country to the First Platoon area two kilometers to the west. Only later did Neel realize that he had been wounded by fragments during the encounter.

The fog was starting to burn off faster by this time, about 1000, and Greene's #3 gun near the town church knocked out a second panzer following on the tracks of the first, this time with two AP rounds into the tank's flank at a range of 100 meters. However, the retreating fog meant that the 3-inch gun's 18-foot long muz-zle flash was clearly visible for a good distance, and the gun and nearby infantry began to draw heavy volumes of German small arms fire. This prompted the GIs of Second Platoon, Company A, to complain loudly and demand that the gun move to another location. However, the gun crew did not oblige.

German small arms fire and grenades had by now eliminated most of the infantry support for Greene's TD guns. Sgt. Martin's #1 gun, exposed by the lift-ing fog to longer range tank fire, was hit and destroyed by an HE shell. The explo-sion wounded three or four crewmen. The survivors took them back to the hotel in the northwest part of town that had served as Company A's CP and aid station, not knowing that it had already been overrun by the Germans. Company B to the northwest was also in danger of being surrounded, with German infantry reported on both its flanks, and German tanks breaking out onto the Mortain-Avranches road and driving toward Juvigny.

At about 1030, Greene decided that his #4 gun, which had not fired all morn-ing because its restricted fields of fire had prevented it from sighting a target, should be moved south to replace the destroyed #1 gun and to fire at German infantry

Test of Courage 33

moving on half-tracks up the sunken trail leading "into town from the southwest. The gun's crew first manhandled it around to cover the road that led past Greene's CP then moved it again to a position behind a hedgerow along the main highway, about 50 meters north of #2 gun. Once in this position, #4's crewmen discovered that even after cutting a hole in the hedgerow they could not depress the gun far enough to hit the German half-tracks moving up the trail. The Germans had already driven the infantry of First Platoon, Company C, from its positions near the gun, so #4 was without infantry support. SS panzer grenadiers (identified as such by Greene because of their camouflaged smocks) leapt from the half-tracks on the trail and advanced on the gun, firing their submachine guns and throwing grenades. The commander of #4 gun, realizing that his situation was untenable, removed the firing pin from the gun, and he and his crew abandoned the posi-tion. Their fate was unknown to the rest of the TD platoon.

At about the same time, around 1045, #2 gun was also being hard-pressed by German infantry coming from the sunken trails and the main road. The Ger-man small arms fire had wounded many nearby infantrymen and men of Sgt. Hig-gins' security squad, and #2 gun itself was also unable to hit the half-tracks on the sunken trail because a hedgerow on the east side of the trail blocked the crew's line of sight. The gun was able to fire on another panzer approaching up the highway and hit it with an AP round. The tank kept rolling, though, but did not fire its weapons. It moved past #2 gun and on into the town, where it finally stopped and burned in the street right outside Greene's CP. An HE round from another panzer struck and wrecked the #2 gun ten minutes or so later, injuring about half the remaining crewmen, all of whom fled the position.

By now it was about 1100, and the firing inside St. Barthelmy was dying down. Only small pockets of American resistance remained. Some engineers from the division's organic 105th Engineer Combat Bn. tried to set up a defensive ring in the old Company B area in the northeast part of town, using bazookas against the tanks. A number of German tanks drove out of the west end of town, headed toward Avranches and the 117th's regimental command post. Their advance was not to be an easy one, however. The Regimental Cannon Company was deploy-ing its short-barreled 105mm howitzers along the German route to harry their advance. Also, Lt. Neel had just returned to the First Platoon area, walking down the road with what remained of his gun crew. When asked by an unknown officer where he thought he was going, Neel replied "to get another gun, sir."

Commandeering another gun, with its support truck, half-track, and fresh crew, Neel set out eastward once again. About a kilometer west of St. Barthelmy he pulled into a field off the main road and directed his men to set up the gun along the edge of a hedgerow perpendicular to the road. In this way, they would have a perfect flank shot at any German tank coming down the road but would be shielded from observation by the hedgerow to the right of the gun. Then they sat down to wait for the Germans.

As Neel was setting up his second gun, inside St. Barthelmy Greene was con-sidering saving what was left of his platoon and getting out of town. All four TD guns had been knocked out (the manner of #3 gun's destruction is unknown), and


A 57mm antitank gun of the Twelfth Infantry, Fourth Division, 7 August 1944, along a road near Mortain, France.

few of his men were left uninjured. Just after 1100, an infantry sergeant from the 117th ran into Greene's CP, saying his unit's machine gun had malfunctioned while they were in a desperate fight to keep the Germans from overrunning their posi-tion. Greene told the sergeant that one of his half-tracks with a machine gun on a ring mount was parked in back of the building and he could have that. The two men went out and pulled the gun from its mount. As they were carrying the weapon to the sergeant's position, however, a Panther tank about 75 meters away fired an HE round into the hedgerow they were walking behind. A large spinning fragment struck the sergeant in the groin and ripped him almost in half vertically; he died instantly. Greene was hit by a small fragment just below his elbow. See-ing that he could offer the sergeant no help, Greene began spraying the nearby buildings and hedgerow with the machine gun to suppress any German infantry while he made his way back to his CP. After two or three long bursts, he ran out of ammunition, so he threw the machine gun away. He was armed now only with a single hand grenade he had in his pocket. As he rounded the end of the hedgerow, he literally ran into a German soldier armed with a Schmeisser submachine gun and wearing the field gray tunic of a Wehrmacht infantryman. Greene had no choice but to surrender. As he was being led to the collection point for POWs at the hotel that had housed Company A's CP until an hour ago, the Germans were cleaning out the remaining, scattered resistance in St. Barthelmy and pushing their remaining tanks down the road toward Juvigny.

As the first of these tanks came into the line of sight of Neel's second gun, nestled into the side of the hedgerow, his crew aimed an AP round at the panzer's

Test of Courage 35

flank at a range of about 45 meters. The tank lurched to a halt and the crew began to bail out, probably expecting a second round to be fired momentarily (it was a standard practice of the TD men to fire a second shot as insurance). Neel then fired an HE round, which persuaded the German crew to seek cover in a stand of trees a good distance away on the other side of the road. They had left the panzer's engine running, and Neel briefly considered trying to recover the tank. Allied air attacks, which had begun raging against the Germans as soon as the fog had burned off, changed his mind. A second tank, the next in the column of vehicles moving west down the road, had seen the incident, and, although its crew could not see Neel's gun directly, it saw the cloud of dust the gun's blast had kicked up when it fired. The tank fired an HE round at where the commander guessed Neel's gun was, and though not a direct hit, the explosion showered the crew with hot frag-ments and wounded some of the GIs. Leaving the gun, Neel withdrew his men to cover behind the next hedgerow further back, where they met up with Lt. Cush-man's platoon from the le Bois du Pare roadblock. They had set up their defen-sive position behind that hedgerow and were nervously awaiting the approach of the panzers when Neel set up his gun in front of them and effectively blocked the road by knocking out the first tank in the column.

Although Neel could see his gun from Cushman's position, he judged it too dangerous to try to man it again since the Germans apparently knew its location. In any case, he would get no more targets for the gun since his first kill had blocked the road and left the German column to the mercy of the Allied fighter-bombers buzzing over the area for the rest of the day.

The site of Neel's ambush was the high water mark of the German main thrust toward Avranches. Soon, the order came from von Kluge for the German soldiers to dig in where they were and prepare defensive positions.

St. Barthelmy's Aftermath

The heroic stand by the infantry of the First Bn., 117th Infantry Regiment, and First and Third Platoons, Company B, 823d TD Bn., at St. Barthelmy con-tributed to the German defeat at Mortain. The U.S. Army's official history of the battle claimed that forty out of an estimated seventy German tanks were knocked out on the first day of the battle. More important perhaps was the fact that the ferocious defense of St. Barthelmy had cost the Germans six precious hours of fog in which to advance their forces before being beset by Allied planes (the U.S. IX Tactical Air Command reportedly flew 320 sorties over Mortain on 7 August; the British Second Tactical Air Force flew 294). They also bought time for forces in the rear and on the flanks of the Thirtieth Division—the Third Armored Division and the Fourth and Thirty-fifth Infantry Divisions—to react to the German attack.

Lt. Neel was able to recover his second gun the next day when a counterat-tack by a regiment of the Fourth Infantry Division drove the Germans back toward St. Barthelmy. The village itself was not retaken until 12 August, falling, appro-priately enough, to the 117th Infantry Regiment. By then, little remained of the


town except rubble and bodies. Lt. Greene eventually arrived at a POW camp in Poland where he and other Americans captured at Mortain spent the brutally cold winter of 1944-45 in little more than rags, their uniforms having been taken from them to be used by German infiltrators in the Battle of the Bulge. In return, they were given the overcoats of Polish officers who had been executed by the Nazis. Pvt. Noble, one of the men in Sgt. Hardy's patrol, also survived the battle. After heading west trying to find the rest of their gun crew, the men of the patrol ran across their truck, mired in a muddy field, with the gun still in tow. The gun's firing pin had been removed and the truck's engine destroyed with a thermite grenade. The patrol finally linked up with its unit after spending a couple of days with some infantrymen in an ad hoc defensive position.

The battle at St. Barthelmy would ultimately be only a footnote in the long history of American infantry in World War II, but the valor of the town's defend-ers stands as a shining example of the capabilities of determined men even in the face of an armored onslaught. While Lt. Greene's TD platoon and the First Bn., 117th Infantry, were sacrificing themselves to delay the Germans at St. Barthelmy, another important footnote to the Mortain battle was being made.

The Defense of l'Abbaye-Blanche

In order to block the possible approach routes into Mortain, on 6 August the 120th Infantry Regt. of the Thirtieth Infantry Division established a series of roadblocks on the roads leading into Mortain from the east. These roads actually entered the town from the north and south because they were forced to bend around the dominating mass of Hill 314 immediately east of the town. The First Platoon of Company F, 120th Infantry, established a roadblock at l'Abbaye-Blanche, a collection of buildings named for the large white abbey just across the little Cance River. L'Abbaye-Blanche sits astride the main north-south highway that connects Mortain with St. Barthelmy where it bends west and leads to Avranches, the key German objective of Operation Lüttich. There is also a large railway sta-tion in the village. L'Abbaye-Blanche rests on the steep west bank of the Cance River, across from Hill 314 to the east, and has a commanding view of the roads to the east. A parallel north-south highway is located about 350 meters east of the village; the two roads merge at Grande la Dainie, about 1500 meters to the north. The road running through l'Abbaye-Blanche was called Highway 2, so named because of the quality rating assigned to it on the February 1944 version of the maps in use by the Thirtieth Infantry Division at the time of the battle"; the par-allel road to the east was called Highway 3.

Although the U.S. First Infantry Division had captured Mortain from the German Second Panzer Division on 3 August, mopping-up operations were still in progress three days later when the Thirtieth Infantry Division moved in to

*Quality 1: 8+ meters wide, metalled or paved; Quality 2: 6-8 meters wide, metalled or paved; Qual-ity 3: 3-6 meters wide, metalled or paved; Quality 4: Track or secondary road.

Test of Courage

relieve the First. To afford the best possible protection for the northern approach into Mortain, the roadblock at l'Abbaye-Blanche was composed of both antitank and tank destroyer guns and supporting infantry. Captain Reynold Erickson, commander of Company F, 120th Infantry, sent his First Platoon under Lt. Tom Andrew to the village at about 1445 on 6 August. A bazooka team and a BAR team (some sources say it was a ,50-cal machine gun team) formed a roadblock along the trail at Villeneuve, just to the west, laying mines across the trail and occupying sev-eral nearby houses. A 57mm AT gun from the Second Platoon of the AT Company, led by Lt. Sid Eichen, deployed at a road junction just across the river from the abbey, covering the trail paralleling Highway 2. This trail ran along the river from the north-east and was one of the most likely routes for a German counterattack. Eight infantry-men and a .30-cal machine gun covered the 57mm gun at the junction. Another AT gun, the only other one left in the under-strength platoon, covered the entrance into l'Abbaye-Blanche from the south, and a squad of riflemen and two .30-cal machine guns protected this gun. The infantrymen also placed mines across both bridges that crossed the Cance from the abbey. At the northernmost of these two bridges, a bazooka team and a BAR provided additional protection. At the south end of the bridge that spanned the railroad cut in the village was a cave, in which many of the villagers hid during the battle. Near the mouth of the cave, American riflemen and bazooka teams, supported by a .50-cal machine gun, dug in to block any traffic coming from the east or down the railroad track.'

Opposing Forces at l'Abbaye-Blanche

At around 1700 on 6 August, as the soldiers of the 120th Infantry prepared their positions, Lt. Tom Springfield, platoon leader of the First Platoon, Company A, 823d TD Bn., arrived to scout out positions for his towed 3-inch tank destroyer guns, a welcome addition to the roadblock's forces. According to Springfield, the infantry contingent at the roadblock numbered about twenty to twenty-five men; there were fifty-two men in his platoon, most of them crewmen for his four guns. Judging that any German counterattack (which was not considered a likely threat) would strike from the north or east, both of which would require the Germans to use Highway 2 or 3, Springfield decided to concentrate his firepower at the north end of l'Abbaye-Blanche covering both roads. His men and guns arrived later that night. As directed, Springfield initially occupied the positions of the previous TD unit, but he judged that the fields of fire of his guns in those positions coincided with those of the infantry's 57mm guns already in place, so he moved his guns about 200 meters to the north. The crews barely finished emplacing their pieces before daylight finally faded around 2330.

*The Thirtieth ID Combat Interviews, GL-347/16, say that a 60mm mortar section from the weapons platoon of F Company was also included in the roadblock's complement, but Thomas Springfield denies this, saying that at no time during the five-day battle was the roadblock able to call on artillery sup-port of any kind.

37


Springfield's #1 and #2 guns were placed behind a hedgerow, facing gener-ally east, in an orchard just east of Highway 2 and west of Highway 3. Their higher elevation afforded a commanding view of a one-kilometer stretch of Highway 3, from Pont de la Vacherie (the dairy bridge) north. His #3 and #4 guns set up in the shallow ditches on either side of Highway 2, facing north-northeast toward St. Barthelmy. They were covered by two .30-cal machine guns apiece. The wheels of all four 3-inch guns were dug into the ground to lower their profiles.

During the day, Lt. Springfield reported to the 120th Infantry Regimental commander, Colonel Hammond Birks, on his dispositions. Being senior to the infantry's Lt. Andrew, Birks put Springfield in command of the l'Abbaye-Blanche roadblock. Lt. Andrew acted as his co-commander, and the two lieutenants coop-erated well. The infantry took over the southern half of the roadblock while Springfield took the northern half. The two forces also formed a "strike squad" of five men with a BAR and rifles to act as a mobile reserve.

While the crews of the First Platoon, Company A, 823d, were digging in, a regiment of the Second SS Panzer Division "Das Reich," the Fourth SS Panzer-grenadier Regt. "Der Fuhrer," was moving into its assembly area at le Petit Fieffe, just over three kilometers to the east. As the lead elements of "Der Fuhrer"reached the hamlet, however, they found that parts of the First SS Panzer Division, which was to have vacated the area hours before, were still there. This created great con-fusion and a massive traffic jam. A British Typhoon fighter-bomber, shot down by German antiaircraft units a few hours before, had serendipitously crashed onto

The Roadblock at

I'Abbaye-Blanche 7-12 August 1944

Test of Courage 39

the lead Panther tank of the First SS Panzer Division column as it drove through a narrow defile at Vente a few hours before. Hours of backing and filling were required to get the blocked column turned around and onto an alternate route, delaying both the attack of the First SS Panzer Division toward St. Barthelmy and the attack of the northern task force of the Second SS Panzer Division toward Mor-tain and Hill 314. While the rest of Second SS Panzer Division launched its attack against Mortain from the southeast at 0100 on 7 August, entering the city at 0200, "Der Führer" did not get underway until 0430. By that time, Captain Erickson of Company F had lost telephone communication with his roadblocks, including lAbbaye-Blanche, because German artillery fire had cut the phone lines and because a fire was raging in Mortain from German bombing the previous night. Apparently the southeast column of the Second SS Panzer Division met only light resistance, because the men at lAbbaye-Blanche heard no signs of fighting and, without communication with Captain Erickson, had no idea of the impending German attack upon their position.

The Attack Begins

The first contact with the roadblock was made by the Ninth Kompanie, III Battalion, Fourth SS Panzergrenadier Regt. with four assault guns and followed closely by II Bn. and the Sixteenth Kp (engineers) at around 0500 in the dense fog along the river bank. The lead German reconnaissance element, told to expect only light resistance, moved down the trail leading southwest from the railroad station along the river's edge. This point force was composed of a motorcycle with sidecar, a favorite German reconnaissance vehicle, followed by a four-wheeled armored car (probably a panzerspähwagen Sd Kfz 221 or 222), a Kübelwagen (mil-itary Volkswagen), and an officer's car. These were reportedly followed by a half-track loaded with German infantry and another half-track loaded with ammuni-tion. The American .30-cal machine gun covering the AT position fired on and destroyed the motorcycle and shot up the unarmored Kübelwagen while the 57mm gun, manned by a squad directed by Sgt. Rhyne, destroyed the armored car with one round and the staff car with another. The Americans then machine-gunned the surviving German crew members, killing most of them. Apparently the Ger-mans were so surprised that they were never able to return fire. The carnage left by this ambush effectively blocked the narrow riverside trail, and the Germans did not attempt to advance down that lane again.

Meanwhile, by 0500 the fog was intermittent and patchy on the hillside above this action, giving Springfield's #1 and #2 guns a visibility of about 500 to 600 meters to the east beyond Highway 3. The Germans were moving forces north on this highway, with the intention of either striking into St. Barthelmy from the south or turning southwest at Grande la Dainie to attack l'Abbaye-Blanche and Mortain from the north. The 3-inch guns on the hill had an unobstructed line of sight to the enemy traffic on Highway 3, and the Germans, unknowingly, were obligingly presenting flank shots to the American gunners. As the German vehicles,


traveling in single file, strained to slowly climb the steep road from the river to Grande la Dainie, the tank destroyers opened up on them. In just a few minutes they had destroyed three half-tracks, one ammunition truck (identified as such by the size of the explosion when it was hit), and one "small" tank, probably a Mark IV. These shots were made at a range of about 320 meters."

As was often German strategy, command troops were following close behind these ill-fated lead elements. Caught totally by surprise by the accurate American fire and "lavish expenditure of ammunition"* coming from l'Abbaye-Blanche, the Ninth Kompanie staff, the III Bn. headquarters, and the regimental staff of the Fourth SS Panzergrenadier Regt. all scrambled for the nearest cover—the dairy at the foot of the Pont de la Vacherie bridge. German accounts mention that all three command groups were trapped in the single building for almost eight hours by the intense American fire pouring from Springfield's guns and from those of the infantry on Hill 314.

Shortly after this "turkey shoot" on Highway 3, at about 0600 hours, two German vehicles accompanied by infantry probed southward down Highway 2 along the stretch covered by Springfield's #3 and #4 guns. The tank destroyers fired on the lead vehicle, a half-track mounting a 75mm gun (either a Sd Kfz 250/8 or a Sd Kfz 251/22), and the following half-track, probably an ammunition resup-ply vehicle for the first. The concealed tank destroyers fired at a range of only 30 meters, waiting until the Germans had rounded a bend in the road and emerged from behind another orchard. The lightly armored German vehicles, suffering hits from three armor-piercing shells designed to stop tanks, were annihilated. Sup-porting U.S. infantry with ,30-cal machine guns opened fire on the surprised Ger-man infantry, who were now in among mines the Americans had hastily planted along the roadside. Few German survivors were left to retreat after fifteen minutes of fierce skirmishing.

The Second SS Panzer Division was stunned by the solid resistance its north-ern force had encountered. There was a lull in the fighting from about 0615, when the firing at the north end of the roadblock died down, until about 1000 while the Germans regrouped and considered what to do next. They were not allowed to plan in peace, however. Even though they were not being directly attacked, Springfield's #1 and #2 guns continued to snipe at German vehicles attempting to move along Highway 3, causing a considerable number of vehicle and personnel casualties. Furthermore, Allied air support had appeared over Mortain as the fog lifted, and around 0900 the III Bn. of the Fourth SS Panzergrenadier Regt. lost two of its four StuG-III assault guns to aerial rocket attacks.

Around 1000 hours, Lt. Stewart of the Second Platoon, Company F, arrived at the south end of the l'Abbaye-Blanche roadblock with two squads, all that was left of his platoon after having been overrun at the roadblock farther south. They had been forced to leave most of their heavy weapons behind, but Lt. Andrew was still glad to add their numbers to his force. He placed Lt. Stewart in charge of the

*Interview with Tom Springfield, 21 January 1990. †Ibid.

south end of the roadblock, which now faced enemy-occupied Mortain. Lt. Stew-art himself reportedly knocked out one German tank and one half-track by bazooka fire.

By noon on 7 August, the unit spearheading the German attack against l'Ab-baye-Blanche, the Ninth Kp, III Bn., Fourth SS Panzergrenadier Regt., reported that it had suffered the loss of nine vehicles, six of which were half-track person-nel carriers, as well as many casualties. The American defenders had not yet lost a single man.

At 1400, the Germans asked for a truce in order to pick up their dead and wounded from the battlefield. The Americans consented. Using large Red Cross flags, the Germans spent an hour retrieving their fallen under the watchful eyes of the American gunners. During this quiet period, the three German command staffs pinned in the dairy were able to pull back to safer and more dispersed positions.

Combat around lAbbaye-Blanche was more sporadic during the afternoon of August 7, with a single tragic exception. At around 1600 hours, British Typhoon fighter-bombers coming in from the north mistakenly attacked several American positions around lAbbaye-Blanche and Mortain, despite the fact that the Amer-icans displayed aerial recognition panels and used colored smoke to mark friendly positions. Several rockets burst around Springfield's #3 and #4 guns, killing one man. Other rockets wounded two other 823d TD Bn. men south of the road-block, and damaged one of the battalion's supply trucks.

Intermittent combat continued throughout the afternoon and evening. Ger-man vehicles inexplicably continued to try to move north along Highway 3 at intervals, providing a "shooting gallery" for #1 and #2 guns. At around 2330 hours, just after dark, the Germans called for another medical truce, again taking about an hour to collect their dead and wounded, the numbers of which were steadily mounting. At some point during the day, the crew of #1 gun had pinpointed the location of a German machine gun nest on the other side of the Cance River and knocked it out with HE fire. Only during the night were the Germans able to inflict any casualties on the roadblock force. They had tried to fire on the American posi-tions all day with artillery, but since Springfield's position was on a ridge, the Ger-man shells kept overshooting to the west. Some Nebelwerfer rocket salvos, how-ever, did strike the ridge itself that night, wounding two to four men. Lt. Andrew said later that the rounds exploded about 400 meters away, close enough for him to "feel the shrapnel." Andrew also remarked that even though the German artillery was zeroed in on the roadblock (which occupied former German positions), his men would take cover during the barrages, having learned that the German infantry had little faith in their artillery and therefore did not follow it closely when attack-ing.

The total score of German vehicles for the l'Abbaye-Blanche roadblock on 7 August is difficult to compile. Sources provide conflicting or incomplete figures for the number of kills. A reasonable estimate of the roadblock's kills for the first day included two Mark V Panthers, five Mark lV tanks, one half-track assault gun, one bus-type cargo vehicle, one two-and-a-half-ton truck, three full-tracked per-sonnel carriers full of troops, two motorcycles, one quarter-ton truck (Kübe lwa-

Test of Courage 41


gen), one staff car, one machine gun nest, and an estimated 150-200 German sol-diers and tanker crews killed or wounded and another ten captured.

The German Attack Continues: 8 August

The Second SS Panzer Division renewed its attack on the roadblock at dawn on 8 August. At about 0500 hours, a panzer grenadier patrol from the north and northwest worked its way into the orchard northwest of #3 and #4 guns, concealed by the fog and foliage and using the wreckage of the previous day's patrol as cover. The American infantrymen guarding the two guns fired on this patrol with their ,30-cal machine guns and bazookas, killing five Germans in a brief firefight. The remaining Germans withdrew into the orchard. At about the same time, a Ger-man squad with MG-42s, the excellent German light machine gun, attacked the trail outpost at Villeneuve but was also driven off. Shortly thereafter, the Germans began assaulting the #3 and #4 guns' position in force. The Americans were able to smash the first wave of attackers, destroying two (possibly three) Mark IV tanks and four half-tracks. With their vehicles gone, the determined German infantry-men continued to attack the position on foot, using a machine gun and a flamethrower in addition to their small arms (the presence of the flamethrower indicated that this may have been an SS Pionier [engineer] company). With Lt. Springfield in the lead, the "strike squad" repulsed this attack, ending the flamethrower operator's life in a fireball as a bullet struck the weapon's fuel tank. The squad captured fifteen Germans, more than their own number.

This action lasted about two hours, and by then the morning fog had lifted, and Allied planes began furiously attacking the Fourth SS Panzergrenadier Regt.'s positions. This halted most of the attacks since the deadly "Jabos," as the Ger-mans called the hated planes, would immediately pounce upon any moving vehi-cle or group of men. But the Germans persisted in sending vehicles up Highway 3 toward St. Barthelmy and kept the shooting gallery in operation. As Springfield recalled later, "for two days we fired all day!" Around noon, Springfield received five new recruits as replacements, the only reinforcements sent to the roadblock during five days of fighting. But over the next few days other men from different companies straggled into the village, as had Lt. Stewart's contingent. The force eventually contained men from companies D, E, G, H, and K as well as from Com-pany F and had a peak strength of about 150, "but by far the greatest number of these were battle exhaustion cases and had little part in the actual defense."' Ger-man artillery continued to harass the roadblock all day on 8 August but only wounded a couple of GIs.

At around 1530, a group of Germans attacked the south end of the road-block at the abbey bridges in front of Lt. Stewart's men, driving up in half-tracks and dismounting. They used flamethrowers and concussion grenades, wounding four men of Lt. Eichen's AT platoon, but American small arms fire wiped out the

*Interview with Springfield, 21 January 1990.

Test of Courage 43

attackers. Under cover of the attack, a brave German officer or NCO tried to remove the double belt of mines across the bridge so his vehicles could cross it and enter the village, but the American BAR team shot him down in the attempt, and the bazooka team destroyed his half-track. Lt. Andrew later remarked that "he should have known that a minefield is always covered by fire."

The fighting dwindled after this, and the Germans made no more attacks on the roadblock on 8 August. At some point during the day, the Americans suffered another "friendly" air attack, this time from a fighter plane that made a strafing pass over the area. No American casualties were reported. At the time, Lt. Springfield thought the plane was a German Focke-Wulf 190, but German and Allied records alike show that all air support for the Mortain offensive was inter-cepted over the German airfields to the rear and that only Allied planes flew over Mortain. This incident was probably just another case of mistaken identity. Just after dusk, the Germans asked for and were granted another truce to evacuate their wounded.

On the night of 8 to 9 August, the situation around Mortain began to shift as American units to the north and south of l'Abbaye-Blanche, recovering from the shock of the German offensive and heavily reinforced, regained the initiative and attacked to recover the lost ground and relieve the beleaguered battalion of the 120th Infantry on Hill 314 across the river from l'Abbaye-Blanche. At about 2115 on 8 August, the U.S. Second Bn., 119th Infantry, attacked eastward and recaptured Grande la Dainie on the St. Barthelmy-Mortain road and about one kilometer north of the roadblock. The Germans hit Grande la Dainie almost imme-diately with a fierce counterattack from the northwest composed of tanks, armored cars, and motorcycles, but after an hour of heavy fighting the Americans still held the crossroads, securing a large section of Springfield's roadblock perimeter against further German attacks.

Return to Normalcy

Life for the l'Abbaye-Blanche garrison was considerably quieter on 9 August even though the Second SS Panzer Division did capture and hold Hill 276 to the southwest for a while, threatening the roadblock's supply line. This supply route had been under German observation and fire since 7 August, but Company F of the Second Bn., 120th Infantry, had kept it open. Springfield's roadblock was cred-ited with destroying three German vehicles of unknown type moving north on Highway 3 on 9 August. German artillery fire damaged the gunsights of both #1 and #2 guns, so Springfield's men took the sights from #3 and #4 guns to replace them. They then boresighted guns #3 and #4 on the road emerging from behind the orchard, and the crews resumed their vigil.

On 10 August, the Germans began a last-ditch effort to dislodge the l'Ab-baye-Blanche roadblock, launching an infantry attack. While records provide few specifics regarding the direction, timing, or size of the attacks, they were all repulsed with the loss of only nine men of the 823d TD Bn. and terrible losses to the


Germans. At about 0100 hours on 10 August, a German half-track, lost and loaded with wounded, blundered past the apparently sleeping American sentries at the south end of the railroad bridge by the cave. Lt. Springfield, asleep in his com-mand post about 100 meters south of the bridge, woke at the sound of the unfa-miliar vehicle approaching and went downstairs to see what was happening. His sentries stopped the ambulance marked with red crosses right outside his com-mand post building, and from a window in the CP, Springfield informed the vehi-cle's crew and wounded passengers that they were now prisoners of war.

The forces at the roadblock destroyed several half-tracks and nine other vehi-cles on 10 August. By that night, the German XLVII Panzer Korps had begun its withdrawal from the Mortain area. The Germans were barely able to hold off an attack by the U.S. Third Armored Division on Hill 307, northeast of Mortain. The First SS Panzer and Second SS Panzer Divisions completed their withdrawal from the Mortain-St. Barthelmy area by 1100 hours on 11 August, and the road-block at l'Abbaye-Blanche was finally relieved the next day, 12 August 1944.

Official and eyewitness accounts list varying numbers of German vehicles knocked out at l'Abbaye-Blanche during the five days of the Battle of Mortain. Reasonable estimates point to at least twenty-four vehicles, including three Mark V Panther tanks, eight Mark IV tanks, nine half-track armored personnel carriers or assault guns, three cargo trucks or cargo vehicles, three full-tracked personnel carriers, two motorcycles, one staff car, one armored car, one Kubelwagen jeep, and at least ten other vehicles, as well as nearly 220 Germans killed and captured. In an interview soon after the battle, Lt. Andrew estimated that the roadblock knocked out at least sixty vehicles, many of them victims of Springfield's towed 3-inch TDs. He also said that twelve German armored vehicles had been destroyed on High-way 3, apparently by bazooka teams or Lt. Eichen's 57mm guns, but that they had been hauled away in the night by the Germans for repairs. These were in addition to the TD guns' kills." The 120th Infantry's regimental history mentioned that one of the roads near the roadblock, probably Highway 3, had at least twenty-four destroyed German vehicles on it, all lined up bumper-to-bumper as if destroyed while parked that way.† Official losses of the U.S. roadblock force were three killed and twenty wounded.

Colonel Birks, commander of the Thirtieth Infantry Division's 120th Infantry Regt., regarded the stand of the l'Abbaye-Blanche roadblock as one of the most important factors in the division's successful repulse of the German counteroffensive, saying that "if the roadblock had not held, the whole position of the 120th would have been nullified and the resulting gap would have permit-ted the enemy to smash through the Thirtieth Division's line."§ He stated that the scores of wrecked German vehicles that littered the roads around l'Abbaye-Blanche "were the best sight I had seen in the war."

*120th Infantry Regiment History, August 1944, p. 6. † lb id . §Thirtieth ID Combat Interviews, "Mortain Counterattack, " GL 347-16, p. 6.

Second Chance Crossing

In the Allied drive across France the U.S. Third Army's crossing of the Moselle River at Arnaville presented a key element in encircling and taking the German "fortress" city of Metz. The crossing represented the beginning of the southern arm of the city's encirclement.

The original plan of attack on Metz was to have the Fifth Infantry Division's (known by the unit's shoulder patch as the Red Diamond) Eleventh Regimental Combat Team (the Eleventh Infantry Regt. and attachments), commanded by Colonel Charles W. Yuill, force a crossing in the vicinity of the village of Dornot just south of Metz while the Second RCT made a frontal attack on the city from the west. But the plan came apart not long after getting started. The crossing had little success and proved costly in men and material. The German defenses were too well established for the Americans to make much headway at Dornot. In fact, the evacuation of the battered Eleventh Infantry bridgehead appeared imminent. A new plan was needed.

The precarious American foothold on the bank east of the Moselle at Dornot was only nominally a bridgehead since there were no bridges linking the troops on the east bank to the main body on the west bank. The Germans had so restricted the foothold at Dornot that there was no space to maneuver or to bring more troops into the bridgehead. German 88's were positioned to fire on the river making bridging operations nearly impossible.

On the west bank of the Moselle Major General S. LeRoy Irwin, Com-manding General of the Fifth Infantry Division, still had available the Tenth Infantry (Colonel Robert P. Bell) in the vicinity of Chambley, nearly two battal-ions of the Eleventh Infantry, elements of Combat Command B, Seventh Armored Division, and the Second Infantry (the Second remained tied down west of Metz during the Arnaville operation). Only vague reports had filtered across from the Second Bn., Eleventh Infantry (Lt. Col. Kelly B. Lemmon, Jr.), on the east bank during 9 September, and repeated requests for air support brought no help.

General Irwin believed that the Dornot bridgehead was too rigidly contained to be of further value and wished to withdraw the troops from there; however, General Walker (XX Corps commander) insisted that this foothold on the east bank would have to be maintained until another bridgehead was secured. Uncertain as to the exact situation across the river, the division commander sent word for the


Second Bn. to be prepared to push to the south and link up with the Tenth Infantry, whose crossing was set for the early hours of 10 September.

At 1400, 8 September, orders were received at the Tenth Infantry CP from Division HQ to send one battalion to the high ground west of the Moselle near the town of Arnaville to relieve a battalion of the Eleventh Infantry already in position there and the Third Bn. accomplished this task before nightfall. At 2200 Lt. Col. Randolph C. Dickens, G-3, Fifth Infantry Division, brought to the reg-iment's CP orders for the Tenth Infantry to cross the Moselle the following day. The time and exact site for the crossing was to be at the discretion of the com-manding officer of the Tenth Infantry. Their mission: to secure the high ground north of the town of Arry on the east bank.

An amended plan for capturing Metz was becoming apparent. Orders had been issued for the Second Bn., Eleventh Infantry, to hold its bridgehead for the time being in the hope that it would hold the attention of the Germans in the vicinity while the Tenth RCT established a more tenable bridgehead to the south. The Eleventh Infantry bridgehead was proving costly, and attempts to cross the Moselle by other divisions along the line were faring little better. The Moselle River had to be forced.

It had been anticipated that crossings of the Moselle would initially, and for some time after the establishment of bridgeheads, be exposed to German obser-vation. Smoke screen operations had therefore been included in the plans to cover bridging operations. However, this was originally expected to be a job for a 4.2-inch chemical mortar battalion, but the only smoke unit available was a smoke generator company, the Eighty-fourth Chemical Company (Smoke Generator). As a result a new support technique in Third Army river crossing operations was to be put into practice: a large area forward smoke screen. The Eighty-fourth Chem-ical Company was attached to the Fifth Division on 6 September. Unfortunately, at the time of the Dornot crossing, the Eighty-fourth had not yet arrived from its employment with the Red Ball Express, the personnel driving trucks on the sup-ply run up from the Normandy beaches. Not until the crossing at Arnaville was it able to begin its new assignment, arriving on the scene only hours before the attack.

The Eighty-fourth's mission was new in many ways. It was the first of its kind in the entire European theater. Neither the Fifth Division nor its supporting engi-neers had ever before worked with a smoke generator unit in a river crossing oper-ation. The Eighty-fourth had been trained only for rear-area antiaircraft missions, not for assault support. But so long as the casemate artillery at Fort Driant to the north of the crossing site, on the river's west bank, had observation and so long as roving German howitzer batteries and independent guns on the east bank could move freely within range of the river, all hope of throwing a bridge across and of keeping it intact rested with the smoke generators.

Early on 9 September, Colonel Bell, described as a no-nonsense, straight-forward kind of commander, went with a reconnaissance party to Arnaville. Find-ing that the area had not been completely cleared of Germans, the party divided into two patrols and made its way to the river. There they found extensive

Second Chance Crossing 47

demolition by the Germans. The local citizens warned the party that the roads and trails were mined; however, the reconnaissance party was able to select suit-able avenues of approach for the operation. Parallel to the railroad track, which followed the river, the Americans came upon a deep canal—a further complica-tion to bridging operations. However, they found that infantry could cross on footbridges at a lock in the canal. Although an expanse of approximately 200 yards of open, marshy ground extended from the canal to the river, in one place a tree-shaded trail provided concealment all the way to the water's edge. The riverbank itself was suitable for launching assault boats. Detailed engineer reconnaissance could not be made until later, but it appeared that a suitable bridge site existed where a military bridge had been constructed and later destroyed by the French Army during its 1940 campaign. On the near bank the two hills flanking Arnav-ille to the north and south covered the Bayonville-Arnaville road to the west and would provide direct-fire positions for guns and cannons supporting the assault.

Beyond the river was another stretch of some 500 yards of open, marshy flatland. A network of trails over the ground led to a group of outbuildings and a large house known as Voisage Farm where the Arry road, from the southeast, inter-sected with the Metz-Pont-a-Mousson highway—the main north-south artery leading to Metz. From the highway the ground rose abruptly to the dominating east-bank hills. Southeast of the Voisage Farm, on the steep slopes of the east-bank hills stood the village of Arry; directly north of the farm and northwest of the Cote de Faye, hard by the river, was the village of Corny. Other factors of terrain that were to prove important included two defiles that converged in the vicinity of the crossing site, one running east and west from Arnaville and a shallow draw lead-ing from the Voisage Farm to a saddleback between Hills 369 and 386.

To the reconnaissance party, Hill 386 in the Bois des Anneaux and the wooded Cote de Faye (Hills 325, 370, and 369) seemed to offer natural defensive posi-tions and were therefore assigned as battalion objectives. On the maps used by the reconnaissance party, Hill 325 on the Cote de Faye appeared wooded. In reality it was a bare knob exposed to observation and direct fire from Forts Sommy, St. Blaise, and Driant, which guarded Metz's southern perimeter. Although Colonel Bell realized that the dominant terrain feature in the area was Hill 396, one thou-sand yards east of Hill 386, he felt that he could not expect the two assault bat-talions to take and hold this hill the first night. Since so far no attempt to estab-lish a bridgehead across the Moselle had succeeded, except for the tenuous foothold at Dornot, Colonel Bell recognized that success was needed and he did not want to aim for more than his resources would allow him to accomplish.

Returning at about 1400 to his command post in Chambley, Colonel Bell issued attack orders to his regiment and its combat team elements: the Forty-sixth Field Artillery Bn. (105mm howitzers); Company B, Seventh Engineer Combat Bn • ; Company B, 818th Tank Destroyer Bn. (with one platoon of Reconnaissance Company, 818th, attached); Company B, 735th Tank Bn.; and Company B, Fifth Medical Bn.

To emplace the needed bridges were a mix of engineer elements. Lt. Col. George E. Walker's 1103d Engineer Combat Group, attached to the Fifth Division,


consisted of the 160th and 204th Engineer Combat Battalions, the 551st Heavy Pontoon Bn, the 989th Treadway Bridge Company, the 537th Light Pontoon Company, and the 623d Light Equipment Company. Assistance in engineering operations could also be expected from Company B of the Fifth Division's organic Seventh Engineer Combat Bn.

Thirteen field artillery battalions were available to furnish supporting fire. Supporting field artillery battalions of the Fifth Infantry Division Artillery included the Nineteenth, Twenty-first, Forty-sixth FA Bns. Attached was the 284th FA Bn.

Order of Battle: US 5th ID at Arnaville


and the 434th Armored FA Bn. of CCB, Seventh Armored Division. Corps Artillery included the Fifth FA Group (695th and 558th FA Bns.), 203d FA Group (270th, 277th, and 739th FA Bn.), and the 204th FA Group (177th, 773d, and 943d FA Bns.). The division's Fiftieth FA Bn. was not available to support the cross-ing operations as it was busy with the Second RCT

With the hour of crossing set for moonrise, 0055,10 September, Colonel Bell ordered his First Bn. to lead the assault and capture Hill 386. The Second Bn was to follow at 0400 and capture the Cote de Faye (Hills 325, 370, and 369). The Third Bn. was initially to hold its positions on the west bank's high ground in the vicinity of Arnaville, support the operation by fire as called for by the assault bat-talions, and protect the crossing site.

Initial ferrying of the First Bn., Tenth Infantry, was to be done with assault boats manned by Company B, Seventh Engineer; the Second and Third Bns., Tenth Infantry, were to be ferried by Company B, 204th Engineers, and, eventu-ally, the Third Bn., Eleventh Infantry, by Company C, 160th Engineers. Since Colonel Bell's attack plan depended upon surprise, the engineers were to make no preparations or further reconnaissance before dark except to assemble sixty assault boats and crews in covered positions in the vicinity of Arnaville. Construction of infantry support rafts was begun on 10 September by Company B, 204th Engi-neers. Because of heavy German artillery fire work was delayed and only a few rafts were completed before daylight, 11 September.

The artillery plan, prepared with the advice of Lt. Col. James R. Johnson, commanding officer of the Forty-sixth FA Bn., called for no preparatory fires unless the crossing was detected. Although guns would lay preparation fires across 1,200 yards of front beyond the river, the only officer who could call for them was the artillery liaison officer with the First Bn., Captain George S. Polich. One platoon each of the regiment's cannon company and antitank company was attached to each rifle battalion and was to cross by ferry or bridge, whichever was available first. Company B, 735th Tank Bn., was ordered to cross with its Sherman medium tanks as soon as a bridge could be completed; Company B, 818th TD Bn., was to move after dark to hull-down positions on the bare hills north and south of Arnav-ille and be prepared to engage enemy tanks and vehicles beyond the river. The Eighty-fourth Chemical Smoke Generator Company was ordered to initiate oper-ations at daylight, laying a front-line, large area smoke screen around the cross-ing site as protection against German observation. The Tenth Infantry's CP was to be at Vandelainville, west of Bayonville.

Preparations

Shortly after the attack order was given, the First Bn. commander, Lt. Col. Frank V. Langfitt, Jr., was evacuated due to illness and the executive officer, Major Wilfred H. Haughey, Jr., was informed by the regimental executive officer, Lt. Col. William M. Breckinridge, that he was to assume command.

Ordering his company commanders to forward assembly areas at Villecey-


sur-Mad, near Waville, Major Haughey went with his S-3, company comman-ders, and artillery liaison officer to reconnoiter the crossing site. There, he laid out his plan of attack. The advance was to be made in a column of companies in the order A, C, B, each with elements of D and Battalion Headquarters attached. Across the river the same formation was to be followed, using two powerline clear-ings on the skyline as guides to the objective—Hill 386. Company A was to swing left, eventually to tie in with the Second Bn. to the north. Company C was to swing right, pushing out to the south nose of Hill 386 in the direction of Arry. Company B was to dig in along the western edge of the woods on the rear slope of the hill, mop up any resistance bypassed, and guard the right flank and rear against German counterattacks coming from Arry. With each of the two assault companies was to be a platoon of heavy machine guns of Company D. The men were to carry with them a full canteen of water, all the ammunition possible, and three K rations. A rear battalion CP was to be maintained in Arnaville.

When the battalion officers returned to Villecey by about 1700 on 9 Decem-ber, enough daylight remained to permit the platoon leaders to go to Bayonville, where they obtained a brief and distant view of the objective; but there was no time to provide the noncommissioned officers with any kind of reconnaissance. Although most of the men of the First Bn. were veterans of the Seine River cross-ing, they were aware of the terrific pounding from artillery and counterattacks the Eleventh Infantry's Dornot bridgehead had received and sensed that this crossing would prove more difficult than that of the Seine.

Meanwhile, the commander of the Second Bn., Major William E. Simpson, had taken his company commanders and staff to the hill south of Arnaville over-looking the crossing site and had decided to launch his attack also in a column of companies. After making its scheduled crossing at 0400, Company F, leading the battalion, was to advance past Voisage Farm and move up the shallow draw between its objective and Hill 386. Then it was to turn left (north) and follow the ridge line of the Cote de Faye to take, in turn, Hills 369, 370, and 325. Companies G and E were to follow, the latter assigned the mission of mopping up in the bat-talion's rear and on its left flank. One machine gun platoon of Company H was to be attached to each of the two forward companies, and the 81mm mortar pla-toon was to follow Company G. The members of an advanced CP were to accom-pany Major Simpson at the head of Company E.

It was believed that the German troops in the area consisted principally of two regiments of German officers' candidate school personnel as well as elements of the Seventeenth SS Panzergrenadier Division, the Second SS Panzergrenadier Division, and the Panzergrenadier Division "Gross-Deutschland" and several bat-teries of artillery. Later, intelligence and interrogation reports would identify the Eighth Panzergrenadier Regt., 103d Panzer Bn. (equipped with twenty Mark III and IV tanks and thirty-six 75mm assault guns) and Panzerzerstörer Kompanie (an experimental unit armed with a German version of the bazooka) of the Third Panzergrenadier Division; the 115th Panzergrenadier Regt. from the Fifteenth Panz-ergrenadier Division (Major General Eberhardt Rodt); Kampfgruppe Schmitt from the Seventeenth SS Panzergrenadier Division "Goetz von Berlichingen" (recently


brought up to strength by the addition of men who had formerly belonged to the Luftwaffe and with volksdeutsche—Germans from southeast Europe); the Forty-ninth SS Panzergrenadier Brigade; the 282d Ersatz & Ausbildungs Bn. (a unit composed of an estimated 450 men with stomach ailments); and at least one com-pany of the Fourteenth Machine Gun Ersatz Bn.

Fifth Division personnel believed they were fighting the elite troops of the Metz military schools; however, these school troops were actually in the German "bridgehead" west of Metz surrounding Forts Driant, Marival, and Jeanne d'Arc and were engaging the Second Infantry and elements of the Seventh Armored Division. Not until after the Arnaville bridgehead was secure did any of these school troops enter the American bridgehead battles south of Metz, except for one battalion of signal school troops (SS Signal School Metz) which fought against the Second Bn., Eleventh Infantry, opposite Dornot. The replacement battalions in the area, though originally under Division Number 462, were not school troops.

The Eighty-fourth Chemical Company was placed under operational con-trol of the 1103d Engineer Combat Group, which was to construct the Arnaville bridges, and under the general supervision of the Fifth Division's chemical officer, Lt. Col. Levin B. Cottingham. After the Tenth Infantry received its orders to cross at Arnaville, Lt. Col. Cottingham instituted a meteorological study of the area, supplementing weather reports from the Air Corps with local observations from supporting artillery and the area's natives. He determined that the prevailing wind was out of the west "and generally at low velocity. Both Lt. Col. Cottingham and the chemical company commander conducted reconnaissance and decided that if generators were placed at Position 1, about a thousand yards (900 meters) west of Arnaville behind the hill mass north of Arnaville, the prevailing wind would carry the smoke through the Arnaville defile, spread it over the crossing site and into the German positions on the eastern hills, and thus cover the entire crossing area with a haze that would deny German air and artillery observation on both the approaches and the crossing site. Being so placed to the west of the hill mass, the generator positions, oil supply dump, and unit personnel would be protected from German fire and could be readily supplied along the Bayonville-Arnaville road. Because of these advantages, the presumed improbability of a wind change, and the Eighty-fourth's lack of experience under forward-area combat conditions, it was decided that initially no generator would be placed in the immediate vicinity of the crossing site.

An observation post (OP) was to be established at the positions of the Can-non Company, Tenth Infantry, on the crest of the hill south of Arnaville and another one on the hill north of the town. Communications between the OPs and the smoke control officer, Lt. Col. Cottingham, at the crossing site was to be by radio. The engineers thus had tactical control of the smoke through the control officer. The troops of the Eighty-fourth moved into Position 1 and the OPs dur-ing the night of 9 to 10 September.

The Eighty-fourth was equipped with the new M2 smoke generator, a weapon especially designed for forward-area screening. The unit was also prepared to sup-plement the screen with Ml and M4 smoke pots. Fog oil had to be hauled by the


Fifth Division's Quartermaster Company trucks from the Third Army depot at Troyes, some 180 miles (290 km) in the rear, to the Eighty-fourth's bivouac area, about four miles (6.5 km) to the rear of Position 1. Loads were then transferred to company trucks, which hauled the oil and other supplies to the generator posi-tions. An M2 generator consumed an average of fifty gallons of fog oil per hour. A total of 1,535 smoke pots and 26,400 gallons of fog oil would be expended dur-ing the first twelve days of the operation. While forty-eight generators were avail-able, only twelve were to operate at Position 1. The generators were to begin mak-ing smoke at daylight, 0600, 10 September.

Bridging operations were expected to be complicated also by several difficult terrain features at the crossing site itself. The engineers would have to bridge two streams, possibly three. The first was the deep Moselle Canal, 80 feet (24 m) wide, except at the locks where it was much narrower. Next came the Moselle, approx-imately 250 feet (76 m) wide. There was also the Rupt de Mad, a small east-west tributary running through the Arnaville defile, passing under an elevated section of the canal, and emptying into the river north of the crossing site.

Reconnaissance revealed that southeast of Arnaville where the north-south railroad, which followed the river, met a southwestern spur line, a narrow trail, overgrown with vegetation, led up to a steep dike on the canal and to the remains of a steel truss bridge constructed by French military engineers in 1940. The bridge itself had been demolished, its debris blocking the site. Opposite this possible bridge site was another high dike, but beyond the dike another narrow trail led to the river and to an outlet road on the eastern bank leading to Voisage Farm. The banks of the river here offered satisfactory prospects for a floating bridge. To reach the canal crossing point, vehicles would initially have to travel south out of Arnav-ille on the Pagny highway and cross the Rupt de Mad on an existing masonry arch bridge between the town's main street and the railroad spur.

The most direct route from Arnaville to the river led due east through under-passes beneath the railroad spur and the main line to a lock on the canal. Although foot troops would be able to cross the canal at the lock, approximately thirty feet of bridging would be necessary for vehicular traffic. But to reach either River Site 1 (the initial Moselle crossing site) or another possible bridging site (River Site 2, planned for a location northeast of the canal lock) vehicles would have to cross the Rupt de Mad between the canal and the river. River Site 2 also offered an out-let road beyond the river that led to the Metz-Pont-a-Mousson highway.

Alternatively, vehicles might turn north after crossing the canal and follow the canal dike to reach the river at a shallow rapids offering a possible fording site. Engineers recognized, however, that a large amount of bulldozer work would be necessary in order to prepare the steep river banks for fording. Another terrain fea-ture—later to prove an advantage against German shelling—was a section of aban-doned railroad embankment about eight feet high that stretched at intervals along the river bank from south of River Site 1 to River Site 2. Because of frequent gaps in the bank, it did not pose an obstacle in reaching the river bridging sites them-selves.

With Company B, 204th Engineers, engaged in constructing infantry support


rafts at the Arnaville site and Company C, 160th Engineers, still busy in the vicin-ity of the Dornot bridgehead, the remainder of the 1103d Engineer Combat Group made plans for its bridging operations and assembled materials and construction equipment west of Arnaville. The actual bridging operations were not to begin until the night of 10 to 11 September. The division's Seventh Engineer Combat Bn. was disposed as follows: Company A with the Second RCT to the north, Com-pany B to assist with ferrying operations at Arnaville, and Company C occupied with the Dornot bridgehead.

The initial engineer plan envisioned construction by Company B, 204th Engineers, of a double treadway bridge across the canal at the lock. A second thirty-foot section of bridge would be required across the Rupt de Mad. Concur-rently the 537th Light Pontoon Company was to remove the demolished steel truss bridge at the southern canal bridge site and erect a Bailey bridge. As soon as equipment was able to cross the canal, the 989th Treadway Bridge Company, assisted by Company B, 160th Engineers, was to erect a treadway bridge at River Site 1 while HQ Company, 204th Engineers, conducted bulldozer operations to level the banks at the fording site. Company A, 204th Engineers, was to relieve Company B, 204th, of its ferry responsibilities. The remainder of the engineer group would be called upon as needed.

10 September

While the Second Bn., Eleventh Infantry, only two miles north at Dornot, was receiving a terrific pounding from heavy artillery, on the west bank of the Moselle Canal guides from Company B, Seventh Engineers, met the leading squads of Company A, First Bn., Tenth Infantry, crossed the canal footbridges, and reached the river crossing site at approximately 0035. The infantry company, having pre-viously been divided into twenty assault boat parties, was to wait with assigned engineer crews, but the engineers were not yet ready. It was 0115 before loading began. As the boats pushed out into the water, German outposts along the far bank fired a few scattered rifle rounds, but caused no casualties and no delays. On the far shore the company commander, Captain Elias R. Vick, Jr., reorganized his men, and by 0200 they were ready to move out. In the meantime, the engineers returned to the west bank and began crossing the men of Company C. By the time Company A had finished reorganizing, two platoons of Company C were across the river. No artillery was called for as the surprise was considered to be complete.

First Lt. Ralph R. Cupelli, Company C, a graduate of Pennsylvania State Uni-versity from Point Marion, Pennsylvania, recalls:

The march from Chambley [to Arnaville] was long and we had had very little sleep before the start. I remember going into the assembly area, the night of preparation, a briefing by Captain Davis as to the situation, and the general uneasiness felt in the company. . . .

The approach to the river was quiet. We waited as A Company boarded the assault craft and crossed the river. Their crossing, to the best of my recollection, was


undetected. It's unclear whether part of C Company crossed undetected, but when the engineers were returning, my platoon was next to embark, all hell broke l oose -flares, machine gun tracers, and artillery. But only the artillery was effective as it came down in or near the embarkation area. When the engineers returned, they started to take cover. I ordered them to get back and get us across. We got across. At the time it was safer on the east bank.

We were held up in a field due to machine gun fire that pinned down A Com-pany.*

Company A's movement across the flat tableland toward the north-south Metz highway and Voisage Farm brought the Germans to life. Machine guns raked the bottom land and the crossing site, and mortars began to find the range. Although a red signal flare went up, German artillery reaction was slow; it was not until daybreak that the first artillery concentrations began to fall. This delay was probably due to poor communications—brought about by shortages in personnel and equipment—so poor that sometimes it took several hours for a message from troops in the Moselle valley to reach headquarters in Metz.

The Second and Third Platoons of Company A advanced in the face of inac-curate machine gun fire to the north-south highway. Here, more accurate fire from a machine gun at the Voisage Farm crossroads enfiladed the road and pinned the men in the ditches on either side. When 2d Lt. Karl Greenberg, the leader of the Second Platoon, made his way toward the crossroads to locate the German gun, he was wounded. The company commander, Captain Vick, moved to the high-way in an attempt to get the assault platoon in motion again and was also hit by machine gun fire. He died of his wounds before he could be evacuated.

Back at the crossing site, darkness and German fire created confusion. Ready to cross with his two remaining platoons, the Company C commander, Captain William B. Davis, could find engineer crews for only six of the assault boats. While he was searching for additional boats, the executive officer of Company D, 1st Lt. Francis L. Carr, took part of his men across, his own troops manning the boats.

Lt. Charles S. Holtz, a recent Company D replacement and a former ROTC officer from the Kansas State University class of 1943, crossed with the mortar pla-toon. As the platoon crossed, German machine gun fire cracked over the men's heads. The German machine guns had such a high cyclical rate of fire that it sounded to Lt. Holtz like a rattlesnake, and the air was so thick with tracers that he felt he could have reached up and caught a helmet full of bullets. The rowers on Holtz's side of the assault boat were evidently so scared they were paddling like mad while those on the other side of the boat were so scared they could not row. As a result, the boat started to circle in the middle of the river. Holtz attempted to compensate by not rowing; that and the current seemed to equalize the boat, and it headed again for the far shore.

When the boats were returned to the west bank, Captain Davis followed Lt. Carr's example and manned the boats with his infantrymen. Once on the far shore,

*Ralph R. Cupelli, letter, 27 October 1992.


the officers attempted to organize their troops, but the German fire had prompted the men to seek protection behind the six-foot river bank. Companies C and D became intermingled in the darkness, and before they could move out Company B was also landed. Having finally succeeded in getting reorganized, Company C pushed forward and took cover alongside a stone wall that surrounded a small orchard at the northwest corner of the Voisage Farm crossroads. The 81mm mor-tars of Company D were set up in a sunken road along the river's edge. The bat-talion commander, Major Haughey, had crossed his advance CP elements with Company C, and, while Company B waited near the river, Major Haughey and his S-2, 1st Lt. Leo E. Harris, moved up to the highway. Here they made contact with the Company A CO, 2d Lt. Warren G. Shaw, who had replaced the mortally wounded Captain Vick. With daylight fast approaching, Major Haughey was well aware that he could expect increased artillery fire to start falling and tear his bat-talion apart if it was caught on the flatland. Meanwhile, Company F, the leading element of the Second Bn., already delayed in its crossing by the First Bn.'s late start, had crossed the river and come up behind Company A. Its commander, Cap-tain Eugene M. Witt, was impatient to get off the tableland and onto the objec-tive before daylight and wanted to push through Company A.

While Company A and C were stalled, they returned fire at the German machine gun positions, making generous use of rifle grenades and 60mm mortars. The First Bn.'s artillery observer, 1st Lt. George Dutko, utilizing previously regis-tered check concentrations, secured 199 rounds of artillery fire, one concentration of which wiped out the crew of a 75mm antitank gun at a gooseneck curve in the Voisage Farm-Arry road.

Sending his S-2, Lt. Harris, to quickly reconnoiter the most favorable route to the top of Hill 386, Major Haughey readied Companies A and C for a com-bined assault. When Lt. Harris found what he believed to be an avenue of approach, his response was immediate. Assembling one nearby platoon each of Companies A and C in the growing light, Harris led a dash past Voisage Farm and up the hill. When the platoons jumped off, they met little fire of any sort, but the distance and ascent were too great to permit a rapid pace all the way to the crest. The men paused at the western edge of the woods to catch their breath and reorganize and were joined by the Second Platoon of Company C. This platoon was led by 1st Lt. Isaac Howard Storey, an easygoing Georgia native, who had received his train-ing in ROTC while attending the University of Georgia from which he had grad-uated in December 1942.

Since the remainder of Company A had not moved up, Captain Witt directed his Company F to pass through. Streaming through a gap in a low wall east of the road, the leading platoon under 1st Lt. Andrew H. Paulishen was stopped tem-porarily by fire from two German machine guns. The GIs unleashed a barrage of hand grenades, dispatching the gun crews, and then continued their advance. Fol-lowing the trail that led east up the Voisage Farm draw, Company F turned north upon coming abreast of Hill 369, its first objective. The remainder of Company A, having at last begun to move, had followed Company F, but turned to the south through the woods to reach the crest of Hill 386.


To the southeast, on the reverse slope of Hill 386, Lt Harris, with one pla-toon of Company A and two from Company C, completed reorganization and began moving toward the crest. Except for a small force of Germans, which was quickly dispatched, the GIs' advance to the crest was virtually unimpeded. At approximately the same time, S.Sgt. William J. Stone of Company D arrived at the crest from the north with a section of heavy machine guns. Having followed closely behind Company F until turning north to Hill 369, the machine gun sec-tion chased a small German force from the northern end of the crest. The men then began digging in their weapons. Closely behind them came 1st Lt. Robert B. Guy, also of Company D, and Lt. Dutko, the artillery observer, who began to reconnoiter for machine gun and mortar positions and observation posts. The remainder of Company C soon joined its two leading platoons and began to dig in on the exposed southern nose of the hill, overlooking Arry to the southwest. The remainder of Company A, disorganized after the fight at the highway and the climb through the woods, moved into position on the left near Sgt. Stone's machine guns, but no contact was made with the Second Bn. to the north. Company D's 81mm mortars were set up in support to the left rear.

By 0720 on 10 September the leading companies of the First and Second Bns. were east of the river and astride the initial regimental objective. Detailed maps of the area showed a partially wooded ridge line about a thousand yards from the river, running north from Hill 386, which rose in the midst of the Bois des Anneaux. Since no map sheets were on hand for the area east of this ridge line it was designated as an objective without knowledge of the fact that Hill 386, instead of being the key feature in the area, was commanded by Hill 396, a thousand yards further to the east.

Shortly before 0830, Company B, still coming up from the river bottom, had passed the Voisage Farm crossroads when members of its Third Platoon, bring-ing up the rear, caught sight of a German tank approaching from the north along the Metz highway. Taking cover, the platoon's bazooka team prepared to fire as the tank advanced to the crossroads and halted. The bazooka team attempted to fire, but its rocket did not discharge. However, the tank commander opened the tur-ret and the Third Platoon guide shot him in the shoulder. Buttoning up quickly, the tank fired two rounds over the heads of the platoon. Just at that moment a German artillery concentration fell near the crossroads, and the tank sped back north in the direction of the town of Corny. Meanwhile, Company B's First Pla-toon, seeing a Mark V Panther tank advancing from the outskirts of Arry, took cover in abandoned foxholes along the Arry road, but the Panther pulled back into the town without firing. The platoon, followed by the rest of the company, then continued up the slope of Hill 386. A short while later the men saw the Panther return, run over the foxholes where the First Platoon had been hiding, and retreat once more into Arry. By 1000, Company B had taken positions running from the right flank of Company C atop the southern crest of Hill 386 down the slope to an orchard not far from the edge of town. A patrol of one squad from the Third Platoon, sent to investigate Arry, returned with the report that at least one pla-toon of German tanks and some infantry occupied the town.


Meanwhile, the men of Company C were in the midst of digging in at their position on the exposed southern nose of Hill 386 at about 0830 when a platoon of German infantry appeared to their right front, evidently having emerged from Arry. As the German platoon began to move in, Pfc. Wilbur H. Dodson, a light machine gunner on the right flank with the First Platoon, opened fire, eliminat-ing most of the Germans before he himself was killed. This ended the first attempt by the Germans to recover the hilltop.

Although German mortar fire continued to fall around the crossing site after the First Bn.'s crossing, Company F, leading the Second Bn., had begun its move in assault boats at 0430, only slightly behind schedule. The assault boats were manned by Company B, 204th Engineers. Closing up behind Company A where it was stalled along the Metz highway, Captain Witt, Company F CO, finally passed his company through just at daybreak. The unit moved up the Voisage Farm draw until it was opposite Hill 369 and then turned north toward its objec-tives. Three fourths of the way up the hill, Lt. Paulishen's lead platoon had a brief engagement, using bayonets and grenades against a small force of entrenched Ger-man infantry, but otherwise the movement was uncontested. Passing initially along the forward edge of the Bois de Gaumont on Hill 369 and then just east of a trail on the crest of the ridge line, the company advanced quickly to Hill 370 and then continued north toward Hill 325. Finding Hill 325 to be a bare, exposed knob, Captain Witt halted his company, and the men began to dig in along the eastern and northwestern edges of the woods where they had unrestricted fields of fire against Hill 325.

Close behind the leading company came the men of Company G, their advance also uncontested. The men began to dig in across the eastern and southeastern brow of Hill 370 under cover of the woods. The company's left flank was at a "jagged clearing" in the woods on the southern nose of Hill 370 and its right flank on the southern slope of Hill 369, the company front thus extending almost a thousand yards. Because of the distance to be covered the company was forced to spread its line of foxholes thin; even the closest were more than ten yards apart.

When the GIs of Company E came forward behind Company G, the com-pany's Third Platoon was moved into the gap caused by the jagged clearing between the two companies. Two squads of the Second Platoon went through the woods along the left rear to check for German stragglers and then dug in to the left rear of Company F's left flank. The remainder of Company E was held in reserve on the reverse slope of Hill 370. One platoon of heavy machine guns of Company H was emplaced with Company F's left flank (to the northwest); another was with Company G's left flank at the jagged clearing. The weapons company's 81mm mor-tars were set up within the part of the clearing extending to the reverse slope of Hill 370.

By 0800 on 10 September the troops of the First and Second Bns. were on top of the two hills, 386 in the Bois D'Arry and 370 in the Bois de Gaumont, and were consolidating and digging in to repel expected counterattacks. Artillery For-ward Observers (FOs) registered defensive fire concentrations. Major Haughey moved his advance battalion CP up with the rifle companies as did Major Simpson's


(Second Bn. CP), digging in on the wooded portion of the reverse slope. Even as the infantrymen were digging in, German artillery fire was falling with increasing intensity.

Throughout the day, German action against the Second Bn. was confined to scattered and occasional mortar and artillery fire until just at dusk when a platoon of German panzers passed across the bald crest of Hill 325, apparently conduct-ing a reconnaissance. Men of the Second Bn. held back from firing their bazookas, but some opened up with small arms. When artillery concentrations were called down, the German tanks withdrew.

The Tenth Infantry Antitank Company under Lt. Frank Vinson had taken over the job of ferrying across men, materiel, jeeps, 57mm antitank guns, and two-and-a-half-ton kitchen trucks on rafts. At 0600, the smoke generators were started, the prevailing winds carrying the smoke over the crossing site. The site was busy with troops, supplies, and ammunition crossing the river to the east and the evacuation of wounded by assault boats and rafts going west. Although Ger-man artillery fire did fall around the crossing site, the crossing appeared to be unobserved.

At about 1000 hours a sudden shift in wind direction from west to north-east sent the smoke away from the crossing. The screen rapidly dissipated, expos-ing the area. German artillerymen took immediate advantage of the opportunity to blast the area with all the artillery they could bring to bear, emphasizing, accord-ing to chemical officers, the protection afforded by the screen and the necessity for reestablishing it.

Some of the shell fire was directed at the Eighty-fourth Chemical Company's positions causing some of the inexperienced crews to abandon their generators. An immediate reconnaissance was conducted to identify new generator positions. The new location, Position 2, was only a few yards from the river and behind the six to eight feet high abandoned railroad embankment. A number of men under 2d Lt. Frank W. Young moved four generators forward and set them up under heavy artillery fire at this new site. Screening smoke was started again before noon.

Since the smoke company's executive officer, 1st Lt. George R. Lamb, hap-pened to be across the river reconnoitering for additional positions, the Eighty-fourth's 1st Sergeant rounded up some of his men and organized details for mov-ing spare generators and oil to Position 2. Inadequately prepared for combat operations and without a company commander to lead the way, many of the chem-ical troops took up positions "only after considerable persuasion." Lt. Lamb was then given command of the company, and the 1103d Engineer Combat Group's commander was given specific control over smoke operations while the Fifth Divi-sion's chemical officer was to continue providing technical supervision.

Throughout the afternoon of 10 September the smoke screen was maintained by the four generators at Position 2, augmented by smoke pots to conceal the gen-erators themselves. Meanwhile, preparations were made for establishing additional positions. Position 3 was set up late in the afternoon along the railroad embank-ment beside the Arnaville-Noveant road just north of Arnaville. To test the feasibility of night operations in the event of a German air attack, screening


continued through the night of 10 to 11 September at Positions 2 and 3. The smoke hung low to the ground and hid the crossing site from observation by moonlight. Because no night air attack developed, further night operations were considered unnecessary. Before daylight (11 September) eight generators and crews were fer-ried across the river to occupy Position 4, almost directly across the Moselle from Position 3, on the flatlands some 150 yards from the river. Also on 11 September, Position 5, between the canal and the river, south of the crossing site, and Posi-tion 6, between the railroad and the hill south of Arnaville, were established. They were not put into operation but were kept in readiness for use if needed. One gen-erator was also mounted on a truck to move up and down the Arnaville-Noveant road on the west bank in order to cover any gaps in the screen.

At approximately 1230 on 10 September, while men of the First Bn. were still preparing their defensive positions in the rocky soil of Hill 386, shells from Ger-man tanks began to burst in the fir trees above Company C's CP at the southern edge of the woods. The command group, on the flank closest to Arry, was badly hit; the radio operator was killed and the company commander, Captain Davis, was wounded in both legs. Three Tiger tanks (possibly Mark V Panthers) soon appeared on the bare southern slope of the hill from the direction of Arry. These

Crossing the Moselle i t Arnaville

11-14 S e p t e m b e r 1944


were soon followed by two other tanks. This platoon-strength group of panzers moved diagonally across the front of Company C's right platoon (the First), firing as they went. The First Platoon's bazooka team opened fire but without success, its rockets bouncing off the heavy armor. The tanks pushed on, closing to within a hundred yards of the foxhole line. Exposed in their shallow holes, the men were ordered by 1st Lt. Carl E. Hansen, First Platoon, and Lt. Storey, Second Platoon, to fall back to the tree line.

Once the troops reached the woods, tree bursts from the tank guns caused even heavier casualties and created confusion, with many men continuing on down the rear slope. The wounded company commander, Captain Davis, remained in action, using his radio to continue directing artillery and mortar support, then managed to move downhill to his company post and gave orders for troop dispo-sitions in order to meet the attack, which had already broken through and over-run some positions. His actions inspired the company, and the attack was beaten back with heavy casualties on both sides although just before the attack was turned back, the company ran out of bazooka ammunition and rifle grenades and had four bazookas knocked out. Captain Davis refused evacuation until he finally col-lapsed. Tragically, he was decapitated by a rifle grenade as he lay on the ground waiting to be evacuated.

Although no German infantry was seen, some of the GIs noted that the lead tank commander opened his turret hatch during the assault and waved, as if to signal supporting infantry to move forward. The German tanker commander, momentarily exposed, was shot by an automatic rifle team. By this time support-ing mortar and artillery fire was falling on the area. If infantrymen were sched-uled to follow in the wake of the panzers, they did not appear.

In the meantime two more German tanks emerged from Arry and advanced toward the Company B positions along the Arry-Voisage Farm road. It appeared to some that these panzers, in conjunction with those previously observed, were operating in an effort to bring about a double envelopment of the First Bn. on Hill 386.

German shell-fire, an estimated seventy-five rounds, caused heavy casualties in Company B's Third Platoon and command group and a breakthrough threat-ened. When the German tanks broke through the infantry line and headed toward the positions of the company's 81mm mortar, T.Sgt. Walter E. Jenski of Company B ran down a narrow road right alongside one of the tanks firing rifle grenades at the treads. When that effort failed, he tossed a hand grenade at the turret. Despite his failure to knock out the tank, the tenacity of the men of Company B's First and Second Platoons prompted the two tanks to pull back into Arry, and a fur-ther breakthrough was averted.

During the counterattack Sgt. Angelo Speggen of Company D observed a Ger-man squad of nine Landsers (infantry) attempting a flanking movement on the com-pany's position. Speggen waited until the Germans were almost on him, then killed the nine with bursts from his machine gun. Pfc. John Yezzi, in another machine gun squad, was riddling the ranks of counterattacking Germans who advanced firing their machine pistols and rifle grenades even as they yelled "Kamerad" in an obvious ruse.


"Kamerad, hell!" shouted Pfc. Yezzi to his squad, "pass me another belt of ammo!"*

Cpl. Russell D. Brugler knocked out a tank with five bazooka rounds. Pfc. John Greentree hit a tank with three rounds of bazooka ammunition but failed to put it out of action. Undaunted, he killed the German infantrymen following the tank with his Ml rifle and kept the tank buttoned up until it retired.

Although Company C had suffered heavily and was disorganized, the Ger-man tanks on the hill pushed no farther forward, moving instead across the front of the battalion to a position facing Company A. The men of Company A were careful to take advantage of the concealment offered by the woods in their area, and the German panzers soon ceased firing but remained just outside effective bazooka range in front of Company As positions. Meanwhile, Company C was busy trying to reorganize. Company C's executive officer, 1st Lt. Eugene N. Dille, having assumed command after the company commander's (Captain Davis) death, sent one squad back to the original positions as outposts and observers. A second squad was sent to regain contact with Company B and a third to guard the com-pany CP. A soft-spoken man, Lt. Dille searched the reverse slope for any stray mem-bers of the company. Learning that many of the men had retreated all the way to Voisage Farm, he eventually succeeded in locating about eighty men and sent them back to their former positions.

The reoccupation of the open slope prompted the German panzers once more to action. As before, the GIs had little protection on the exposed nose of the hill. But, as if out of a Hollywood movie, American P-47s suddenly entered the bat-tle. They bombed and strafed the tanks, coming dangerously close to the foxhole line. One bomb appeared to bounce as it hit the ground and skidded to within a few yards of a group of Company A men, but did not explode. In the face of the "Jabos" the German panzers at last withdrew.

The intervention by the P-47s, part of the XIX Tactical Air Command, was the first positive response to numerous requests for air support. On 9 September the Ninth Air Force had planned to limit air support since the XX Corps attack was supposed to be "adequately" supported by artillery. But that evening reports of a steadily worsening situation had reached the G-3 air officer at Twelfth Army Group HQ. He had therefore authorized the release of as many fighter-bombers from the day's primary target, the French port of Brest in Brittany, as the com-mander of the XIX TAC deemed necessary for adequate bridgehead support. Although the XIX TAC still had many responsibilities—bombing at Brest, sup-porting the attack of the XII Corps at Nancy, protecting the Third Army's exposed southern flank, and flying cover for heavy bombers over Germany—the required P-47s were made available. The planes that arrived at this opportune moment on 10 September over Arry were from the 406th Fighter-Bomber Group and had been vectored from a ground support mission in the Nancy area. They claimed fifteen enemy tanks destroyed—a very "optimistic" number. Besides assisting the First

*"The Fifth Infantry Division in the ETO," 1945; The Fifth Division Historical Section.


Bn. to repel the tanks, the planes bombed and strafed the German assembly area at Arry, leaving much of the town in flames.

American pilots also supported ground operations by striking at targets on the roads leading into the bridgehead area, seven or eight kilometers to the south and east, strafing motor columns and destroying a convoy of fifteen gasoline trucks.

Lt. Cupelli explains:

Not long after the German tank attack out of Arry, I got back to the platoon as we were taking moderate fire. My platoon suffered more casualties.

A little later, four officers located me in the company area—Lt. Hensen (C Com-pany), Lt. Storey (C Company), Lt. Dutko (Forty-sixth Army FO), and another FO who was attached to the unit. They had sought me out and recommended we withdraw since they felt we could no longer hold it. It was put to me to make the decision since I was the senior officer [present]. They pointed out control was lost, the company commanders were killed, and the counterattacks and the heavy casu-alties we were taking made the situation untenable. I would not give the order to withdraw—not that I was optimistic about the situation. It was about this time that Lt. Dille, who had taken over as CO, appeared and I told him what they proposed. He was emphatically opposed. This incident may have possibly saved the crossing. The image of the remains of Companies A and C streaming off the hill and its effect would have been too much on the rest of the battalion.*

Reports of the seriousness of the panzer counterattack against the First Bn. had reached the Tenth Infantry CO, Colonel Bell, by about 1335 on 10 Septem-ber. He ordered his Third Bn., still in position astride the west-bank hills flank-ing Arnaville, to leave Companies L and M in place and prepare to cross Com-panies I and K with orders to capture Arry.

While these preparations were under way, the First Bn. set about reorganiz-ing its lines. The Company A executive officer, 1st Lt. William H. Hallowell, who had been on the west bank organizing supplies, was sent forward to take com-mand of Company A, which Lt. Shaw had been commanding since the original company commander's death (Captain Vick). Collecting some sixty men of Com-pany A from where they had taken cover on the reverse slope, Lt. Hallowell moved to his company's positions on the battalion's left. The Second Platoon was placed on the right, the First Platoon in the center, and the Third on the left flank, ech-eloned to the left rear to protect the battalion's left flank as well as the heavy machine guns and mortars of Company D. The battalion commander, Major Haughey, then ordered Company B to move from its right-flank positions facing Arry and to take over Company C's sector. This time the area designated took advantage of concealment in the woods. Company C was then assembled at the western edge of the woods on the reverse slope and prepared to follow the Third Bn. into Arry after its capture. Its mission was to establish road blocks with a pla-toon of antitank guns, which were to be ferried across the river after dark. Despite the havoc caused initially by the German's counterattack at noon, the First Bn.

*Ralph R. Cupelli, Letter, 27 October 1992.


had given up only the most untenable positions on the bare southern nose of Hill 386.

The Germans launched no more counterattacks against Hill 386 during the afternoon, but shelling and long-range machine gun fire harassed the men there for the rest of the day. However, another counterattack was attempted soon after the First Bn. action when both tanks and infantry moved south from Corny, a move calculated to cut off the bridgehead at its base. Artillery observers and tank destroyer crews took advantage of their observation posts on the west-bank hills as the Tenth's mortars, cannons and supporting tank destroyers on the west side of the river knocked out three German tanks, after which the German force fell back to Corny.

Throughout the first three days of the bridgehead battle, the supporting field artillery and TDs received firing data from the forward companies through both forward observer and infantry radios that were in direct communication with a regimental field set situated atop the regimental CP at a schoolhouse in Vande-lainville. An operator at the regimental set relayed the information by telephone to the CP where the Forty-sixth FA Bn. commander, Colonel Johnson, was con-stantly on duty. The regimental CO felt that any failure to get artillery fire at a needed moment could result in the bridgehead being wiped out.

In the Dornot bridgehead action, the Americans had experienced the initial good fortune of attacking on the boundary line between two German battalions. In the Arnaville action that initial good fortune had been even greater: the bound-ary between the German XIII SS Infantrie Korps (SS Lt. Gen. Hermann Priess) on the north and the XLVII Panzer Korps on the south ran just north of the Voisage Farm. This line also divided the 282d Infantry Battalion, attached to Division No. 462 (this rather unusual division designation was to have been temporary as the unit was to eventually become a volksgrenadier division) and assigned to the area north of the crossing site, and the Eighth Panzergrenadier Regiment, a unit of the Third Panzergrenadier Division, south of the boundary. The infantry battalion was charged with the defense of the Cote de Faye and the panzer grenadiers with the defense of Voisage Farm, Arry, and Hill 386. The counterattack against Hill 386 had been launched by elements of the Eighth Panzergrenadier Regt., sup-ported by attached tanks.

On the American side, litter carriers and ammunition carriers were per-forming miracles carrying wounded men and materiel one and one-half miles back to the river. Already difficult because of the natural obstacles, this task was made even more hazardous by the heavy shelling from the 105mm and 150mm guns at Fort Driant, Fort St. Blaine, and Fort Sommy over the 500-yard stretch of flatland before the river. Counterbattery fire against the forts was useless, as later inspec-tion of the forts showed that the only weapon that had any effect against the steel-reinforced concrete forts was a direct hit by a 2,000-pound bomb. Shells from American 105-, 155-, and 240-millimeter howitzers and 8-inch (203mm) guns had no effect. In addition, batteries of emplaced artillery and scattered 88s kept peppering the terrain held by the Tenth Infantry.

Medic Milton Bartelt, attached to Company G, Second Bn., Tenth Infantry,


crossed the Moselle carrying a litter. Bartelt, along with several other GIs, took cover in a culvert during a period of heavy shelling. At age 22, Medic Bartelt con-sidered himself to be just a kid. The shelling grew so close and became so intense that Bartelt started crying. The battalion chaplain was present, and together with some of the other soldiers, he soon broke the tension and had everyone laughing.*

The work of the engineers bridging the river had been disrupted by constant shelling. Some aid was provided when troops of the Tenth's AT Company took over the task of operating the river ferries. During the night German patrols infiltrated to the river, attacking and harassing the American carrying parties. Fer-rying operations were accomplished under constant artillery fire. Evacuation of casualties had continued all through the day despite the German fire, and by dark 142 dead and wounded had been removed from the bridgehead—this, however, represented only a part of the day's losses. German shelling of Arnaville contin-ued to be heavy throughout the night of 10 to 11 September causing delays in bridge construction. At the time, the ferrying rafts and assault boats were the only means of getting across the river.

The regiment's service company carried the ammunition and supplies down to the river bank where the men of the AT Company ferried the goods across and returned with casualties. When the rifle companies clamored for more bazookas, Regimental Headquarters Company personnel not involved in maintaining com-munications or operations were able to locate and requisition forty-nine of the desperately needed rocket launchers.

Communications personnel continued to service the phone lines through-out the artillery barrages. In order to facilitate communications with the east bank where radios were of little use because of the high hills, a division switch board was set up near the river. Nineteen lines were run across the river; however, due to artillery fire, at one point all but one of the lines was put out of action—an indication of the intensity of the artillery fire.

On the first day of the crossing, S.Sgt. James O'Connell, Company B, Tenth Infantry, seeking a site to get his jeep across the Moselle Canal, asked a French girl for help. Pointing to a spot in the canal, she beckoned the sergeant to follow, raised her skirts, and waded into the water. The water was shallow, and the sergeant found that he could cross on what he described as a "submerged concrete bridge." In this manner kitchen trucks also crossed the canal and were ferried across the river late on the next day, 11 September, thus providing at least one hot meal a day to troops in the bridgehead. However, carrying parties often found it too danger-ous to take the time to obtain the food, and the men often were forced to be satisfied with K rations.

After dark, men in the outpost line of the Second Bn. heard tracked vehicles moving in front of them and patrols found that German tanks had pulled up to within 150 yards of the battalion, directly to Company F's front. The attitude of the German tank crews was self-confident to the point of cockiness. They taunted

*Milton Bartelt, Letter, 29 September 1992.


the Americans, trying to get them to disclose their positions. The Germans sat on top of their tanks smoking, laughing, and talking loudly, evidently either unaware of the nearest of the GIs or sure that they had the Americans at their mercy.

The GIs of the Tenth Infantry were nearing the end of their physical strength. They had left their bivouac at the village of Chambley twenty-four hours before, trekked twenty miles, crossed the Moselle, fought uphill, and absorbed shellings and counterattacks all day, and then got no sleep during the night. They lay awake in their foxholes awaiting the imminent counterattack. Their misery was made worse when rain started to fall and then turned to a pelting sleet. The combina-tion of the steep slope and muddy ground prevented the 57mm guns from get-ting forward in the area of the Second Bn. The men were running low on bazooka ammunition, but there was plenty of rifle ammunition as well as hand and rifle grenades.

11 September

In accordance with Colonel Bell's orders, at 1335 hours, 11 September, the Third Bn. commander, Major Alden P. Shipley, left Companies L and M in defen-sive positions on the west bank and moved Companies I and K to the river, cross-ing at about 1735 at the same site as the other two battalions. The infantrymen took with them extra ammunition and bazookas and deposited them on the east bank to establish a bridgehead stockpile.

After crossing the river Company K was placed to the left of the Voisage Farm-Arry road and Company I on the right. They advanced past the former Company B positions facing Arry and stopped briefly on the outskirts while P-47s and artillery bombarded the objective. Then the rifle companies continued on virtually unresisted, rooting the Germans from houses and cellars where they had sought cover from the bombardment. The Americans fired antitank grenades at three German tanks that were seen fleeing east toward Lorry, but the grenades bounced off the armor and the tanks escaped. Bazooka teams engaged four more, knocking out two Mark IV tanks and driving off another pair. The town was cleared by 2130, but the regimental commander, Colonel Bell, ordered Compa-nies I and K to pull back to Voisage Farm, feeling that the Tenth Infantry's lines were overextended. With an open flank at Corny and a dangerous opening between Hills 369 and 386, a bridgehead reserve was needed. Returning to Voisage Farm, the companies dug in and covered their foxholes with tree branches.

Colonel Bell directed Lt. Dille of Company C to hold Arry after its capture; the company was to establish road blocks. However, a break in the occupation of the town was caused either by the premature withdrawal of Companies I and K or by Company C's late arrival. Before moving out, the company discovered that it had only about 60 men of the 209 who had originally crossed. In any event, it was 0300 on 12 September when Company C headed toward Arry.

Advancing in a column, the company was led off by the Third Platoon and its leader, Lt. Ralph Cupelli. The depleted company moved down the main road


into the town. Lt. Cupelli and his platoon sergeant, T.Sgt. Robert M. Johnson, were taking the lead. Silhouetted against the burning town, Lt. Cupelli spotted two figures approaching them. Believing that they might be members of compa-nies I or K, Cupelli called out to them, asking if they were Americans. The figures did not respond but kept advancing. Cupelli stopped the company as Lt. Dille came forward to find out what was going on. Cupelli pointed out the two approach-ing figures.

The three Americans—Cupelli, Dille, and Johnson—took up a position to the left of the road, alongside or in the ditch. Sgt. Johnson had taken up a prone position on the right berm of the ditch; Lt. Dille was kneeling in the ditch to John-son's left, and Lt. Cupelli was to Dille's left on the ditch's left berm, also in a prone firing position. Suddenly, recognizing the outline of the helmets of the two figures as German, the three Americans simultaneously opened fire, Lts. Dille and Cupelli with their Ml carbines and Sgt. Johnson with his Ml rifle. With the three of them firing it was hard to tell who hit the lead German; however, Cupelli's carbine jammed after five or six rounds. Cupelli recalled that the German did not die instantly but went down with a scream as he caught the brunt of the fire. The trailing German quickly returned fire letting loose a burst from the burp gun he carried, the gun characteristically climbing to the right. As Lt. Dille was standing in the ditch with Lt. Cupelli on an embankment to his left, the burst of fire cut across Lt. Dille, killing him instantly, and wounding Lt Cupelli in the hand. Although Sgt. Johnson dropped the German before he could fire another burst, it was obvious that the Germans had reoccupied the town after the Third Bn.'s depar-ture.

The wounded Lt. Cupelli went back down the line, the company being in column along the road, and sought out Lts. Storey and Hensen. Cupelli told them what had happened, and, realizing Lt. Hensen could not properly handle the job, told Storey to take command (the fourth man to do so in a little over twenty-four hours). Cupelli instructed Storey, the Second Platoon's leader, not to go into the town, but to block the road and to inform the battalion of the situation. Lt. Cupelli then proceeded to the aid station at Voisage Farm to have his hand attended to. The wound was serious enough to eventually require his evacuation.

Shell fire scattered the company, but upon reaching the fields to the north Lt. Storey managed to restore order. He then moved the men back to the north-ern edge of the village, where they began digging in. At 0430 on September 12 heavy artillery fire, presumed to be both American and German, blanketed the area, causing more casualties. With his handful of men further diminished, Lt. Storey wanted to withdraw. He finally established communication with his battalion com-mander, and the company was withdrawn at about 0800 to the vicinity of the First Bn. CP on the reverse slope of Hill 386. Here again the men came under intense shelling and suffered additional losses. On Lt. Storey's request, the company was moved to defensive positions on the left flank of Company A on Hill 386; the company numbered now only forty-three men.

The First Bn.'s 57mm antitank guns and its attached platoon from the reg-iment's AT Company, which had been scheduled to be part of the road block


defenses in Arry, were ferried across the river during the night. Since the antitank guns could not be moved into Arry, they were manhandled to positions on the right flank of Company B on the southwestern slope of Hill 386 where they could cover the town and the road between Voisage Farm and Arry. The two remaining companies of the Third Bn. (Companies L and M) and Major Shipley's Third Bn. HQ crossed the Moselle at approximately 1900 on 11 September. Battalion head-quarters and the heavy weapons company moved to Voisage Farm to become part of a bridgehead reserve even before Companies I and K were withdrawn from Arry to join them. Company L took up a secondary defensive position covering the potentially dangerous Voisage Farm draw between the First and Second Bns. Another platoon of 57mm guns from the AT Company went into position near the north flank of the bridgehead, covering Corny, and the Third Bn.'s antitank guns were ferried across during darkness on 11 September and dug in just south-east of Voisage Farm to cover the road south to Arry.

In the early hours of 11 September the Tenth Infantry had the only foothold the XX Corps had on the east bank of the Moselle River. East of Toul, in the zone of XII Corps, the Third Bn. of the 319th Infantry, Eightieth Infantry Division, had a small bridgehead at the tip of the Moselle tongue while the 317th and 318th Infantry were making preparations to cross at Dieulouard to the south of Arnav-ille. South of Nancy assault units of the Thirty-fifth Infantry Division and the Fourth Armored Division were forming for a predawn crossing attempt between Crévéchamps and Bayon. However, there was still no bridge to the east bank at Arnaville and the force in the bridgehead was not considered adequate to expand the lodgment.

During the night of 10 to 11 September General Irwin had given orders that a bridge be put across the Moselle before morning "at all costs." However, there was still no bridge in position when daylight came. East of Arnaville the Moselle had a width of about eighty yards and a swift current. Bridging was further com-plicated by mud and marshes on both banks, by the canal paralleling the river on the west, and by an east-west tributary of the Moselle that passed through Arnav-ille and bisected the Fifth Division's zone. The engineers had to cross the tribu-tary, the canal, and a wide area of swampland before bridging equipment could be brought up to the main channel of the Moselle—and all the time they were under constant fire. Furthermore, the river was too low in September to float a heavy pontoon bridge. One solution was to lay sections of treadway bridging mate-rial on the soft river bottom at a ford just north of the point where the canal and the main river channel separated. This fording site was ready at about 1100 on 11 September, but the stream was too shallow for vehicles to drive across, and the troops had to dismount to cross.

Previously, at about noon on 10 September, General Irwin had formulated plans for evacuating the Eleventh Infantry's Dornot bridgehead during the night. In the meantime the Third Bn., Eleventh Infantry, under Major William H. Bird-song was ordered to cross the Moselle east of Novéant and to expand the perime-ter held by the Tenth Infantry. The Eleventh was brought in on the left flank of the Tenth in hopes of stabilizing the bridgehead by seizing Corny, which the


Germans were using as a staging ground to launch sallies into the American left flank. However, the Third Bn. was badly depleted: Company K was already a part of the hard-pressed Dornot bridgehead, and Company I was heavily engaged sup-porting the Dornot crossing from the west bank. Even if the battalion were to wait until after the evacuation of the Dornot bridgehead, Companies I and K would not be able to join the new crossing for some time because the GIs of both com-panies were diminished and fatigued from the intense fighting at Dornot. Thus,

German Counterattack at Arnaville

II September 1944


to strengthen the Third Bn., companies B and C of the Second Bn., Eleventh Infantry , were a t t ached .

Since the bridgehead was already congested by the arrival of the Third Bn., Tenth Infantry, and the regiment's supporting units, Major Birdsong's battalion was ordered to reconnoiter for another crossing site. With his reconnaissance party Birdsong crossed the Moselle Canal just southeast of Novéant on the debris of a footbridge. Finding the terrain between the canal and the river to be wooded and informed by an engineering officer that he could construct a footbridge across the canal in time for the crossing, Major Birdsong selected what appeared to be a good crossing site. Arrangements were made with the Tenth Infantry for ferrying the battalion's antitank platoon, the attached Second Platoon from AT Company, Eleventh Infantry, and radio and litter jeeps. They were directed to join their par-ent battalion in the vicinity of Voisage Farm. Upon crossing, the Third Bn., Eleventh Infantry (companies B, C, and L, along with heavy weapons elements of Company M), was to be attached to the Tenth Infantry. The crossing was sched-uled for 0200 on 11 September.

The construction of a footbridge across the canal took longer than antici-pated, making the Third Bn.'s leading company, Company L, two hours late in getting started. The assault boats, manned by troops of the 160th Engineers, finally pushed off into the darkness as the men of Company L took a telephone with them, laying wire as they went. With Company L presumably landed on the far shore, the engineers returned to the west bank. Company B was loading when the Com-pany L CO, Captain Robert H. Williams, telephoned that his men had disem-barked only to find that they had landed on an island in the river. Neither maps nor ground reconnaissance had revealed the presence of this small, high-banked island. Since Captain Williams deemed the east bank of the river across from the island too steep and unfit for a landing, the assault boats had to be sent back to retrieve the company. With only a short period of darkness remaining, Major Bird-song secured permission to cross his battalion at the site of the Tenth Infantry's previous crossing.

While this mishap was taking place, the battalion's antitank platoon, radio, and litter jeeps and the attached Second Platoon, AT Company, Eleventh Infantry, had been ferried across the river by the Tenth Infantry at Arnaville. Although the organic AT platoon, radio, and litter jeeps waited for their battalion near Voisage Farm, the sergeant of the Second Platoon, AT Company, T.Sgt. Harry O. Chafin, believed that the unit's infantry elements had already preceded him to Corny. Moving with the 57mm guns, he and his men pushed north up the Metz high-way and, unbeknownst to them, into German-held Corny.

As the platoon neared Corny, Sgt. Chafin moved forward to reconnoiter. He returned shortly and directed the platoon to continue up the highway toward Corny. Arriving at the south edge of the town, the GIs came under fire and sought cover m a brick foundry and a garage on opposite sides of the street. The fire was so intense that Sgt. Chafin ordered the men to withdraw with their 57mm guns and prime movers. As they loaded up, "hell broke loose." Because much of the German fire seemed to come from a nearby house, the men put one gun into action, firing


several rounds into the house. This momentarily silenced the Germans. Again the GIs attempted to mount their carriers, but once more the Germans opened fire. Seeing that the situation was hopeless, Sgt. Chafin ordered his men to abandon their guns and trucks and head for the river.

One soldier, Cpl. Di Pietro, ran through the garage, out a back door, and slid down the river embankment. Working his way south using the concealment of bushes, he encountered five other men of the platoon. The group ran into Ger-mans who encircled them and tossed concussion grenades down the embankment, wounding Cpl. Di Pietro in the right leg above the knee. Soon thereafter the six were forced to surrender, and, together with two men captured earlier, were headed toward the rear. One of his companions was forced to carry the corporal on his back. Cpl. Di Pietro was taken to a frontline German hospital where his right leg was amputated.

In the quick and violent firefight most of the antitank platoon escaped, including eighteen men who swam the river, leaving behind their AT guns and eight of their comrades. Sgt. Chafin led a number of the platoon's survivors back toward the Arnaville crossing site and located the battalion. He insisted upon returning to rescue his men and guns but collapsed as the battalion advanced toward Corny.

Not until after daylight, at about 0825 on 11 September, did the leading ele-ments of the Third Bn., Eleventh Infantry, succeed in crossing at the Arnaville site. The men immediately reorganized and pushed slowly north toward Corny, Company L on the right, supporting the Second Bn., Tenth Infantry, protecting the right flank of that battalion by covering a draw, and Company B (Captain Harry Anderson commanding) on the left, its left flank on the river. They were met with occasional artillery and mortar fire.

After an advance of nearly one mile, the First and Third Platoons, Company B, made contact with the Germans and a firefight followed. All through the after-noon the Third Bn. inched its way toward Corny under the fire of the German batteries at Fort Driant, some 4,500 yards away. Company B, raking the German positions ahead of it with marching fire, advanced to the southern fringe of Corny. En route to the town a large German ammunition dump of 88mm and 20mm rounds was captured. As the attack progressed, it became evident that the German unit opposing them was considerably less fierce than the units encountered dur-ing the initial crossing. The company arrived in Corny at about 1830. The com-pany captured forty prisoners and took up positions in and around the old brick factory at the edge of town. Casualties were heavy, but the battalion had managed to reach the edge of the village and reorganized there as night came on.

Meanwhile, Company L advanced up the bush-covered northwestern side of the Cote de Faye (Hill 325) and began to dig in where the men could cover the open northwestern slopes and were in sight of the Second Bn., Tenth Infantry, to the southeast. The Eleventh Infantry's Reconnaissance Platoon, together with the Ammunition and Pioneer Platoon, established outposts on the northwestern slope of Hill 325 between companies L and B. The heavy weapons of Company D were distributed among the advance positions. In the late afternoon Company C,


Eleventh Infantry, attached to the Third Bn., crossed the river and went into a reserve position on the slope near the highway, to the left rear of Company L. The Third Bn.'s organic AT platoon with its 57mm guns went into position echeloned in depth astride the highway south of Corny. Depth in antitank defense was con-sidered essential in order to block possible avenues for tank attacks: down the highway from Corny, across the Cote de Faye, and down the northern woods line of the Bois de Gaumont.

By nightfall the Third Bn. was well dug in. The original orders to capture Corny had not been carried out after Major Birdsong discovered that German positions to the east and north would dominate defenses in the town. The Ger-mans had also blanketed the town with mines and booby traps, further discour-aging the Third Bn.'s entry.

Having made probing attacks on 10 September, which evidently disclosed the location of the First and Second Bns., Tenth Infantry, the Germans struck vio-lently against both battalions just before daylight on the morning of 11 Septem-ber. The battles to withstand these counterblows assumed great importance; given that the Arnaville bridgehead was the only foothold the XX Corps had, holding the crossing was vital.

Between about 0500 and 0530, at the first sign of light, a platoon of German panzers followed by approximately one company of infantry (some reports indi-cated them to be elements of the 115th Panzergrenadier Regt.; others thought them to be SS troops from the Seventeenth SS Panzergrenadier Division) came from the direction of the town of Vezon toward the portion of the Second Bn. lines (Cote de Faye) at the edge of the Bois de Gaumont along Hill 370. Without artillery prepa-ration but firing their main guns and machine guns as they advanced, the tanks attempted to pulverize the defenses of Company F. They then pulled off to Com-pany F's right front to provide fire support for the accompanying infantry advanc-ing behind them. With the defenders pinned to their positions by the support-ing fire, the German infantry came up close, fighting at hand-grenade throw-ing range. One enemy grenade knocked out a Company H machine gun on Com-pany F's left flank. Forward elements of Company F began to fall back some fifty yards.

The Germans were apparently unaware of their impending success, for the attack now rolled around to the front of Company G, which was attempting to turn the corner of the woods into the jagged clearing. Here the Germans set up machine guns, and for a few minutes it looked as if they might succeed in sweep-ing aside the GIs. Radio problems prevented the Americans from receiving artillery support. However, Captain Lewis R. Anderson, Company G's commander, man-aged to reach the corner of the woods and coordinated the fire of a nearby section of heavy machine guns, his riflemen, and some 81mm mortars. Anderson's efforts broke the German attack. Except for a small infantry contingent that probed up the draw on Company G's right flank, southeast of Hill 369, the counterattack was ended. The probing effort on the right flank was stopped when Company G's light machine guns annihilated a squad of attacking landsers.

Later, Medic Bartelt recalled that the GIs' position had originally been


densely covered with trees, but when they left, "you could play baseball on that hill."*

During the assault the German tanks in front of the American lines fired from a distance of 750 yards (686m), even sighting on individual infantrymen with their main guns. One small group of Germans with machine guns went into action on a small hill crest, firing on the flank of Company G and on mortar positions of Companies E and H. Captain Anderson took company headquarters' person-nel and his mortar section and attacked the machine gun position, killing the crews. A casualty report of the counterattack summarized German losses as 125 dead, 100 wounded and 15 taken prisoner.

With the counterattack broken, Company F mopped up small resistance groups and individuals who had infiltrated around the left flank while a platoon of Company E was sent forward to take position between Companies F and G. Although the line had held, the German counterattack had cost the Second Bn. 102 casualties, further reducing the battalion's already diminished manpower.

At approximately the time of the counterattack against the Second Bn., ele-ments of the Third Panzergrenadier and Seventeenth SS Panzergrenadier Divisions launched a two-pronged attack against the First Bn., Tenth Infantry, on Hill 386. On the First Bn.'s left front, some 500 yards beyond Company A's forward fox-holes, stood a group of buildings resembling barracks, which were not shown on the battalion's maps. During the first day's operations, Lt. Dutko, artillery FO, had turned the fire of heavy 240mm howitzers and 8-inch (203mm) guns on the buildings, only to find that they concealed an underground radar station and underground barracks. All the above ground structures except one were destroyed. As daylight came on 11 September, an estimated company and a half of German infantry emerged from the ruins. With artillery support on call, Company A held its fire, allowing the Germans to come in close, out of the cover of the trees and into the company's lanes of fire. Some of the Germans advanced to within twenty-five yards of the forward foxholes when Company A, its supporting artillery, and Sgt. Stone's machine guns of Company D opened fire. The raking fire quickly broke the attack; few of the Germans escaped unscathed.

While this infantry attack was being beaten back, a platoon of German tanks emerged from an orchard just east of Arry and advanced north toward the Com-pany B positions on the southern portion of Hill 386. The oncoming tanks fired directly into the defenders' foxholes. Calls for artillery brought immediate results, and the American tank destroyers on the high point west of the river also brought their guns into play. As the Germans continued to threaten, the 57mm antitank guns in positions with Company B opened fire, their first rounds knocking out one of the tanks. The AT crewmen claimed another kill but admitted it might have resulted from artillery or tank destroyer fire from across the river. The remain-ing tanks concentrated their fire against the 57mm guns, destroying one. Since the guns had not been dug in, it became nearly impossible for the crews to man them

*Milton Bartelt, Letter, 29 September 1992.


safely. But the tanks had been discouraged by the firepower encountered and with-drew to the cover offered by the houses in Arry.

The Tenth Infantry sector remained relatively quiet after the counterattacks in the early morning, due in part to the aid of the 512th Squadron, XIX TAC, which had descended on Arry and knocked out an estimated ten German tanks and assault guns.

Meanwhile, the rate of artillery fire on the river never let up. An 88mm shell struck a double pontoon raft carrying two deuce-and-a-halfs loaded with ammu-nition and nearly capsized it, leaving the raft badly tilted in midstream. Lt. Odvar Haug, the battalion motor officer, a first generation American of Norwegian par-ents, took a detail of six "volunteers" and undertook the dangerous job of trans-ferring the ammunition from the trucks to assault boats and paddling the boats to the east bank where carrying parties took it by hand and small carts to the troop positions. The unloading took five hours, all under artillery fire that shot up gey-sers of water all around the crossing site.

A private of the Second Bn. recalls the crossing:

I remember Sergeant Cox, the heavy weapons company's mess sergeant that night. How the devil he got down to the river in the first place I don't know, but he was there, inquiring when the bridge was going to be in because his men needed food and ammunition. We explained that the span wasn't in and the next thing we knew he had a row boat and he began ferrying mortar ammunition and rations across to this company. I don't mean he made just one trip, either. That beat me. There was a guy [who] could have been back peeling potatoes, in fact, he should have been. How the hell can you lose when even your cooks won't stay out of the fight.*

Later in the day German artillery fire increased in tempo; artillery observers identified a total of forty fixed German batteries and numerous roving guns, rang-ing in caliber from 88mm to 150mm, firing on the Arnaville sector. Since a large portion of the surrounding heights were still in German hands and many of the German batteries were in concrete fortifications, American counterbattery fire was not very effective. Then, too, the shortage of artillery ammunition, chronic through-out the Third Army in early September, was beginning to quiet the XX Corps artillery. On the two previous days the corps had fired about 20,000 artillery rounds per day, which had eaten heavily into its allotment and now forced a drastic cur-tailment in counterbattery and harassing fire. Despite the ammunition shortage, the thirteen field artillery battalions in position to support the Arnaville crossing on 10 and 11 September fired a total of 12,774 rounds, most of them in support of the bridgehead. Fortunately, air support was able to replace some of the artillery missions. Through the afternoon of 11 September more planes were diverted to sup-port the Fifth Division (XIX TAC flew 411 sorties on this date, about equally divided between Brest and the Moselle front), bombing and strafing Arry and Corny, break-ing up German formations as they moved up to attack positions, and by their very presence over the area periodically silencing the German batteries.

*Tenth Infantry History (Draft), July 1944-January 1945.


Despite the commanding heights held by the Germans, most of their fire against the crossing site was apparently not guided by observation, possibly because of the area smoke screen being maintained by the Eighty-fourth Chemical Com-pany. In the forward areas the German fire was definitely based on observation and caused numerous infantry casualties notwithstanding American efforts to provide overhead cover for foxholes and emplacements. Artillery observers felt that the Ger-mans here demonstrated considerably more skill than usual; the volume of fire indi-cated that they had no shortage of ammunition. The Germans usually fired sin-gle rounds of smoke or time fire to obtain a deflection correction followed by five minutes of heavy fire for effect. Although no time fire for effect was noted, many tree bursts occurred. On the third or fourth day after the crossing there seemed to be an increase in the intensity and accuracy of German artillery fire on the bridge site. The American commanders believed it was being directed from some-where near the bridges. A house to house search was conducted and three French-men (from Metz) with a German radio were discovered. The Frenchmen were exe-cuted, and the harassing fire on the bridge site stopped.

During the first two days the bridgehead was supplied primarily by the Ser-vice Company, Tenth Infantry, the Ammunition and Pioneer Platoons of the bat-talions, and the Mine Platoon of the Tenth Infantry's AT Company. The infantry claimed that these units had virtually replaced the engineers in the task of oper-ating the rafts and assault boats.

Despite heavy German fire, the engineers began their work. Not long after midnight (10 to 11 September) Company B, 204th Engineers, had placed the dou-ble treadway span across the canal at the lock and had begun work on a treadway section across the Rupt de Mad. Meanwhile, HQ Company, 204th, moved to the fording site and began to level the high riverbanks. Despite intense artillery fire, which killed two bulldozer operators, the ford was pronounced ready for vehicles at approximately 1030 on 11 September.

A technical sergeant of the Second Bn. remembers:

Of course you can say that the shelling we were getting there on the Moselle was the worst that the Germans had laid down on any troops in the ETO [European Theater of Operations] up to that time or you can point out that there were forty known enemy batteries pounding us—but that doesn't describe it. Hell couldn't be a whole lot worse. To begin with, the place was crawling with krauts. They were constantly infiltrating and staging little, isolated attacks. We were dug in on a wooded slope and the fragmentation of the tree bursts was like rain. It was almost impossi-ble to get food up to us and when it did come by way of carrying parties, hardly a man would leave his hole to eat. There was a steady stream of wounded going back down the hill like a parade that went on twenty-four hours, day and night. You did-n't wonder if you were going to be wounded or killed, you wondered when.*

As the 537th Light Pontoon Company was moving from Arnaville toward the southern canal bridge site, German artillery fire demolished the masonry span

*Tenth Infantry History (Draft), July 1944-January 1945•


across the Rupt de Mad just south of Arnaville's main street. Receiving a change in orders, the 537th began construction of a double-double Bailey bridge to replace the masonry span. Although German artillery fire continued to be heavy on Arnav-ille, only two vehicles were damaged and no personnel casualties resulted. The bridge was completed by 1500 on 11 September.

Just after 0200 (11 September) Company B, 204th Engineers, completed the small section of treadway bridge across the Rupt de Mad near the canal lock and began moving equipment and bridging materials for the erection of a treadway bridge at River Site 1. Work had been in progress for an hour, when at about dawn German artillery fire wounded several men and damaged eight pneumatic floats. Another heavy shelling almost an hour later halted work while the men took cover behind the abandoned railroad embankment. An increase in the smoke screen helped to reduce the German artillery fire and almost brought it to a halt, thus allowing work to be resumed.

It was then (at about 0900) that some unidentified engineer, evidently hop-ing to speed construction, ordered the operators of the smoke generators to cease operations. German artillery reacted almost as soon as the smoke cleared. An air compressor and a Brockway truck were damaged, and a quarter-ton truck was demolished by a direct hit. Approximately eight engineers were wounded, and six were killed. Shells continued to fall at five- to ten-minute intervals as the com-pany was withdrawn to a position of safety west of Arnaville.

The chemical officer, Colonel Cottingham, reacted quickly to the emergency, and in the name of the division commander, ordered the screen reestablished. But during this period, as during the previous day when a change in the wind had removed the screen, the Germans were given an opportunity to position their artillery pieces.

After restoration of the smoke, control of smoke operations was returned to the Fifth Division commander to be exercised through the division chemical officer. On 12 September and on subsequent days until 8 November, the Eighty-fourth Chemical Company, and later the 161st Chemical (Smoke Generator) Company, maintained smoke during daylight around the Arnaville site. Chemical company losses due to random shellfire included eight men for combat fatigue, seven wounded, and two killed. Nevertheless, the chemical troops stuck to their task. Artillery liaison planes proved effective in helping to determine the effectiveness of the screen, and at least three flights were made daily for this purpose. The con-vergence of the draw and defiles along the Moselle near Arnaville caused such vari-ance in wind conditions that often the smoke from two generators only a hun-dred yards apart drifted in opposite directions, but the dispersion of the generators after the first day, along with smoke pots and mobile generators on both banks helped to maintain the screen.

Meanwhile, American armor was anxiously awaiting an opportunity to make an entrance. The 735th Tank Bn. had been waiting in a forward assembly area west of Arnaville for completion of a bridge across the Moselle. Although the 818th Tank Destroyer Bn. had entered the action with fire support from its Company B positions atop the west bank hills flanking Arnaville, the tank destroyers were also


waiting for an opportunity to cross the river and join in the bridgehead fight. At 1030, when HQ Company, 204th Engineers, completed leveling the banks at the fording site, it seemed that American armored elements might at last join the bat-tle. The river bottom at the ford was gravel and most of the stream was not over two feet deep. Near the far shore, however, a sixty-foot channel was found where the depth was from four to four-and-a-half feet, a dangerous depth for armor. Seek-ing to lower the water level, supporting artillery units attempted to puncture a dam across the Moselle south of Ars-sur-Moselle, located north of the crossing site, while the engineers worked to lay sections of treadway bridge on the river bottom in the channel.

Even though the dam had not been broken by 1500, the First and Second Platoons of the 818th TD Bn. began to hazard the crossing. Movement was slow and exasperating. Almost every time a vehicle crossed the treadway sections on the river bottom had to be repaired. At one time German artillery fire literally blasted the treadway sections out of the water. One M10 Wolverine tank destroyer was hit and disabled by artillery fire, and by 1630 only six had crossed the Moselle. The M4 Shermans of Company B, 735th Tank Bn., next attempted the crossing. Six tanks crossed under their own power and three others, stalled in mid-stream, were towed the remaining distance.

Since artillery had failed to puncture the dam south of Ars-sur-Moselle, P-47s of the 492d Squadron, Forty-eighth Group, took a turn. They scored a hit at about 1830, blasting a big hole in the dam and lowering the water level by about seven inches at the ford. By early the next morning (12 September), the remain-der of Co B, 735th Tank Bn., and two platoons of Co B, 818th TD Bn., were able to cross the river and move into assembly areas behind Hill 369 and 370, east of the Metz highway. Although some supply and medical jeeps were ferried across, mud and steep slopes made their use impractical east of the highway, and vehicles operating on the flatlands were constantly exposed to shelling. One platoon of Can-non Company, Tenth Infantry, had originally been attached to each of the rifle battalions, but delays in ferrying operations had prompted the regimental com-mander to make other dispositions of the organic howitzers. All six guns were placed on the hill south of Arnaville where they continued to fire in support of the infantry until the bridgehead was considered secure.

As the German shells screamed in mounting crescendo, the Second Bn., Tenth Infantry, command post was hit and forced to move back 100 yards to a better, defiladed spot. A runner passing the battalion CP as it was being cleared out noticed the headquarters personnel moving back and excitedly reported to his company commander that the battalion was retreating. That company CO relayed the information to Captain Witt, commanding F Company, who had received no word from battalion headquarters about a withdrawal. Despite the grim outlook, Witt replied: "I don't give a damn what battalion is doing. I'm going to hold. I'm the senior officer here and until I get word otherwise, you hold, too."* A message from battalion a little later justified his action.

*"The Fifth Infantry Division in the ETO," 1945; The Fifth Division Historical Section.


Shelling increased in intensity and the battalion CP was hit again. Shells also pummelled the First Bn.'s sector. Shortly after midnight the Germans fired a lengthy artillery barrage on the entire bridgehead that made the previous shelling seem merely monotonous. The air screamed, the earth quaked, and tree branches were sheared and shredded by the shells as the Americans pressed against the bottom of their foxholes, checked their ammunition, and prepared to meet the next blow.

When efforts at constructing a treadway bridge across the Moselle at River Site 1 were postponed during the early morning hours of 11 September because of German shelling, the only bridge building activity in the Arnaville vicinity dur-ing the middle of the day was that of the 537th Light Pontoon Company. By 1500 the company had finished construction of the Bailey bridge across the Rupt de Mad. HQ Company, 204th Engineers, was working at the ford trying to cross tank destroyers and tanks, and Company A, 204th, was assisting Company B, Seventh Engineers, with infantry support rafts at two ferry points south and north of the original assault crossing site.

In the late afternoon work on a treadway bridge across the river was ordered resumed, this time at River Site 2. Two companies were assigned the task: Com-pany B, 160th Engineers, and the 989th Treadway Bridge Company. Both were under the supervision of the 160th Engineer Combat Bn. commander, Major Thomas L. Howard. The engineer group commander, Lt. Col. Walker, was pre-sent at the site throughout the night and until noon the next day.

Working under the concealment provided by the smoke generators and then by darkness, the engineers had completed a third of the bridge by about 2100 when German artillery again showered the area. Several engineers were wounded, and work was halted for twenty minutes in order to reorganize and test the equipment. Operations had hardly been resumed when fire began again, wounding several men. While the engineers sought cover behind the abandoned railroad embank-ment, Lt. Col. Walker sent a messenger to the Tenth Infantry CP requesting coun-terbattery fire, only to learn later that the messenger failed to locate the CP. When work was resumed after about twenty minutes, five or six shells landed some 50 yards away. While they failed to interrupt work at the site, the shells did score a direct hit on one of two engineer powerboats—the boat's operator disappearing in the blast. As an order went back for the third and last powerboat to be brought forward, the only crane at the bridge site was damaged by another shelling, again forcing the engineers to withdraw behind the embankment. Again the shelling stopped, again equipment was tested preparatory to resuming work, and again German projectiles hit the area. While the engineers waited under cover, Lt. Col. Walker personally went to the Tenth Infantry CP and requested counterbattery artillery fire. Both the Tenth Infantry CO, Colonel Bell, and his artillery officer, Colonel Johnson, could do little due to the shortage of artillery ammunition and the engineer's inability to give precise information on the location of the German batteries firing on the bridge site.

On his return to the bridge site, Lt. Col. Walker found that the German artillery was still creating havoc. At about 0200 at least one German self-propelled gun, which had run down close to the east bank of the river, fired some ten to


fifteen rounds into the embankment and the canal dike. An hour later German artillery fire was blanketing the area at frequent intervals. Deciding that it was pointless to retain the engineers at the river when there was no hope of safely using the machinery, Lt. Col. Walker ordered their withdrawal to Arnaville. He and another engineer officer remained at the site.

With engineer activities around the crossing site at a temporary halt, the hard-pressed bridgehead still lacked a means of safely crossing vehicular traffic. There was a feeling among the infantry commanders that despite the difficulties involved the engineers were not pressing their work sufficiently. On 11 September, General Irwin had noted that the engineers were "not well coordinated." The Tenth Infantry S-3 journal reported on 12 September "deficiencies by the engineers in getting the bridge ready for use." Whatever the criticisms, the two engineer companies that had been working the night of 11 to 12 September had been hit hard by the shelling. They had lost not only personnel (nearly a fourth of the two bridging companies were casualties in this single night) but also vital equipment, which was already in short supply in the Third Army. Although the engineer group commander keenly felt his responsibility to the infantry, he believed it was unwarranted to commit his personnel and equipment recklessly and thus invite a fatal disaster.

12 September

As engineering activity around the crossing site came to a halt during the early morning of 12 September, preparations begun by the Germans during the night suddenly erupted in artillery, armor, and ground action all along the line. Initial warning of German intentions surfaced when a platoon of panzers took position beyond bazooka range on Hill 325 and directed 20mm and machine gun fire against Company F at the edge of the Bois de Gaumont. While the harassment of Com-pany F continued sporadically through the night, men of Company A on Hill 386 could hear movement several hundred yards in front of them. S.Sgt. Leslie W. Griffin crawled forward of the company's lines with a telephone and directed artillery fire down on the source of the noise. The movement ceased, but tanks continued to be heard at intervals throughout the night on the Arry-Lorry road.

At about 0300 a preparatory mortar and artillery barrage began in front of both the First and Second Bn.'s lines. Moving forward in hundred-yard jumps, the barrage rolled up the hill and over the crest into the positions of the reserve infantry, subjecting the defenders to the heaviest fire they had yet encountered in the bridgehead. Close behind the barrage came panzer grenadiers of the Seven-teenth SS, Third and Fifteenth Panzergrenadier Divisions. The first counterattack, a well-coordinated night attack, hit Company A on Hill 386 at approximately 0330. When the company heard the Germans forming up some one hundred yards in front of its lines, Lt. Dutko, the artillery FO, called for fire. Although the artillery cut into the rear of the attackers, causing some disorganization, the attack had already moved in under this fire, striking primarily against the positions of the First Platoon at the company's center. Stationing S.Sgt. Carmine F. D'Anillo


with an automatic rifle near the Third Platoon on the left and a light machine gunner and a bazooka team on the right beside the Second Platoon, Lt. Hallow-ell, commander of the company, ordered the First Platoon to withdraw about 150 yards. Even as Company D's heavy machine guns on Company A's left flank fired into the flank of the German attack, the grenadiers moved into the First Platoon's positions. Sgt. D'Anillo opened fire with his automatic rifle, and the light machine gunner and bazooka teams on the right joined in. D'Anillo continued firing even after four men with him became casualties and he himself was hit in the stomach. Supported by this fire, the First Platoon, aided by some men of the flank platoons, stormed back into its positions. This German attack was broken.

On the right of the Tenth Infantry, a battalion of German infantry attacked. American artillery mowed down the first waves, but two companies managed to break into the lines of Company A, First Bn., where most of the German grenadiers were killed in a hand-to-hand fight. German dead covered the hillside. The Ger-man assault companies were well armed with automatic weapons—Company A found fourteen machine guns and other automatic weapons in the area after the fight. Most of the attackers were killed with few prisoners taken except those that had been wounded—many of the wounded refused to surrender as long as they had working weapons. Company A had sustained twenty-five casualties. The attack was evidently to have been supported by tanks attacking from Arry, but supporting artillery and 57mm antitank guns kept the town covered, and no tank effort developed.

On the left flank of the bridgehead the German counterattack was late get-ting started and consisted primarily of a tank attack. Two platoons of tanks and a company of infantry were detected at about 0400 moving in from the direction of Vezon against the Second Bn. elements on the left portion of Hill 370. Heavy protective fire from artillery, tank destroyers, and the Cannon Company, Tenth Infantry, broke up the attack before the Germans could get close to the lines.

About an hour later, four panzers moved against Company L, Eleventh Infantry, now on the lower slopes of Hill 325, to the left of Company F. After the tanks had fired a dozen scattered rounds against positions in the Bois de Gaumont and against the bridge site, Company L's bazooka men opened fire. When one tank was hit, although not knocked out, the four withdrew. Farther down on the slope a platoon of tanks led by a half-track moved in against the outposts established by the Reconnaissance and Ammunition and Pioneer Platoons of the Third Bn., Eleventh Infantry. The half-track bogged down on the muddy slope as bazooka teams fired at the tanks. The Germans then abandoned the half-track, and the tanks withdrew.

On the extreme left flank of the bridgehead, the positions of Company B, Eleventh Infantry, in the buildings around the brick factory at the southern edge of Corny were hit just before daylight soon after the attack on Company L petered out. At 0530 Company B reported the approach of a platoon of infantry accom-panied by four tanks, presumably those whose earlier attack had been thwarted by the bogged-down half-track. The company reported that it had only one bazooka and that even though the German infantry could be stopped, the tanks might break through. Major Birdsong, the battalion CO, sent his orderly, Pfc. Harry


Saghbazarian, on foot to the tank destroyer assembly area north of Voisage Farm to guide tank destroyers into firing positions against this threat.

Spearheading the attack, the four panzers passed through the Company B positions. One of Third Bn.'s 57mm guns, manned by 1st Lt. Mitchell J. Hazam and S.Sgt. Cline Bills, opened fire on the lead tank and set it ablaze. The second German tank returned fire, knocking out both the crew and the AT gun and forc-ing the other gun crews to take cover. As the three remaining tanks continued to advance, the Wolverines of Company B, 818th TD Bn., arrived and opened fire with their 3-inch guns, knocking out one of the panzers and damaging another. Meanwhile, Company B, Eleventh Infantry, had held fire allowing the German infantry to get into its positions. On signal the GIs opened fire from their covered positions in the houses, catching the German infantry in a deadly cross fire. Thirty-three Germans were killed and another thirty were captured. The two remaining tanks (one of them damaged) raced back through the company's positions. Although Pfc. Walter A. Andrews, Company B, shot the commander of one of the tanks through an open hatch, both vehicles escaped into Corny and hid there throughout the day and night. The next morning when one tried to escape on the Metz highway to the north, it was set on fire by M10s firing from west of the river. Later, the remaining panzer, previously damaged by the 818th's destroyers, was found abandoned in the town. The Germans had been beaten back but not with-out cost; in its right flank platoon Company B had lost the platoon leader and eighteen men—missing in action. Captain Harry Anderson and eleven men of Company B had killed twenty-two Germans and captured another twenty-eight in a furious encounter at the company CP.

Although heavy German shelling, most of it against the reserve positions around Voisage Farm and on the reverse slopes of the hills, continued for almost an hour, by 0800 the third major attack against the Moselle bridgehead had been defeated. Prisoners were identified from the 282d Infantry Bn., a separate machine gun battalion, a supporting tank battalion (103d), the 115th Panzergrenadier Regt. of the Fifteenth Panzergrenadier Division, which had moved into the area the day before, and the Seventeenth SS and Third Panzergrenadier Divisions. That night the Fifteenth Panzergrenadier Division began to move south to the Nancy sector, leaving the burden of the Arnaville fight to the Seventeenth SS and Third Panz-ergrenadier Divisions. However, at the time the Americans knew nothing of the Fifteenth's shift.

At daylight on 12 September, General Irwin faced a number of problems. The GIs were tired from constant alerts and shaky from the continuous pounding from the German artillery. Feeling that he needed more infantry—his division was short by approximately sixty officers and sixteen hundred men—before beginning a drive out of the bridgehead, Irwin asked for additional reinforcements.

The First Bn., Eleventh Infantry, was already committed in holding the divi-sion's north flank at Dornot, while its Companies B and C were attached to the Third Bn. in the bridgehead. Although the Second Bn., Eleventh Infantry, still had not crossed, it had been ravaged in the Dornot battle and was still recover-ing—furthermore, it was the division's only infantry reserve. There was however,


Combat Command B (CCB), Seventh Armored Division, which was alerted to cross the moment a bridge could be completed over the Moselle. But General Irwin was alarmed about the lack of infantry to support the combat command. The unit's Twenty-third Armored Infantry Bn. had been reduced in the Dornot fighting to a point of being considered not battleworthy. The Fifth Division CO could count on Companies C and D, 735th Tank Bn., and Company C, 818th TD Bn. However, Company D was equipped with light tanks while the A Com-panies of both battalions were already attached to the Second RCT fighting west of Metz. On 12 September, the Third Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron was attached to the Division. The XX Corps commander, General Walton Walker, briefly considered aiding the Fifth by leaving the Second Infantry to continue the attack west of Metz by itself and sending CCA, Seventh Armored, to the bridge-head, but the commander of the Seventh advised him that it would take more than one infantry combat team to contain the German forces to the west of Metz. Therefore, XX Corps had to turn to a plan that called for a wider reshuffling all along its front.

General Irwin tried to make arrangements with the Fourth Armored Divi-sion, which had moved up to the river at the village of Pagny-sur-Moselle, south of Arnaville, as it sought a crossing over the Moselle. Late on 11 September the Fourth Armored had agreed to cross in conjunction with an attack by Fifth Divi-sion's elements to break through Arry and take Hill 385 to the southeast, oppo-site a proposed crossing at Pagny. Irwin set about planning this attack, but at 0400 on 12 September the Fourth Armored sent word that it had to delay its crossing for twenty-four hours. Throughout the day, the shortage of infantry stymied plans to break out of the bridgehead.

Lt. Col. Walker, the engineer group's commander, had evacuated all engineer personnel from the Arnaville bridge site at 0300 the morning of 12 September. Two and a half hours later, noting that the German artillery fire had slackened, he ordered that construction begin again on a treadway bridge at River Site 2. The 989th Treadway Bridge Company, this time assisted by Company C, 204th Engi-neers, and one platoon of Company C, 160th Engineers, resumed work at 0800. Operations would have started earlier, but none of the troops had been kept on construction alert after the earlier withdrawal. By 1230, under fog-smoke, some fifty-eight hours after the infantry had begun its crossing, a treadway bridge at last spanned the Moselle. Concurrently, the 537th Light Pontoon Company's Foot-bridge Section combined assault boats and support rafts into a footbridge to facil-itate the evacuation of walking wounded.

Ten minutes after the treadway bridge was completed at River Site 2, tanks of Company C, 735th Tank Bn., began moving across it and into the bridgehead. The remaining platoon of Company B and the Third Platoon, Company C, 818th TD Bn., followed while the other two platoons of Company C, 818th, maintained firing positions on the west-bank hills. The destroyers were followed by the Sher-mans of Companies A, B, and C of the Seventh Armored Division's Thirty-first Tank Bn. The M4s moved into an assembly area behind Hill 370 east of the Metz highway. CCB's tank destroyer support, Company B of the 8l4th TD Bn., followed


soon after, occupying assembly positions in the rear of the Third Bn., Tenth Infantry.

The confined bridgehead was almost bursting with uncommitted a rmor -five medium tank companies, seven self-propelled TD platoons—but infantry sup-port was still in short supply. An infantry reserve of sorts was provided by the Third Bn., Tenth Infantry. It had been held back despite the battered condition of the First and Second Bns., Tenth Infantry, because using it in an attack might extend the infantry lines. The Germans were still punishing the area with shellfire from 210 degrees of the compass. They still held Hill 396, the dominant terrain feature in the area, and the battered village of Arry as well as most of Corny and the bare slopes of Hill 325. On the night of 12 to 13 September the Germans used their advantage, plastering the bridgehead with artillery fire that took a toll on person-nel of the bunched armored units on the flatlands along the Metz highway. Heavy shelling continued throughout the night, but there were no attacks to accompany it. The autumn rain hindered the movement of the German panzers and self-pro-pelled guns and turned the bridgehead roads and trails into quagmires.

The thirteen field artillery battalions charged with support of the bridgehead had fired a total of 5,733 rounds on 12 September, almost as many as on the attack's opening day. No doubt a large portion of this fire was directed at repelling the fierce counterattacks of the early morning. In comparison with the weight of Amer-ican shelling, however, General Irwin noted that "Boche artillery has actually had superiority today due to our ammunition restrictions, and has fired over [the] whole area all day long."* Planes of the 371st Fighter-Bomber Group, XIX TAC, taking advantage of another cool, clear day with good visibility, augmented Amer-ican artillery throughout the day, causing Irwin to comment: "Air furnished splen-did support today and has been of greatest value. It cooperates quickly and efficiently, and has uncanny ability to find targets, both from our designations and its own." Major missions included bombing gun positions at Mardigny, southeast of Arry, strafing tanks and infantry, and bombing the Verdun forts, Sommy and St. Blaise, by P-47s of the 406th Squadron, 371st Group. One plane and pilot were lost during the day's actions.

Late on the afternoon of 12 September the 551st Heavy Pontoon Bn. was ordered to erect a reinforced heavy pontoon bridge across the Moselle at River Site 1. Necessary abutments, trestles, and hinge-span rafts were to be constructed dur-ing the night and await the corps' orders for completion. Movement of the pon-toons and other equipment was a laborious process because the engineers had to use the same route as bridgehead traffic. In addition, a steep incline at the canal lock crossing and a sharp turn at the second treadway over the Rupt de Mad pre-sented formidable obstacles to the engineers' heavy trailers. Despite these difficul-ties, the first load of equipment reached the river by about 2100, and work was begun by the First and Second Bridge Platoons, Company A, and the Second Bridge Platoon, Company B. The engineers finished all preliminary work by 0700 and then retired to await further orders.

*"The Fifth Infantry Division in the ETO, " 1945; the Fifth Division Historical Section.


At noon on 13 September came the order to resume construction. By the time personnel and equipment, including additional materials necessary for the float-ing portion of the bridge, had moved to the site through the maze of bridgehead traffic it was 1500. Construction then proceeded rapidly for a time. There was approximately one and a half hours of work left to do when German shelling began at 1745, forcing the engineers to seek cover. Concentrations continued to fall at fifteen-minute intervals, and work resumed during the lulls. At about 1830 the fire increased, shell concentrations landing every two or three minutes, until finally, five hours later, Lt. Col. Robert H. Latham, the 1103d Engineer Combat Group's executive officer, ordered the engineers to withdraw.

The shelling, presumably from the heavy batteries at Fort Driant, knocked out a section of the treadway bridge at River Site 2, but the engineers were able to repair it quickly. The 537th Light Pontoon Company, which had begun con-struction of a Bailey bridge over the southern canal crossing site during the after-noon, also suffered casualties from the shelling, including two severely wounded platoon leaders. The unit withdrew at 2330.

Work was resumed on both bridges at 1000 the next morning (14 Septem-ber) with assistance at the heavy pontoon bridge by Company B, 160th Engineers. Several metallic pontoons that had been damaged were repaired in place. A crane and several vehicles had been knocked out and seven pneumatic floats had to be replaced. Later, at about 1330, shelling increased, and all personnel were withdrawn. The engineers returned to the job once again at about 1500 and in two hours com-pleted a 250-foot reinforced heavy pontoon bridge (Class 40 tons). At 1830 an eighty-foot double-single Bailey bridge was completed across the canal at the southern crossing site. The two bridges, combined with the treadway bridges at River Site 2 and at the canal lock, furnished two one-way routes and completed bridge construction at the Arnaville crossing until after the bridgehead was secured. Although shelling continued, there was no major damage to either the treadway or the heavy pontoon bridge until the pontoon bridge was hit on 28 September; quickly repaired, the bridge was again ready for traffic the next morning.

The 1103d Engineer Combat Group had constructed a total of six bridges across three water barriers—the Rupt de Mad, the Moselle Canal, and the Moselle River. In the process one hundred men were wounded and thirteen killed.

13 September

A cold, driving rain began during the night of 12 to 13 September. By day-break the bridgehead across the Moselle River was a morass of mud and caused hardships for the assembled armor, adding to the discomforts of the battle-weary infantry. The infantrymen, who had had little sleep for three days and four nights, were grateful for a temporary respite from the fierce German counterblows. Both the First and Second Bns., Tenth Infantry, atop Hill 370, 369, and 386 had been reduced to 50 percent of their original strength, and battle fatigue had become a serious problem.


Elsewhere in the bridgehead the Third Bn., Eleventh Infantry, continued to hold the north flank, and the Third Bn., Tenth Infantry, remained in reserve around Voisage Farm. Armored reserves included companies B and C, 735th Tank Bn.; Company B and one platoon of Company C, 818th TD Bn.; Company B, 8l4th TD Bn. (CCB, Seventh Armored Division); and Companies A, B, and C, Thirty-first Tank Bn. (also of CCB).

At approximately 0900 a platoon of light tanks of Company D, 735th Tank Bn., with one 105mm assault gun and one 81mm mortar attached, and the Fifth Reconnaissance Troop crossed into the bridgehead to patrol to the south along the east bank of the river. No sooner had they started south than they were stopped by intense shellfire.

Later in the morning the First Bn., Tenth Infantry, sent a small infantry patrol toward the town of Arry. By 1100 the patrol reported that they had found only dead Germans and four knocked out tanks—the town had been abandoned. Another First Bn. patrol, going northeast from the battalions positions on Hill 386, also found no Germans. In the afternoon another patrol, this time a platoon from the Third Bn., Tenth Infantry, investigated Arry and confirmed the earlier findings. Ascertaining that it would take more than a platoon to defend the town, the patrol withdrew. Despite evidence that Arry was not occupied, no Tenth Infantry troops were sent to hold the town. American commanders continued to fear an overex-tension of their lines and felt that Arry, now reduced to a pile of rubble, could be controlled by the troops on Hill 386 and by direct fire from TDs and Cannon Company howitzers on the west-bank heights south of Arnaville.

Notwithstanding signs of a possible German withdrawal to the southeast and south of the bridgehead, little effort was made to exploit the situation. Although Brigadier General John M. Devine, the new commander of Combat Command Baker, Seventh Armored Division, came into the bridgehead during the early after-noon with orders to attack, intense German shelling, a lack of time for recon-naissance, and the deep mud that mired his tanks, prompted him to ask that the attack be postponed until the next day—permission was granted. The remnants of the Twenty-third Armored Infantry Bn. had also begun marching toward Arnav-ille, where they would help remedy the shortage of infantry. They were halted at the town of Onville because of the decision not to attack on that day.

Plans for expanding the bridgehead included a reshuffling of units by direct-ing the Ninetieth Infantry Division to begin taking over part of the Seventh Armored Division's sector west of Metz in order to permit CCA to prepare for movement into the Arnaville fight. This was the first step in a move that was even-tually to release all of the Seventh Armored Division and the Second RCT. Despite the shortages of men and equipment in the Second Bn., Eleventh Infantry, Gen-eral Irwin alerted the Eleventh to be prepared to send another battalion into the bridgehead. Meanwhile, Irwin's HQ issued Operations Instruction 13, confirming previous verbal orders and calling primarily for the movement of the remainder of CCB into the bridgehead. The instructions also ordered a subsequent attack by the combat command to seize Mardigny, to the southeast of Arry, and ordered the Third Bn., Tenth Infantry, to capture Hill 396.


Conclusion

No further German counterattacks occurred in the bridgehead area. The Fifth Infantry Division, in conjunction with the Seventh Armored Division, would spend the time between 13 and 15 September preparing to expand and break out of the bridgehead.

Five days of bitter fighting had brought XX Corps its first successful Moselle crossing. The ill-fated Dornot crossing, which had cost the Eleventh Infantry Regt. and the Twenty-third Armored Infantry Bn. many casualties, had been the key to the Tenth Infantry's success because it held the Germans' attention during the ini-tial stages of the crossing operations at Arnaville.

After the successful attacks of the Third Bn., Tenth Infantry, and CCB on

15 September, the bridgehead was strengthened as the relief of Seventh Armored Division units to the northwest was continued and elements of CCR began cross-ing the Arnaville bridges. On 16 September CCA began to cross, and the Second Infantry also began to move in. The Eleventh Infantry, relieving its First Bn. (com-posed of Companies A, I, and K) in defensive positions north of Dornot with the reconstituted Second Bn., sent the First Bn. into the bridgehead the afternoon of 16 September. The battalion crossed the Moselle River at Arnaville and relieved elements of the Tenth Infantry on Hills 310 and 361 on the right of the Third Bn., Eleventh Infantry. The commanding officer of Eleventh Infantry then assumed command of the north sector of the bridgehead.

The attacks to break out of the bridgehead and capture Metz began again early on the morning of 16 September with the capture of Lorry by elements of CCB. German guns were still able to shell the bridgehead area, including the bridge sites. There was still much fierce fighting before Metz itself fell. Not until 22 November, nearly two and a half months later, did the battle for Metz come to a close with the fall of the city; however, the last of the forts, Fort Driant, did not capitulate until 8 December.

German losses during operations were exceedingly heavy and it was estimated that the number of killed and wounded amounted to 2,000 men; there were also 233 prisoners. German operations during this period were characterized by stub-born and fanatical resistance. Again and again, undaunted by heavy losses, the Germans counterattacked, sometimes with as few as thirty-five men. Every yard of ground was bitterly contested, with ample support from artillery—at times from as many as fifteen batteries.

German morale varied among the units engaged, depending on whether they were composed of recent replacements or seasoned veterans. Generally, the morale of the SS personnel, in such units as the Seventeenth SS Panzergrenadier Divi-sion, was high due to the fanatical leadership of the junior officers. Many of the prisoners taken were arrogant, still believing that Germany would win the war. Older soldiers, especially those who had been in units that had taken severe losses, were ready to quit, figuring that they were being sacrificed for no reason. Among one of the units were Poles of the 698th Replacement Bn., whose morale was very low; the Poles were fighting only as long as SS troops were present.


Troops of the U.S. Tenth and Eleventh Infantry Regts. had forced the bridge-head and held it despite incessant shellfire, despite constant attacks by tanks and infantry, and despite high casualties. German panzers had been beaten by a com-bination of artillery fire, bazookas, and rifle grenades again and again. The Germans had spared nothing in their attempt to dislodge the Americans. The troops of the Tenth RCT and the Third Bn., Eleventh Infantry, had withstood on the average one full-scale counterattack every five hours and numerous smaller harassing actions. The infantrymen fired until certain types of ammunition were exhausted and until machine guns burst their water jackets. When the Germans reached their lines through sheer weight of numbers the U.S. soldiers stood their ground with pistols, rifle-butts, and bayonets. The bridgehead was now secure, but it had been secured at a staggering price.

Major Stanley Hays, the executive officer of the Third Bn., Tenth Infantry, summarized the operation:

It was truly an "eyeball-to-eyeball" infantry fight at its miserable worst—many casu-alties, rain, cold, impossible for troops to stay dry, with a large number of troops lost to flu, dysentery, and trench foot. The Tenth Infantry lost twenty-five officers. Seven hundred men were killed and wounded in three bloody days of attack and counterattack. In my mind's eye I can still see the combat engineers: given the for-midable task of getting the assault troops across the swollen Moselle and to con-struct bridges for supplies and to evacuate wounded, all this under the observed artillery fire from 150-millimeter howitzers and guns in turreted fortifications. In crossing these bridges, first only a footbridge and later two pontoon bridges over the Moselle and a Bailey bridge across the canal, several times during the fighting I was relieved to get clear of the bridges. The engineers, however, not only had to build the bridges under fire but to remain close by in order to repair damages and construct additional bridges for the buildup and the armor traffic to follow. It takes a lot of guts to continue working on the girders of a bridge or secure a loose pon-toon while 150mm shells are fired at you with considerable accuracy. I had great respect for those engineers who worked to keep the bridges intact, a vital part of the success of the crossing

The operations of the Metz Campaign, as exemplified at Arnaville, proved the magnificent fighting quality of the American soldiers. The battle was fought under appalling conditions against a gallant and determined enemy. Trying con-ditions, the wet and cold, German resistance, hours of fighting without rest, were overcome and the battle won because of the discipline and character of the troops and officers.*

*From remarks by Colonel Stanley Hays, (AUS) Retired, at the dedication of the Metz Firing Range, Ft. Leonard Wood, Missouri, June 1992.

"Blutiger Eimer" Schmidt and Kommerscheidt, Germany;

2-8 November 1944

In late October the Allied Armies in Western Europe faced a serious supply problem. Though the important Belgian port of Antwerp had been taken, the Ger-mans held the banks of the Schelde Estuary, denying access to the port.

The Supreme Allied Commander, General Eisenhower, continued his strat-egy of advancing on a broad front and building up along the Rhine River before striking into the heart of Germany. In September he had deviated slightly from this approach when he supported Montgomery's Twenty-first Army Group by sending the U.S. First Army north of the Ardennes.

By November, the drive had slowed around the Germany city of Aachen, but new plans were formulated for the First Army to move into the Rhineland and cross the Rhine River south of Cologne (Köln). A new force, the U.S. Ninth Army under Lt. Gen. William H. Simpson, was to protect the First Army's north flank while Patton's Third Army in the Lorraine advanced along the south flank.

The last major obstacle before the Rhine, in the First Army's area was the Roer River. Because of the heavy rains in the late summer and early fall of 1944, the Roer was swollen. If the German-held dams along the Roer were destroyed, the resulting flood would sweep away bridges and trap any forces that had man-aged to cross the Roer. Earlier the Allies had attempted to destroy the dams by bombing but had failed. Directly in the path of the First Army was the Schwammanuel Dam, some ten kilometers south of the town of Düren.

On October 21, the same day that General Hodges' First Army received its orders, Aachen fell to the Americans after bitter fighting. To Hodges the VII Corps looked like the logical choice for the main effort. Only one big problem remained— the Huertgen Forest, technically known as the Rotgen, Wenau, and Huertgen Forests, but generally dubbed Huertgen by the Americans. Hodges was convinced that the forest had to be taken in order to secure his right flank.

Opposing the Americans in the Huertgen area were elements of the German Seventh Army-LXXIV Korps with its Twelfth, 353d, 344th, 272d, and 275th Volksgrenadier Divisions (VGD), and the Eighty-ninth Infantry Division.


The forest was a gloomy expanse below Aachen where the trees, terrain, and weather multiplied the problems facing the Americans. The roads in the area were poor; the best of them ran north and south, more or less along the top of the ridge lines. The whole forest complex comprised some fifty square miles thick with pine trees. The trees grew close to the roads and left a dense blanket of needles mak-ing the planting of mines and boobytraps relatively easy. The area was cut by ridge lines and deep gullies. The natural defense this afforded was improved by an unusu-ally heavy rainfall, which not only soaked the ground, making it difficult for vehi-cles to move off the roads, but soaked the men as well. Finally, the November late afternoon brought heavy fog and mist. As winter approached, snow and cold fur-ther hampered the attackers.

The atmosphere of the forest was cold, wet, and hostile, littered with emer-gency ration containers, stripped and splintered trees, stacks of unearthed mines along muddy, almost impassable firebreaks and trails, shell and mine craters by the hundreds, and bloated bodies yet to be removed by graves registration. Artillery was especially deadly in the forest as falling shells burst on hitting the tree tops, showering metal all around and not only increasing the effective damage radius of the burst, but turning foxholes without overhead cover into graves.

The town of Schmidt, directly in the path to the Schwammanuel Dam, had to be taken. Lest the main effort be weakened by leaving the responsibility for Schmidt with the VII Corps, General Courtney Hodges transferred the objective to V Corps. Hoping to assist the First Army's drive toward the Rhine by luring enemy strength away from it, Hodges directed the V Corps to attack, if weather permitted, on the first day of November and, regardless of weather, no later than the second. He also directed General Leonard Gerow, V Corps commander, to seize the woodline overlooking the nearby town of Huertgen so that a division of the VII Corps later might use it as a point of departure.

With the U.S. Ninth Infantry Division already in dire straits in the Huert-gen Forest, Gerow turned to a veteran division of heavy fighting in Normandy, the Twenty-eighth. The Twenty-eighth was a Pennsylvania National Guard Divi-sion, known to the Germans as the "Blutiger Eimer" (bloody bucket) after its crim-son Keystone patch (symbolic of the state) and the ferocity of its onslaught near Mortain during the beachhead breakout. As part of the V Corps, the Twenty-eighth had participated in earlier attempts to pierce the Siegfried Line in the Ardennes-Eifel, but since then had been resting near the town of Monschau.

After taking Schmidt, the Twenty-eighth Division was to move into the rear of German positions in the Monschau Corridor. Though intent on husbanding the bulk of the V Corps for a later attack south of the Roer Dams, Gerow never-theless ordered a combat command of the Fifth Armored Division to prepare to attack against the face of the corridor as the Twenty-eighth came in from the rear. Gerow also provided strong reinforcements to the Twenty-eighth Division. In addition to the normal attachments of a battalion each of medium tanks and self-propelled tank destroyers, the division received a battalion of towed tank destroy-ers, a chemical mortar battalion, a detachment of forty-seven "Weasels" (light, highly maneuverable all-terrain type, jeep-size, tracked cargo carriers), and the

"Blutiger Eimer" Schmidt and Kommerscheidt 89

entire 1171st Engineer Combat Group of three engineer battalions. A self-propelled 155mm howitzer battalion, a 105mm towed howitzer battalion, and two 155mm towed howitzer battalions were added to the division's artillery complement for direct support. In general support were two batteries of 4.5-inch (114.3mm) guns, two 155mm gun battalions, and one 8-inch (203.2mm) howitzer battalion.

The Twenty-eighth was ordered to use an entire regiment, the 109th, for the task of gaining the woodline overlooking Huertgen on the division's left flank, which would then permit elements of the VII Corps to pass through and take the town. Since the division would require a direct line of supply into the Monschau


Corridor once Schmidt had fallen, its 110th Regiment, on the right flank, was ordered to open secondary roads leading into the corridor through the woods below the village of Richelskaul. This left the Twenty-eighth Infantry Division with only one regiment, the 112th, for making the main thrust to Schmidt.

The First Army's commander, General Hodges, considered the plan "excel-lent." He particularly liked that the thrust to secure the woodline overlooking Huertgen might appear to the enemy to be the main effort. However, the Twenty-eighth's commander, Major General Norman D. Cota, was decidedly unhappy with the attack plan. Cota felt that the dictates for employing his forces imposed by Army and Corps left him with little initiative.

A big, ruddy-faced New Englander whose friends called him "Dutch," Cota had gained a reputation for personal daring and courage while an assistant divi-sion commander in Normandy. Cota had taken over command of the division in August, succeeding Brigadier General James E. Wharton, who had been fatally wounded. But Cota was not one to shirk an assignment, no matter how much he might dislike it.

Cota's dilemma was how best to use the limited freedom left him to over-come the immense difficulties imposed by the divergent missions and by the harsh nature of the terrain. The Roer and subsidiary streams, including the Kall River, sliced the sector into three sharply defined ridges, all of them bald but surrounded by dense forest. Cota's attack first had to move to the Germeter-Vossenack Ridge in the center. Since Cota had no force available to take the ridge on the left, the Brandenberg-Bergstein Ridge, he would have to operate under enemy guns firing from that ridge with no help except from artillery, which had a limited ammuni-tion allotment. Since the third ridge, crowned by Schmidt, was higher than the Germeter-Vossenack Ridge, Cota's troops would have to fight an uphill battle all the way to Schmidt.

The roads—such as they were—ran along the open high ground. A dirt road linked Germeter and Vossenack. From Vossenack, the map showed a narrow cart track, about two meters wide, dropping precipitously to the Kall River, then ris-ing tortuously through a series of hair-pins to the towns of Kommerscheidt and Schmidt. Only light vehicles could negotiate it in its present state. This meant that the engineers would have to widen the trail if tanks were to be able to reinforce the 112th. The existence of this track could not be verified from aerial photographs and had not been confirmed by patrols; yet the Twenty-eighth Division would have to rely on its being there for no other route existed for supplies and armor to reach the troops at their objective. Through Schmidt ran the main highway leading from the Monschau Corridor, the principal supply route for the German Eighty-ninth Division, and another highway leading downhill to the Schwammanuel Dam. Thus the Germans would be better able to bring reinforcements into the area than the Americans.

General Cota hoped that his attached engineer units could open the cart track to tanks and that fighter-bombers could interdict German armor attempt-ing to reach Schmidt. Yet, this would seem unlikely given the generally poor November weather and the short daylight period. In the path of the Twenty-eighth


was the German 275th Division, which had opposed the U.S. Ninth Infantry Division. Moreover, the Twenty-eighth would be making the only attack along some 170 miles of front, thus providing an opportunity for the Germans to inter-vene with all their available reserves at a single point. The Twenty-eighth was going out on a limb, a very thin and unsteady limb.

The Germans were aware of the presence of this new American division but assumed that its objective was the town of Huertgen. Thus they proceeded with plans to relieve the Eighty-ninth Division in the Monschau Corridor. The Eighty-ninth was to be reorganized for use in the forthcoming Ardennes Offensive, and the Schmidt area was to be an important staging area on the north flank of the counteroffensive.

The Twenty-eighth Division's attack was to begin with a preliminary thrust along the Germeter-Huertgen highway to the woodline overlooking Huertgen. At the same time, an infantry battalion was to clear the Vossenack Ridge with the help of tanks. Beginning at noon, the 112th Infantry was to make the main attack from Richelskaul through a wooded draw south of the Vossenack Ridge, across the Kall River, through Kommerscheidt, and then into Schmidt. The 110th Regiment was to attack in the woods below Richelskaul while holding out one battalion to pro-vide a nominal division reserve. Except for assigning a company of tanks for Vosse-nack, General Cota bowed to the difficulties of the terrain and assigned the rest of the tanks and the self-propelled TDs to augment division artillery.

Operating in close support of the 112th Infantry was the 1171st Engineer Combat Group. The engineers were assigned to work on the forest supply trail from Germeter through Vossenack, across the Kali River, and on to Kommer-scheidt and Schmidt. Company B, Twentieth Engineers, was to be responsible for opening and maintaining the road from Richelskaul to Vossenack and on to the Kall River bridge; Company A was charged with bridging the Kall if necessary and opening and maintaining the road from the river through Kommerscheidt to Schmidt. Company C was to be held in battalion reserve in the woods west of Germeter with the stipulation that it could only be committed with the approval of the engineer group commander. The Twenty-ninth Combat Engineers were directed to improve the cart track across the Kall gorge.

Cota charged the engineers with providing security for the trail since no infantry would be available to defend the gorge. The engineers would be the only force to prevent the Germans from cutting the trail and isolating the troops in Kommerscheidt and Schmidt. But they interpreted their orders from General Cota to mean security for their own personnel, and nobody, including Cota, contested this interpretation. The success or failure of the operation hung on the possession of the track across the Kall.

Due to the expected poor condition of the Kall trail and the exposed nature of the Vossenack ridge, engineer vehicles (with the exception of three-quarter-ton weapons carriers and quarter-ton jeeps) were not to accompany the leading engi-neer troops.

When the target jump-off date of November 1 arrived, rain, fog, and mist grounded fighter-bomber support and forced postponement of the assault. Yet,


according to General Hodges' original directive, the attack had to be made the next day, regardless of the weather. The hope that the Twenty-eighth Division might divert German reserves from the main drive by the VII Corps ceased to have any merit as a rationale for the attack on November 1 since the army group com-mander, General Omar Bradley, agreed to postpone the attack of the main corps. Because new divisions scheduled to augment the drive had been slow in arriving, Bradley moved the jump-off date from 5 November to 10 November. Even this date was highly tentative since to insure a big air bombardment, D-Day had to have fair weather. Bradley specified that the main attack begin on 10 November or the first fair day thereafter but in any event no later than 16 November.

That a two-week time difference might be developing between the Twenty-eighth's attack and the corps attack seemed to have gotten little attention. No one seemed to acknowledge that German forces would be free to attack the Twenty-eighth Infantry Division and still be available to oppose the main effort. Hodges made no move either to alter the Twenty-eighth's deadline date or to arrange for help should it run into trouble.

2 - 3 November: Supporting Attacks

The day dawned cold and misty. Though the mist limited ground observa-tion, both the V Corps and VII Corps artillery used more than 4,000 rounds in the preliminary barrage. Fifteen minutes before the ground attack, direct support artillery shifted to planned targets. By H-Hour the Twenty-eighth Division artillery had fired 7,313 rounds—sizable for a one-division attack. However, fighter-bomber aircraft were not able to operate until midafternoon. The weather forced cancel-lation of two of five air group missions. Even then most planes failed to locate assigned targets, roaming instead far afield in search of targets. Perhaps the most notable air action of the day was the mistaken bombing of an American artillery position in which seven men were killed and seventeen wounded.

At nine o'clock, men of two battalions of the 109th Infantry climbed out of their foxholes and slit trenches and headed north on either side of the Germeter-Huertgen highway. Harassed as much by problems of maintaining direction and contact between units in the thick forest as by German fire, the battalion west of the highway moved with surprising ease. By early afternoon the men were digging in at the woodline overlooking Huertgen. But the other battalion almost from the start ran into a dense antipersonnel minefield just short of the village of Wittscheidt. Every effort to find a path through the mine field only resulted in more casualties. Every time engineers tried to clear the mines, machine guns and mortars drove them to cover.

The next day, 3 November, the battalion east of the road was seeking to flank the minefield when some two hundred Germans struck the battalion at the wood-line. Though noisy, the counterattack posed no real threat, but the battalion east of the road could not know this. Confused by a garbled radio message, the bat-talion commander, following the age-old maxim to march to the sound of the guns,


sent two companies toward the noise of the counterattack. As these companies became hopelessly enmeshed in the other battalion's fight, the day's attempt to outflank the minefield and take the other half of the 109th's Infantry's objective came to an end.

Though the 109th Infantry still had a reserve battalion, attempts to thwart German infiltration behind the advance battalions already had tied up this force. By the evening of the second day, 3 November, the 109th Infantry's position had almost set. The regiment had forged a narrow, mile-deep salient into the forest between the Weisser Weh Creek and the Germeter-Huertgen highway. The Ger-mans nevertheless continued to hold the network of trails in the creek bed in a countersalient into American lines. For the next few days, while the men dug deep and roofed their foxholes with logs, the 109th Infantry tried both to eliminate the countersalient and to take the other half of the objective east of the highway, but to no avail. Every movement merely increased the already alarming number of casualties and drove the companies and platoons deeper into the forest.

The 110th Infantry began what would prove to be a frustrating campaign dur-ing which no one recognized that the infantry needed direct fire support. Two bat-talions attacked at noon on 2 November, one to take pillboxes below the Raffels-brand road junction, the other to push through the woods to the little settlement of Simonskall alongside the Kall River. Seizing these two objectives was the first step toward opening secondary roads into the Monschau Corridor and a possible alternate supply route to Schmidt.

Shelling had already covered the forest floor with a layer of limbs and debris and left deep gashes on the trunks of trees. Opposing lines were within hand-grenade range of each other. The Germans were dug in behind thick bands of con-certina wire, tripwires, mines, and booby traps. Log-covered bunkers and foxholes almost flush with the ground augmented the pillboxes. This atmosphere of death and doom was intensified by the dim light filtering through the thick branches of the fir trees.

No sooner had the troops of the two attacking battalions risen from their foxholes than a rain of machine gun and mortar fire brought them to earth. After several hours of painful, costly infiltration, one battalion reached the triple con-certinas surrounding the pillboxes. Squads and platoons got lost; mortar shells landing among assault teams carrying demolition charges set off the explosives and blew up the carrying parties.

All communications failed except for spasmodic reception over little SCR-536 radios. The chatter of machine guns and crash of artillery and mortars kept frightened, forest-blind infantrymen pinned to the earth. In the late afternoon, the decimated units staggered back to the line of departure, having given up efforts to advance.

These men obviously needed armor help or heavy direct fire weapons if they Were to make any progress. But again on the second day of supporting operations, 3 November, nobody made any effort to get tanks or tank destroyers forward. The dedicated infantrymen again rose from their holes and went forward. With no supporting fire to back them up they were quickly cut down by the Germans. The


results were the same as on the previous day. In one company, only forty-two men made it back to the line of departure.

As 3 November came to an end, neither the regimental commander nor Gen-eral Cota made any effort to send tanks down the muddy, mine-infested firebreaks and trails toward Raffelsbrand. Cota came up with another possible solution. He called upon the 110th Infantry's remaining battalion, the one earmarked as a divi-sion reserve, to move to Vossenack and before daylight the next morning to go south through the woods to Simonskall, thereby cutting in behind the pillboxes and entrenched Germans at Raffelsbrand. Yet this meant deploying the Twenty-eighth Infantry Division's only reserve very early in the operation. Should disaster occur elsewhere in the division's zone, he would be left with few options.

On the previous day, 2 November, the Second Bn., 112th Infantry, under Lt. Col. Theodore S. Hatzfeld, had attacked with a company of tanks eastward from Germeter to gain the town of Vossenack and clear the Vossenack Ridge. German assault guns firing from the Brandenberg-Bergstein Ridge knocked out several tanks, but the spinelike village of Vossenack was in American hands by early after-noon. As the tanks sought cover among the damaged buildings, the infantry began to dig in. Rather than take up positions in the fringe buildings of the village, the infantrymen were ordered to dig in on the exposed northeastern nose of the ridge within full view of German observers on the Brandenberg-Bergstein Ridge.

The Twenty-eighth Infantry Division's main effort began at noon on 2 November with an attack by the two battalions of the 112th Infantry under Lt. Col. Carl L. Peterson, a slender, wiry man with reddish blond hair and moustache who had grown up in Bradford, Pennsylvania, among the miners and oilfield work-ers who constituted the core of the regiment's noncoms. The regiment began to move east from Richelskaul to pass through the woods south of Vossenack and cross the Kall gorge to Kommerscheidt and Schmidt.

The leading battalion had hardly begun to move when the first company came under intense small-arms fire. For the rest of the day the men of the com-pany hugged the ground, unable to advance. Apparently impressed with the rela-tive ease with which Hatzfeld's Second Bn. had gained Vossenack, Colonel Peter-son committed no more of his regiment, calling for only a few volleys of artillery fire. Peterson wanted to wait until the next day and move on Schmidt by way of Vossenack, thus setting back by at least half a day the plans to take Schmidt.

3 November

Starting at 0700 and passing through Vossenack, the First and Third Battal-ions of the 112th Infantry (the Second Bn. holding Vossenack) headed southeast into the Kall gorge. The Germans were strangely quiet. The Third Bn., under Lt. Col. Albert M. Flood, led the advance.

Company K, under Captain Eugene W. O'Malley, with one heavy machine gun section from Company M's Second Platoon attached and supported by the Third Tank Platoon of Company A, 707th Tank Bn., was ordered to spearhead


the battalion. Echeloned 300 to 400 yards to the left rear of Company K was to be Company L, with the other section of Company M's Second (machine gun) Platoon attached and the Second Tank Platoon, Company A, 707th, in support. Company I, with the First Tank Platoon, Company A, 707th, was to follow L.

The day was cold, not quite freezing, with a heavy mist and a morass of mud blanketing the area. There was no artillery preparation before the attack except normal harassing missions. The riflemen crossed the line of departure at Germe-ter and shifted into the customary five-yard intervals between men. The move-ment was uneventful until about 0730 when the formation halted at the church in Vossenack to reorganize and make adjustments to a new line of departure—the main street of Vossenack. As the direction of movement was shifted from east to southeast, a brief but intense German artillery concentration struck the battalion. The troops took cover in nearby buildings, but one man in Company L was wounded. While the infantry reorganized, the supporting tanks of Third Platoon, Company A, 707th Tank Bn., moved up to the nose of the high ground south-east of Vossenack and fired their machine guns at the woodline to the southeast in an effort to neutralize any opposition.

The men of Company K, Third Bn., had received their monthly pay in Ger-man Invasion Marks only three days before. Most were veterans of Normandy, the pursuit across France, and most recently, the Monschau Forest and the Siegfried Line. They had been awakened at 0500 and were moved out at about 0630. At

112th Infantry Regiment Attack on Schmidt

2-3 November 1944

German Counterattack 4 November 1944


the line of departure they were instructed to drop their blankets and overcoats as the company moved out on point.

Company K moved out across the open ground to the south of Vossenack, its left flank guiding on the Vossenack-Kommerscheidt trail. Shells from German light mortars fell with muffled explosions in the muddy ground, but there was no artillery fire. The men moved rapidly, and by 0845 the lead elements were across the clearing and into the woods. According to plan, the tankers of Company A, 707th, ceased firing with their MGs and began using their main guns as direct fire artillery against Kommerscheidt, beyond the wooded Kall River gorge.

Descending the steep wooded slope toward the Kall River, the men of Com-pany K were now hit by artillery fire. One man was wounded and three were killed. Occasional sniper fire also began to harass them; a man laying telephone wire was wounded in the leg and a staff sergeant killed.

At the Kall River the company's scouts came upon ten Germans and opened fire, killing one. The other nine surrendered. The Germans offered no other resis-tance, and the men of Company K, surprised by the ease of their attack thus far, waded out into the icy water of the Kall. They forded the river at a point just south of a mill, Mestrenger Mühle, shortly after 0900.

Sporadic German artillery continued to fall in the wooded valley, but failed to halt Company K's advance up the steep eastern slope. When the GIs reached the edge of the woods slightly southwest of the village of Kommerscheidt, they saw the little town clearly. Shells from supporting Shermans back near Vossenack were falling among the scattered buildings. A small group of Germans fired from the open field between the woodline and the town. Company K returned the fire, and eight Germans came forward to surrender. As the German POWs came in, Company K's scouts moved across the fields and into the village to reconnoiter, the supporting tank fire lifting as the tank crews spotted the scouts. When the scouts signaled all clear, Company K moved into its first objective, a drab little commu-nity of scattered houses. They had captured their initial objective by 1300.

Prisoner interrogations disclosed that the troops taken were part of the Third Kompanie, Eleventh GAF Fortress Bn. and Seventh Kp., 984th Regt., 275th Volks-grenadier Division. The fortress battalion consisted of three companies of approx-imately one hundred men each and had come down to the area from Düren. The unit had been committed on or about 1 November on the right flank of the 984th.

Perched on the sloping eastern portion of the ridge line, the town of Schmidt was clearly visible from Kommerscheidt. Woods fringed the ridge on all sides, and along a dirt road that ran between the towns there were several pillboxes. The Company K commander had begun to reorganize his men to continue into Schmidt when the Germans fired a short but violent artillery concentration at Kommer-scheidt. As soon as the fire lifted, the company headed down the road toward Schmidt; only occasional shots from German landsers (infantry) contested the advance. As the GIs moved forward, a group of Germans near a pillbox, marked by the wreckage of an American plane on top of it, opened fire. The Americans drove some of the Germans back into the pillbox and the others into a wooded draw to the west.


A base of fire from the attached machine gun platoon and flanking fire from a group of riflemen disposed of the Germans in the pillbox. At the outskirts of Schmidt Captain O'Malley split his company; one group continued through the town's center, and the other went into the southwest section of the town that lay along the Schmidt-Strauch road. The Germans in Schmidt offered little resistance. The attack had evidently come as a complete surprise. Some were captured in the houses while they were eating, and some were reported to be drunk. Others were caught as they rode bicycles or motorcycles into the town, and still others were taken as they strolled along the main road into town from the west.

By 1430 Company K had advanced into Schmidt. Neither in Kommerscheidt nor in Schmidt had there been appreciable German resistance although G-2 sources determined later that a battalion of the 275th Division with a strength of eight officers and 276 men had been charged with the area's defense.

At the start of its move from Vossenack to Schmidt, Company L was eche-loned to the left rear, its Second and Third Platoons forward. When Company K entered the Kall Woods, Company L was still in the open between Vossenack and the woods and came under heavy mortar fire. The Third Platoon on the right then went along the main Vossenack-Kommerscheidt trail as it neared the river. The platoon then joined the remainder of the company in fording the river 300 yards north of the bridge. The company's advance kept pace with that of Company K, which was fording the stream to the south at about the same time (0900).

Company L continued up the steep slope beyond the river, keeping inside the woods in order to skirt the open fields to the north of Kommerscheidt and approach the town unobserved from the east. One stray German soldier was taken prisoner, and later, about noon, some of the men reported they saw Germans in the houses of Froitscheidt, across a shallow wooded draw to the east. The com-pany halted almost abreast of this settlement, set up two heavy machine guns, and fired on one of the houses. Nothing happened; so the company commander, Cap-tain Jack W. Walker, sent a patrol to the buildings only to find them unoccupied.

The advance continued and by 1400 had reached a position at the edge of the woods east of Kommerscheidt. When Captain Walker checked in with his bat-talion HQ, he learned that Company K had already taken Kommerscheidt and that Company L was to move immediately to assist in taking Schmidt.

Walker shifted his attack formation to put the First and Second Platoons for-ward and the Third in support. Company L then moved south, unopposed, toward Schmidt, staying within the woodline east of the Kommerscheidt-Schmidt road. Two German troop shelters with smoke streaming from them lay along the route of advance, but they found only one German, fatally wounded. It was now well after 1500. Another message from battalion said Company K was already in Schmidt and directed Company L to move ahead quickly. The men pushed on and entered Schmidt at the junction of the Bergstein and Harscheidt roads near the eastern end of town, taking approximately thirty prisoners. Falling darkness and harassing sniper fire hampered the company in its mop-up operations. Finally, total darkness and a battalion order to switch over to the defense halted the mop-up.


The Third Bn.'s reserve company, Company I—except for its First Platoon, which was on security guard at division HQ—followed the advance of the other two companies. Near Vossenack mortar fire severed contact to the 60mm mortar section at the rear of the column. The rest of the company entered the woods south of Vossenack before the section leader could reestablish contact. Because mor-tar fire continued to pound the open ridge and because he did not know his com-pany's objective, the section leader kept his men in Vossenack and attached them to Company H. The main body of Company I had no difficulty after entering the

Kall Woods and moved on into Schmidt shortly after 1600. When the Company M commander, Captain Guy T. Piercey, received word

that Company K had captured Kommerscheidt, he directed his 81mm mortars in Vossenack and his machine gun platoon on the Vossenack ridge to move up quickly in order to provide fire support for the subsequent attack on Schmidt. However, with Company K's rapid advance into Schmidt there was no reason for the weapons men to halt in Kommerscheidt, so they moved directly into Schmidt. It was well after dark when they arrived.

At the start of the attack on Schmidt the Third Bn.'s medical aid station had been located in the woods west of Germeter. After the battalion reached Vosse-nack, 2d Lt. Alfred J. Muglia, Medical Administrative Corps, established a for-ward collecting point. He used two jeeps and an M29 Weasel to transport patients back to the Germeter aid station. That afternoon, when the Third Bn. had reached Schmidt, Lt. Muglia and several medics moved forward in a Weasel to reconnoi-ter for another aid station site. On the narrow and slippery Vossenack-Kommer-scheidt trail through the Kall Woods the Weasel threw its tracks and had to be abandoned, blocking the trail, so Lt. Muglia and his men returned to Vossenack.

The First Bn., except for Company B, had moved out of Germeter about noon on its way to Vossenack in the order Company A, Battalion HQ, C, and D and reached Vossenack by 1330. At the town's church it turned out across the open ground toward the Kall Woods. Artillery fire then struck the column and killed a Company D messenger. In the woods sporadic shelling continued, severely wound-ing a sergeant of Company A and killing a mortar section runner.

Because the river was to be used as a reorganization phase line, Company A halted just north of the Kall River bridge and began to dig in. Upon reaching the river farther to the south, Company C also began to dig in. When ordered to move on, Company C shifted to the head of the column and advanced across the bridge toward Kommerscheidt. Darkness was rapidly approaching. At the woodline over-looking the open fields leading into Kommerscheidt, Company C halted and dug in (creating a backup position), and Company A and the remainder of the col-umn passed through Company C's position and into Kommerscheidt.

Interestingly, at 1614 the Twenty-eighth Division chief of staff sent a mes-sage to Colonel Peterson, 112th Infantry, instructing him to send his First Bn. to Schmidt to assist the Third—per the regiment's original attack plan. However, the First Bn. made no effort to continue past Kommerscheidt. At 2255 Colonel Peter-son reported that he had a battalion in Schmidt and another in Kommerscheidt, and Division issued no further instructions.


During the night the Germans hit Kommerscheidt with fire from heavy mor-tars. Company A was deployed with the First Platoon defending to the east, the Second Platoon to the south, and the Third Platoon to the southwest, the battal-ion Ammunition and Pioneer Platoon between the Second and Third Platoons, and the company's light machine guns with the Second Platoon covering the road to Schmidt. Company D, with its machine gun and mortars, arrived in Kom-merscheidt about an hour after Company A. One section of machine guns went to the left flank (east) and one to the right (west), and the 81mm mortars took position in the rear (north) of the town. The company's third machine gun pla-toon had been left behind with Company B at Richelskaul.

The First Bn. command group was established in a small, partially covered, trench-type dugout in an orchard near a road junction on the northern edge of the town. Not far away the First Bn.'s aid station was set up in the cellar of a house.

Back on the Vossenack ridge the Second Bn., 112th Infantry, maintained its positions under increased shelling. During the day the Second Bn. was ordered by the regiment to send a platoon east into the Kall gorge to secure the north-south river road north of the Kall trail, but for some reason the orders were not carried out.

With Schmidt in hand, the focus of the Twenty-eighth Infantry Division's operations now turned to the cart track across the Kall gorge. On the condition of this narrow path rested the fate of the American troops beyond the Kall and the eventual success or failure of the Twenty-eighth Division's attack.

During the day, word had circulated in Vossenack that the bridge over the Kall had been demolished, but not until late afternoon did Captain Edwin M.

Lutz, commander of Company B, Twentieth Engineers, and Captain Joseph W. Miller, battalion liaison officer, reconnoiter the trail. After the trail from Vosse-nack entered the woods, it became a narrow shelf, one side a sharp rise studded with rock outcroppings, the other a sheer drop. Yet the trail could be used. How-ever, Lt. Muglia's Weasel with the thrown track blocked the narrow route. It would be a tight squeeze for tanks, but once the Weasel was removed, tanks might pass by hugging the right bank. At the bridge site a stone arch bridge was still in place.

The two engineer officers returned to Vossenack by about 1600 and reported their findings to Company A of the 707th Tank Bn. The tank company com-mander, Captain Bruce M. Hostrup, had his vehicles under cover in a slight defilade around the southernmost houses of Vossenack. On hearing that the trail across the

Kall gorge was passable, Hostrup took one of his tank platoons and raced across the open southern slope from Vossenack to the woodline as darkness fell. He then halted the platoon and went forward with his command tank to test the trail.

About a quarter of the way from the woodline to the river Captain Hostrup found the trail becoming narrow and slippery. The trail's left shoulder, which dropped away sharply toward the draw, began to give way under the weight of his tank. With rocks jutting out of the right bank the trail was about nine feet wide, but so was the tank. Suddenly the tank slipped and almost plunged off the left bank into the draw. Quickly reversing the vehicle, Hostrup returned to his pla-toon and reported that the trail was impassable. At about 1900 the battalion com-mander, Lt. Col. Richard W. Ripple, radioed that the engineers were to work on


the trail all night and that Captain Hostrup's tanks should be ready to move through to Schmidt at dawn. This was Lt. Col. Ripple's first time in combat.

Sometime during the afternoon, as Captain Hostrup's tank crews were wait-ing for word about the trail, one of the tanks threw a track and another bellied on a sharp rock outcropping in the open ground south of Vossenack. These mishaps together with the earlier loss of another tank (immobilized by a mine in eastern Vossenack at the start of the 3 November attack) left the company with only thir-teen of its original sixteen tanks.

With the coming of dusk the engineers were given an opportunity to cross the open ridge without danger from artillery fire. Led by 2d Lt. Robert E. Hus-ton, a platoon of Company B, Twentieth Engineers, moved down into the woods with instructions to remove the damaged medical Weasel that blocked the trail. The engineers went to work with picks and shovels to clear the road as best they could. With the First and Third Bns., 112th, having left no troops in the woods, the engineers were forced to provide their own security. This was according to plan but took men away from the labor parties.

Captains Miller and Lutz returned to their battalion CP to report on the sit-uation (including their belief that the road was passable for tanks as it was) and to request a bulldozer in order to whittle down some of the right bank and widen the trail. Both a bulldozer and an air compressor reached the work site at about 0230. By this time Lt. Huston's men had pushed the damaged Weasel from the trail by hand. The bulldozer proved of little value, and after about an hour it became disabled by a broken cable.

Meanwhile, late in the afternoon, information had reached Company A, Twentieth Engineers, that it could proceed to work sites beyond the Kall, and the company moved out toward Vossenack. As the men crossed the ground from Ger-meter to Vossenack, small arms and artillery fire killed one engineer and wounded another. In Vossenack, the main body of the company waited while the Second Platoon under 2d Lt. Robert K. Pierce reconnoitered the Kall River bridge site.

Lt. Pierce and his reconnaissance team returned at about 2230 with news that the bridge was in good condition. They had gone as far as the positions of Company C, 112th Infantry, at the top of the hill east of the river. The road was clear except for some debris and abatis and possible mines. Under no apparent pressure, Company A remained in Vossenack for several hours. At 0200 the First Platoon, under 1st Lt. John 0. Webster, set out with mine detectors to clear the trail from the river up toward Schmidt. The rest of the company joined the First Platoon beyond the river at about 0600.

At about midnight (3 to 4 November) an infantry supply train of three M29 Weasels loaded with rations, ammunition, and sixty anti-tank mines negotiated the trail to Schmidt. Sniper fire continued to hamper defensive efforts by the men of the Third Bn., 112th Infantry, during the night, and Company L drew some machine gun fire from houses along the southeastern Hasenfeld road. But in gen-eral the night was quiet. The infantrymen felt good about their easy success.

Company L's Third Platoon was placed astride the Hasenfeld road, its Sec-ond on the left of the Third, and its First Platoon on the Second's left, blocking


the Harscheidt road to the northeast. The company's two light machine guns and a section of heavy machine guns from Company M were tied into the defense, and patrols between rifle platoons covered any gaps.

Company K, whose aggressive advance had put the first American troops on the division objective, set its defenses to the south and southwest in the town and placed its three rifle platoons on line to cover the Strauch road and the area between the Strauch and Hasenfeld roads. With the company was a section of heavy machine guns from Company M. Forty-five Germans, apparently unaware that Schmidt had been captured, wandered into the Company K positions from the southwest and were taken prisoner. Occasional sniper fire and one or two light shellings ham-pered Company K's defense preparations. Captain O'Malley, the company's CO, was hit in the stomach by a bullet while checking the company's positions. Cap-tain Thomas from Company L was given command of K.

The reserve company, Company I, dug in on the north side of the town with its two rifle platoons and a light machine gun section. One platoon extended Com-pany L's left flank to the left rear and the other extended Company K's right flank to the right rear. An all-around defense of the town was established, but none of the three rifle companies was able to keep a platoon as a reserve.

Company M's 81mm mortars were placed in the yard of a house about a quarter of the way between Schmidt and Kommerscheidt. The mortar men dug in their weapons but were so fatigued that they did not dig foxholes for them-selves but took refuge in a nearby building instead. Nearby, facing northeast to assist a platoon of Company I, was the remaining machine gun platoon of Com-pany M.

The battalion commander, Lt. Col. Flood, set up his CP in a pillbox along the Kommerscheidt road and wanted to get tanks or tank destroyers or antitank guns into Schmidt before daylight, but no reinforcement arrived. The battalion had to content itself with the sixty antitank mines brought by the Weasel supply convoy. The mines were placed on the three hard-surfaced roads into the town. No camouflage was attempted, but bazookas and small arms covered the mines and defensive artillery fire zones were plotted around the town.

A report of the German Eighty-ninth Division of 9 November 1944, although written with a strong propaganda tone, provides an interesting contrast to Amer-ican views of the activities of 3 November:

After the breakthrough east of Simonskall [the attack of the Third Bn., 112th] the enemy appears to have opened a way over [between] Vossenack and Schmidt toward the south and southeast. General [Walter] Bruns [CO of the Eighty-ninth] who hap-pens to be in this sector at this time, orders Captain Olbricht, with two Russian companies [formed from POWs], to contact the enemy. These elements form the first new opposition for the enemy and prevent his unopposed advance. The men, who since the beginning of the battles for the Westwall had repulsed the enemy with heavy losses and had prevented all reconnaissance and patrol activity, experience a sudden change of mind. Gone are the thoughts of rest and relaxation, gone is the hope for an eventual furlough. Hard necessity requires the new^commitment. The thrust of the enemy continues, taking the Kradenberg, the Mestrenger Mühle, and Kommerscheidt. A further advance of the enemy must be prevented under all


circumstances, or all battles, all hardships, all sacrifices of the last weeks and months will have been in vain.... In fast, improvised actions the enemy is first halted. Tank-destroyer troops advance, and our new reserves are moving up. The pressure of the enemy is always increasing; his artillery fire intensifies. At 1619 the following message comes through: "Schmidt taken by enemy." At 1600 Bn. Wolf is assembled and in readiness. Roadblocks on the roads are being prepared for demolition. . . . Confident and determined, Colonel Hesse gives orders to build new positions; the coming attack is being prepared for. Assault guns and tanks are moving up. Our soldiers are overjoyed. It's a long time since they have seen these "big brothers."*

First Night in Schmidt

One of the forest's largest communities, Schmidt sprawled along four roads that intersected in the center of the village. Because Major Hazlett had left one company at Richelskaul, only two rifle companies and his heavy weapons com-pany were available to support the Third Bn. These three companies were split between Kommerscheidt and a supporting position at the woodline where the Kall trail emerged from the gorge. In deference to his regiment's exposed salient, Colonel Peterson had effected a defense in depth.

As night fell, the men preparing to defend Schmidt were cold and wet from fording the Kall, tired from their two-day exertion, and lulled by the ease of their day's conquest. Neither tanks nor antitank guns had crossed the Kall gorge, and only after midnight did the infantry have any antitank defense other than bazookas—the sixty antitank mines. For whatever reason, patrols were not sent out to try to determine the enemy's intentions. The battalion's CO, Colonel Flood, was not even in the village, having located his CP in a pillbox along the road to Kommerscheidt. Taking Schmidt had been easy—too easy.

The situation map at the Twenty-eighth Division's CP showed two battal-ions beyond the Kall, one in Kommerscheidt and the other on the division objec-tive in Schmidt. The capture of Schmidt had cut the main supply route to the German defenses in the Monschau Corridor. German units encountered during the advance, as expected, were the three regiments of the 275th Division (the 983d, 984th, and 985th Grenadier Regts.), representing, in fact, consolidations of numerous kampfgruppen. No one had yet spotted any German armor—a good sign, maybe.

Division and corps commanders all along the front telephoned General Cota that evening with their congratulations. But Cota and his staff had failed to con-sider certain facts before them. During the day intelligence reported that the 272d Volksgrenadier Division had begun relieving the Eighty-ninth Infantry Division in the Monschau Corridor.

Only minutes before Colonel Flood's 112th Infantry entered Schmidt, two German battalions of the Eighty-ninth Division's 1055th Regt., moving back from

*Twen t y - e i gh th Infantry Division After Action Report, November 1944.


the front and traveling northeast, had passed through the village. They stopped between Schmidt and Harscheid for the night, less than a mile beyond the town, the III Bn., 1055th Regt., digging in astride the Harscheid-Schmidt road. A third battalion (II Bn.) of the 1055th Regt., nearing Schmidt after midnight, found its route of withdrawal cut. This battalion dug in on the Schmidt-Strauch road just west of Schmidt. A little patrolling by Colonel Flood's battalion might have revealed the presence of the Germans deployed about Schmidt. In any case, the Twenty-eighth should have been alerted to the presence of the Eighty-ninth Division because, on 3 November units of the V Corps had taken prisoners who informed their interrogators of the division's relief.

What the Twenty-eighth Division could not have known on the preceding day, 2 November, is that at almost the same moment as the Twenty-eighth had begun to attack, staff officers and commanders of Army Group B, the Fifth Panzer, and Seventh Army as well as several corps and divisions, including Straube's LXXIV Korps, had convened with Field Marshal Walther Model at a castle near Cologne (Köln) to conduct a map exercise. Directed by the monocled Army Group B com-mander, the exercise was based on a theoretical American attack along the bound-ary of the Fifth Panzer and Seventh Armies near Huertgen. The meeting had been in session only a short time when an urgent phone call from the LXXIV Corps chief of staff reported the actual American attack. The situation, the chief of staff said, was critical: the LXXIV Corps did not have enough men even to plug the gaps already opened; the Seventh Army would have to be reinforced.

Model promptly ordered General Straube to return to his headquarters. He then directed that the exercise be continued but use actual reports from the front. When news arrived that Vossenack had fallen, Model decided to send a small infantry task force from the 116th Panzer Division to assist Straube. This was the refitted and reorganized command of Major General Siegfried von Waldenburg, a young energetic officer specifically chosen because of his tactful ability in dealing with subordinates. This small kampfgruppe counterattacked the 109th Infantry's penetration north of Germeter. The counterattack was designed to push through to Richelskaul and cut off the part of the 112th Infantry that had penetrated into Vossenack. The main components of the 116th Panzer Division included the 116th Panzer Bn., the Sixtieth and 156th Panzergrenadier Regts., 116th Panzer Recon-naissance Bn., and the 146th Antitank Bn.

Though the counterattack took place at dawn on 3 November, the 109th Infantry beat back what amounted to two thrusts without loss of ground. At the map exercise, which was still in progress on 3 November, news of the counterat-tack's failure prompted Field Marshal Model to send an entire panzer grenadier regiment of the 116th to Huertgen immediately, followed by the rest of the divi-sion that night and the next. Since the pattern of the American attack indicated that Schmidt might also be an objective, Model ordered the 1055th Regt. of the Eighty-ninth Division, already relieved in the Monschau Corridor, to halt in place and make preparations to counterattack, if necessary, at Schmidt.

When the map exercise broke up, the Seventh Army commander, General Erich Brandenberger, returned to his headquarters. Soon after nightfall on 3


November word came about Schmidt. Because he now controlled the 116th Panzer Division, he promptly ordered General Waldenburg to reroute his panzer regiment from Huertgen to Schmidt. At dawn on 4 November, some thirty tanks of the panzer regiment moved to support the 1055th Regt. in an effort to retake Schmidt and Kommerscheidt while Waldenburg's Sixtieth Panzergrenadier Regt., en route to Huertgen, was to launch a new counterattack against the 109th Infantry.

Unlike most German infantry regiments during this period of the war, those of the Eighty-ninth Division had been organized with three battalions instead of two, but the division had only two regiments—the 1055th and 1056th—both of which had been badly mauled in the battles in France and reconstituted from con-glomerate units as well as assorted engineer, antitank, reconnaissance, artillery, sig-nal, antiaircraft, and Landesschützen (local security) units.

The pattern of the German counteraction was rapidly taking shape. Because of the terrain and the mine fields, the bulk of the 116th Panzer Division's armor was to operate near Schmidt and Kommerscheidt in conjunction with the Eighty-ninth Division. The panzer division's two panzer grenadier regiments were to strike at the 109th Infantry and at Vossenack. Having traveled at night, neither armor nor infantry encountered American fighter-bombers and so arrived in good shape.

On the American side, as daylight approached on 4 November, General Cota was committing his only infantry reserve, a battalion of the 110th Infantry, to move south from Vossenack through the woods to Simonskall in an effort to turn the stiff German line at Raffelsbrand. The attack met negligible resistance. By 0900 the battalion had seized Simonskall, but the gain failed to have any effect on the resistance of the pillboxes at Raffelsbrand.

Before daylight that morning (4 November), the tankers of Captain Hostrup's Company A, 707th Tank Bn., warmed up their motors for another try at travers-ing the precipitous trail. The First Platoon, commanded by 1st Lt. Raymond E. Fleig, led off.

Lieutenant Fleig's tank had only just entered the woods on the trail from Vossenack and begun to advance along the slippery narrow path when it was jarred by a sudden explosion. It had struck a mine. No one was injured, but a track was disabled; the tank partially blocked the trail. The platoon sergeant, S.Sgt. Anthony (Tony) R. Spooner, suggested winching the other tanks around Lt. Fleig's immo-bilized M4 Sherman. Using the tow cable from Fleig's tank and the tank itself as a pivot, Spooner winched his tank around and back onto the narrow trail. Fleig boarded Spooner's M4 and continued down the trail, directing Sgt. Spooner to repeat the process with the remaining three tanks. As Lt. Fleig continued to inch down the dark trail, sharp curves necessitated much stopping and backing. The lieutenant noticed that his tank was tearing away part of the left shoulder of the trail but did not consider the damage to be serious. With slow, painstaking effort, he made his way toward the river, crossed the bridge, and proceeded up the oppo-site slope. There the route presented little difficulty except for three switchbacks where Fleig had to dismount and direct the driver. It was just beginning to grow light when his tank churned into Kommerscheidt.

Back on the trail, Sgt. Spooner succeeded in winching the three remaining


tanks around the disabled vehicle. Sgt. Jack L. Barton's tank led the group and came to a sharp bend, which was precarious due to a large outcropping of rock on the right embankment. Then Barton's tank partially threw a track. Captain Hostrup came forward to determine what was holding things up and directed the next tank in line to tow Sgt. Barton's tank back onto the trail. The track was fixed, and, using the trailing tank as an anchor, Barton successfully rounded the curve. He in turn anchored the rear tank and it too passed the obstacle.

Coming across Lt. Huston, whose engineer platoon from Company B, Twen-tieth Engineers, was working on the trail, the tank crews asked the engineers to blow off the projecting rock that had caused them so much difficulty. The lieu-tenant had no demolitions, so he used three German Teller mines that had been removed from the trail. The resulting explosion had little effect.

The last tank in line, Sgt. James J. Markey's, arrived at the rock outcropping a few minutes later in spite of difficulty with a crumbling left bank. The engineer platoon assisted in guiding it safely around the bend. Although four tanks were now past the initial obstacles of the narrow trail, the last three still had some dis-tance to go before they would be in a position to assist in the defense of Kom-merscheidt and Schmidt. It was still not quite daylight.

4 November

A few minutes before sunrise German artillery opened fire, and a hail of shells began to crash among the hastily prepared defenses along the southern edge of Schmidt. Shells rained in from the northeast, east, and southeast. The shelling went back and forth over the town for more than thirty minutes. The bombardment quickly cut American telephone lines, and at this early hour rear area operators took a long time to realize that there was a break and to turn on their radios.

Probably the first to sight the Germans was Company Is Second Platoon on the left of the Harscheidt road. Shortly after dawn a runner reported to Captain Raymond R. Rokey at the company's CP that observers had spotted some sixty German infantry [elements of the I and III Battalions, 1055th Regt.] in a patch of woods about a thousand yards northeast of Schmidt, forming to attack. Hav-ing no communication with his platoons except by runner, Captain Rokey left immediately for the Second Platoon's area. Although the artillery Forward Observer (FO) at Company Is CP promptly put in a call for artillery fire, for some reason the call produced no immediate results.

Company M machine gunners, positioned on the left flank of Company L, fired on ten or fifteen German soldiers who emerged from the woods and dashed for some houses at Zubendchen, a settlement north of the Harscheidt road. A sec-tion of 81mm mortars directed its fire at the houses, scoring at least one or two direct hits. Other German landsers continued to advance from the northeast. Com-pany Is Second Platoon, coming under light mortar fire, employed small arms to repulse an uncoordinated attack against its position.

A heavier assault struck almost simultaneously against the right flank of


Company L along the Hasenfeld road to the southeast. Riflemen opened fire with automatic weapons as the Germans crossed a small hill to their front. A German machine gun less than fifty yards away at the base of a building in the uncleared southeastern edge of Schmidt returned fire. Taking action, a squad leader, S.Sgt. Frank Ripperdam, crawled forward with several of his men until he was almost on top of the German gun. Suddenly five landsers jumped up, yelling in English, "Don't shoot! Don't shoot!" Sgt. Ripperdam and two other men stood up to accept their surrender, only to have the Germans jump back quickly into their emplace-ment and open fire with the machine gun. Dropping again to the ground, the sergeant directed one of his men with a rifle grenade to fire at the machine gun. Ripperdam saw the grenade hit at least two of the Germans, but the machine gun continued to fire. One of the Company L men suddenly sprang up and ran for-ward behind a sparse hedgerow, firing his rifle in a one-man assault. The Germans shifted their gun and raked his body with fire, killing him instantly. Sgt. Ripper-dam and the remaining men withdrew to their defensive positions, but the Ger-mans had evidently been discouraged, for there was no more fire from the MG position.

Holding the Germans to their front with small arms and mortar fire, the men on Company L's right flank could see Germans infiltrating on their right through the Company K positions. A machine gun opened intense fire from a road junction near the uncleared houses on the Hasenfeld road. The Germans were now attacking from the east, south, and west.

Supporting artillery of the 229th FA Bn. was engaged in harassing fire mis-sions until 0823 when an airborne observer called for and received twelve rounds on Harscheidt, even though the previous call from the FO with Company I still had produced no response. At 0850 American artillery joined the battle with its first effective defensive fire—216 rounds of TOT (Time on Target) on a concen-tration of German tanks spotted to the east just south of the Harscheidt-Schmidt road. The 229th alone fired 373 rounds until 1000, with supporting corps artillery and the 155's of the 108th FA Bn. joining in.

German panzers now entered the battle. With the tanks came more German infantry: five tanks and a battalion of infantry were reported along the Harscheidt road and another five tanks and a battalion of infantry along the Hasenfeld road.

The American defenders opened up with their bazookas, but the panzers rum-bled effortlessly on, firing their main guns into foxholes and buildings. On the Hasenfeld road, at least one Company L bazooka scored a hit, but the tank stopped only briefly, and then moved on again. This sight demoralized the GIs.

The attack against Company K on the south had spilled over to the south-west, and was joined by other landsers attacking from the west. Company I's Third Platoon on the right of the Strauch road found itself under assault. A runner reported the situation to Captain Rokey, the company commander, who was still with his hard-pressed Second Platoon. Rokey sent word back for the Third Pla-toon to withdraw from its foxholes in the open fields to the cover of the houses in Schmidt.

Along the Harscheidt and Hasenfeld roads the German panzers spotted the


feeble rows of mines laid across the road and disdainfully pulled off to the sides, skirting them. Then they were among the buildings of the town and the foxholes of the defenders, systematically pumping round after round into their positions. Along the south and southwest positions the situation rapidly disintegrated. Com-pany K's defenses broke under the attack.

American riflemen streamed from their foxholes to the sanctuary of the woods to the southwest. As they sought relief from the pounding they had been taking, their route of escape was actually taking them farther into German territory. They were joined in their flight by men from Company L.

Another Company K group of about platoon size retreated into the Com-pany L section of town and told a platoon leader that the Germans had knocked out one of the heavy machine guns attached to Company K and captured the other. The Germans had completely overrun the company's positions. The Com-pany L platoon leader sent three men to his company's CP near the church in the center of town to get a better picture of the situation. The men quickly returned, reporting that they had been prevented from reaching the CP by fire from Ger-mans established in the church and that there did not seem to be anyone on their right flank.

The first German troops to reenter Schmidt were a platoon and a commu-nications section of the III Bn., 1055th Regt., supported by tanks and assault guns. The panzers plunged through the positions of the First Platoon, Company L, in the center of the company's line to the east. They overran the company's 60mm mortars, knocking out two of them with direct hits. Notifying the company's CP that they could not hold out, the Americans retreated into the woods to the south-west where they had seen Company K troops withdrawing.

The retreat by small groups and platoons had turned into a disorderly exo-dus. Captain Rokey ordered his Second Platoon, Company I, to pull back to the protection of the town's buildings, but the German fire was so intense that con-trol became virtually impossible. The men fled, not to the buildings as they had been ordered, but north and west over the open ground and into the woods.

In the Company K sector, 2d Lt. Richard Tyo, a platoon leader, had noticed the withdrawal of the company's machine gun section and First Platoon. Told that they had orders to withdraw, Lt. Tyo took charge of the troops around him and led them back toward Kommerscheidt. On the way they passed two men from the company's Third Platoon, one with a broken leg and the other lying wounded in his foxhole. The wounded men said their platoon had gone "that way" and pointed toward the woods to the southwest. Tyo and his group continued north, however, and joined those struggling to get back to Kommerscheidt.

The headquarters groups of Companies L and K tried to form a line in the center of Schmidt, but even this turned into confusion. Someone in the line said an order had come to withdraw. The word spread quickly—no one questioned its source. A Company K man remembered the forty-five prisoners in a nearby base-ment, and two men headed them back double-time toward Kommerscheidt.

The 81mm mortar platoon on the northern edge of town had received its first indication of a counterattack shortly after daybreak when a round from an 88


slammed against the house near their dug-in mortars, seriously wounding one man. The mortar crews, providing on-call fire for the rifle companies, were so intent on their job that they did not notice that the rifle companies were with-drawing. Well along in the morning a lieutenant from Company I stopped at their position and told them the rifle companies had all fallen back and German tanks were only a few houses away. Carrying the seriously wounded man on a stretcher made from a ladder, the mortar men withdrew. Once the withdrawal had begun, the companies lost all semblance of organization; each small group tried on its own to make its way back toward Kommerscheidt.

It was now about 1000. Schmidt was being abandoned. The battalion's CO notified the companies he still had contact with that the battalion's CP was pulling its switchboard and that they should withdraw. Little could be done for the seri-ously wounded. Several aid men stayed behind to lend what assistance they could. As the skies cleared around noon, the 396th Fighter-Bomber Squadron's P-47s dive-bombed the village. The squadron termed results of the bombing "excellent," but this did not change the final result. By 1100 most of the GIs who were to get out of Schmidt had done so. By 1230 the loss of Schmidt was recognized at Twenty-eighth Division's HQ.

While the Third Bn., 112th Infantry, was engaged in the fight for Schmidt, other troops of the regiment were in motion. At 0500 the Third Bn. aid station had received a message from Colonel Flood, the battalion commander, to move forward. Lt. Muglia and T3g. John M. Shedio moved into the Kall Woods to reconnoiter for an aid station site.

Beside the trail about 300 yards from the Kall River, Muglia found a log dugout approximately twelve by eighteen feet in size. The roof had been con-structed of two layers of heavy logs providing excellent protection from all but a direct artillery hit.

The three Weasel supply trains, which had reached Schmidt after midnight had been under the command of 1st Lt. William George, the Third Bn.'s motor officer. Just before dawn the three Weasels returned to Germeter, carrying men wounded during the previous day's capture of Schmidt. Lt. George then agreed to return to Schmidt with the battalion's antitank platoon leader and a load of ammu-nition. On reaching the trail's entrance into the woods southeast of Vossenack shortly after dawn, the party found the trail blocked by Lt. Fleig's abandoned tank. Although other tanks had previously passed this obstacle, the group gave up attempts to move further when the Germans shelled the area and one of the sup-ply sergeants was killed.

The abandoned tank also caused problems for the tanks of Company A, 707th Tank Bn. The Second Platoon of three tanks began its journey before day-light. In S.Sgt. Anthony S. Zaroslinski's lead tank rode 2d Lt. John J. Clarke, whose own vehicle had been immobilized by a mine the day before in Vossenack. When his tank reached Fleig's abandoned Sherman, Sgt. Zaroslinski, unaware that the First Platoon had successfully bypassed the obstacle by winching the tanks around it, attempted to pass on the left. The venture ended disastrously: Zaroslin-ski's tank slipped off the road, and the sergeant found himself unable to back it


up because of the steep and slippery incline. When the crew dismounted to inves-tigate, a barrage of German shells struck the area killing Zaroslinski and wound-ing Lt. Clarke.

Sgt. Walton R. Allen, commanding the next tank in the column, decided to try squeezing between the two disabled tanks, using Sgt. Zaroslinski's tank as a buffer on the left to keep his own tank from sliding into the draw. Succeeding in this effort, he dismounted and turned his tank over to Sgt. Kenneth E. Yarman, who was in charge of the next tank in the column. Allen then led Yarman's tank through, boarded it, and continued down the trail.

Sgt. Yarman, now commanding the lead tank of the Second Platoon, reached the bend where the rock outcropping continued to make passage difficult. As he tried to pass, his tank slipped off the left side of the trail and threw its left track. The next tank under Sgt. Allen reached a point short of the outcropping and also slipped off the trail to the left, throwing both its tracks. About the same time, Sgt. Markey, commanding the last tank of the First Platoon tanks, which had traveled down the trail the night before, reported back to his company commander, Cap-tain Hostrup, that his tank had gotten stuck near the bottom of the gorge and had also thrown a track.

Only one tank, Lt. Fleig's, had reached Kommerscheidt. Two others were now past the river. But behind them on the trail sat five disabled Shermans. Still farther to the rear and waiting to come forward were the four tanks of the Third Platoon. While the armor remained stymied on the Kall trail, precious time was slipping by. For some time now the crewmen had been hearing the sound of fight-ing at Schmidt, and by 1100 occasional stragglers from the town had begun to pass them heading toward the rear.

Still working with hand tools on the Kall trail was Company A and Lt. Hus-ton's platoon of Company B, Twentieth Engineers. Occasional artillery fire wounded six of the engineers. Huston's Company B platoon, informed by the tank crews that they thought they could replace the tracks on their disabled tanks with-out too much delay, worked to repair the damage done by the tanks to the deli-cate left bank of the trail. Although almost twenty-four hours had elapsed since Company K, 112th Infantry, had first entered Schmidt, the division commanders seemed unaware of the poor condition of the Kall trail and that there was only one company plus a platoon of engineers, without heavy equipment or demoli-tion material, working on the trail.

At dawn on 4 November, just before the Germans counterattacked at Schmidt, the officers of Companies A and D, 112th Infantry, had taken stock of their situation in Kommerscheidt and made minor adjustments to the positions they had set up the night before. The Americans found themselves situated on the lower portion of the Kommerscheidt-Schmidt ridge, with densely wooded draws on three sides, and another wooded draw curving around to the southeast along their front. A shortage of troops had caused them to forego occupying the houses along the southern road leading toward Schmidt. Company C was in a reserve posi-tion at the edge of the woods north of town. Their only armor support was Lt. Fleig's M4, but just before noon Fleig's tank was joined by Sgt. Barton's and Sgt.


Spooner's. After daylight the Germans harassed the Kommerscheidt positions with occasional light artillery and mortar barrages.

From the direction of Schmidt the men could hear heavy firing. By mid-morning it was evident that a disaster was occurring. Small groups of frightened, disorganized men began to filter back through the Kommerscheidt positions with stories that "they're throwing everything they've got at us." By 1030 the scattered groups had reached the proportions of a demoralized mob. The officers and men of Major Hazlett's battalion tried frantically to halt the terrified men. In some cases, it took physical force and even the point of a pistol to make them join Kom-merscheidt's defenders. "There was no holding them,' said S.Sgt. Frank Ripper-dam of Company L. "They were pretty frantic and panicky."*

When the Germans did not immediately pursue the retreating GIs from Schmidt, the Third Bn. troops found an opportunity to reorganize. Company I, withdrawing through the wooded draw southeast of Kommerscheidt, found it had about seventy-two men and with a few stragglers from other companies joined the center of the Kommerscheidt defense along the southern face of the town. Approx-imately twenty-six men with Sgt. Ripperdam of Company L, augmented by a small group of battalion HQ personnel, went into position on the northwest fringe of town, facing slightly south of west, on the right flank of the Third Platoon, Company A. The remnants of Company K, about thirty-five officers and men, including the group that had retreated with Lt. Tyo, were organized into two under-strength platoons: one of about fourteen men dug in at the rear of Kom-merscheidt (north); the other faced to the northeast guarding the left flank. The Company D commander, Captain John B. Huyck, made contact with Captain Piercey, Company M commander, and coordinated the fire of Company D's weapons with that of those surviving from Company M—three 81mm mortars without ammunition and three heavy machine guns. The latter went into posi-tion on the southwest edge of Kommerscheidt. Many men continued past Kom-merscheidt. Some were stopped at the Company C position, but others withdrew all the way to Vossenack and Germeter. Rough estimates indicated that only about two hundred men of the Third Bn. joined in defending Kommerscheidt.

Even as the Third Bn. was being knocked out of Schmidt, the battalion's assis-tant S-3, 1st Lt. Leon Simon, was making his way forward with a regimental order instructing the Third Bn. to hold temporarily in Schmidt while the 110th Infantry continued its attack against Raffelsbrand. Lt. Simon got no farther than Kom-merscheidt where he was directed by Colonel Flood, the Third Bn. commander, to return and tell regiment he absolutely had to have more tanks. Despite radio communication with Kommerscheidt, the Schmidt action was a confusing blur at regimental HQ. Before Lt. Simon could return, the regimental executive officer, Lt. Col. Landon J. Lockett, and the S-2, Captain Hunter M. Montgomery, accom-panied by two newspaper men and an MP/driver, went forward to get pictures and some stories—obviously not aware of the nightmare they were heading into. When Simon returned to the regiment's HQ, there had been no word from Colonel

*Charles Whiting, The Battle of the Huertgen Forest, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989, p. 82.


Lockett's party. Colonel Peterson, the regimental commander, told Simon to lead him to Kommerscheidt. Shortly after they left, the assistant division commander, Brigadier General George A. Davis, and his aide also departed for Kommerscheidt.

Although the Germans did not immediately pursue the retreating Americans to Kommerscheidt, artillery fire and direct fire from tanks and self-propelled guns in Schmidt harassed the GIs. Then, at about 1400, at least five German armored vehicles accompanied by a small force of infantry attacked from the wooded draw to the southeast of Kommerscheidt. The assault force was from the 1055th Regt., assisted by tanks of the 116th Panzer Bn.

The German panzers, Mark IVs and Vs, stood out of bazooka range and fired round after round into the foxholes and buildings of the town. Artillery observers with the defenders called for numerous concentrations against the attack, but they failed to stop the German tanks. From 1000 to 1700 the 229th FA Bn. fired at least 462 rounds into the Kommerscheidt-Schmidt area, which were farther aug-mented by the guns of the 108th FA Bn. Captain W. M. Chmura, a liaison officer from the 229th FA Bn., described the supporting fire as "terrific."*

As the attack hit, Lt. Fleig and the other two tank commanders of Company A, 707th Tank Bn., were in a shallow draw in an open field just northwest of Kom-merscheidt near the woodline. The tankers pulled their Shermans up on a slight rise and fired at the German panzers, Fleig claiming two and his companions a third. Noticing that some of the GIs were retreating from the left flank of the town, Fleig maneuvered in that direction entering an orchard just in time to see a Mark V Panther approaching. At a range of 200 to 300 yards Fleig fired, hitting the German twice, but with high explosive ammunition, leaving the Panther's tough hide undamaged. The lieutenant then discovered that he had no armor-pierc-ing ammunition inside the tank, all of it being outside in the Sherman's sponson rack. When the German crewmen, evidently frightened by the high explosive hits, jumped out of their tank, Fleig ceased firing and turned his turret to get at the rack. The Germans seized the opportunity to reenter their tank and open fire, but their first round was a miss. Working feverishly, Lt. Fleig and his crew thrust one of the AP rounds into the gun chamber and slammed home the breechblock. Their first round cut the barrel of the German's main gun in two. Three more rounds in quick succession tore into the left side of the Panther's hull, setting the tank on fire and killing its crew. Fleig returned to the fight on the right.

The remaining panzers continued to blast the positions around the town. One tank worked its way up a trail to the southwest where Sgt. Tony Kudiak, of the First Bn. HQ, acting as a rifleman, and Pvt. Paul Lealsy, crept out of their holes to meet it with a bazooka. Spotting the two Americans, the German turned his machine guns on them, then his main gun, but missed. Kudiak and Lealsy went to get help. While they were gone, the panzer approached to within twenty-five yards of a stone building at the southern edge of town, a second panzer pulling into position nearby. Just then P-47 fighter-bombers suddenly materialized, roaring

*Charles B. MacDonald and Sidney T. Mathews. Three Battles: Arnaville, Altuzzo, and Schmidt. Washington, D.C.: Dept. of the Army, 1952, p. 221.


down and dropping two bombs. The first German tank was so damaged by the bombs that it could not move, although it still continued to fire. Sgt. Kudiak, hav-ing returned, finished it off with one bazooka rocket that penetrated the side just above the track, setting the tank ablaze. The second German tank backed off with-out firing.

In the midst of the battle, Colonel Peterson arrived on foot at the northern woodline. He had abandoned his regimental command jeep just west of the Kall River. At the woodline he took charge of about thirty stragglers from the Third Bn. who had been assembled there and led them into Kommerscheidt.

With the arrival of air support and the continued hammering by artillery, mortars, small arms, and the three Shermans, the German assault was stopped at about 1600. The defenders had sustained numerous casualties, but in the process they had knocked out at least five German tanks without losing any of their own. Like roving linebackers, Lt. Fleig and his three tanks had provided an obviously needed backbone to the defense.

General Davis, assistant division CO, had also come forward during the after-noon. He conferred with Colonel Peterson and the battalion commanders in Kom-merscheidt on the situation and then radioed a report on the condition of the men and equipment beyond the Kall to division. After spending the night in a Kom-merscheidt cellar, he returned to the rear the next morning.

As night came, the men of Companies A and D and the remnants of the Third Bn. worked to consolidate their positions. Colonel Peterson warned Lt. Fleig not to withdraw his tanks for any reason. He feared a counterattack that night and was concerned that, if this small tank force were withdrawn, the infantry might pull out. Division HQ had lost control of the battle mainly through the lack of information as to what was really going on along the Main Line of Resis-tance (MLR). On the night of 4 to 5 November, word reached Courtney Hodges at First Army HQ that the troops beyond the Kall had attacked during the after-noon to retake Schmidt and had gained 300 yards. In fact nobody had attacked; the soldiers were too busy just trying to hold their ground.

While fighting was going on in Kommerscheidt, the engineers were busy along the trail. Company A, Twentieth Engineers, continued to work on the switch-back curves east of the Kall, and Lt. Huston's platoon, Company B, struggled with the difficult stretch west of the river. Although explosives had now been brought up, Huston's men were not able to blast away the rocky outcroppings for fear of damaging the Shermans that were being worked on nearby.

Captain Lutz, the Company B commander, sent a six-man patrol under 1st Lt. George E. Horn from Vossenack to check on a rumored alternate route to the

Kall farther to the southwest. The patrol returned after a firefight—having killed three Germans and capturing four. The proposed alternate route, Lt. Horn reported, was a swampy firebreak blocked by felled trees. Captain Lutz then ordered Horn to take his platoon and assist Huston.

Company A's commander, Captain Henry R. Doherty, satisfied with the work done by his men on the trail east of the river, decided at about 1430 to move his company back across the Kall and into the woods south of Vossenack for night


bivouac. As they reached the exit of the trail from the woods southeast of Vosse-nack, he met General Davis going forward to Kommerscheidt. The General ordered the company to take up defensive positions on either side of the trail and to "guard the road near the bridge." Captain Doherty reluctantly obeyed the order, placing his Third Platoon under 1st Lt. Aurelio Pellino in the woods north of the trail near the western edge of the woods and the First and Second Platoons on the trail where it entered the woods. The Third Platoon was told to put a security guard of three men under T4g. James A. Krieder at the bridge. Except for the bridge guard, the positions were hardly of any value in defending the trail as a thick expanse of woods separated the defenders from the bridge and the defense covered only a part of the trail, near the northern entrance into the Kall Woods.

By noon on 4 November the hard-working, but unfortunate tankers of Com-pany A, 707th Tank Bn., had accomplished little toward putting their five dis-abled tanks back in operation. Captain Hostrup found that Sgt. Markey's tank, the one nearest the bridge, could not be pulled from where it blocked the trail, but he did discover a switchback trail running to the left that would permit pas-sage of vehicles around it. Sgt. Yarman's tank, the lead vehicle of the Second Pla-toon with its thrown track, was at the sharp bend where the rock outcropping hin-dered passage. Approximately 150 yards further up the trail was Sgt. Allen's tank with both tracks thrown. The other two tanks, abandoned near the entrance to the woods, were those of Lt. Fleig and Lt. Clarke (Sgt. Zaroslinski's tank).

After several hours of trying, the tankers finally managed to replace the track on Sgt. Yarman's Sherman. Yarman pulled ahead about ten feet and again threw the track, this time damaging the left idler wheel. The track was replaced and again Yarman drove a short distance, and once more the track jumped off. By this time it was almost 1600, and men from the Kommerscheidt action were pouring back along the trail telling of the fierce pounding they had received. Radioing Colonel Ripple, his battalion commander, Captain Hostrup insisted that if more tanks were to get through to Kommerscheidt, more engineers were needed to open the trail. Colonel Ripple radioed back at about 1730 that relief was on the way—more engineers as well as tank maintenance crews were coming.

The maintenance officer of Company A, 707th, 1st Lt. Stanley Lisy, his crew, and the battalion maintenance officer, Captain George A. Harris, reached the dis-abled tanks at about 1900. Working on Sgt. Yarman's tank near the rock outcrop-ping, Lt Lisy's crew had the troublesome track on again by 2200. The tank moved twenty-five yards farther and off came the track. The difficulty was diagnosed as a damaged idler wheel. A replacement wheel was salvaged from Lt. Fleig's aban-doned tank and quickly installed.

Soon after dark a tank supply group with a jeep and five Weasels towing quarter-ton trailers loaded with rations, tank ammo, and ,30-cal rounds for the infantry, had started for Kommerscheidt from Germeter. Learning in Vossenack of the difficulties along the trail, the officers in charge of the column, Captain William H. Pynchon, S-4, 707th Tank Bn., and 1st Lt. Howard S. Rogers, Recon-naissance Platoon leader, HQ Company, 707th, reconnoitered and then led the supply train to the entrance of the trail shortly after midnight. A guide carrying


a white handkerchief moved ahead of each vehicle on foot. At a point where the trail slanted discernibly to the left and jagged rocks projected from the right embankment, the lead Weasel threw a track. It took about fifteen minutes to replace the track before the column could continue.

German artillery fire constantly harassed the trail, but the supply column was able to reach Sgt. Yarman's tank by about 0100. Doubling its efforts to install the new idler wheel on the tank, the maintenance crew completed the job at approx-imately 0200. As the tank started forward, success at last seemed within the grasp of the exhausted crewmen. It moved only about ten yards before the left shoulder of the trail gave way, and once more the track came off.

Captain Pynchon had brought with him a timely message for Captain Hostrup: "Holiday 6 [General Cota, division commander] wants to give you all the time possible to retrieve your vehicles, BUT that main supply route must be open by daybreak. If necessary, you will roll your immobilized tanks down the slope and into the draw."

Captain Hostrup ordered Sgt. Allen, whose tank was 150 yards up the hill, to fasten the tow cable of his tank to a tree and pull his Sherman as far off the road as possible, allowing the jeeps and Weasels to pass. Sgt. Yarman's M4 at the rock outcropping was also pulled off to the left. However, Captain Pynchon's men were required to assist in digging around Sgt. Yarman's tank, before passage was assured. By now it was 0300, and the men of the supply train were getting worried, hop-ing to complete their mission to Kommerscheidt and return before daylight.

The column passed Lt. Fleig's and Sgt. Zaroslinski's abandoned tanks with-out difficulty. At Sgt. Markey's tank, nearer the bottom of the draw, the switch-back to the left provided passage. The trail above and below Sgt. Markey's tank was intersected by two branches of the north-south river road and a road leading to the Mestrenger Mühle (mill). To pass Sgt. Markey's tank, each Weasel had to detach its trailer and back up the river road to the north since the short turn at the intersection of the Kall trail and the river road was too abrupt for a forward turn. At the sharp junction seventy yards up the river road the trailers were reat-tached after having been pulled by hand over the slippery, rock-studded trail; then the Weasels and trailers continued to the south along the Mestrenger Mühle trail and back onto the main trail.

Beyond the Kall, as the trail rose up from the gorge to Kommerscheidt, the supply train encountered two more switchbacks necessitating 180-degree turns, and the laborious task of moving the heavy trailers by hand. Despite these difficulties, the supply group reached Kommerscheidt by about 0430. After quickly unload-ing their vehicles, the soldiers departed the town. It was just beginning to get light when the Weasels returned to their supply assembly point at Germeter.

The arrival of additional German units during 4 November helped to tighten their hold on the Twenty-eighth Division. To the south, in the Monschau Corri-dor, continued relief by the 272d Volksgrenadier Division made available the Eighty-ninth Division's second regiment, the 1056th. The Eighty-ninth Division's commander, Major General Bruns, ordered the 1056th Regt. into the woods west of Kommerscheidt to hold a line between Simonskall and the 1055th Regt.


A battalion of the 347th Infantry Division, originally to the south of the Eighty-ninth Division, had been moved into a defensive position astride the Hasen-feld-Schmidt road during the day, but there was no indication that this battalion participated in any of the attacks on Kommerscheidt.

Untroubled by the lack of American offensive action elsewhere on the Sev-enth Army's front, the German army commander, Erich Brandenberger, took per-sonal charge of the campaign to push back the Twenty-eighth Division. Bran-denberger directed Lt. Gen. Hans Schmidt's 275th Division to hold the wings of the American salient and prevent its widening. General Bruns's Eighty-ninth Divi-sion, assisted by the 116th Panzer Bn., was to continue hammering at the Ameri-cans in an effort to remove the Kommerscheidt salient.

The Germans planned to renew the attack against Kommerscheidt the next day (5 November), to continue the build-up of the 156th Panzergrenadier Regt. against Vossenack on the north, and to send the 116th Panzer Division's Recon-naissance Bn. down the Kall gorge in an effort to link up with elements of the 1056th Regt., Eighty-ninth Division, and thus cut the American supply route across the Kall.

In addition to the organic artillery, assault guns, and antitank weapons of the three committed German divisions—116th Panzer, the Eighty-ninth, and the 275th—on 4 November, Army Group B and Seventh Army sent several artillery, assault gun, antitank, and mortar battalions into the sector, and LXXIV Korps also committed artillery and antitank guns from divisions not affected by the Twenty-eighth Division's attack (possibly the 347th Infantry Division, and the Twelfth and 272d Volksgrenadier Divisions). These additions accounted for a marked increase in German artillery fire.

Earlier in the evening, before Captain Pynchon's supply train had gone for-ward, the Third Platoon, Company B, Twentieth Engineers, under 2d Lt. Reynold A. Ossola, had been sent to assist Lt. Huston's and Lt. Horn's engineer platoons along the western section of the Kall trail. With the Third Platoon went an air com-pressor, 300 pounds of TNT, and a bulldozer. After the tanks were partially removed from the trail and Captain Pynchon's supply column had passed, the engineers blasted the rock outcropping. By 0400 the trail was completely open.

Company C, Twentieth Engineers, originally in battalion reserve, had moved during the morning of 4 November to a forward bivouac area near Germeter. The headquarters group and First Platoon under the company commander, Captain Walter C. Mahaley, were ordered to move across the Kall to a position allowing them to assist Company A, Twentieth Engineers, the next day They left Germe-ter at about 2330 on foot and by 0300 (5 November) were in bivouac near Com-pany C, 112th Infantry, where the trail formed a large loop on the hill above the east bank switchbacks. Two squads of the company's Third Platoon were to move by truck with 5,000 pounds of explosives to the vicinity of the Kall bridge. There they were to be prepared to blow pillboxes in the Kommerscheidt-Schmidt area. Under the platoon leader, 2d Lt. Benjamin Johns, these two squads, the First and Third, arrived in Vossenack after midnight, learned that the Kall trail was still clogged with tanks, and returned to the forward bivouac area near Germeter.


Misinformation throughout the day of 4 November had kept the Division HQ ill informed about the condition of the trail across the gorge. Most reports repeatedly asserted that the supply route was open, thus contributing to the fail-ure of the commanders to realize the seriousness of the situation. Neither the reg-iment nor the division had liaison officers on the spot. Not until approximately 1500 had General Cota intervened personally by ordering the 1171st Engineer Group commander, Colonel Edmund K. Daley, to send a "competent officer" to supervise work on the trail. Colonel Daley not only visited the area himself but ordered the commander of the Twentieth Engineer Combat Bn., Lt. Col. J. E. Sonnefield, to take personal charge.

The 893d Tank Destroyer Bn., equipped with M10 Wolverines mounting a 3-inch gun, had been attached initially to the Twenty-eighth Division as indirect artillery support, but was prepared to move forward into the fight. However, the battalion had only two companies available, B and C, Company A having been attached to the 102d Cavalry Group to the north. In all, twenty-three destroyers were available for commitment.

Until 4 November the tank destroyers were in indirect firing positions just south of Zweifall and north of Roetgen. A Reconnaissance Company platoon leader attached to Company C, 1st Lt. Jack W. Fuller, was sent forward to reconnoiter the Kall trail in the event the destroyers would later be ordered to Kommerscheidt.

About 2315 Captain Pugh, Company C, 893d, having moved up to provide support in Vossenack, was ordered to prepare his company for movement to Kom-merscheidt. Lt. Fuller and Captain Sidney C. Cole, commander of the Recon-naissance Company, 893d, made another reconnaissance of the Kall trail and returned by about 0200 with news that the route was still clogged with disabled tanks but would probably be open by daylight. Company C's First and Third Pla-toons went into an assembly area near the entrance of the trail, ready to move to Kommerscheidt. The Second Platoon under 1st Lt. Curtis M. Edmund, near Vosse-nack, was ordered to be ready to follow the other platoons across the Kall River. En route one of Lt. Edmund's destroyers struck a mine near Richelskaul and had to be abandoned, leaving the already weakened platoon with just two guns.

On 3 November the Third Bn., 112th Infantry, had laid telephone wire as it advanced to Schmidt, and the First Bn., 112th, laid wire to Kommerscheidt. On 4 November both circuits apparently broke down, and despite efforts to replace them the German shelling and patrol activity kept the wire out of service for the rest of the operation. Circuits between Germeter and Vossenack were repaired at least twenty times, but there were still long periods with no telephone communi-cation to Vossenack. However, radios were generally giving satisfactory service although the engineers in the Kall gorge had found reception poor in the low areas. Nevertheless, all requests for artillery fire were apparently getting through.

Artillery of the 229th FA Bn., operating in direct support of the 112th Infantry, fired missions throughout the night against possible German assembly areas in the Kommerscheidt-Schmidt area.


5 November

The men of the First and Third Battalions, 112th Infantry, at Kommerscheidt spent a fitful night. Many had no overcoats or blankets to keep them warm (items left behind at the line of departure at Vossenack on 3 November), some tried to dig their foxholes deeper to ward off the icy cold. Just at dawn the German artillery and mortars suddenly roared again, the disheartened infantrymen dreading what they knew would follow. Positions were a haphazard intermingling of companies and pla-toons, with only three tanks in support. A previous estimate of two hundred men from the remnants of the Third Bn., which had retreated from Schmidt, was scaled down to one hundred. In addition, Companies A and D had suffered some combat depletion. Company C, in reserve along the woodline to the north, could contribute only little in the way of direct fire support in defense of the town.

It was just after dawn when the German fire lifted. Through the early morn-ing mist observers could see at least five German panzers emerge from Schmidt and head toward Kommerscheidt, firing as they came. A small force of German infantry advanced out of the wooded draw to the southeast and launched an attack against Company As left flank. The First Platoon and its heavy weapons support engaged the infantry with small arms, machine gun, and mortar fire; artillery of the 229th FA Bn. fired several heavy concentrations. The German infantry attack was stopped, but the tanks continued on.

Lt. Fleig and his three Shermans (Company A, 707th Tank Bn.) were still in their shallow draw northwest of the town. While the German tanks were still at long range, the three American tanks moved to the crest of the draw and fired, scoring seven hits on one Mark V Panther and immobilizing it. The remaining panzers continued to fire but did not press the assault. Supporting American artillery fire fell on the tanks and on Schmidt. Kommerscheidt had held again, but casualties included both the company commander, Captain Rokey, and the exec-utive officer of Company I.

The two platoons of tank destroyers (Company C, 893d TD Bn.) in posi-tion southeast of Vossenack received word that the trail was clear after the engi-neers had blasted at approximately 0400. Lt. Leonard, accompanied by Lt. Fuller, reconnaissance platoon leader, headed out before dawn with his First Platoon. As Lt. McElroy's Third Platoon followed, one of his destroyers threw a track as it attempted to move out of the muddy assembly area, but the others continued, finding that although the route was indeed clear, to travel it was a time-consum-ing task. Leonard's platoon reached Kommerscheidt at about 0930. By the time McElroy reached the woodline overlooking the town, his destroyer had developed an oil leak and was overheating. He halted to work on it, holding up the tank destroyers behind him temporarily. Eventually he pulled off the trail and joined another crew as the column continued into town. The Third Platoon arrived in Kommerscheidt at about 1000, adding seven destroyers to the defense.

At about 0920 a message from General Cota reached Kommerscheidt, order-ing Colonel Peterson to renew the attack and recapture Schmidt without delay. That was as far as the order got. As the message arrived the men in Kommerscheidt


were being subjected to another German assault. German infantry again struck the left-flank positions, coming in from the wooded draw to the southeast. Panz-ers joined in with supporting fire from Schmidt, while several tanks moved about out of sight in the woods to the east, their engines racing and sirens blasting, apparently trying to unnerve the Americans.

This second German assault of the day was in full progress when the tank destroyers of Company C, 893d, arrived. Lt. Leonard and Lt. McElroy coordi-nated immediately with Lt. Fleig, placing Leonard's First TD Platoon near the three tanks on the right (west) flank of town and the other platoon, the Third, on the left (east) of town. The destroyers joined with the three tanks in firing at the panz-ers in Schmidt, but without any observable success.

On the left flank, 2d Lt. Ray M. Borders, Company M, seized an abandoned automatic rifle and sprayed the attacking German infantry, taking out almost two full squads. Small arms, machine gun, mortar, and supporting artillery fire, plus the timely arrival of the tank destroyers, halted the half-hearted German effort. Once again Kommerscheidt had held.

Except for some .30-caliber ammunition brought up by Captain Pynchon, 707th Tank Bn., the first infantry supplies to reach Kommerscheidt after the Schmidt disaster arrived just before dawn on 5 November. The load included enough emergency rations for all the infantry in the town and much needed small arms ammunition. In charge of the supply convoy was Lt. George, motor officer of the Third Battalion, 112th Infantry, who had earlier led the three-Weasel sup-ply train to Schmidt. He had moved along the trail without undue difficulty after the tanks had been pulled off.

Lt. George and his supply party left Kommerscheidt shortly after dawn. At a hastily organized ammunition supply point established by the lieutenant where the Kall trail exited onto the open Vossenack ridge, the group met the 893d's Wolverines on their way to Kommerscheidt. George secured the assistance of the destroyers in transporting additional mortar shells and miscellaneous ammunition requested by the defenders in Kommerscheidt.

Intending to lead another supply train to the front after dark, Lt. George first planned a reconnaissance of the trail in the hope of taking two-and-one-half ton trucks (deuce-and-a-halves) forward. With S.Sgt. John M. Ward, Company I's supply sergeant, he again approached the point where the trail entered the Kall Woods and was surprised to see in the distance two figures in German uniforms and another in an American uniform. The American figure waved and yelled to them. Cautiously, Lt. George and Sgt. Ward advanced. The two Germans turned out to be medics and the American a wounded officer whom they recognized as the 112th Infantry S-2, Captain Montgomery.

Montgomery had gone forward the day before with Colonel Lockett, regi-mental executive officer, two reporters, and a jeep driver and had not been heard from since. Captain Montgomery revealed that the party had proceeded toward the Kall and had been nearing the Mestrenger Mühle when they had run into a German ambush. Captain Montgomery had been wounded and the entire party captured, but when the uninjured GIs were led away, Montgomery was left behind.

"Blutiger Eimer" Schmidt and Kommerscheidt l19

Two German medics had come upon him later, and while they attended to his wound, he had talked them into surrendering—helped by the fact that they were much inclined to do so already.

At about 0700 on 5 November, Captain Hostrup, Company A, 707th Tank Bn., started for Kommerscheidt with six tanks. He had formed an ad hoc platoon with the four tanks left from the Third Platoon under 2d Lt. Richard (Dick) H. Payne, one from Lt. Clarke's Second Platoon, and his own command vehicle. The Second Platoon's tank was apparently one of those that had bellied or thrown a track in the open ground south of Vossenack the day before. Hostrup put Lt. Payne in the lead while he followed with his command tank at the rear of the column. Payne arrived at the woodline overlooking Kommerscheidt by about 0900 and halted there at the direction of Lt. Fleig in Kommerscheidt. On the Kall trail west of the river, Captain Hostrup's tank developed engine trouble, stalled, and could not be started again. The hill mass prevented direct radio communication with Fleig, but using Payne's lead tank as a relay Hostrup directed Fleig to take com-mand of the company until he could get forward. Fleig summoned the five tanks under Payne into Kommerscheidt at about 1300, assigning them along the right flank. He and his three "veteran" tanks moved over to the left.

Throughout this time, German artillery had continued firing intermittently after the second attack of the morning. Then, at about 1400, word passed quickly along the line of riflemen: "Tanks!" A number of men jumped from their foxholes and headed for the rear. Only quick action by NCOs and officers prevented a wholesale flight.

The report that German tanks were approaching was half rumor, half fact. The Germans did employ tanks at intervals throughout the afternoon, one or two supported by small groups of infantry in what were apparently probes against var-ious sections of the line, but no general attack developed. The panzers contented themselves with firing, often with deadly effect, from their dominant positions in Schmidt some 800 yards away.

With the arrival of the six tank destroyers (one was still at the woodline) and five more tanks, fourteen armored fighting vehicles were present to defend the town. However, one tank destroyer was knocked out during the afternoon by German tank fire. The infantry was reinforced as the Second Platoon, Company C, 112th Infantry, under T.Sgt. Carl Beckes moved from the woodline into the town.

Meanwhile, overhead the 474th Fighter Group had thirty-six twin-engine P-38 Lightnings in the area from 0835 to 1015, attacking tanks and troops in and around Schmidt. Flak downed two of the planes, the first aircraft lost in support of the Twenty-eighth Division's attack. An air strike by American P-47's (a squadron of the 365th Group) hit the Germans in Schmidt during midafternoon, and men of Company D, 112th Infantry, saw a P-47 blast a German tank with a bomb at a crossroads at the northern edge of Schmidt.

The 229th FA Bn., in direct support of the 112th Infantry, experienced one of its busiest days on 5 November, firing heavy and frequent concentrations in the Kommerscheidt-Schmidt vicinity: 3,947 rounds in 249 missions.

German probing efforts continued throughout the afternoon but accomplished


little other than to harass the already fatigued defenders. Toward dusk came the usual intense mortar and artillery barrage. The riflemen could hear tanks churn-ing along their front, and the voices of German soldiers gave the impression that the enemy was collecting his dead. One group of Germans got so close to the American defensive positions that they called out for the GIs to surrender. The response was a burst of small arms fire.

Late in the day elements of the Eighty-ninth Division's 1056th Regt., mov-ing up from the southwest, and the Reconnaissance Battalion of the 116th Panzer Division, advancing down the gorge from the northeast, met at the Mestren-ger Mühle. But positions that would have cut off the American route across the gorge were not established. Elements of the 1056th Regt. were committed to defend along the gorge from southwest of Simonskall, northeast to the Mestrenger Mühle.

The 272d Volksgrenadier Division continued to relieve the Eighty-ninth Division out of its former positions to the south in the Monschau Corridor. By the end of 5 November twenty-nine of thirty-four troop trains had arrived in nearby assembly areas bringing the 272d Division from a training area near Berlin; the rest of the trains arrived the next day.

The Twenty-eighth had managed to free up some units as a result of the suc-cessful flanking drive the day before by the 110th Infantry in its attempt to take Simonskall. This released Company B, 112th Infantry, at Richelskaul. With Lt. Simon, assistant S-3, Third Bn., leading, the company and its attached heavy machine gun platoon from Company D moved out at midday in single file, pro-ceeding along the edge of the woods south of Vossenack down the Kall trail and into Kommerscheidt.

Company B, minus one platoon, went into position along the southeast por-tion of the line between Third Bn. elements and Company A. The company's other rifle platoon, under T.Sgt. Bruce Pitman, was deployed to reinforce Company L and the Third Platoon, Company A, along the town's southwest perimeter. The platoon waited on the edge of town for Sgt. Pitman to find out from Captain Walker, Company L commander, what the platoon's sector was to be. As the men waited, the Germans threw in their usual early evening shelling, driving the Amer-icans to cover. When Pitman returned, he reorganized his men in the darkness. One man was missing, and the sergeant again told the platoon to wait while he made a search for him. A burning house on the edge of town lent an eerie atmos-phere to an already tense situation, and the men, feeling that every move they made was silhouetted against the flames, scattered again. When Sgt. Pitman failed to return, a squad leader and the platoon guide, S.Sgt. Roy Littlehales, went to look for him. They found him about twenty-five yards away; he had been hit by an artillery shell and killed.

The remaining platoon of Company C, 893d TD Bn., Lt. Edmund's Sec-ond Platoon, with only two guns, had been delayed in reaching Kommerscheidt because the company commander, Captain Pugh, wanted to make a personal recon-naissance of the situation before committing his last two guns. Edmund's two vehicles finally reached the northern Kommerscheidt woodline between 1600 and

"Blutiger Eimer " Schmidt and Kommerscheidt 121

1630. Captain Pugh placed them at the edge of the woods in a reserve position with orders to go into Kommerscheidt at daybreak. He had been unable to find his two lieutenants, Leonard and McElroy, in Kommerscheidt and left for Vosse-nack to try to get at least one replacement officer and to form a party to resupply his guns.

Five operational M10 Wolverines were now in Kommerscheidt and three were lending the firepower of their guns to the positions behind Company C, 112th Infantry, along the woodline. One of the latter three was Lt. McElroy's with an oil leak. These were all the operational guns that remained of Company C, 893d. The unit's advance left behind a trail of wrecked and broken vehicles: one tank destroyer had developed a leaking recoil mechanism on 2 November, another had hit a mine near Richelskaul on 4 November, a third had thrown a track south-east of Vossenack, a fourth was knocked out in Kommerscheidt that afternoon, 5 November, by tank fire.

A forward CP group under Major Richard A. Dana, S-3, 112th Infantry, moved up about noon to the vicinity of the Company C, 112th, positions and later shifted slightly to the rear to a hunting lodge alongside the Kall trail. While this forward displacement might have been expected to assist the Kommerscheidt defense in both command and morale, it nevertheless left the rear CP virtually inoperative, primarily because no one was left in nominal command.

During the day Colonel Flood, the Third Bn. CO, was evacuated for slight wounds and combat exhaustion (battlefield fatigue). Major R. C. Christensen, executive officer, assumed command. The First and Third Bns. had lost so many men and had become so intermingled that Major Robert T. Hazlett, the First Bn.'s commander, was placed in command of both battalions. Captain Walker, Com-pany L, was placed under him in command of all infantry elements on the right flank, consisting now of one platoon of Company A, elements of Companies I and L, and, after dark, Sgt. Pitman's platoon of Company B.

Telephone communications with the rear had become almost nonexistent on 5 November. Communications relied primarily on radios, with some use of run-ners. After dark Lt. Simon, assistant S-3, Third Bn., was sent back with a message from Colonel Peterson to General Cota, delivered at about 2300. The message said that the First and Third Bns. were disorganized, that the men were shell-shocked, that the armor in Kommerscheidt was not as strong as desired, that the tank destroyers were not sufficiently aggressive, and that he (Peterson) would try to reorganize and hold the town. He added that, if possible, he would try to retake Schmidt.

Early on 5 November, the First Platoon of Company C, Twentieth Engineers, which had dug in the night before with its company headquarters group to the rear of the 112th Infantry's Company C's woodline position, began maintenance of the trail from the bridge up to Kommerscheidt. Just before dark a nine-man mine detector detail attempted to check the roads within the town, but was discouraged by German artillery fire. Lt. Ossola's platoon of Company B, Twentieth Engineers, continued maintenance and revetment of shoulders of the trail west of the Kall. Company A, Twentieth, which had gone into defensive positions designated by


General Davis at the edge of the woods on the southeastern nose of the Vossenack ridge, left its Third Platoon for defense and sent the others to work on the trail east of the Kall.

At approximately 2000 a 707th Tank Bn. supply party with one jeep, three Weasels, and one deuce-and-a-half truck carrying gasoline, rations, water, two batteries, and a tank generator reached the entrance of the Kall trail into the woods. With a white handkerchief tied around his helmet, Captain Pynchon, battalion S-4, led the way on foot. The column moved slowly, often being held up to allow medical jeeps to pass on their way to the rear. Some 300 yards past the bridge, the party was subjected to eight or nine rounds of shellfire, but no damage resulted.

Reaching the woodline north of Kommerscheidt shortly after 2200, Captain Donald C. Kelley, HQ Company, 707th Tank Bn., and 1st Lt. Charles S. Weniger, Service Company transportation officer, continued with the Weasels to the shal-low draw just northwest of Kommerscheidt. They moved on foot from tank to tank distributing supplies. Lt. Fleig asked them to report to Captain Hostrup that the tankers in Kommerscheidt would not use their radios except when absolutely necessary because they believed their radio transmissions were drawing fire.

Now that passage over the trail with a two-and-one-half-ton truck had been proved possible, Lt. Weniger left with a Weasel for Germeter in order to get addi-tional trucks to bring up more ammunition while it was still dark and to estab-lish a forward ammunition supply point. The lieutenant's Weasel threw a track forcing him to return to Kommerscheidt for another. This time he continued with-out mishap.

Captain Pynchon, Captain Kelley, and the HQ Company supply sergeant, S.Sgt. Curtis E. Walker, remained in the Kommerscheidt area, and Lt. Rogers left for Germeter with the remaining empty Weasel, the jeep, and the truck just after midnight. The return column came under mortar fire near the Kall bridge but escaped unscathed. At the exit of the trail from the woods southeast of Vossenack the truck found difficulty in climbing the steep, slippery grade. The engineer bull-dozer, close by, was called to assist, drawing spasmodic machine gun fire from the woodline to the southwest. There were no casualties, and the column was soon able to move on.

Lt. George, who was in charge of supplying the infantry in Kommerscheidt and who had earlier come upon Captain Montgomery and the two German medics, went forward again around dusk with a supply group consisting of one truck and several Weasels. Once the group reached the wooded stretch of the trail, Lt. George put Sgt. Ward, the Company I supply sergeant, in charge of the train while he returned to Germeter to bring up another supply train. This second train con-sisted of two trucks, one jeep, and three Weasels, two of which towed 57mm anti-tank guns of the Third Bn.'s AT Platoon, 112th Infantry. Once again reaching the entrance of the trail into the woods southeast of Vossenack, Lt. George told his men to take cover in abandoned foxholes nearby while he made a reconnaissance on foot. Farther along the trail he found Sgt. Ward and was told that the advance supply train had gone through although one Weasel had thrown a track. The


intense artillery fire in the area had affected Ward's nerves so badly that George sent the sergeant to the rear.

Returning to his supply train, Lt. George slowly and cautiously led his vehi-cles along the treacherous trail. Nevertheless, one of the Weasels threw a track. The men detached the antitank gun the Weasel had been towing and hooked it to a jeep, then started to transfer the Weasel's supplies to the other vehicles. In the meantime one squad of the AT Platoon under S.Sgt. Leo L. Cannon moved on ahead in one of the Weasels.

The main column under Lt. George finally started forward again and had almost reached the bottom of the gorge when the men saw a sudden bright glow up ahead and heard an explosion. A few minutes later a man from Sgt. Cannon's antitank gun crew staggered back to them. Burned almost black, the soldier said the squad had been ambushed. The Germans had blasted their Weasel with three phosphorus grenades or shells. Moving forward to investigate, the remainder of Lt. George's supply group saw no Germans but found another AT crewman burned slightly and two others who were seriously injured. Sgt. Cannon could not be found.

With this warning in mind, the column put out security for the remainder of its trip. Six rounds of artillery fell close by as the column traversed the switch-backs east of the river, but it managed to reach the forward regimental CP unscathed. Lt. George established an ammunition supply point in the vicinity of Company C, 112th Infantry, and the men dug in for the night with the two 57mm guns set up in positions supporting the infantry. The time was about midnight. Although the ambush indicated that the Germans had infiltrated the supply route, the empty vehicles of Lt. Rogers, 707th Tank Bn., returned without mishap.

Lt. Fuller, reconnaissance platoon leader for the tank destroyers (Company C, 893d TD Bn.), attempted to move forward in an armored car in an effort to resupply the tank destroyers in Kommerscheidt. When he reached the trail near Vossenack, he found it blocked by a Weasel and three or four other vehicles (prob-ably Lt. George's last supply column). He returned to Vossenack and made plans for another attempt the next day.

On 5 November the aid station of the First Bn., 112th Infantry, was still in a basement at the northern edge of Kommerscheidt while the Third Battalion's aid station remained in the log dugout alongside the trail in the Kall gorge west of the river. In Kommerscheidt the First Battalion's surgeon, Captain Linguiti, had been disturbed by the continued gathering of fighting personnel and equipment around his aid station. After a supply train had deposited its load near the station's entrance before daylight and distribution had been going on from there for several hours, he had no doubt of the reason for an enemy shelling that centered on the house, causing further injury to several patients and killing three medics.

During the afternoon medical Weasels and any jeeps that could be rounded up, including that of the Third Bn.'s chaplain, were used to shuttle patients from the Kom-merscheidt aid station to the Third Bn.'s station back on the trail. When all patients from the forward site had been evacuated, the medical officers decided to abandon the First Bn.'s station except as a forward collecting point and to combine the two


battalions' medical facilities at the log dugout. Eight litter bearers from the First Bn. and a driver with a jeep were left to man the collecting point.

Many of the walking wounded were evacuated past the Third Bn.'s aid sta-tion—sent to the edge of the woods southeast of Vossenack where ambulances from Company E, 103d Medical Bn., maintained a forward loading point. The lack of Weasels and litter bearers prevented further evacuation of many litter cases although all personnel of the regimental aid station who could be spared had already been sent forward to act as bearers.

The medical personnel first realized the extent of German infiltration along the trail when about midnight, Pfc. Delmar C. Putney, leading a group of walk-ing wounded from Kommerscheidt, was stopped by some Germans on the trail east of the river. The Germans forced him at gunpoint to carry one of their wounded comrades for a distance along the trail. They then released Putney, who made his way to the log aid station.

By noon on 5 November a rumor had spread among the troops in Kom-merscheidt that division was forming a special task force to relieve them. The first indication of such an action did not come until late afternoon when Colonel Rip-ple, CO of the 707th Tank Bn., was informed by General Cota that he was to command such a task force (Task Force R). But Ripple was told that his force was not intended to relieve the defenders of Kommerscheidt, but to pass through them, recapture Schmidt, and take the high ground to the southwest of the town. Inter-estingly, although the area to the southwest was reported as an objective, it was not known at the Twenty-eighth's HQ that men from the Third Bn. who had retreated from Schmidt were holding out there. The Kommerscheidt defenders were to follow and assist in holding Schmidt at all costs. The attack was to be launched before noon the next day, 6 November.

Following the loss of Schmidt, Courtney Hodges, along with General Gerow of the V Corps and General Collins of the VII Corps, had visited the Twenty-eighth Division's CP on 5 November, but General Cota's optimistic plans to retake Schmidt with Task Force R allayed their concerns. Hearing news of problems at Vossenack, Gerow called upon the Fourth Division, which was en route to the VII Corps as a participant in the corps' upcoming offensive, to send a regiment to help. During the night, this regiment was to relieve the 109th Infantry before Huert-gen, freeing it for use at Vossenack and, Gerow hoped, for retaking Schmidt.

Task Force R was to include a battalion of the 110th Infantry, a company each of medium and light tanks, and a company of tank destroyers. Though this sounded impressive, in reality the task force was to consist of the Third Bn., 110th Infantry, a little more than three hundred men, a third of which were heavy weapons per-sonnel, weakened by fighting in the woods to the south of Richelskaul; Company A, 707th Tank Bn., already in Kommerscheidt with nine remaining tanks (a full-strength tank company operated seventeen M4 tanks); Company D, 707th, the battalion's light tank company equipped with Stuarts (no match for either the Ger-man Mark IV or V tanks); Company C, 893d TD Bn., already in Kommerscheidt but reduced by four destroyers and possibly a fifth (Lt. McElroy's with an oil leak at the Kommerscheidt woodline); and one platoon of Company B, 893d.


The infantrymen intended for Ripple's force, who had only recently been removed from a grueling battle against fortified positions in the wooded 110th Infantry sector, left on foot from Germeter for Kommerscheidt at about 0245 (6 November). Just when the light tanks of Company D, 707th Tank Bn., were to move to Kommerscheidt was not made clear; they had been assisting the Twenty-eighth Reconnaissance Troop to block the woods southwest of the 110th Infantry and did not leave those positions until 8 November (thus were never considered a serious participant).

In Vossenack the infantry column was delayed by shelling. On the south-eastern nose of Vossenack ridge, it was met by Captain Pugh, Company C, 893d TD Bn., who asked for at least a platoon of infantry to accompany a platoon of Company B's destroyers down the Kall trail. Colonel Ripple refused. His infantry force was already too far under strength. Learning from the engineers that the Germans virtually controlled the trail, Ripple decided to make his way to the river along a firebreak that paralleled the trail just to the west. Almost as soon as the infantry column entered the woods at the firebreak, it became engaged in a firelight. The fight lasted almost the length of its trek through the woods to the river, Rip-ple's men fighting their way step by step down the steep wooded slope to the Kall. With the approach of daylight, Task Force R's infantry component was still fight-ing to get across the Kall.

The Americans did not know it at the time, but elements of the proposed Task Force R had successfully met and driven back an attack by the 116th Panzer Division's Reconnaissance Bn.

After dark on 5 November the two platoons of Company A, Twentieth Engi-neers that had been working on the Kall trail east of the river, had returned to their former defensive bivouac just inside the woods on the southeastern nose of Vossenack ridge, leaving the company's four-man security guard at the bridge. Lt. Ossola's platoon of Company B continued to work on the trail west of the Kall and near the bridge while the other two platoons of Company B remained all day in Vossenack. The First Platoon, Company C, was dug in near Company C, 112th Infantry, on the east bank near the Kommerscheidt woodline; the Second Platoon was still on a mine-clearing mission with the 109th Infantry. The Third Platoon, Company C, under Lt. Johns, which was to transport TNT to a forward dump hut had postponed the trip the previous night, left Germeter at about 2200 with two trucks, one loaded with 5,000 pounds of explosives and the other with two squads of men.

After unloading the explosives near the Kall bridge some time after mid-night, the two squads crossed the river in an effort to join their company's First Platoon near Company C, 112th Infantry, for the night. However, heavy shelling hit them near the east bank switchbacks, wounding two men and killing another. Lt. Johns returned to the west bank to deposit the wounded at the Third Bn., 112th, aid station. He then took the rest of his two squads and began to dig in near the trail about thirty yards west of the bridge. Except for the four-man security guard at the bridge, Lt. Johns's small force constituted the only obstacle to the Germans' movement through the gorge.


Lt. Johns's two squads had been digging in for only about ten to fifteen min-utes (at about 0230 or 0300 on 6 November) when a German jumped out on to the trail some fifteen yards away, blew two shrill blasts with a whistle, and shouted something in German. Small arms fire suddenly erupted from all sides.

Before the firing started Sgt. William O'Neal had been digging a foxhole with another man. They had struck a large rock and decided to try another spot. O'Neal had his hands full of equipment when the Germans struck. One German with a burp gun began firing from about seven yards away. Unable to fire because his rifle was at sling arms, O'Neal half jumped and half rolled into a small patch of scrub pine. When the Germans began to send up flares, he could see some of the engineers of his platoon lying on the ground nearby, either wounded or dead. There was little return fire. It seemed to O'Neal that the Germans must have destroyed most of the two squads with their first blast of gun fire. Sgt. O'Neal crawled off through the trees and came upon another member of his platoon who had been left as a guard near a pile of shovels. The man said he had tried to warn the squads, but had lost his way, the Germans having passed right by him on their way up the trail.

Lt. Ossola's Third Platoon, Company B, Twentieth Engineers, had been work-ing on the trail near Lt. Johns's platoon. When German artillery fire began to fall dangerously close, the men took cover in a ditch near a culvert. Because they had not put out local security, the appearance of the Germans took them by surprise. They watched as the Germans set up machine guns only a few feet from the ditch, but the engineers held their fire out of fear of revealing their presence.

Beyond the river, men of the First Platoon, Company C, Twentieth Engi-neers, could hear firing in the river valley, but they were afraid to return the fire and run the risk of hitting other GIs they knew to be in the area. At the bridge the four-man security guard under T4g. Krieder heard the first whistle blasts and the subsequent firing. Later, five Germans ran across the stone bridge, followed almost immediately by twenty-five or thirty more, but Krieder and his men, under cover, also feared revealing their presence to this superior force and so did not fire.

At about 0300 there was a knock at the door of the log dugout aid station. The visitor turned out to be a German private who quickly called up his NCO. A Third Bn. medical clerk who spoke German, Pfc. Joseph Cally, talked with the Germans, telling them that these were American medics caring for wounded. The Germans asked if they had rations. When Cally replied that they had enough for one day, the German noncom said he would return with more rations and some German medics; in the meantime the Americans were to remain. To insure com-pliance, a German squad was left at the door. At intervals throughout the remain-der of the night the aid station personnel could see German patrols near their dugout, including one group that mined the trail, but at daylight the German guards were gone.

Captain Pugh, commander of Company C, 893d TD Bn., and Lt. Fuller, whose attempts earlier in the night to resupply the tank destroyers in Kommer-scheidt had failed, moved out again about 0530 on 6 November with two jeeps


in another effort to get ammunition and rations to Kommerscheidt. Fuller rode in the first jeep and Pugh in the second with a driver and 2d Lt. Louis J. Izzo. Izzo was the replacement officer going forward to take command of either the First or the Third TD Platoon in Kommerscheidt; both platoon leaders, Lt. Leonard and Lt. McElroy, were still presumed missing.

Lt. Fuller, driving his own jeep and accompanied by two enlisted men, had gone about 300 yards south of Vossenack on the open southeastern nose of the ridge when he spotted what seemed to be about forty heavily armed Germans. Cap-tain Pugh, Lt. Fuller, and the Germans reacted in the same instant. Pugh yelled, "Look out!" and fired his jeep's machine gun, but the weapon jammed. Fuller stepped on the gas, and his companion in the front seat fired about ten rounds from the jeep's machine gun. Pugh jumped out of the left side of his jeep almost at the same time that a panzerfaust rocket grazed the top of the jeep, smashing the windshield. A husky German then came at him with a bayonet. He blocked it, suffering a gash across three fingers, then escaped, heading for Vossenack, along with his driver and Lt. Izzo.

The Germans now turned their machine guns on Fuller's jeep and hit the front seat gunner as well as the enlisted man riding in the back. The lieutenant yelled, "Shoot, man, shoot!" But the gunner answered, "I can't, Lieutenant; I'm dying right here!" Unable to lend any assistance, Fuller made his way back to Vossenack. There he found Captain Pugh, Lt. Izzo, and their driver and told them he wanted to go back for the two wounded men.

At that moment Pugh and Fuller spotted several M10 tank destroyers head-ing out of Vossenack toward Kommerscheidt. These were from 2d Lt. Horace L. Smith's Second Platoon of Company B, 893d, which had been ordered forward from Germeter to join Task Force R in Kommerscheidt. Captain Pugh and Lt. Fuller commandeered two of them and went forward again. It was still dark, and fog had settled in. Near the ambush site they fired the destroyer's machine guns, killing several of the Germans and putting the others to flight. The rescue party found Pugh's wrecked jeep. The man in the back seat of Fuller's jeep was badly wounded, and the gunner in the front seat, as he had said, was dead, shot through the stomach.

Action along the western portion of the trail took place at a time when the Twenty-eighth Division HQ thought that the trail was open to traffic. Colonel Daley, 1171st Engineer Group commander, had made the first report of German infiltration at 0355 (6 November), but at 0445 the route was said to be open; the Twentieth Engineers were told to keep it open. At 0715 General Cota ordered the engineer group commander to provide security for the bridge, and at 0747 Colonel Daley reported that the Twentieth Engineers had men along the road. It wasn't until 0800 (6 November) that Colonel Daley got word that the Germans had cut the trail. He immediately ordered the Twentieth Engineers to sweep the Germans from the woods. "Get every man you have in line fighting. Establish contact with the Infantry on right and left . . . ," Daley thundered. However, nothing was done to comply with this order, for by this time the picture had changed again.

As dawn on 6 November approached, the situation in Kommerscheidt was


relatively stable. On the way forward was a decimated battalion of the 110th Infantry along with a "scheduled" company of light tanks and a tank destroyer platoon which were to join with tanks and tank destroyers already in Kommerscheidt to form Task Force R for retaking Schmidt. The attack was to jump off sometime before noon on 6 November. In the Kall gorge the Germans had gained the upper hand—having infiltrated and mined the trail. For all practical purposes the Ger-mans controlled the vital river bridge.

As a footnote to the ongoing fight, on 5 November, the Germans had set out to reduce the American force (elements of the Third Bn.) that had fled Schmidt to the woods to the southwest. Here officers among the group had organized a perimeter defense, but persistent German attacks had gradually whittled down their numbers.

6 November

With the of dawn came the thunder of German shelling. Through the early morning mist the men could see at least three panzers moving toward them from Schmidt and a large group of German infantry milling around on the high ground near Schmidt. Radio appeals for artillery fire brought what many felt to be the most effective artillery support of the engagement, preventing the German infantry from joining the tanks in the attack. The panzers got only a short way out of Schmidt before they were stopped, but from there poured direct fire into the houses and foxholes at Kommerscheidt. On the left flank, in the Company A positions, at least seven men were killed by this fire, and Company A's Third Platoon was forced to move its CP when tracers set fire to the building. Three men from Com-pany L were killed in their foxholes by the shelling, and a round from one of the tanks tore through Company L's CP, wounding the first sergeant and killing the company commander's runner.

The tanks and TDs in Kommerscheidt occasionally peeked over the shallow defilade to their front and fired at the German tanks, but without any notable suc-cess. Some of the GIs felt their armor was letting them down, but others took into account the dominant position held by the Germans. It was clear that the Amer-ican armor had at least made the German infantrymen reluctant to accompany their own tanks in the attack. The GIs showed an increasing tendency to desert their foxholes unless their armor was visible and active.

Some of the GIs had heard small arms fire from the Kall valley during the night—indicating that they might be cut off. In the Company C, 112th Infantry, positions at the northern woodline the firing in the valley was more apparent, and the men feared they would be attacked from that direction.

The panzers soon tired of their target practice, and the situation once again settled down to intermittent artillery and mortar fire. The shelling continued to keep the riflemen pinned in their holes. It was cold and wet, and rather than expose themselves, the men were forced to take care of their bodily functions in their fox-holes, disposing of the waste as best they could. Exhausted and fearful, the infantry was near the end of its rope.


The Third Bn., 110th Infantry (part of Task Force R), crossed the river at about 0815. It took the battalion almost another three hours before it finally arrived at the positions of the Company C, 112th Infantry. The trip across the gorge had cost it two officers and fifteen men of its already reduced ranks. Making contact with Colonel Peterson, the companies were told to dig in temporarily along the woodline. After seeing the battered battalion that was to be his main striking force, Peterson felt that the planned attack was not possible; nevertheless, he intended to proceed.

The Third Bn. commander, Lt. Col. William Tait, wanted to get to Kom-merscheidt to report to Colonel Ripple. In order to avoid the open ground north of Kommerscheidt, Lt. Col. Tait, in company with his S-2 and S.Sgt. Martin J. Joyce, intelligence sergeant, chose a route along the edge of the woods to the south-west. The men had reached a shallow draw just northwest of Kommerscheidt when German riflemen in a nearby patch of woods opened fire. Colonel Tait's right arm was shattered, and his S-2 was wounded. The S-2 was unable to seek cover because of his wounds, and the Germans fired again, killing him with a bullet through the head. Only the timely intervention of Sgt. Marshall F. Pritts's tank destroyer saved Sgt. Joyce and Lt. Col. Tait. The tank destroyer fired into the woods killing one German and causing two others to surrender, one of them pointing to the S-2's body and whimpering that he had not shot the wounded man.

The Wolverines of the Second Platoon, Company B, 893d TD Bn., which were to supplement the tanks of Task Force R, had tried to secure infantry assistance in moving down the Kall trail. Assistance had been refused, and so the platoon decided to go on alone. Just inside the woods the TDs met a group of engineers who told them the trail was mined and blocked by damaged Weasels. The destroyers pulled back to the edge of the woods southeast of Vossenack and waited.

At about noon the German panzers in Schmidt began harassing the Ameri-cans in Kommerscheidt. Again the infantrymen began to leave their positions. Some men had become so shaken that the mere sound of a tank racing its motor caused them to run for the rear. With more and more infantrymen pulling out, conditions were becoming critical. In an effort to stabilize the situation, Colonel Peterson ordered the tanks and TDs to bring the German tanks under fire. To comply with this order the First Platoon of tank destroyers and Lt. Fleig's tanks on the right of the town proposed that the tanks should move up to the crest of the small hill in front of them to draw fire while the destroyers would make a flank-ing movement along the woodline to the southwest.

Lt. Fleig's three tanks moved out and immediately "succeeded" in drawing fire. The tanks returned fire, but the TDs failed to follow through. The platoon leader, Lt. Leonard, dismounted in the face of small arms fire from a pillbox and attempted to lead his destroyers into position. Still they failed to come up. Fleig saw Leonard move back to his vehicles and gesture the gun commanders to fol-low him; again nothing happened. Captain Pugh, the TD company's CO, said later that the destroyers had bellied on the hidden stumps of a hedgerow that ran across a field to the southwest of the town. Lt. Fleig withdrew his tanks to the defilade of the shallow draw. The proposed demonstration had not gone as planned, but


in exchange for jammed turrets on two of the Shermans one German tank was claimed as destroyed and the panzers had ceased firing. For his heroic actions at Kommerscheidt during 4 through 6 November, Lt. Leonard, who was subsequently seriously wounded, received the Congressional Medal of Honor.

Except for continued heavy shelling, there was no more German action against Kommerscheidt that day. The defenders became more and more conscious of the German's excellent positions for observation. Infantry casualties mounted, and two more of the M4s suffered jammed turrets. Only three TDs remained fully opera-tional.

The late arrival of the Third Bn., 110th Infantry, near Kommerscheidt ruled out the possibility of launching Task Force R against Schmidt at noon. Colonel Peterson and Colonel Ripple still planned to attack even though the infantry com-mander, Colonel Tait, had been seriously wounded. The battalion had less than three hundred men fit for duty and only the tanks and tank destroyers presently operational in Kommerscheidt could be counted on as armored support.

At about noon Colonel Peterson issued attack orders and sent his infantry company COs to conduct their preattack reconnaissance. While they were doing this, German fire wounded the battalion executive officer, Major Robert C. Reynolds, in the right hand and chest and the commander of Company I was killed. Thoroughly discouraged, without supplies, without more armor, and with an understrength infantry force, Colonel Peterson was convinced that an attack on Schmidt was now hopeless. He canceled the attack and sent the newly arrived battalion to dig in at the woodline behind Kommerscheidt in order to supplement his strength in depth.

That night Kommerscheidt was quiet except for the sound of German artillery fire. During lulls in the shelling the fatigued riflemen could catch the sound of tanks churning about somewhere to their front.

The Eighty-ninth Division's report of 6 November reads as follows:

At 1430 the enemy attacks Kommerscheidt from the north. Previously, as in the days before, the enemy places heavy fire on Schmidt and other of our positions. How-ever, our artillery is doing a thorough job also. Again and again heavy stuff goes over our heads, falling into the encircled area. . . . Every cellar, every barn must be cleaned up. Thus the enemy attack is broken up under the fire of our artillery and the unbreakable fighting spirit of our grenadiers. Two enemy tanks have been shot up, three more damaged. Some of our own tanks had to fall out also in this hard battle. In the evening the general, who is also known as "Papa Bruns" by his men, calls his commanders together. The trapped force must be annihilated under all cir-cumstances before the enemy has a chance to rally new strength and attempts to break into the pocket from any direction thus to free the trapped unit. The 105 5 [th] Regiment receives the mission, in cooperation with the armored Task Force Bayer, to resume the attack on 7 November 1944 to annihilate the trapped enemy. The 1056[th] Regiment must make contact with the Reconnaissance Bn. of the 116th Panzer Division and thus prevent the enemy north of Vossenack from making con-tact with the enemy encircled at Kommerscheidt.*

*Twenty-eighth Division After Action Report, November 1944.


At 1130 General Cota instructed his assistant division commander, General Davis, to secure the Kall trail and stabilize the situation in Vossenack, if necessary by using the engineers as riflemen.

A column of the 1340th Engineers had been directed to move out about noon for the Kall valley. Company B, 1340th Engineers, had only reached the Company A, Twentieth, positions at the entrance of the trail into the gorge when Colonel Daley radioed instructions for the company to go back to Vossenack. While the men of the company dug in near Company A, Twentieth, their commanders went to Vossenack and talked with Lt. Col. Carl J. Isley, the 146th Engineers' com-mander, who was now in command of troops in the town. Even though the posi-tions now being occupied by Company B, 1340th, were not very satisfactory, it was decided that the men should remain in them rather than find new ones in the dark.

In the meantime Company C, 1340th, with approximately ninety-two men and five officers, had reached the bridge site without fighting and was in a defen-sive position by about 1830. The Third Platoon under 2d Lt. Jack H. Baughn and one squad of the First Platoon crossed the bridge and dug in east of the river; the Second Platoon on the west bank dug in, setting up a perimeter defense near the bridge facing northeast. The remaining two squads of the First Platoon dug in south of the Second but still north of the bridge, facing south and southwest. The com-pany's rifles were supplemented by six machine guns and nine bazookas.

Thus, despite initial confusion and contradictory orders, by nightfall the engineers had established defensive positions in the gorge. At the Kall bridge was Company C, 1340th Engineers. At the entrance of the Kall trail into the woods southeast of Vossenack two platoons of Company A, Twentieth, and all of Com-pany B, 1340th, were deployed. Farther west and south of Vossenack, along the woodline, approximately two platoons of Company B, Twentieth, were in posi-tion. Beyond the river and tied in with Company C, 112th Infantry, was one pla-toon of Company C, Twentieth Engineers, as well as the company's headquarters group.

After the Third Bn., 110th Infantry (Task Force R), had crossed the Kall bridge at bout 0815, T4g. Krieder, the engineer in charge of the security guard at the bridge, moved his small detachment north, up the hill, to report to the local company commander. During their trek Krieder and his men came across five men from the 707th Tank Bn. who had remained with their disabled tanks through the German patrol action the night before. The tanker, whose immobilized tank had made it necessary for vehicles to use the switchback west of the Kall, Sgt. Markey, said he had remained inside his tank and could hear the Germans knocking on the hull and talking; luckily they had made no effort to look inside.

That afternoon when the men of Company C, 1340th Engineers, under Cap-tain Ralph E. Lind, Jr., moved toward the Kall bridge, they found no Germans present. By 1830 they had established their defensive positions near the bridge: the Third Platoon and one squad of the First Platoon were across the bridge on the river's east bank; the Second Platoon was on the west bank along the Kall trail; the remaining two squads of the First Platoon were on the west bank facing south


and southwest. A five-man patrol reconnoitered the Mestrenger Mühle and found it unoccupied.

At dusk Captain Lind sent two mine detector crews under the company exec-utive officer, 1st Lt. Lumir T. Makousky, along with a small security detachment to sweep the trail leading from the bridge back toward Vossenack. About 200 yards above the bridge, between the bridge and the infantry aid station, the men spot-ted four to six Teller mines, which had been hastily laid in the mud. Before they could remove the mines, a burp gun from the right opened fire. Although it was fast growing dark and the men could not spot the enemy gunner, Cpl. Thomas W. Hamlett, in charge of the detector crews, fired off a full clip from his rifle into the undergrowth putting a stop to further firing. Lt. Makousky directed the detec-tor crews to move back to their platoons and told Cpl. Hamlett to establish an outpost at the intersection of the Kall trail and the north-south river road.

It was well after dark before German artillery fire began striking the engi-neers' positions around the bridge. Later, at about 2330, a particularly heavy con-centration showered the area. Close on its heels came a group of about twenty-five Germans, following the artillery so closely that they were almost on top of the Second Platoon's position when the shelling stopped. They opened fire with burp guns, machine guns, and grenades, killing the First Squad's leader and wounding the First Platoon's leader and Corporal Hamlett.

The engineers' return fire seemed to disrupt the attack although individual Germans continued down the river road toward the southwest. Some of the engi-neers left their foxholes during the firefight and retreated up the hill toward the positions of Company A, Twentieth Engineers. Nevertheless, the attack was bro-ken up. The next morning the engineers counted nine dead Germans.

The Germans continued to harass Company C, 1340th Engineers, at the bridge the rest of the night with artillery and mortar fire. Counting the casualties of that night and the number who had retreated during and after the patrol action the next morning, the company found itself reduced to about half its original strength.

At about 1930, the assistant S-3 of the 110th Infantry, Captain George H. Rumbaugh, was called to his regiment's operations room. Word had been received there that both Colonel Tait, commander of the Third Bn., 110th Infantry, and Major Robert C. Reynolds, executive officer, had been wounded. The extent of their injuries was unknown. Captain Rumbaugh was directed to proceed to Kom-merscheidt, taking with him two Weasels loaded with water, food, and medical supplies. If he found both officers seriously wounded, he was to assume command of the Third Bn.

As Captain Rumbaugh readied his jeep and two Weasels for the trip, he learned that five Weasels and one jeep from the 112th Infantry were going forward under the command of 1st Lt. Robert W. Pratt. The two groups consolidated and moved out at about 2300. In Vossenack and on the open ridge southeast of the town, the supply column received some harassing small arms fire but continued, although two of the Weasels overturned in a sharp gully and a third threw a track. The remainder of the column entered the gorge but was delayed by felled trees, which had to be pushed or pulled out of the way.


As the column paused in the vicinity of the Kall trail aid station, Captain Rumbaugh thought he heard the sound of guttural voices further down in the draw. Flattening themselves under their vehicles, the men could see two figures silhou-etted against the left edge of the trail. When Captain Rumbaugh challenged them, one of the figures tossed a hand grenade up the slope. The convoy personnel answered with gun fire and Captain Rumbaugh tossed a grenade, ending the action. Four dead Germans were later found nearby.

In addition to the earlier loss of the three Weasels, a jeep and trailer were lost somewhere along the group's route, and the remaining vehicles finally crossed the river at about 0200. Beyond the Kall the column was delayed for about an hour by a large fallen tree, which had to be removed with ropes and axes. Still later, another Weasel threw a track when it attempted to bypass three tanks of Com-pany A, 707th Tank Bn., which had withdrawn to the woodline north of Kom-merscheidt after their turrets had been damaged by artillery fire.

Captain Rumbaugh eventually reached the 112th Infantry forward CP at the northern edge of Kommerscheidt at about 0300 (7 November) with just three Weasels and his own jeep—all that remained of the original nine-vehicle convoy. Rumbaugh found that Colonel Tait had already been evacuated and that Major Reynolds was in no condition to continue his duties. Major Reynolds was placed in one of the Weasels to be returned to the rear, and Rumbaugh assumed com-mand of what remained of the Third Bn., 110th Infantry.

The Germans had also suffered reverses in the Kall gorge. The ll6th's Recon-naissance Bn. had been pushed back by Task Force R as it fought its way across the river. Orders were issued during the afternoon for the battalion to move back into the gorge, but the movement of the 1340th Engineers to the bridge area dur-ing the late afternoon indicated that German units did not actually move back into the area until well after dark.

During the evening of 6 November the commanding general of the Eighty-ninth Division had convened his commanders and ordered them to whip out the Americans at Kommerscheidt. The 1055th Regt, and the 116th Panzer Bn. were to renew their efforts at dawn the next day (7 November) while the 1056th Regt was to continue its efforts to maintain contact with the ll6th's Reconnaissance Bn. near Mestrenger Mühle.

In Kommerscheidt the combined strength of the First and Third Bns., 112th Infantry, having withstood several minor German attacks during the day, was barely equal to two full-strength companies. In their rear, at the northern woodline, sat the remnants of Company C, 112th Infantry (except for one of its platoons, which was in Kommerscheidt), and the Third Bn., 110th Infantry, one platoon of engi-neers (Company C, Twentieth), and two 57mm antitank guns with crews. The supporting armor now consisted of only three fully operational TDs (one had been knocked out and five others were partially damaged) and four tanks (three had pulled back to Company C, 112th Infantry, after their turrets were damaged). Only one supply convoy, Captain Rumbaugh's, had gotten through during the day.

At the head of the trail, Company B, 1340th Engineers, and some thirty men of Company A, Twentieth Engineers, held positions. In the gorge only a few men


and officers of Company C, 1340th Engineers, remained in defensive positions near the bridge. German patrols still moved about the area almost at will. Fortunately for the Americans, the Germans seemed no more interested in holding the area than were the engineers. As daylight came on 7 November, the situation along the trail was something of a paradox. The Germans claimed control of the gorge; yet American vehicles were still able to cross the Kall.

7 November

As daylight approached on 7 November, a cold winter rain added to the mis-eries of the combat soldiers, turning foxholes into muddy pools. The winter rain was followed by a rain of German shells. Many of the hard-pressed men of the First and Third Battalions, 112th Infantry, felt this was the heaviest artillery bar-rage since their arrival in Kommerscheidt. The Americans estimated that the Ger-mans were employing four or five artillery battalions. One officer counted about fifty explosions in a period of ninety seconds, the barrage lasting approximately thirty minutes. The shelling left the gutted buildings of Kommerscheidt in flames, the infantrymen in a stupor.

Close behind the wake of the barrage came eighteen German tanks and assault guns. Some GIs were not even aware of the tanks' presence until the panzers opened fire. German infantry, one to two battalions, accompanied them, while other tanks and self-propelled guns provided fire support for the assault from positions at Schmidt.

On the left flank of the Company A positions one panzer moved up close and fired straight into the company CP, and then directly into the foxholes of the First and Second Platoons. Captain Seth R. Frear, the company CO, was wounded. On the right (west) flank, as a panzer moved in against Company B, an assistant squad leader, Sgt. John Ostrowski, killed three accompanying landsers with his Ml and then hit the tank with a bazooka rocket. Black smoke billowed up as the tank backed away. Tank fire eliminated the four remaining machine guns and two of the 81mm mortars of Company M. The panzer firing on the mortars was in turn knocked out by the Company M commander, Captain Piercey, employing a bazooka.

Lt. Payne, platoon leader in Company A, 707th Tank Bn., spotted one of the German armored vehicles moving around the right flank of the town. Although unable to sufficiently depress his gun because of a damaged elevating mechanism, Lt. Payne nevertheless managed to score two hits on the German's turret. Still the panzer kept coming. Two American tank destroyers came to Lt. Payne's aid, each pumping two rounds into the German to stop him.

In the center of town Lt. Edmund's tank destroyer knocked out a Mark V Panther at a range of only thirty yards, and another unidentified M10 knocked out three panzers. The machine gunners of the TD's crew estimated they killed or wounded about forty of the supporting infantry. But Lt. Edmund's TD and two others were knocked out shortly afterward by the rampaging panzers.


Outside the CP of the combined First and Third Bns., in an orchard just north of Kommerscheidt, the CO of the HQ Company, 1st Bn., Captain Ross Mar-tin, was seriously wounded. As Colonel Peterson and Major Dana, regimental S-3, dragged him into the CP, Colonel Ripple called from outside to inform them that a German panzer (some thought it was a Mark VI Tiger) was advancing toward the dugout. Leaving a medic with Martin, Peterson, Ripple, and Dana walked quickly back toward the northern woodline positions, consciously avoiding break-ing into a run so as not to start a panic. Shortly after they left, the panzer moved in and fired almost point-blank into the CP dugout. Despite efforts to drive it off, the tank refused to be budged from its station near the CP.

Sgt. Ripperdam of Company L reported:

There was a hellish amount of noise and confusion and everyone was pretty ner-vous. I was feeling pretty low. Then the first thing I knew one of the boys said there was a big tank right on top of the battalion CP. We took off to have a look. I saw the tank on the CP, in a position to cover the entrance. . . . There were American soldiers in front of it and they had their hands raised in surrender. There was a white flag showing. . . . With this scene in our minds we saw A and B Company men streaming back to the rear, running, but most of them still had their weapons. We took off and joined them.*

Major Hazlett, the First Bn.'s commander, moved among the First and Third Bn. positions encouraging the men to hold. By about 0830, however, German tank and infantry infiltration had so unnerved many that they were leaving their holes and running toward the rear. The German tanks were cruising among the forward foxholes, shooting right and left with their cannons and burying men under mud with their grinding steel tracks. The American lines began to give, not in a panic as at Schmidt, but they were giving nevertheless.

Back at the northern woodline, a messenger sent by Colonel Peterson relayed instructions to Captain Rumbaugh to organize his harried battalion and move it forward to assist at Kommerscheidt. Colonel Peterson was looking to strengthen his defenses, feeling that his troops were about to be pushed out of the town. Before the battalion could be assembled, Peterson appeared, having withdrawn from the orchard dugout only a few steps ahead of the German panzer. The colonel now changed his orders to Rumbaugh, having decided instead to commit the remainder of Company C, 112th.

Before Company C could be thrown into the fight, Colonel Peterson received a written message that he was to report immediately to division headquarters. Peterson did not question the order. For a day now he had heard a rumor that he was to be relieved of his command. With his own eyes Peterson had seen the men of his regiment—many of whom he had known almost from childhood—ripped to pieces in an attempt to carry out an assignment that Peterson believed had become impractical without the addition of prompt and sizable reinforcements.

*Charles B. MacDonald, The Battle of the Huertgen Forest, New York, 1963.


Convinced that the true situation beyond the Kall had never reached the ears of General Cota, Peterson welcomed a chance to set the record straight. Turning over his command to Colonel Ripple, Peterson left between 0900 and 1000 with a dri-ver and one other enlisted man.

After Peterson's departure, Colonel Ripple went to see about the movement of Company C, 112th Infantry, into Kommerscheidt. He found the Company C commander and his men too dazed to carry out the order. Ripple himself attempted to lead them forward, but the men would not move—he told them to hold where they were.

More and more men in Kommerscheidt were leaving their foxholes and run-ning toward the rear. Some of the retreating men cried out to Lt. Payne that Ger-man tanks were overrunning the left flank, and so Lt. Payne's tank and another under Sgt. Andrew J. Lipe moved to deal with the threat. Spotting a panzer among the houses at the eastern edge of town, Sgt. Lipe opened fire, hitting the German tank with an armor-piercing round. With shellfire landing dangerously close to Payne's tank, the lieutenant radioed Sgt. Lipe to withdraw while he pulled back into the shallow open draw northwest of Kommerscheidt. Apparently Sgt. Lipe did not get the message. Another German tank advanced through the center of town knocking out Sgt. Lipe's tank and another under Sgt. Marvin S. Olson. Sgt. Lipe dismounted and took over a tank destroyer whose crew leader had been killed or wounded. He remained with the TD until it too was knocked out.

With two tanks and three TDs lost, the remaining American armor began to withdraw toward the northern woodline. While doing so two of the Shermans threw tracks. One of these was Lt. Payne's, which had bellied on a rock outcrop-ping. This left only two M10s and one M4 in action.

With armored support nearly exhausted, the infantry's situation worsened. Major Christensen, the Third Bn.'s CO, ordered the few remaining men on the right flank to withdraw, Captain Piercey pulling out with about fifty men. A panzer and two machine guns fired at them as they retreated. Three officers in a slit trench took a direct hit. One was killed and the second had his arm blown off, but man-aged to walk to the aid station unassisted. The third officer was blown right out of the trench, but escaped without a scratch. The open field over which the men withdrew was soft from the rain, and it seemed to the GIs to take a lifetime to get across it.

On the left flank, about seventy-five men from Company A had started to retreat from Kommerscheidt, but only about fifteen made it to the Company C, 112th, position. Three men, Pfcs. Nathanuel M. Quinton, Company A, and Clarence J. Skain and Lewis Gardner, Company B, were pinned down by fire and could not get out when the rest of the unit left. Later they turned back several local assaults by German infantry before Gardner was killed by a sniper. Quinton avenged Gardner by throwing a grenade into the building from which the Ger-man marksman had fired. He and Skain then made a run for it, crawling toward the woods to the east and eventually making their way back to the northern wood-line.

Captain Walker, Company L, was told by Major Christensen to build up


another line in the open field north of Kommerscheidt, but the badly shaken men hesitated for only a few minutes before continuing on toward the rear. As the hope of forming a line in the open field evaporated Captain Walker witnessed Major Christensen turn and walk slowly back into German-held Kommerscheidt.

Not all the men fell back to the northern woodline. Many retreated into the woods to the west where they were either met by German fire or were able to con-tinue across the Kall. Lt. Tyo of Company K was with one group of about twenty-one men, nine of whom were wounded. A heavy artillery concentration wounded five more as the group approached the Kall bridge. Two were so badly hurt that the others were forced to abandon them. Tyo was later told by medics that these men were recovered. The others forded the river. Across the river the wounded were left at the aid station along the trail, and Lt. Tyo and the six remaining men dug in alongside a group from the Twentieth Engineers.

Frantic reorganization was now taking place among the infantry positions at the north woodline among the men of the Third Bn., 110th Infantry, Company C of the 112th Infantry, and one platoon of Company C, Twentieth Engineers. Between 150 and 200 survivors of the action in the town had arrived there and were hastily formed into a provisional company. One tank, two tank destroyers, and two 57mm antitank guns furnished heavy support. At 1125 on 7 November Colonel Ripple sent a message to division that the town was lost.

The woodline defenders were reluctant to call down artillery on the town, knowing that many of their wounded and captured comrades were still there. Throughout the morning's fight in Kommerscheidt, American artillery support had been on the job and now continued to fire on the approaches to the town and on Schmidt. Response to calls for fire had been prompt and accurate. Nevertheless, the shelling had failed to stop the German tanks. Responding with missions directed into the Schmidt-Kommerscheidt-Vossenack area, the 229th FA Bn. fired 205 neutralizations, 3 TOT's, and 52 harassing missions during the day.

Although German artillery and mortar fire continued throughout the after-noon of 7 November, the Germans did not press on to the woodline until about 1830 when flares revealed four or five panzers followed by infantry approaching across the open fields. The Germans poured marching fire into the woodline posi-tions, but the defenders called for supporting artillery, and the lead German tank was knocked out within a hundred yards of the woodline. The other tanks milled about for a time and eventually withdrew. A prisoner captured later said that the assault had been made by a battalion of fresh infantry and that the tanks, while maneuvering to escape the American artillery fire, had backed over and killed some of their infantry, disorganizing the attack. As the night wore on, the American line held though the German shelling continued. But American casualties could not be evacuated because of the situation in the Kall gorge to their rear.

Even as Kommerscheidt was being lost, Colonel Gustin M. Nelson, former fa ins commander in the Fifth Armored Division reported to the Twenty-eighth Division HQ. There he was assigned to command the 112th Infantry and told to make his way forward to Kommerscheidt. However, each time Colonel Nelson attempted to reach his new command, he was stopped, once because of a guide's


failure to find the unit he was to accompany and three times because of German shelling.

At dawn on 7 November, as the battle for Kommerscheidt was beginning, remnants of Company C, 1340th Engineers, still held a defensive position around the Kall bridge. At about 1000 the men at the bridge saw about twenty or thirty GIs, evidently from the Kommerscheidt battle, cross the bridge in single file headed toward Vossenack. The men moved hurriedly, and the engineers did not know quite what to think. Shortly after that, the engineers on the west bank heard shouts from their own Third Platoon, which, with one squad from the First Platoon, was defending across the river. These men soon came running across the bridge, a machine gun from the vicinity of the mill firing at them as they ran. The sight of the men running and the sound of the firing reacted on others among the engi-neers, and almost all of the men still present headed for the rear. Among them was S.Sgt. Benjamin A.P. Cipra, Jr., First Platoon, who stopped at about noon at the Company B, 1340th, positions at the western edge of the woods. Cipra reported to the Company B commander, Captain Thomas F. Creegan, that Company C had retreated from the bridge.

Six men, including the company CO, Captain Lind, and a platoon leader, were still at the bridge. They hid behind a slight embankment and observed small groups of Germans making their way down from the direction of the mill and clustering around a knocked-out American jeep. These Germans were part of the 1056th Regt. moving in from the southwest.

When the other engineers of the 1171st Engineer Combat Group had been committed the day before as riflemen, Company A, 1340th Engineers, had been garrisoning pillboxes and doing road repair work behind the 110th Infantry's front to the south. The company commander, Captain Frank P. Bane, reported to Colonel Setliffe, 1340th commander, early on 7 November and was told to move his men to a reserve position in the wooded draw just south of Vossenack. On its arrival, the company was hit by artillery fire and sustained approximately twenty casualties, including one man killed.

Between 1300 and 1400 Colonel SetlifFe, learning that the Kall bridge had been left unguarded, immediately ordered Captain Bane to take his company, move to the bridge and "stay there." Preceding the main body of the company, the battalion S-3 took charge of the company's First Platoon and moved down the firebreak west of the trail toward the river. Halfway down the hill the unit encoun-tered six Germans emplacing a machine gun. The First Platoon overcame the Ger-mans and then dug in along the firebreak.

Captain Bane and the remainder of Company A, 1340th, moved on down the Kall trail, passing through the positions of Company A, Twentieth, and Com-pany B, 1340th. They were joined by a platoon of Company B under First Lt. Kelsey C. Manin, six or seven men of Company C, 1340th, under Lt. Makousky, and a provisional platoon from the remnants of Company B, Twentieth, under Lt. Horn, which had been defending the southern draw leading up toward Vossenack. The column met no opposition and finally reached the bridge area where Captain Bane made contact with Captain Lind, Company C, 1340th. The two officers concluded


that they did not have enough men to hold both sides of the river. Captain Bane's two platoons of Company A, dug in on a small knoll just to the north of the trail near the junction with the north-south river road, and the remainder of the engi-neers were echeloned up the hill toward the northwest, adding depth to an all-around defense. Although patrol contact was maintained with Company B, 1340th, at the western edge of the woods, no contact was made with the infantry at the Kommerscheidt woodline across the river.

As the engineers began to dig in at about 1500, they could see Germans dig-ging in on the other side of the river and fired sporadically to harass them. Pris-oner identifications indicated that all three battalions of the 1056th Regt. were roaming the Kall gorge between Simonskall and Mestrenger Mühle.

On his trip from the woods north of Kommerscheidt to the division CP Colonel Peterson was accompanied by two enlisted men, Pfc. Gus Seiler, First Bn. HQ Company, and a second, unnamed soldier. At the second hairpin bend in the trail east of the Kall, heavy small arms fire forced the three men to abandon their jeep and cut through the woods. Coming once more upon the winding trail near the river, they saw several abandoned Weasels and the bodies of two Americans who had fallen on the trail and been run over by a vehicle. They pulled these bod-ies off the trail and removed several others from the abandoned Weasels. As soon as they had finished this task, Germans somewhere along the river opened fire with small arms.

Colonel Peterson, carrying a submachine gun, and the two enlisted men plunged into the woods. They headed south, hoping to ford the river farther upstream. Avoiding occasional groups of Germans, they were finally able to cross the stream, only to come again under small arms fire. Turning to the southwest they narrowly avoided being hit by mortar fire. They engaged in a brief fight and killed two Germans but received another pounding from mortars. A shell frag-ment hit Peterson in the left leg. The unnamed enlisted man asked permission to go for help. Colonel Peterson refused, but the soldier moved ahead as "point," soon outdistancing them.

Partly because Peterson's left leg was giving him trouble and partly because they believed the woods were full of Germans, the Colonel and Pfc. Seiler dropped to their knees and crept along. Suddenly, a German machine pistol opened up from their left front. Seiler, aiding Peterson, shielded the Colonel as the rounds tore into him. Peterson put an ear to Seiler's chest—he was dead.

Another hail of mortar fire fell in the area. This time Peterson felt a burning pain in his right leg; when he tried to move, he found the limb useless. Dragging himself and his weapon, unable to use one leg and the other only partially, he retraced his route across the river, not knowing exactly what he planned to do after crossing, but hoping to find another route to the rear and avoid the Germans who seemed to be everywhere.

As he pulled himself from the water on the east bank, three Germans passed nearby. The third man in line spotted him. Although dazed Peterson managed to fire his submachine gun. The Germans fled.

Again he dragged himself across the river to the west bank. Edging forward


slowly, he crossed an open space and entered the woods. He picked up the sound of American voices and of someone using a pick near by. He prayed and had the impression he must have fainted. When he came to, he heard Americans talking again and called out for assistance. The pick axe stopped; shells fell in the area. He again dragged himself to the river, crossed, and then recrossed. When he reached the west bank again, a little farther to the north, he saw two Germans walk down the river road and sit down. Later two Americans came along the road and took the Germans prisoner. Colonel Peterson called to them—the two Americans dropped into firing stances. Seeming to hear nothing, they walked away with their prisoners.

Peterson was running out of energy. It seemed that it was only a matter of time before he would die. He began to call out in desperation: "General Cota . . . Colonel Peterson." Two GIs, apparently the same pair that had taken the Germans prisoner earlier, came out of the woods again. This time they spotted him and took him to their position where he was given aid and evacuated.

The three battalions of the 109th Infantry assembled in the woods west of Germeter on 7 November. Soon after dark the Second Battalion relieved the 146th Engineers of its defensive positions in and around the houses of Vossenack. Both the Second and Third Battalions were far below strength. The First Battalion had received some two hundred replacements and was to constitute part of a force being put together to recapture Schmidt, designated Task Force Davis after the division's assistant commander, General Davis.

The task force was to consist primarily of the First Bn., 109th Infantry; the 112th Infantry (less the Second Bn.); the Third Bn., 110th Infantry; companies A and C, 707th Tank Bn.; companies B and C, 893d TD Bn. Small detachments of medics, engineers, signalmen, and chemical mortar men completed the list. How-ever, not one of the infantry, tank, or tank destroyer units was anywhere near full strength. The power of this task force was illusionary: the First and Third Bns., 112th Infantry, had been decimated at Kommerscheidt, the Third Bn., 110th Infantry, was hanging on just north of Kommerscheidt, and a reduced Company A, 707th Tank Bn., and Company C, 893d TD Bn., were also nearing their lim-its before Kommerscheidt.

At about noon on 7 November, Lt. Col. Mays was called to the Task Force Davis CP, which had been set up in the same building as the 112th Infantry rear CP, to report on the location and status of his tank destroyers. Lt. Col. Mays informed General Davis that only two TDs remained in the Kommerscheidt area and that only one of them was mobile. The mined and contested Kall trail, Lt. Col. Mays explained, had prevented other tank destroyers from getting to Kom-merscheidt. The General insisted that all remaining destroyers cross over the Kall immediately. With no infantry available, Davis refused Mays's request for infantry to accompany his vehicles through the gorge. Davis made the movement of a pla-toon of TDs to Kommerscheidt, with or without infantry, a direct order.

Preliminary to Task Force Davis's move to Kommerscheidt, the Third Bn., 109th Infantry, was ordered to move immediately from near Germeter to the Kall bridge and secure it. Although the battalion set out at about 1500 and reported


itself in position at 1735, it was learned later that night that the battalion had actu-ally become lost in the woods west of Germeter and had dug in about a thousand yards southwest of Richelskaul to the rear of the 110th Infantry—three miles out of position.

Movement orders for the main infantry component of Task Force Davis, the First Bn., 109th Infantry, were not issued that night. The remaining seventeen tanks of companies B and C, 707th Tank Bn., had been alerted for possible move-ment to Kommerscheidt but received no specific orders. News of the withdrawal from Kommerscheidt had by this time circulated through the command. There was an increasing attitude at the combined CP for the 112th rear and Task Force Davis that the planned attack would be in vain. In the meantime, General Davis had received word from division to await additional instructions before issuing fur-ther orders.

Lt. Col. Mays instructed Lt. Smith to lead the Second Platoon, Company B, 893d, with the assistance of Lt. Fuller in an attempt to run the Kall gauntlet. Ear-lier in the day Fuller had gone forward in a half-track and determined that the trail was still blocked, but preparations were made for four M10 Wolverines to obey the general's order. Loaded with extra ammunition, rations, medical supplies, four additional machine guns, and with several men from the battalion's Reconnais-sance Platoon as security, the four destroyers moved out at about 1500.

They had little difficulty getting through Vossenack, but when the TDs attempted to cross the 1,200 yards of exposed ridge between the town and the woods, German artillery shells, direct fire from self-propelled guns, and long-range machine gun fire showered down upon them. Two of the TDs received direct hits and were knocked out. Another was hit by a shell on the left drive sprocket and veered off the road. The last destroyer neared the woods but was going too fast and skidded, plunging out of control over the left bank of the trail. The crew members smashed their radios, disabled their guns, and withdrew. Barely started on its journey, the unit had been eliminated as a fighting force.

Colonel Peterson was evacuated to the rear and moved to the division CP at Roett, where he demanded to see General Cota. When the general appeared, Peter-son attempted to explain the situation in Kommerscheidt. He told him of the message directing him to report to headquarters. General Cota indicated that he had sent no such message. Cota was appalled at the sight of Peterson. Tired from long days and sleepless nights, mentally exhausted from what was happening to his division, Cota could think only that Peterson had abandoned his troops under fire. It was too much for Cota—he fainted.

The Twenty-eighth Division's holdings beyond the Kall were now reduced to a small defensive perimeter at the woodline northwest of Kommerscheidt. Sol-diers on the scene as well as those behind the lines realized that there was little hope of holding for long. Adding to the day's bad news, three men arrived at the American lines from the Third Bn. elements that had retreated into the woods southwest of Schmidt on 4 November. They had escaped from the pocket to report that over one hundred men were trapped there. There seemed to be little that could be done for them.


Later that afternoon in a telephone consultation between General Cota and General Gerow, commanding general of the V Corps, Cota recommended that his troops be withdrawn to west of the Kall River. Gerow in turn called General Hodges at First Army HQ. In an unusual step and an affront to Cota, General Hodges insisted on first getting the opinion of General Davis, who once had served on his staff. Hodges then gave his approval.

So long as the corps and army commanders believed it was more important to retain their strength for the planned "big offensive" rather than reinforcing the Twenty-eighth Division for the retaking of Schmidt, there was little reason to maintain a foothold beyond the Kall. Interestingly, a combat command of the Fifth Armored Division that stood ready near the Monschau Corridor was still not committed or called in.

That night General Cota ordered the troops east of the Kall to pull back.

8 November

On the morning of 8 November General Davis ordered the Third Battalion, 109th Infantry, which had been unable to find its way to the Kall gorge the day before, to try again. It was to secure the area in preparation for the subsequent withdrawal of troops from the Kommerscheidt woodline. Accompanied by Gen-eral Davis and Colonel Nelson, the latter still attempting to reach the 112th Infantry, the battalion moved out. It advanced along the Simonskall road and then through the woods to the north-south river road. At the road Company L dropped out of the column to serve as flank protection while the battalion moved on to the bridge site, arriving there between 1300 and 1330. The men dug in near the Kall trail.

Company L forded the river and moved along the east bank toward the bridge. It met stiff resistance and suffered heavy casualties in a three-hour fight. Unable to advance, the company eventually withdrew to the west bank and dug in. The forces encountered were probably elements of the 1056th Regt. After the main body of the 109th's battalion had reached the bridge area and while Com-pany L was still engaged on the east bank, General Davis asked for a volunteer patrol from Company K, 109th. Its mission was to lead Colonel Nelson across the river to the Kommerscheidt woodline and to reconnoiter a route of withdrawal for the forces there. Volunteers included 2d Lt. Edward W. Tropp, T.Sgt. Robert McMillin, Sgt. Alexander Bretal, and Pfc. Lester Sunburg.

General Davis's orders to Colonel Nelson were to reach the force beyond the Kall and lead it back to the west bank, meet up with the Third Bn., 109th, and

then complete the withdrawal to an assembly area near Richelskaul. Moving in a diamond formation, Colonel Nelson and the patrol moved out at about 1445. They had gone approximately 700 yards to the north when they encountered a six-man German patrol. Lt. Tropp opened fire with his carbine, the Germans answering with machine pistols. Firing his Ml rifle from the hip, Sgt. Bretal hit one of the Germans, and the others retreated, dragging their wounded comrade with them.

Turning east, Lt. Tropp's party forded the river and proceeded up a steep,


clifflike slope beyond through another stretch of dense woods and eventually with-out further encounters, into the American woodline positions. Colonel Nelson con-tacted Colonel Ripple and then sent Lt. Tropp's patrol back across the river.

The remnants of the First and Third Bns., 112th Infantry; the Third Bn., 110th Infantry; Company A, 707th Tank Bn.; Company C, 893d TD Bn.; and the First Platoon, Company C, Twentieth Engineers, had spent a comparatively quiet morning and afternoon in their defenses along the woodline. Although occasional artillery and mortar fire had harassed the men, shelling was nothing like what they had experienced in Kommerscheidt. Early in the morning, six Ger-man tanks had maneuvered from northeast to southwest across their front at a distance of 300 to 500 yards, but artillery had driven them off. At about 1600, a Mark IV and four Mark V Panthers were spotted moving in the open near Kom-merscheidt. Four American tank destroyers from across the gorge at Vossenack opened fire on the panzers. Two rounds fired at the Mark IV caused the crew to evacuate the vehicle. The destroyers then began firing high-explosive ammuni-tion. One of the Mark V's was hit, spun halfway around, and began burning. The Americans then turned their fire on the three remaining Panthers. The occupants of one jumped out and were immediately killed or wounded. A second caught fire. Since the tank destroyers had a few rounds of high velocity armor-piercing (HVAP) ammunition, they depressed their muzzles to allow for the greater muz-zle velocity of the HVAP projectiles and scored several direct hits on the remain-ing Mark V, immobilizing it.

Shortly before Colonel Nelson arrived at the woodline, Colonel Ripple had received a message from division ordering him to withdraw to the west bank of the Kall. He was awaiting a reply to a request for information about the situation along the trail when Colonel Nelson arrived. The two officers issued joint orders, asking for volunteers to carry the wounded and designating Company L, 110th Infantry, as a covering force. Colonel Nelson stipulated that the column of wounded was to proceed directly down the Kall trail at dusk. Another column of fit or able men was to go cross-country some thirty minutes later over the route he had followed into the area. The colonel's theory was that the Germans, who had patrols all along the east bank, would allow a column made up of wounded and litter bearers to pass. The men were ordered to strip down to the absolute essen-tials. Abandoned equipment, including the remaining tank and two TDs, was to be destroyed or disabled without the use of explosives. Supporting artillery, which had been so effective that Colonel Ripple felt he "could not have remained in the woodline pocket for twenty minutes without it,"* was to fire a heavy concentra-tion against Kommerscheidt at 1800 to conceal the noise of the withdrawal.

With only about two hours for preparations, the men worked hurriedly to prepare litters for the wounded using saplings, overcoats, and blankets. The still operational tank was placed on the trail as a road block. The tank, tank destroy-ers, and 57mm antitank guns were all booby-trapped. To cover the withdrawal, Company L, 110th, was required to move to the positions of Company C, 112th.

"MacDonald and Mathews, Three Battles, p. 249.


This was accomplished by exchanging the men in small groups so as to avoid bunching up or causing a panic among the other troops should they see Company C withdrawing.

There were approximately 300 to 350 combat-able GIs in the group, about twenty walking wounded, and thirty litter cases. Colonel Nelson and Captain Rumbaugh planned to lead the column through the woods with Colonel Ripple bringing up the rear and checking for stragglers.

Just before the withdrawal was to begin, Captain Walker, commanding the provisional 112th company, saw the column of wounded preparing to leave and thought the withdrawal had already begun. He ordered his men out on the trail, clogging it while the wounded were trying to get through. When Company I, 110th, which was to lead the column through the woods, saw this activity, it too moved out on the trail. It took about fifteen minutes to straighten things out. In the near-darkness, the procession of wounded started down the trail toward the river, and Company I, 110th, led by Colonel Nelson, started cross-country.

While the woodline defenders north of Kommerscheidt were preparing to withdraw, the engineers along the trail suffered from more artillery fire. About noon a heavy artillery concentration hit the positions of the Third Platoon, Com-pany B, 1340th Engineers, near the western edge of the woods, killing twelve men, including the 1340th's medical officer and the executive officer of Company A, Twentieth Engineers, and wounding thirteen others. That afternoon the Company B, commander, Captain Creegan, went to a rear aid station with trench foot, leav-ing 1st Lt. Carl B. Setterberg in command.

When the Third Bn., 109th Infantry, moved into the area in the afternoon, General Davis told Colonel Setliffe, commander of the 1340th, to have the trail cleared from Vossenack to the bridge in order to facilitate the evacuation of the wounded. After removing all vehicles and a road block of felled trees, Colonel Setliffe reported by about 1700 that the trail was open.

That morning, Lt. Tyo, Company K, 112th Infantry, who had retreated from Kommerscheidt with a group of seven men and had spent the night with the engi-neers along the trail, determined that the men were suffering so badly from expo-sure and that their feet were so hurt from the cold and dampness that he decided to continue to the rear. Accompanied by a wounded engineer, the lieutenant led the men through the gorge toward the south in a circuitous route that eventually led into the 110th Infantry's sector. On the way they passed through a former Ger-man position that was littered with equipment and two dead Germans. A man walking through the position behind Lt. Tyo stepped on a booby-trapped grenade or antipersonnel mine. In the resulting explosion the man lost a foot, Tyo was thrown to the ground, the engineer's leg was broken in two places, and another man was blinded. The members of the column were too worn-out to carry the wounded men, and therefore the two with leg wounds were left. As soon as they reached a battalion CP of the 110th Infantry, the men sent back a party to recover the two wounded GIs.

Near the Kall bridge, two platoons of Company K, 109th Infantry, were ordered just before dark to go to the bridge and secure it for the withdrawal. They


were to knock out a German machine gun covering the bridge (possibly the machine gun at the mill). By the time the platoons were organized for the move, it was well after dark, and when the first of the platoons reached the bridge, the men found the withdrawal already in progress.

After the initial confusion during the withdrawal from the Kommerscheidt woodline, the column of wounded and litter carriers began to make its way down the trail toward the river. The column of some three hundred combatants, led by Colonel Nelson and Captain Rumbaugh moved toward the northwest. There were apparently no advance, flank, or rear guards put out. The order of march was Company I, 110th, the provisional 112th company under Captain Walker, tank and tank destroyer crews, engineer personnel, Company C of the 112th, and the cov-ering force, Company L of the 110th. The remaining members of companies K and M, 110th, were sandwiched into the column.

Darkness enveloped the column as it moved through a dense part of the for-est. To maintain contact each man placed one hand on the shoulder of the man ahead of him. Debris, obstacles, and the steep hill made progress very difficult. Colonel Nelson, leading, went forward a few steps at a time with his head low-ered, using his helmet as a shield to protect his eyes from jagged hanging branches, then pausing to look up to see where to step next. To make matters worse, Nel-son had lost his compass.

Not long after the column of combatants had started out, mortar rounds started landing in the valley and on the rear of the column. Many men scrambled for cover, scattering the column and breaking it into several small groups. The dark-ness and woods made it impossible for many to reestablish contact.

Only a small group of men remained with Colonel Nelson at the head of the column. As they came to a sheer drop Nelson detoured around it. Soon Nelson found himself back on the Kall trail and in the midst of the column of wounded. He halted his group to let the wounded pass, hoping that the rest of the column of combatants would find him. After a while he decided to wait no longer. Tak-ing his little group past the column of wounded, Nelson reached the bridge, crossed over, and reported to General Davis in the 109th Infantry's defensive area. Strangely, Nelson left no one to guard the bridge or to see to the safe crossing of the column of wounded.

The column of wounded had a difficult time descending the steep grade to the river. As the men neared the bridge, five mortar rounds fell, wounding five men. The litter bearers continued nevertheless and reached the bridge. There they found four German soldiers guarding it and smoking openly. These guards had appar-ently taken their posts after Colonel Nelson's little group had passed over. At first the Germans protested that only two men per litter would be permitted to cross, but an unidentified American medic talked with them and arranged for all to pass, including many of the litter bearers who were still carrying their rifles.

Of the separated columns of combatants, one group of GIs under Captain Rumbaugh was joined by a group of nearly eighty men under Colonel Ripple. Together, Captain Rumbaugh and Colonel Ripple headed their men down the trail, not knowing if the bridge was held by the Germans or friendly forces, but


they were determined to cross even if they had to fight their way through. They had gone only a short distance when another shelling began, scattering the men again and destroying the last semblance of organization. A column as such no longer existed.

Colonel Ripple, Captain Rumbaugh, and a few men moved to the north to ford the river. As they approached the edge of the stream, Ripple fell about twenty feet down a steep rocky slope and was temporarily dazed. After a short time he recovered, and the group forded the river. Ripple continued with a few men into the area of the Third Bn., 109th Infantry. Before Rumbaugh went on, he sent a lieutenant back across the stream to search the east bank for any men who might still be there. The lieutenant returned with seven or eight GIs he had found there. Captain Rumbaugh directed these men to guide on burning buildings in Vosse-nack and move on to the rear. He and several other men made another quick search of the riverbank but found no one else. As they continued up the western slope of the valley trail, they were stopped by a GI who directed them to a temporary assembly area. There they dug in for the night.

Other groups made their way across the gorge. Captain Hostrup and Lt. Fleig, Company A, 707th Tank Bn., had about fifty men with them when they became separated from the main column. Unaware of the orders to dig in on the west bank, they crossed the river and continued on to Vossenack, arriving there at about 2300.

One group of eight, including Sgt. Toner of Company 1,112th Infantry, found upon arrival in Vossenack that two Germans had somehow become intermingled with them in the darkness. Another group with Pvt. Peril, Company C, 112th, wan-dered about almost the entire night before crossing the river, reaching the west bank positions by about 0530 the next morning. A mortar section leader from Company M, 112th, 2d Lt. Wayne E. Barnett, reached the river despite having been wounded by mortar fire, and he eventually made it to Vossenack.

The Germans finally demolished the Kall bridge sometime during the night. Despite the many difficulties of moving through the heavy woods and crossing the river, most of the force, between 300 and 350 men, escaped. German activity on 8 November consisted primarily of patrolling and mopping-up operations near Kommerscheidt and Schmidt. Elements of the Eighty-ninth Division launched another attack against those men of Companies K and L, 112th Infantry, who had been surrounded since 4 November in the woods southwest of Schmidt.

OB WEST ordered Army Group B to provide for the "speedy transportation of booty" taken in the Kommerscheidt and Vossenack areas "to Wahn [Training Area] for purposes known to this command." Some of this equipment would be turned against the Twenty-eighth Division in December at positions further south in the Ardennes.

Conclusion

Schmidt remained in German hands until captured by the U.S. Seventy-eighth Infantry Division in February 1945. The fortunes of General Cota and the


Twenty-eighth Division had risen and fallen quickly and dramatically from con-queror of Schmidt to a panicked group of soldiers. The division was a physically and spiritually beaten unit. In the days after Schmidt the Twenty-eighth was moved south along the Belgian-German border, directly into the path of the forthcom-ing German offensive.

The Huertgen battles were the most bloody fighting since the early days of Normandy. The heavy rain kept everyone soaked; the heavy German artillery fire kept the Americans pinned down in their foxholes for extended periods. Battle fatigue was widespread. Survivors sat silently staring straight ahead—"the 1,000 yard stare." The Huertgen reminded the Americans that the German Army had not lost its fighting ability.

The assault on Schmidt had developed into one of the most costly actions to be fought by a U.S. division during World War II. The G- l of V Corps esti-mated total casualties (battle and nonbattle) for the Twenty-eighth Division and attached units from 2 through 8 November at 3,684, but many casualties occur-ring during the period were not reported until later because of the policy of delay-ing reports until the last possible date in the hope that missing or wounded men might return to duty. German situation reports revealed 641 prisoners captured in the area between 5 and 10 November.

Hardest hit of the Twenty-eighth Division's regiments was the 112th. Between 2 and 8 November, the regiment reported 707 missing, 625 wounded, 129 killed, and 284 nonbattle casualties—1,745 officers and men. Many of those listed as missing were eventually reclassified as killed in action (KIA).

On 9 November special instructions were issued to all units that had been involved in the fighting in the Schmidt-Kommerscheidt area to make an accurate headcount of their men as soon as possible. The results were far from encourag-ing. The First Battalion, 112th Infantry Regiment had 9 officers and 357 enlisted men; Company B had no officers and only 50 men left. The Third Battalion, 110th Infantry Regiment, coming fairly late to the fight, showed 17 officers and 490 enlisted men. The Third Battalion, 112th Infantry Regiment, which had borne the fighting at Schmidt, had 13 officers and 287 enlisted men. Authorized strengths were 3,118 for a regiment, 871 for a battalion, and 193 for an infantry company.

Of the companies of the Third Bn., 112th Infantry, that had made it all the way to Schmidt, Company K reported its strength on 9 November as one officer and forty-two men. From 9 to 12 November, Company K received 186 replace-ments. In addition, a number of those previously reported as missing began to turn up. By 13 November the company could report that it had begun to reorganize its Second, Third, and Fourth Platoons and "the outfit began to shape up as a com-pany again." Estimated German casualties from 2 through 8 November were 923 prisoners and 2,000 killed and wounded.

American material losses in the Schmidt action included sixteen of twenty-four M10 tank destroyers of the 893d TD Bn. and thirty-one of fifty medium tanks of the 707th Tank Bn. In addition, other heavy equipment lost included bulldozers, trucks, Weasels, and 57mm antitank guns.

U.S. Artillery ammunition expenditures for 2 through 8 November, including


tank and tank destroyer ammunition fired in direct support and 4.2-inch mortar ammunition, numbered 92,747 rounds—an average of 552 rounds an hour for every hour during the period.

The mission of drawing German reserves to the area and away from a planned major First Army attack in the VII Corps zone to the north had been accom-plished—all too well. But because of weather conditions the VII Corps attack failed to get off as scheduled. Thus the Twenty-eighth Division, making the only attack in either the First or Ninth Army sectors, was left to the German's wrath. By the time the VII Corps attack was launched, the 116th Panzer Division had returned to reserve.

The Germans had been allowed to operate freely behind their lines because the weather limited air interdiction missions. They had a plentiful supply of artillery and artillery ammunition to draw on and a sufficient and willing force of panzers to give them the punch they needed to defeat the Twenty-eighth Division.

A group of V Corps officers, designated by General Gerow to study the action soon after the battle, concluded that tactical planning had been sound given the circumstances. Their report indicated that a number of factors had combined to cause the operation to fail: the violent German response, adverse weather condi-tions, an inadequate and unprotected supply route, lack of regimental and divi-sional reserves, the wide frontage, and divergent missions. Many of the successes won by the U.S. Army in Europe had begun as gambles under less than favorable circumstances. Schmidt was a gamble that failed.

Night Assault with Bayonets and Grenades

Between September and December 1944 the Allies had slowly been moving forward along Germany's western reaches. Their dash across northern France and Belgium from Normandy and up from the French Riviera, had ended. The U.S. Third and Seventh Armies were bogged down, slugging their way through the Alsace-Lorraine region. The British and Canadians were cleaning out the Chan-nel ports of die-hard German garrisons and were regrouping along the Belgian-Dutch border after Operation Market-Garden. The U.S. First Army had made the first penetration into Germany and captured the city of Aachen, but it was pinned down by costly fighting in the Huertgen Forest. Just ahead of the First Army lay the key to the Reich's war machine—the industrial Ruhr district.

By October 1944, the First Army had ripped two big holes in the Siegfried Line, at Aachen and east of Roetgen. Having captured Aachen, the army was next scheduled to cross the Roer River on its way to the Rhine. It main effort was to be made toward Düren in the VII Corps' zone southeast of Aachen and then on toward the city of Bonn.

In keeping with these plans the VII Corps' 104th Infantry Division (the Tim-berwolves) was ordered to cross the Inde River. The key to this crossing was the village of Lucherberg, Germany, crowning a clifflike ridgeline a mile beyond the river. Lucherberg's western approaches are steep, gutted by strip mines with sheer walls and masked by a nest of factories. From the southwest and south, the village and the ridge were protected by the bed of the Weh Creek, a slag pile, and more strip mines, one of which had filled with water to form a lake. On the north, the approach to the village was more open as the ridgeline sloped gently northward, parallel to the Inde. The Germans had crisscrossed the northern approach with deep trenches and placed machine guns to provide grazing fire across the fields. Facing the Americans in this sector were elements of the LXXXI Korps (General Friedrich Koechling): 246th Volksgrenadier Division's (Colonel Peter Korte) 404th and 689th Volksgrenadier Regiments and the tough Third Fallschirmjäger (Para-chute) Division's (Luftwaffe Lt. Gen. Wadehn) Eighth and Ninth Fallschirmjäger Regiments, supported by an estimated eleven to twelve German artillery battal-ions, including the 403d and 405th Volksartillery Brigades located east of the Roer


River, capable of firing into the area. POW interrogation reports indicated that the 246th VGD had received 800 to 1,000 replacements in the ten days prior to the action.

The 104th Infantry Division commander, General Terry del la Mesa Allen, a strong believer in night combat operations, had planned for the 413th Infantry Regiment to force a bridgehead opposite the town of Inden while the 415th Infantry Regt. under Colonel John H. Cochran was to cross the river at Lamersdorf (just to the south of Inden) and seize Lucherberg; however, the 413th had become involved in severe fighting at Inden. Faced with the heavy losses at Inden, Gen-eral Allen instead directed the 4l3th Infantry to fall back as division reserve and ordered the 4l4th Infantry Regt. (Colonel Touart) to take over the assignment at Inden and the 415th Infantry to proceed as originally planned to accomplish the more critical task at Lucherberg.

Colonel Cochran had four days to plan and prepare for the river crossing before the final conquest of Inden gave the green light. He gave his officers and men an opportunity to conduct a detailed study of their roles and the terrain. Although aware of the obstacles to attacking Lucherberg from the west, Colonel Cochran was also aware of the defenses the Germans had erected along the northern approach. Confident of the ability of his men to conduct night operations, he believed they could get past the strip mines, the factories, and the clifflike portion of the ridge into Lucherberg before the Germans became aware of their presence.

Lucherberg was a small citadel town of some four hundred inhabitants in seventy-five buildings perched on a 500-foot height. A church spire dominated the town and surrounding area and consequently became a focal point of the fight-ing. A small town, Lucherberg was a mixture of farm buildings with courtyards, cowsheds, gardens, and brick and stone houses with reinforced cellars. In addi-tion, between the town and western cliff-face was an orchard that had been planted in a thick L-shape. At the inner corner of the L was a double house (duplex), standing alone about 75 to 100 yards west of the church. The house was a two-story brick building with an attic facing northeast and windowless sides facing northwest and southeast. Dominating the surrounding countryside, the town rep-resented the geographic key to the west bank of the Roer River between Schophoven on the north and Hoven on the south. From the hill observers could monitor the surrounding towns of Pier, Merken, and Echtz and the fields stretching east to the Roer. The town also dominated the country immediately to the west—the towns of Inden, Lamersdorf, and Frenz, and the Inde River lying within view of the hill. Before the U.S. VII Corps could gain control of the west bank of the Roer and assure communication and a supply route across the ground already occupied, Lucherberg had to be captured.

The Germans had constructed an elaborate and well-planned defensive sys-tem around the town. As the defenders knew, there were three routes the Ameri-cans could use to attack Lucherberg. On the south they could cross the fast-flowing Inde and move east either along an autobahn or across the open fields from the town of Frenz before swinging north. However, the lake hard by the southeast part of the town and a huge coal pit to the southwest formed an excellent natural barrier

Night Assault with Bayonets and Grenades 151

against any attack from that direction. In addition, dominating the ground just south of the town was an old and very large mound of dirt (also referred to as the slag pile), apparently taken from the strip mine, that was the lake basin. It gave the Germans an excellent defensive position with observation, fields of fire, and natural obstacles.

If the attacking force tried to reach Lucherberg by approaching directly from the west, it would face both natural and man-made obstacles. The Inde River, though normally not more than knee-deep, was an obstacle to armor since the banks were soft and the prewar bridge had been blown. The flat ground between

The Battle of Lucherberg 3 -5 D e c e m b e r 1 9 4 4


the river and the factory area just to the west of the town would provide good fields of fire to forces barricaded in the large coal factory processing plant along the north side of the road from Lamersdorf to Lucherberg. The coal factory would make an excellent defensive position, its thick walls and heavy machinery provid-ing good cover. Even after the river had been crossed and the factory seized, an attacking force would still face difficulties in getting to the town. On the south (or right) of the Lamersdorf-Lucherberg road was the slag pile. Moreover, a row of stone houses along the south side of the road afforded protection for defend-ing infantry. The western edge of the town and hill overlooked the road in this area. On the north side of the approach road was a woods (reportedly heavily mined) extending from the factory to the hill, affording concealment to an advanc-ing force from eyes in the town, but not from observers on the brow of the hill. Artillery shells striking the area would almost invariably result in tree bursts, mak-ing the woods a death trap to attacking infantry. Moving from the coal factory to the town, an attacker would also have to cross some marshy ground before reach-ing the base of the clifflike hill.

In view of the difficulties of attacking from the south or the west, the Ger-mans set up their defenses to meet what they felt would be the most likely threat, an attack from the north, since this ground, though sloping, was generally flatter and open with no natural obstacles.

« *

Objectives, Plan, and Preparation

The 104th Division had been continuously in action since it was committed on 23 October 1944, the 4l5th Infantry having been in the front line for twenty-nine days. Attachments to the division included the 555th Antiaircraft Artillery (Automatic Weapons) Bn. (Mobile), 692d Tank Destroyer Bn., 750th Tank Bn., 188th Field Artillery Bn., Battery A of the 987th FA Bn. (self-propelled), and the Eighty-seventh Armored FA Bn.

Detailed plans and preparations for the attack on Lucherberg had been laid down between 28 November and 2 December while the 413th Infantry was com-pleting the seizure of the towns of Inden and Lamersdorf. All the men were thor-oughly briefed on the part they were to play in the operation. Prior to the attack the 104th's unit commanders, including those at platoon level, conducted inten-sive studies of maps and aerial photos, even to the point of taking part in recon-naissance in artillery liaison and spotter planes.

To supply and support the units assaulting Lucherberg, Company A, 329th Engineer Combat Battalion, was ordered to construct a Bailey bridge at Lamers-dorf. Meanwhile, Company C, 329th, was directed to forge a ford-crossing before daylight on 3 December, then a footbridge during the day, and finally a floating footbridge on 4 December.

On 29 November the Third Bn., 415th Infantry, moved from Weisweiler to Frenz, relieving elements of the 4l4th Infantry. The next day the Third Bn. moved into Lamersdorf, relieving the Second Bn., 4l3th Infantry. The battalion mopped


up isolated German strongholds in the vicinity of both towns. In the afternoon of 1 December a reinforced platoon of Love Company (Company L) advanced to the north of Lamersdorf, seizing the large factory at the south end of Inden in an effort to facilitate its crossing that night. At 1700 it made contact with elements of the 413th Infantry in Inden. The 415th Infantry was disposed before Lucher-berg with its First Battalion at Eschweiler, Second Bn. (less Company G) at Dur-wiss, Company G detached at Lohn, Third Bn.'s Company I at Weisweiler, Com-pany K at Frenz, and Company L at Lamersdorf.

Colonel Cochran directed two companies of the Second Battalion to cross abreast at sites at Frenz and Lamersdorf at 2300—one company to seize the fac-tory complex between the river and Lucherberg, the other to provide flank pro-tection by taking a chateau (known as Lutzeber Chateau) south of the factories— plan objectives B and C, respectively. An hour after these companies had begun to move, the Third Bn. was to send two companies across the river from the vicin-ity of Inden, further north, using the debris of a damaged spur railroad bridge between Lamersdorf and Inden. These two companies, in column, were to take advantage of rough terrain north of the coal factory, avoiding the woods, and, hoping to catch the Germans unawares, assault the town from the cliff side. In addition, it was important that the initial attack be made at night so as to negate possible German observation. Each company received a detailed map on which artillery concentrations were plotted at every conceivable point of trouble.

The 104th Division artillery was to provide a heavy concentration of fire sup-port starting one hour before H-Hour and lasting until five minutes before the jump-off, augmented by fire from the VII Corps, First and Thirtieth Infantry Divi-sion artillery, in addition to support from attached tanks, tank destroyers, and the 555th AAA (AW) Bn. The guns were to continue at intervals until the infantry requested a concentration of white phosphorus—a signal that friendly troops had entered the town.

Intelligence from an American officer who had recently escaped from the Germans indicated that they were keeping all tanks, trucks, and artillery under cover in sheds in small villages two to five miles behind the lines during clear weather but tended to move about freely on rainy days. Their motor vehicle move-ment usually commenced about dusk on clear days and continued all night.

An assessment of German capabilities indicated that they would make a deter-mined effort to hold the towns in the division's sector, that the Germans would probably launch local counterattacks in company strength supported by tanks or self-propelled (SP) guns, and that they could be expected to launch a coordinated attack with up to two battalions of infantry, with tanks or SPs, in an effort to regain Lucherberg if necessary.

Interrogation of prisoners late in the afternoon of 2 December determined that there were 500 to 600 German infantry (landsers) with tanks garrisoned in and around Lucherberg. It was also revealed that a German panzer division, pos-sibly the Twelfth SS Panzer Division, was east of the Roer River with plans to attack in the direction of Aachen. Despite these reports, the assault was to be launched as planned.


Company G, Second Battalion, was given the key assignment of seizing the coal factory between Lamersdorf and Lucherberg, from which further attacks on Lucherberg would be launched. Company I, Third Bn., would conduct the ini-tial assault on the town with support from companies F, L, and K.

Company E, assembling at Weisweiler, on the right flank of the assault, was given the mission of capturing the chateau and establishing flank support posi-tions on the eastern bank of the creek running past the chateau. The CO and the platoon officers of Company E went to Frenz and made a reconnaissance of the area the company would have to pass through. Each platoon was given its mission for the night and the route it was to follow. The company moved up to Frenz at about 2100; the attack was to start at 2300 with the line of departure being the railroad track to the east of Frenz. The Third Platoon was given the mission of securing the chateau and establishing a position on the east bank of the stream; while the Second Platoon was to move north up the railroad track, taking up posi-tions on the bank of the stream, making contact with Company G on the left flank, and tying in with the Third Platoon on the right. The First Platoon was to follow behind the Third Platoon by approximately 150 yards, then swing to the south and occupy the trench system in that area, put a roadblock on the autobahn, and establish contact with the Third Platoon at the chateau. The company HQ was to follow the Third Platoon while still maintaining a rear CP in Frenz, which would move up when ordered.

Company F, in battalion reserve at Weisweiler, was to move north to Lamers-dorf, occupy the trench system there, and clear any pockets of resistance in the area through which Company G would pass before reaching the river. The mor-tar platoon of Company H, the battalion's heavy weapons company, was to sup-port the attack from positions in Frenz, the company providing a platoon of machine guns to each assault company.

At this time Company I, the assault company of the Third Bn., was located in the factory on the southern outskirts of Inden, from which it was possible to make a visual reconnaissance of the route to Lucherberg. Using field glasses, a route was selected that crossed the Inde at the damaged railroad bridge, turned south along the banks of the stream for 500 yards, and then east toward the objec-tive. The route led across a railroad, which paralleled the stream, then north of the coal factory along the edge of the woods, and up the steep slope to the town.

One platoon of Company L was to protect the crossing of Company I from positions near the Inden factory. The balance of the company was to follow the assault company across and move directly to the objective. Company M was to support the attack with its mortar platoon from positions in Lamersdorf and have a platoon of machine guns ready to support the attack from the vicinity of the factory. Company K ("King"), the battalion reserve, was to move from Frenz to Lamersdorf after the attack had jumped off in order to be ready to cross just east of the town as soon as the engineers had completed putting in a bridge.


Order of Battle: US 104th ID at Lucherberg

The Attack

At approximately 1300 on 2 December, 1st Lt. James Milliner assembled ele-ments of Company G near the town of Weisweiler and made a reconnaissance of the Lamersdorf area and the Inde River for a crossing site. The river and the open field beyond represented the main obstacles the company would have to overcome. One of the engineers attached to the company forded the river and two of its small tributaries at several places in order to determine the best route for the company to cross. The water at most of the crossings, although icy cold, was reported to be only knee-deep. Lt. Milliner moved the company out of the assembly area at 2100, using a secondary road from Weisweiler to Lamersdorf and took up positions in houses at the eastern edge of the town, astride the Lamersdorf-Lucherberg road. Each platoon had been assigned an objective and was to move directly to it, occu-pying it without depending upon support from the other platoons.

Artillery laid a heavy barrage on the area through which the company would move, then shifted its fire to other targets at 2300. The shell bursts were so close to the American positions that the infantrymen could feel the shell concussions pressing their uniforms against their bodies.

The men of Company G were ordered to make their approach without firing, each man being issued six grenades and told to use their bayonets; thus, anyone firing would identify himself unambiguously as the enemy. The First Squad of the First Platoon and the company's light machine gun (LMG) section were to move on the right flank of the company and take the factory buildings at the junction


Lucherberg, Germany. The entrance to the coal processing plant, "the factory," just west of town, assaulted by the 415th Infantry, 104th Division.

of the railroad and road. The First Platoon was to occupy the northwestern part of the coal factory, the Second Platoon the eastern end of the complex, and the Third Platoon including the company HQ, the main or central part of the fac-tory.

Company G jumped off at 2255. The night was clear with a three-quarter moon masked by clouds, offering visibility of about 300 yards. As the men cau-tiously stepped down into the supposedly knee-deep Inde, many a muffled gasp was heard until they found footing on the waist-deep bottom. The First Squad of the First Platoon and the light machine gun section moved south from Lamers-dorf about 100 yards, then struck directly east for their objective. The GIs moved in column. Meeting little resistance they took up positions in the main factory building with one LMG stationed at the southeast corner and another in the south-west corner. These guns were provided with good fields of fire toward the rear and to the south where there was quite a gap between them and Company E. The First Squad provided infantry support for the machine guns with a BAR in the north-west corner, and the balance of the squad spread around the building.

Company G's Sgt. O'Connor recounts the attack:

About two minutes before 2300, when the artillery was to cease firing, Lt. Milliner saw that we had to cross an open field approximately two hundred yards wide; so, without waiting, he gave the order to move out, as he realized the Jerries wouldn't


be expecting visitors at least until the artillery ceased. When our first platoons stepped off into the river, they found that it was much deeper than the twelve inches we'd been told, and it later turned out that the Germans had blown up a dam further upstream. As more and more men plunged into the freezing, swiftly flowing water of the Inde River, they found the water over their waists, but, holding their rifles high over their heads, they all surged on. Now we were crossing the open field and were still undetected. Just a company of grim, determined men, and with each step forward we were that much nearer another goal. Out of the darkness on the other side of the field Pfc. Claudie L. Soape spotted two emplacements and figured they were occupied, so without hesitating, he made a one-man assault on the first one, threw two grenades, instantly killing its two occupants, and another grenade into the second, wounding two more and taking their desire to fight right out of them. By his actions it was later shown that Pfc. Soape had knocked out two machine gun nests that were laid in on the river and had perfect grazing fire directly across the rest of the company's entire front, but because of our early jump-off they had not had time to man their weapons after the artillery ceased. [For his actions Pfc Claudie L. Soape received the Silver Star.]

The fight was now on, and as we moved into the factory, we wanted to be as quiet as possible so refrained from opening up and engaging in any firefights. The artillery in our immediate vicinity had now stopped so the only noise was that of someone's stumbling through the darkness or the report of a grenade being thrown in some doubtful spot. In the next fifteen minutes we moved on into the rest of the factory, clearing it out as we went along and setting up a hasty defense. From all appear-ances we had caught Jerry off-guard as we merely walked in on them and gave them the familiar "hande-hoch" before they could tell us from their own men. So far we'd captured some thirty-five prisoners, killed many more, and the factory was ours. About this time they launched their one real counterattack, which was quickly repulsed after our defense had done an effective job of eliminating them as they showed themselves, but another twenty prisoners were taken without a single casu-alty inflicted on our forces. The rest of the night was spent with every man on the alert and ready for business and with the advent of dawn came a realization that we'd done a good job, relieved the pressure on our adjacent units, and were now just that much nearer to complete victory.*

The First Platoon, Company G, minus its First Squad, moved out with squads on line followed by the mortar section heading toward the north end of the fac-tory. The platoon crossed the Inde River with difficulty and moved across the open field to its objective without meeting resistance. Upon reaching a loading shed which the rear of the factory, the platoon split up, and the Third Squad move to the south and the Second Squad to the north.

Instead of searching the basement of the factory, guards were placed at each of its two entrances. The balance of the platoon occupied positions on the north side of the building, some on the second floor and the remainder at the windows and doorway of the ground floor. From their positions they could look directly down on the dead end spur track that ran approximately 100 yards east. About 50 yards from their positions they could also see a dug-in German position, which later turned out to be an elaborate bomb-proof air-raid shelter. Just west of the

*Leo A. Hoegh and Howard J. Doyle, "Timberwolf Tracks: The History of the 104th Infantry Divi-sion, 1942-45 " (Washington, D.C.: Infantry Journal Press, 1946), pp. 159-160.


position was a draw leading from the railroad track to the woods on the north, and there were German positions on top and on the sides of a mound of earth about twenty-five yards north of the factory. Fire coming from the mound was silenced with grenades and rifle fire.

A sergeant and five men went to clear a house adjoining the factory. Two pris-oners were taken and the crew manning the LMG in the southeast corner of the factory reported eight Germans seen running from the house toward positions near the eastern end of the earthen mound.

The Second Platoon, Company G, was sent to take and hold the buildings at the eastern end of the coal factory. The soldiers moved through the factory in a column of squads, Second leading, First and Third following. The platoon took up positions in the row of buildings running from the spur track to the Lamers-dorf-Lucherberg road, consisting of three main buildings and one smaller build-ing. The First Squad occupied the northernmost building, the Second Squad took the next couple of buildings, and the Third Squad split into one team occupying the southern building and a BAR team and three riflemen taking up positions in the small building near the road. The platoon received some small arms fire from German positions in houses along the Lamersdorf-Lucherberg road, but there were no casualties. The First Squad could hear the Germans moving up and down the spur track throughout the night and fired at them but was unable to observe the results. The Third Squad's Pfc. Doff with two other men took eight antitank mines and laid a hasty minefield on the Lamersdorf-Lucherberg road, about twenty-five to thirty yards in front of their position.

The Third Platoon and two mortar squads were to follow to the right rear of the First Platoon, moving in squad column, First, Second, and Third. The com-pany's machine gun platoon was to follow and provide support to the Third Pla-toon. The platoon occupied the central part of the factory without meeting any resistance and set up the company CP in the central and largest building of the factory complex. At 0200, Sgt. William E. Rhoades, platoon leader, and Cpl. Wal-ter W. Urmetz conducted a search of the basement of the factory's center build-ing and found a corridor ending at a steel door. They blew the door off its hinges with a grenade and found ten Germans on the other side who surrendered with-out a fight. The Second Squad maintained general security and placed guards on the doors leading into the building.

At about 0300 a small counterattack of approximately ten to fifteen Germans came from the direction of the air-raid shelter along the railroad track and from the draw. Two of the German landsers succeeded in reaching the factory and tossed three grenades into the building but caused no damage—one of the attackers was killed and the other escaped. The Germans shuttled back and forth from the air-raid shelter to the draw throughout the night. They were fired upon each time. Some casualties were believed to have been inflicted but could not be confirmed.

Lutzeber Chateau. Company E jumped off on its mission at 2300. The Third Platoon moved in right under the artillery barrage as it lifted at 2315. The Third Platoon received some artillery and mortar fire as it moved up on the chateau, but


this did not slow its advance. The platoon approached the chateau without encoun-tering resistance. The chateau was surrounded by a moat, which the platoon crossed without difficulty, encountering only one soldier at the gateway, who was killed. During a search of the chateau nine Germans were found in the basement and taken prisoner. Evidently the building had been the CP of the Third Fallschirmjäger Division's reconnaissance company, which were in the process of being relieved by the Tenth Kompanie (Tenth Company), Eighth Fallschirmjäger Regt.

The First Squad of the platoon was sent to positions at the rear of the chateau across the Weh Creek, where a trench system was expected; however, the soldiers found only a series of unoccupied foxholes. The squad took up a defensive posi-tion on the eastern bank of the stream. The other two squads remained in the chateau, posting guards and maintaining general security. Just as the company CP was moving into the chateau, two Germans walked in, apparently unaware of what was going on. They were much too surprised to offer resistance and were quickly taken prisoner by the fast-thinking GIs. The Second Platoon reached its objective without encountering opposition, took up positions on the stream, and made con-tact with Company G to the north. The First Platoon had almost reached its objec-tive when it came under fire from its front and was pinned down for a short time. By 2400 the company's objectives had all been taken and the company buttoned up for the night. The rear CP in Frenz was then ordered to come up. This party consisted of the executive officer, an officer from Company H, 1st sergeant, com-munications sergeant, wire team, and several runners. As the group was moving forward, it was ambushed by a German patrol. A grenade fight ensued during which five men were captured and three of the CP group killed. The 1st sergeant and the communications team escaped and returned to Weisweiler. The captured group was taken to a pillbox occupied by a German captain and approximately eighty soldiers. Thanks to the quick thinking and diplomacy of the company's executive officer, the German captain surrendered his group when a First Division (the division's zone being just to the south of the nearby autobahn) tech sergeant fired several rifle grenades at the pillbox—the German officer thought the fire came from a tank.

3 December

Company I, under 1st Lt. John J. Olsen, moved out as scheduled at mid-night. A three-quarter moon had risen, making the night dangerously bright. The men rubbed dirt on any pieces of light-colored clothing they were wearing. The company moved out with the Second Platoon leading. Its First and Second squads were abreast, in columns and the Third Squad in the rear. The men negotiated the river over the badly damaged but still standing railroad bridge—crossing a gap in the bridge's roadbed by holding onto one of the rails which still was in place and walking on the other, which had been blown into a twisted position beneath the °ther. This tightrope crossing enabled the men to reach the east bank with dry feet, but it was a slow process.


None of the men were lost in the crossing although artillery shells fell near the bridge. The First Platoon, followed by the Third Platoon, then crossed the river. Immediately after the crossing was accomplished, the company reformed on the east bank and then followed the edge of the stream 500 yards south as previously planned. The ground along the river's edge was firm, but as soon as the company turned east, it ran into a small marsh. Some of the men fell into bogs up to their waist, but none were lost. After the Second Platoon had crossed the railroad track, at about 0100 to 0130 hours, occasional small arms fire began to probe the col-umn. Though the fire was inaccurate, it caused some confusion. Company I's rear platoon, the Third, became separated from the company. Conscious that success depended upon reaching Lucherberg before daylight, Lt. Olsen decided to con-tinue on with his remaining two platoons.

About 50 yards east of the railroad track, the leading elements of the com-pany encountered a three-strand civilian-constructed barbed wire fence, and as the men stopped to go through the wire, they began to receive rifle and automatic weapons fire from the direction of the factory to the south. The fire temporarily disorganized the company, and it halted beyond the fence for a short time in an effort to get organized. The First Platoon, which had gotten somewhat behind the Second Platoon, came up abreast during this time.

In the meantime, Lt. David Sheridan, leader of the First Platoon, took along a messenger and worked his way up the hill to the outskirts of Lucherberg. He then sent back word that the way was clear and ordered the rest of the company to come forward. By now German reinforcements had arrived and a firefight began to take shape. Lt. Olsen, recalling previous costly and tough spots, yelled to the men, "I'm making a rush to the town, come if you like, or stay and be wiped out by artillery fire in the morning."* The two platoons darted out across the uneven ground, through the German's unaimed fire, and up the steep clifflike hill into Lucherberg. There was a tank in the western part of the town firing point-blank at the advancing men, but they found cover in numerous holes in the rough ter-rain, and after the Americans fired several bazooka rounds at it, the tank wheeled about and moved out of range. The company's leading elements got into three houses near a road junction in the northern part of town. The trailing platoon with Sgt. Miller took up positions in the "double house" near the orchard.

After entering the town, Olsen radioed, " We are very close to them now; they are firing with everything they have; I am going to rush them."'† Even though there had been some firing during the company's approach to the town, Olsen attempted to enter stealthily, scolding his troops when he thought they made too much noise as they approached the town's church. The movement had occurred so quickly and quietly that some Germans were taken prisoner while still sleeping in their foxholes.

Lt. Olsen took a small group of men forward to a house near the church, in the northwest part of the town and after a twenty minute battle cleaned out the

*History of the 415th Infantry Regt., chapter 9. †"104th Infantry Division: Timberwolves," 1944, p. 163.


house and placed his men inside. Realizing how critical their situation was, Olsen sent a radio message for help and dispatched a patrol to guide the rest of Com-pany I forward.

With ten or twelve men of the Second Platoon, Olsen tackled another house where his men captured fifteen Germans who had been waiting to be relieved, many in a state of undress. After cleaning out this house, Lt. Olsen had the men blast a passageway through the wall into the adjoining building. As he started through the hole, Olsen went down with a head wound. Sgt. Harry Ducat, close by, thought that a grenade may have caused Olsen's wounds, recalling after the war a ringing in his ears. For his actions during the assault Lt. Olsen was awarded the Distin-guished Service Cross.

Platoon leaders lieutenants Verelli and Sheridan had by now gone forward to the vicinity of the church, where Verelli took charge of the company. Company I now had a foothold in the town with approximately fifty men, not counting casualties.

Sgt. Thomas R. Cheatham, platoon sergeant, Second Platoon, observed a column of men coming up the street from the southeast toward his position. At first he had his men hold their fire, thinking that the approaching troops might be friendly (the whereabouts of some of the elements of Company I being uncer-tain). However, as soon as they were recognized as Germans, every available gun opened fire, killing many of them.

The situation became greatly confused—the darkness, the fact that a portion of Company I was cut off near the church and that German fire was being received from the southwest. Then an uncommon event occurred. At about 0400, a Ger-man medical officer came forward and asked for a truce so that his men could evac-uate their dead and wounded comrades. He also promised first aid to Lt. Olsen, who required immediate attention. Three German medics and one American sol-dier then carried Lt. Olsen into the cellar of one of the houses the Americans were occupying, and administered first aid to him as best they could. Verelli, Sheridan, and the German officer attempted to keep order and direct their troops during the truce although neither knew the other's language. Verelli called to Sgt. Cheatham to cease firing. Cheatham and his men came out of the house they were occupy-ing and with the rest of the Second Platoon placed their weapons against the out-side wall of the house and began to attend to the wounded.

Third Platoon's Approach. As mortar observer, Lt. John D. Shipley, of Appleton, Wisconsin, with his radio man and one other soldier, followed the Second Pla-toon in its attack across the marshy and uneven terrain toward the cliff on the western edge of the town. In the vicinity of the barbed wire fence, everyone hit the ground when machine guns opened fire on the column from the area of the factory. Shipley observed two MGs at the northeastern edge of the factory. There were also Germans to the north of their line of advance who tried to throw hand grenades at the men, but these all fell short.

Shipley brought up the Third Platoon and a machine gun section to the base of the cliff, where he met three men Lt. Olsen had sent back for help. They


The church at Lucherberg not far from the spot where the truce was held, yet also typical of a town well worked over by artillery and mortars.

informed him that the platoon should head for the church, and the three then continued toward the rear in an effort to locate Company L. In crossing the open area toward the high ground, the platoon took thirteen prisoners. When Shipley got to the top of the cliff, he sent a five-man patrol up to the church while the machine gun section and about thirty men remained not far away at a house on the western outskirts of the town (probably the double house). After the machine gun fire from the factory, Shipley's column had not been fired upon and had yet to hear any firing from the direction of the town (probably because of the truce). Shipley took three men and went over to investigate the double house. There he met Sgt. Miller with his small force. Shipley then called up the rest of the platoon and set up a defense in the house. He set one machine gun at a hole in the east wall facing toward the town and another on the opposite side of the building to cover the west and northwest approaches. Men were stationed in the upper floors under the direction of S.Sgt. Charles F. Shotts.

Shortly after the Third Platoon moved into the double house, word was received from Lt. Sheridan for Sgt. Marokus, who spoke German fluently, to come to the church and act as interpreter. Lt. Shipley also took Sgt. Miller and another man to the church. As he approached he could hear talking, a mixture of German and English, and as he came up to the church he saw Lts. Sheridan and Verelli, who told him to send forward a machine gun and additional men. These forces were brought up to the church by Miller. After surveying the truce, Shipley returned to the double house.


When Sgt. Marokus reached the vicinity of the church, he found lieutenants Sheridan and Verelli talking with the German medical Oberst (colonel) by means of sign language. Marokus entered into the conversation in an effort to help settle on terms. While these conversations were going on, some of the Germans who had continued shooting at the Americans stopped when an aide to the German med-ical colonel went out with a Red Cross flag and called to them to cease fire. There were about forty German soldiers in the vicinity, and approximately twenty-five Americans of the First Platoon and thirty of the Second. It was agreed that the sol-diers would lay aside their arms and that all would help the wounded so that each side could evacuate its own personnel. Shortly afterward, while the truce was still in progress, a German captain with about thirty to forty men came up and started firing on the Americans. The German colonel managed to stop the shooting as he, the infantry captain, Marokus, and Sheridan entered into discussions.

This new group of Germans continued to move in and surround the Amer-icans, acting as if they thought the American soldiers wanted to surrender and started collecting the arms the Americans had set aside. The Germans now out-numbered the Americans—there were seventy-five to one hundred Germans in the immediate area. The German captain was putting plans in motion to take them all prisoner, despite the truce. An argument now started between Marokus and the cap-tain about permitting the Americans to withdraw, the German medical colonel, a little man, backing up Marokus. To overcome the captain's objections, Marokus argued that "In an army with such fine discipline, he [the captain] should obey the Oberst." The captain claimed that the colonel was a medical officer and not in com-mand of the situation. First the captain said that he was going to keep the men on the left (north side of the town) as prisoners since he had been fighting with them. Finally, the captain became angry and in a frantic rage told the Americans that he would give them fifteen minutes to get out of the town. At first he was not going to let them take their weapons, but then he let them pick up what they could if they were quick about it (actually, very few weapons were still around).

While all of this was going on, the Germans were apparently grabbing one or two American soldiers at a time and leading them away as prisoners. It is thought that Lt. Verelli disappeared in this way. The German captain kept Lt. Sheridan as a hostage while the medical colonel went with Marokus. Marokus returned with nine men from the First Platoon and eight from the Second Platoon. When Sheridan was freed, the colonel returned to his lines. Even before the fifteen minutes were up, firing began again. Then it was discovered that Lt. Olsen had died from his wounds. Tak-ing stock of their meager defenses, the Americans holding out around the church quickly moved to the double house, taking along their wounded.

Years later Sgt. Ducat recalled the somewhat bizarre scene during the truce:

The truce was unbelievable! Germans and Americans milling around the square pushing and shouting at each other. Both claiming each other as prisoners. It was like just before a fight at a football game. We kept yelling to the other [American] soldiers to stay in the crowd, not to go down this or that street. Many of my friends got separated and were taken prisoner. We kept yelling at Sgt. Marokus to tell them it was a truce. He kept saying, "I forgot how to speak German." However, he did


calm down and his memory of German luckily returned. It took him a long time to live that down. It was finally agreed that we could pick up our guns and leave. We withdrew to the houses on the edge of the hill. It was the double house.*

At approximately 0600, Sgt. Marokus came into the double house, together with the remaining men of the First and Second platoons and several prisoners. Lt. Shipley now took command and quickly organized his command post in the basement of the house. A quick check on the strength of Company I showed that there were forty-five men available for action, twenty-two were missing, and sev-eral others had been wounded. Men were stationed so they could provide an all-around defense. The house now came under an intensive attack. Using SCR-300 radios (SCR or Signal Corps Radio 300—the renowned "walkie-talkie"), the Amer-icans were able to call on both 81mm mortar and artillery fire for support.

Sgt. Ducat recalls:

We would be upstairs firing and as the Germans would attack, we would call for artillery fire (air bursts) on top of the houses—then run down to the basement. As soon as the artillery fire would cease, we would run upstairs and take our positions ready for the next attack. !

The Third Bn.'s organization included forward observers from division artillery, the regimental cannon company, and the heavy weapons company. Each of the observers usually had direct radio and wire communication to his respec-tive arms or units. While Lt. Shipley used his radio to call for mortars, Lt. Arthur A. Ulmer, a smiling, jet-haired man with big hands and a slow manner of speech, and the forward observer of the 929th Field Artillery, used battalion communica-tions to headquarters, which then passed on the request to the Fire Direction Cen-ter, which relayed it to the artillery or cannons. The mortar and the artillery observers called up 370 fire missions (18,950 rounds) during the first twenty-four hours.

Cpl. George R. Smith, 929th FA Bn., recalls the heroic action of Lt. Ulmer:

During the early morning hours of 3 December, the enemy launched seven savage counterattacks, which were effectively repulsed not only by the efforts of the infantry but by the murderous artillery fire rained down on the Germans by Lt. Ulmer. §

The Germans became active at daylight within Lucherberg, the II Bn., 404th Volksgrenadier Regt., having moved up from east of the Roer during the previous night to reinforce the town's garrison. Having received artillery, mortar, and small arms fire as they attempted to move into the town, one of the volksgrenadiers later stated that "the confusion and casualties were terrible."

Throughout the day Shipley and the others stayed in the house, communi-cating only by radio with regiment and division. The Germans had three machine

*Harry Ducat, Letter, 4 August 1992. † H a r r y Ducat, Letter, 4 August 1992. §Hoegh and Doyle, "Timberwolf Tracks."


guns in place firing on the house. Meanwhile the American riflemen in the house sniped with good effect every time a German showed himself. At one point, a Ger-man worked his way up to the front of the house and fired a bazooka (Panzerschreck) round into the doorway at the eastern end of the building. The two radio sets in the house were jarred by the impact, but they continued to operate throughout the fight. Another German worked his way up to the window on the left side of the house, and lobbed in some hand grenades. One of the American defenders dropped a grenade right on the German, killing him. Then another German walked right in the front door of the building, carrying his gun at high port, and was taken pris-oner. Every time the Germans attempted to rush the house they were stopped cold by the fire of bazookas and machine guns, hand grenades, and artillery fire. How-ever, during the afternoon the Americans began to run low on ammunition.

In the original plan of attack, Company L had been instructed to follow Company I across the railroad bridge just south of Inden and to push directly behind the assault company up to Lucherberg. Just as the leading elements of Company L worked their way up to the bridge, however, a German landser fired a flare from the area to their left front directing mortar fire on the GIs. Company L tried twice to force the crossing at this point, but each time the mortar fire proved too much for them.

In view of Company Is situation and its continuous call for reinforcements, Lt. Col. Gerald C. Kelleher, Third Bn. commander, ordered Captain Francis J. Hallahan, Company L's CO, to find a means to get Company L forward.

Ironically, Captain Hallahan and Company I's Lt. Olsen had become friends as enlisted men in the 101st Cavalry, New York National Guard, had gone through infantry OCS together at Ft. Benning, Georgia, and had been commissioned and both assigned to Company I, 415th Infantry. Hallahan had been transferred to Company L just prior to the unit's being shipped overseas. Captain Hallahan had the sad duty of removing Olsen's personal effects the next day and returning them to Olsen's wife, Olive, and their two daughters.

Battalion plans called for the company to conduct an enveloping attack against the positions of a now alert and reinforced enemy just east of the railroad tracks, in order to assure continued movement along the route that Company I had used. At 0300 the company's First Platoon, the machine gun section, and Captain Hallahan moved to Lamersdorf, where they successfully crossed the river and joined Company G in the coal factory at 0400.

The balance of Company L (Second and Third platoons), under 1st Lt. Thomas Danowski, attempted another crossing at the railroad bridge but was repulsed for the third time by German defensive fire. Moving south along the west bank of the river to the village of Lamersdorf (crossing site of Hallahan's group) the men tried again to cross but ran into heavy artillery and machine gun fire. Lt. Danowski next reconnoitered the river between Lamersdorf and Inden for a pos-sible ford. Everywhere he tested the depth, he found that the water would soak the men and make it impossible to take enough ammunition across to adequately assist Company I. Thereupon, he took the company to the next village to the south, Frenz.


At daylight, 3 December, Lt. Danowski took the two platoons across on a foot bridge just south of a previously blown bridge in the town. After crossing, they turned northeast, using the cover of the low river embankment to reach the coal factory. Lt. Danowski figured that if the Germans had observers out, they would most certainly shell a long column of men, therefore, he kept his men down, using what little cover there was to protect them in the open country. As the col-umn arrived at the road crossing southwest of the factory, Lt. Danowski went to check the situation with Company E, whom he knew to be in the chateau. On his way back Lt. Danowski accidentally crossed territory not cleared of German troops and captured a couple of soldiers who were hiding in a foxhole. From the road crossing he had his men sprint to the protection of the coal factory.

Company F moved from its reserve position in the area of Weisweiler to Lamersdorf, arriving by about 0500 on 3 December. The company's Third Pla-toon crossed the Inde and made a search of the trenches and dug-in positions in the rear of Company G. Finding them clear, the platoon joined Company G near the factory, followed later by the balance of the company.

At around 1300, Colonel Cochran ordered Captain Hallahan to take over immediate command of the operation in order to coordinate the attack of the forces from around the factory. Plans were worked out to move to the town and secure it: Company L (temporarily directed by Lt. Danowski) was to attack along the edge of the woods following the approximate route taken by Company I; Com-pany F together with an attached platoon of machine guns was to move over to the slag pile to the south of the Lucherberg road with the objective of seizing the southern half of the town. It was planned for the companies to tie in near the church, since its steeple furnished an excellent landmark to guide the men.

The attack jumped off at 1630, with Company L leaving from the factory area, skirting the woods west of the town, moving slightly north of Company Is route, pushing up the steep hill and over the crest with the sun at its back and then on toward the first row of houses. The company moved in a column of pla-toons: the Third, First, Weapons, and Second. Company L had 102 men; approx-imately twenty-five or twenty-six in each platoon. It took only twelve to fifteen minutes for the leading elements to reach the edge of town. The only fire sustained in the initial attack came from some automatic weapons in the woods between the coal factory and the edge of town.

The company took three or four prisoners who came out of houses at the edge of town—they offered no resistance and were dazed from the constant artillery and mortar fire they had been receiving.

Upon reaching the town, Lt. Danowski assigned defensive sectors in the northern part of the village to each of his three platoons. Each was to clean out its portion and hole up there for the night. Using the church as a point of refer-ence, Lt. Danowski assigned the houses along the east side of the street leading north toward the town of Pier to the Third Platoon. The Second Platoon was given the five buildings on the east side of the street leading southeast from the church. The First Platoon took over the buildings west across the street from the church. Lt. Danowski contacted Lt. Shipley by radio and, learning of the double house


about seventy-five yards away, he went there to talk over the situation with lieu-tenants Sheridan, Shipley, and Ulmer. The officers worked out the sectors of town for defense, putting most of the men and weapons facing north and west, in the general direction of the previous German attacks. Before Lt. Danowski could return to his company, German elements moved in between the town and the double house, and for the rest of the night and during the counterattack the following morning, he remained with Company I in the double house. It was now getting dark and small arms fire was heavy around Company L's position near the church. The troops of Company L did not occupy the houses to the south of their posi-tion because they did not want to spread themselves too thin.

Company L's Weapons Platoon Leader, Lt. Thompson, and the men around the church organized the defenses for the night. The unit's mortar section set up its tubes in craters near the church, and the men took positions throughout the buildings wherever they could obtain a field of fire. The machine gun section was set up behind the building that housed Company L's CP (next to the church), with a field of fire to the west and northwest. Machine guns were placed on the first floor of the house next to the CP. Under the cover of darkness, Captain Hallahan moved to coordinate the night defenses, however, there was no contact with Com-pany F. It was also learned from a prisoner that the Germans planned to counter-attack by daylight. Most of the night, therefore, was passed in "sweating out" the anticipated attack.

Pvt. Charles Davis, Company L, armed with a sniper rifle (a Springfield M1903 .30-caliber rifle styled after the World War I model and fitted with a Weaver 330 telescopic sight) arrived in Lucherberg with five riflemen and the Company L communications wire (phone) team sometime during the first night, after the initial assault team had gotten into the town. Davis's group approached the town through the woods and came up the clifflike slope and then advanced to the near-est house.

Before daylight Lt. Danowski ordered a tall, young, bespectacled soldier to guide the five riflemen who had come up with the wire team over to the First Pla-toon's position. Pvt. Davis went along in order to accompany the young GI on the return trip to the company CP, as it was army policy to always travel in pairs during darkness.

About a block away they entered a large house, First Platoon's HQ; the CP was located in the cellar. Pvt. Davis and the young GI passed along a warning to the platoon leader of the forthcoming German attack at dawn.

Stopping at the front door of the HQ on their way out, the young GI sug-gested that he and Davis stop across the street and pick up some rations. Pvt. Davis argued that they should get back to their building as soon as possible so that they would not get caught out in the open in the event the German counterat-tack materialized. They were still arguing several minutes later when a GI rushed out of the house's kitchen and into the hallway and whispered, "There's about fifteen Jerries going by outside!"*

*Charles Davis, Letter, 18 April 1992.


Pvt. Davis hurried into the kitchen as another squad of Germans started to file past. Davis:

Instinctively I raised my rifle and was just going to squeeze off a shot when some-one grabbed my arm and whispered to me not to shoot. I lowered the '03, waiting until they could alert the other men. When two or three of us opened up on the next bunch several of them hit the ground and the rest disappeared. The range was only about ten yards, but there were intervening trees, a stone wall, and two small sheds limiting our view.*

As the smoke cleared Davis spotted two Germans peeking around the cor-ner of the church next door. They were facing him, one behind the other; Davis took careful aim at the nearest of the two with his sniper rifle and dropped them both with a single shot—the bullet passing through the first and striking the sec-ond as well.

As the Americans fired from the house, the Germans returned fire, one sol-dier firing a rifle grenade at the kitchen window, striking the corner of the win-dow frame but hurting no one inside. Pvt. Davis moved to the attic, and from there he laid down intermittent rifle fire for the next two hours.

At 1715, 3 December, Colonel Cochran reported that his regiment held Lucherberg. In actuality, only companies I and L were holding part of the north-ern end of town—and their hold seemed tenuous at best. The two companies were sitting tight and waiting for dawn to continue clearing the town. They had sus-tained 10 killed, 8 wounded, and 27 missing in action, and had taken 104 pris-oners.

Company E. At 2200 on 3 December, Company E received orders to move up to the road running south from Lucherberg to Luchem, make contact with Com-pany F on the left (which was thought to be well forward in the southeastern part of Lucherberg) and with elements of the First Division on the right in the vicin-ity of Luchem. The company crossed the road and took up positions without meet-ing resistance. They remained in this position for the night, with the Third Pla-toon on the left, Second Platoon in the center, and First Platoon on the right, but did not make contact with Company F or the First Division. Around noon the following day, 4 December, the First Platoon sent out a strong combat patrol (fifteen men plus a BAR) to the autobahn underpass to their south and as far as the lake southeast of Lucherberg. The patrol returned without meeting any Ger-mans. The company then moved up and took positions on the west bank of the lake, making contact with the First Division. The company held this position for the night with a front of roughly 1,000 yards extending from the autobahn to the lake.

Company F. At 1500, on 3 December, Company F moved toward the southern part of Lucherberg. The Second Platoon, plus mortars and LMGs were sent to occupy the slag pile and cover the advance of the First and Third platoons into

*Charles Davis, Letter, 18 April 1992.


the town. The First Platoon moved out followed by the Third. After advancing a short distance, the First Platoon was pinned down by machine gun and small arms fire from German positions in the houses bordering the Lucherberg road. The Third Platoon was ordered to send a combat patrol to the south of the slag pile, which was then to work its way to the rear of the houses, attacking from the rear while the First Platoon attacked eastward along the road. The combat patrol (fifteen men, two BARs, and a bazooka) worked their way over the slag pile and opened fire. Receiving no return fire the patrol went on down to the houses, which they found unoccupied, but candles were still burning in the basement. The Third Pla-toon then occupied the eastern part of the block of houses while the remainder of the company took up positions in the other houses along the road. The efforts to take the row of houses had taken so long that it was decided to remain in place for the rest of the night.

The night of 3 to 4 December was sleepless and tense for Company F. At 0500 on 4 December, two Germans coming down the road from Lucherberg surrendered after being challenged. At daylight the Third Platoon was ordered to take and hold the southern part of the town. As the men were leaving the platoon CP, the build-ing was hit by an artillery shell, causing several casualties. The company advanced to Lucherberg in a column of platoons, the Third Platoon followed by the First and Second, and received sniper fire on reaching the outskirts of the town from Ger-man positions to the east. The First Platoon occupied the first two rows of houses; they were then leap-frogged by the Second Platoon, which in turn was passed by the Third. The Third Platoon finally settled into positions at the crossroads near the center of town. The First Platoon took up positions on the east side of the town. The Second Platoon was sent to make contact with Company L. By 0900 the com-pany was in position occupying the southern part of Lucherberg.

After having gone into position, the First Platoon began receiving sniper fire. S.Sgt. Jesse W. Saul of the First Platoon was leaning out of a second floor window and could see the sniper's position in a house to the north. He called back to some nearby members of the Third Platoon to send him down a bazooka so he could "get the bastard." But before it could be brought he was shot and killed.

Visibility was poor during the day due to intermittent rain. At 1100 a squad of men, comprised of parts of the Second and Third squads of the Third Platoon, Company F, were sent to the First Platoon's position to help maintain the out-posts, one of which was set up in a barn about fifteen yards from the house the First Platoon was using as a CP. The squad from the Third Platoon set up its BAR m the northwest corner of the barn. At about 1130 the outposts could see a patrol of twenty Germans coming in from positions on the slopes east of town. Upon teaching the Lucherberg-Echtz road the patrol split up, ten men moving north-west and the other ten moving up a draw by the lake. The outposts waited until the two patrols were within fifty yards of their positions and then opened fire, anni-hilating the northern half of the patrol while killing seven or eight men moving along the lake; the others escaped.

The Second Platoon meanwhile had set up in a house just off the town square with its outposts in an orchard adjoining the house. It had an excellent view of


the German positions to the east of the town and as far north as Pier. The out-posts in the orchard received some small arms fire throughout the day. At 1630 they were on the receiving end of an artillery barrage, during which the outposts withdrew to their CP. Later, when the shelling had ceased, at about 1700, a squad returned to man the outposts for the night.

The Engineers. Throughout 3 and 4 December, there was much concern and anx-iety at regimental headquarters over the bridging of the Inde River by the 329th Engineer Bn. It was critical to provide for the crossing of battalion antitank guns, tank destroyers of Company B, 692d TD Bn., and the Shermans of Company C, 750th Tank Bn., in order to support the troops in Lucherberg against an antici-pated German armored counterattack. Shortly after the attack began at midnight on 2 to 3 December, reconnaissance was begun by the engineers for a site to con-struct a bridge across the river at Lamersdorf. The bridge that had formerly spanned the stream at this point had been destroyed, except for a single arch at the west-ern end. Reconnaissance revealed that the mortar and artillery fire on the area was too hot for bridge construction to get under way. At 0100 two platoons of Com-pany C, 329th, were brought up by truck to Lamersdorf to begin construction of a ford approximately forty feet south of the blown bridge. As soon as the men arrived, they began unrolling Somerfield matting and started breaking down the bank at the stream's edge. Five mats were used, one hooked to the other, and placed in the knee deep water. The ford was completed by 0400. Throughout the oper-ation, mortar rounds landed in the area but not close enough to hinder efforts. For a short time a German automatic weapon fired on the site from a nearby rail-road crossing some 200 yards east of the river. Shortly after the ford was com-pleted, the river began to rise. At 1400 an M4 Sherman tried to cross the matted ford but got too far off to one side and was bogged down in the stream-bed with only its turret protruding above the water. With the crossing blocked, another route had to be found for the tanks. In the evening the Third Platoon began con-struction of a footbridge using the treadway of an infantry assault bridge. While this was going on, the Second Platoon was busy building a floating footbridge.

At about 2000 hours on 3 December the engineer battalion HQ ordered Company A to start construction of a Class 40 (Bailey) bridge regardless of enemy fire. The company had been on alert in Eschweiler while the 501st Engineer Light Pontoon Company, its trucks loaded and ready, was alerted to move the Bailey bridge materials up to Lamersdorf. At about 2130, the trucks hauling the materi-als arrived just west of Lamersdorf. As the materials were needed, one truck at a time was led into the town and up to the bridge site by personnel from Company C. At 2200 hours orders arrived from the engineering HQ to construct an alter-nate bridge at Frenz due to the continued mortar and artillery fire at the Lamers-dorf site. As a result, the entire bridging crew, which had just gotten to work improving the old abutments at Lamersdorf, was instructed to march to Frenz. The men returned through Lamersdorf and started south down the highway to the new site. At about 2230 the German fire let up, and the men were called back to continue the bridge construction at Lamersdorf.


As the crews started to work once again, it was discovered that the brick siderails of the one arch left standing were only fifteen feet wide, and the Bailey bridge would require a minimum width of about eighteen and one-half feet. There-fore, it was necessary to bring forward a bulldozer to push down the siderails in order to allow for further construction. A radio request was sent to the battalion HQ and a dozer promised immediately. During the night the weather was cloudy, and work in the darkness was difficult.

Shortly after midnight on 4 December, the engineering crew, waiting in the bridging area for the dozer to come up from Eschweiler, began to receive mortar fire again. It fell in the road at the edge of some buildings 75 to 100 yards from the bridge site. Company A's commander thought that a German counterattack might be in the offing and so ordered his men to take up defensive positions. Sev-eral hours were spent waiting for the counterattack that never materialized. It was approximately 0130 when another unforeseen delay occurred: the dozer transporter became stuck while making a sharp corner at Eschweiler.

Between 0230 and 0300 the dozer arrived at the site and encountered no difficulty in getting to the bridge. The bridge rails were of brick construction, the mortar old. In a few minutes the dozer had pushed down the rails, backed off, and was loaded back on its carrier, departing again for Eschweiler.

By 0400 the real work was under way. The rollers were placed for the sec-tions, the ten-foot sections were assembled, and the bridge was slowly pushed out across the stream. The gap to be spanned was almost 110 feet wide.

With daylight bridge construction proceeded much faster. However, even before daylight the river had risen about two feet, and the footbridge to the south was washed out. The floating bridge, fabricated in the town, where the men were protected, was put in place while the footbridge was reinstalled. Throughout the morning, the bridge site continued to receive artillery fire, but with the aid of a squad from Second Platoon, Company C, the engineers of Company A had the Bailey bridge finished by 1500 on 4 December.

By about 0130 on 4 December, Company B, 329th Engineer Bn., completed a bridge over the river at Inden. In an effort to get friendly armor into the town to meet the expected German counterattack, the commander of Company C, 750th Tank Bn., decided to attempt a crossing at Inden and to approach Lucher-berg by first driving south, parallel to the river and the railroad, to the Lamers-dorf-Lucherberg road. The route selected was somewhat risky as it was not known if the ground was firm enough to support tanks. Since the area was not occupied by friendly troops, the tanks would also require infantry protection against the possibility of encountering Panzerschreck teams. At 0600, nine tanks, with troops °f the First and Third platoons of Company K riding on them, rumbled north °ut of Frenz up the west bank road towards Inden. At 0800, after they had com-pleted the crossing, the lead tank was knocked out by a mine and the others recrossed to the west side of the river lest they should draw fire while the mine field was being cleared. The mine field, however, was too extensive to be cleared under intermittent fire.


4 December

At around 0400 on 4 December, a company-strength force of men was seen approaching the double house from the northwest. It was first thought that the men might be friendly troops, and so some of the GIs called to them. But Lt. Danowski, who was on the roof of the house, recognized them as Germans when they emplaced machine guns in foxholes in the nearby orchard. Danowski ordered all the men to move to higher positions in the double house in order to snipe at the Germans. It was like a "shooting gallery," with the men picking off the Ger-mans as they became visible. Rifle and hand grenades were employed by the Amer-icans, and the Germans threw some back. Concussion grenades knocked out some of the Third Platoon's men but otherwise did little harm.

Lt. Danowski, from his rooftop OP, coordinated with Lt. Shipley, the mor-tar Forward Observer (FO), and brought down the weight of the American mor-tars. The Germans' 200 yard frontage was covered with mortar rounds falling at the rate of one every fifteen seconds. From the buildings near the church Lt. Thompson, Weapons Platoon Leader of Company L, laid the fire of his 60mm mortars on the slope of the hill and orchard. The fire of 81mm mortars were laid in close to the house in order to create a barrier against any German landsers who might try to approach the building. The mortar barrage lasted about half an hour. At around 0900 the Germans were seen withdrawing in platoon strength (twenty-five men) to the north. At this time 1st Lt. Dan Dorsey (Company M), who had set up a platoon of heavy machine guns the day before at the Inden factory across the open terrain to the northwest, harassed the withdrawing Germans as they attempted to reach Pier.

The Germans were not able to advance in the face of the fire employed by the Americans in Lucherberg. Just before 1100 their assaults on the double house ceased. At that time Lt. Shipley and Sgt. Shotts went out and picked up four machine guns and three "burp" guns from the dead Germans. A patrol led by Sgt. Cheatham under the cover of BARs from atop the double house traveled in an arc around and through the orchard to the church, flushing remaining Germans out of their holes. The roundup netted twenty prisoners. Many of them were too dazed and shocked to speak coherently while others jumped out of their holes with their hands in the air. As the prisoners were being lined up in the street in front of the church, a sniper fired and killed two American soldiers. The nearby buildings were searched again, but the search failed to turn up the sniper.

Shortly after that, Lt. Sheridan and five men went out, this time circling around the northern edge of town, flushing Germans from the fields and the houses. Germans who tried to resist were killed in their holes. One officer and five men were taken prisoner. This patrol reached the houses near the church by about 1200 and contacted Company L. Interrogation of the captured German lieutenant revealed that he was part of a force of some two hundred that had crossed the Roer River with orders to retake the town. He thought that their attack had been poorly planned but had succeeded in infiltrating his group of thirty men into the north-west part of town.


During the sweep Lt. Sheridan was hit as he passed between two houses at the edge of town; a German medic came over to give him first aid. Sgt. Ducat crawled across fifty yards of fire-swept terrain to give aid and evacuate the wounded officer. For this and other deeds during the engagement Ducat received the Silver Star.

The day had been cold with bursts of hail and periodic light rain. Pvt. Davis, employed as a sniper with the Third Platoon, Company L, wiped his scope clear with GI (olive drab colored) toilet tissue while the Germans continued to lay down small arms fire. Sgt. Evans, a Company L squad leader was in the same building with Pvt. Davis and was suddenly killed when struck in the neck or chest. The bullet also wounded a second man standing behind him. Evans had been firing out of a window on a second floor landing and apparently had just lit up a ciga-rette thus giving his position away, possibly to the Germans in the next building only twenty feet away.

In the meantime, the Germans were approaching the town across the open plain to the north of Lucherberg. They were well spread out and walking slowly. As the Germans neared the town, they used a row of houses on the edge of the village, which the Americans had not occupied, as cover. This row of houses was just north of the positions of the First Platoon, Company L. The platoon CP was located in a large building, the church rectory, which had formerly been a Ger-man CP.

Pvt. Davis was suddenly startled by a burst of machine gun fire from the floor below him and shouted at the offender to "cut it out!" A moment later Sgt. Mar-ion D. Smart, the platoon leader, appeared at the stairway with a Thompson sub-machine gun in his hand. Smart gave Davis a disdainful look and recognized him as a replacement since he was not wearing the division shoulder patch and was without helmet netting.

Sgt. Smart ordered a telephone line run up to the attic and proceeded to have mortar fire placed on the Germans approaching from Pier. The 60mm mortar fire dropped into the open field to the north but appeared to have little effect as the Germans across the street from the Third Platoon's position continued to receive reinforcements.

It seemed to Davis that the Germans were closing in on his position from three sides. The gravest threat came from the house directly across the street. Because it had a steep slate roof, anyone in its attic could use the slightest opening to fire into the First Platoon's building with little chance of being discovered.

Sgt. Smart sent for one of the platoon members who had been carrying some rifle grenades. However, when the soldier arrived, he seemed scared and did not know how to place the launcher attachment on his rifle. Sgt. Smart grabbed the rifle and launcher from the soldier and proceeded to put two antitank grenades into the roof of the opposite building. This opened up a good view of the attic's interior and forestalled any threat from that quarter.

Disposition of forces. Company L and what was left of Company I, were hold-ing the northern end of the town while Company F was defending to the south-


ern and eastern ends. Company E was deployed south of the town—forestalling an attack from that direction. Company G was in a support or fallback position at the coal factory. Company H was distributed with a platoon each of machine guns attached to companies E, F, and G, and its mortar platoon providing sup-port from Frenz. Tanks and TDs had still not crossed the Inde. The mortars of Company M continued to provide support from positions in Lamersdorf and with a platoon of machine guns did the same at the factory on the south edge of Inden. The only company not yet committed was Company K, the battalion reserve.

Company K Arrives. Around 1400 on 4 December, the Second Platoon, Com-pany K, arrived in Lucherberg to relieve the remnants of Company I. Elements of the Second Platoon were placed with half of the First Squad at the CP in the mid-dle building of three across the street from the church. The other half of the First Squad went with the Third Squad to the double house. The platoon's machine gun section likewise was set up in the double house. The Second Squad took up positions in the long buildings just north of the CP (on the west side of the street running north toward Pier and just across from Company L's CP).

The First Platoon, Company K, arrived in Lucherberg at about 1500, taking up positions in buildings in an arc south of the church and tying in with Company F, which was holding the high ground at the southwestern edge of town.

Since the Germans had already attacked from the northwest, it was believed that they might try the same route of approach again. The Second Squad, First Platoon, was placed in a house and barn north of the platoon's CP. The assistant squad leader was stationed as a lookout on the second floor of the house. Two men were placed at the windows and doors of the building so they could fire to the northwest. A squad and a half and the machine gun section, a total of about twenty-five men, was positioned in the buildings on the western edge of town. Two light machine guns were placed to cover the orchard to the northwest. There was no mortar observer with Company K, but the battalion's artillery observer moved from the double house to the Company L CP. From here, north of the church, on the east side of the main street, the observer directed protective fire for both companies. In Company K's CP men were stationed on the upper floor, where they could observe the area to the west. Except for occasional German artillery and mortar fire the situation remained quiet.

After having been relieved by Company K, Company I returned to the fac-tory south of Inden for reorganization and much needed rest. During the action at Lucherberg all of the company's officers had been either killed, captured, or wounded.

The CO of Ninth Kompanie, Eighth Fallschirmjäger Regt., captured by Company I at Lucherberg during the morning stated that his CP had originally been located in the cellar of the coal factory. He indicated that the terrific Amer-ican artillery fire had caused tremendous demoralization; most of his men were only seventeen to eighteen years old and had not eaten for the past four days. He had been ordered to hold the position at all costs, not to retreat or expect to receive any reinforcements. He indicated that it would have been easier to make a stand


farther east at the Roer River but that he was defending German soil and each kilometer was precious to the Germans.

Armored Support Arrives. The three guns of the Third Bn.'s Antitank Platoon, commanded by Lt. Raleigh Taylor, rolled over the Bailey bridge at Lamersdorf, up the Lamersdorf-Lucherberg road, passed the coal factory, and climbed the grade into Lucherberg at 1530 on 4 December. Lt. Taylor contacted Lt. Collins of Com-pany K and Lt. Danowski of Company L to coordinate antitank defenses. Taylor placed his three 57mm guns near the main intersection at the northern end of the town with one gun on the right of the crossroads facing east down the road toward Echtz. The second gun was on the left of the crossroads in a barnyard to the left of the Third Platoon, Company L, and covered the road toward Pier, and the third was placed together with the AT Platoon CP opposite the church and the First Platoon, Company L; it also covered the Pier road. The gun positions thus formed a U or pocket. Mines were also laid across the road to Pier.

Toward evening Shermans crossed over the Inde and were able to move to the factory area where they went into mobile reserve. Around 1700, the First and Third Gun Squads of the Second Bn.'s Antitank Platoon, reinforced by one pla-toon of tank destroyers of Company B, 692d TD Bn., was sent over the river at Lamersdorf. The First Squad went into position at the southern end of Lucher-berg with guns pointing south. A bazooka team was placed on the east flank of this position across from two tanks of the 750th Tank Bn. that had moved into position in the town. The Third AT Squad went into position east of Company F's CP along the south side of the road. Around midnight another four Sherman tanks and three TDs came up into town. The TDs moved into positions covering the roads leading to the church.

Pvt. Davis. As the second night of occupation of the town approached, the Ger-mans were still situated in the houses surrounding the positions of the First Pla-toon, Company L. Pvt. Davis and Sgt. Smart realized the urgency of the predica-ment—if they did not move soon, the Germans might. Smart was in telephone contact with the company CP and learned that a squad from one of the other com-panies was being sent up to clear the row of houses along their front.

Unwilling to wait on those troops, Smart organized a force of six men and prepared to lead them in an assault on the building next door. On a signal, sev-eral members of the First Platoon opened a covering fire. In less than thirty min-utes, the assault group reached the last house on the edge of town without a sin-gle casualty, having killed several Germans and taking ten prisoners.

As a result of the sweep, the Company L HQ was moved from across the street from the First Platoon CP to the rectory next to the church and the First Platoon moved up to positions along the edge of town. Men of the Third Platoon occupied the house across the street from the First's CP, the same one from where antitank grenades had been fired at the attic roof.

As darkness closed over the town the cellar of the building that housed the Company L HQ also gave shelter to eighteen to twenty headquarters personnel


and forward observers from M ("Mike") Company, Cannon Company, division artillery, and the artillery flash and sound unit. The observers were accompanied either by radio men or by wire team crews. All in all, nearly thirty men were crowded into the small space.

At about 2300 that night the whole town seemed to explode as one long con-tinuous burst of shellfire tore across the village, the GIs seeking shelter in base-ments and cellars. As soon as the barrage lifted, the Americans reoccupied their defensive positions. It was not long before rifle shots were heard followed by bursts of fire from automatic weapons and machine pistols.

At about this time Pvt. Davis, who had exchanged his Springfield rifle for a Thompson, made the mistake of standing in the moonlight before the hole a shell had torn in the attic roof of the CP. Suddenly a rifle flash erupted from an arch-way just across the street, the same archway where one of the 57mm guns was sup-posed to be. The bullet bounced off the bricks at Pvt. Davis' feet; Davis instinc-tively replied with a burst of five or six rounds from his Thompson but without any observed result.

Things started to heat up as the Germans closed in and small arms fire opened up from around the American positions. A building that housed one or two squads of the Third Platoon, Company L, was spitting machine gun and rifle fire from every window and opening with such volume and intensity that one observer thought the building was on fire. Standing on a street corner, the building was apparently considered by the Germans to be of some importance since their assault focused on it.

Eventually things quieted down, but the stillness only seemed to accent the purring sound of a nearby engine. At first, Pvt. Davis thought that it might be a half-track or a jeep. It did not have the sound of the American M4's motor. The mystery vehicle was somewhere off to Davis's left—possibly down a sidestreet lead-ing west out of the town.

Pvt. Davis went to the cellar to ask Captain Hallahan whether they (the Americans) had any half-tracks or tanks in the area. But Hallahan indicated that he was not aware of any. Pvt. Davis returned to the attic and continued to listen and watch. The sound of the motor seemed to come from behind a red brick house across from Pvt. Davis's, a building where a squad of the Third Platoon under Sgt. "Red" White were housed. For a time it was thought that there might have been two tanks present. Two men of Third Platoon reached the Company L CP with word that a German tank had the muzzle of its 88 almost sticking in the window of their house. The squad had a bazooka but figured it would have been suicide to attempt to use it against the tank—reportedly a 70-ton King Tiger. Davis later learned that in its approach, the Tiger had fired a round striking a man in the door-way of one of the houses occupied by the First Platoon. Only the man's right foot was found.

German Counterattack. Throughout the night there had been numerous Ger-man patrols and the worst fifteen-minute artillery barrage that many members of the regiment recalled ever experiencing. At 0300 Company L called for artillery


fire to be laid on the outskirts of the town. The combined fire of the 104th's Divi-sion Artillery and 4l5th's Cannon Company descended on the Germans, inflict-ing many casualties. The Cannon Company alone fired six hundred rounds in three hours.

Shortly after the artillery barrage, Sgt. Zahora of Company K saw a squad or more of Germans enter the barn immediately behind the company CP. The Ger-mans launched an assault employing Panzerschrecks and throwing hand grenades at the windows of the building. American rifle fire killed four at close range while grenades were used each time the Germans tried to sneak up to the house. During the fight, the GIs could hear a German officer shouting orders to his men in the nearby orchard west of the barn behind the CP. The barn in which the Germans had taken shelter had no roof, and the GIs tried to throw grenades in on their adversaries. When the German soldiers tried to withdraw, they were stopped by a ring of American artillery fire placed around the town. Likewise, time fire and mor-tar fire were placed on German positions in the northwestern part of town.

While the troops in the CP building and in the house north of it were meet-ing one German thrust, the GIs in the double house were attacked by two other groups, one assault following the same path as the one that had hit Company I, coming from the west across the orchard. The machine gunners let the Germans get well into the open ground and then opened fired breaking up the attack. Another group of Germans fired on the house from the barn behind the CP while a machine gunner and a soldier with a BAR returned fire. One group of Germans fired a Panzerschreck at the double house and quickly departed. This action lasted until about 0430, when the Germans in the Company K sector retired. Between 1100 and 1130, the Third Platoon, Company K, arrived in Lucherberg. The men were positioned in an arc on the northern outskirts of town, taking over the thinly held positions of the Second Squad.

One group of Germans, more determined than the rest, worked its way around to the west side of the hill to where the short, sheer cliff rose up. A pla-toon of Company K commanded by Lt. Frank Kimball and a section of HMG's under 1st Lt. Dorsey waited patiently until the winded Germans lined the edge of the cliff, then opened fire with their machine guns and rifles, stopping the attack almost before it got started. A German officer rushed forward and fired point-blank at Lt. Kimball, hitting him in the left shoulder. Lt. Kimball returned the fire, drop-ping the German.

These assaults seemed minor when compared to the whirlwind that was about to hit the Americans.

5 December

The Germans' main effort to retake Lucherberg began before daylight on 5 December. Employing a company of tanks and a battalion of infantry, the Ger-mans assaulted the village in the early morning darkness. For several hours the fight-ing raged at close quarters. Two American M4s and one 57mm AT gun were


knocked out early in the engagement. Tanks of Company C, 750th Tank Bn., were moving forward to meet the German threat while the 57mm guns of the Third Bn. in their pocket formation waited for a chance at a flank shot at the approach-ing vehicles. Sgt. Wayne Hess of the Third Bn.'s AT platoon, whose squad held the right tine of the platoon's U-shaped position, held fire as a German panzer moved in. When the right moment came, he opened fire—a hit on the side of the tank. Stung, the King Tiger (as it was later identified) returned fire at the gun crew, evening the score by wounding Sgt. Hess. Two more shots at close quarters by each adversary found the tank and the 57 still in action. The Tiger gave ground, back-ing off to the Pier road where it burst into flames, making a pyre for its crew and burning all morning. Amazingly, a lowly 57mm gun had found a chink in the armor of the mighty Tiger.

The AT crews were alerted, but in the darkness the German soldiers got in so close to their positions that the crewmen were unable to man their most for-ward gun (the gun on the left tine of the U in the barnyard covering the Pier road), permitting one of the "grey monsters" to get right into their position. The com-pany called for defensive artillery fire, which had been preplotted in case of an attack, but the tank and some of the Germans were too close and the rounds passed over them. However, other armored vehicles and infantry farther back were stopped. The shells dropped about 150 yards in front of Company L. Five Ger-man soldiers got into a small haystack about fifty yards northeast of the house Com-pany L was using as an OP. One of the American infantrymen took a submachine gun and went out to deal with them, killing all five. The fire of 60mm mortars was employed in an effort to fill the gap between the American positions and the impacting artillery rounds. A German panzer stopped alongside the wall of a house on the west side of the road (about fifty yards north of the OP). A section of heavy machine guns, a light machine gun squad, and one squad of the Third Platoon were in the house across the road from the tank but did not have a bazooka available to attack it. Realizing that they could not stop the tank, the men kept quiet.

By now there was a tremendous concentration of German artillery falling on Lucherberg and on the Lamersdorf-Lucherberg road, shredding phone lines and disrupting messenger service. Radios and pyrotechnic signals were pressed into service to call up protective fire from the 929th FA Bn. and the 415th Cannon Company.

Another panzer just outside the zone where the artillery was impacting pulled back and moved toward Pier at about 0700, while a second panzer pulled onto the road a little while later. A GI on the second floor of the OP building had secured a bazooka and from his excellent firing position attempted to get a shot off, but the bazooka failed to fire. TD fire was employed to drive off the tank.

Meanwhile, Pvt. Davis believed that he had finally located the German tank that had moved in behind the Third Platoon earlier. He returned to the cellar to find Captain Hallahan; both talked with Lt. Taylor, Company B, 692d TD Bn., about engaging the German panzer—a King Tiger. Taylor knew that his guns could not hope to penetrate the frontal armor of the Tiger.


Lt. Taylor went with Pvt. Davis to the attic and was shown where the tank was sitting in the road, on the other side of the intersection, about a block to the north of his gun. Taylor then went to join his crew across the street after declar-ing he would fire five rounds "right down the middle."

The intrepid lieutenant and his crew wheeled the 57mm from the archway of the building where the gun had been hidden from view and man-handled it into a position in the street. Members of Company K witnessed the AT crew being sniped at while they maneuvered their gun. Just as it began to get light (about 0630), the gun crew opened fire. The first round went down the middle of the street, across the intersection, passed the Tiger, and on across the fields, finally strik-ing a house in the town of Pier, about two miles away. The next four rounds fol-lowed the path of the first. The muzzle blast from the small gun was terrific. Amaz-ingly, the Tiger, instead of returning fire, disappeared from view, pulling off to the west side of the Pier road behind some buildings. The AT crew quickly pulled its gun back into the archway.

The men of the First Platoon prepared to meet the Tiger if it decided to come their way. Pvt. Roy Williams, a tall, choir-boy type from the state of Wash-ington, was armed with a bazooka and had positioned himself in a second floor window nearest the corner. From his position, about forty feet from the corner, he had an excellent view of the street. A tall, nervous Southern fellow prepared to assist Williams as loader.

Meanwhile, in the cellar of the building, Pvt. Davis witnessed the entry of a tank captain who informed the Company L CO that he and his men were now safe—the captain and his tank platoon had arrived—his Shermans (Company C, 750th Tank Bn.) had parked behind the church. The tanker's sense of safety was shaken quickly when Captain Hallahan informed him that there was a King Tiger prowling along the company's front. The captain left to talk over the situation with his officers and promised to radio back. He was not heard from again.

At about daylight the elusive Tiger turned over its engines, a soft, powerful purr coming from down the street. Watching from the attic with Pvt. Davis were several officers; Williams, on the floor below them, had his bazooka poised. Sud-denly, the end of a gun barrel began to slowly emerge from around the corner. Its muzzle brake identified it as a German 88. The gun tube was so long that the brake reached the center of the intersection without exposing the tank hull to view. The muzzle began to wave from side-to-side and up and down as if sensing for a tar-get.

As the hull of the tank reached the corner, everyone in the attic made a break for the stairs. Pvt. Davis, stopping at the landing, told Lt. Danowski that he was going back and was going to try to button the tank up (pin the crew inside with rifle fire); however, when Pvt. Davis returned to his attic OP he found that the Tiger's crew was securely inside their vehicle with the hatches closed. Davis then decided to make an effort to hit the tank's viewing slits. But before he could get off a shot, the Tiger backed out of sight.

Pvt. Williams had been unable to get off" a shot with his bazooka because of a bad connecting wire between the battery and trigger. Having turned about, the


Tiger now took off toward Pier. Sgt. "Red" White ran out of the house he had been holed up in and fired one or two bazooka rockets at the retiring monster. He later claimed that he had hit it in the motor and that it entered Pier burning.

The German troops that managed to get inside the American ring of artillery fire were eventually flushed out of the buildings, and Company L consolidated its positions and coordinated with companies K and F during the morning.

AT Guns. When an AT gun crew was put on alert, normal procedure called for four men on the gun and four men under shelter. During the earlier German artillery barrage all but two men of Gun #2 took shelter—Pfc. Shelby Pelfrey and Pfc. Charles Gary had been posted as security in a cowshed to the left of the gun position and could not get back to the shelter. Six AT crewmen and five Company K men had taken shelter in the cellar of a nearby house. During the barrage the house received several direct hits and collapsed, trapping the GIs. After the bar-rage lifted, Pelfrey saw about twenty-five German infantry approach from the northwest toward his position. The Germans, shouting and yelling, rushed up to the cowshed. Pfc. Gary covered the window on the road side of the shed while Pfc. Pelfrey covered the door facing northwest. Pelfrey was armed only with a .45-cal pistol, Gary had an Ml rifle, which he emptied out of the window at the Ger-mans. The Germans scattered at first and then began converging on the building. One of them tossed a hand grenade in the window, causing the two GIs to dive into a cow stall. The grenade's explosion shook them up, but they were unhurt. As soon as the smoke and dust cleared they went back to their positions. Pelfrey then saw two Germans outside about ten feet away from the door, but his pistol failed to fire. He called out to Gary, who killed one with his Ml; the other fled. By this time most of the Germans had moved past the cowshed. The two defend-ers then withdrew to the house where the gun crew and Company K men had become buried. They stayed there until the fighting slackened, firing occasionally at Germans they could see moving about. They also witnessed an attack on the platoon's #3 Gun. At about 0630 hours on 5 December they went across the road to where a platoon of Company L was stationed. Later, at around 0800 hours, four wounded men of Company K and the members of the #2 Gun crew were dug out of the cellar.

The attack on the #3 Gun that Pelfrey and Gray witnessed involved twelve to fifteen Germans. The Americans were equipped with Ml rifles, carbines, and M3 "grease guns," but had no hand grenades. The Germans came in from the west, getting to within fifteen or twenty feet of the building opposite the church that housed the CP and #3 Gun crewmen. Lt. Taylor had deployed his crew to defend from the building's windows. Close fighting lasted about twenty minutes, and small arms fire was exchanged for another half hour. The Germans had come into the barns just behind the houses on the west side of the street (across from the church). Only two or three could be seen at a time, as they crept up to within grenade throwing distance of the AT Platoon CP. Two of the Germans were killed about fifteen feet from the door of the CP. Some kept up a stream of fire from the barn and adjoining sheds while others kept moving to the southwest.


During the fighting German panzers or assault guns worked their way close to the town from the northeast. After the firefight around the positions of the #2 and #3 AT guns had died down, a German armored vehicle was seen in the area where mines had been laid across the Pier Road. It had apparently damaged a track when it encountered the mines. Lt. Taylor observed the tank from the Company L CP and saw the Germans attempting to make repairs. He told the #3 Gun crew to wheel their piece out into the road and fire. They managed to fire off four rounds, getting at least two direct hits; however, the projectiles just ricocheted off; the tank, its track quickly repaired, pulled off the road to the east. The AT crew then pushed their gun back into the archway of the building that was being used as the AT Platoon's CP. Another tank was spotted behind a house on the east side of the Pier road but the AT gun could not be brought to bear on it as the tank was too close to the forward positions of Company L. At daylight, about 0700 hours, a Mark V Panther pulled onto the Pier road just north of the crossroads. Taylor told the gun captain, Sgt. Hess, to move his gun back onto the road and fire on the tank as it sat just north of the crossroads, about seventy-five yards away. The crew pushed the gun out into the road, and fired two rounds point-blank. With the second round the tank turned around and moved about 500 yards in the direction of Pier before the continuing fire of the AT gun stopped it. A second tank was then sighted in the distance moving toward Pier from the east. The #3 Gun crew reported firing on this tank and that it burst into flame on the edge of the town. The entire action was over before 0800 hours.

Sgt. R. T. Ames, squad leader of the #2 Gun crew, had managed to escape from the house that had trapped his crew on its collapse. He made his way to the AT Platoon CP for help, but it was impossible to assist him in digging out the buried crewmen at the time because everyone was busy fighting off the German attack. He tried three times to get back to his crew, but each time German fire drove him back. Later, while the #3 Gun crew was firing, he helped carry ammu-nition to the gun. The Germans threw grenades at the ammunition handlers from the upper story of the barn near the ammo truck, wounding one of the GIs.

The crew of #1 Gun did not fire during the attack. German panzers (to include the Panther referred to earlier), sitting directly east of the north crossroads pinned down part of the Weapons Platoon of Company L that was holed up in some nearby buildings. The bazooka team of #1 Gun was told by the infantrymen not to fire at the tanks because they might provoke the Germans into blasting the building in which the Company L men were sheltered.

Company F. Due to some mixup the Company F outposts had been led to expect friendly tanks and infantry to approach from the northeast and east. About fifteen minutes before the German counterattack (0645) began, a German was report-edly killed about an arm's length away from the #1 Gun. Evidently he had attempted to sneak up on the gun during a mortar barrage. Mortar fire was now coming down on both sides of the Pier road and hitting the house in which the gun crew had taken shelter. One of the crewmen heard distant motors, but it was impossi-ble to tell what direction they were coming from. A German tank had moved in


and taken up a position beside the house the Third Platoon was using as a CP while another took up a position in the vicinity of the First Platoon's CP. This tank fired several rounds, one of which knocked out the AT gun, another set fire to a one-and-a-half-ton truck and with three more rounds knocked out an American tank that had just arrived on the scene. The AT gun crewmen were coming out of a cellar just as their gun was hit, a piece of the gunshield flying right past them. The burning truck, loaded with fifty rounds of AT ammunition, a case of grenades, and .50-cal machine gun rounds, exploded. The German tank wreaking all this havoc was a King Tiger.

One of the AT crewmen got a bazooka and went to an upstairs window, but while he could see the tank he could not bring his bazooka to bear on it. The tank moved up the road into town and fired directly into Company F's CP, mortally wounding Lt. Davidson, the Company F CO, and killing Lt. Saunders, FO of 929th FA Bn., who had replaced Lt. Ulmer. The tank then backed down the road and took up a position near the First Platoon's CP.

Present during the action was Pfc. Charles Brodeur, a Company F messen-ger with the Weapons Platoon. Brodeur, from Detroit, Michigan, had joined the army in December 1942, a month before being drafted. After having been turned down by the Air Corps, Navy, and Marine Corps because of a punctured ear drum, he had been accepted in the Army Special Training Program and was sent to the Engineering School at the University of Illinois. When the program was termi-nated, Brodeur was sent to the California desert to join the 415th Infantry while on maneuvers. Pfc. Brodeur described the events at the company's command post:

I was in the Company F CP at the time that the German tank fired into it. We had heard firing but were unsure as to where it was coming from. Lt. Saunders left the CP in an effort to locate the source of the firing. Lt. Davidson told me to get on the field telephone while he got on the radio, attempting to reach headquarters and find out what was going on. The radio's pack was just outside the entrance to the CP—the entrance recessed below street level—the pack was placed on the street side of the entrance with the antenna sticking up above ground level. The field phone was resting on a wooden counter just inside the entrance to the CP. I was standing there working the telephone and Lt. Davidson was standing in front of the entrance with his back leaning against my right side when the shell struck. He just sort of slid down my side and came to rest with his head on my right foot. The shell must have landed near the entrance of the CP because Lt. Davidson took the full impact of the resulting shrapnel. It was obvious that he was mortally wounded. No one else in the CP seemed to have been hurt, although we were certainly shaken up and somewhat in shock.

I climbed through the rubble at the entrance and went out to find a medic for Lt. Davidson. When I searched the street I looked to the right and saw one of our tanks smoking [this actually may have been the burning ammo truck of the AT pla-toon]. I saw a body lying on the street. Still dazed, I was standing with my back to a building trying to understand what was happening. I looked to the left and saw the German tank with its gun swinging towards me. I pushed off the building with my foot just as the tank fired. Fragments from the shell's impact struck me a glanc-ing blow on my left upper arm, the force of the impact knocking me to the street and spraining my right ankle. Several of the guys from the First Platoon reached out and pulled me into their house. While I was being treated by a medic I witnessed


an individual [Sgt. George Burns] engaging the tank. I believe that Lt. Saunders was killed out on the street by the same tank that fired on me. The [German] tank crew probably spotted the radio antenna outside the entrance to the CP and fired at it, realizing that it indicated a CP.*

At 0700, Sgt. George E. Burns, of Saranac Lake, New York, was posted in the doorway of a concrete building that housed what was left of the Second Pla-toon, Company E The building was heavily damaged with only the basement, a stairwell, and the casement of the first floor door still standing. In the initial assault on Lucherberg the platoon had taken heavy casualties—about half of two squads had been killed or wounded. The platoon maintained an outpost north of the building and a guard post at the doorway entrance. As daylight was coming to the village all hell was breaking loose. Sgt. Burns has vivid memories of what hap-pened next:

I heard loud gunfire and explosions directly in front of me, but could not see clearly at first. When the smoke cleared somewhat and daylight came, I could then see a huge German tank directly in front of me, about 500 feet away, down the slope of the hill overlooking the road that entered Lucherberg from the northwest. The hatch of the tank was open and a German soldier was yelling out directions for the firing of the main gun. The tank had already hit an ammunition truck, which was burn-ing fiercely, belching black and grey smoke as rounds of ammo exploded. I could have easily killed the German in the turret, but I realized that if I missed the tank would turn on me and perhaps collapse the already weakened concrete roof of our building, killing the remnants of the Second Platoon.

I knew that there were several American TDs in the town square less than 500 feet away. I expected that shortly I would see them coming around the building east of me and start shooting at the Tiger. That did not happen and the tank kept firing point-blank into the village square. I was beside myself with frustration, seeing that nothing was being done to combat the tank. I realized that I had to do something. I decided to get one of our bazookas and ammo and sneak up on the tank in the confusion and try to disable it. To add to my frustration I found that there was not a bazooka left in the platoon and that we were out of rockets.

Keeping the building where the Third Platoon CP was between me and the Tiger, I made my way to the village square. In the square were [three] American TDs, all buttoned up with their crews inside. I was sick at heart and furious with them, espe-cially upon seeing the body of Lt. Saunders laid out in front of the Company F command post. A round from the German tank had neatly cut him in two.

I crossed the square to the TDs and began banging on the hatches of the vehi-cles, yelling, "Why don't you sons-a-bitches give me a hand?" I also called them a lot of unprintable names, and they yelled back for me to go to hell!

I was half out of my mind at this point and so decided to attack the Tiger, even if it killed me. I unstrapped a bazooka from the side of a TD along with some rounds of ammo and was about to confront the tank when suddenly a soldier appeared and said that if I had the guts to go after the tank, he'd help with the ammo and reload for me. I could never have accomplished what I did without his help, especially since I had never loaded a bazooka before.

We made our way through the building housing the Third Platoon and found an outside doorway opposite the burning truck, only about 50 feet from the German

*Charles Brodeur, Letter, 5 August 1992.


tank. I fired two rounds at the tank, missing both times. My un-named helper kept reloading and screaming at me to keep my finger off the trigger as he feared I would accidentally fire it with him catching the back-blast. By now, the smoke from the burning truck gave good cover, and, enraged over missing twice from such close range, I now threw caution to the wind and leaped out from the doorway and fired point-blank at the tank, hitting it squarely in the turret. I'm sure that this hit did no real damage, but when I returned to the street after reloading I found that the tank was no longer in sight. Exultant and fearless with my success, I decided to run after the tank and finish it off. I had gone no more than 60 feet down the left side

Fighting In Lucherberg

3-5 December 1944

2d Plat - Bums' initial guard post

Burning AT Plat ammo truck

Co F CP 3d Plat - Bums' first firing position Original position of Tiger when Burns first opened fire

Side street where Bums encountered Tiger and panzergrenadiers Area where Bums caught the retreating Tiger


of the narrow road when I discovered the tank backed into a side street between two buildings on the other side of the road, the Tiger facing me and supported by infantrymen. They did not have their rifles raised, "at the ready." I was holding the bazooka, ready to fire, but the Germans so surprised me that I screamed in terror and swung the bazooka around and fired at a German soldier standing in front of the tank. The rocket went through the stomach of the soldier and exploded upon striking the front of the panzer directly behind him, spraying blood, guts and shrap-nel on the other German soldiers standing near by. I turned in fright and escaped back to my doorway before they could recover from the shock of my one-man rocket attack.

After this close call, and realizing that I had not mortally wounded the tank, I decided to fire the remaining rounds we had at the front of the tank and cannon muzzle, which was protruding around the corner of the building. I fired some rounds, trying to confuse the Germans, and then, after reloading, I stepped out into the street and stood there paralyzed as the tank came out onto the street—providing me with a perfect target. The tank turned north, away from me, and started retreating up the road with the infantry running along on both sides. They never even looked my way. I ran after the retiring tank and fired a round from a distance of about twenty feet into the Tiger's engine vents, causing it to catch fire, the bulky tank wad-dling away in flames and smoke. As the tank kept moving the crew was abandon-ing it.*

Burns survived the encounter with the Tiger, and his action helped to turn the tide of the German counterattack and to drive them out of Lucherberg. For his daring, Burns received the Distinguished Service Cross.

At about 0800 the tank destroyer platoon, which had positioned a gun by the side of the house where the Third AT Squad had had its gun, sighted two Ger-man self-propelled guns that had become bogged down near the north end of the lake. The TD platoon opened fire and reported the destruction of both SP guns. In addition, Company B, 692d TD Bn., reported destroying one Panther, one light tank, and one mechanized vehicle.

At about 1500, Pfc. Robert H. Jones, while on guard at the east end of town, saw a German with a heavy pack making for a house down the street from his position. Opening fire on the German a squad of American infantrymen watched in horror as the German literally disintegrated in a loud and violent explosion— obviously he had been carrying a load of demolition charges into the town.

Early in the afternoon the Third Platoon of Company K moved from Lamers-dorf to the northern outskirts of Lucherberg, supplementing the town's defenses in case the Germans decided to launch another counterattack. A German prisoner revealed that the dawn counterattack had employed four Tiger [King Tiger] tanks, three Panthers, and three self-propelled assault guns supported by an estimated 500-600 Fallschirmjägers (members of the Third Battalion, Eighth Fallschirmjäger Regt.; Kompanien 13,14, and 15 of the Ninth Fallschirmjäger Regt.; and the Third Reconnaissance Kompanie of the Third FJD). The use of the Tigers was an indi-cation of how important the Germans considered recapturing the town. The King Tigers, the Germans' largest operational main battle tank, may have been from the

*George Burns, Letter, 17 March 1992.


Wehrmacht's 506th Heavy Panzer Bn. (sPzAbt 506). The battalion had been trans-ferred from the Eastern Front for refitting in August 1944, had responded to Allied airborne operations in the Arnhem-Nijmegen area, and was then employed against the Americans at Geilenkirchen and Aachen. The sPzAbt 506 would later be active during the Ardennes Offensive.

Final Night

As dark approached, Pvt. Davis returned to the familiar Company L CP cel-lar. Many of the GIs, their rations gone, had not eaten in a couple of days, and so took to eating the contents of German knapsacks they had found, most of which consisted of black bread, butter, fish paste, and bologna.

About midnight Davis returned to his attic as the "Jerries" started coming in again. Listening to the field phone that had been installed earlier, he could hear the platoons calling for artillery and the outposts reporting over the phone net about approaching German infantry.

Artillery observers having registered the guns during the day, the rounds began to land on predesignated areas. The crash of bursting proximity shells rent the sky like "thunder bolts." The fire was non-stop. Pvt. Davis could hear frag-ments of steel hitting on the slate roof of the attic. Crouching low beneath the rafters, he kept the phone to his ear.

Many of the shells burst right over the American outposts. The troops became frantic. Their foxholes offered little or no protection from the air bursts above them. "Call off the fire! Get them to extend the range!" the men were shouting over the phone.

The artillery FO immediately got on the radio and ordered the fire to be lifted. But it still continued to fall. "Stop the fire!" screamed the operators at the platoon HQs. Pvt. Davis got on the line. "The shells are bursting almost over my head. Why in the hell don't they stop that fire?"*

The barrage had been going on for about fifteen minutes without let up. The German infantry, out in the flat, open ground, had been completely dispersed.

The telephone operator kept telling the outposts and platoons that they had called to lift the fire. Finally the artillery FO said that it must be German fire. He claimed that the American barrage must have lifted long ago. But the soldiers seemed to know differently.

After nearly twenty minutes of concentrated fire, the barrage finally lifted. Things remained quiet around headquarters for the rest of the night, except for an occasional short burst of harassing fire from German artillery or mortars.

This terrific artillery barrage seemed to have drawn the fight at Lucherberg to a conclusion although a few minor attempts were still made by the Germans to recapture the town. During the hours of darkness, Pvt. Mike Suskind, Third Pla-toon BAR man, on outpost duty at the corner of the barn where Pvt. Davis's Tiger

*Charles Davis letter.


tank had turned around, saw two Germans walking right past him. Young Pvt. Irwin Schwartz of Brooklyn caught them with a long burst of ,45-caliber slugs from his M3 "grease" gun. The next morning the two dead Germans, one an officer, were found with a large radio; undoubtedly they had intended to direct artillery onto the town.

Conclusion

Through the combined efforts of the two American infantry battalions, tanks, and tank destroyers, plus substantial mortar and artillery support, Lucherberg had been held. But more important, the Americans were now able to continue their advance to the west bank of the Roer River.

At 1500, 5 December, a reorganization of the Third Bn. took place, with Lt. Col. Kelleher reporting to regiment for duty. Major C. Clough was placed in com-mand of the battalion; Captain W. H. Buckley was made battalion executive officer; Captain Hallahan was assigned as battalion S-3; Lt. Danowski assumed command of Company L, and Lt. Versel Case of Company I.

The loss of Lucherberg was keenly felt by the Germans, as is evidenced by the counterattacks undertaken and a report that Field Marshall Walther Model, while in nearby Düren, had personally ordered efforts for recapturing the town.

In an assessment of the action after the war, the German LXXXI Korps com-mander, General Friedrich Koechling claimed that everything possible had been done to defend Lucherberg with infantry, artillery, and engineers. But there were limits due to the lack of available forces. Lucherberg was defended by a battalion of the Third Fallschirmjäger Division, but they had only arrived there a short time before. These troops, especially the commanders, lacked combat experience and had little or no training in night combat operations. General Koechling claimed that security had not been set far enough forward and that there were many gaps in the line of overstrained infantrymen. The failed counterattacks were due to poor tank support caused by the rain-soaked ground and insufficient quantities of artillery and mortar ammunition. He especially cited the failure of the assault bat-talion (246th Volksgrenadier Division) as being due to the intensity of the Amer-ican artillery fire.*

On 7 December General Allen, 104th Division, issued the following com-mendation:

The successful attack on Lucherberg was made possible by the stubborn fighting of the 413th Infantry in first taking Lamersdorf and Inden, and the quick crossing of the Inde River by the Third Bn., 4l4th Infantry. In the actual night attack on Lucher-berg, involving a river crossing and the assault of a strongly fortified town, the troop leading and dash of the Second and Third Battalions, 415th Infantry, were out-standing. The functioning of the forward artillery observers and the close artillery

'MS A-997, Combat Operations in the Aachen sector, Sep.-Dec. 1944; Gen d'Inf Koechling of LXXXI Army Corps.


support was highly effective. The troop leading, dash, and tenacious fighting of Company I, 415th Infantry, in its night attack to seize the north edge of Lucher-berg and in retaining its position until its timely support by the Second and Third Battalions, was particularly outstanding.*

In the three-day fight for Lucherberg, at least 204 Germans were killed and 209 captured and an estimated 400 to 500 wounded. The Germans had also lost two Tiger tanks, two Panther tanks, one or two self-propelled guns, and five 75mm antitank guns.

Despite the initial losses of Company I, the 415th Infantry's casualties were relatively light. From the evening of 2 December until 5 December 1944, the 4l5th Infantry suffered twenty-one killed in action, one died of wounds, eighty-eight wounded, and twenty-nine missing. For their actions during this period the men of the 415 th were awarded two Distinguished Service Crosses, eleven Silver Stars, and twenty Bronze Stars. In addition, the Third Battalion, 415th Infantry, received a Presidential Citation.

In pushing beyond the Inde, the 104th Division had come abreast of the other divisions of the VII Corps. A smaller bridgehead the 4l4th Infantry had established at Inden together with the 415 th Infantry's taking of Lucherberg secured the division's position and provided an adequate base for renewing the push across the remaining three miles to the Roer.

*Hoegh and Doyle, "Timberwolf Tracks."

6 The Iron Division

Nazi Germany's great counteroffensive into the Ardennes region of Belgium and Luxembourg in December 1944 was conducted mainly by two armies: the Sixth Panzer Army in the north, and the Fifth Panzer Army in the south. (Actually, the Seventh Army to the south of Fifth Panzer Army was also involved, but as it was comprised only of infantry units, its contribution to the offensive was compara-tively small.) In a sense, the Ardennes attack was a test of two opposing theories within the German Armed Forces: the Sixth Panzer Army was composed primar-ily of Waffen-SS units (sometimes referred to as the Sixth SS Panzer Army, a name it did not acquire until 1945) while Fifth Panzer Army contained mostly divisions of the Wehrmacht, or regular army. Some German leaders felt the Ardennes attack would show that politically indoctrinated troops such as the SS were more effective than traditional units, like those of Fifth Panzer Army. Partly for that reason and because of Hitler's bias toward the SS units, the Sixth Panzer Army was assigned the primary role in the Ardennes attack; namely, seizure of the Allied port of Antwerp and encirclement of about a million Allied troops in Belgium and Hol-land. The role of the Fifth Panzer Army was to support the drive of the SS for-mations and protect their southern and western flanks. However, tenacious Amer-ican stands at places like Krinkelt-Rocherath, Dom Bütgenbach, Trois Ponts, and Stoumont disproved the theory of SS superiority (despite the habit of the German High Command to assign more and better replacements and equipment to the SS). On the contrary, the ostensibly supporting drive of the Fifth Panzer Army made the deepest advances into the American defenses and came nearer to achiev-ing the offensive's goals than either of the other two armies. That the Fifth Panzer Army failed to reach the Meuse River was due in no small part to the heroic defense of one small American regiment on a narrow ridge between two rivers: the 110th Infantry Regiment of the Twenty-eighth Division.

The Americans

On 16 December the 110th, one of three regiments of the Twenty-eighth Infantry Division, was holding a front of about 15 miles along a steep north-south ridge between two rivers in Luxembourg—the Our on the east and the Clerf on


the west. Just across the Our in Germany were the pillboxes of the Westwall, Hitler's defensive barrier stretching from Switzerland to the North Sea, dubbed the Siegfried Line by the GIs. It was a formidable barrier to the advance, but at the moment of little concern to the men of the 110th. They had been sent to this sector of the Ardennes to rest after having received a brutal mauling in the Huert-gen Forest six weeks earlier. The Twenty-eighth Division, which had earned the name "Iron Division" from General Pershing in World War I, had suffered over 6,000 casualties in the Schmidt-Vossenack sector of the Huertgen Forest, and after a month spent absorbing some 2,000 replacements the 110th's rifle companies were finally back to full strength although many of its soldiers had a bare minimum of training and exposure to combat. For that reason the commander of the 110th Infantry, Colonel Hurley E. Fuller, had gotten into the habit of sending small patrols across the Our to see what the Germans were up to, to take prisoners for interrogation, and to season his new troops. However, he did not have enough troops to defend his extended front in strength, so he established a series of vil-lage strongholds along the ridge and based his defense plan on them.

There were four main east-west roads that crossed the 110th's sector along which any (though seemingly unlikely) German attack would have to pass—Das-burg-Clervaux, Ober Eisenbach-Hosingen-Drauffelt, Gemünd-Holzthum-Wilw-erwiltz, and Stolzembourg-Hoscheid-Kautenbach. The American strongholds served to block these roads. Each of the frontline companies sent three to five squad-sized outposts to the bank of the Our River by day and patrolled the roads between the villages, but withdrew these patrols at night.

The Ardennes area was widely considered to be a quiet sector with terrain unsuitable for attack. Intelligence showed the unit facing the 110th on the other side of the Our was the Twenty-sixth Volksgrenadier Division (VGD). It had moved into the area in October after three and a half years of almost continuous fighting on the Russian front and was known to be as exhausted as the Twenty-eighth Infantry Division. Convinced that the Germans had no intention or capa-bility of attacking in their sector, the men of the 110th rested and trained in peace from mid-November until 16 December. They did not know that the volks-grenadiers of the Twenty-sixth were screening the assembly of two panzer divi-sions just to the east.

Following the military axiom that a commander should always keep some kind of reserve, the commander of the Twenty-eighth Infantry Division, General Norman D. Cota, held a division reserve of one battalion at Donnange, several kilometers west of the Clerf River behind the 110th's positions. Unfortunately for the 110th, however, that reserve was their own Second Battalion; this left only two battalions to cover the regiment's front. The First Bn., 110th, commanded by Lt. Col. Donald Paul from his command post in Urspelt, held the northern half of the regiment's front. Farthest north, near the boundary with the division's 112th Infantry Regt., Company A guarded the road junction of Heinerscheid, supported by Company C of the 707th Tank Battalion. Two kilometers to the southwest, Company D (the battalion's heavy weapons company) held the village of Grind-hausen while Company B and a platoon of towed 3-inch guns from the 630th

The Iron Division 191

Tank Destroyer Bn. had the job of protecting the vital crossroads east of Mar-nach.

The Company A and B positions were connected by one of the few excel-lent paved roads in the Ardennes, a highway snaking along the top of the ridge and reminding the men of the Twenty-eighth Division of the Skyline Drive in the Blue Ridge mountains back home. They therefore christened this road the Sky-line Drive, but it was also known as the Red Ball Highway after the Red Ball Express trucks that used it as a supply route. The road was, and is, known locally as highway N16. Near Marnach it crossed one of the main east-west roads in the area, a road running from Dasburg on the east side of the Our to the town of Cler-vaux on the west side of the Clerf. This road continued west toward Bastogne, one

110th Infantry Regiment Sector

December 1944


of the Ardennes' chief road and population centers, making the Marnach cross-roads a vital objective for the upcoming German attack. Company C and the reg-iment's Cannon Company with its six howitzers were stationed in Munshausen several kilometers southwest of Marnach.

The Third Bn., 110th, under Major Harold F. Milton held the southern part of the regiment's sector. South of Marnach on the Skyline Drive, Milton's Com-pany K garrisoned the village of Hosingen, augmented by Company B of the 103d Engineer Combat Bn. (the Twenty-eighth Division's organic engineer battalion). An unpaved trail led from Ober Eisenbach on the German side of the Our up the ridge near Hosingen and back down to the town of Bockholtz. There it split, one path leading to Drauffelt and the other to Wilwerwiltz. Both these towns were crossing sites on the Clerf River (the division's tank battalion, the 707th, was head-quartered at Wilwerwiltz). Hosingen controlled the main approaches to both. Company L held the town of Holzthum and had outposts at another small cross-roads on the Skyline Drive, where a small building known as the Cafe Schincker was located. Just down the road to the southwest of Holzthum, Major Milton had set up his Third Bn. CP in Consthum, guarded by Company M (heavy weapons company). To the southeast Company I was at Weiler, blocking the road that crossed the Our at Stolzembourg, and behind its position the assault gun com-pany of the 707th Tank Bn. and the AT Company (57mm guns) of the 110th Regt. were in Hoscheid, through which ran the 110th's boundary with the 109th Infantry (the Twenty-eighth Division's third regiment). Companies C and L were ostensi-bly the reserve for each of their battalions, leaving only the equivalent of four com-panies (A, B, I, and K) manning the regiment's entire 15-mile front—averaging about three and a half miles per company. (The heavy weapons companies, D and M, had distributed most of their manpower and weaponry among the front-line companies.) The scattered outposts and strongholds could not support each other with fire because of the distance between them, but could communicate via tele-phone and SCR-300 radios.

Colonel Fuller's regimental command post was located in the picturesque town of Clervaux, built on a spur of rock around which looped the Clerf River (the town itself was sometimes referred to as Clerf). The position's inherent defen-sibility was recognized long ago—in the 1100s a local noble family had built a cas-tle there. In 1944, however, the town was famous as a resort for tourists and boasted ten hotels. These hotels were pressed into service by the Twenty-eighth Infantry Division, which was using Clervaux not only as a regimental command center (located in the Hotel Claravallis) but also as a divisional rest area. About five kilo-meters west of Clervaux, just off the main highway running to Bastogne, lay the little village of Donnange, where Lt. Col. Ross C. Henbest's Second Bn., 110th, was assembled in division reserve.

Scattered throughout the regimental area between Heinerscheid and Hoscheid were elements of various supporting units: three batteries of the 109th FA Bn. (a seasoned unit, armed with 105mm howitzers, that traced its lineage back to the American Revolution), one battery from the 687th FA Bn. (Battery C, 105mm howitzers), Battery A of the 447th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, and the 3-inch


gun platoons from Company B of the 630th TD Bn. Unlike many American units in the Ardennes, the 110th Infantry could not call on an overwhelming array of artillery to support its defense because most of the VIII Corps artillery battalions were located farther north in the sector of the inexperienced 106th Infantry Divi-sion. In addition, the nature of the hilly terrain, the extent of the regimental front, and the distance of several kilometers from the 110th's front line to the German front line on the far bank of the Our River forced those batteries that were avail-able to deploy much closer to the front-line battalions and much farther away from each other than usual. These factors would be very significant in the fighting to come.

Although the patrols of the Twenty-eighth Infantry Division had noticed changes in the appearance and behavior of the German soldiers across the river in the past several days—more saluting between officers and enlisted men, troops appearing in new winter overcoats; a patrol had even captured a disoriented young German soldier on 13 December who told of an impending German attack between 17 and 25 December—no one on the American side took the threat of a German offensive seriously, and there had been no interruption of the daily routine.

The Germans

Across the Our from the Twenty-eighth Division, the seemingly idle Twenty-sixth VGD was preparing to attack and open up approach routes for the panzer units to follow, which were then to sweep to the Meuse and beyond. This tired but elite unit was one of the few that had truly earned the honorific Volksgrenadier Hitler generously bestowed on many of his later recruited infantry divisions, hav-ing fought against the Soviets on the eastern front continuously from July 1941 until late September 1944. It had been formed in 1935 as the Twenty-sixth Infantry Division, and took part in the invasion of France and the Low Countries before moving east in early 1941. Fighting in the central sector in Russia, it had been involved in the Volga River battles between Rzhev and Kalininiy in late 1941 and around Orel in early 1942. During the summer of 1943 the division fought in the Kursk counteroffensive, suffering terrible losses, and then defended a series of posi-tions as the Soviets pushed inexorably into Poland in 1943 and 1944. After fight-ing a desperate and costly delaying action around Warsaw, the division was pulled out of the line and moved to the city of Poznan in September 1944, where it was combined with the remnants of the 582d VGD. The newly reconstituted and renamed Twenty-sixth VGD moved to Trier, Germany, in October to absorb sev-eral thousand replacements, most of them ex-sailors from the Kriegsmarine (Ger-man navy). By November the division was back to full strength and moved to the area around Dasburg on the Our River to prepare for the upcoming Ardennes assault. By 16 December the Twenty-sixth VGD numbered about 17,000 men, and most of the equipment destroyed or lost in Russia had been replaced. The divi-sion fielded forty-two of the ubiquitous German 75mm towed antitank guns in addition to the usual complement of infantry weapons and guns and was further


strengthened by the attachment of the 1026th StuG Kompanie (assault gun com-pany) with fourteen Jagdpanzer 38(t) Hetzers. Artillery support was provided by four artillery battalions, which included eighteen 88mm guns, thirty-six 105mm guns, and twelve 150mm guns. The battalion of 150mm guns was horse-drawn, as was much of the division's equipment, since motor transport was at a premium in German infantry units at this late stage of the war. However, the Twenty-sixth VGD owned at least 5,000 horses, some brought back from Russia and some acquired during refit in Germany.

Behind the Twenty-sixth VGD positions along the Our, two veteran panzer divisions took advantage of the lull in Allied offensive operations and the bad win-ter weather, which grounded American reconnaissance planes, to assemble for the attack. In the north, roughly opposite the First Bn., 110th, was the Second Panzer Division, one of Germany's three original panzer divisions (formed in 1935) and one of the most experienced units of any nationality in the war. It had partici-pated in the annexation of Austria in 1938 (after which Vienna became the divi-sion's home station) and fought in Poland, France, and Greece before moving to the Russian front, where it stayed until after the Kursk counteroffensive in 1943. The division moved to France in early 1944 for refitting, and was stationed around Arras when the Allies invaded Normandy. It had a central role in the failed coun-terattack at Mortain in early August, after which the remnants (consisting of about 2,000 men and 15-20 tanks) withdrew to the Westwall for further refitting.

By early December, the division was back to 80 percent of its strength with about 12,300 men and 75 tanks (49 Mark V Panthers and 26 Mark IVs). It also fielded 45 self-propelled assault guns and was supported by three battalions of motorized artillery. Due to a shortage of motor transport after the Normandy fighting, one of the division's panzergrenadier battalions was equipped with bicy-cles, but the steep hills and poor roads in this part of the Ardennes rendered them almost useless. The division's commander, Major General Meinrad von Lauchert (equal in rank to a U.S. Army Brigadier General), had assumed command of the unit on 15 December, less than 24 hours before the start of the attack, but he was an aggressive and experienced commander and did what he could to make sure his division was ready to attack on time. As part of his preparations he reorganized the division into three Kampfgruppen (KG), known as KG von Böhm, KG Cochen-hausen, and KG Gutman (each named after its commanding officer). They were primarily composed of the division's reconnaissance battalion and its two panzer-grenadier regiments with panzer assets divided among them.

South of these Viennese panzers, in the zone across from the American Third Bn., 110th, an unusual armored division gathered for the attack. This was the 130th Panzer Lehr Division (armored training), which had only been formed in January of 1944 and used tank instructors and ceremonial demonstration units of other divisions as a cadre. As a result, from its inception this division had a special ^lan and a core of competent officers. The division had participated in the German occu-pation of Hungary in the spring of 1944 and had then returned to the west. After the Normandy landings it had moved to block the Allied breakout and had engaged in bitter fighting against the British around Caen, suffering tremendous casualties.


Like many other German divisions, it had spent the autumn of 1944 refitting behind the Westwall. Because of its now renowned effectiveness, Hitler had sin-gled out the Panzer Lehr Division for a prominent role in his Ardennes coun-teroffensive, giving it the task of exploiting a breakthrough to be made by the Fifth Panzer Army.

While resting and training in preparation for this operation, the Panzer Lehr was suddenly called upon in November 1944 to help stop a thrust by Patton's Third Army into the Saar district. Though successful in carrying out this mission, the division lost many of the replacement tanks and soldiers it had received. More replacements were hastily diverted to the unit in early December, but by 16 Decem-ber it had only fifty-three tanks (twenty-three Panthers and thirty Mark IVs). To strengthen it further, the German command attached the 559th Panzerjäger (tank destroyer) Bn. to the division's 130th Panzer Regt., adding fifteen Jagdpanthers and assault guns to its complement, and also provided the 239th StuG Bn. Panzer Lehr's organic tank destroyer battalion, the 130th Panzerjäger Bn., boasted four-teen Jagdpanzer IVs.

The division's commander, the feisty Lt. Gen. Fritz Bayerlein, reorganized his division into three Kampfgruppen for the Ardennes attack: KG von Fallois, comprised of the division's reconnaissance battalion reinforced by a company of Mark IVs, a company of jagdpanzers, a company of engineers, and a battery of artillery; KG 901, which was the 901st Panzergrenadier Regt. supported by a com-pany of Mark IVs and three batteries of artillery; and KG 902 (also called KG von Poschinger after its commander), composed of the 902d Panzergrenadier Regt. with two companies of Panthers and a battalion of 105mm guns. The remaining elements of the division were held in reserve for the time being. Even with the reinforcements, Bayerlein's division was still shorthanded, as one whole battalion of his panzers was still at the depot in Fallingbostel being fitted with the experi-mental Sperber (Sparrowhawk) infrared night vision device. One of his panzer-grenadier battalions had virtually no mortars and a severe shortage of machine guns. Nevertheless, Panzer Lehr was in position and ready to attack on the morning of 16 December.

The three German divisions—26th VGD, Second Panzer Division, and Panzer Lehr Division—were under the command of General of Panzer Troops Heinrich von Lüttwitz, the commander of the XLVII Panzer Korps that formed the left wing of the Fifth Panzer Army. Lüttwitz's task was to throw the Twenty-sixth VGD across the Our River at Dasburg and Gemünd, breach the American line with the volksgrenadiers, and open attack corridors for the two panzer divi-sions, which would then cross and break into the American rear on the west side of the Clerf River. After that his panzers were to seize Bastogne and turn north-west to cross the Meuse around Namur. To help accomplish this, XLVII Panzer Korps had available the 766th Volksartillerie Korps, the Fifteenth Volkswerfer Brigade for extra artillery support, and the Army's 600th Pionier Bn. to build the bridges across the Our. With luck, the Germans would seize the Clerf bridges intact. Lüttwitz ordered his troops to bypass the villages on the Skyline Drive that the Americans had turned into fortified strongholds, but as most of the few good


roads ran through or just past these villages, this order would prove difficult to fol-low. Likewise, after breaking through the Twenty-eighth Infantry Division's line on the ridge, Panzer Lehr initially was to bypass Bastogne on its way to the Meuse and leave that town to be taken by the Twenty-sixth VGD. The XLVII Panzer Korps' mission was indeed going to be a difficult one to accomplish, but Lüttwitz and his division commanders were known for their aggressiveness and creativity.

To achieve surprise and ensure the establishment of a foothold across the Qur at the start of the offensive, the commander of the Fifth Panzer Army, Gen-eral of Panzer Troops Hasso von Manteuffel, had convinced Hitler to alter the ini-tial attack plan in his sector. Hitler had wanted to open the offensive with a mas-sive artillery bombardment upon the American positions, followed closely by the first waves of grenadiers advancing from behind the Westwall. This plan was fol-lowed in other sectors of the Ardennes, but given the steep wooded slopes across which his troops would have to advance and the lack of bridges across the Our until the German engineers brought up mobile 60-ton bridges, Manteuffel doubted his infantry could follow the barrage closely enough to take advantage of its effects. Instead, he persuaded Hitler to permit him to infiltrate infantry assault teams across the Our beginning on the night of the 15 December. He knew this would be pos-sible because he had personally visited the sector and had observed the Americans

German Plan for the

Ardennes Counteroffensive

December 19*4


withdrawing their patrols to the fortified villages at night. This tactic, he argued, would allow his men to be in place when the artillery bombardment began the next morning, and they could then overrun the Twenty-eighth Infantry Division's defense line atop the Skyline Drive before the GIs had emerged from their shel-ters. That Hitler, who had micromanaged the entire Ardennes offensive planning up to this point, would allow one of his generals to argue with his plan and even consent to the change indicates Manteuffel's influence with the Führer. He approved the change, and on the night of 15 December German assault parties of thirty to sixty men each formed on the east side of the Our while columns of tanks and half-tracks inched their way forward on traffic-clogged roads to the crossing sites at Dasburg and Gemünd.

The Opening Assault

At about 0300 on 16 December, an hour and a half before the scheduled start of the artillery barrage, the assault teams of the Twenty-sixth VGD began quietly paddling across the Our in rubber boats, their movements concealed and sounds muffled by a thick fog rising from the river. After disembarking, they moved up the wooded hills on the west bank. The Seventy-seventh Grenadier Regt., Twenty-sixth VGD, assembled in the woods near Hosingen while the Thirty-ninth Fusilier Regt. gathered north of Wahlhausen. The Seventy-seventh Grenadier Regt. was to bypass Hosingen to the north and seize the bridge at Clervaux via the village of Marnach. Behind this regiment engineers were already moving along the Our to erect bridges at Gemünd and Ober Eisenbach. Another bridge was to be built at Dasburg, but miscommunication between the engineers and the troops manning that section of the Westwall delayed the start of construction there for several hours. Completion of these bridges was crucial to the German plan, for without them the Twenty-sixth VGD's attack could get no tank support if it ran into heavy resistance, and the drive to Bastogne and the Meuse would stall at the river's edge. Although the Our River is narrow and not usually very deep, it has extremely steep banks that prevent fording by armored vehicles, making bridges a necessity for tanks. Hitler's schedule called for Manteuffel's panzers to reach the Clerf River by nightfall on 16 December, with no tolerance for delays.

At 0515 the dark eastern horizon was lit up by the flashes from hundreds of German guns firing the first volley of the Ardennes offensive. American observers in Hosingen reported seeing flickering lights to the east, but almost before they had time to wonder about the source, a rain of shells began falling on the Twenty-eighth Infantry Division's positions. The fortified villages at the front line were heavily hit by the accurate German fire, and the command posts and logistics areas on the west side of the Skyline Drive, as far west as Clervaux itself, were also pum-meled—a testament to the German artillery commanders' meticulous planning and the thorough reconnaissance that had been performed by German patrols over the preceding weeks. The shelling continued without letup for forty-five agonizing minutes, salvos of shells and rockets and mortar rounds shattering the weeks-long


silence of the sector. One American unit reported 400 shells in 20 minutes, an average of one explosion every three seconds. Between 30 and 40 rounds landed in the area of Battery A, 687th FA Bn., and Battery C of that same battalion reported 200 to 250 rounds. The regiments to the north and south of the 110th endured similar poundings.

Around 0600 the barrage dwindled to occasional shelling so that the Ger-man assault teams could move to seize their initial objectives along the Skyline Drive. The men of the 110th Infantry, though shaken, were not as cowed as expected by the artillery preparation and began to resist the German infantry, sporadically at first and then more fiercely. Almost no one in the 110th yet saw the German attack for what it was; still believing they were facing an all-but-beaten enemy, most officers who had the leisure to think about it at all figured that this was just a local counterattack, a large raid, or at worst a series of raids. The first shells had severed the phone lines connecting the front-line positions with their headquar-ters, so information from the front was sketchy for the first few hours. The radios in the forward positions continued to work when not jarred by the artillery explo-sions, but even when functioning they were of limited value given their unrelia-bility and restricted range in the hilly country.

Hosingen

The 110th Infantry's Company K guarded a two-mile section of the Skyline Drive around Hosingen and the area just south of it, blocking one of the four main roads across the ridge—that leading from Ober Eisenbach through Hosingen and Bockholtz, where it split into two roads leading to Drauffelt and Wilwerziltz on the Clerf River. The company's First and Second Platoons as well as two machine gun sections from Company M were scattered in and around the village. One sec-tion of 81mm mortars from Company M had set up behind a building in the cen-ter of the village. The First Platoon and the company's Weapons Platoon held the northern part of the village, covering the Skyline Drive to the north with their machine guns, and their 60mm mortars were set up in a courtyard (except for one that had been lost during a patrol down to the river a few days before). The Sec-ond Platoon garrisoned the southern half of the village. Two small outposts observed the approaches to the village from the east, one atop the concrete water tower just past the north end of the town and one on the crown of a hill called Steinmauer about 250 meters southeast of the village. However, neither outpost could directly observe the Our River because of intervening high ground. On the company's southern flank, Third Platoon, reinforced by a section of three .50-cal-iber machine guns from Second Platoon, Company M, and three 57mm antitank guns from the Regimental AT Company, guarded the actual intersection of the Skyline Drive with the east-west road to Bockholtz. This intersection was located about 200 meters south of the village proper. Because of the dispersed nature of these positions, the Company K commander, Captain Frederick Feiker, placed a great deal of importance on covering draws and high ground with BAR and rifle


U.S. infantrymen set up their 57mm antitank gun somewhere in the Ardennes. The small size of the 57's round made it virtually useless against German heavy tanks.

fire and he had adjusted the company's mortars to cover those low spots the riflemen could not see.

As the German attack began, Company K was still feeling the consequences of its previous fighting in the Huertgen Forest near the village of Schmidt. The Third Bn., 110th, had received a batch of replacements on 8 November, including fourteen officers, one of whom, 1st Lt Thomas Flynn, was made Company K's sec-ond in command. The new commander of the Third Bn., 110th, Major Milton, was also one of the replacements. The arrival of the newcomers brought Company K up to a strength of 4 officers and 149 men, almost 100 of whom were inexperi-enced. Most of the NCOs were also replacements, but they were from an earlier wave and had at least been present for the Huertgen fighting.

The company, still short of automatic weapons and mortars, had moved to Hosingen by truck on 20 November and taken over defensive positions prepared by the previous tenants, the Eighth Infantry Division. At the time the village had suffered little damage from the war, and the houses and shops still had electricity and running water. Comfortable as this made the town, Company K's officers deemed the Eighth Infantry Division's defensive preparations unsatisfactory and set about improving them. They also ensured that Company K had a reliable com-munication link with the battalion headquarters; the company switchboard con-trolled twenty-four phone lines connecting the CP with the engineers, all the pla-toon CPs, the two observation posts, the flanking cavalry units, artillery forward


observers, battalion HQ of the Third Bn., 110th, and even to the other companies and the regimental CP via the battalion switchboard in Bockholz. Captain Feiker also had two SCR-300 radios at his CP, one for talking to the battalion CP and one linked to radios at the First and Second Platoon CPs. The Third Platoon had no radio and had to rely on landline communications. While Feiker was fairly confident about his communications, the ammunition situation gave him reason for concern. He wanted to have at least a three-day supply on hand, but it was division policy to distribute only one day's supply each morning, leaving little in reserve should supply be disrupted.


In addition to Company K, about 125 men of Company B, 103d Engineer Combat Bn. under Captain W. H. Jarrett were in Hosingen. They were responsi-ble for maintaining a 15-mile stretch of the Skyline Drive for the Red Ball Express supply trucks, and while they had not been assigned any defensive or support duties regarding Company K, they were equipped with eight or ten trucks mount-ing ,50-cal machine guns. The engineers occupied a number of buildings on the western side of the village. Also, according to Lt. Flynn, a group of twenty men from a "Raider" unit (organization unknown) who had come in for specialized training in scouting and patrolling, was also billeted in the town. Their role in the upcoming battle remains a mystery to this day.

At about 1800 on 15 December the daily patrol from Hosingen had returned from the no-man's-land between the Skyline Drive and the Our. Shortly after that, Lt. Flynn heard activity from the German side of the river, which he thought sounded like motorcycles, but because of the convoluted terrain and the distance he could not be sure. However, there seemed to be no cause for alarm, so only the customary security precautions were taken in Hosingen that night: the company would stay on 50 percent alert, and the men in the town would bed down on the top floors of the buildings. Those outside the town would camp on high ground. Perhaps the next patrol out, scheduled to leave at 0530 on 16 December, would reveal what the Germans were up to.

Before midnight, however, the men in Hosingen were treated to a light show as the Germans shone spotlights on the low winter clouds, lighting up the whole area with their reflection. American observers in Clervaux said that the town was lit up almost as well as in daylight. Even this unusual activity did not cause any alarm among the American commanders. They did not know that the light was being utilized by the German assault teams to help them find their way across the Our and through the woods on the west bank.

Concealed by the heavy fog, the German grenadiers clambered up the east side of the ridge toward their objectives on the top. Even though the Seventy-sev-enth Grenadier Regt. had orders to bypass Hosingen and make straight for the Clerf crossings at Clervaux and Drauffelt, it was obvious that Hosingen would have to be taken eventually since it dominated one of the few roads over the ridge, the one that the Twenty-sixth VGD planned to use as its main supply route. General von Lüttwitz intended for the follow-on armored forces to sweep through the town after it had been isolated by the Twenty-sixth VGD's advance.

When the shells began falling on Hosingen at 0525 on 16 December, a cold Saturday morning, the Americans were surprised but not overly concerned. Frag-ments from the explosions blew out the tires on seven of the trucks belonging to the engineers and direct hits set five houses on fire, which illuminated the whole ridge top, but there were no casualties. During the shelling Captain Feiker turned out his men and sent them to their defensive positions as a routine precaution. Lt. Flynn, the company's executive officer, went to the northern section of Hosingen to monitor the 1st Platoon's situation and to gather information for Captain Feiker while another lieutenant stationed himself at the southern end with the Second Platoon. Lt. Flynn climbed down into a foxhole behind the two machine guns


that overlooked the Skyline Drive coming into the village from the north. The engineer commander, Captain Jarrett, called Captain Feiker, and they agreed upon a radio channel over which to keep in contact since the shelling had cut all their phone lines. As the shelling began to taper off about forty-five minutes later, Cap-tain Jarrett sent his First Platoon under Lt. Hutter to the western edge of the town where two small roads from the west joined, and there they set up a roadblock. By so doing, they shielded the Company M mortar section under Lt. Morse from any attack from the rear. Jarrett's Second Platoon, led by Lt. Pickering, went to the southeastern sector near the Company K CP and a roadblock on the Skyline Drive facing south. The Third Engineer Platoon under Lt. Devlin took up posi-tions in the northeastern part of Hosingen, from where the soldiers could give fire support to the Company K outpost in the water tower. Lt. Jarrett moved his com-pany CP to a hotel in the northern part of town between the left flank of the Third Platoon and the right flank of the First Platoon. After they had taken up their posi-tions, the men of the garrison ate a breakfast of hot cakes and coffee, still duck-ing the occasional German artillery round.

By 0615 the men in the water tower and in the buildings on the northern edge of Hosingen could hear German infantry moving through a draw and cross-ing the Skyline Drive to the north, heading west, but it remained quiet and despite the glow from the German searchlights they could not see the enemy, so they did not fire. The sounds of movement continued for over an hour until about 0730 when the dawn light filtering through the lifting fog allowed the defenders to make out shadowy figures sprinting across the highway. The Americans opened fire with their machine guns and felled a number of the grenadiers. Some of the Company M mortarmen brought one of their 60mm mortars, which had had its bipod man-gled by an artillery blast during the barrage, to the northern part of town behind the machine guns to further interdict the highway. Reports of other targets began to come in by walkie-talkie to the crews of the other 60mm and 81mm mortars.

South of the town, the first initial rush of the Seventy-seventh Grenadier Regt. along the Ober Eisenbach-Hosingen-Drauffelt road overran the outpost on the Steinmauer hill and cut off the Third Platoon of Company K and the Antitank Company, which were south of the town proper covering the main intersection. Captain Feiker was unable to regain contact with either of these units. He radioed the CP of the Third Bn., 110th, and informed Major Milton that Hosingen was being bypassed by large numbers of German infantry but that he had seen no Ger-man tanks and was not yet being directly attacked. Milton told him to hold his position and promised that reinforcements and a resupply of ammunition would be sent forward to help him. Milton intended for Company L, which was in reserve near the battalion CP, to move to Hosingen to combat what was thought to be a local counterattack, but about that time the first elements of the Thirty-ninth Fusilier Regt. appeared in front of Holzthum, and Company L was hotly engaged trying to keep the Germans from breaking through to the Clerf River just a few miles to the west.

Back in Hosingen, Captain Jarrett climbed up into the steeple of the town's church to get a better look at the situation and saw a large German force, com-


posed of foot troops, troops on bicycles, and horse-drawn artillery crossing the Sky-line Drive about 500 meters south of town. He contacted Lt. Morse of Company M and had him drop a mortar barrage on the crossing spot, which temporarily cut off the flow of Germans to the west. Captain Feiker attempted to call for artillery support from Battery C of the 109th FA Bn., which was located directly to the west on the reverse slope of the ridge, but it was under attack by the German infantry that had bypassed Hosingen earlier and was using direct fire from its howitzers to keep from being overrun. Since the earlier barrage had severed his phone lines and kept him from contacting any other units, the only support he had was from his own mortars. In an attempt to secure help for what was fast becoming an Ameri-can island in a sea of German infantry, Captain Jarrett "started the 284 [radio] at 0700 hours Saturday and kept it going until noon Sunday."*

Jarrett's and Feiker's transmissions were being overheard at the 110th Infantry Regt. headquarters in Clervaux. At 0730 Colonel Daniel B. Strickler, executive officer of the 110th, heard a report over the radio that German troops had fought their way into the outskirts of Hosingen. In fact, two companies of the II Bn., Seventy-seventh Grenadier Regt., had attacked the town from the east, contrary to orders, and for a time it looked as though they might succeed in dislodging the defenders. Strickler could do nothing about it, however, for although the push by the leading elements of the Seventy-seventh Grenadier Regt. had by this time bogged down in the face of stiffening resistance on the western slopes of the ridge, the 110th was still too scattered and confused by the sudden attack to mount a counterthrust. Before long it seemed to be too late to help Company K, for at 0750 a radio operator in Holzthum intercepted a report by the executive officer of Battery C, 109th FA Bn., that reported Hosingen as quiet; this gave the false impression that the Germans had completely overrun the village and that resis-tance there had ceased. In fact, the silence was due to the fact that the attacking grenadiers had pulled back from Hosingen and ceased to cross the Skyline Drive within sight of the town. Having gained a new respect for the firepower com-manded by the little garrison, they continued crossing the highway farther north and south, out of range of the American machine guns and mortars.

During this brief but fierce skirmish between the defenders of Hosingen and the Seventy-seventh, the Americans captured a German officer who carried a map outlining the XLVII Panzer Korps attack plan as far west as Bastogne. Immedi-ately recognizing the significance of the map and realizing that this was no local attack but part of a large counteroffensive, Captain Feiker attempted to have a run-ner carry the map back to the regimental CP at Clervaux, but there were too many Germans now between the two towns and the runner returned to Hosingen with the map.

As a consequence of the Germans bypassing Hosingen, Captains Feiker and Jarrett feared that the Germans might circle around and attack the village from the west. They shuffled the engineer positions around to more completely cover the approaches on that side, and the engineers began pulling the .50-cal machine

*W. H. Jarrett, Letter to Richards, 23 May 1945.


guns off their trucks and setting them up on the perimeter. Feiker's Company K was already beginning to run low on ammunition, and the drawback to keeping only one day's supply on hand was becoming evident. Jarrett's engineers were able to furnish 3,000 rounds each of .30-cal and .50-cal ammunition to the GIs, but if the Germans launched another frontal assault on the village those rounds would not last long. The engineers also coordinated their defense with the mortarmen of Company M so that they could call for fire. This shored up the western defense but also thinned the defenses elsewhere along the perimeter. With the Third Pla-toon of Company K now gone, the line was thin indeed.

As the morning progressed, the men in Hosingen began to feel as if they were in the eye of a storm. Sounds of fighting echoed from the hills around them, and they knew that they were surrounded by a large force of Germans, but apart from the one brief attack earlier, no one was attacking them. In fact, some of the GIs guarding the southern part of town indulged in a bit of sport, sitting cross-legged in the middle of the Skyline Drive at the southern end of town and sniping with rifles and .50-cal machine guns at any Germans foolhardy enough to try to dash across the highway farther south. A few GIs reoccupied a farmhouse about 600 yards southeast of Hosingen and they too joined in the shooting, killing about 35 Germans and destroying some horse-drawn artillery. Grateful for the lull in any case, the two American captains toured the perimeter, adjusting squads and weapon positions to give the best all-around coverage. Since there were few bazookas in the village and since the three 57mm antitank guns that had been guarding the main intersection with the Third Platoon were now in German hands, the Amer-icans were also thankful that they had not yet seen any German armor.

Judging by the constant flow of men and guns passing by their village, it was clear that the Hosingen garrison lacked the strength to break through the German lines and return to friendly territory, but the men held out hope that the rein-forcements promised by Major Milton would be able to break through to them. Any such breakthrough was likely to be brief, so Captain Jarrett took advantage of the respite to load all his company's equipment except for the useful s tu f f -mines, TNT, machine guns, demolition charges, and ammunition—onto trucks in preparation for immediate evacuation. He also had his staff begin destroying all the unit's maps, records, and any other papers that might be of any conceiv-able intelligence value to the Germans. As he made these preparations, however, a brief radio message came through from the HQ, Third Bn., 110th, placing his company under Captain Feiker's command, and ordering him not to evacuate any-thing or anyone without Captain Feiker's approval.

To try to effect just such a breakthrough as was being prayed for in Hosin-gen, the Twenty-eighth Infantry Division commander, General Cota, issued orders through Colonel Fuller for companies A and B of the 707th Tank Bn. and Com-pany C of the First Bn., 110th, to launch a counterattack to relieve Hosingen and other surrounded villages on the ridge. The tanks moved out from their camps at Drauffelt and Wilwerwiltz around 1000, but they attacked in platoon-sized units rather than in whole companies, dispersing their strength and making little headway. There was also a great amount of confusion as to which villages and


crossroads were still in American hands, and several incidents of tanks firing on U.S. troops and vice versa resulted. Despite those problems and resistance from the German infantry, the Shermans of the First Platoon of Company B, 707th Tank Bn., made their way along a winding trail that ascended the west slope of the ridge from Wilwerwiltz to Bockholtz. Reaching Bockholtz around noon, the tanks came to the rescue of Battery C of the 109 th FA Bn., which was under attack for the second time that day. Together they drove off the attacking German infantry and even recaptured one artillery piece that had been lost earlier in the morning. In fact, this sharp action brought the advance of the entire Seventy-seventh Grenadier Regt. to a halt for the day. After regrouping for about thirty minutes, the tanks took to the road again, heading for Hosingen through the German lines. Pausing frequently to fire at groups of Germans, who were nearly powerless to stop them since all their heavy weapons and assault guns were still on the other side of the Our waiting for the bridges to be finished, the tanks reached the intersection of the Skyline Drive around 1300 and took up defensive positions. Apparently they stayed there for two hours, yet for some reason did not proceed into Hosin-gen and were unnoticed (or at least uncontacted) by the village's garrison.

Help Arrives

At around 1500 on 16 December, a band of Germans from the Seventy-sev-enth Grenadier Regt. launched a counterattack from covered positions against the Shermans of the First Platoon, Company B, 707th, at the Hosingen crossroads. They fired panzerfausts at the American tanks and sprayed them with small arms fire, forcing the tankers to button up. As his tanks returned fire against the con-cealed Germans, the platoon leader called for help over his tank's radio. In response, at 1515 the Third Platoon of Company A, 707th, commanded by First Lt. Robert A. Payne, headed south on the Skyline Drive from Marnach, which had just been retaken by an American counterattack. Driving headlong down the Skyline Drive with machine guns blazing, Payne's tanks entered the northern end of Hosingen at 1600, to the cheers of the GIs in the town. At almost the same moment, how-ever, the five Shermans of the First Platoon, Company B, still sitting at the cross-roads just south of the village, suddenly pulled up stakes and turned south down the Skyline Drive toward Hoscheid, accompanied by two more tanks of their outfit that had just come up from Bockholtz. Because of the lack of coordination between these units, which was most likely due to unreliable radio communications, the defenders of Hosingen were denied the establishment of a potent twelve-tank, two company counterattack force in the rear of the Twenty-sixth VGD. Instead, Payne's five tanks hurried to take up defensive positions before darkness. Three of the Shermans moved out onto the Steinmauer hill to overlook and fire on the road from the Ober Eisenbach bridge. They were accompanied by a few infantrymen sent as an escort by Captain Feiker. A fourth tank stayed near the northern edge of Hosingen to interdict the highway crossing site the Germans had been using all day. Lt. Payne moved his own tank to the southern end of town to do the same


there. Captain Feiker, while relieved that he now had heavy firepower to give his defense some backbone, was disappointed that the tanks had arrived without the ammunition that Major Milton had promised. Calling Major Milton on the radio, he learned that Milton had meant for Company L, not the tanks, to break through to Hosingen. Milton said that while he would try to find someone else to send to Hosingen with more ammo, he had his hands full keeping the Germans away from the Our crossing sites.

As Payne's five M4 medium tanks went into defilade positions in and around Hosingen late that afternoon, a few kilometers to the east the German engineers of the 600th Pionier Bn. had finally erected a bridge capable of carrying the heavy Panther tanks and jagdpanzers across the Our at Ober Eisenbach. Their work had been slowed drastically by the river's steep banks, which prevented heavy equip-ment from being used, and by the river itself, which was flowing much higher and faster than usual because of heavy snow melt. General von Lüttwitz had hoped to have the bridges up by noon so his tanks could follow close behind the attacking grenadiers, who were supposed to have secured the crest of the ridge by then; now it would be after dark before they could get past the former American front line, and rather than exploiting a breakthrough they would have to help the Twenty-sixth VGD's two lead regiments achieve that breakthrough. Nevertheless, von Lüt-twitz ushered the first tanks and assault guns of Bayerlein's Panzer Lehr Division's armored reconnaissance battalion (a.k.a. KG von Fallois) across the bridge, where they were met by another obstacle. The roads leading up the steep western side of the Skyline Drive ridge had been heavily cratered by bombs and mines, and in some places were still blocked by abatis placed there by retreating German troops a few months earlier. Worse, tight curves and precipitous drops made the going slow and dangerous for the cumbersome tanks, and they advanced at a snail's pace. When they finally reached the crest of the ridge, a less passive barrier awaited them: the garrison of Hosingen.

General Bayerlein protested von Lüttwitz's commitment of KG von Fallois against the Hosingen garrison. That unit was to be his division's armored spearhead, and he had anticipated that it would be the unit that would seize Bastogne before the Americans could bring up their reserves. Using it against Hosingen, he reasoned, would only delay his division's advance and incur needless casualties among his troops and tanks. Von Lüttwitz, however, recognized the necessity of clearing the Twenty-sixth VGD's main supply route, and so overruled Bayerlein.

To help KG von Fallois eliminate the irksome American position, General Heinz Kokott of the Twenty-sixth VGD called upon his division reserve, the Sev-enty-eighth Grenadier Regt. The I Bn. of that regiment moved across the river as dark descended on the Our valley and picked its way up the wooded hillside. It took up positions two kilometers west of Ober Eisenbach, there it assembled for a second direct assault against Hosingen. The grenadiers carried some flamethrow-ers with them and would rely on Bayerlein's panzers for heavy fire support. Just to the south of Hosingen, meanwhile, the II Bn., Seventy-eighth, bypassed the town using the route taken by the Seventy-seventh Grenadier Regt, earlier in the day and headed for the Clerf crossing at Wilwerwiltz.


General Kokott wanted one more crack at Hosingen before complete dark-ness set in. At about 1700, not long after Lt. Payne's five tanks had arrived in the village, three Mark IVs from KG von Fallois finally worked their way up the road from the bridge and moved out onto the top of the Steinmauer and engaged the three Shermans there. Outmaneuvered, the Shermans beat a hasty retreat into Hosingen, where they took cover behind some houses at the southern end of the village near the positions of the Second Platoon, Company K. The handful of infantrymen that had been with them on the hill retreated back into the town as well, except for a few GIs who stayed in a farmhouse southeast of town.

Following in the panzers' wake, Kokott's Twenty-sixth Replacement Train-ing Bn. hurled itself at the northeast corner of Hosingen. Fighting swirled around the base of the town's water tower, where one of the American observation posts was located.

The Germans pushed forward furiously, heedless of their losses, which were considerable thanks to Feiker's and Jarrett's carefully arranged defenses. Never-theless, the assault bogged down after the grenadiers had captured only a few houses on the outskirts of the village, but vicious and often hand-to-hand fight-ing continued until around 2200. The firing tapered off but continued sporadi-cally throughout the night as German patrols worked their way closer in the dark-ness in preparation for another assault in the morning. Much of the sniping came from the west side of the village, emphasizing the isolation of the small American force. In addition, the GIs could hear westbound traffic on the Ober Eisenbach-Bockholtz road, which was now open again after the seizure of the Steinmauer by KG von Fallois' Mark IVs. Captain Feiker's casualties had been light during this first day of fighting and waiting, but that was probably little consolation to him and his men as they contemplated the struggle that was sure to continue at first light the next morning.

By 0500 on 17 December, the engineers of the Twenty-sixth VGD had cleared and repaired the Ober Eisenbach-Bockholtz road sufficiently for the vehicles of the division and of the Panzer Lehr to make good time from the Ober Eisenbach bridge to the Hosingen area. Some of the self-propelled assault guns from the Twenty-sixth VGD's panzerjäger battalion and self-propelled flak guns from the antiaircraft battalion assembled with the panzers of KG von Fallois and infantry of the II Bn., Seventy-eighth Grenadier Regt. for another assault on Hosingen. Complementing this buildup east of Hosingen, the Seventy-seventh Grenadier Regt. finally cleared Bockholtz of American resistance early on 17 December, mak-ing an American breakthrough to Hosingen before the garrison's ammunition ran out very unlikely.

Small groups of grenadiers moved out onto the crown of the Steinmauer under cover of darkness and began spraying Hosingen with automatic weapons fire. Their presence forced the American outpost in the farmhouse southeast of Hosingen to withdraw into the town. Since the Germans could not see very far in the predawn gloom and since the Americans in Hosingen were too well dug-in, their harassing fire had little effect on the defenders. As the eastern sky began to lighten, however, Feiker's men were able to make out the silhouettes of the Germans


on the hill and his machine gunners and riflemen quickly cut down the Ger-mans. The survivors reeled back to the east side of the big hill. The noise of firing quickly died down and was replaced by the faint sound of tanks and trucks of the Second Panzer Division bypassing the town to the north, moving to attack Cler-vaux.

By now General von Lüttwitz was growing impatient to clear the Americans from Hosingen. As long as they were there they blocked the Twenty-sixth VGD's supply route, denying that division the ability to bring its full weight to bear against the Clerf River crossings. If seizure of those crossings were delayed, Amer-ican reserves might well win the race to Bastogne. In desperation, von Lüttwitz diverted several Panthers and Mark IVs from the Second Panzer Division and brought them south to help KG von Fallois and the II Bn., Seventy-eighth Grenadier Regt. force the issue.

At around 0900 the Germans launched another attack on the town. This one was supported by artillery, which had not been a factor since the opening barrage because the Germans had spent the previous day moving their batteries forward on the traffic-jammed roads. American artillery spotter planes, flying over the Sky-line Drive ridge, remarked on the intensity of the barrage they observed falling on Hosingen. One of the shells, a 150mm round with a delay fuse, crashed through the front wall of the hotel in which Captain Jarrett had his CP and buried itself six inches deep in the floor before exploding. Jarrett and his radio operators had just gone down into the cellar a few moments earlier to escape the shelling, but he was hit in the foot by shell fragments and masonry. His operators were untouched. One of them, a Cpl. Putz, applied a sulfa dressing to the captain's wounds and bandaged his foot so that Jarrett was still able to hobble around on it. The explosion had demolished the hotel, so Captain Jarrett moved his CP to the basement of a dairy nearby. The dairy was a modern one, built of concrete and steel. It seemed much sturdier, if less comfortable, than the hotel had been.

Shortly thereafter Captain Jarrett was helping to man a machine gun that had been set up to fire out of a window in the dairy's basement. A German with a machine pistol came close enough to the building to fire a burst into the win-dow. The bullets missed Jarrett but struck the gunner, Sgt. Groenveld, in the upper thigh as he shifted the machine gun to bear on the German. Jarrett quickly got a tourniquet on Groenveld's leg, no easy task as his shattered leg bone was pro-truding from the skin. He was also able to locate two units of plasma for the sergeant, which was difficult because medical supplies of any kind were becoming quite scarce in Hosingen.

Meanwhile, under cover of the artillery fire, German tanks and infantry again advanced out of the woods from several sides and attacked the perimeter. The fighting raged for over an hour. The Germans were not able to expand their lodg-ment in Hosingen and suffered heavy casualties, but the American ammunition supply was growing perilously low. Lt. Payne's Shermans also helped to keep the panzers at bay. Captain Feiker was able to contact the Third Bn., 110th, CP again and asked for artillery fire to break up the tank attack, but Major Milton informed him that there were no artillery batteries within range of Hosingen anymore—they


had all been forced to retreat across the Clerf by the attacks of the Seventy-sev-enth Grenadier Regt. and Second Panzer Division. Nevertheless, the Germans began pulling back to their starting positions around 1000, leaving the ground strewn with their dead and wounded.

Captain Jarrett described the situation and morale in Hosingen during the siege as follows:

Throughout the action Saturday, Sunday, and Monday [16-18 December], we used the system of keeping ourselves hidden as much as possible, permitting the Jerries to move in very close then pinning them down with machine guns and cutting them to pieces with mortar and rifle fire. The whole outfit had a good time while the ammo lasted. . . . All during the action there were anywhere from eight to twenty tanks around the town dropping shells in on us occasionally, but I do know that we were able to disable a few of them by dropping mortars on them. We were all of the opin-ion that the Jerries thought the town lightly held as they only made small-scale attacks time after time. Our machine gunners and riflemen did beautiful work, and I was certainly proud of the way each man conducted himself. It seemed that after we all realized that we were cut off, each man seemed to settle down to the task of killing as many Goons as he could. . . . We maintained our communication with King [Company K] right up to the end although we had to change channels about eight times due to the fact that they (the Goons) were cutting in on us every once in a while.*

Failing to break into Hosingen by direct attack, particularly because of the effective fire of Lt Payne's five tanks, the Germans resorted to trickery. At about 1100 they sent two half-tracks down the Skyline Drive from Marnach. The Amer-icans manning the machine guns in the northern part of town and the crew of the Sherman there, could clearly see that the lead vehicle was an American half-track, but they could not make out the second vehicle clearly enough to determine its nationality. Could this be the vanguard of the breakout force they had prayed for? They did not think so, for they knew large German forces had been crossing that area for over twenty-four hours and that any American breakthrough attempt would, of necessity, have been accompanied by fierce fighting, which they would have heard. But likewise it did not seem possible that this could be another attack, for why would the Germans send only two lightly armed vehicles into the sights of the guns and tank they knew to be stationed at the northern end of Hosingen? Suspicious, the American GIs and tankers held their fire and let the half-tracks approach. When they were about a thousand meters from the edge of town, the two vehicles quickly turned around and sped off back north. At that time the Sher-man crew was able to identify the second vehicle as German. The GIs wondered what the Germans were up to until a short time later when lookouts in the water tower sighted two Panthers hiding about 500 meters to the northwest. They were in a perfect position to destroy the Sherman had it revealed its location by firing at the half-tracks.

At around 1300 these two Panthers opened fire on the water tower. All through

*Jarre t t , Letter to Richards.


the previous attacks the American observation post there had watched and fired on the Germans. Even while grenadiers had swarmed around the base of the tower the GIs there had stayed at their post, protected from German fire by the sturdy con-struction of the tower. It was essentially a steel tube containing a steel stairway and surrounded by thick concrete walls. It proved its strength as it shrugged off the 75mm rounds from the two Panthers. Before long six tanks from the Second Panzer Division arrived from Marnach to join the first two, and the whole group concen-trated their fire at the tower, inspired in their marksmanship by a reward offered by their commander to anyone who could destroy the bothersome structure. No one collected because the tower held although it had to be abandoned later in the day because German advances made it an untenable position.

At the same time the volume of small arms fire coming from the woods to the west of Hosingen intensified while German infantry advanced from the north under cover of the panzers' fire. Lt. Payne quickly moved two of his Shermans from the southern part of town to the north and west to help stem the attack. The machine guns and mortars at the northern edge of town pinned the German infantry there, but no sooner did that attack seem to bog down than more grenadiers attacked from the west. Captain Feiker tried to send some bazooka teams out to drive off the Panthers that were firing from the northwest, but the German small arms fire was too heavy for them to get past the buildings at the edge of the village. Soon the Germans reached the outlying buildings and engaged in hand-to-hand combat with the engineers and riflemen there.

The fighting raged into the afternoon. During the course of the battle the Germans knocked out both of the machine guns covering the Skyline Drive to the north, and all the 60mm mortars either ran out of ammo or were destroyed. Another .50-cal machine gun was put out of commission as well, and even rifle ammunition began to run out. The houses and shops of the town took a terrific pounding from artillery, mortars, and small arms fire. As the day waned, the eight Panthers and Mark IVs that had been firing into the town from nearby hills and woodlines began to work their way closer to the village, wary of American tanks and bazooka teams. Four more tanks covered their advance with cannon and machine gun fire. From his CP with the First Platoon of Company K, Lt. Flynn discovered that his radio had been damaged by the concussion of an exploding shell and would no longer transmit though it could still receive. In order to report the First Platoon's situation to Captain Feiker, he dashed from cover to cover through the rubble-strewn streets of Hosingen, dodging German gunfire and shell-bursts, to reach Captain Feiker's company CP in the southern part of the town. There he learned that the Germans had resumed moving past the town to the south again, further increasing the garrison's isolation.

The German weight of numbers now began to tell. By 1600 the grenadiers, armed with rifles, machine pistols, and panzerfausts and following close behind the advancing panzers, had pushed into the center of the village. The two Sher-mans that had moved to the northwestern part of town had been knocked out, one by a panzerfaust. The other three Shermans were soon restricted to moving only along the Skyline Drive inside the village, and gradually fell back toward


Feiker's CP. The GIs kept firing from the windows and doors of the buildings until the last possible moment, then retreated out the back doors after setting booby traps for Germans entering from the front. They set all the buildings they aban-doned on fire or blew them up to prevent the Germans from using them as cover. Burning them had the additional advantage of illuminating the cultivated fields that surrounded the town, exposing any German advance to American fire. Nonetheless, the Germans pressed forward despite their losses and their numbers in the village grew. Captain Jarrett's engineers were compressed into a perimeter in the western part of the village while most of the First and Second Platoons of Company K and Payne's three remaining Shermans withdrew into a pocket on the southeastern edge. Small groups of First Platoon men remained cut off in the north, and individuals and groups of two and three from the Second Platoon were scattered throughout the town. The water tower, pounded by fire from the Ger-man tanks and assault guns, and all other outposts had been abandoned. Ammu-nition was all but exhausted, and much of the fighting was now being done only with hand grenades. Food was beginning to run low as well, although throughout the action the company kitchens had been providing hot meals at regular inter-vals. Because of battle damage to the town, there was no more fresh water except what could be gotten from snow melt.

That night, Captain Feiker managed to get through to Major Milton again on the radio, explaining Company K's situation and asking for instructions. Resignedly, Milton recommended that he break the garrison into small groups and infiltrate westward through the German lines after dark. Feiker replied that the density of German troops in all directions around his position was so high that the chance of these groups escaping detection was zero.

While the Germans battered their way into Hosingen, other elements had seized the Clerf River bridges at Drauffelt that evening. Finally, von Lüttwitz had the breakthrough he wanted. Immediately he ordered the panzers of KG von Fal-lois to pull out of the battle at Hosingen, head straight for Drauffelt via Bockholtz, and move on Bastogne with all speed. This did little to ease the pressure on Hosin-gen, however, as the Twenty-sixth VGD's assault guns and the borrowed tanks of the Second Panzer Division were still arrayed around and inside the town.

Capitulation

Monday, 18 December, promised to be cloudy and cold, the temperature hovering just above freezing. The American soldiers in Hosingen, who had fought

elements of two German divisions for two whole days and given the rest of their own division a fighting chance to avoid complete destruction, were hungry, Weary, and out of ammunition. The two medics in Hosingen lacked any facilities for the care of the wounded. At around 0100 that morning Captain Jarrett dis-patched two men, Pfc. Frank Smith and Cpl. Putz, to try to infiltrate through the German lines and bring back some plasma or a surgeon, but they had not gone a mile before they were spotted and captured by a German patrol. Shortly after that,


at around 0200, a German platoon broken into two parties of about sixteen grenadiers each charged Captain Jarrett's command post in Hosingen's dairy, but Jarrett and several other men beat them back with fire from their rifles and Thomp-sons and by hurling grenades. When the Germans retreated, Jarrett redistributed his few reserves to bolster his shrinking perimeter. One of these men, Cpl. Slo-bodzian, went to the Third Platoon's machine gun position behind the hotel that had formerly housed Jarrett's CP. Shortly after his arrival he was hit in the leg by German small arms fire. Several comrades carried him to the town church, which was being used as an aid station. Jarrett sent a runner through the German-held streets in the center of town to obtain some plasma from Feiker's company, but there was none to be had. Several hours later, both Slobodzian and Sgt. Groen-veld, who had been wounded in the leg the day before, died of their wounds. According to Jarrett, "our two aid men did everything they could but lost out in the end."

At 0400 on 18 December, Captain Feiker called Lt. Flynn and the other infantry officers into his CP for a council of war. Taking stock of their situation, they discovered that in all the town only two rounds of smoke ammunition remained for the 81mm mortars. The Germans had knocked out all the 60mm mortars the previous day. Rifle ammunition was so scarce that the men were pool-ing their few remaining rounds. All agreed that there was little chance of infiltrat-ing through the German lines. Finally, Feiker took the agonizing step of autho-rizing a surrender. He issued orders for the destruction of all usable equipment to begin at once. Meanwhile, he contacted Captain Jarrett to notify him of his deci-sion, and asked him if his engineers would help with the demolition operations. Jarrett agreed, and the two men attended to their preparations before approach-ing the Germans for surrender terms. Feiker called Major Milton to tell him the news. Jarrett's engineers supplied the infantry and tankers with TNT from their stores. They set fire to all their trucks and equipment and shot or slashed all the tires. They torched the building that had been serving as a garage. They made piles of all the mail, records, and official papers they could find, doused them with gaso-line, and set them alight with white phosphorus grenades. The cooks destroyed their field ranges and kitchens after distributing the little available food, consist-ing primarily of K and D rations. The infantrymen smashed their rifles and machine guns. The engineer command post trailer and battalion welding trailer were the only major pieces of equipment not destroyed, as they had been captured during the German advance the day before.

Those men not busy destroying equipment still found time to exact a toll on the Germans. Around 0700, Lt. Hutter of the engineers' First Platoon fired the last of his .50-cal ammunition at a column of horse-drawn German ammunition wagons that had unwisely exposed themselves on the east-west road about 400 yards southwest of Hosingen. Jarrett later wrote, "Hutter allowed the road to become jammed with vehicles before he raked them with his machine gun and in about two seconds all hell broke loose on that road. It was a grand sight."

By about 0830 it began to get light enough on the ridge-top for the Ger-mans to pick out targets, and their tank and small arms fire increased. To prevent


more American casualties, Feiker and Jarrett raised a white piece of cloth outside a building at the northern end of town and waited for the Germans to stop firing, which they did immediately. The two men started across the thousand yards of open ground at the edge of town. Lt. Payne hung white surrender panels on his remaining tanks, all three of which were damaged.

The Germans searched the captains thoroughly. In so doing, one of them found Captain Jarrett's dentures, which were wrapped in a handkerchief in his pocket. For whatever reason, the German kept them. Then they met with the rank-ing German officer on the scene, a staff colonel from the Seventy-eighth Grenadier Regt., Twenty-sixth VGD, and began to discuss surrender arrangements.

At 0955, as the two captains parleyed with the German commander, a mem-ber of Feiker's staff radioed news of the surrender to Major Milton's CP. "We're down to our last grenades," the man reported. "We've blown up everything there is except the radio. It goes next. I don't mind dying—I don't mind taking a beat-ing—but we'll never give up."*

But in fact the gallant American defenders of Hosingen did give up at last. Feiker and Jarrett returned at gunpoint at 1000 with a number of German officers and soldiers. Under orders from the German commander, Feiker told his men to come out of the buildings in groups of three, hands on helmets. Many of the Americans had their boots and galoshes taken from them by the grenadiers, despite Jarrett's protests to their commander. The Germans assembled the Americans into a column and marched them eastward down the ridge, toward the Ober Eisen-bach bridge and captivity. As the Americans filed past, the Germans looked on with some astonishment. The garrison consisted of no more than 300 men and 8 officers, yet they had held whole battalions at bay. Even more incredible, they had suffered only seven men killed and twelve wounded during two days of fierce com-bat. It was with considerable chagrin that the German colonel acknowledged the fighting prowess of the Hosingen garrison.

Epilogue

The defense of Hosingen was a small part of the stand of the Twenty-eighth Division in front of Bastogne. Other small units clung tenaciously to other small towns at places like Marnach, Heinerscheid, Weiler, Hoscheid, Holzthum, Con-sthum, Clervaux, and Wiltz. All of these towns fell to the Germans eventually, but one town the Americans did hold—Bastogne. The failure of the Fifth Panzer Army to take this vital crossroads sealed the failure of the Ardennes offensive. And yet, the defense of Bastogne would never have happened had not small garrisons like Company K of the 110th Infantry Regt. and Company B of the 103d Engineer Combat Bn. held on to towns like Hosingen.

The price for these stands was high. Due to the confusion and the destruc-

*Twenty-eighth ID Press Releases and Newspaper Clippings, December 1944; Twenty-eighth ID Divi-sion Newspapers, December 1944.


tion of records that followed the German attack against the Twenty-eighth Infantry Division, precise casualty figures will never be known, but estimates of personnel losses to the 110th Infantry alone range from 1,621 to 2,750 men, and material losses were virtually total. In January the regiment counted only 333 men present for duty. The Twenty-eighth Infantry Division as a whole lost more than 4,700 men killed, wounded, and captured—staggering losses considering that almost all of them were from the front-line combat units.

German casualties at Hosingen are even more uncertain, but men of Company B, 103d, and Company K, 110th, who were captured and put to work burying the dead around the village over the next two days reported burying five Americans and over 300 Germans. Undoubtedly many more Germans were wounded in the fight-ing. Because of the lack of antitank weapons in Hosingen after the Germans over-ran the antitank guns of the Third Platoon, Company K, on 16 December, no Ger-man tanks are known to have been destroyed during the engagement. Any that were hit by mortar fire were presumably repaired and sent forward again.

Even the commander of the XLVII Panzerkorps, General von Luttwitz, paid grudging respect to the Hosingen defenders. He wrote after the war:

The first resistance of the U.S. Twenty-eighth Infantry Division was broken in a surprisingly short time, but then, after having overcome the first shock, they fought excellently. Again and again, at points well chosen, they put themselves in front of our advancing columns. A special mention must be made of the defenders of Hosin-gen. We were able to break the resistance in Hosingen only after the Seventy-eighth Grenadier Regt. of the Twenty-sixth VGD had arrived on 17 December. After Hosin-gen was taken, the enemy resistance was paralyzed considerably. Summing up, I must point out that the resistance of the U.S. Twenty-eighth Infantry Division was altogether more stubborn than I had expected.*

During his captivity, Captain Jarrett chanced to meet with Colonel Fuller, commander of the 110th Infantry, who had also been captured. They and other officers of the 110th were marched to a POW camp in Poland, where they were liberated by the advancing Russians in late January 1945.

Captain Feiker went to a POW camp in Hammelburg, Germany, and was there when Patron's Third Army launched a failed attack to liberate them. After that, the Germans moved the Hammelburg prisoners farther into the interior of Germany to keep them away from the advancing American armies. While they marched through Nürnberg on 5 April 1945, an American air raid struck the city and killed thirty of the prisoners, including Captain Frederick Feiker.

*XLVII PzK in the Battle of the Ardennes: Interview with General der Panzertruppe Freiherr von Luttwitz, MS# A.940, p. 6.

Battle for the Twin Villages

Following the Allied beachhead breakout at St. Lo in July 1944, the near encirclement of the German forces near Falaise wrecked the German Army in the west. Even though the Allies never completely closed the pocket and many units escaped, the Germans left most of their equipment and thousands of casualties behind. Allied armies chased the shattered remnants toward the German border, but their logistics could not sustain this sudden, swift advance. By fall, supply difficulties and stiffening German resistance from units the Germans had man-aged to rebuild with prodigious effort combined to slow the Allied advance. As the Allies ran into the defenses along the German border, they became locked into a grinding battle of attrition in terrain in which even second-rate German units could inflict heavy casualties. By mid-December 1944, American units were mov-ing forward slowly if they were moving at all. The main objective of General Omar Bradley's U.S. Twelfth Army Group was the capture of the Roer River dams that, if opened, could flood the river and prevent its crossing. Since the Roer blocked the approach to the Rhine, it had to be crossed before Germany could be invaded and defeated.

The German Plan

Even as Allied units raced toward Germany in September, Hitler was already planning a counteroffensive. On 16 September, gesturing at a map, he had announced to his astonished generals that he would attack, "here, out of the Ardennes, with the objective—Antwerp."* Hitler was determined to make an attack in the west. The vastness of the eastern front and the fact that the Soviets com-manded over 500 division-size units meant that there was little likelihood for a decisive victory there. But in the west, a hard blow against the forces of what Hitler always considered the fragile alliance of the "decadent democracies" seemed to offer some chance of success. During the months of planning that followed, Hitler's generals tried to persuade him to adopt a less ambitious plan. An offensive to Antwerp, in their view, exceeded the combat power and logistics reach of the forces

*Hugh M. Cole, The Ardennes: The Battle of the Bulge, p. 2.


they were able to rebuild during the fall of 1944. But in the end, the plan adopted was very much the one Hitler had dictated.

With elaborate secrecy the Germans assembled the forces for their offensive. For the assault, the Germans were able to gather or rebuild thirteen infantry and seven armored divisions. Another five divisions were in reserve. The assault units had over a thousand tanks or armored assault guns and some 1,900 supporting artillery pieces. The German plan was to attack west of the Meuse River and cross that river in the vicinity of Liege. Then the Germans would swing north and cap-ture Antwerp, separating the British from the Americans and, Hitler hoped, cre-ate another Dunkirk. The main attack would be carried out by the Sixth Panzer Army with the Fifth Panzer Army attacking to cover its southern flank. On both sides of the penetration, infantry divisions would attack to secure the shoulders and defend against Allied counterattacks.

Responsibility for conducting the main attack of the German offensive belonged to the Sixth Panzer Army. Commanded by SS General Josef "Sepp" Diet-rich, a former butcher by trade and a fanatical Nazi, the Sixth Panzer Army was the strongest of the three armies participating in the offensive. It included nine divisions in three corps: LXVII Army Korps (326th and 246th Volksgrenadier Divisions); I SS Panzer Korps (First and Twelfth SS Panzer Divisions, Twelfth and 277th VGD, and Third Fallschirmjäger (Parachute) Division); and II SS Panzer Korps with Second and Ninth SS Panzer Divisions. For its main effort, the Sixth Panzer Army planned that I SS Panzer Korps would break through along two east-west roads crossing the northern Ardennes, code-named Rollbahns (Routes) C and D. North of the main attack, at Monschau, the LXVII Army Korps' mission was to break through the American lines and block any thrust from the north (its bloody failure is not described in this narrative). To exploit I SS Panzer Korps' break through, Dietrich held II SS Panzer Korps in reserve.

To conduct its main attack, the Sixth Panzer Army planned to use the I SS Panzer Korps' infantry to break through the defending Americans and open the way for its armored divisions to move toward the west. In the north, the 277th Volksgrenadier Division was to seize the twin villages of Krinkelt-Rocherath in order to give the Twelfth SS Panzer Division access to Rollbahn C. To the south, the Third Fallschirmjäger and Twelfth Volksgrenadier Divisions were to open Roll-bahn D for the First SS Panzer Division. Seizing these roads was critical to the Germans' success. The hilly, forested terrain in the Ardennes made cross-country movement, particularly in the winter, difficult if not impossible. The German attack depended on quickly opening the roads if it was to have any chance of suc-cess. Dietrich's timetable allowed one day for breaking through the American lines, another for clearing the Hohes Venn high ground, a third for reaching the Meuse and a fourth day for crossing it.

American Positions

Standing in the way of the German attack was the American Ninety-ninth Infantry Division, a new unit being seasoned in what was considered to be a quiet

Battle for the Twin Villages 217

sector of the front. Inserted in the middle of the Ninety-ninth's sector, the vet-eran Second Infantry Division was attacking toward the Roer dams. The Ninety-ninth was stretched over a broad front with no reserves. From north to south, its 395th, 393d, and 394th Infantry Regiments defended the front. Because it was astride all three routes needed by the Twelfth SS Panzer Division, the 394th would be hardest hit.

The Ninety-ninth "Checkerboard" (the division's shoulder patch insignia) Division was an inexperienced unit, having been in Europe only since 3 Novem-ber. As such, the Ninety-ninth had not yet had time to accumulate the extra weapons, vehicles, and equipment commonly found in other units that had been in action for a while. In addition, its attached tank destroyer battalion had only towed guns, and their lack of mobility was an especially severe problem in the Ardennes. The division was occupying a sector of the northern Ardennes in an effort to gain some experience before being committed to offensive operations. The Ninety-ninth Division's front stretched for 19 miles from Buchholz Station in the south to Monschau in the north.

In contrast to the Ninety-ninth, the Second Infantry Division was a very sea-soned unit. After the St. Lo breakout in late July, the Second Division advanced into Brittany with the VIII Corps. The division came to the Ardennes in the autumn of 1944 to rest and absorb replacements. Following this respite, V Corps gave it the vital mission of capturing the Roer River dams. The Second Division launched this attack on 13 December, meeting stiff resistance. By the beginning of the German offensive three days later, the Second Division had already suffered 1,200 casualties.

Despite its losses, the Second was still a formidable force, having collected many extra automatic weapons and vehicles from earlier actions, as well as having three self-propelled TD battalions attached to it rather than the usual single bat-talion. One of its chief assets was the experienced 74lst Tank Battalion, which on 16 December had forty-seven M4 Sherman medium tanks. The division was also fortunate in having as its commander, General Walter M. Robertson, a bold and skillful officer who was to be largely responsible for the success of the American defense around the Elsenborn Ridge. The presence of this veteran unit in the Rocherath area came as a complete surprise to the Germans.

In reserve was the U.S. First Infantry Division, which had joined V Corps at 2400 on 16 December to help plug the holes the Germans had torn in the U.S. lines. The First was arguably the most veteran unit in the U.S. Army, having seen action in North Africa, Sicily, and Normandy. After having fought its way across France in July and August of 1944, the division suffered heavy casualties in the battle to take the German city of Aachen during September and October and in the bloody fighting in the Huertgen Forest in November. Like the Second Divi-sion, the First had been sent to the Ardennes to recuperate in early December, being short more than 3,300 men, most of them from its front-line combat ele-ments.


The Opening Move

At 0530 on 16 December, the German attack opened with a heavy artillery barrage that lasted until about 0700. Immediately thereafter the Volksgrenadiers and paratroopers moved out of their positions toward the thin American line, with German searchlights behind them creating artificial moonlight to aid their advance. Occupying a refused position at the right rear of the regiment, the Third Bn. of the 394th Infantry was probably the first unit to encounter the German attack. At Buchholz Station, Company L had its breakfast interrupted by Germans in a marching column and drove them back after a stiff fight at close quarters. To the east, advancing units of the Twelfth VGD had their first encounter with the First Bn., 394th, near Losheimergraben, losing a self-propelled gun. But the Twelfth VGD was not able to strike hard at the First Bn., 394th, until about noon, after a tortuous approach march. The American battalion held most of its company posi-tions but was badly hurt, regiment pulling units from the Third Bn. to reinforce the depleted First. On the First Bn.'s left flank the German attack hit the Second Bn., 394th, which repulsed infantry and armor assaults with small arms and artillery. By mid-afternoon the 394th had stabilized its front.

At about 0730 the 277th VGD struck hard at the 393rd Infantry on the divi-sion's left flank, which defended its front with only two battalions (one battalion had been detached and assigned to the 395th). The Third Bn., 393d, in the north

The Northern Shoulder of

the Ardennes 16-17 December 1944


lost its K Company in the first rush and by 0930 was holding at the battalion CP with the remaining two companies. South of the Third Bn., a heavy German assault pushed the First Bn., 393d, back 300 yards and destroyed most of two compa-nies. Further, German infantry began to infiltrate through a gap created between the two battalions. To backstop the heavily pressed regiment the Ninety-ninth Division asked for and received the Second Infantry's reserve, the Twenty-third Infantry Regiment. One battalion, the Third Bn., moved into a position east of Rocherath behind the 393d.

The Ninety-ninth Division ordered another of the Second Infantry's reserve battalions, the First Bn., Twenty-third, to move into positions previously prepared by the Ninety-ninth south of Hünningen. By nightfall the battalion was in place. The remaining battalion of the Twenty-third Regiment, the Second, remained north of Rocherath. South of the Ninety-ninth's sector, the Germans had broken through the Losheim Gap and could be seen moving west. But at the end of the day, the Ninety-ninth was still holding its line.

After waiting impatiently all day for the Twelfth VGD to break through the 394th's line, the impetuous commander of Kampfgruppe Peiper of the First SS Panzer Division commandeered some paratroopers to help his tanks and panzer-grenadiers conduct their own penetration. During the night, the kampfgruppe overran the defenders of the town of Buchholz, which had been stripped of troops to reinforce First Bn., 394th. By 0500 on 17 December, Peiper began to advance on the village of Honsfeld.

In the south, the day began ominously when Peiper's group struck Honsfeld just before dawn. That town was occupied by Ninety-ninth Division rear echelon troops and a variety of units moving either to reinforce the front or retreating away from it. Peiper's attack took the GIs by surprise and quickly overran the Ameri-cans. He then detoured from Rollbahn D to Büllingen in order to avoid the poor secondary road leading to Moderscheid. The Americans at Büllingen, expecting the enemy to move north to capture major supply dumps, were surprised when the Germans turned south from Büllingen back toward Rollbahn D. A small recon-naissance unit sent by Peiper to Butgenbach was stopped by an American road-block.

Because of the now obvious seriousness of the German attack, the Second Infantry Division's previous planned attack toward the Roer River dams was can-celed, and the division commander, Major General Robertson, began moving units south. Peiper's detour was a key to the Second Infantry Division's scheme for rein-forcing the Ninety-ninth. The threatened German advance from Büllingen might reach the twin villages of Krinkelt-Rocherath and cut the line of supply and retreat of both Second and Ninety-ninth Infantry Divisions. Therefore, the first objec-tive was to reinforce near Wirtzfeld to protect the twin villages. As the remaining uncommitted regiments of the Second abandoned their attack against Wahler-scheid and began to move south, the lead unit, the Ninth Infantry Regiment, was to move to positions south of Wirtzfeld while the trailing Thirty-eighth Infantry would defend the twin villages.

Small units of German infantry and armor making forays north from Büllingen


Panther 126 of the Twelfth SS-PzD "Hitlerjugend" burns fiercely after being knocked out by a U.S. Sherman tank on the road between Wirtzfeld and Krinkelt, 17 December 1944.

heightened the Americans' concern during the morning. With welcome reinforce-ment from the First Platoon, Company A, 801st TD Battalion, which had been in position east of Hünningen, the First Bn., Twenty-third, stopped these Ger-man advances.

In its sector, the 394th near Losheimergraben suffered a strong German attack just after dawn. By noon the town had fallen, and during the afternoon the sur-vivors of the regiment began withdrawing toward Mürringen. Later that afternoon, the Germans finally turned their attention to the First Bn., Twenty-third, south of Hünningen, striking that unit at 1600. The Americans repulsed the attack but lost

most of Company B before withdrawing to Wirtzfeld during the night. Early on 17 December, the tired Third Bn., 393d, counterattacked toward

the west to clear its rear and then toward the east to regain the positions lost the previous day. By 1000, these soldiers collided with an attacking German battalion reinforced by tanks parceled out from the Twelfth SS Panzer Division to strengthen the attack. The Americans were forced to retreat as the First Bn., 393d, fell back to a position abreast of the Third Bn., Twenty-third, by 1400. The Third Bn., 393d, had barely passed through American lines when the Germans struck hard at the Third Bn., Twenty-third, and by dark that shattered battalion had to with-draw. This action isolated the First Bn., 393d, which withdrew cross-country to Wirtzfeld the following day. Wearily, the Third Bn., 393d, moved forward again to defend Rocherath, and at the end of the day was still holding the town.


General Robertson had spent his day shepherding the movement of his divi-sion to the south. When the Germans attacked the Third Bn., Twenty-third, he recognized the threat to his flank and diverted Company K, then the rest of the Third Bn., Ninth, and then the entire First Bn., Ninth, to back up Third Bn., Twenty-third Infantry. By dusk, the First Bn., Ninth, was in position in front of Rocherath, and the First Bn., Thirty-eighth, established a defense east of Krin-kelt. Both of these battalions were reinforced by tanks and tank destroyers. Dur-ing the night, German armor and infantry launched a heavy but poorly coordi-nated attack against the villages. Penetrating the infantry's defenses, the Germans were able to get men and tanks into the towns. But after wild fighting during the night, the American defenders managed to hunt down and eliminate the Ger-mans.

"Hitlerjugend" Attempts to Break Through

The hours before dawn of 18 December at Krinkelt-Rocherath were omi-nously quiet as the Americans sought to reorganize after the confused fighting dur-ing the night. Since the 277th VGD had failed to break through and clear the way for the Twelfth SS Panzer Division to advance, the commander of the "Hitlerju-gend" Division decided to take on the task himself. Just before light, the Germans began coordinated tank-infantry assaults against the U.S. positions. The First Bn., Ninth, fought to destruction, withstanding the German attack against Rocherath for nearly six hours, enough time for the Second Bn., Thirty-eighth, to move into position and permit the battered Ninth infantrymen to withdraw. During the day, the Germans again managed to penetrate into the villages with tanks and infantry, but the Americans eliminated them in close combat. After fighting all afternoon, the Second Bn., Thirty-eighth, still held Rocherath.

At Krinkelt, German assaults also began just before dawn. Though they repulsed the main attacks, the Americans could not prevent German tanks from penetrating as far as the CP of the First Bn., Thirty-eighth, in Krinkelt. But by day's end, the German armor had been decimated. During the night, German infiltrators continued to pressure both villages, but the Americans mopped them up by dawn.

Failure to capture the twin villages after two days of heavy fighting convinced the Germans that the Twelfth SS Panzer Division would have to find another way to Rollbahn B. The division began shifting to the south and finally assembled at Büllingen, days behind schedule, to begin its advance toward Bütgenbach. There it would find the First Infantry Division in position, waiting for it.

The American mission of protecting the withdrawal of the Ninety-ninth Infantry Division was fulfilled during the night of 18 to 19 December as the last units of that division withdrew past the Second Infantry Division. Despite severely Weakened armor support, the German infantry continued its assault on 19 Decem-ber. A rain of American artillery stopped most of the attacks dead in their tracks, so to speak. Although convinced it could hold the twin villages, Robertson's Second


Infantry Division had accomplished its mission, and he ordered a withdrawal to the Elsenborn Ridge during the night. Elements of the division began their with-drawal at 1745. By dawn on 20 December, both the Ninety-ninth and Second divi-sions occupied strong defensive positions on the ridge from which they easily repulsed further German attacks in the days that followed.

What follows is a series of vignettes taking a closer look at some of the infantry and tank engagements fought by American units in and around Krinkelt-Rocherath during the three-day period between 16 and 19 December 1944.

Assault Gun at Losheimergraben

The men of the First Bn., 394th Infantry, guarding the Belgian-German frontier town of Losheimergraben were amazed at the intensity of the artillery bar-rage that began falling on the town at 0530 on 16 December. Even the few veter-ans of the Normandy Campaign who had transferred to the division admitted that it was the heaviest they had ever seen.* When the barrage finally lifted at around 0715, the battalion commander, Lt. Col. Robert H. Douglas, went to inspect his company positions to find out how well they had weathered the barrage. His Com-pany A covered the battalion right between the railroad and the Losheim-Losheimergraben highway, overlooking Losheim from the slopes of the Eichels-berg hill. Company B, in the center of the battalion position, lay astride the Losheim highway. To its left, Company C covered the gap between the First Bn., 394th, and Company G of the Second Bn., 394th, to the north-northeast. In the Company B sector, three 57mm antitank guns of the battalion AT Platoon cov-ered the highway from Losheim. Heavy machine guns from Company D had been parceled out to cover the Company A and B fronts, and the battalion's 81mm mor-tar platoon from Company D occupied dug-in positions about 200 yards south-east of the Losheimergraben crossroads, using a couple of the outlying buildings for shelter from the weather. The front-line troops of the First Bn., 394th, had strengthened their positions by felling trees, planting mines, and stringing barbed wire across the front.'''

As soon as the barrage lifted, the men of Company B were startled to see an American jeep, driven by Germans, approaching them up the hill from Losheim. The jeep halted before it reached the American line, literally under the nose of one of the 57mm AT guns that was hidden about 50 meters north of the road on the south slope of Hill 666. In the glare of the spotlights the Germans behind the Westwall were bouncing off the low clouds, the gun crew could clearly see the jeep and its occupants, but in their surprise and uncertainty they hesitated to fire. Turn-ing around, the jeep sped off back down the slope and into Losheim. A few min-utes later it reappeared, leading what some American accounts say was a tank. However, since the Twelfth Volksgrenadier Division had no tanks attached to it,

*Ninety-ninth ID Combat Interviews, "Ninety-ninth ID, Ardennes, 16-20 December 1944." †Cavanagh, Krinkelt-Rocherath: The Battle for the Twin Bridges, pp. 22-23.


the vehicle was instead almost certainly a Sturmgeschutz (StuG III 75mm self-pro-pelled assault gun) belonging to the division's organic 1012th StuG Co. (Postwar accounts by the commander of the Forty-eighth Grenadier Regiment, Col. Wil-helm Osterhold, confirm this supposition and mention that German infantry were riding on the Sturmgeschutz; no such reference is made in any of the American accounts of the incident.)

The American AT gun crew again let the jeep pass, but fired on the assault gun as it drew up in front of their gun. The first round struck the vehicle in the right flank, knocking off a track and immobilizing it. The second and third shots penetrated the vehicle's starboard hull, with the third shot setting the assault gun aflame. Some accounts say the only survivor of the crew was the commander, a lieutenant, who was badly wounded and staggered from the wreck. Others say the entire crew bailed out, apparently unhurt, and began firing small arms at the AT gun crew. Considering the paucity of flank armor on the StuG III (only 30mm)* and the proximity of the AT gun when it fired, the former outcome seems far more likely. The infantrymen of Company B, farther up the road toward Losheimer-graben, killed the occupants of the captured American jeep with small arms fire at the same time as the assault gun was destroyed.

Because the going was slow up the steep wooded draws the Germans had to

*Von Senger and Etterlin, German Tanks of World War II, p. 203.

The Assault Gun at

Losheimergraben

0730, I t December 1944


use to reach other portions of the First Bn.'s positions, it was well into the morn-ing before the GIs saw any more of the enemy; but when the Germans came, they came in strength. Two battalions of the Forty-eighth Regt. hit the seam between two American companies in the thick forest northeast of Losheimergraben; then one of the battalions swung down the line of Company B's foxholes in the direc-tion of the crossroads, taking the positions in the flank. With the attacking Ger-mans was Osterhold himself, frustrated because he was unable to establish radio contact with his supporting artillery, and when he finally did get through to call for fire, the artillery fell short on his other battalion, disrupting that part of the attack.

The assault against Company B nevertheless continued and by early after-noon the company had lost sixty men, including the leader of an attached heavy machine gun platoon, T.Sgt. Edward Dolenc, last seen firing his machine gun with twenty or more Germans piled in front of it. Because the other half of the Ger-man thrust had been disrupted by the misdirected artillery fire, the men of Com-pany C were free to try to reestablish their neighboring company's positions, but they had little success. Night was falling when Colonel Osterhold and one of his battalions reached the edge of the woods overlooking Losheimergraben. Osterhold was reluctant to continue further without assured fire support from either artillery or assault guns.

In the woods on the other side of Losheimergraben, what appeared to be two platoons of Germans bounced off positions of Company A astride the Interna-tional Highway and worked their way toward the crossroads. Only the men of Company D's 81mm mortar platoon, their mortars dug in around a farmhouse a hundred yards before the crossroads, stood in the way. The Germans were almost on top of one of the mortar positions before the crew spotted them across a firebreak no more than fifteen yards away. Elevating the tubes to almost ninety degrees, the mortarmen in the other positions opened fire. Once the shells began to burst, the surviving Germans fled.

On this second day of the offensive, 17 December, Osterhold was continu-ing to have trouble getting fire support for his volksgrenadiers in their attempt to wrestle the village from elements of the 394th. Finally a Sturmgeschütz tried to move forward to help.

This assault gun was a converted vehicle, having originally been a Czech-made M3 tank mounting a 37mm gun in a turret. Because of the limited hitting power of the gun, the German soldiers had dubbed it " Panzer Anklopfgerät" mean-ing that its shells would wake up the crews of enemy tanks but would not do much more than that. In an effort to turn it to their advantage, the Germans had removed the turret and mounted a 75mm gun in the hull to be used in an antitank role, the long 75mm having good accuracy and sufficient armor-piercing capability. Enemy tanks found it difficult to achieve a quick and solid hit on the low-profiled

Sturmgeschütz. As a rule, the first round would go too high, and when the crew succeeded in getting off a second one, this was often too low, hitting the ground in front of the vehicle, and its front armor was sufficient to withstand the impact of a ricocheting projectile.


Up to that moment, German armor had made no effort to approach Los-leimergraben for fear of the Americans' bazookas. The German panzers stood out of range and provided the village with the support of artillery, which Osterhold was finally able to contact by radio at midday. The American infantrymen sought shelter in the basements of the houses. The attacking Sturmgeschutz was promptly immobilized when an antitank gun concealed among the houses hit its left track. Arriving on the scene not long after the vehicle had been disabled, Colonel Oster-hold noted that with its track gone the assault gun could not bring its 75mm gun to bear and that its commander was firing a machine gun out of the open offside hatch (the side of the vehicle furthest away from the Americans). The vehicle com-mander, a noncom, was firing at a group of four or five men who were attempt-ing to manhandle a 57mm antitank gun into a firing position 25 yards from his vehicle, at the northwest corner of one of the border town's three customs build-ings that lined the road. However, his fire was failing to have an impact on the antitank's crew because they stayed behind the weapon's gun shield.

It did not take them long to position the gun and fire a round at the dis-abled assault gun, but the shell struck the front armor and failed to penetrate, ric-ocheting off into the sky. Finally realizing the hopelessness of his situation, the vehicle commander hurriedly quit the Sturmgeschutz, jumping down on its star-board side, keeping the vehicle between him and the American antitank gun.

Colonel Osterhold reported later:

Noticing me crouched on my heels at the rear of the Sturmgeschutz, he approached and stammered, almost sobbing, "I couldn't get them behind the gun's shield, no hard core ammunition for the machine gun and the driver is still in there." I told him to calm down as I would take care of the situation. Accompanied by one of my noncoms, I hurried across the road to the protection of the walls of the first cus-toms house [three customs buildings sat side by side along the road], A moment later the first of our explosives bearers (carrying American AT mines) joined us. This first customs house turned out to be empty, but afforded an excellent opportunity to open negotiations with the defenders of the second house.

I told them that I was the German officer leading this attack and for their own good would like to speak to the officer or noncom officer in charge here. Would they be willing to receive me in their cellar? Several "yes" were shouted, and I told them that nothing would happen to them, as I had my soldiers under rigid control and as proof of this I would tell my men to cease firing. Not one single shot would be allowed as long as negotiations were underway. I was impressed with how calm it suddenly became. I still hesitated to leave the cover of the protection given by the walls of my house without a final warning: "You have just experienced that I have control over my men. When I come out into the open don't shoot at me as my sol-diers might get furious at such an incident." I then went down into the cellar and attempted to convince the occupants that their situation was hopeless and they should surrender. To persuade them, I told them we had fifty American AT mines and that I would have them thrown into the cellar through the basement windows. They were not overjoyed, but they acquiesced, feeling a little bit embarrassed. One of the men asked permission to go to his vehicle so that he could obtain his per-sonal belongings.*

*Wilhelm Osterhold, Letters, 6 September 1986 and 4 February 1990.


Inspired by the request, Colonel Osterhold allowed them all to get their per-sonal belongings from the vehicles and suggested that they take every edible crumb they might have as during their first few days in captivity there might be a prob-lem in obtaining food. Osterhold's catch included thirty enlisted men and a lieu-tenant, many holding hand grenades from which they had already pulled the pins. Having assented to the surrender offer, the Germans helped them find and replace the safety pins.

As the would-be prisoners left the cellar, Osterhold mingled with them as a means of protection from any nearby Americans inclined to fire on him. As the American prisoners from the second or No. 2 customs house moved to their vehi-cles at the rear of house No. 3, they shouted to their companions that the war was over for them and that they were about to get their personal property from the vehicles. This "invitation" caused the defenders of No. 3 to come pouring out.

The Sideshow

The initial German artillery barrage began hitting the positions of the Sec-ond Bn., 394th Infantry, in the woods along the International Highway west of Udenbreth at 0530 on 16 December. The men of the Second Bn., 394th, had been sleeping soundly in the log cabins they had constructed for themselves, but as the first shells fell they quickly sought shelter in the holes they had dug outside their cabins. The barrage lasted for ninety minutes and concentrated on the battalion's left flank, from about midway in the Company F sector, north across Company E's area, and continuing north into the 393d Infantry's sector. Company E suffered twelve to fifteen casualties from the bombardment, but companies F and G were not significantly damaged. The GIs in their covered foxholes were not terribly con-cerned about the intensity of the German barrage, believing it to be merely a reac-tion to the attack of the Second Infantry Division to the north.

The area occupied by the Second Bn., 394th, was part of the attack sector assigned to the 277th Volksgrenadier Division, an inexperienced unit recently reconstructed from two shattered divisions and composed largely of Volksdeutsche (ethnic Germans from outside Germany) and Alsatians. The division was reputed to have a "poor fighting spirit." Of the division's two forward regiments, the 989th Grenadier Regiment, reinforced by a Pionier engineer company and a battalion of jagdpanzers (self-propelled tank destroyers), was to attack out of Hollerath and seize Rocherath, securing Rollbahn A for elements of the Twelfth SS Panzer Divi-sion. The 990th Grenadier Regt., supported by a company of fusiliers and a com-pany of Pioniers, assembled around Udenbreth with the intention of securing the Weisserstein Trail and thus opening a second route to Krinkelt-Rocherath. The main body of this force was scheduled to strike to the north of the Second Bn., 394th Infantry, in the zone of the First Bn., 393d.

The only force remaining to the 277th VGD commander, Colonel Wilhelm Viebig, with which to attack the Second Bn., 394th, was the fusilier company attached to the 990th Grenadier Regt., which he ordered to advance as soon as


the artillery bombardment lifted. However, the fusiliers' inexperience showed itself in their failure to follow up the barrage closely enough. The GIs of the Second Bn., 394th, saw the Germans advancing through the thick mist at about 0735, more than thirty minutes after the last German shells fell. American planning paid off as the GIs called down an intense artillery fire that forced the fusiliers to go to ground even before they could reach the forest's edge. They vainly tried to con-tinue their advance until about 0800 but could not expose themselves without being cut to pieces by the accurate U.S. artillery and automatic weapons fire.

At about 0830, Colonel Viebig, seeing his attack in this sector falter, sent forward three armored vehicles and about a platoon of infantry under a smoke-screen in an attempt to regain the initiative. Since the only other armored vehi-cles in the 277th VGD belonged to the 277th Panzerjäger Bn., which was attack-ing with the 989th Grenadier Regt. farther north, these vehicles must have been Jagdpanzer 38(t) Hetzers of the 1277th Sturmgeschutz Kompanie, which had four vehicles when the attack began. The smokescreen allowed the Hetzers and their fusilier escort to enter the woods and approach "to within hand-grenade distance" of the American positions without being spotted. As they reached the American foxhole line, T.Sgt. Fred Wallace of Company G, 394th Infantry, called the Ninety-ninth Infantry Division's general support artillery battalion and requested fire on his own position in order to stop the German advance. The response from the artillery was immediate and devastating, as a heavy concentration of 155mm shells fell among the advancing Germans.

Wallace and his men were spared the effects of the barrage by the log cover on their foxholes and dugouts. The Hetzers, however, quickly reversed direction and fled back into the town of Neuhof while the fusiliers made another futile attempt to dislodge the Americans from their positions. By about 0900, the men of Company G had killed or captured all the remaining Germans in the area, and the threat to the Second Bn., 394th, was over.

Jubilant and proud of their performance in repulsing the German attack, the men of the Second Bn. did not know that their action was just a sideshow, that the main German attacks were being made to their left and right, and that soon they would occupy a salient with only tenuous communication to the rear. Worse still, the battalion's inexperienced commander had been completely unnerved by the German attack and spent the rest of the day cringing in one of the log cabins with his head between his knees.

KG Peiper Reaches Honsfeld

SS Lt. Col. Joachim Peiper, commander of the Kampfgruppe of the First SS Panzer Division that bore his name, was growing impatient. The mission of the Twelfth Volksgrenadier Division had been to punch a hole through the American lines at Losheimergraben, allowing Peiper's armored column to advance into the Americans' rear areas along the road from Losheimergraben through Büllingen to Malmédy. This was to have been accomplished in the first few hours of the attack


on 16 December; yet almost twenty-four hours later Peiper's tanks were still wait-ing for the signal to move out. Finally, around 0300 on 17 December, the frus-trated Peiper ordered his panzers and panzer grenadiers to take to the road, accom-panied by a battalion of paratroopers from the Third Fallschirmjäger Division whom Peiper had attached to his force. Since the volksgrenadiers were apparently unequal to the task, Peiper was determined to force his own breakthrough to the Meuse. The columns moved out from the vicinity of Buchholz Farm and Lanz-erath, where they had spent the night, down the narrow forest road toward Hons-feld. They met almost no resistance, except for two platoons of Company K, 394th Infantry, around the Buchholz Farm, but this was quickly overcome. Before long, the leading vehicles (two Mark V Panther tanks and three armored half-tracks car-rying SS panzer grenadiers) emerged from the woods just where their road merged with another that was crowded with American vehicles retreating toward Hons-feld. Some of these vehicles belonged to the Eighteenth Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, which until the day before had maintained the tenuous connection between the Ninety-ninth Infantry Division and the 106th Infantry Division to the south by patrolling the Losheim Gap at two-hour intervals. Rather than open-ing fire, the Germans quietly joined this column, their identity hidden by the darkness, fog, and general confusion. Some German veterans of Peiper's force deny this account, averring that they never saw an American vehicle that morning.


The Second Platoon of Company A, 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion, con-sisted of three towed 3-inch guns with their vehicles and crews. Two of these guns were posted about half a kilometer southeast of Honsfeld to cover the road from Lanzerath. The third gun, about 700 meters to the southwest, guarded the road that ran from Holzheim north through the forest belt known as the Schirr Busch to Honsfeld. At around 0400, the crews of the two eastern guns reported to the Company A command post that a U.S. M3 light tank driven by Germans had got-ten past them, but that the platoon leader and two other men had taken a bazooka and set off to intercept and destroy the tank. When these three men reached the Honsfeld-Lanzerath road, they saw a whole convoy of German tanks, half-tracks, and other vehicles, all following the captured U.S. tank toward Honsfeld. They also observed that the crewmen of the M3 were speaking English.* The three GIs

'801st TD Bn. AAR, Dec. 1944. This may indicate that the tank was not captured at all, but was just another retreating American vehicle. This would be consistent with the German accounts report-ing they just insinuated their panzers and half-tracks into the American vehicle column. However, it does raise the question of why the TD gun crew thought the U.S. tank was being operated by Ger-mans, since it is not mentioned in the 801st TD Bn. AAR that the crew was speaking German, and the fog and darkness would certainly have prevented the TD crews from making out uniform details. On the other hand, it is known that attached to Peiper's Kampfgruppe was a 700-man detachment from Otto Skorzeny's commando unit with twelve Mk V Panthers crudely disguised to look like Sher-mans (MacDonald, A Time for Trumpets, p. 198; he probably meant that they were disguised to look like M-10s), a ruse which could work only on a dark and f o g g y night or at long range.


hid by the side of the road as the convoy halted for a few moments, allowing the Americans to distinguish German infantry riding on the decks of the panzers. Soon the column started forward again, and the three Americans made their way back to their two guns. The leader of the Second Platoon reported by radio to the com-pany CP what they had seen then set out with his two men for the platoon CP.

Meanwhile, as the vanguard of KG Peiper approached the stream the road crossed before entering Honsfeld, they passed a lone U.S. armored car on the side of the road. This armored car was commanded by Sgt. George Creel of A Troop, Thirty-second Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, whose unit had moved to Hons-feld the night before in order to get out of the way of strong German units advanc-ing through the Losheim Gap. Creel and his crew had been sent as outpost to the road from Lanzerath by their troop commander, 1st Lt. Robert B. Reppa, who wanted them to give warning if the Germans approached. Throughout the night of 16 to 17 December, Creel and his men had seen only American vehicles, some singly and some traveling in groups, heading toward Honsfeld to get away from the German advance. But now, around 0500, they were astonished to see the giant Panther tanks and half-tracks full of German infantry passing casually by them, guided through the fog by a soldier walking ahead of the lead tank carrying a flash-light. Recovering from his shock, Creel moved to fire the armored car's small can-non at the Germans, but found that his shots would be blocked by a trailer the car was towing. With Peiper's column stretched out before and behind them, Creel and his crew realized the futility of resistance and abandoned their vehicle in an (ulti-mately unsuccessful) attempt to get into Honsfeld on foot to warn Lt. Reppa.

By now the lead panzers had reached the small stream flowing south of Hons-feld and then turning northeast to empty into the Warche River. Behind the stream was a thin line of American infantry, hastily established the previous evening by the American captain in charge of the Ninety-ninth Infantry Division's rest cen-ter in Honsfeld. This line had been increased to about company strength by the constant arrival of stragglers throughout the night. The infantry opened fire on the approaching Panthers with their small arms, and their harmless shots were quickly answered by a hail of fire from the panzers and the grenadiers following in the half-tracks and riding on the tanks. KG Peiper's flak tanks (37mm guns on Mark IV chassis) and flak wagons (half-tracks mounting quadruple 20mm anti-aircraft guns, which had been used very effectively against the American defend-ers at Buchholz Station) probably also had a hand in suppressing the American resistance. After only about a minute, the U.S. line began to crumble, the GIs run-ning for the shelter of the buildings in Honsfeld. As they ran, they passed the two towed 3-inch guns of the Third Platoon of Company A, 801st TD Bn. These guns had been set up around 1900 the night before among the houses at the edge of town after the platoon had pulled back from its position in the woods covering the road between Buchholz Station and Lanzerath. There were also two platoons of towed 3-inch TDs from the 612th TD Bn. in Honsfeld, their crews asleep in some houses in the village. However, their presence in Honsfeld was unplanned— they were en route to somewhere else and had just stopped for the night)—and consequently they were not in position to fire on the Germans.


The Third Platoon's gunmen, on the edge of the village on the east side of the road heard the sound of tanks moving up the road to their right. A security patrol reported that the tanks were American M3 Stuart light tanks. This was not unexpected, because a few hours earlier, at 0030, an officer from the Eighteenth Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron had informed one of the 801st's Reconnaissance Platoon section leaders that he would be bringing his tanks through Honsfeld that morning and had said that the TD men should be careful not to fire on them. Soon, however, a second report from the security patrol said that they could hear English and German being spoken and that German Mark IV panzers were behind the M3 tanks. Immediately the Third Platoon's commander ordered his crews to swing their guns to the right to fire on the German column, but the panzer grenadiers and paratroopers with Peiper's vehicles heard this activity and began firing at the TD crews, pinning them down before they could finish realigning their guns. As the U.S. gunners returned fire with their few available small arms, the German tanks swung their turrets to bear on them and fired their main guns, knocking out the 3-inch guns and wounding several of the crewmen. The Third Platoon's commander ordered his men, outnumbered, outgunned, and unsup-ported, to fall back to the railroad track at the northeastern edge of Honsfeld. This they did, with each of the two crews alternately pulling back and then stopping to cover the withdrawal of the other. After they had reached the comparative safety of the railway cut, the Third Platoon's leader ordered the two gun sergeants to lead their crews back to the Company A CP, across the Warche River on a hillside west of Hünningen.

While this was happening, other elements of KG Peiper were attacking the Second Platoon's guns southeast of the village. The Second Platoon's commander and his two aides, on their way back to the platoon CP after identifying the Ger-man column, encountered a German patrol that had infiltrated the area, but the night was so dark and the visibility so limited by fog that the three were able to safely evade the Germans. As he finally reached his CP, the platoon leader could hear the sounds of mortar rounds and small arms fire from the direction of his guns. Doubling back, he returned to the platoon position just in time to see Ger-man infantry advancing from the woods to the south, firing their weapons and throwing hand grenades. The Americans could also hear German tanks approach-ing, but could not see them in the darkness. The Second Platoon's leader was sur-prised and dismayed, because the direction from which this attack came was where infantry of the Ninety-ninth Infantry Division was supposed to have been, and his guns were otherwise unsupported. The platoon leader ordered the two guns to be destroyed and the crews to head for the company CP outside Hünningen.

With American resistance in and around Honsfeld quickly evaporating, the sol-diers of KG Peiper now moved into Honsfeld. The groggy crews of the 612th TD Bn., awakened by the sound of gunfire just down the street from their bivouacs, tried gamely to fire their guns at the German vehicles out of the alleys in which they were parked, even though the guns were still limbered for towing and attached to their half-tracks. The First Platoon, Company B, of the 612th accounted for two "self-propelled AT guns" (possibly Jagdpanzer IVs, of which there were twenty-eight in


The American line in the Ninety-ninth Division's zone continued to disin-tegrate as the morning of 17 December wore on. Survivors of the 393d Infantry withdrew through the Krinkelter Wald (a forest one and a half kilometers east of the twin villages), passing through the new positions established by the Third Bn., Twenty-third Infantry, which had just arrived at the Ruppenvenn crossroads (near the southwestern corner of the Krinkelter Wald) to back them up. The 394th Infantry, or what was left of it, was retreating from its positions around Losheimer-graben and in the woods to the north, trying to reach the village of Mürringen where the regimental commander, Colonel Don Riley, hoped to be able to reor-ganize his battered and exhausted troops. Right on Riley's heels were the equally battered and exhausted grenadiers of the Forty-eighth Grenadier Regt., who had suffered tremendous losses pushing Riley's men back. In pursuit of the 394th Infantry the grenadiers stopped to regroup when they broke out of the forest and onto the high ground east and southeast of Mürringen. Before they could con-tinue their advance, they had to eliminate a new point of resistance—the village of Hünningen, which had marked the southern end of the U.S. V Corps line in the area since the breakthrough of KG Peiper at Honsfeld and Büllingen earlier in the morning. In fact, by about 1000, Hünningen was surrounded on three sides—east, south, and west—by German-held territory, making it a very precar-ious and potentially disastrous position for any unit trying to hold it.

That task fell to the First Bn. of the Twenty-third Infantry Regt., formerly the division reserve of the Second Infantry Division but attached to the 394th Infantry since about 2330 the previous night. The men of the First Bn., Twenty-third, had been loaded onto trucks at their bivouac at Camp Elsenborn (a large prewar camp complex of the Belgian Army to the northwest of Krinkelt-Rocherath) for the midnight drive to Hünningen where they were to occupy "secondary defen-sive positions''† in support of the 394th Infantry. Now, ten hours later, their defense

First SS Panzer Division*), and the Second Platoon, Company B, knocked out one tank, type unknown but probably either a Mark lV or Mark V Panther. However, these two platoons were quickly overrun by the German infantry. The First Recon-naissance Platoon of the 6l2th's HQ Company destroyed three German "scout cars or half-tracks" before being surrounded and overwhelmed by the SS panzer grenadiers. While the panzers were at a disadvantage in the narrow streets of the village, unable to traverse their turrets very far, the American crews had no small arms to fight off the determined paratroopers and SS men. As is related in other accounts, the atrocities the Germans committed in Honsfeld against their Amer-ican prisoners and against Belgian civilians set the tone for the rest of the brutal advance of KG Peiper along the northern shoulder of the Bulge, including the noto-rious Malmédy massacre a few hours later.

*Gliederung for First SS Panzer Division, RH 10/312. Bundesarchiv Freiburg. †Second ID Combat Interviews, "Battle of the Bulge, 17-20 December 1944," page 1.

The Defense of Hünningen


of the little hilltop village of Hünningen would determine whether or not the Ger-mans could roll up the U.S. flank on the northern shoulder of the Ardennes pen-etration.

This defense was a major undertaking for a single battalion, especially on such short notice. The battalion commander, Lt. Col. John H. Hightower—"a great hulk of a man" —had his men dig in as soon as they detrucked, and by 0600 this was largely completed. Company C held the battalion's left in a great arc extending from the slopes of the Kaltenburgsknipp hill to the east edge of Hün-ningen itself while Company B dug in just outside the southern edge of the vil-lage, on the top of the hill overlooking the Warche River. The total frontage cov-ered by Company B was 1500-1700 yards; Company C's was about 1800 yards. These were large frontages for such small units; Company B averaged 25-30 yards between foxholes.† "A Company, in a semireserve position, had one platoon defend-ing Hünningen from the west, another platoon east of the town covering a gap in B Company's line, and a third platoon farther north on the southern edge of Mür-ringen."§

*MacDonald, A Time for Trumpets, p. 388. †Second ID Combat Interviews, "German Breakthrough," 14 December 1944-16January 1945, p.2. §Second ID Combat Interviews, "Battle of the Bulge, 17-20 December 1944: The German Break-through, V Corps Sector: Interview with Col. Jay B. Lovless, Co 23rd Inf. Regt. and sketch by Capt. Francis A. Phelps, Jr."


From their position atop Hill 619, the soldiers of the First Bn., Twenty-third, could hear, and occasionally catch a glimpse of, the tail end of KG Peiper moving northwest along the Honsfeld-Büliingen road throughout the morning, but the thick fog over the river prevented the calling down of artillery on the enemy col-umn. Nevertheless, one section of towed 3-inch guns from the First Platoon, Com-pany A of the 801st TD Bn., had been ordered to Hünningen at daylight on 17 December with orders to interdict the Honsfeld-Büliingen road, and the crew had set up on the west slope of Hill 619 facing south. Determined to take some sort of toll on the Germans, the soldiers opened fire on the column across the river at a range of about 1000 meters as soon as there was enough light for them to see, at about 0700. According to one source, the gun knocked out four Mark IV tanks and one half-track with these long-range flank shots.* However, the German tanks, possibly aided by their artillery, began firing back at the gun, and the resulting explosions wounded the TD platoon leader and kept the crew suppressed. Inter-mittent artillery fell on the First Bn.'s positions around Hünningen for the rest of the morning.

At around 1030, Company B, Twenty-third Infantry, reported German vehi-cles gathering at the edge of the rectangular spur of woods that jutted out from the Buchholz Forst, an area known as the Bield. They may have been assembling for an attack against Hünningen, but more likely they were seeking cover from the American P-47 fighter-bombers that were pounding the Honsfeld-Büliingen road from time to time.† A pair of towed 3-inch guns from the 801st TD Bn. that had escaped from KG Peiper in Honsfeld that morning happened to be set up in the area of the Third Platoon, Company B, overlooking the Bield, about 800 yards away. Despite the fog and the woods sheltering the panzers, one of the two guns opened fire on the vehicles, and in six shots it scored five direct hits and destroyed four of the twelve vehicles. The remaining eight quickly withdrew further into the trees to escape the murderous TD fire.

The exact type and origin of these twelve vehicles remains something of a mystery. Later accounts labeled them as Mark IV panzers, but there is no direct evidence to support this claim.§ Since no tanks (in the sense of turreted, tracked, armored vehicles with large-caliber guns) were attached to either the Twelfth VGD or the 277th VGD, if these had really been Mark IVs, they would have had to come from one of the two SS panzer divisions of I SS Panzer Korps. The Twelfth SS Panzer Division was not committed to the battle until later, and even then not in this sector but several miles to the north, in the forest along the Schwarzen-bruch and Weisserstein Trails. Elements of KG Peiper of the First SS Panzer Divi-sion were still in the area, but if these dozen "tanks" came from that unit, they were considerably off course given that the main body of KG Peiper was at that

*801st TD Bn. AAR, December 1944. †Cole, The Ardennes, p. 94; Second ID Combat Interviews, "Battle of the Bulge, 17-20 December 1944." §Compare Second ID Combat Interviews, "twelve tanks and an unknown number of infantry" with Cole, p. 94, "twelve Mk IV tanks had appeared southeast of Hünningen" and Cavanagh, pp. 56-57, "twelve Mk IV Panther [sic] tanks."


time centered around the villages of Möderscheid and Schoppen, 7 to 9 kilome-ters to the west. The Bield was in the zone of the Twelfth VGD, which had only one unit of armored vehicles attached to it on 17 December: the Twelfth Panzer-jäger Abteilung, whose 1012th StuG Kp had had only six battleworthy StuG III assault guns available when the attack started on 16 December. Two or three of those had been knocked out in the attacks on Losheimergraben, so it seems unlikely that the dozen vehicles assembling in the Bield were from that unit.

One alternative is that these were not "tanks" at all, but some other sort of large vehicle. They may have been flakpanzers (37mm AA guns on Mark IV tank chassis) or flak wagons (quadruple 20mm AA guns mounted on half-tracks) and could have come from the Twelfth VGD's organic flak unit, or perhaps from the Sixth Panzer Army's flak units, which are known to have been in the general vicin-ity. Given the poor visibility conditions, due to the fog, the woods, and the Amer-ican gunners facing southeast in the general direction of the rising sun, and know-ing that large German armored forces were in the area at the time, it is not impossible that they mistook the vehicles in the woods for something more threat-ening than they really were.

The Forest Battle

The failure of the 989th Grenadier Regiment to break completely through the American lines west of Hollerath on 16 December posed a serious threat to the Sixth Panzer Army's timetable. The grenadiers had followed the preliminary artillery barrage very closely and had achieved a greater measure of tactical surprise than perhaps any other German unit on the entire Ardennes front. Their initial attack had completely wiped out two platoons of Company K, 393d Infantry, that were blocking access to the Schwarzenbruch Trail. This trail was one of only two routes usable by tanks through the Krinkelter Wald, the forest between the Westwall and the twin villages of Krinkelt-Rocherath, and it was vital to the Twelfth SS Panzer Division's mission of seizing Rollbahns A and B and advancing to the Meuse. As morning turned into afternoon, however, the Americans halted their retreat through the forest as Lt. Col. Jack G. Allen, commander of the Third Bn., 393d, estab-lished an all-around defense, centered on his battalion command post in the heart of the forest.

The defense of this position stopped the German infantry cold. Even the com-mitment of a battalion of Twelfth SS Panzer Division's panzer grenadiers, the I Bn. of the Twenty-fifth SS Panzergrenadier Regt. under SS Captain Alfons Ott, rein-forced by a company of Pioniers and a company of towed howitzers, could not dislodge the Americans. By afternoon, the Germans had penetrated no farther than the point where the Schwarzenbruch Trail crossed over the Jans-Bach creek. There, the oncoming darkness and the exhaustion of the German troops, partic-ularly those of the 277th VGD, forced a halt to their advance, less than four kilo-meters from their starting positions. The German infantry had suffered very heavy losses, especially among the officers and NCO's who had to lead their inexperienced


and unmotivated troops by example from the front. That night, while the men of the surrounded Third Bn., 393d, struggled to keep warm in their hastily dug fox-holes in the center of the forest, KG Müller of the Twelfth SS Panzer Division moved forward. This kampfgruppe included the Twelfth SS Panzerjäger Bn., with twenty-two Jagdpanzer IV/48s, the headquarters of the Twenty-fifth SS Panzergrenadier Regt. and two battalions (II and III) of that regiment, a towed flak company, the II Bn. of the Twelfth SS Artillery Regt. with 105mm howitzers, and a company of Pio-niers. Like its sister division, the First SS Panzer Division, "Hitlerjugend" was being forced to create its own breakthrough in order to reach the Meuse, rather than wait-ing for the volksgrenadiers who had failed in that task.

While the Germans were marshaling their strength for the next day's attack, the Americans on the other side of the forest scrambled to establish another defense line in front of the Germans at the western edge of the woods. Since there were only two trails that passed through the dense woods, intersecting on the west side of the forest at a place known locally as the Ruppenvenn, this seemed to General Robertson of the Second Infantry Division to be the most logical place to block the German advance. The only unit available for this task was the Third Bn., Twenty-third Infantry, part of the Second Infantry Division's reserve for the Wahlerscheid attack. As soon as the situation in the Krinkelter Wald became clear at the Second Infantry Division's headquarters, General Roberts ordered the Third Bn., Twenty-third, out of its barracks at Camp Elsenborn and onto trucks bound for the Ruppenvenn. They arrived there at about 1630 hours on 16 December, just as the pale winter sun was setting behind them. Company I moved a few hundred yards down the Schwarzenbruch Trail and established a roadblock. They knew that the remnants of the Third Bn., 393d, were somewhere in the dark woods in front of them; they knew the Germans were there too. Company L dug in on the bat-talion right, covering the Weisserstein Trail. Company K filled in the gap between them, and blocked the exit from the forest. All three companies were stretched thin, and the thick woods made it almost impossible for them to coordinate their positions or activities. To make matters worse, "[the] battalion was none too well prepared for defense, having arrived with no mines and very little ammunition. Trucks bringing ammunition forward had found the road between Büllingen and Krinkelt barred by the Germans and so never reached the battalion."*

On the extreme left of the Third Bn.'s position, pointing like a finger down the trail at the German penetration, was Company I's First Platoon, commanded by 1st Lt. Long H. Goffigon. It occupied a line of previously dug foxholes strad-dling the trail. Some of those holes even had overhead log cover, but "there were not enough holes for the entire platoon and crews of the two heavy machine guns that arrived later."† Those men of First Platoon unlucky enough to have to dig their own foxholes found it a daunting task with only personal entrenching tools to use on the hard-frozen soil. A load of picks and shovels, along with some rifle and machine gun ammunition, finally arrived at the company's position at about

*Cole, The Ardennes, p. 99. †MacDonald, A Time for Trumpets, p. 375.


2100, having taken a roundabout route, but this did little to alleviate the ammu-nition or cover problems. In addition, Lt. Goffigon realized that his thirty-five-man platoon and two machine gun crews were occupying a position whose left flank hung in the air and was directly athwart the only route the German force in the northern part of the forest could use to get to the twin villages.

Whether that force would contain tanks or not Goffigon did not know, but if it did the prospects of the First Platoon holding its position were not bright. In addition to not having any mines, the Third Bn., Twenty-third, had only seven bazookas with three rounds apiece. When Goffigon's platoon had occupied its posi-tion early in the evening, he found two 57mm AT guns from the 393d Infantry already in position there, "but sometime during the night the crews of the two guns hitched up and slipped away."*

Upon their arrival the men of the Third Bn., had been told that their mis-sion, come daylight on 17 December, would be to attack to the east to relieve the surrounded Third Bn., 393d, in the Krinkelter Wald and to help that battalion reestablish its former positions along the International Highway. However, radio communications with the surrounded battalion were regained during the night, and Colonel Allen reported that his situation had stabilized. As a result, the Third Bn.'s mission was altered to that of merely occupying backup positions. The fact

*MacDonald, A Time for Trumpets, p. 375.

The Forest Battle

17 December 1944


that the Americans in the Krinkelter Wald, a force of less than battalion strength, thought they had the situation under control when in fact they were surrounded by the equivalent of three German battalions reinforced with armor indicated how little they actually knew about the real situation and is a classic example of the fog of war.

As the cold night wore on, German artillery began a steady pounding of the Ruppenvenn crossroads, probably firing at map coordinates since there was no way for them to know that the Third Bn., Twenty-third, had moved into the area. They may have been trying to interdict any elements of the Third Bn., 393d, attempting to infiltrate through the woods back to Krinkelt-Rocherath. Most of the rounds fell in Company K's area, but no casualties were recorded.

Before dawn, a few stragglers from the Third Bn., 393d Infantry, began arriv-ing at the positions of the Third Bn., Twenty-third, trying to get out of the for-est before the Germans could renew their attack. By this time, Colonel Allen's force numbered no more than 475 effectives. Around 0730, just before sunrise, an under-strength platoon of two Sherman tanks from Company C, 74lst Tank Bn., commanded by 1st Lt. Victor Miller, arrived at the Ruppenvenn and placed itself at the Third Bn.'s disposal. They were directed to positions just behind Lt. Goffigon's First Platoon line.

At 0800, Colonel Allen's Third Bn., 393d, launched a counterattack to the west to clear the Schwarzenbruch Trail and reopen the line of communication with the Third Bn., Twenty-third. The Germans were surprised by the direction of the attack, and the Americans drove them off the trail. As the GIs turned back east to restore their previous day's positions, however, they collided with KG Muller's renewed attack, consisting of a battalion of the 277th VGD, the II Bn., Twenty-fifth SS Panzergrenadier Regt., and a platoon of five Jagdpanzer IV/48s from III Platoon, Second SS Panzerjäger Kompanie. This was at about 1000. The lead jagdpanzer rolled down the trail toward the CP of the Third Bn., 393d, but Amer-ican artillery fire forced its infantry escort to seek cover. Undeterred, the jagdpanzer continued on to the vicinity of the Company M CP, about 200 yards northwest of the battalion CP, but without its infantry protection it was vulnerable to Amer-ican close combat weapons. Soon, one of four bazooka teams in the area, firing from a ditch at the side of the trail, immobilized the vehicle by hitting one of its tracks. The stricken jagdpanzer's crew continued to fire its machine guns at the American infantry in the area, pinning them down and allowing the grenadiers to move up closer. Before long, the remaining four jagdpanzers of the platoon approached down the trail from Hollerath. One of the GIs from Company L, Sgt. Vernon McGarity, who had been wounded in the previous day's fighting, snatched up a bazooka and quickly knocked out the leading jagdpanzer while his squad drove off the accompanying SS panzergrenadiers. The remaining three vehicles withdrew, abandoning the now blocked trail in order to work their way forward via the narrow tracks and firebreaks that crisscrossed the area.

Although the armored threat had temporarily been fought off, the German infantry were still swarming forward wherever possible. To support their advance, the grenadiers brought up one of the towed howitzers of Thirteenth Kompanie,


Twenty-fifth SS Panzergrenadier Regt. Sgt. McGarity, after pulling a wounded comrade to safety, directed the small arms fire of his squad onto the position of this howitzer, eliminating it before it could be used. By now his men were run-ning low on ammunition, so McGarity ran to retrieve more rounds from an ammu-nition hole nearby. In so doing he discovered that some of the SS panzer grenadiers had worked around behind his squad's position and had set up a machine gun, cutting off the only escape route. In a rage McGarity single-handedly used his rifle to kill the machine gun crew, and for a while he and his men fought off all Ger-man attempts to reman the machine gun. Eventually, however, the Americans ran out of ammunition and were captured.

By 1030 the remaining three jagdpanzers and a large number of German infantry were working their way around behind the Third Bn., 393d. His resis-tance weakening as more of his men were hit or ran out of ammunition, Colonel Allen began pulling his group back to the west. More German reinforcements in the form of the III Bn., Twenty-fifth SS Panzergrenadier Regt., and three more companies of jagdpanzers from the Twelfth SS Panzerjäger Bn., were coming down the Schwarzenbruch Trail to add their weight to the assault. It began to look as if the Third Bn., 393d, might be crushed before it could reach the lines of the Third Bn., Twenty-third Infantry. Around 1100, all the wounded that would fit aboard were loaded onto the few remaining, vehicles and the Third Bn., 393d, began to retreat toward Rocherath.

About two kilometers to the west, the men of the Third Bn., Twenty-third, could hear the battle raging in the forest. Before long they could hear the Third Bn., 393d, convoy approaching, jeep-mounted machine guns spraying the woods on either side of the trail to minimize German interference with the withdrawal. Soon the first vehicles reached Lt. Goffigon's First Platoon, Company I. As they passed through the line, the men of the Third Bn., 393d, turned over to the Sec-ond Infantry Division men what little ammunition they had left (mostly small arms, a few bazooka rounds or grenades)—ammo they knew would be needed for the coming fight. Only two men stayed to fight with the Third Bn., Twenty-third; the rest continued withdrawing to the rally point near the Lausdell crossroads. As Captain Charles MacDonald, commanding Company I, put it,

To everybody in the Third Bn., Twenty-third, it was obvious that the Germans would be close behind the withdrawing column. How long the battalion could hold, how long its ammunition would last, and how well two Shermans might deal with accompanying German tanks—on all those factors might depend the fate of those men of the Second Division who were beginning to withdraw through the forest from Wahlerscheid to the twin villages and Wirtzfeld. Indeed, the fate of everybody in the Second and Ninety-ninth Divisions might well depend on how long the Third Bn., Twenty-third, could hold—and when it got right down to it, upon how long Lt. Goffigon and the men of First Platoon, Company I, could hang on.*

To help prepare for the German attack, Captain MacDonald ordered Lt. Miller's Shermans to cover a road junction about 500 yards to the north. Shortly

*MacDonald., A Time for Trumpets, p. 377.


thereafter, however, Lt. Miller pulled his tanks back toward the Ruppenvenn, into the space between companies I and K, telling Lt. Goffigon that this was to obtain better firing positions. This left Goffigon's platoon entirely without antitank sup-port except for its one bazooka and three rockets.

By noon, no more troops from the Third Bn., 393d, were arriving at the lines of the Third Bn., Twenty-third Infantry. Lt. Goffigon could see a body of troops gathering downhill from his position, along the banks of the Jans-Bach, but he could not tell whether they were Germans massing for an attack or more retreat-ing Americans. At 1230, however, the first German attack hit. A force of forty to fifty German infantrymen attacked the right flank platoon of Company L, near the vertex of the two forest trails. Company L repulsed this first attack, but more Germans kept arriving until an estimated company was attacking that point. Mean-while, on the battalion's left flank, Lt. Goffigon could see tanks on the ridge across the Jans-Bach creek about 2500 meters northeast of his position, and he could hear several more that were still hidden by the trees. He radioed in a request for artillery fire, but as it began to fall on the ridge and scatter the tanks, the Ger-mans in the Jans-Bach draw advanced up the trail and a heavy infantry attack erupted on Company Is front and on the left flank. The American small arms fire pinned down the Germans to the front, while Goffigon's First Platoon checked the left flank assault with small arms and mortar fire. Captain MacDonald called in repeated requests for artillery support, but each call was answered only by a piti-ful three rounds. Six successive German attacks by the II Bn. of the Twenty-fifth SS Panzergrenadier Regt., were repulsed by Company Is small arms, but with each attack MacDonald's company grew weaker.

While the German infantry kept the Americans busy, some of the jagdpanz-ers of the Twelfth SS Panzerjäger Bn. were picking their way down the ridge and through the woods along tracks and 'firebreaks to positions from which to enfilade the Americans. Other jagdpanzers approached right down the Schwarzenbruch Trail to within 100 yards of Lt. Goffigon's platoon and opened fire on the defend-ers' foxholes.* The time was now about 1450. Captain MacDonald's placement of artillery fire on the jagdpanzers had no effect; however, the sheer volume of the company's small arms fire kept the vehicles buttoned up while decimating the accompanying panzer grenadiers. It was at this point that Captain MacDonald learned to his dismay that Lt. Miller's tanks were unavailable, having withdrawn to the Company K area.

The jagdpanzers continued to approach until they were close enough to fire their main guns at point-blank range into the American foxholes. Goffigon's bazookaman fired two rockets at one of the vehicles, but both missed and he was killed. The two Company M machine guns attached to Company I continued to take a heavy toll on the German infantry, but soon their ammunition was exhausted. Five German jagdpanzers were now inside the First Platoon's positions,

*Contrary to MacDonald's contention in A Time for Trumpets that the AT guns from the 393d Inf. had fled the previous night, the Second ID Combat Interview says "at this time, according to Capt. MacDonald ... the AT crews from the 393d abandoned their guns."


and the panzer grenadiers launched a series of renewed attacks against Company Is front and rear. The Germans had no artillery support, but the volume of their small arms fire wiped out Goffigon's platoon. With the First Platoon destroyed, the Second and Third Platoons fell back onto Company K's left flank and tried to form a new line, but after about ten minutes the jagdpanzers caught up with them and overran them again. At about 1500, as the last of his men scattered, Captain MacDonald and his staff burned all the maps and papers at the company CP.

Up to now, except for the initial assault against its left platoon at about 1230, Company L had had little contact with the enemy. At around 1500, some sixty men from Company I passed through the Company L area, headed for the rear. This was Company L's first indication that the units to its left were pulling back. First Lt. Walter E. Eisler, Jr., the Company L commander known as "Chief" to his men, stopped the Company I stragglers and ordered them to form a secondary defense line behind Company L. Shortly afterward "a number of men dressed in American combat pants, combat jackets, and American helmets approached from the direction of K Company. As they reached the first line of foxholes, they opened fire on the L Company troops. According to the men of that unit, there is no doubt but that they were German troops dressed in American uniforms and were trying to infiltrate behind L Company's position."* Simultaneously, a strong Ger-man infantry attack hit Company L's front and both flanks. While the First Pla-toon provided covering fire with its few remaining rifle and machine gun rounds, Company L fell back about 200 yards. While reorganizing there, Lt. Eisler received a message from Colonel Turtle, CO of the Third Bn., Twenty-third Infantry, order-ing Company L to continue withdrawing all the way into Krinkelt.

Meanwhile, with Company I gone, the Germans now struck Company K, grenadiers attacking from the front while panzers and infantry hit the left flank. There the First Platoon inflicted heavy casualties on the infantry, but was power-less to stop the armored vehicles. The platoon's commander had been wounded earlier, so rather than retreat without orders, the First Platoon fought in place and was overrun. In what had become a standard American tactic, the GIs crouched in their foxholes to let the jagdpanzers pass above them, then reemerged and engaged the grenadiers in close combat. It was a bloody melee, both sides using bayonets and swinging their rifles like clubs. The platoon's bazookaman tried to club a German with his empty rocket launcher but was mowed down by subma-chine gun fire. Lt. Clise, commander of the Second Platoon, went to get Lt. Miller's Shermans and bring them forward for support but found that they had withdrawn again, this time out of the forest altogether. The Company K commander, 1st Lt. Lee Smith, ordered the remnants of his command, Second and Third Platoons, to

*Second ID Combat Interview, "German Breakthrough. "It is conceivable that these could have been commandos from KG Y or KG Z of Skorzeny's Panzerbrigade 150, as they were stationed behind the attacking Twelfth VGD and Twelfth SS-PzD at this time. However, Meyer makes no mention of such an incident or the presence of Skorzeny's commandos at the front line in his divisional history of 'Hitlerjugend," and in any case few of Skorzeny's men were equipped with such a full complement of

American gear. Given the highly confusing situation in the forest at that time, it seems highly prob-able that this was just a tragic instance of two jittery friendly forces firing on each other.


fall back just as three jagdpanzers continued down the Schwarzenbruch Trail and hit the Second Platoon's left flank. The two platoons staged a fighting withdrawal to a wooded draw near the edge of the woods a few hundred meters to the north-west of the trail junction, where they reformed their line. About twenty minutes later they were again hit and overrun by the jagdpanzers. This time, their with-drawal took them out of the forest and into the open area east of the Lausdell cross-roads area, where the Germans hit them with an artillery and Nebelwerfer barrage that dispersed them. As they scattered, the men of Company K could see Lt. Miller's two Shermans burning a few yards from the edge of the forest where they had engaged the leading jagdpanzers as they emerged from the trees. Miller's tanks had knocked out two of the jagdpanzers but had been destroyed by return fire from the other German vehicles. By now it was dusk, and Company K's fighting with-drawal had allowed the survivors of companies I and L to escape from the forest, and it had bought time for the troops from the Ninth and Thirty-eighth Infantry Regiments to arrive and begin constructing a new line around the Lausdell cross-roads. Both companies I and K had taken heavy losses and would not be reorga-nized until 20 December. Meanwhile, the Germans continued their westward advance, destined to collide next with the First Bn., Ninth Infantry, at the Laus-dell Crossroads. The outcome of this encounter would prove crucial, for the First Bn., Ninth, was the last American unit between the Germans and the Wahler-scheid road, down which three of the battalions of the Second Infantry Division had yet to pass in their withdrawal to the twin villages.

Death of a Battalion

By nightfall on 16 December, the Second Infantry Division's General Robert-son had accumulated enough information to fully appreciate the gravity of the German attacks in the Ninety-ninth Infantry Division's sector. Two of the Second Infantry Division's three regiments were still clustered around the little crossroads village of Wahlerscheid, and their only connection with the rest of V Corps was a narrow forest road that led to Rocherath, some seven kilometers to the south. If the German forces attacking west down the Schwarzenbruch and Weisserstein Trails were able to cut this road before Robertson could withdraw those two reg-iments, the Ninth and the Thirty-eighth, then they would likely be cut off and destroyed. To prevent this, Robertson and his staff quickly worked out a plan for the disengagement from Wahlerscheid and withdrawal back to Krinkelt-Rocherath. Robertson called the V Corps commander, General Leonard Gerow, and requested permission to withdraw. Gerow bucked the question up the chain of command to the First Army commander, General Courtney Hodges. The latter gave permis-sion for Robertson to halt the American attack at Wahlerscheid but not for a with-drawal. By 0730 the next morning, after repeated requests from Gerow, Hodges still would not authorize the withdrawal of the Second Infantry Division but told Gerow he could "act as he saw fit."*

*Cole, The Ardennes, p. 104.


By this time, the Second Infantry Division had been in almost continuous action at Wahlerscheid for ninety-six hours and had already lost 1,200 men. From a starting strength of 35 officers and 678 men on 13 December, the First Bn., Ninth, was down to 22 officers and 387 men. Worse, Company A had lost two company commanders, companies B and C had each lost one, and numerous pla-toon leaders and platoon sergeants had also become casualties. These losses made the order to withdraw from the hard-won crossroads, which the First Bn., Ninth, received at 0955 on the morning of 17 December, all the more bitter for the men of that battalion, and Wahlerscheid became known to them as "Heartbreak Cross-roads." According to Robertson's plan, the First Bn., Ninth, was to be the last bat-talion of that regiment to withdraw from the Wahlerscheid area, moving out on the heels of the Third Bn., Ninth Infantry. The Third Bn. began its withdrawal at about 1200 hours. Company K, the last company in the column, was late getting started and was therefore several hundred yards behind the rest of the battalion. When Company K reached the Rocherather Baracken crossroads, about one kilo-meter north of Rocherath, at 1230, it was met by General Robertson. He ordered the company commander to move his unit as quickly as possible to the Lausdell crossroads—a crisscross of narrow roads and farm trails near a lone farmhouse, about halfway between the woodline of the Krinkelter Wald to the east and the village of Rocherath to the west. Once there, Company K was to dig in and await the arrival of the next battalion, to whom Company K would then be attached. As Company K turned east to comply with this order, Robertson intercepted the Third Bn., Ninth Infantry's Ammunition and Pioneer Platoon, and the First Pla-toon of Company M, a heavy machine gun platoon, and gave them the same mis-sion.

Farther north, the First Bn., Ninth, started its march to the twin villages, first regrouping in the low ground 1200 yards south of Wahlerscheid at about 1500, then proceeding south on the forest road at about 1530. One platoon of Com-pany A was sent into the woods to the east as flank protection, while a small force of one platoon each from companies B and C covered the rear. The column reached the Rocherather Baracken at 1600, where they, too, encountered General Robert-son. He loaded as many of the men as would fit onto two trucks he had com-mandeered and sent them off to join the Third Bn., Ninth, at the Lausdell cross-roads. General Robertson and the First Bn., Ninth, battalion commander, Lt. Col. Will iam D. McKinley (grand-nephew of President William McKinley), followed the trucks in Robertson's jeep after ordering the First Bn.'s executive officer, Major Will iam F. Hancock, to follow on foot with the rest of the battalion. Hancock had authorization from Robertson to commandeer any vehicles that passed him head-ing west and use them to move the troops to Lausdell.

By this time, General Robertson was well aware that the Third Bn., Twenty-third, in the woods at the Ruppenvenn was fighting for its life against the Ger-man attack, and he was determined to construct a new defense line at Lausdell before the Germans could break out of the forest. To this end he authorized McKin-ley to take command of any troops he could lay his hands on to strengthen his force, warning him that large numbers of Second and Ninety-ninth Division men


would probably be straggling out of the woods into his position in front of the German advance. Robertson told McKinley he could call on his usual supporting artillery battalion, the Fifteenth FA Bn., as well as on the 924th FA Bn., which had been supporting the Wahlerscheid attack from positions just northeast of the Rocherather Baracken.

By 1700, as the sun was setting, the First Bn., Ninth, had reached the Laus-dell area and was digging in on a small hill overlooking a shallow bowl from which a gradual ascent led into the Krinkelter Wald. A heavy fog hugged the ground, which was covered by a layer of snow. Visibility was limited to about 100 yards. As McKinley's men took up their positions, they could see that General Robert-son's assessment of the situation had been correct. Stragglers from the Third Bn., Twenty-third, and Third Bn., 393d, some with their weapons and some without, streamed along the roads and across the fields, retreating before the German advance. Sounds of heavy fighting emanated from the dark forest to the east. Com-pany K of the Third Bn., Ninth, which had arrived a few minutes before the First Bn., Ninth, dug in south of the Ruppenvenn-Rocherather Baracken road and was supported in that position by three self-propelled tank destroyers of the 644th TD Bn. Company C, whose effectives numbered less than fifty men, arrived and estab-lished positions to the left of Company K north of the road, while Company B dug in astride the road itself. Company A assumed positions south of the road to Company B's right.

Death of a

Battalion 17-18 December 1944


Like the Third Bn., Twenty-third, had done when it was rushed into defen-sive positions the previous day, the First Bn., Ninth, had left its AT mines behind in the interests of saving time. Fortunately, however, the TDs of the 644th TD Bn. had some mines with them, which McKinley's men hurriedly fashioned into five daisy chains of six mines each. The battalion's ammunition vehicles arrived before long, carrying fifteen extra bazookas, which were passed out to specially trained teams of bazookamen. McKinley had organized five teams of riflemen in each company specially trained in bazooka operations when he realized that the terrain around Wahlerscheid was unsuitable for employment of the 57mm AT guns. As a result, there were a total of twenty-two bazooka teams in the First Bn., Ninth Infantry, at Lausdell. Company M's machine gun platoon placed its heavy machine guns on the high ground covering the road to the southeast in order to interdict any German infantry advance from that direction. A platoon of four towed 3-inch tank destroyers, the Third Platoon of the 801st TD Bn.'s Company B, also guarded the area. All told there were about six hundred men in McKin-ley's battalion and its attachments.

At about this time, the retreat of the Third Bn., Twenty-third, from the Rup-penvenn area caused the commanding general of the Ninety-ninth Infantry Divi-sion, General Lauer, to order the battered Third Bn., 393d Infantry, back into action to help halt the German advance. The battalion commander, Colonel Allen, sent a four-man patrol south to reconnoiter, and they contacted Company C, Ninth Infantry, at Lausdell. Before long the Third Bn., 393d, had tied in securely on the left flank of the First Bn., Ninth.

Meanwhile, inside the Krinkelter Wald, the jagdpanzers and panzer grenadiers of KG Müller had rooted out the last organized resistance of the Third Bn., Twenty-third Infantry, and were preparing to continue driving toward Rocherath and Krinkelt. The Germans had suffered heavy casualties in the forest battle. Accord-ing to the commander of the II Bn., Twenty-fifth SS Panzergrenadier Regt., SS Lt. Col. Schulze-Kossens, "in the first hours all the company commanders had been killed or wounded, as well as the battalion adjutant, SS Second Lt. Buchmann, and all the technical officers. Sergeants were commanding companies."* As darkness fell and the rest of KG Müller regrouped, the commander of the Twelfth SS Panzer-jäger Bn., SS Captain Brockenschmidt, ordered his First Kompanie under SS 1st Lt. Helmut Zeiner† and an attached escort of a panzer grenadier company out of reserve and gave them the objective of spearheading the assault on Rocherath.

At about 1930, as darkness set in, this force moved off down the Schwarzen-bruch Trail, the jagdpanzers moving slowly so the panzer grenadiers on foot could keep up. In the darkness, fog, and blowing snow, the force became separated; the leading four vehicles and a platoon of the infantry (hereafter referred to as KG Zeiner) became separated from the rest of the company when the rear elements made a wrong turn at one of the trail intersections. KG Zeiner continued on the

Meyer, Kriegsgeschichte der 12 Panzerdivision "Hitlerjugend" II, p. 421. †A mistranslation has led Zeiner to be referred to in some sources as an SS Lieutenant Colonel, but his actual rank was Obersturmführer (SS 1st Lt.), not Obersturmbannführer (SS Lt. Col.).


correct road to Rocherath, passing right through the lines of Company B, Ninth Infantry, without being challenged.

Some sources say that since the Americans at Lausdell knew that other Amer-icans were still in the area and retreating out of the forest, nobody felt the need to question the identity of these troops. Other sources say that McKinley's men did indeed recognize the Germans for what they were, but that it would have been suicide to engage them and that McKinley issued orders to let them pass through the American position. This attitude is unlikely, given the First Bn., Ninth's per-formance against even greater odds later in the evening, and it is especially unlikely since the battalion was digging in at Lausdell for the purpose of preventing just such a penetration. In any case, the Germans did get by without any trouble, and upon reaching the outskirts of Rocherath, Zeiner stopped his vehicles and sent infantry scouts ahead to see whether the village was occupied. He was unaware that he had passed through more than a battalion of American infantry.

At around 2030, the artillery liaison officer to the First Bn., Ninth Infantry, Lt. John C. Granville, managed to repair a recalcitrant SCR-610 radio set and reestablished contact with the outside world. Just then, Company B called the First Bn., Ninth, battalion CP to report the sound of tanks approaching from the east. It was the remainder of Zeiner's First Panzerjäger Kompanie and their panzer grenadier escort, who had advanced down the northern trail parallel to the Schwarzenbruch Trail after getting lost. This time the Company B men identified the vehicles as German, but by the time they had done so the first three jagdpanz-ers and a number of grenadiers had passed through their position, moved about 400 yards closer to Rocherath, and then pulled off the road where the vehicles turned off their engines. Perhaps their commander, like Zeiner, was sending for-ward infantry to assess the situation.

The Americans, however, hesitated no longer. Lt. Granville at the battalion CP called down artillery fire from the Fifteenth FA Bn. on the three jagdpanzers; the Company A commander, Lt. Stephen A. Truppner, adjusted this fire, and one of the vehicles was hit and set aflame. Lt. Roy E. Allen and Sgt. Ted Bickerstaff, both of Company B, pulled the daisy chains of AT mines across the road while the following jagdpanzers were still about 400 yards away. Two of the vehicles ran over them, blowing off their tracks and becoming immobilized. Some of McKin-ley's bazooka teams tried to sneak close enough to finish off the vehicles, but the light given off by the burning jagdpanzer on the other side of the U.S. line made this impossible. Other jagdpanzers, following behind that unlucky pair, veered off the road in an attempt to continue cross-country; bazooka teams knocked out two of them but the others proceeded to fan out across the fields, perhaps to provide flank support for the rest of the attack. The American artillery was also causing casualties among the German infantry, as they were caught out in the open when the barrage began. Either the American artillery or German tanks set fire to the only buildings in the vicinity, the Palm family farm, located in the center of the battle area.

At about 1840, Company A spotted a column of seven tanks or jagdpanzers accompanied by infantry approaching its position. Lt. Granville adjusted artillery


fire on this column, which knocked out four of the seven vehicles and killed an undetermined number of German infantry. The remaining three tanks churned through the Company A line, bereft of infantry support, and entered Rocherath before any other weapons could be brought to bear on them.

At the same time, the Company B commander, Lt. John Melesnick, reported a disturbing development to Major Hancock at the battalion CP. He had spotted another column of German armor and infantry approaching his position. This col-umn, however, appeared to be almost 1,000 yards long, stretching all the way back into the forest. Lt. Granville directed artillery fire down onto this column as well. The first salvos impacted right in front of Company B, and Granville walked the rounds steadily back, working over the column for at least ten minutes while Com-pany B raked it with machine gun fire. For some time after the barrage, the screams of wounded SS men filled the night.

Despite these heavy losses, German tanks and jagdpanzers were still infiltrat-ing through and around McKinley's position. The Americans tried desperately to cope with the vehicles that had penetrated the line, but many GIs had already been killed or wounded since the beginning of the German attack. At about 2215, Lt. Melesnick personally destroyed one German tank with a bazooka. Lt. Granville told the supporting artillery battalions to maintain their barrages on the road from the Ruppenvenn until he told them to stop. U.S. riflemen picked off any of the tank crew members who emerged from their hatches; nevertheless, a number of panzers got to within 50 yards of some of the company CPs.

One of these panzers was hit in the track and disabled by an American bazooka round. Lt. Melesnick and several other bazooka teams fired at it in order to finish it off, but its armor shrugged off four of their rockets. The tank was proving to be a nuisance to the defenders since it was still firing its machine guns and cannon at the U.S. foxholes (one of its machine gun bursts wounded Lt. Melesnick in the leg), so Cpl. Charles Roberts of Company D and Sgt. Otis Bone of Company B teamed up to neutralize it. They filled a five-gallon jerry can with gasoline drained from a nearby abandoned American half-track, doused the panzer with the gaso-line after approaching it from a blind side, and set it afire with a thermite grenade.

At around 2230 the Germans doubled their efforts to finish off McKinley's thin line, launching simultaneous tank and infantry assaults down all three trails leading from the forest. Lt. Granville, who was having trouble getting artillery requests through on his radio because the Germans were using the same frequency, finally contacted his battalions and requested the heaviest possible fire on all three routes. Struggling to be heard over the din of battle as the Germans approached, he shouted into his radio, "If you don't get it [artillery] out right now, it will be too goddamn late!" Just then his communications were broken, perhaps by a Ger-man transmission, and he never received acknowledgment of his request. Assum-ing the worst, namely, that his request had not been heard, Granville "reached out for God to take him by the hand,"* but three minutes later an astonishingly heavy artillery concentration blanketed all three German advance routes, and their attacks

*Second ID Combat Interview, "Battle of the Bulge, 17-20 December 1944, "p. 6.


all but disintegrated under it. Unbeknownst to Granville, General Robertson considered McKinley's defense of Lausdell so crucial that he had committed all the artillery under his control, except for any that was engaged in emergency mis-sions, to support the First Bn., Ninth, before all others. As a result, at least seven battalions of artillery answered Granville's call, including all four of the Second Infantry Division's organic battalions and three 155mm howitzer battalions of V Corps (an estimated 112 howitzers or guns).

The American artillery deluge afforded the ragged defenders of Lausdell some breathing space. They took advantage of this opportunity to evacuate their casu-alties, replenish their ammunition, and lay a telephone wire from McKinley's CP dugout to Colonel Francis Boos's First Bn., Thirty-eighth Infantry, CP in Rocherath. McKinley's First Bn., Ninth, was now attached to the First Bn., Thirty-eighth, and Colonel Boos's first communication was to emphasize to McKinley the importance of his Lausdell position. Boos also promised McKinley that his men would be permitted to withdraw the next day.

By 2315 the German attack had run out of steam under the relentless Amer-ican artillery fire, and McKinley's force, though badly mauled, had not retreated an inch. Only the four jagdpanzers of KG Zeiner had been able to establish a lodg-ment inside Rocherath,* and the Germans seemed resigned to waiting until day-light to resume the attack. Both sides sat back to lick their wounds and prepare for the renewed fighting that everyone knew would come with first light. Mean-while, a silence that Major Hancock described as "almost frightening" descended over the battlefield.

In the early morning hours before dawn on 18 December, Colonel Boos informed Colonel McKinley that he would be able to withdraw as soon as Colonel Jack Norris's Second Bn., Thirty-eighth Infantry, was firmly dug in behind him. This event was greatly anticipated by the First Bn., Ninth, which hoped to be able to leave the crossroads without a repeat of the previous night's carnage, but that was not to be. At 0645, at the first brightening of the winter sky in the east, the Germans renewed their attack with a sudden fury. During the night, using the din of battle to cover their noise, a company of tanks from the I Panzer Bn. of the Twelfth SS Panzer Regt, had crept to within direct fire distance of the American foxhole line, and now those soldiers fired their cannon and machine guns to cover the advance of more panzers and a battalion of infantry from the woods. The approaching force was from the First and Third Kompanies of the I Panzer Bn. (Mark V Panthers), followed by Fifth and Sixth Kompanies (Mark IVs); the infantry belonged to the II Bn., Twenty-fifth SS Panzergrenadier Regt., which had assem-bled in the draw just east of Lausdell. To their left, the I Bn., Twenty-fifth, attacked directly east of Krinkelt.

Visibility was very poor for the weather was hazy and drizzly, "German weather" which forced the GIs to wait until the enemy was very close before firing,

*According to Meyer, "parts of the battalion [ I I / T w e n t y - f i f t h SS Panzergrenadier Regt . ] and a few panzerjägers [of the Twelfth SS Pzjg Bn.] had temporarily broken into the village, but had not been able to hold there" (p. 425).


Two smoldering Panthers from Third Kompanie, Twelfth SS-Panzer Regiment of "Hitler-jugend" bear testimony to the savagery of the fighting in Krinkelt. Note how the gun bar-rel of the Panther in the foreground has been blown off; note also the charred body of a crewman on the panzer's rear deck. The original U.S. caption states that these tanks were knocked out by bazooka and rifle fire.

but they engaged the Germans with every weapon at their disposal, including artillery, which the GIs called down virtually on top of their own positions at times. Private Wil l iam K. Soderman of Company K conducted his own personal war as he leaped into a roadside ditch with a bazooka and knocked out the lead panzer in full view of the supporting German forces. This blocked the trail and forced the vehicles following to withdraw. Returning to Company K, Soderman ran across a platoon of panzer grenadiers in the fog and opened up on them with his rifle, killing at least three and forcing the rest to flee.

The tanks and jagdpanzers that had been knocked out on the trails that morning and the night before compelled most of the vehicles in this attack to detour across the fields. Five panzers thus approached the A&P Platoon position, passing the hulks of two tanks destroyed in the night attack. They fired point-blank into the American foxholes as they passed through, and although two were knocked out by bazookas, the other three proceeded into Rocherath.

By 0800 the panzers and grenadiers had completely overrun the front line companies of the First Bn., Ninth, south of the main road, but the Americans still clung tenaciously to the crossroads. The tanks fired their cannon directly into the foxholes, and if the GIs tried to run they were mown down by the tanks' machine guns. One desperate soldier was seen trying to immobilize a panzer by jamming


his rifle between the cleats of its track. When about half a dozen men on Com-pany B's right flank ran out of bazooka ammunition and headed for the rear, Colonel McKinley stepped out of his dugout CP, stopped them, and sent them back to their platoon. All along the line, the GIs and grenadiers were engaged in fierce hand-to-hand fighting.

The dense fog over the crossroads lifted at about 0830, allowing Lt. Truppner, the Company A commander, to register artillery fire on the Germans who had over-run his company. An entire U.S. artillery battalion dropped its shells on the Com-pany A area for thirty minutes; the German attack was stopped, but only a dozen men from Company A survived. Truppner was not one of them. Company K of the Third Bn., Ninth, was likewise swamped. Of Company K's entire complement, only one officer and ten enlisted men escaped the fighting at the crossroads. Yet McKin-ley's line still held, for Colonel Boos had radioed him and said it would be another hour or more before the Second Bn., Thirty-eighth, could be in position at Rocherath's edge. The First Bn., Ninth, held because it had to hold.

With companies A and K effectively gone, the momentum of the attack car-ried some of the German panzers and infantry into Rocherath itself, but the rem-nants of companies B and C, as well as the Third Bn., Ninth Infantry's A&P Pla-toon, still maintained their positions. To the north, the German attack had also hit the Third Bn., 393d, which had lost half its men and all its machine guns, mortars, and AT guns in the forest battle on 16 and 17 December. Although a bazooka team hit one of the German tanks attacking through this sector, the round failed to penetrate, and Colonel Allen's men fell back another 1,000 yards.

By 0900, the firing at Lausdell was beginning to die away, since much of the German force had now passed south of the remaining First Bn., Ninth, platoons and into Rocherath, and there were not that many Americans left to engage the Germans. There were still considerable forces engaging McKinley's line, however. Around 1000 a second wave of seven German tanks and infantry smashed into the American line, hitting mostly around the Third Bn., Ninth's A&P Platoon posi-tion. Several U.S. tanks had just come into the area; one of these fired six shots at the oncoming panzers, all of which missed. The Shermans quickly retired. Amer-ican artillery then fell on the panzers, one of which exploded as a result—Lt. Knut-sen, the A&P Platoon leader, thought an artillery round may have entered the panzer's open top hatch and detonated. The other six tanks swept on into Rocherath while the grenadiers stayed behind to mop up the A&P Platoon and nearby sur-vivors of Company K. The result was a terrific small arms fight, during which Pvt. Soderman of Company K continued his personal war against the Germans. As some other panzers approached the remnants of his company, Soderman staged a repeat performance of his action earlier that morning by disabling the lead panzer with one shot from his bazooka. As he ran for cover after firing the weapon, however, one of the tanks fired a burst of machine gun fire that tore into his right shoul-der. Soderman fell, severely wounded, but managed to drag himself back to the protection offered by the ditch.

At about the same time, Colonel Boos called Colonel McKinley and told him that he could withdraw his battalion from the crossroads beginning at 1300, since


the Second Bn., Thirty-eighth, should be in position behind his battalion by then. This was welcome news to McKinley, but it came almost too late as he did not have much of a command left by then. As more German tanks and infantry poured into the Lausdell area from the woods, Lt. Granville called for emergency artillery on the area, and "it seemed that all the artillery in the First Army responded to the call."* The shells continued to fall for about thirty minutes, allowing the First Bn., Ninth, and its attachments to fend off the remainder of the German advances. McKinley told Colonel Boos that he could not hold out any longer, but that he also could not withdraw without being annihilated because his troops were too closely engaged and because German tanks were blocking his withdrawal route. McKinley said he needed a counterattack by tanks or self-propelled TDs to cover his withdrawal. No sooner had he said this than Lt. Eugene Hinski, the First Bn., Ninth's AT Platoon leader, spotted four Shermans of Company A, 74lst Tank Bn., moving north out of Rocherath on the road to the Rocherather Baracken. Run-ning to intercept them, Lt. Hinski asked the tank platoon commander, Lt. Gae-tano Barcellona, if he and his men wanted to fight. "Hell, yes!" said Barcellona, so Hinski led the tanks to the First Bn., Ninth, CP.

There, McKinley explained the situation and told Barcellona that the great-est difficulty facing the First Bn., Ninth, was four German tanks located between the Palm farmhouse and Rocherath, interdicting the battalion's withdrawal route. To counter this, Barcellona split his command into two pairs; one pair, including Barcelona's own tank, stayed behind cover from where they could shoot at the panzers, while the other two moved out into the open to lure the panzers into leaving their cover in the hope of an easy kill. The plan worked brilliantly. At 1115, U.S. artillery began firing to cover the withdrawal, and the two decoy Shermans moved out. The panzers followed. Barcellona knocked out the first panzer with one shot, and three more rounds finished off the second. Discerning the trap too late, the remaining two panzers turned to flee into Rocherath but one of the other Shermans hit one in the rear, disabling it. The fourth panzer made it into the com-parative safety of the village.

With the armored threat disposed of, Barcellona's tanks turned back east to cover McKinley's withdrawal, two Shermans on each flank of the position. Their machine gun fire kept the Germans' heads down while the GIs pulled back. "Colonel McKinley stood at the roadside, grasping the hands of his men as they passed and thanking them for what they had done to hold back the Germans . . . McKinley was the last to leave the area. As he and his operations officer, Captain James Harvey, left their command post, they could hear the shouts of 'Hände hoch!' coming from the Germans behind nearby hedgerows."†

In the words of Captain MacDonald, who had been present during the fight:

McKinley and the men of the First Bn., Ninth, and K Company, Third Bn., Ninth, had performed an incredible feat. By their stand, they had enabled two of the bat-talions of the Thirty-eighth Infantry to reach the twin villages for a defense that

*Second ID Combat Interview, "Battle of the Bulge, 17-20 December 1944, "p. 4. †MacDona ld , A Time for Trumpets, pp. 397-398.


otherwise probably could not have been mounted. ("You have saved my regiment," Boos told McKinley.) They had left the ground around the cluster of roads and trails and the farmhouse littered with German dead and the carcasses of seventeen tanks and tank destroyers. For all the pertinacity and valor displayed by a number of other battalions of the Second Infantry Division during the fight for the twin vil-lages, none performed with more fortitude and sacrifice than the men of McKin-ley's battalion and K Company. And for all the defenses of many another American unit during the German counteroffensive, probably none exceeded and few equalled McKinley's battalion and K Company in valor and sacrifice.*

The First Bn., Ninth, passed through the Second Bn., Thirty-eighth, and headed west to the high ground just northwest of the Rocherather Baracken. There McKinley was able to see for the first time the true extent of his losses. Company A had twelve men left;† Company B had twenty-seven; Company C had just over forty; Company D, the heavy weapons company, still had sixty men left; while Company K of the Third Bn., Ninth, had only eleven or twelve men. The Third Bn., Ninth Infantry's A&P Platoon also had only twelve men left. Later in the day, when the battalion assembled in Rocherath, only 20 officers and 197 men were present of the 600 that had arrived at the crossroads less than twenty-four hours before. There were only enough combat effectives left in the battalion to form six rifle squads. The cost of holding the Lausdell crossroads had indeed been high, but the cost of failure would have been much higher.

Pocket of Resistance

As the Ninety-ninth Infantry Division defense line between Wahlerscheid and the Losheim Gap crumbled on 17 December, the American commanders hastily issued orders for the establishment of new defensive positions to halt or at least slow the German advance. Among the most vital places to defend were the twin villages of Krinkelt-Rocherath, through which passed the only supply and com-munications route for the bulk of the Second Infantry Division at Wahlerscheid. The villages were also the key to two of the three rollbahns the Twelfth SS Panzer Division needed to reach the Meuse, so they were destined to become the focus of the fighting in front of the Elsenborn Ridge as the German and American units collided.

At around 0745 on 17 December, Colonel Francis Boos, commander of the Thirty-eighth Infantry Regt., informed his AT Company commander, Captain James W. Love, that a German tank and infantry force (KG Peiper) had just cap-tured Büllingen. Fearing that the Germans might turn north to roll up the flank of the Ninety-ninth Infantry Division and cut the Second Infantry Division in two, Colonel Boos ordered Love to move immediately to Krinkelt and Rocherath

*MacDonald, A Time for Trumpets, p. 398. †Some accounts say only five men were l e f t , but seven men came back that night after hiding in the Lausdell area and seeing a long column of American prisoners being marched to the German rear.


and organize a defense of the villages. Acting swiftly, Love sent his First Platoon (three 57mm AT guns) to defend the southern and western approaches to Krinkelt; the Second Platoon (three guns) went to cover the eastern edge of the villages; and the Third Platoon (three guns) moved to the northern and northeastern edge. While they were preparing to move out, the Fourth Platoon (Mine Platoon) under Lt. George W. Stewart organized as infantry and prepared to move between the First and Second Platoons. The Thirty-eighth Regimental Service Company did the same and moved to provide infantry protection at a roadblock on the main road from the Ruppenvenn through the twin villages to Büllingen, a road known as the "Route vers Udenbreth."

At 1230, General Robertson ordered the Second Bn., Thirty-eighth Infantry, to disengage from the Wahlerscheid attack and move south to the twin villages. He sent similar orders to the First Bn., Thirty-eighth, about two and a half hours later. The First Bn., Thirty-eighth, commanded by Lt. Col. Frank T. Mildren, moved out around 1530, its withdrawal covered by an artillery barrage by the Thirty-seventh FA Bn. and the 81mm mortars of the Second Bn., Thirty-eighth. While the battalion was marching down the forest road between Wahlerscheid and Rocherath, a few kilometers away Colonel Tuttle's Third Bn., Twenty-third, was embroiled in the bitter and doomed defense of the Ruppenvenn, and Colonel McKinley's First Bn., Ninth, was hurriedly digging in at the Lausdell crossroads. When the First Bn., Thirty-eighth, reached the Rocherather Baracken at about 1630, the Germans began shelling them heavily with artillery and nebelwerfers. Company A, in the lead, hurried through the crossroads largely unscathed, but Company B and especially Company C were hit hard by the barrage. Company C lost twenty-two men, seventeen of them in the Second Platoon, but perhaps more important, the companies lost precious time needed to reach the twin vil-lages before the Germans did. By the time the Second Platoon, Company C, com-mander, 1st Lt. George Adams, made sure that his wounded were properly looked after, the rest of Company C had gone ahead and disappeared from sight. Setting out with the remainder of Second Platoon, a machine gun section from Company D, and part of the HQ Company, Adams eventually reached Rocherath and rejoined the rest of Company C, which at this point had about seventy men left. Adams' group was joined by several men from the Third Platoon, who had been sent to reinforce the Service Company roadblock at the northeastern edge of the village but had retreated when German tanks overran the roadblock. These tanks were undoubtedly some of the jagdpanzers of the Twelfth SS Panzerjäger Bn. who got past the First Bn., Ninth Infantry, at Lausdell, but who were unable to main-tain their foothold in the village without infantry support.

At around 1730 on 17 December, just as it was getting dark, the Company C commander, Captain Edward C. Rollings, met Lt. Adams and showed him where to deploy his platoon. Adams's Second Platoon went into house #65 in Rocherath, near a corner overlooking one of the village's main streets. This house was owned by one Johann Drosch, a relative of the mayor of Rocherath, Paul Drosch. Adams sent one of his squads across to the east side of the street to the home of Johann Rauw at #61. Rollings' company CP was in a house a few yards


to the northwest of Adams's position. A couple of houses to the north of #65, Cap-tain Love had established his AT Company CP. Adams and his platoon were now placed under Love's command. Their positions along this street in northeastern Rocherath would play a central role in the next two days of fighting, especially Adams's #65, which covered one of the two main German entry routes into the twin villages from the northeast.

At this time, few of the American troops moving into the Belgian houses had any idea of the situation beyond the next street. Everyone had heard conflict-ing rumors that the Ninety-ninth Infantry Division was routed, that it was hold-ing fast at all costs, or that it was counterattacking. The men could hear the fight-ing to the northeast at Lausdell, where McKinley's First Bn., Ninth, was then fighting for its life, and they could see flares of all colors streaking the sky to the


1 7 December 1944


north and northeast. These flares were steadily falling closer and closer to the vil-lage.

At around 1800, the Germans attacked the area around Love's AT Company CP. First they softened up the area "with the most intense concentration of mor-tar and artillery fire that Captain Love had experienced."* Shortly after the bar-rage stopped, German tanks or jagdpanzers entered the village from the northeast, using two parallel roads. The first force, using the northern route, did not even penetrate as far as the street where Love and Adams were before pulling back, but the southern branch of the attack pressed on down the Route vers Udenbreth to the area around the town's church, where the infantry riding on the decks of the vehicles dismounted and sought cover in the buildings. This southern group may have been KG Zeiner of the First SS Panzerjäger Bn., which was the only German force to stay in the village all night, but other reports said this attack was carried out by at least 20 tanks and 500 infantry, which was a far larger force than Zeiner's. During the fighting, the squad of Second Platoon in #61 was attacked by about a half dozen German infantrymen. Since it was now dark outside and since the Rauw house had no windows or doors on the eastern side from which to bring the Ger-mans under fire, Lt. Adams ordered the squad to pull back across the street into #65, where the Second Platoon consolidated its position. An excerpt from the Sec-ond Infantry Division Combat Interviews reads as follows:

All during this attack, in which it seems the Germans had difficulty getting their artillery fire to lift, the enemy artillery was falling over the whole area, including where their own infantry was operating. Their method of attack seemed to be to illuminate the targets and blind the U.S. gunners with momentary flashes from floodlights that were mounted on the tanks. The effect of the floodlights was terri-fying, according to Captain Love. The blinding light, followed by the inky black-ness of the night in which no one could see anything, made the battle seem as unco-ordinated as if it had been fought in the Pit. The enemy seemed to depend heavily on the effect on morale of a high percentage of tracer in his ammunition, and Cap-tain Love estimated that most of the firing that was done that first night to be about 1/3 ball ammunition and the rest tracer.†

All that afternoon and evening, stragglers from all units of the Second and Ninety-ninth Divisions had been wandering through the twin villages, looking for their outfits or headed vaguely toward "the rear." During the battle, two Ameri-can half-track crews entered #65, seeking shelter from the German attack. Their half-tracks were nearby, one parked in the street just outside the house and the other across the street, next to #61, which was now held by the Germans. Adams was glad of the reinforcements, but the crews were not inclined to contribute much to the defense of the position. Instead they spent the whole night in the cellar with five Belgian civilians who had so far passed most of the evening praying for deliv-erance.

At 1845, about 15 minutes after the half-track crews arrived at #65, a Ger-man tank stopped at the intersection just south of Adams's house and began firing

*Second ID Combat Interview, "Battle of the Bulge, 17-20 December 1944," p. 3. †ibid., pp. 3-4.


into the First Platoon's positions to the rear of Adams's Second Platoon. Leaving through a door or window on the other side of the house from the panzer, Adams ran to a self-propelled TD of the 644th TD Bn. he had seen nearby. He tried to persuade the vehicle commander to move to a position from where he could take out the German tank, but the commander refused, citing a number of reasons, including that it was too dark for him to use his telescopic sights. Adams pleaded and argued with him, even offering to act as gunner himself, but to no avail. Sgt. Andrew Paul, who had accompanied Adams, grew impatient with the TD com-mander's hesitation. He removed a ,30-cal machine gun mounted on a nearby jeep, draped a belt of ammunition around his neck, and stepped out into the street. He walked steadily toward the panzer, firing his machine gun from the hip at the tank as he went. After a few rounds, Paul's machine gun jammed, but Lt. William Trumbley, of Company D's machine gun platoon, emerged from the house, took the gun from Paul, and cleared the stoppage, and then took Paul's place, spraying the panzer with the machine gun. "A German infantryman from somewhere in the vicinity fired what was thought to be a rifle grenade at Lt. Trumbley, which hit the wall of the house about six feet from the lieutenant, wounding him in the right leg with a fragment. The enemy tank, unaffected by all this, fired about six more rounds at the house and moved away. At this time the American TD pulled out and was not seen again."* One can only imagine what the crew of the Ger-man tank thought of this cowboy behavior.

With the German tank gone and the battle seemingly dying down around them, Adams redeployed his men at the windows and doors of #65. About ten minutes later, one of the guards reported a column of twos marching north past the AT Company CP. Thinking that it might be a group of German infantry, Adams went outside to a Sherman tank Captain Rollings had placed north of #65 earlier in the evening. Why Adams had not tried to get this Sherman to fire on the German tank earlier is unknown. Perhaps the battle situation at the time did not allow him to reach the Sherman's position. In any case, Adams now argued for the commander to fire on the column, but the tanker was convinced that the column was American and refused, even when Adams again offered to man the gun himself. The identity of the troops is not known for certain, but they were probably Company E of the Second Bn., Thirty-eighth Infantry, which had been ordered to move into the area, and it is likely that the Sherman commander saved a friendly unit from unnecessary casualties.

The Germans, meanwhile, regrouped and renewed their attack on the cen-tral part of Rocherath at about 2000. Grenadiers across the street from Captain Love's AT Company CP were firing rifle grenades and panzer faus t s at the house, so Love pulled most of the men out of the building and into a field a little north-west of the house, where they would be screened from the German fire until the Germans could be driven off. He left a machine gun and its crew inside the house, and they took the Germans under fire from their post at an upstairs window. At about the same time, the Sherman tank, whose commander Lt. Adams had spo-

*Ibid.


ken with earlier, drove out of its position and toward another part of the town. It is unknown whether the tank was moving forward to engage the attacking Ger-mans or seeking a safer haven farther to the rear, but shortly after its departure, two German tanks pulled up within view of Adams's platoon and began firing at #65. While their situation certainly was not a pleasant one, Adams and his men soon realized that the danger was not as great as it seemed, for the German HE shells could do no more to the house's thick stone walls than chip the outside and knock off plaster from the inside. Seeing their ineffectiveness, the panzers soon moved on to the southwest.

At about 2030, while the battle flared around him, Captain Love got a call from Colonel Boos informing him that the Second Bn., Thirty-eighth, was mov-ing into the area to reinforce him and that the first unit to arrive, Company E, would be under his control. Captain Love dispatched a guide to the northern road to locate this company and lead them to positions he had chosen, but the guide discovered that Company E had already arrived and was occupying positions to the east and a little to the north of Love's street, in an arc just behind the Service Company roadblock. Unable to go to Company E's position to take charge of the men personally because of the fighting going on around him, Love accepted their positions as a fait accompli and turned his attention back to supervising the defense of his own area.

As the fighting continued, Colonel Boos dispatched Company K of the Thirty-eighth Infantry, at around 2100 hours to reinforce Love's position. En route from Krinkelt, this company was attacked by a German thrust trying to penetrate into the villages from the east. Although the soldiers were able to knock out two Ger-man tanks and kill about fifty SS panzer grenadiers, Company K was further delayed as it cleared the remnants of the attacking force from the houses in the area. Mean-while, German pressure on Love's and Adams's positions increased. Sometime dur-ing this attack, the Germans overran the Ninth Gun Squad of Love's Second AT Platoon, which was stationed a little farther northeast near the water tower. As Ger-man tanks rumbled down the southern road past Adams's position, his men fired rifles and AT grenades, tossed hand grenades, and even threw rocks in an attempt to stop the tanks or at least dislodge the infantry riding on them. By the time the fighting died down again around 2130, the Germans had a strong force holding the east side of the street while the AT Company and the Second Platoon, Company C, still held the west side. During the battle, the Germans overran and captured a number of men from First Platoon, Company B, who had been stationed on the eastern edge of the village and herded them, along with prisoners from Love's Ninth Gun Squad, into the basement of the Rauw house, #61.

The Germans were now on all sides of Love and Adams, having penetrated down the streets to the north and south, occupied the houses across the street, and infiltrated behind the position and attacked American strongholds in and around the town church. When the fighting tapered off again in his area, Captain Love brought his AT Company men back into the house at #63 and posted guards around the building. He put the men on a rotating schedule so they could start to catch up on their sleep. Now that it was relatively safe to travel the neighborhood


as long as one avoided the Germans in the houses across the street, Love sent the AT Company Assistant Reconnaissance Officer, Lt. Edward Sweeney, to effect the overdue contact and coordination with Company E of the Second Bn., Thirty-eighth, to the northeast. Company G arrived in the area at about this time with orders to tie in on the AT Company's right. "The guard outside the door of the AT Company CP stopped the Company G column just in time to save them from walking down the road between the company positions and the enemy houses across the street."*

At around 2300, after all the German tanks in the area had withdrawn, the Germans in #61 across from Adams's house began shouting in German. Having received no response after about five minutes, the Germans switched to "heavily accented English," calling on the Company C men to surrender. Adams's men did not answer, but watched silently from the windows and doors of #65, where they could not be seen. Some Germans emerged from the Rauw house, holding cap-tured Americans in front of them at gunpoint as human shields. Adams refused the surrender demand the men in the street shouted at him; he was unsure whether they were really captured Americans or Germans in American uniforms. After a few minutes, the Germans and their captives withdrew back into the basement of #61.

The fighting continued to decrease in intensity, so that at about 0100 Cap-tain Love, after checking on his Third and Fourth Gun Squads, felt safe to finally turn in and get some sleep himself. For the rest of the night, the street that he and Lt. Adams had guarded was relatively quiet. Flames from burning houses and vehi-cles lit up the night sky, and the mist and light rain that kept falling at intervals during the night mixed with the heavy smoke to severely limit visibility in the town. The Germans took advantage of the lull to gather their forces for the next morn-ing's assault. The 989th Grenadier Regt. of the 277th VGD finally made it through the Krinkelter Wald and assembled northeast of Rocherath, and by dawn most of the Twelfth SS Panzer Division—the Twelfth SS Panzerjäger Bn., the Twenty-fifth SS Panzergrenadier Regt., and the panzers of the I Bn., Twelfth SS Panzer Regt.— had gathered northeast and east of the twin villages. However, the II Bn. of the panzer regiment (composed of the 560th Heavy Panzerjäger Bn.) did not finish negotiating the muddy, churned-up trails through the forest until later on 18 December.

On the other side, the Americans consolidated their positions in Krinkelt-Rocherath and Wirtzfeld but still did not have a cohesive front for opposing the Germans. According to American historian Hugh Cole,

Most of the Thirty-eighth Infantry was in and around the two villages, plus about a battalion and a half of the Ninth Infantry and a few platoons of the Twenty-third Infantry. Although these Second Division troops had gaping ranks, so had their opponents. Fortunately, in view of the number of tanks already in the German camp, the American infantry had the means of antitank defense at hand: the 74lst Tank Bn., 644th TD Bn., a company of the 612th TD Bn., and a few guns from


the 801st TD Bn. . . . The flanks of the Second Infantry Division positions at the villages were more or less covered by elements of the Ninth and Twenty-third Infantry in Wirtzfeld, to the southwest, and the battalions of the 393d Infantry deployed in blocking positions to hold the road net north of Rocherath. As yet, how-ever, there was still no homogenous line sealing the Second Infantry Division front.*

Captain Love was awakened at about 0700 on 18 December, just as the sun was coming up and the fog was lifting. Some of Adams's men had heard voices coming from the house across the street, leading them to suspect that the Ger-mans were still there and were still holding their American prisoners. Some of Adams's men, stationed in the doorway of #65, sniped at two or three Germans who carelessly showed themselves at the windows of the Rauw house. At about the same time, the Company C commander, Captain Rollings, and his runner made the dash from the Company C CP to #65, safely avoiding being shot at by the Germans across the street. When he learned that Adams's squad had abandoned #61 the night before, he was angry that the house had been given up without a fight and ordered Adams to recapture and reoccupy the building.

With the rest of Second Platoon providing covering fire from the windows and doors of the Drosch home, the Second Squad ran into the street. A wounded SS officer threw a potato-masher grenade into the street from a basement window of #61, wounding two of Adams's men, while some Germans behind the house fired two red flares into the morning sky. This may have been a signal for tank support, for soon German tanks could be heard approaching from the Lausdell crossroads area, but they did not arrive in time to help the defenders of the Rauw house. Two Second Squad men threw three hand grenades into the house and the rest of the squad stormed in, killing eleven Germans, capturing sixteen, and free-ing six American prisoners. Among the freed prisoners was Lt. Ralph L. Schmidt of Company B, and S.Sgt. Ron Mayer and Pfc. Henry Mills, machine gunners from Captain Love's Ninth Gun Squad. They had been captured the previous night while manning their machine gun in a house near the Service Company roadblock. The released Americans picked up whatever abandoned weapons were lying about, scrounged some ammunition from the two half-tracks parked in the street, and then dispersed to find their units. The wounded German prisoners were taken into the Drosch home while Captain Rollings, who was wounded slightly in the leg by a ricocheting bullet while observing the fight from the door of #65, and his run-ner escorted the others to the rear.

Shortly after this action, Captain Love sent a detail to the regimental ammu-nition depot in Krinkelt to pick up a resupply of bazooka rounds and K rations. They returned by 0900, just as a platoon of Company I, Thirty-eighth Infantry, arrived and took up positions in the house to the north of the AT Company CP. On their heels was a platoon of Company K, which occupied supporting posi-tions in another house about 50 yards northwest of Love's CP.

At around 0730, a force of eleven German panzers came barreling down the southern road past the Drosch house, going so fast that none of the men in Love's

*Cole, The Ardennes, pp. 113-115.


CP had time to bring his weapons to bear. Just down the street, Lt. Adams quickly organized two bazooka teams, using one launcher his group had brought and another scrounged from a jeep parked outside. These two teams fired numerous rounds at the passing panzers, scoring many direct hits on them but achieving no penetrations. Captain Love was surprised that these panzers could have gotten past his Fifth Gun Squad, stationed farther northeast along the road, without at least being fired at. After calling the Thirty-eighth Infantry Regt. CP to warn them of the armored threat coming their way, he called all three of his platoon leaders to see what their situations were. His Second Platoon leader, Lt. Marc M. Schowalt-er, reported that he could not locate the Fifth Gun Squad (unbeknownst to him, the Germans had overrun the gun the night before, capturing the crew).

As the tanks passed the Drosch and Rauw houses, their column began to "accordion" as the head of the column stopped and the rear vehicles closed up behind. One of the tanks, a Mark V Panther (presumably at or near the very rear of the column), was about 200 yards from Love's CP when it stopped, but was blocked from his view by the intervening buildings. He left his CP and located two self-propelled TDs of the 644th TD Bn., but they refused to move to posi-tions from which they could get a shot at the panzer, saying they had strict orders to stay right where they were, "covering critical positions." Love then found an M4 Sherman tank nearby, and the commander directed his vehicle to follow Love to a firing position about 75 yards to the Panther's right. "The M4 finished it off with two rounds, beautiful flanking shots into the side of the hull. Score: One Mk V tank, no U.S. casualties. The doughboys in the windows [of Love's CP] enjoyed picking off the [German] tank crew as they abandoned their vehicle."*

Meanwhile, in #61, Adams's Second Squad commander, Sgt. Richard Shine-felt, fired three rifle grenades at the panzers but to no effect. The men of the Sec-ond Platoon in both the Drosch and Rauw houses sprayed the tanks with small arms fire, killing or wounding almost all of the infantry riding on them. The last three tanks in the column stopped at the intersection just southeast of #65, one facing southwest toward Krinkelt, one facing due west, and the other facing due north toward the Drosch house. This last one fired its cannon at #65 but succeeded only in knocking loose some plaster from the walls and ceiling, as had all such shots from other panzers the day before. It also fired a round into the Company C CP, which caught fire as a result. While most of Adams's men had their atten-tion focused on the panzers outside the front of the house, someone looked out of the rear windows and saw a number of American tanks moving into position to the north. Seeing that a large-scale tank battle was about to begin and not want-ing to be caught in the middle of it, Adams and his men dashed out of #65 and took cover in #63 across the cul-de-sac, into which the Company C CP was just then relocating.

As they did so, another Panther, a little behind the others, continued south-west toward the one that had just been knocked out by the Sherman. Pvt. Isabel Salazar, one of Love's AT Company staff members, grabbed a bazooka and one of

*Ibid.


the newly arrived rockets and ran from the basement to one of the first-story win-dows. He fired and knocked out a Panther moving at 200 yards with his first shot. The Panther's momentum carried it forward until it came to rest alongside the Sherman's kill, the two wrecks very effectively blocking the road.

Within moments after Adams had withdrawn his platoon from #65, a huge tank battle erupted in Rocherath. Adams and the rest of the Second Platoon and the Weapons Platoon stayed in Company C's new CP for about an hour while the tank fight raged around them. At about 1300, when the worst part of the fighting appeared to be over, Captain Rollings returned to the CP from the battalion aid station (where he had gone to have his leg wound attended to after dropping off his prisoners) and sent Adams and his group back to #65. Someone mentioned at the time that fifteen German tanks had been destroyed in the tank battle. During the fighting, Company L of the Third Bn., Thirty-eighth Infantry, took up posi-


tions to the left (north) of AT Company, using the cellars and basements of ruined houses as strongholds.

As they reentered #65, the men of Adams's Second Platoon realized that they had left their two wounded German prisoners there during the tank battle. One, the wounded SS officer who had thrown the hand grenade earlier that morning, was still there since his leg was too badly injured to walk on; but the other, who also had a leg wound but a less severe one, was gone. Thinking the man could not have got-ten far, Adams ran out to the front door to look for the escaped man. He spotted the man "wobbling down the road toward another house on the corner." Since he was too far away and too exposed for Adams to recapture, Adams shot him.

Despite the ferocity of the earlier tank battle, the north-facing panzer that had menaced the intersection that morning was still in position. Adams's men could no longer see it since it was now hidden from their view by the shed adja-cent to the Drosch house, but they could hear it warming up its motor from time to time. Through a gap in a hedge they could also see tankers and infantrymen running to and fro near the tank. Adams watched this activity for a little while, then got his carbine, which he had modified to be fully automatic when desired. Bracing against a ground-floor window sill, Adams began firing bursts at the Ger-mans appearing in the gap. Apparently they never figured out where the firing was coming from because he carried on with this sniping for some time, and by evening a rather large pile of German dead had accumulated in the gap, and they had stopped using it as an avenue of approach.

At around 1600, a German tank approaching from Lausdell stopped on the road behind #61. Using one of the tanks knocked out earlier as cover, it began firing into #65 to cover other panzers heading for Krinkelt. Firing from Captain Love's AT Company CP, Pvt. Salazar repeated his morning performance by knock-ing out one of these, a Jagdpanzer IV from the 560th Heavy Panzerjäger Bn., as it pulled up behind the two destroyed tanks blocking the southern road. A few minutes later, the last tank in the column joined the first in bombarding Adams's platoon in #65. The sturdy house withstood the pounding until one of the tank rounds came in through a window or door and exploded inside, destroying the staircase leading from the basement to the first floor. "Amidst the choking smoke and dust, Lt. Adams ordered his men out of the house"* and into a ditch behind of the building. As they did so, the two watching panzers followed their fellows southwest down the road into Krinkelt.

When they had gone, Adams went into the Company C CP to ask permis-sion to abandon the demolished house, which was proving too easy a target for the panzers, but Captain Rollings refused, saying the position was vital. Accord-ingly, Adams moved the Second Platoon back into the house as soon as the smoke and dust had cleared enough for them to breathe. He reestablished his guards at the windows and doors. One of the tank rounds had set the half-track in front of the Drosch home on fire, and it continued burning into the night. Since his group was so small and the Rauw house had no openings facing east, making it

*Ibid.


indefensible at night, Adams withdrew Shinefelt's Second Squad into #65 when it got dark. At around 1800 on 18 December, U.S. artillery on Elsenborn Ridge began firing "in a target area that seemed to enclose Lt. Adams and his group within a semicircular wall of fire interposed between him and the enemy. This fire was kept up all during the night," and despite the noise, the men derived a great deal of comfort from it."*

Things were quiet (as quiet as they could be in the middle of a battle) until about 2200, when a platoon of four German tanks led by a captured Sherman came up the southern road from Krinkelt, turned left at the intersection, and passed by the Company C CP. The tanks had their headlights on, and the Amer-icans along the street were fooled at first by the Sherman into thinking it was an American column. They hailed the tankers in English, but when they got no reply and saw that the subsequent tanks were German, they opened fire with their small arms and machine guns. The tanks, unaffected, continued to the northern road, where they turned right and continued north out of the area.

At some point during the night, a single German tank drove up and down the street, spraying its machine gun fire at the houses on either side. The men in the AT Company CP fired bazookas at it and hit it several times, but none of the rounds penetrated, and the tank, apparently undamaged, eventually drove away.

In the predawn hours, another lone panzer came down the Route vers Uden-breth and stopped between the two knocked-out tanks blocking the road. There it sat until dawn. At about the same time, a self-propelled tank destroyer of the 644th TD Bn. pulled up behind Adams's position at #65. The panzer heard the TD moving into position and fired a few blind shots in that direction, but nei-ther vehicle moved out of its cover to get a better shot for fear of becoming exposed to the other's fire.

At around 0900, four Belgian civilians picked their way through the rubble in the foggy half-light of dawn and entered #65, where they joined the other five civilians who had been in the basement since the beginning of the battle.

A little later, a single Mark V Panther stopped behind the houses just east of Captain Love's AT Company CP and began shelling the CP with its 75mm gun. As Love recalled, this was one of the many instances when the German tanks fired HE shells uselessly against the stone buildings but AP shells would have been deadly. Adams's men in #65, who were not forced to take cover against the tank's fire like Love's men were, opened fire on the panzer with their small arms, but suc-ceeded only in diverting its attention to themselves. The Panther traversed its tur-ret toward them and fired four or five rounds at #65. His cannon's ineffectiveness evidently annoyed the German tank commander for he did an extraordinary thing. Opening the turret's top hatch, he pulled a panzerfaust from inside the tank, rested it on his shoulder, and fired it at the AT Company CP house. The 88mm shaped-charge rocket struck the attic and caved in the entire roof of the house, injuring one of Love's men. The tank commander then calmly withdrew back into the tur-ret, closed the hatch, and the Panther turned and drove away. During the entire

*Ibid.


episode not a single shot was fired at the panzer's commander, so stunned were the Americans at the sight.

Shortly thereafter, Adams's and Love's men spotted a panzer hiding in a wooden shed about 60 yards north of Love's CP. The panzer had backed into the shed, apparently intending to ambush any American vehicles that might pass by with a flank shot at point-blank range, but its cannon barrel was too long for its hiding place and protruded from the shed. One of the tank destroyers of the 644th TD Bn. that had been reluctant to move from covered position during the fight-ing was able to fire on the shed without changing position. Several rounds demol-ished the shed and as the panzer moved out to seek more substantial cover, the TD knocked it out.

At about 0900, a force of German infantry estimated at between a platoon

Pocket of Resistance Early Morning,

19 December 1944


and a reduced company moved into #61, from which Lt. Adams had pulled the Second Squad at nightfall the previous evening. Captain Rollings got the TD behind #65 to fire three rounds into the house, and they were apparently very effective, because for the next forty-five minutes the Germans could be seen car-rying casualties out of the house. Meanwhile, more infantry joined the panzer on the road behind #61 and together they moved to assault Captain Rollings' Com-pany C CP from the right (north) side of #61. The panzer began firing its main gun at the TD behind #65 and the Company C CP at a range of 200 yards. Lt. Adams could hear, over the shooting, the tank commander shouting orders in Ger-man, including "Range, 200!"

While the Americans returned fire and pinned down the German infantry with their small arms and automatic fire, Lt. Adams and Sgt. Rudolph Kraft, sec-ond in command of the Second Platoon squad manning #65, each grabbed a bazooka and climbed into the attic of #65 to get a shot at the panzer. Counting down from three to one, both men fired simultaneously, but Adams's weapon failed to discharge. Kraft's rocket, however, struck the panzer in the starboard bogies. Discarding his malfunctioning bazooka, Adams quickly loaded a second round into Kraft's weapon. This shot penetrated the thin armor on the top of the panzer's turret and was followed by an explosion inside the vehicle. As Adams bent to pick up a third round (an act which may have saved his life), a high explosive round from another nearby tank burst into the attic and exploded, collapsing the roof and part of the attic walls onto the two men. It was quickly followed by a second round exploding against the wall, but Adams and Kraft were protected against its effects by the rubble covering them. The two men dug themselves out and raced down into the basement, where the rest of the Second Platoon had already taken cover. Adams had been injured when the wall fell on him, but he continued to command his platoon.

For the next three hours the two forces battled across the street as, in between tank rounds, the men of the Second Platoon and AT Company sprang to their windows to return fire as best they could. At about noon, two more panzers entered the intersection and added their fire, targeting Adams's #65 and the other houses in the area. Seeing how little effect their 75mm HE shells were having against the stone houses, the panzers switched to spraying the area with machine gun fire. A number of bursts struck the shed adjacent to the Drosch house. This shed had a thatched roof that was easily ignited by the tracer rounds. Lt. Roy E. Mode, one of the Company C officers in the house with Lt. Adams, tried to extinguish the blaze with two five-gallon jerry cans of water, but was unsuccessful and the flames soon spread to the house proper. The Drosch home, #65 Rocherath, which the Second Platoon, Company C, had defended so successfully for two days, finally had to be abandoned. While one GI ran to the top of what remained of the base-ment stairs to warn the civilians, yelling "Home brennt; you must go," the rest of the platoon exited through the rear of the house and headed down a track lead-ing past #64 and westward toward Wirtzfeld.

At 1300, the commander of the 644th's self-propelled TDs in the area reported to Love and informed him that he (Love) was now in command of the vehicles


and could deploy them as he chose. Finally able to countermand the orders that had kept the TDs fixed in place and unable to fire at many targets during the bat-tle, Love quickly issued movement orders to several of the vehicles, placing one on the north side of his CP building and another in reserve behind the house. At around 1500, a Mark IV panzer that had worked its way around to the rear of Love's position began shelling the area from the west. One of its rounds hit and penetrated the TD behind the CP, wounding all the crew members. One of the AT men in the CP reacted and hit the Mark IV with a bazooka round, striking the engine compartment and immobilizing it, while Love maneuvered one of the other TDs around to finish it off. The panzer attempted to respond to the maneu-vering TD, but could not rotate its turret fast enough to get a shot at it. "Because of the locations of the buildings, the TD had to come up with its gun pointing to

Pocket of Resistance Mid-morning,

19 December 1944


the rear, and while the Mark IV was traversing slowly, as if by hand, through 90 degrees, the TD traversed through about 200 degrees, got off three rounds, and took the turret right off the Mark IV. Another Mark IV that was moving in near the first one apparently saw what was happening, for he pulled out."*

Just before 1700, Captain Love was summoned to attend a meeting at the Thirty-eighth Regimental CP a few blocks away. At this meeting, Colonel Boos issued orders to his battalion and company commanders to begin the withdrawal to Berg and Elsenborn at 1730. Love's AT Company was to follow behind Com-pany L, which was attached to the Second Bn., Thirty-eighth, on the road west through Wirtzfeld. Boos instructed the commanders to destroy any equipment,

*Ibid.


Afternoon. 19 December 1944


German or American, that could not be carried. Captain Love returned to his company and got the preparations underway. Finally, at around 1830, a radio mes-sage informed him that Company L had cleared the area, so Love put the rem-nants of his three gun platoons and mine platoon on the road. By 2100 the com-pany had reached Elsenborn, where it was ordered to occupy a section of the new defense line. This was accomplished by the morning of 20 December.

One Panzer's Saga

The bulk of the First Bn., Thirty-eighth Infantry, under Lt. Col. Mildren, had withdrawn from Wahlerscheid beginning at 1450 on 17 December with orders to assume defensive positions in the twin villages. Making its way down the for-est road through the Rocherather Baracken and into Rocherath as the Germans hammered Colonel McKinley's First Bn., Ninth, at Lausdell to the east, Mildren's battalion had reached its positions around dusk. Company C, as described above, occupied some houses just southwest of the water tower in Rocherath. Compa-nies A and B moved east of the villages, but a German tank and infantry attack overran Company B before it had a chance to dig in, and the remnants of the com-pany withdrew into the village. Sporadic German attacks throughout the eve-ning and early morning of 18 December resulted in a rather chaotic American defense.

At around 0730 on the morning of 18 December, a force of German tanks, probably Panthers of the I Panzer Bn., came down the southernmost of the two main roads running through the twin villages, past the water tower and Company C's position. These seemed to be the same eleven tanks engaged by Lt. Adams and Captain Love just before the Rocherath tank battle began. By about 0800, five of these tanks had penetrated through that area and were nearing the intersection in Krinkelt that was flanked by the church and the building housing Colonel Mil-dren's First Bn., Thirty-eighth, CP. Mildren's men were ready for the tanks, Cap-tain Love having notified the battalion CP when the tanks passed his position. As the panzers reached the intersection, Mildren's men in the nearby buildings (includ-ing a small force in the church) opened up on them with every automatic weapon available. This had no effect on the buttoned-up panzers, which began returning fire with their cannon. They directed much of this fire at Mildren's CP, where sev-eral light machine guns were posted in the upper story windows. The American gunners ran from room to room, staying one step ahead of the shells the German tanks were hurling through the windows and all the while keeping up the stream of fire at the panzers.

While the German tanks were thus engaged, stationary in the middle of the street, they drew the fire of some Shermans that were stationed on the outskirts of the village, to the east of the CP. Their fire knocked out the first two panzers in the column and spurred the others into motion. The next two panzers bypassed their stricken comrades and continued southwest down the road past Mildren's CP. When the first one reached the next intersection, a bazooka team from the


First Bn., Thirty-eighth's AT Platoon (one of five bazooka teams from various units in the area) fired and hit it in the track (presumably in the port side, given the panzer's direction of travel). The panzer was immobilized, but could still pivot in place, and its crew and weaponry were undamaged. The German crew swung the tank 180 degrees about, spraying the area with the vehicle's machine guns. They then began firing the tank's cannon and both machine guns* to the northeast, past Mildren's CP. Lt. Howard O. Emerich, the First Bn., Thirty-eighth's Battalion Motor Officer, was just traveling to the CP from the northwest when he found the damaged Panther blocking his path, so he retraced his steps a bit and found a Sherman tank of the 74lst Tank Bn., which he guided into a position about 200 yards due north of the CP. From there it had a clear view of the German tank, and the Sherman's first shot penetrated the Panther's turret on the port side and silenced the panzer. Bazooka teams from Company A and the Company D 81mm mortar platoon, working in tandem, fired several shots that destroyed the fourth Panther not far behind the third.

The fifth Panther proved to be more of a problem. Apparently following some distance behind the preceding four tanks, it skirted past the remains of the first two panzers and past the church, where the tank commander apparently saw the third panzer either already destroyed or in the process of being done in. In order to avoid a similar fate, the fifth Panther turned left at the church, intend-ing to bypass the dangerous area by using a parallel street one block south. It turned right on the street behind Mildren's CP, then right again when it reached the next street. The AT Platoon bazooka team fired several rounds at the Panther as it approached the carcasses of the third and fourth panzers, but none of the rounds penetrated the tank's armor. Upon reaching the intersection, the crew of the fifth Panther found the road blocked by the wreck of the third tank; its hull and cannon, pointing northeast, prohibited movement in that direction. While the fifth Panther was backing and filling in order to turn around, Lt. Sidney P. Dane, the First Bn., Thirty-eighth's S-2, and Sgt. Charles Wood ran out of the CP building to a place nearby (presumably a barn or pen of some sort) that housed some cows belonging to one of the local farmers. To keep the Panther from going back the way it had come, where it would be loose in the rear of companies A and I, but lacking any antitank weapons, Dane and Wood stampeded the cattle up the middle of the street toward the German tank. The Panther crew fired one of their

*The fact that eyewitness accounts specifically mention the tank firing two machine guns as well as its cannon is significant in that it helps narrow the possibilities of what type of vehicles these really were. We know from the German gliederungen (tables of organization and equipment) that there were only

four types of panzers and jagdpanzers committed by the Twelfth SS Panzer Division at the twin vil-lages: Mk IV panzers, Mk V Panthers, Mk IV Jagdpanzers, and Mk V Jagdpanthers. The latter two vehicle types carried only one machine gun apiece, so the vehicles in this platoon must have been either Mk IV or Mk V tanks. This tells us that they were from the I Pz Bn. of the Twelfth SS Panzer Reg-iment, the only German unit in the battle to employ turreted AFVs. Unfortunately for our accuracy, both Mk IVs and Panthers had either two or three machine guns, so we cannot narrow the field of possibilities any further than this. However, since the American eyewitnesses refer to them repeat-e d l y as Panthers, we shall bow to their judgment and refer to them as such for the remainder of this story.


machine guns, killing some of the cows, but nevertheless decided against running through the herd.* They swung the tank to the left and crashed through the back yards and gardens of the houses on that block. All the while, Sgt. Grover Farrell, in the upper story of the CP building, was directing a stream of .50-cal fire onto the tank to keep its crew buttoned up or perhaps hoping to get a lucky hit through a vision slit.

The Panther turned again and entered the alley between the CP building and the next building to the east. At the other end of the alley, the commander spot-ted three American jeeps parked in front of the CP and drove the Panther out of

*One of the American sources speculates that perhaps the German tank crew was afraid of throwing a track while running over the cows, but that seems unlikely. Nor is it consistent with SS behavior that they veered o f f course for humanitarian (bovinitarian?) reasons.


the alley and over the jeeps two or three times, smashing them into unrecogniz-able piles of wreckage. Still shrugging off the heavy automatic weapons fire that was hitting it from all sides, the Panther then moved so that it was able to stick its cannon muzzle through one of the CP's ground floor windows. To the intense relief and puzzlement of the Americans inside, however, the tank did not fire, although when backing out of the position a few minutes later the tank's fender knocked loose a corner of the building. Apparently satisfied that there were no other targets nearby worthy of its attention, and perhaps fearful of the American bazooka teams roaming the area, the Panther roared off down the street, past the wreck of the third Panther and then northwest. The tank then turned southwest on the Route vers Udenbreth as if heading for either Büllingen or Wirtzfeld.

Farther to the southwest, at the CP of Colonel Barsanti's Third Bn., Thirty-eighth Infantry, Major Vivian Paul, the Thirty-eighth Infantry Regiment's S-4, was just leaving to return to the Regimental CP in Rocherath after a meeting with Colonel Barsanti. He and his driver had just gotten into their jeep, parked in front of the CP, when the surviving Panther "rounded the corner going lickety-split," heading right for them. Major Paul and the driver leapt from the jeep and rolled into a roadside ditch just as the Panther slammed into the jeep and crushed it. At that moment, one of the 57mm AT guns of the Third Bn., Thirty-eighth's AT Pla-toon, which was covering the Route vers Udenbreth against just such a German incursion, fired at the Panther. The shell struck the panzer and apparently dam-aged the turret traverse mechanism, for the Panther continued down the street but "with the turret swinging wildly, completely out of control." The Third Bn., Thirty-eighth's Assistant S-3, Lt. Fred Sutton, was nearby and witnessed the episode. He ran to a nearby Sherman tank and notified them of the Panther in the neighbor-hood. The Sherman quickly fired a round at the Panther but missed. The Panther was lost to the Sherman's view before the American tank could fire a second shot.

The Panther pressed on toward Büllingen, approaching the Company L CP. Just as it passed in front of that building, a self-propelled TD from the 644th TD Bn., which Colonel Barsanti had placed near the Third Bn., Thirty-eighth, CP to guard against a German attack from Büllingen, fired three rounds in rapid suc-cession into the Panther's thinner rear armor at a range of 250 to 300 yards. That finally stopped the rampaging Panther, and as the crew bailed out of the tank, the Company L riflemen picked them off. When the panzer's hulk was examined later, it was found to have eleven bazooka holes in it (none of which had penetrated all the way through the armor) as well as the three TD penetrations in the rear and whatever mark the AT gun's round had left.

Conclusion

The activities of the American forces in Krinkelt-Rocherath and on the approaches to the twin villages at the Lausdell crossroads and in the Krinkelter Wald blunted what was to have been the main German drive to the Meuse. The American infantry, tank, TD, engineer, and antitank forces sacrificed themselves


in many cases to buy time for reserves to be marshaled and new defenses estab-lished. They succeeded in carrying out one of the dictums of military strategy in defense against penetrations: hold the shoulder of the breakthrough in order to launch a later counterattack to cut the penetration off at the base. This is exactly what happened two weeks later, as the American First and Ninth Armies launched simultaneous drives to erase the German Bulge.

We Fight and Die Here

In Hitler's plan for Wacht Am Rhein, the offensive through the Ardennes in December 1944, the Twelfth SS Panzer Division " H i t l e r j u g e n d " was supposed to take the northernmost route to the Meuse. The division, named after the Hitler Youth (HJ) organization and having many teenage volunteers from the "HJ" in its ranks, had earned a reputation in Normandy for being bold and merciless. Engaged against the British and Canadians at Caen, the division had been nearly destroyed, only 300 riflemen and 10 tanks remaining when it reached the safety of the Westwall in August 1944. Over the next three months, "HJ" had a high pri-ority for receiving replacements, and by 16 December it was back to full strength with 23,346 men. Some 2,000 of these replacements were from the Luftwaffe, hav-ing been hastily trained as infantry and assigned to the division during the first two weeks of November. The cadre of experienced officers and NCOs in the divi-sion was very small, and most of the staff officers were inexperienced. These defects were most apparent in the panzer grenadier regiments, which the divisional com-mander, SS Colonel Hugo Kraas, felt were not even ready for defensive duty, much less for a major attack. The divisional armored reconnaissance battalion had actu-ally only one light armored rifle company.

The real backbone of the division, the Twelfth SS Panzer Regiment, was down to one battalion, but one that was fortunate in being well-manned with seasoned veterans of all ranks. To help correct the deficiency of tanks, 560th Heavy Panz-erjäger Battalion was attached to the regiment in mid-December to act as its sec-ond battalion. The 560th was a regular Wehrmacht unit, not a member of the Waffen SS. Although it was unusual to link SS and non-SS units in this way, there is no record of difficulties in command or control of the arrangement, and some vehicles in the Twelfth SS Panzer Regt. even seem to have had mixed SS and Wehrmacht crews. The battalion was composed of heavily armored Mark IV Jagdpanzer and Mark V Jagdpanther self-propelled tank destroyers, these nontur-reted vehicles were at a distinct mobility disadvantage in an attack role, especially against the more agile American M4 Sherman tank. In addition, the mix of four types of vehicles in the panzer regiment was a logistical nightmare for the divi-sion's already overloaded support units. The panzer regiment was at 90 percent of its strength in personnel and 80 percent strength in vehicles, with thirty-nine Mark IV tanks and forty-one of the dreaded Mark V Panthers in the I Bn. and fourteen


Mark V Jagdpanthers and twenty-one Mark IV Jagdpanzers in the 560th Heavy Panzerjäger Bn. (II Bn.). The Twelfth SS Panzerjäger Bn., a battalion of self-pro-

pelled tank destroyers organic to the division, had twenty-two Jagdpanzer IV/48s at the start of the campaign. The division also had 120 armored half-tracks at its disposal, most of them in the Twenty-sixth SS Panzergrenadier Regt. (as was nor-mally the case since one of the two grenadier regiments was designed to be more mechanized than the other).

The Twelfth SS Artillery Regiment, the "HJ" Division's organic artillery support, was at a severe disadvantage in that it was comprised only of towed artillery pieces (105 and 150mm), plus a towed rocket-launcher ( n e b e l w e r f e r ) bat-talion. However, the artillery officers and staff were all veterans. The division's other technical and support units had survived the withdrawal from France intact as well.

The chief handicap to the division's mobility at the start of the Ardennes cam-paign was its lack of motorized transport. Fully 25 percent of its trucks had not been replaced after the battles in Normandy, and the Twenty-fifth SS Panzer-grenadier Regiment, which was officially motorized, had almost no motor trans-port left and was relegated largely to marching on foot. The division trains could hold no more than 300 tons, about 50 percent of its Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) capacity.

"Wacht Am Rhein"

The German Ardennes Offensive broke upon the Allies on the morning of 16 December 1944. Although the Americans were completely surprised that the Germans were even capable of mounting so large an offensive operation, the Ger-mans were, as we have seen in previous chapters, victims of overly optimistic plan-ning and an underestimation of American tenacity. While the secondary attacks of the Fifth Panzer Army and the Seventh Army to the south made stunning ini-tial progress, the Sixth Panzer Army took all day on 16 December just to clear the belt of woods to its front. By the end of the day the commander of I SS Panzer Korps felt compelled to commit the Twelfth SS Panzer Division to force its own penetration of the American line, because the Twelfth and 277th VGDs had exhausted themselves just pushing the American line back a couple of miles. Nowhere did they achieve an appreciable penetration. As a result, on 17 Decem-ber the "HJ" Division fought its way through the Krinkelter Wald to the twin vil-lages of Krinkelt-Rocherath, where it battled unsuccessfully for two more bloody days, wasting its strength trying to win the breakthrough that the grenadiers were to have achieved in the first few hours.

Finally, on 19 December, the German commanders admitted the futility of continuing to attack against an obvious American stronghold and began to shift the Twelfth SS Panzer Division to the southeast in an attempt to make an end run around the American V Corps at Bütgenbach. It took most of the next two days for the "HJ" Division to move the few miles to the assembly point at Büllingen due to the muddy forest trails it had to use because the direct route from Krinkelt

We Fight and Die Here 275

to Büllingen was still covered by American fire. The division's progress was further delayed by the heavy corps traffic on the main road from Losheimergraben.

The Twelfth SS Panzer Division had already suffered heavy losses at the twin villages where the Second and Ninety-ninth U.S. Infantry Divisions had made a heroic stand to hold that area until a more solid defense line could be established on the Elsenborn Ridge to the west. The "HJ" Division had lost two Mark IV panzers, eighteen Mark V Panthers, and one Jagdpanzer IV had been destroyed, and a further eight Panthers and two Jagdpanzer IVs had been damaged at Krinkelt-Rocherath. These losses, followed by the difficult withdrawal and displacement southeast on muddy roads in the bitter cold, meant that the SS troops were far from "fresh" when they finally began to dribble into Büllingen. But their morale was not broken; they still believed in their cause and in their own proven fighting ability and were willing to sacrifice everything, if necessary, to accomplish their assigned mission—seizure of the highway that ran from Büllingen through Büt-genbach to Liege and the Meuse. However, the delay at Krinkelt-Rocherath had allowed U.S. forces to get to Bütgenbach before them.

American Forces at Dom Bütgenbach

The First Infantry Division, nicknamed "the Big Red One" for its shoulder patch emblem, was transferred to V Corps at 2400 on 16 December to help plug the holes the Germans had torn in the U.S. lines. The Second Battalion of the Twenty-sixth Infantry Regiment, which was to defend Dom Biitgenbach, was also one of the units that had suffered heavily in the Huertgen Forest. Companies E and F, with two heavy machine gun platoons of Company H attached, had been surrounded and destroyed in the town of Merode between 30 November and 3 December. Company G was also hard hit. Two days after the division had pulled out of the forest on 7 December and moved to Aubel, Belgium, to rest, it received a wave of new replacements to fill some of the gaps. When the battalion moved to Dom Biitgenbach on 17-18 December, companies E and F were only up to 60 percent strength, with about 100 men each, and these men were 90 percent inex-perienced replacements and 10 percent hospital returnees. Company G was espe-cially weak, with only about 50 men, although only 10 to 15 percent of these were replacements, the rest veterans. The two machine gun platoons of Company H had to be completely rebuilt, and between them they could count only eight vet-eran members. In the entire Second Bn., Twenty-sixth, there were only seven officers remaining who had been with the unit on D-Day: four in the battalion HQ, three in the line. The battalion was also suffering from some equipment shortages but these were not acute. The companies had only four Browning Auto-matic Rifles (BARs) apiece, and there was a scarcity of rifle grenade launchers. All the other heavy weapons in the battalion (machine guns, mortars, bazookas, etc.) were at full strength or above. The battalion's vehicle situation was excellent since

was only short by two jeeps. In total, the Twenty-sixth Infantry Regt, had about it

2,500 men, rather than the more than 3,000 it should have had.


"We Fight and Die Here"

The American reaction to the German attacks of 16 December was swift. At 2400 on the 16th, the 254th Engineer Combat Battalion, which was bivouacked at Büllingen, an important supply center for the Second and Ninety-ninth Divi-sions, was put on two-hour alert for use as infantry. Ninety minutes later the Ninety-ninth Division G-3 called the battalion commander, warning him that the Germans had broken through the front lines and were heading down the Hons-feld-Biiliingen road. All the roads into Büllingen were blocked by light tanks and self-propelled tank destroyers, he said, and he ordered the engineers to take up a defensive line south and east of Büllingen to protect these roadblocks. After hang-ing up, the battalion commander split the engineers into two groups. The first, composed of 19 officers, 191 men, and a few trucks and bulldozers, would be the combat element forming the defense line. The second group, HQ and Service Company, was comprised of all the battalion's noncombat elements. It moved to Waimes for safety and to await further orders.

The first echelon dug in around Büllingen, where the soldiers found that in fact the road from Honsfeld was not protected by friendly tanks and TDs at all but was completely deserted. Company B stretched a thin line of fighting holes from the Riechels-Busch forest almost to the railroad embankment, covering all the roads into the town from the south. Company A set up on the southwestern slopes of a large hill called the Hohen Berg, on the eastern side of the Warche River across from Büllingen. Company C occupied the town itself. At around 0500, some of the engineers brought a sergeant from one of the tank destroyer battal-ions to the battalion CP in the town. The sergeant said he had been captured by the Germans at Honsfeld but had escaped. He warned the engineers that he had seen twelve panzers in that town and could hear more coming from the east, all heading toward Büllingen.

An hour later, the engineers saw four flares fired into the sky over their right front—blue, white, red, then white. That must have been the German signal to attack, because five minutes later the front line troops could hear vehicles moving in front of them in the foggy dark. They could not positively identify these vehi-cles as German, however, and they knew that there were still some American units in front of them somewhere, so they were hesitant to open fire. Their doubts were dispelled when they heard voices shouting in German. The lieutenant in charge of Company B ordered his men to open fire with their rifles, rifle grenades, and machine guns. The German SS panzer grenadiers, who were from SS Lt. Werner Sternebeck's Spitze, or point group, of Kampfgruppe Peiper, piled off their vehi-cles and charged the engineers. The vehicles on which they had been riding were now seen to be six SPW 251 half-tracks. In the fierce twilight combat that ensued, the Germans got to within 15 yards of the engineers' foxholes before the Ameri-cans drove them back. The half-tracks on which they had ridden withdrew into the fog rather than advancing to support the attack, probably fearing the presence of U.S. antitank guns.

The whole assault lasted only about five minutes. The German infantry pulled


back into the fog, regrouped for about twenty minutes while Sternebeck's four Mk IV panzers and some flak wagons arrived and prepared to attack, then the Ger-mans charged Company B again at about 0630. This time their tanks fired in sup-port. They lobbed a few large HE shells at the GIs, but most of the supporting fire was comprised of machine gun fire from the panzers and 20mm rounds from the flak wagons. This attack was in greater force than the previous one, but despite the fire support and the exhortations of the SS officers, the German attack with-ered under the desperate defensive fire, and the soldiers fell back again with heavy losses.

A ten-minute pause in the battle allowed the engineers to evacuate their own wounded. It was now about 0645 and getting quite light even with the fog. The Germans began their third attack, but this time Sternebeck's panzers, augmented by others from the main body of the Kampfgruppe, led the assault. They had appar-ently realized that the engineers had no heavy antitank weapons to use against them. The tanks spread out in a line abreast and overran the Company B foxholes, crush-ing two machine guns under their treads. The engineers crouched low in their fox-holes, however, and allowed the panzers to pass over them. Miraculously, only three men were injured by the passing tanks. Then the defenders scrambled back up to firing positions and poured such a heavy volume of fire into the advancing grenadiers that they fell back a third time. They had not followed the panzers closely enough. After the tanks had passed overhead, the Company B engineers used their bazookas to destroy one and immobilize two others from the rear. Many German dead were also left lying on the battlefield.

The German numbers were telling, however. By now Peiper had assembled so many of his panzergrenadiers to assault Büllingen that they were able to over-lap Company B on its exposed right flank by attacking out of the Riechels-Busch. The engineer CO reported this development to the Ninety-ninth Division CP, which ordered the battalion to withdraw to Bütgenbach after fighting a delaying action. Company C pulled back through the streets of Büllingen itself, waging a confused running battle with the Tenth Panzergrenadier Kompanie on their heels. American trucks were pulling out of town on one side as German half-tracks poured in on the other, and sometimes the two were almost side by side on the village's streets. Two Germans platoon commanders were wounded in this bitter little fight. Company C successfully disengaged and formed a new defense line north of the town. Company A had not yet been hit by the German attack, being on the other side of the river, so it remained where it was. Company B, however, had been cut off by the overrunning Germans and could not reach the road. The battalion's headquarters personnel fell back to the west and established a new, weak line along a ridge overlooking Büllingen in an effort to stop the expected German drive to Bütgenbach and Malmédy.

This line was so sparsely manned that the headquarters personnel moved from position to position to give the Germans the impression of a strongly held line with favorable defensive terrain in front of it. The engineers did not really expect this ruse to work, so they were astonished when the Germans, after refu-eling from the captured American fuel dump in Büllingen and driving about two


kilometers to Morschheck to regroup, continued going southwest toward Moder-scheid and St. Vith instead of turning north to capture Bütgenbach and the vital highway to Liege. As the Ninety-ninth Division's commander later put it, "the enemy had the key to success within his hands, but did not know it." The engi-neers were jubilant at having "deflected" the German attack, but actually Peiper had just been looping through Büllingen to avoid a bad stretch of road running more directly west out of Honsfeld.

Given time to catch their breath, by 0800 the 254th Engineers began dig-ging more permanent positions at the east end of Dom Bütgenbach, a road junc-tion between Büllingen and Bütgenbach. They were augmented by an ad hoc infantry force composed of men from the Ninety-ninth Division Headquarters and nearby antiaircraft artillery units, about fifty men in all, as well as by four towed 3-inch guns of the 612th Tank Destroyer Bn. These guns were commanded by Captain John J. Kennedy who, as ranking officer present, took command of the roadblock group. A skeleton force of engineers stayed on the ridgetop over-looking Büllingen.

At around 1000, the remnants of Sternebeck's Spitze tried to scout up the road from Büllingen to Dom Bütgenbach. Some accounts say that there were five Mk IV tanks in this force and that Kennedy's TD guns opened up on them and knocked out three of the five, the surviving two hurriedly returning to Büllingen. In fact, Sternebeck only had two Mk IVs and two half-tracks remaining, and Ger-man accounts say that his column drove from Büllingen to Dom Bütgenbach, turned left toward Morschheck, and rejoined Peiper. An American medical group was encamped at Dom Bütgenbach, and supposedly a doctor came out to surrender to Sternebeck's force, but Sternebeck waved the man aside as his vehicles rumbled toward Morschheck. Whatever the truth, Kennedy was recommended for the Sil-ver Star for his defense of the vital crossroads, and it remained in American hands throughout the day.

While the engineers were fighting to block the Büllingen-Bütgenbach high-way, unbeknownst to them, help was on the way. At 1145 on the day before, 16 December, the First Infantry Division, resting near Aubel, had gone on six-hour alert. At 0230 on 17 December, the Twenty-sixth Infantry Regiment set out for Camp Elsenborn and commitment on V Corps' southern flank, which was now wide open. Although briefly delayed by the necessity of hunting down some Ger-man paratroopers who had dropped in the division's path, the first units of the Twenty-sixth reached Camp Elsenborn by 0700 on 17 December, and the remain-der of the regiment had arrived by 0900. The Americans were told that the Ger-mans had captured the town of Büllingen at 0700 that morning, and with it a large fuel dump that the First Army had built there. Fearing that the Germans might secure the vital highway running from Büllingen through Bütgenbach to Malmédy and Liege, the Twenty-sixth quickly moved to guard the important road junction at Domane Bütgenbach, two kilometers southeast of Bütgenbach. Domane is a German word meaning a manor held by a lord, and it was just such an estate that overlooked the vital area.

Lt. Col. Derrill M. Daniel, who had a Ph.D. in entomology from Clemson,


commanded the Second Bn., Twenty-sixth Infantry, and, at age thirty-nine, he was one of the division's senior battalion commanders, having commanded a bat-talion of the Twenty-sixth since the North Africa landings in 1942. Lt. Col. Daniel drove onto the grounds of the manor house at 1300 hours on 17 December, some seven hours after KG Peiper had passed through Büllingen. By that time, Com-pany B of the 254th Engineers had worked its way out of Büllingen. Some of the men infiltrated into Hünningen where elements of the Ninety-ninth Division were holding out; the remainder joined the engineers at the Domane just as a German artillery barrage drove the American pickets off the ridge. The men of the Twenty-sixth Regt, relieved the battered engineers, who began moving back to Bütgen-bach by about 1500.

The large stone manor house known as Domane Bütgenbach with its flank-ing stone-foundation wooden barns and nearby gardens was situated in a narrow valley between two hills, one to the north (Hill 598) and one to the south (Hill 613). These hills were mostly devoid of cover except for some straight rows of tall, widely spaced spruce trees on either side of the trails crisscrossing the estate. At the top of Hill 613, almost a kilometer south of the manor, lay the edge of the Bütgenbacher Heck, a dense strip of coniferous forest. A kilometer beyond that, out of sight over the hill's crest, was the crossroads of Morschheck, which was occupied at that moment by the paratroopers of the Third Fallschirmjäger Divi-sion. The main east-west highway the Germans wanted so desperately ran south-east past the manor, dipping into another small valley about 500 meters to the east. Through this valley flowed the Schwarzenbach, or Black Creek, north toward Lac de Biitgenbach. The road rose again on the other side of the stream bed and split into two roads, both of which led into Büllingen, 2 kilometers from the Domane. Another main road led due north out of Morschheck, over the top of Hill 613, and plunged down the steep hillside to a junction with the Büllingen-Biitgenbach highway about 100 meters east of the manor house.

Taking in the terrain and its advantages and disadvantages for his defensive mission, Lt. Col. Daniel immediately set about positioning his troops. Company G went east toward Büllingen and dug in behind a row of trees running along the top of a hill on the east side of the Schwarzenbach. Company E took up positions behind similar treelines south of the manor, about halfway up the hill leading to the Bütgenbacher Heck and Morschheck. Company F moved southwest to cover the area between the other two companies, digging its foxholes on the reverse slope of a ridge scarcely half a kilometer from Morschheck. This was the same ridge-top occupied by the engineers earlier that morning. The fourth company of the Sec-ond Bn., Twenty-sixth, was Company H, the heavy weapons company. Lt. Col. Daniel parceled out its machine gun and bazooka teams among the other com-panies to stiffen the defense line, and he placed their six 81mm mortars behind Hill 598, from where they could support the whole perimeter. He held one pla-toon of Company G in reserve behind the manor house, all he could afford because of the depleted condition of his battalion.

The nature of the terrain and the fog blanketing the area compelled Lt. Col. Daniel to place his antitank assets well forward; otherwise they would not have


had sufficient visibility to support the foxhole lines. He set up three 57mm anti-tank guns covering the road running east to Büllingen and supported them with three M10 self-propelled tank destroyers mounting 3-inch guns. He sent three more AT guns to bolster the main line of resistance, or MLR, in the area of com-panies E and E Each of the 57mm guns had as part of its ammunition supply seven to ten rounds of British discarding sabot (DS) ammunition, which had been issued before D-Day. Designed originally for the British 2-pounder gun, these rounds used a disposable sleeve, or sabot, to allow them to fit in the larger Amer-ican guns. The resulting round had a lighter weight and greater velocity—about 4,200 ft/sec as compared to 2,900 ft/sec—than the normal 57mm rounds. Given this impetus, a DS round could penetrate approximately six inches (154mm) of armor at a 30 degree slope. This made the obsolescent 57mm gun a dangerous weapon again, even against the fearsome Panther tank and Jagdpanther tank destroyer, whose frontal armor was impervious to the 57's normal armor-piercing (AP) round.

Lt. Col. Daniel kept four M4 Sherman tanks around his CP as a mobile reserve and counterattack force. He set up his command post in one wing of the stone manor house. The battalion's medics set up their aid station in the house also. Companies E and H established their company command posts in the barns to the west and east of the manor house, respectively, while companies F and G colocated their CPs in a hut alongside the Büllingen road just behind their MLR. The third floor of the manor house provided good observation of the entire bat-talion sector, so the battalion observation post was located there.

Lt. Col. Daniel was not very happy with his battalion's defensive positions although they were the best that could be done under the circumstances. After the war, in a letter to the commander of his AT company, Captain Donald Rivette, Daniel wrote:

The reverse slope defense on the right flank [Company E] was just necessary. We couldn't go very far south to get on the crest of the hill because that would add sev-eral hundred yards to the MLR and I just didn't have enough men for that. Besides, if we did go to the hill we would have to curve over into the woods with the MLR and that would take even more men. So we went where I thought we had a rea-sonable chance. The hedgerow was bad, I admit it was a perfect target. But either side (north or south) of the hedgerow was even worse. If to the south, there was no concealment and each foxhole could be definitely spotted. If to the north, we would have concealment from ground observation afforded by the hedgerow, but also the hedgerow would limit our observation to a marked degree. Besides, if the line was moved far enough north to get away from fire directed at the hedgerow, the line would be too close to the CP. So we took the hedgerow, which made a reverse slope defense—no help for it.

To provide as much protection as possible for his men from the German artillery, which was expected to be intense, Lt. Col. Daniel ordered that all front-line positions, including crew-served weapons, be enhanced with overhead cover, usually in the form of wooden planks laid over the top of the foxholes. To facili-tate this, Daniel had a load of lumber trucked to the battalion from Bütgenbach.


The GIs also camouflaged their positions as well as they could with whatever mate-rials were at hand, and they piled sandbags up around the fighting pits.

The Second Bn. had finished digging in around Dom Bütgenbach by 1700 on 17 December. The Third Bn., meanwhile had moved to occupy the hilltop sec-tor between Company G and the railroad embankment that paralleled the Warche River. Its positions were as exposed as those of the Second Bn. except for a sparsely wooded patch on top of Hill 503 known as the Schwarzenbüchel. The First Bn. stayed in reserve in Bütgenbach itself. This left Second Bn.'s right flank hanging in the air, and its rear vulnerable to attack from the west or southwest.

As darkness fell by about 1830, Lt. Col. Daniel ordered each of his compa-nies to prepare one 60mm mortar to fire illumination rounds during the hours of darkness. Telephoning the regimental HQ in Bütgenbach, he also requested that the supporting artillery battalions have one howitzer each laid to fire illuminating shells every night. Regiment agreed and informed Daniel that since 1800 the Sev-enth and Thirty-second Field Artillery Battalions had established new positions from which to support the Twenty-sixth. The regiment's normal supporting artillery battalion, the Thirty-third FA Bn., had been in place since 1430. Other artillery battalions were also on the way to Elsenborn to augment the V Corps defenses. At dusk, Lt. Col. Daniel met with the commanders of his line companies in his office in the manor house. They had all heard rumors over the past two days of American soldiers giving up to the Germans or fleeing to the rear. He was deter-mined that the Second Bn., Twenty-sixth would acquit itself better than that. Although at Dom Bütgenbach the regimental combat team was effectively isolated from the rest of the division, it had fought under those conditions before at Kasser-ine in Africa and at Barrafranca in Sicily. Daniel had therefore adopted a slogan for the battalion, which he wanted passed on to every man in the outfit: "We fight and die here."

After dark, even though his men were tired from their long move and hours of digging foxholes in the cold, Lt. Col. Daniel sent patrols out to assess the sit-uation. The patrol to Büllingen soon came running back to the manor house, say-ing it had seen about 100 American prisoners in the town and over a thousand German infantrymen. Another patrol snuck up the hill to the south to establish a listening post at the edge of the Bütgenbacher Heck. Still another patrol reported a brief skirmish with Germans to the southwest of the Domane, leading to unfounded fears that the town of Weywertz, to the west of Second Bn., might have been taken. Feeling the ring of steel tighten around them, the American soldiers waited anxiously through the long winter night.

First Attack: Destruction of "Hitlerjugend's" Probe

At around 1000 hours on 18 December, after a fitful night of rest, the Sec-ond Bn., Twenty-sixth began to expand its lines to the west, trying to give more coverage to the open right flank. This was done without German interference, but it thinned Company E's line even further. The Second Bn., Twenty-sixth was now


covering a front that stretched 2,100 yards with its right flank and rear still exposed. At around 1100, the listening post at the edge of the Bütgenbacher Heck reported hearing at least six German tanks prowling around on trails inside the forest. Lt. Col. Daniel thought about calling down artillery fire on the woods, but the scouts could not pinpoint the location of the tanks, which soon drove out of earshot.

The Twelfth SS Panzer Division's Kampfgruppe Bremer, composed of the Twelfth SS Reconnaissance Bn., reached Büllingen and Morschheck shortly before noon that day. The rest of the "Hi t l e r j u g e nd" Division was either still engaged at the twin villages of Krinkelt-Rocherath or slowly moving toward the new area on the clogged roads leading west. Soon after its arrival, elements of the reconnais-sance battalion set out to investigate the state of the American defenses at Biit-genbach. This was to be the first contact between the German Twelfth SS and the American First Infantry Division.

At 1210, a small SS reconnaissance probe consisting of a single eight-wheeled armored car (probably a Sd Kfz 234) followed by a Kubelwagen, the ubiquitous German jeep, crested Hill 613 on the highway from Morschheck and began a slow descent toward the road junction near the Domane. Because of the lingering fog, the men of Company E could not identify the vehicles as American or German until they were only 200 yards south of the intersection, at which point one of the 57mm guns opened fire, quickly destroying the thin-skinned armored car and unarmored Kubelwagen. The four soldiers riding in the jeep were killed instantly,

The Defense of Dom Biitgenbach:

The First Attack

1210 Hours, 19 De c embe r 1944


as were three of the armored car's crewmen. The American soldiers nearby extri-cated the fourth German from the wreckage and carried him to the command post, where he was interrogated. He gave his unit affiliation* and said that the Ger-mans had thought the Dom Bütgenbach area to be lightly defended.

Five minutes after this skirmish, American observers reported that two truck-loads of German infantry, about twenty to thirty men, had just unloaded at the edge of Morschheck and dashed into the woods northeast of the town. Immedi-ately, American artillery and 81mm mortar fire began raining down on the forest. When the barrage lifted, an American patrol infiltrated the woods to assess the damage of the shelling. They found about twenty dead SS panzer grenadiers and ten more Germans moving back toward Morschheck carrying wounded comrades. The first encounter was over.

Second Attack

The bulk of the Twelfth SS Panzer Division began arriving and assembling in Büllingen during the night of 18 to 19 December for the new attack toward Bütgenbach. One battalion of the Twenty-fifth SS Panzergrenadier Regt. had already arrived as had a few tanks and Kampfgruppe Bremer. The rest of the divi-sion approached Büllingen via Losheim and Losheimergraben, broken into three march groups. The first of these groups to reach Büllingen was KG Kühlmann, composed of the Twelfth SS Panzer Regt. under SS Major Kühlmann, the III Bn. of the Twenty-sixth SS Panzergrenadier Regt, led by SS Captain Georg Urabl, along with that regiment's Thirteenth Kompanie of sIG 33 self-propelled infantry howitzers, and the I Bn. of the Twelfth SS Artillery Regt with towed 105mm guns. The second group was KG Müller, with the Twelfth SS Panzerjäger Bn., the Twenty-fifth SS Panzergrenadier Regt. (I Bn. and Thirteenth and Fifteenth kom-panies), II Bn., Twelfth SS Artillery Regt. (towed 105mm howitzers), under SS Major Günter Neumann, one company of the Twelfth SS Pionier (Engineer) Bn., and two companies of towed antiaircraft guns. This group also included the Oper-ations Staff of the Divisional Headquarters, minus SS Colonel Kraas and his escort, who were still directing the division's withdrawal from Krinkelt-Rocherath from their CP at Hollerath. The division executive officer would direct the attack on

Bütgenbach until Kraas arrived. The third march group was KG Krause, com-posed of the bulk of the Twenty-sixth SS Panzergrenadier Regt. (minus III Bn.), the III (towed 150mm) and IV ( N e b e l w e r f e r ) Battalions of the Twelfth SS Artillery Regt. plus the regimental HQ, the Twelfth SS Flak Bn., and the rest of the Twelfth SS Pionier Bn.

*The Twenty-sixth Infantry Regt. After Action Report and Twenty-sixth Infantry Regt. Journal claim he said he was from the First SS Panzer Division. While it is possible that these vehicles were strag-glers from Peiper's column, it is unlikely since the head of that column was already some miles to the west by this time. It is more likely that the officers interrogating him misunderstood and confused the Twelfth SS PzD with the First, or that the man himself was confused, since the "HJ " division had been originally formed from a cadre of the "Leibstandarte."


While the Twelfth SS Panzer Division was moving into Büllingen, the Amer-icans at Dom Bütgenbach continued to dig in and strengthen their defensive posi-tions. At the same time, they called down harassing artillery fire on likely German assembly areas in Büllingen and the Bütgenbacher Heck. At 2350 on 18 Decem-ber the Second Bn., Twenty-sixth received a shipment of 100 antitank mines, which they immediately laid to block the roads leading to the Domane from Büllingen and Morschheck.

During the evening and night of 18 to 19 December, all four of the First Division's artillery battalions had moved into place, along with a battery of 90mm antiaircraft guns, a corps artillery battalion with 155mm howitzers, another with 4.5-inch guns, a battery of 8-inch guns, and a battalion of 4.2-inch chemical mor-tars.

At around 2320, Company K of Third Bn., Twenty-sixth reported hearing vehicle noises inside Büllingen. This was the sound of III Bn., Twenty-sixth SS Panzergrenadier Regt. of Kampfgruppe Kühlmann, assembling for a reconnaissance in force toward Bütgenbach. The SS panzergrenadiers had relieved the men of the Twelfth VGD who had been holding the town, and the volksgrenadiers crossed the Warche to rejoin their comrades on the Hohen Berg for an attack on Wirtzfeld. After establishing the battalion CP, reconnaissance patrols from the III Bn., Twenty-sixth, advanced out of town and fanned out toward the Schwarzenbüchel, Dom

The Defense of Dom

Biitgenbach: The Second Attack

0225 Hours, 19 December 1*44


Bütgenbach, Morschheck, and into the Riechels-Busch. The latter two patrols encountered elements of the Third FJ Division who despite having been in the area for two days had no information concerning American defenses in the area The patrol to the Schwarzenbüchel ran into strong defensive fire from the Third Bn., Twenty-sixth, and withdrew into Büllingen. The bulk of the reconnaissance force, consisting of twelve jagdpanzers of the 560th Heavy Panzerjäger Bn. and twenty half-tracks and trucks carrying 200-300 infantry, headed southwest out of Büllingen down the road to Morschheck. At 0225, after going about one kilo-meter, most of the half-tracks and trucks stopped and the infantry disembarked, forming up into two assault columns behind the jagdpanzers, which then set off in a northwesterly direction toward Dom Bütgenbach. This preparation occurred about 700 yards in front of Company F's positions. A smaller force of half-tracks drove straight down the main road toward the Domane, where two of them were destroyed by antitank fire in front of the American MLR.

To stop the main thrust from the southeast, the commander of Company F immediately called for prearranged artillery concentrations to be fired on the advancing Germans. He also ordered his 60mm mortars to fire illuminating rounds over the area. The Thirty-third FA Bn. responded immediately, firing salvos of HE, white phosphorus, and starshells. This barrage hit two of the infantry trucks on the road, and their burning hulks helped illuminate the battlefield and silhouet-ted the approaching Germans. The right-hand column of the German double attack, consisting of five jagdpanzers with accompanying infantry, was stopped cold by the combination of artillery, mortars, small arms, and antitank fire. The other prong, seven jagdpanzers strong with one or two companies of infantry, fared only marginally better. Some of the jagdpanzers became mired in the swampy low ground even before reaching the American lines; others were discouraged by the heavy bazooka and antitank fire. The grenadiers were completely pinned down and failed to reach the American lines. However, three of the jagdpanzers ran the gaunt-let of the American fire and broke through Company E's positions. They got onto the Morschheck road leading to the Domane and headed for the battalion CP. See-ing this, the Second Bn., Twenty-sixth, duty officer urgently requested that 155mm artillery be fired on the jagdpanzers since 105mm rounds were too small to affect them. The Fifth FA Bn.'s howitzers responded right away, and they were soon joined by two battalions of the V Corps' heavy artillery.

By this time the jagdpanzers had reached the outskirts of the Domane and had wounded five or six GIs with HE fire from their main guns. The 155mm artillery shells falling dangerously close to the battalion CP in the manor house had the desired effect of chasing the German vehicles off. They turned around and headed back out through the American foxhole line, at which point two of the three were disabled either by artillery, tank destroyer, antitank gun, or bazooka fire. Their crews bailed out and ran for the safety of the German lines.

By 0325, an hour after it had begun, the first serious German effort to cap-ture Bütgenbach had been repulsed. The grenadiers and remaining vehicles with-drew into Büllingen, but they were able to recover some of their damaged or bogged down vehicles using the darkness and thick fog as cover. At daylight, two patrols


from Company F ventured into the attack area and counted over 100 German dead, three destroyed jagdpanzers, and four destroyed trucks, three of them over-turned by the force of the artillery blasts. A relative calm settled over the bat-tlefield, but it did not last long.

Third Attack: The Vise

Following the hour-long German attack in the predawn darkness of 19 December, Colonel John F. R. Seitz, commander of the Twenty-sixth Infantry, began moving elements of his First Bn. out of reserve positions in Bütgenbach. Company B dug in along the north side of the Büllingen-Bütgenbach road between the town and the Domane. Soon after that, Company A moved to new positions 1,000 yards south of Biitgenbach to tie in with Company B. This had the added benefit of guarding Second Bn.'s open right flank, and by 0500 the gap between the two battalions was reduced to 600 yards. Company B would cover this gap by fire during the daytime and establish outposts there at night.

At about 0630, shortly after daylight, the Germans began shelling the Sec-ond Bn.'s positions with artillery and mortar fire. Not heavy at first, the barrage gradually increased in intensity throughout the morning. By 1000 it reached its peak strength, which was maintained until 1010 when the second German attack of the day hit the American positions from south and east.

The first force came out of Morschheck, over the crest of Hill 613 and down the road to the Domane. Leading the attack was a German eight-wheeled armored car, probably an Sd Kfz 234/3, with a turret-mounted 75mm gun. Following closely behind was a large armored vehicle. Contemporary accounts claim this sec-ond vehicle was a Mark V Panther tank, but the only Panthers in Twelfth SS Panzer Division were in I Bn. of Twelfth SS Panzer Regt., which was still on its way to Büllingen from Krinkelt-Rocherath. This second vehicle was probably from the Twelfth SS Panzerjäger Bn. of KG Müller, and was almost certainly a Jagdpanzer lV/48. Together, these vehicles protected the advance of a company of SS infantry, who were probably from III Bn., Twenty-sixth SS Panzergrenadier Regt. Because of the heavy fog blanketing the area, the American gun crews let the Germans approach to within 100 yards of their positions in order to increase the chances of a hit on the vehicles and to confirm their identity as enemy.

The men of the Second Gun Squad, Second Platoon of the Regimental Anti-Tank Company had just finished setting up their 57mm gun on the MLR a few minutes before the attack, and now they drew a bead on the approaching vehi-cles. On command, they began firing the gun as quickly as they could reload it, hammering out three armor-piercing (or possibly discarding sabot) rounds in a few seconds. The first two shells were aimed at the jagdpanzer, which, being the most heavily armed and armored of the two vehicles, was the greater threat. Both rounds struck the jagdpanzer, and damaged it enough so that it was forced to limp back up the hill to its own lines. But the AT gun's muzzle flashes had given away its location, and the armored car swung its turret to fire at the gun. Armored car

J We Fight and Die Here 287

and AT gun fired simultaneously. The American 57mm shell struck the armored car and destroyed it instantly. However, the German 75mm shell also found its mark, destroying the AT gun and killing two members of its crew, Cpl. Hale Williams and Pfc. Richard Wollenberg. Another crewman was blinded by the blast, and another would have to be evacuated because of battle fatigue.

The German advance from Morschheck now ground to a halt because the grenadiers could not advance against the deadly American artillery and small arms fire without armored support. The commanding officer of Company E, Captain Pierre Stepanian, called in artillery and 81mm mortar fire on the exposed Germans, and almost the entire company was slaughtered before the American foxholes. Some of the artillery rounds fell within 50 yards of the American positions. Those few SS troops who were able to stumble back into the Bütgenbacher Heck were ambushed and killed by the men of the American listening post still hiding just inside the forest's edge.

Twenty minutes after the start of the southern attack, the Germans launched another assault westward out of Büllingen. This time they employed between four and eight of the huge jagdpanzers and an infantry force reckoned to be at least a company and possibly a battalion, probably those elements of III Bn., Twenty-sixth SS Panzergrenadier Regt. that had not taken part in the southern attack. This force advanced along the secondary road running parallel to and north of the main Büllingen-Bütgenbach road, perhaps because they now knew that the Americans

The Defense of Dom

Biitgenbach: The Third Attack

1010 Hours, 19 December 1944


had mined the main road. Again, because of the fog, the Americans allowed the SS troops to approach close to their positions. The GIs could catch glimpses of the grenadiers through the fog, seeing them deployed in perfect attack formation behind the jagdpanzers. When the Germans had come within about 100 yards from the American line, the leading SS officer called out for the Americans to sur-render. The Americans answered him with a hail of fire. All the small arms of com-panies F and G, as well as bazookas, tank destroyers, and the two AT guns cover-ing the east-west road opened fire. These latter destroyed the two leading jagdpanzers, and again the German advance halted.

The grenadiers began to fall back after an hour, unable to penetrate the Amer-ican perimeter on either side. At about 1100, they again withdrew into Büllingen. Further attacks would have to wait for the arrival of more of the panzergrenadiers. The Germans were also running short on ammunition because the muddy roads were delaying the supply units. Under increasing time pressure to break through the American defense and open the highway to Malmédy, the "Hitlerjugend' Divi-sion had to content itself with artillery harassment of Dom Bütgenbach for the rest of 19 December.

KG Kühlmann Attacks

Throughout 19 December elements of the Twelfth SS Panzer Division strag-gled into Büllingen, hampered by the muddy, clogged roads and tired from two days of hard fighting at Krinkelt-Rocherath. At some point during the afternoon the rocket-launcher (Neb e lw e r f e r ) battalion of the Twelfth SS Artillery Regt. arrived and fired at least one barrage of rockets at the Second Bn., Twenty-sixth, positions at Dom Bütgenbach; the other three artillery battalions kept up a light but steady rain of shells throughout the day.

Under pressure to attack quickly to seize Bütgenbach and open Rollbahn C, SS Colonel Kraas reorganized Kampfgruppe Kühlmann to include the tanks of I Bn., Twelfth SS Panzer Regt.; the entire Twenty-sixth SS Panzergrenadier Regt.; the jagdpanzers of the 560th Heavy Panzerjäger Bn.; and the II Bn., Twelfth SS Artillery Regt. of towed 105mm howitzers. This force assembled and set out at 2310 on 19 December under cover of darkness to mount a concentrated attack on the American positions east of Dom Bütgenbach. The III Bn., Twenty-sixth SS, secured the assembly area in the west section of Büllingen and pushed a screen of scouts forward while the I Bn., Twenty-sixth SS, and the jagdpanzers of the 560th Heavy Panzerjäger Bn. moved down both sides of the Büllingen-Bütgenbach high-way. The force took a wrong turn, however, and got lost in the darkness. It ended up south of the Domane near Morschheck at about 0150, and Captain Stepanian of Company E, Second Bn., Twenty-sixth, again called upon the U.S. First Divi-sion's supporting artillery to blast the German column. The Fifth, Thirty-third, and 955th FA Bn.s as well as one 90mm battery from the 4l4th AAA Bn. and a battery of 8-inch guns answered the call, and the resulting ten-minute barrage knocked out two of the 560th's Jagdpanzer IV/48s. It was some time before the


Kampfgruppe could turn around and reassemble in its proper starting area. Finally, at 0330 on 20 December, the Germans neared the Americans' eastern perimeter.

Just before reaching the American lines, the Kampfgruppe split into three columns. The northernmost force, a company of Jagdpanthers and some infantry of III Bn., Twenty-sixth SS Panzergrenadier Regt., had the task of clearing the troops of the Third Bn., Twenty-sixth Infantry, from the Schwarzenbüchel on Hill 503 in order to protect the attack's flank; it succeeded in occupying the southern part of the hill, but the attack stalled, and the grenadiers there were locked in combat for hours with the American infantry along the treeline.

The center group rolled due west down the highway for a clash with Com-pany F, which had been alerted by the sounds of battle on Hill 503. The com-mander of the lead Jagdpanzer was struck in the head and killed by an American bullet before his vehicle reached the foxhole line. His driver, panicking, quickly threw the vehicle in reverse before it could be hit by antitank fire and rammed into the following Jagdpanzer. Despite the snarl this caused, the attackers pressed on, and heavy combat ensued between the Americans of Company F and the Ger-mans of II Bn., Twenty-sixth SS. One of the M10 self-propelled tank destroyers of the 634th TD Bn. was in this area, near the Company F CP, and could have been of great value in fighting off the German thrust, but in the confusion of the battle the crew thought themselves surrounded, disabled their vehicle, and fled toward the battalion CP at the Domane.

The Defense of Dom Biitgenbach:

KG Kuhlmann Attacks

0330 Hours, I 20 December 1944


The leftmost German force enjoyed the most success. A company of Jagdpanzer IV/48s accompanied by infantry from the I Bn., Twenty-sixth SS encountered a belt of American mines across the road a hundred yards or so in front of the MLR, so they swung southwest off the main road and headed for the seam between companies E and F using unpaved trails along the hillsides. The Germans skirted just south of the head of the Schwarzenbach Creek, but several of the 45-ton jagdpanzers became mired in the soft mud, some up to their rear decks. Five of the jagdpanzers from First Kompanie managed to make it up the hill and through the American foxhole line, but the grenadiers were again checked by the heavy American small arms and artillery fire. Once through the MLR, the jagdpanzers turned around briefly to spray the American positions from the rear with machine gun and HE fire. This fire knocked out some of the 57mm guns and caused casualties among the infantry, destroying three bazooka teams and a machine gun section of four or five men from Company H, but it also aided in further pin-ning the German infantry on the other side of the MLR. After a few minutes the jagdpanzers turned northwest to continue their mission of breaking through to the Domane, leaving the grenadiers and GIs to fight it out in the heaviest com-bat the regiment had ever seen. The smoke of battle added to the fog, further obscuring visibility, and several German Panzerfaust teams were able to get close enough to knock out the American AT guns with their rockets. German artillery and mortar fire continued to crash down on the American positions throughout the battle. The Germans captured several American soldiers in the fighting, and when they were interrogated later, the Germans learned for the first time that they were facing the Twenty-sixth Regiment of the First Division.

The five jagdpanzers of First Kompanie pushed on alone, driving through the American rear area to within 100 yards of the manor house, where they began firing their 75mm guns directly into the building. However, without their sup-porting infantry they were vulnerable to close combat tactics. American bazooka teams set out to hunt the jagdpanzers among the buildings of the Domane and knocked out two of them. The other three vehicles chose to withdraw and headed for the road to Morschheck. After they passed through the MLR, however, the crews of the American AT guns in the Company E sector were able to spot the vehicles' exhaust flashes through the smoke and fog, and destroyed two more jagdpanzers in short order.

Fearing that his infantry line was in danger of collapse from the enormous pressure being exerted by the panzergrenadiers, Lt. Col. Daniel committed his battalion reserve, the platoon from Company G, to counterattack and restore the MLR in the Company F area. He also called the regimental CP in Bütgenbach and requested a company from First Bn., which was too far west to be hit by the German attack. Colonel Seitz approved, and sent Company C to the Second Bn. area at once. Daniel forwarded two platoons to reinforce Company F, which was being badly chewed up, and kept two platoons as his new battalion reserve.

Meanwhile, in the center of the highway the battle still raged. Three of the giant jagdpanzers broke through the foxhole line and engaged the American tanks and SP TDs along the ridgeline on the southern part of Hill 503. The American


armor pounded away at the German vehicles until they were either destroyed or retreated back through the MLR. Two Sherman tanks and an M10 TD were knocked out in this action. Further north, some German armor also closed with the GIs of the Third Bn. in the Schwarzenbüchel, but the Company I men took out some with their bazookas, tanks, and tank destroyers while 155mm salvos knocked out others. Heavy machine gun fire from Company L helped keep the panzergrenadiers from advancing into the Schwarzenbüchel.

The German attack petered out by 0530. Their artillery fire continued hit-ting the American lines even as the panzergrenadiers and jagdpanzers pulled back into Büllingen. It had been a near thing, to say the least. By the end of the attack, only seventeen rounds of bazooka ammunition were left in all of Second Bn., and the bazooka teams were reduced to scrounging odd rocket rounds from the crews of the AT Company's 57mm guns. The German artillery had cut wire communi-cations with the regiment early in the morning, and the Second Bn. had lost radio contact as well during the fighting. The MLR was in a shambles, desperately in need of repair, and Lt. Col. Daniel was urgently calling for more mines to help block the German advance routes. He only had the two platoons from Company C for a battalion reserve. Another attack might cause the whole American defense around Dom Bütgenbach to collapse.

The Twelfth SS Panzer Division had suffered another bloody nose as well. At least twelve jagdpanzers had been destroyed or damaged in the morning's attack, and the panzergrenadier battalions had suffered heavy casualties. As the remnants of the attacking force withdrew into Büllingen, SS Colonel Kraas immediately regrouped them for a second assault, hoping the Americans would crack before his men did. This time, the attack from Büllingen would be supported by a simul-taneous attack from Morschheck.

The Fifth Attack: The Heroism of Corporal Warner

SS Colonel Kraas launched his second attack within thirty minutes, sending a force of ten tanks westward out of Büllingen and eight jagdpanzers north from Morschheck. This time, the two remaining tank destroyers and three AT guns cov-ering Company F were ready, and as the German tanks crested the small ridge about 300 yards in front of Company F, advancing in single file, the concentrated fire from the American pieces knocked out all ten, one by one. Again, the American artillery and small arms fire pinned down the supporting grenadiers, and the attack on the left flank of the Second Bn., Twenty-sixth, accomplished nothing.

At the same time, the jagdpanzers of Ninth Kompanie, 560th Heavy Panz-erjäger Bn., rolled down the hill out of Morschheck, fanning out a bit to cover more of the American line. The platoon of Company G that Lt. Col. Daniel had committed earlier was practically annihilated by the German tank fire, but the heavy American defensive artillery fire kept the German infantry from overrun-ning the survivors and deflected the advance of the jagdpanzers. As the armor approached the MLR, a shell from somewhere struck the Ninth Kompanie


commander's Mark V Jagdpanther, setting it on fire. He managed to turn the vehi-cle around and drive it back into Morschheck, where he commandeered the Eleventh Kompanie's command vehicle and returned to the battle. While he was gone, his panzer force was further whittled down by the American defenses. Artillery fire destroyed or immobilized three of the jagdpanzers even before they reached the American lines. The commander of one of the 57mm AT gun crews, Sgt. Stanley Oldenski, saw some of the panzers trying to break through the MLR to his right (west), and sent out some members of his gun crew armed with a bazooka to try to secure that flank. The GIs on the right flank later claimed to have knocked out one German panzer with their bazooka, but the claim was never verified.

Sgt. Oldenski could also see gun flashes from two more of the German tank destroyers about 75 yards to his left. With Oldenski acting as loader, his gunner, Cpl. Henry "Red" Warner, began firing DS shells at the Germans. He put four rounds into the first jagdpanzer, destroying it. Then he hit another one with one round, stopping it, but he fired three more rounds into the hulk to make sure it was dead. (This firing of "insurance" rounds was standard procedure among Amer-ican AT and TD gun crews.) On Warner's final shot, however, the AT gun's breech block jammed and the gun would not return to battery. As Warner struggled to fix the weapon, a third jagdpanzer appeared out of the mist, approaching straight toward his gun and firing its bow machine gun. The rest of the crew dove into the nearby foxholes for cover, but Warner continued wrestling with the jammed gun.

The Defense of Dom

Bütgenbach: The fifth Attack

0600 Hours, 20 December 1944


Unable or unwilling to fire his guns at the American weapon, the German tank commander apparently decided to just run over it. He stood up and poked his head out of the hatch to direct the vehicle's movement. When the panzer was about 10 yards away from the gun, Warner gave up trying to fix it, pulled his .45-cal pis-tol and fired blindly at the panzer commander, then dove into the slit trench dug between the gun trails. Warner heard the tank race its engine and speed toward him, as he fully expected to be crushed by it. When it was a few feet from the AT gun, however, the jagdpanzer stopped, went into reverse, and backed away at full speed. Warner, incredulous, peeked out from his trench and saw the German tank commander slumped half out of the hatch, apparently killed by one of his pistol shots.

Soon the Germans were again in retreat, and thanks to the voluminous fire of four American artillery battalions, no German infantry had been able to pen-etrate the MLR. By 0800 the attack was over, and although the Germans contin-ued to launch smaller infantry attacks every four or five hours until nightfall, these were easily repulsed. For the rest of the day the front-line troops continued to improve their defensive positions and lay protective minefields. Lt. Col. Daniel also strengthened Company E's line by attaching to it one of the Company C rifle platoons.

At around 1300 on 20 December, regiment pulled the Third AT Platoon of the regimental AT Company out of the line in the Third Bn.'s sector in the Schwarzenbüchel and sent it with its four 57mm AT guns to replace the gun losses suffered by the Second Bn. in the morning's attack. This made a total of eight AT guns in the battalion's MLR. The Third Platoon dug in its guns in the soft earth behind the hedgerow of poplar trees running to the west in the Company E sec-tor. They fully expected another German tank attack, knowing how important the highway behind them was to the German commanders. They also knew that the gunshields on their guns, made of %-inch thick steel, would stop bullets but were useless against tank rounds.

In Büllingen and Morschheck, the Germans were worriedly counting their losses. When the unit reassembled later in the day, the 560th Heavy Panzerjäger Bn. found that it had only three battleworthy Jagdpanthers and ten Jagdpanzer IV/48s left. These were consolidated into a single company for the next attack, scheduled for 21 December, and the vehicles were sent to Büllingen for repairs, refueling, and replenishment of ammunition. Once there, however, the American shelling of the town was so heavy that the vehicles had to pull back another two kilometers, to the hamlet of Tiefenbach, to complete their replenishment.

High Water Mark

Time was running out for the Twelfth SS Panzer Division. American forces had closed in behind KG Peiper thirty kilometers to the west, and Peiper's armored battlegroup was surrounded and being cut to pieces by American counterattacks. Two U.S. armored divisions, the Seventh and Ninth, and parts of the 106th and


Twenty-eighth Infantry Divisions were still clinging to St. Vith in the south. After almost a week of heavy fighting, none of the roads assigned to carry "Hitlerju-gend" to the Meuse had been opened. Worse yet, the Americans grew stronger daily as they mobilized more reserves while each day more broken panzers littered the hillsides around Dom Biitgenbach.

Accordingly, SS Colonel Kraas prepared for an all-out attack with all three of his available grenadier battalions, to be supported by every operational tank and tank destroyer in his division. He planned to attack with two battalions abreast out of the Bütgenbacher Heck, the III Bn., Twenty-fifth SS on the left supported by the remaining panzers and jagdpanzers of the Twelfth SS Panzer Regt., and the II Bn., Twenty-sixth SS on the right, reinforced by the jagdpanzers of the Twelfth SS Panzerjäger Bn. The armored infantry of the III Bn., Twenty-sixth SS, would be kept in reserve in the forest, to be used to exploit a breakthrough by attacking in conjunction with the tanks of the Twelfth SS Panzer Regt, to seize Bütgenbach. The axis of the attack was to carry the attackers south and then west of Dom Biit-genbach, bypassing the stubborn defenders there and cutting them off by captur-ing Bütgenbach behind them. Once that town was occupied, blocking forces would push across the railroad embankment north of town to stop any American coun-terattack from the north. Supporting the attack were all four battalions of the divi-sion's organic artillery: I Bn. (105mm) at Büllingen, II Bn. (105mm) and lV Bn. (Nebelwerfer) in Hünningen, and III Bn. (150mm) south of Honsfeld. The start-ing time for the attack was 0340 hours on 21 December.

The II Bn., Twenty-sixth SS Panzergrenadier Regt., set out from Hünnin-gen to its assembly area in the Riechels-Busch at 2300 hours on 20 December. The sound of its movement was masked by a light but steady artillery barrage of the American positions around the Domane. Most of the other units scheduled to attack reached their assembly areas on time, and at 0300 the four artillery bat-talions began a massive bombardment of the American positions using all the guns, mortars, and rocket launchers at their disposal. This barrage was by far the worst the defenders at Dom Biitgenbach had experienced in the whole war, and its effects were telling. The front line troops suffered one-third to one-half casualties, most of whom were still lying unevacuated in their foxholes when the German attack began. Many weapons were destroyed by direct hits. All wire communications between units were cut, and even some of the radios, which so far had been used fairly successfully for backup communications, were damaged by the concussions. The shelling disabled the two M4s north and northwest of the manor house, part of the battalion's mobile reserve, as well as the M10 tank destroyer near the east barn of the manor. Both the east and west barns were set on fire. The west barn soon burned down to its stone foundation, forcing the Company H CP there to move into the east barn with the Company E CP. The Nebelwerfer salvos were par-ticularly devastating: ninety-six rockets landing in one earth-wrenching blast. Before long, all that was left of the American MLR were isolated groups of infantry and AT guns separated by wide undefended gaps.

In the manor house, Lt. Col. Daniel could do nothing while his battalion was being shredded. As yet, no German tanks or infantry had appeared, so he had


no targets for his artillery. Instead, in addition to pressing for more counterbat-tery fire in hopes of lessening the German barrage, he called down concentrations on likely German assembly areas in Büllingen and in the Bütgenbacher Heck. He recalled later that between four and twelve battalions of artillery fired in support of his battalion that day; in fact there were at least ten battalions involved, includ-ing battalions from the Second and Ninety-ninth Divisions that were tied into the First Division's fire control center. Patrols later found about 200 dead Germans in the woods in front of Company E, testimony to the disruption this must have caused the German attack.

The American artillery was not the only problem the German attack faced that morning. By 0330, ten minutes before the scheduled attack time, all the attacking units were in their designated assembly areas except II Bn., Twenty-sixth SS, which had set out from Hünningen four and a half hours earlier. The battal-ion staff tried urgently to establish radio contact with any of the companies, and when that failed, the battalion adjutant and ordnance officer set out in a Kubel-wagen to find them. Meanwhile SS Colonel Kraas, in his division CP in Morschheck, ordered the attack delayed until 0430 so the missing battalion could be found. The artillery barrage against the Americans slackened but did not stop completely.

The " H i t l e r j u g e n d " Division had still not located its missing battalion by 0430. Now SS Colonel Kraas was worried that the attack might not get started until dawn, at which time his troops would have to undergo flanking fire from the American positions at the Domane while trying to bypass that position. There-fore, he altered the attack plan and ordered that after all units had assembled, they would converge on Dom Bütgenbach from east and west and advance to Bütgen-bach only after the estate had been secured.

At 0530, the Sixth Kompanie of the II Bn., Twenty-sixth SS, was finally located. The battalion had mistakenly assembled about a kilometer west of its assigned area. It was quickly ushered to its proper position and acquainted with the new attack plan. The renewed German artillery bombardment reached a crescendo while the SS troops moved out of the forest around Morschheck at 0625, almost three hours behind schedule.

When the German artillery ceased its barrage, an eerie silence descended over the battlefield. The American AT gun crews, who had been huddling in their trenches for three hours listening to shell fragments clang off their gunshields, crawled shakily out of their holes, relieved to find their guns still intact. At the far western end of the American line, S.Sgt. Noah Collier, commander of one of the 57s of the Third Platoon, AT Company, told his crew, "Load sabot. Hold your fire until you can get a flank shot at about twenty feet." Soon the men heard the squeaking of tank treads and shouts in German.

After leaving Morschheck, the panzers and half-tracks of "Hitlerjugend" had no room to spread out and deploy in proper attack formation until they had passed the northeastern corner of the Bütgenbacher Heck, so for a brief interval they had to travel in column almost parallel to the American front line. At first they received no fire of any kind from the tree-lined hedgerows where they knew the American


positions to be. They suspected (or hoped) that after the previous day's attack the Americans had little or no antitank defense left. To relieve the oppressive silence and possibly to suppress any Americans still left, the tank crews fired a few machine gun bursts into the treeline, 150 meters to their right. This terrain feature was at the limit of their visibility in the fog and darkness, and the Americans were, indeed, waiting there for the Germans. The lead Panther of the attack column, commanded by SS 1st Lt. Schnittenhelm, had just reached the protruding square patch of the Bütgenbacher Heck when one of the American 57mm AT guns fired, striking the Panther in the right flank and detonating its ammunition. The tank was flung into the air by the force of the explosion and a huge mushroom cloud of oily black smoke enveloped the tank. Two of the crew clambered out of the wreck, but SS 1st Lt. Schnittenhelm was not one of them.

Captain Hils of the 560th Heavy Panzerjäger Bn., following behind in his Jagdpanther, was now in command, and over his vehicle's radio he ordered his forces to turn toward the American line and prepare to attack. He examined his map once more to orient himself and then fired a flare toward the manor house to indi-cate the final attack direction. The men in the other panzers and jagdpanzers awaited the signal to advance, "Marsch! Marsch!' but when no such signal was given after a few moments, they turned back to see Hils' Jagdpanther on fire, his crew abandoning the vehicle. Hils himself was nowhere to be seen. Unnerved by the loss of two commanders in such a short time, the Germans advanced raggedly, and as soon as the panzers and half-tracks full of infantry came in full view of the MLR, a terrific defensive artillery barrage began plunging into the formation, plowing up the hillside and devastating the exposed German foot infantry.

Despite the American bombardment, the young SS grenadiers in their camouflage smocks charged the American line, yelling and firing their weapons. Behind the treeline, Sgt. Collier picked up a BAR left by two wounded infantry-men near his gun and began spraying the onrushing Germans. Another member of his gun crew, Pfc. Donald Rose, fired his Ml carbine into the attackers also. As they rushed from the woods, the Germans were in a line almost perpendicular to the American MLR, so Pfc. Rose and Sgt. Collier were in an excellent position to fire into the attackers' flank. So intent were they on holding back the grenadiers that they almost did not notice the jagdpanther looming out of the fog to the left of their AT gun. Rose quickly dropped his carbine to assist the gunner, Cpl. Irwin Schwartz, in taking out the behemoth. Schwartz fired the already loaded sabot round, which struck the jagdpanther's left front drive sprocket. This caused the left track to jam and the vehicle's forward motion made it skid around one hun-dred and eighty degrees. Rose loaded another sabot round, and Schwartz fired again into the jagdpanther's now exposed right flank. A tongue of yellow flame shot out of the vehicle and it ground to a halt, burning furiously. The nearby grenadiers were now so close, despite Collier's withering fire, that Rose and Schwartz were compelled to pick up their carbines and add their fire to his. After a few minutes, they saw a Mark IV panzer driving along the woodline to their front. They reloaded and fired the 57 three times in rapid succession, and the panzer stopped with smoke pouring from it.


Once again taking up their carbines, Pfc. Rose and Cpl. Schwartz moved about 10 feet down the line to support Sgt. Collier and his BAR. As they did so, one of the grenadiers fired a Panzerfaust whose rocket struck their gun and knocked it off its pintle. With no gun to man, they remained on the MLR for over an hour, firing and throwing hand grenades, until they ran out of rifle ammunition. Dur-ing that time, Sgt. Collier dashed out in front of the MLR to help a wounded GI even though he himself was wounded in the leg. He disappeared into the fog and was never seen again.

About 150 meters to the east, another Third AT Platoon gun crew was also hard pressed. As the German tanks rolled down the hill from the forest, the gun squad leader, Sgt. Kolar, rousted his men from their foxholes and readied their gun for action. Two panzers appeared together out of the fog, heading straight for their gun. Kolar fired at the nearest of the two. His shell hit and penetrated, and the crew reloaded and fired again to make sure of killing the tank. Just as this second shot struck the panzer a burst of machine gun fire from the other tank hit the AT gun as it was returning to battery and disabled it. His crew now bereft of their gun, Kolar snatched up a bazooka and with one of his crewmen crawled out into the fog to hunt down the other panzer. Both men were wounded and captured by the Germans.

The third gun of Third Platoon, AT Company, was another 200 meters or so to the east of Kolar's gun, at the intersection of the long east-west hedgerow and a north-south trail leading directly to the Domane. This gun, commanded by

The Defense of Dom Biitgenbach: High Water Mark

0630 -1600 Hours , 21 December 1944


Joseph Harris, pointed southwest rather than south in order to cover the whole western part of Company E's line and fire into the flank of any tanks advancing from the Bütgenbacher Heck. Harris, a corporal, was one of only three men of the gun's ten-man crew not killed or wounded by the terrible German artillery bar-rage that morning. No sooner did the shelling stop than Harris, climbing out of his foxhole, dimly saw a tank through the fog to his right, about halfway between his gun and Kolar's. While he and his two remaining crew members were loading their AT gun, the tank fired, lobbing a huge HE shell down the hill toward the manor house. As the gun's muzzle blast briefly parted the haze, Harris could see that the vehicle was not really a tank at all, but a self-propelled 150mm infantry howitzer on an old Mark II panzer chassis, known as the Sd Kfz 121, or sIG 33. This vehicle's armor was very thin, only 20mm thick at best. Harris fired the AT gun four times, enough to set the sIG on fire. The AT Company commander, Captain Rivette, examined these hits two days later and found all four to be within a two-foot circle.

While so engaged, however, Harris's crew failed to notice a Mark IV tank slowly moving up to their left. The panzer fired an AP round that detonated against the gunshield and rent open the AT gun's barrel just above the breech block. The force of the impact also blew the gun off its pintle. Stunned by the explosion, Har-ris and his two men were overwhelmed and captured by the storming SS grenadiers a few moments later.

This incident did not go unnoticed by Cpl. Red Warner, who had knocked out two panzers and driven off a third one with his pistol the previous day. His gun was still guarding the north-south trail paralleling the main Morschheck-Dom Bütgenbach road, about 50 meters east of Harris's gun. Since his assistant gunner (and apparently also Sgt. Oldenski) had already been wounded, Warner loaded the AT gun himself and fired at the panzer that had destroyed Harris's gun. His shell struck the Mark IV just in front of its right rear idler wheel and smoke began to pour from the rear of the tank. The panzer was immobilized, but it still had power. As Warner reached for another shell, the tank cranked its turret around and fired a burst from its coaxial machine gun just as Warner was slamming his second shell into the breech. He was hit and died moments later, still trying to close his gun's breech. For his heroism in the defense of Dom Bütgenbach, Warner was posthumously awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor.

Having destroyed or neutralized all the AT guns west of the Morschheck road, the surviving German panzers proceeded to drive up and down the MLR, crushing automatic weapons emplacements and their crews and machine gunning the American soldiers. At one point a panzer drove through a gap in the 500-yard-long hedgerow. The tank commander climbed out of his turret hatch and dropped to the ground, forcing an American soldier out of his foxhole and into the tank at gunpoint. Some of the GIs still manning their foxholes in the eastern portion of Company E's line heard pistol shots, and they assumed that the SS were method-ically shooting the American wounded and prisoners, rumors of the Malmédy massacre and other atrocities at Krinkelt-Rocherath and Honsfeld having already filtered down to the men at Dom Bütgenbach.


As soon as they crossed to the north side of the treeline, the attacking panz-ers were taken under fire by the Sherman tank stationed at the southeast corner of the barnyard and by the two M4s on the slope of Hill 598 north of the manor house. At around 0800, eight Mark lV panzers of Fifth Kompanie, I Bn., Twelfth SS Panzer Regt., made a dash for the manor house, but one was destroyed and another one damaged by the two Shermans around the CP. Those Shermans in turn were destroyed by the panzers' return fire. Three of the German tanks veered northeast and wound up in the Third Bn.'s sector, where they were eventually destroyed by the AT guns and bazooka teams there. The remaining three panzers moved onto the grounds of the estate, hiding behind the barns to escape further antitank fire from Hill 598. Running right behind them were five or six SS panz-ergrenadiers, the only German infantry to make it through the American MLR throughout the whole siege. They sought cover in an old hospital tent that had been set up to one side of the manor house but had been abandoned when the fighting started. Four senior NCOs of the American CP staff, staff officers and radiomen, formed a small strike force and went outside and eliminated the grenadiers after a brief firefight.

Inside the manor house, Lt. Col. Daniel monitored the course of the battle with growing concern. He kept up a steady stream of calls into the regimental CP for more artillery fire, and this unbroken ring of exploding steel in front of the MLR was all that prevented the panzergrenadiers from passing unharmed through the former American positions. The 300-yard gap between the edge of the Büt-genbacher Heck and the Morschheck road was wide open, and German tanks were roaming freely over that area. Daniel knew that if the German infantry were allowed to exploit this gap, the Second and Third battalions would be cut off and destroyed. He was determined not to let that happen.

The three Mark IVs near the manor house had maneuvered so that they were still covered by the south barn, but they could fire their 75mm guns directly into the manor house from only 75 yards away. This they did, trying to penetrate the building and force the command staff there to surrender, but the four-foot thick stone walls of the old house withstood even this direct pounding. Nevertheless, as a precaution, Lt. Col. Daniel ordered all papers in the CP to be burned.

The two platoons of Company C he had retained as a reserve were still avail-able, stationed around the crossroads just east of the manor house, but Daniel could not move them to reinforce the Company E positions because of the panzers roam-ing around the CP area. By the same token, however, the Mark IVs were cut off from their infantry support and were vulnerable to bazooka teams, and they could not withdraw to their own lines (as they had been ordered by radio to do by this point) without exposing themselves to antitank fire from the Sherman tanks on Hill 598.

In the Second Battalion's eastern sector, Company F was holding off peri-odic attacks from Büllingen while suffering heavy casualties, and it had also been badly hit by the morning's bombardment. To its left, Company K of the Third Bn. around the Schwarzenbüchel was attacked by ten panzers and a battalion or so of infantry, possibly the I Bn., Twenty-sixth SS. One of Company K's bazooka


teams hit one of the panzers, and the AT guns on the battalion's left flank knocked out four more, but this did not deter the steady advance of the grenadiers. At one point they had advanced so far that Germans and Americans were fighting hand-to-hand in the trenches and the Company K commander, Captain Botts, called down final protective artillery fires on his own foxhole (he survived). This pre-vented the SS from breaking through the line, and although attacks continued throughout the day, the Germans achieved no penetration of the MLR.

At around 0900, the commanding officer of the AT Company, Captain Riv-ette, left his company CP in Bütgenbach to check on his gun squads around the Domane. As he, his jeep driver, and his Reconnaissance Sergeant left Bütgenbach, they could see three or four tanks burning on top of Hill 613 to their right front. They could not see any infantry along the road all the way to the Domane, nor could they see any where they knew the MLR to be, about halfway up Hill 613. Rivette, not knowing that portion of the line had been overrun, concluded that the infantry must be deep down in their foxholes. As they rounded a bend in the road the stone manor house came into view, and Rivette told his driver to slow down while turning into the estate's driveway. Fortuitously, however, the driver's foot hit the gas pedal instead of the brake and the jeep lurched forward just as one of the Mark IV tanks behind the south barn let loose a long machine gun burst at the vehicle. Captain Rivette was wounded slightly in the back, and the sergeant suffered a minor cheek wound. The driver quickly wheeled the jeep to the back of the CP building, and the three men dashed inside. There Rivette was informed of the grave crisis facing the Second Bn., Twenty-sixth, and his Second Platoon leader told him that several of the AT gun crews had been wiped out. The CP staff knew that the number of dead, wounded, and missing was staggering, but they had not yet been able to compile a complete count.

The situation around Dom Bütgenbach remained relatively unchanged for the next few hours. The portion of the Second and Third Battalions' defenses located east of the Morschheck road held against periodic attacks, and the massed fire of the American artillery battalions kept the German infantry from exploiting the breakthrough the panzers had made in the west. Occasionally one of the panz-ers hiding behind the south barn at the estate would move out just far enough to fire an HE round at the CP while the battalion staff inside prayed that the thick stone walls would hold just a little longer. The panzers also fired at the Company E and H command posts in the east barn a few times, scoring three direct hits. Every time the panzers exposed themselves to take a shot, the Shermans on the hill began firing furiously to knock them out, but the Germans were showing too little of themselves too briefly for the M4s to get a good shot.

At about 1000 a renewed infantry-tank attack struck at the remnants of the Company G platoon positioned between companies E and F, southeast of the Domane. However, as the German tanks came over the ridgeline, silhouetted against the sky, one of the M10 tank destroyers from Company A, 634th TD Bn., knocked out seven of them in rapid succession. The other M10 guarding the road from Büllingen destroyed one panzer at 500 yards; the 57mm AT of the AT pla-toon was credited with at least one kill, knocking out a Mark IV tank from 50


One of the Mk IV panzers of the 12th SS-PzD " H i t l e r j u g e n d " knocked out near the manor house at Dom Bütgenbach. A Sherman tank at the left of the photo guards the area against further German attacks.

yards away. As usual, the combination of small arms and massive artillery fire stopped the German infantry cold, but not before it had put intense pressure on the front line troops.

At 1030 Lt. Col. Daniel urgently requested that regiment send another rifle company from somewhere to reinforce his position and specified that they should be equipped with extra bazookas to handle the large number of German tanks being used against him. Regiment responded quickly, and within an hour Company E of the Eighteenth Infantry Regt. was on its way to shore up the Second Bn., Twenty-sixth's positions. By 1200, with no sizable penetration of the American lines after six hours of heavy combat, the Germans all across the Second Bn.'s front began to pull back. Fighting was still heavy for a while, and the three Mark IVs at the manor house severely curtailed the Americans' freedom of movement in that area, but the pressure on the MLR was noticeably reduced. Lt. Col. Daniel ensured that the curtain of artillery fire south of the manor house was maintained until he could move infantry there to reoccupy the foxhole line, and at 1250 he requested a pla-toon of self-propelled tank destroyers from Regiment so that he could eliminate the panzers on the manor house grounds and restore his infantry's freedom of movement. Company E of the Eighteenth Infantry arrived shortly afterward, but since the panzers still threatened any movement in the area, Daniel told them to wait behind Hill 598.


At 1305 a platoon of four M36 TDs from the 613th TD Bn. moved to posi-tions just west of the Domane by covering its advance from Butgenbach with smoke shells. Daniel ordered the men to position themselves to fire through the south barn at the panzers. The TD platoon leader placed two TDs at the east end of the manor house to fire at the east end of the barn and placed the other two by the small roadside building to the west, where they could fire at the west end of the barn. They began firing their 90mm guns through the flimsy wooden walls of the barn, and with each salvo they worked their shots about 10 feet closer toward the center of the barn. This pattern of converging shells so unnerved two of the panzer commanders that they pointed their tanks uphill and raced for the safety of their own lines. The M36s picked them both off when they were halfway up the hill. The third tank, however, held its ground. Daniel called down a barrage of mortar fire on the south barn to flush it out, but to no avail. He thought about using 155mm artillery, since this was the only shell big enough to actually dam-age the tank, but its proximity to the CP convinced him not to. Finally, under cover of the thickening fog, at about 1600 hours, the last panzer took a parting shot at the CP, then turned and fled up the hill toward Morschheck. Ironically, its last shot finally penetrated the manor house wall and wounded nine men in-side.

For all intents and purposes, the last German attack on the Domane But-genbach was over. The Twelfth SS Panzer Division tried one last time, on 22 December, to seize Butgenbach, but that attack primarily involved the First Bn. of the Twenty-sixth Infantry Regt. farther to the west. The defense that "stuck out like a sore thumb" at the manor house had held.

Aftermath

As the grenadiers and panzers withdrew into Morschheck and Büllingen on the afternoon of 21 December, the weary Second Bn., Twenty-sixth Infantry, began rebuilding its defenses and preparing for the next German attack. Engineers laid a belt of 2,400 mines in front of the MLR, built two strong roadblocks to block the approaches from east and south, and erected three rows of concertina wire across the battalion's entire front.

However, these new defenses would not be tested. After the failed attack on 22 December, which struck west of the Domane, the Germans despaired of ever opening Rollbahn C and reaching Liege. The shattered Twelfth SS Panzer Divi-sion was withdrawn from the fighting and sent west, eventually to fight around Bastogne. Volksgrenadier units that were too weak to attack were sent in its stead to defend Büllingen and Morschheck against any American counterattack.

In four days of fighting, the Twelfth SS Panzer Division "Hi t l e r j u g e n d" had suffered at least 782 dead and a total of at least 1,200 casualties. Including losses incurred at Krinkelt-Rocherath, in its first week of commitment in Wacht Am Rhein the division lost forty-seven panzers, jagdpanzers, and self-propelled guns, fifteen armored half-tracks, one armored car, one jeep, two rocket launcher batteries


(due to counterbattery artillery fire) and an unknown but large number of unar-mored trucks. American patrols sent out to the Bütgenbacher Heck on 23 Decem-ber reported German dead "as common as grass" on the hillside above Company E's MLR and found over 300 dead inside the edge of the forest. The commander of Company M, Third Bn.'s heavy weapons company, told Captain Rivette of the AT Company that the bodies of dead panzergrenadiers were piled so high in front of Third Bn.'s positions that special patrols had to be sent out to clear them from the "final protective line."

The American casualties were proportionally no less severe. The Twenty-sixth Infantry lost six bazookas, five 57mm AT guns, six BARs, two .30-cal machine guns, three M10 self-propelled tank destroyers, and three M4 Sherman tanks defending Dom Bütgenbach. Worse, the regiment suffered 13 officers and 487 men killed, wounded, or captured. Since the First Division as a whole lost 15 officers and 948 men between 16 and 24 December, that meant that 51 percent of the enlisted losses and 87 percent of the officer casualties came from the Twenty-sixth Infantry alone. After the German attack subsided on the afternoon of 21 Decem-ber, Second Bn., Twenty-sixth Infantry, had elements of six companies holding the line—its own E, F, and G leavened by heavy weapons from Company H, plus Company C from First Bn. and parts of Company E of the Eighteenth Regiment. A head count taken that night of men available for duty in the foxholes revealed that Company E had 75 men left, Company F had 75, Company G had 55, and Company H had 80. Company C from First Bn. had 75 men, while even the "fresh" Company E, Eighteenth Infantry, only had 125.

Credit for the defense must be shared with the various supporting battalions of American artillery. These units were no less heroic and instrumental than the infantry in stopping the German attacks. On 18 December, the battalions sup-porting the First Infantry Division fired 26 missions; on 19 December, 102 mis-sions; on 20 December, 169; on 21 December, 291; and on 22 December they fired an incredible 334 missions. Often they fired until they were out of ammunition or until the guns were too hot to fire. In one eight-hour period on 21 December, when continuous artillery explosions were all that kept the German infantry from overrunning Lt. Col. Daniel's CP, 10,000 rounds were fired to support his posi-tion. The same day, the mortar sections at Dom Bütgenbach fired 750 rounds, and the 955th FA Bn. fired 555 rounds in a single interdictory and harassing mission and a total of 2,054 rounds for the day, the battalion's largest one-day ammuni-tion expenditure of the war.

Despite the losses of men and materiel the Second Bn., Twenty-sixth Infantry, endured at Dom Bütgenbach, the price paid must be compared to the cost of a German breakthrough at Bütgenbach. Given an open highway to Malmédy, the I SS Panzer Korps could have rolled up the flank of the Second and Ninety-ninth Divisions and overrun the Elsenborn Ridge, linking up with von der Heydte's paratroopers and unhinging the northern shoulder of the American defense. Such a move would also have nullified the courageous stand of the Second and Ninety-ninth Divisions in and around Krinkelt-Rocherath. While the Germans almost certainly would not have been able to retake Antwerp or force the Western Allies


to sue for a separate peace, as Hitler had hoped, they might very well have reached the Meuse and established strong blocking positions, possibly prolonging the war and causing a much higher loss of life for the Americans and British. The Amer-ican stand at Dom Bütgenbach helped channel the German advance westward, an operationally pointless direction for the advance, and allowed a strong northern shoulder to be maintained from which counterattacks could be launched once the Allies had regained the initiative.

Fight It Out to the Finish

In September 1944, the Allied pursuit of the Germans across France and Bel-gium had ended in the north along the German frontier and the Westwall, in the south along the Moselle River. In the bitter fighting that followed through the autumn and early winter, the U.S. Third Army breached the Moselle line around Metz, pushed northeast across the German border, and broke the outer crust of the Westwall along the Saar River at Saarlautern. Although a combination of attacks by the Third and Seventh Armies compromised the Moselle line along most of its length, the Germans had continued to hold the east bank in a triangle formed by the confluence of the Saar and the Moselle southwest of Trier—the "Saar-Moselle triangle." The Third Army had yet to clear the triangle by December when it was called upon to relieve the situation in the Ardennes.

Although the Westwall in this sector lay behind a loop of the Saar, the Ger-mans in 1939 and 1940 had constructed a supplementary fortified line across the base of the triangle from Nenning in the west to Orscholz. The Germans called the position the Orscholz Switch; the Americans knew it as the Siegfried Switch. The Switch guarded the southeast face of the Saar industrial area and especially Trier, a vital communications center some five miles northeast of the junction of the two rivers. It also served as an outpost and buffer for the Westwall. Fronted by dragon's teeth, antitank ditches, with pillboxes and concrete bunkers, reinforced by field fortifications, this narrow belt of fortifications ran at a right angle to the Westwall. For thirteen miles it wound its way over steep hillsides, terraced with vineyards and dotted with thick clumps of spruce forest, and passed through or near the towns of Oberleuken, Borg, Tettingen-Butzdorf and Nennig. The Switch sat astride high ground forming a watershed for streams flowing northeast to the Saar and west and southwest to the Moselle.

The Third Army's planners realized that this heavily fortified area would have to be breached before any large-scale penetrations of the main Siegfried positions could be made. If not, that part of the main defensive line it shielded could not be neutralized and would be a threat to the flank of any penetration. In a turning of the tables, once the Americans had overcome the Switch a wedge-shaped salient could be thrust into the German lines between the two rivers, imperiling the Ger-man flank to the northwest. Such a wedge would also provide a firm springboard for further attacks to the east.


In November and December, while striking toward the Saar at Saarlautern, General Walton Walker's XX Corps on the left wing of the Third Army had been able to turn only a limited force (elements of the Ninetieth Infantry and Tenth Armored Divisions) against the Orscholz Switch. In late November an armored combat command and an infantry regiment had engineered a minor penetration of the left portion of the switch at the villages of Tettingen and Butzdorf, but the XX Corps had had to relinquish the ground in December in an effort to shorten the line and free units for operations in the Ardennes. On 7 January a relatively inexperienced infantry division, the Ninety-fourth under Major General Harry J. Malony, arrived in the sector from Lorient and St. Nazaire in Brittany where it had kept some 60,000 Germans bottled up for 111 days. In addition, the division had been busy training twenty-nine battalions of French infantry.

The Ninety-fourth Infantry Division moved into a weakened line, the Corps front having been thinned in order to support the Ardennes sector. Beyond the corps' left boundary at the Moselle, a cavalry group of the neighboring XII Corps held the west bank of the Moselle. The Ninety-fourth Division faced the entire thirteen-mile stretch of the Orscholz Switch, from the Moselle to the Saar. The Third Cavalry Group defended the XX Corps center, approximately nine miles along the Saar River to the confluence of the Saar and the Nied. The Ninety-fifth Infantry Division held the remainder of the corps front, roughly equal to the dis-tance covered by the cavalry but with the added responsibility of defending a bridgehead over the Saar at Saarlautern. The Ninety-fifth was subsequently replaced by the Twenty-sixth Division.

The 376th Infantry Regiment, Ninety-fourth Division, moved into posi-tions relieving the Third Cavalry Squadron, which had previously inherited the position from the Ninetieth. These positions were in sight of the dragon's teeth and snow-filled antitank ditches of the Switch. The regiment's first mission upon relieving the cavalrymen was to establish a Main Line of Resistance (MLR) and an Out Post Line (OPL).

The dragon's teeth wound through a series of small farming towns the Ger-mans had converted into formidable strongholds. In addition to dragon's teeth, antitank ditches, communications trenches, and barbed wire, the approaches to these towns were guarded by mines and pillboxes, with perfect fields of observa-tion from neighboring bluffs.

Given the situation before them, the men of the 376th Infantry began the work of setting up an MLR just south of the villages of Besch, Wochern, and Borg. The morning of 9 January was bitingly cold, and the GIs worked under the cover of an early morning ground haze. The job of hewing foxholes and gun positions in the iron-hard, frozen ground was difficult, to say the least, but it was a good way to keep warm.

From 9 to 13 January, the 376th waited in its positions, poised to move for-ward. On the left, in and around the towns of Besch and Wochem, was the regi-ment's First Battalion, to the right, near Borg and Hellendorf and extending as far east as Oberleuken, was the Second Bn., behind them the Third Bn. was estab-lished in a prepared reserve position.

The poor weather initially limited patrol activity. The GIs, dressed in olive drab, presented good targets against the unbroken white snow. It was not long before white outer garments began to appear, hastily improvised from sheets or any large piece of white cloth that could be found. Day after day these ghostly figures moved across the snow fields probing the German lines.

Chill winds swept the towns along the Moselle mud flats tormenting the men who manned the OPL. Fingers, toes, and noses turned numb from the cold. Houses abandoned in haste by German civilians were used as shelters and billets. But the cold weather proved ideal for deer and rabbit hunting for those inclined to sup-plement a diet of C rations.

The corps commander, General Walker, told General Malony on 12 January to begin a series of stabs into the German lines with forces not exceeding one rein-forced battalion in order to provide the division with some offensive combat expe-rience, to contain the Germans in the Orscholz Switch, and also to try to draw German reserves from other sectors while gaining a foothold in the line for later possible exploitation: "94 Div. will conduct offensive operations within Z involv-ing not more than one reinforced Bn. in ea operation. . . . 376 Inf will atk at day-light 14 Jan 45. . . . 1st Bn. atk at 0730 14 Jan 45, seize and hold the town of TET-TINGEN-BUTZDORF. Be prepared to repel counterattacks from the W, N, or E."

With this Regimental Field Order, Lt. Col. Russell M. Miner, commander of the First Bn., 376th Infantry, briefed his company commanders, who in turn oriented their platoon leaders, and so on until every rifleman knew the part he was to play on the day of the assault: the battalion was to move through the dragon's teeth on 14 January to take the town of Tettingen. The plan was essentially designed to provoke a German counterattack, which the Americans could then crush, inflict-ing heavy losses on the Germans.

The members of the 376th knew that this would be their first real test in combat.

Probing the Orscholz Switch

By 1800 hours on 13 January the Third Bn., coming up from its reserve posi-tion had relieved the First Bn., Lt. Col. Miner's men pulling back to the vicinity of Wochern to reorganize for the jump-off on the following morning.

Grouped around glowing stoves in dimly lit rooms, the men were briefed on the task ahead. It was not going to be an easy one. The Switch Line position was expected to be a tough adversary for a single reinforced battalion, narrow as the attacking front might be. The regiment's commander, Lt. Col. McClune, was uneasy at the prospect of striking with so small a force. But XX Corps had been specific in this respect and there was no alternative. The men were on edge. This first attack of the 376th along the front was not as the men had anticipated it would be. During the last days in Brittany they had heard many lectures on armor-infantry coordination, and had been told that such attacks would be carefully rehearsed

Fight It Out to the Finish 307


beforehand. But here there was no opportunity for rehearsal and no tanks since it was felt that this was not a situation in which tanks could be used effectively. Com-pany B of the 607th Tank Destroyer Bn. would be attached, but they were to be used only if absolutely necessary. Company C of the 319th Engineer Combat Bn. was to clear a path through the mine fields to the Line of Departure. The 919th Field Artillery Bn., as well as five battalions of Corps Artillery, the Regimental Can-non Company, and 4.2-inch mortars of Company C of the 812th Chemical Bn., would pound the German positions in preparation for the attack. But from there on it would be up to the GIs to close in and destroy the enemy.

In the darkness prior to dawn on 14 January, the attackers were given a hot breakfast, and each was loaded with enough C ration to last him the rest of the day. Everyone draped himself with as many bandoleers of ammunition as he could carry and hung grenades from his pack-strap rings and buttonholes. But in spite of the intense cold, no one carried more than one blanket, a shelter half, or a rain-coat—speed and maneuverability came first.

Prior to and during the initial jump-off, the six battalions of artillery engaged in hammering the little town of Tettingen, the first village behind the dragon's teeth on the western slopes of a high hogback ridgeline marked by the trace of a major highway leading northeast to Saarburg. At 0730 the First Bn. crossed the Line of Departure with Company A on the right, Company C on the left, and Company B bringing up the rear.

The air was filled with the whine and thud of artillery that formed a mov-ing wall a scant 200 yards in front of the attacking line of infantry. Although the terrain was unfamiliar, the ground covered with a foot of snow, and the day bit-terly cold, everything went smoothly. Pfc. Philip L. Russo, Company I machine gunner, who witnessed the entire attack from his position on the Third Bn. OPL, said it was an almost perfect attack, "just like we used to do in training when no one was firing back at us."

The surprise in the First Bn.'s sector that morning seemed to have been com-plete. The defenders of Tettingen were caught off guard, first by the stunning blasts of artillery and then by the swift, determined attackers who closed in quickly in its wake. There were hurried but futile attempts at resistance and some firing from windows and trenches in and about the town, but by 0815 it was all over. Com-panies A and C were, for the moment, in undisputed possession of their first objec-tive.

So successful was the assault that the regimental commander ordered Lt. Col. Miner to continue on into the adjacent village of Butzdorf. Company C quickly began setting up a hasty perimeter defense against possible counterattacks that could be expected momentarily. Company A had hardly paused to catch its breath when it received the orders to move on and take Butzdorf—across a few hundred yards of open ground from Tettingen. Company A was to move out at 1000.

At 0953 the air was again broken by the jarring slam of exploding American shells, this time landing on Butzdorf. The men of Company A, facing north from the streets of Tettingen, watched them fall as they waited. At exactly 1000 they moved out again. This time, however, the Germans were on the alert, and the


attackers had hardly gained the northern edge of Tettingen when the crack of small arms fire filled the air, followed by the whine of incoming artillery. Any further advance was for the moment impossible, and the men hugged the ground while Captain Carl J. Shetler, the company CO, called back for more artillery support fire. After five more minutes of softening up, gun fire from Butzdorf slackened, and the advance was underway once again. But the troubles of Company A were just beginning.

The open ground between the two towns was comparatively flat and with-out cover. To the east it rose sharply to a ridge overlooking the flats and both towns. This ridge was an ideal location for mortars, and it soon became obvious that the Germans had taken advantage of it. Halfway between the two towns Cap-tain Shetler and his men heard the familiar popping sound of mortars coming from the direction of the ridge. The barrage was murderously accurate, and to the men who took the full brunt of it in the open it was "like standing at the bottom of a well and helplessly being stoned by a group of small boys at the top." When the smoke had cleared, there were numerous casualties, among them, Captain Shetler, mortally wounded.

But once the GIs had crossed the open ground, the attack went more easily, and by 1142 Butzdorf too had fallen. The Company, now commanded by Captain Shetler's replacement, 1st Lt. David F. Stafford, set about preparing its defenses. Although the attack had succeeded in taking Tettingen and Butzdorf, it produced a long, fingerlike salient only 400 yards wide and thrusting 2000 yards into enemy-held territory. But with the added fire power of the weapons company, Company D, distributed among the rifle companies, and the cannon fire which 1st Lt. Hjalmar W. Nielsen (376th Regimental Cannon Company's forward observer) could bring to bear at a moment's notice, the First Bn. was determined to hold the villages.

The main problem at this point, aside from hewing defenses out of the frozen ground around the town and keeping an eye out for counterattacks, was the open ground that Company A had just crossed. The company was out on a limb. To reach Butzdorf from either Tettingen, where Company C was still dug in, or Wochern, the battalion's supply and communications center, it was necessary to cross this open ground under the view of German artillery and mortar observers. But if Company A was to receive much needed supplies and ammunition, if com-munication wires were to be maintained, and if the many wounded still lying on the field where the attack had passed were to be reached and evacuated, the ground had to be crossed. And it was to be crossed many times by such men as Pfc. Don-ald W. Meals of Company A and Wesley E. Phillips of HQ Company, First Bn., who constantly disregarded their own safety to keep the telephone wires intact, and Pfc. Russell Merritt, one of the many aid men who risked their lives to get the wounded to cover.

It was at this time that the "Caldwell bib" was reported to have first put in an appearance. It had become evident that German riflemen were at times indis-criminate in their shooting. A consensus of opinion among the GIs was that this was partly because the red crosses in white circles on the aid men's helmets were


not distinctive enough against the snow in the background. Major Samuel W. Caldwell, the Regimental Surgeon, had devised a possible solution; a white, sleeve-less pullover with a large red cross on the front and back which could be slipped over a field jacket and could not fail to be seen at a distance. Captured Nazi bat-tle flags provided the red material for the crosses, and Red Cross workers in Thionville used their sewing machines to put the bibs together. By the time the First Bn. attacked Tettingen all front-line medical personnel had been provided with these bibs, and it was believed that many lives were saved through their use in the following weeks while snow remained on the ground.

Counterattack

The first German counterattack came at 1225. A reinforced platoon of about forty German infantrymen descended on Butzdorf from the woods just to the east of the town. But the defenders of the town were not to be so easily daunted and drove them off with little trouble, killing about ten.

At 1335 Company B was moved up from its reserve positions near Wochern to strengthen Company C's defenses in Tettingen. The company's First Platoon was sent on to Butzdorf to reinforce Company A. The afternoon and night passed with the GIs "sweating out" the enemy's next move. Artillery and 120mm mor-tar shells fell on both towns and on the approach routes into Butzdorf during the night.

The next day (15 January) the Third Bn. of the 376th Infantry attacked toward Nennig and two other villages on the Moselle floodplain northwest of Tet-tingen and Butzdorf. After a difficult fight these three villages were taken, placing the western anchor of the Orscholz Switch in American hands.

The rapidity with which the two thrusts had broken into these positions was attributable to the fact that the German's 4l6th Infantry Division under Lt. Gen. Kurt Pflieger, responsible for the sector since November, was gravely overextended. Only two regiments held the entire Orscholz Switch, while the third defended in the Westwall beyond the Saar. Only the division's replacement battalion was avail-able as a reserve.

In the early hours of 15 January shelling increased—120mm mortars and 105's rained down and devastated Tettingen, Butzdorf, and Wochern. This was the pre-lude to the first of a series of strong counterattacks, which started at about 0300. Four hundred landsers of the 4l6th Division's replacement battalion swept down from the high ground on three sides of Butzdorf and, covered by heavy support-ing fires from positions overlooking the town, succeeded in completely encircling it. At the same time part of this force attempted to encircle Tettingen.

With a crackling roar that echoed off the ridges to the east, the First Bn. struck back. The darkness was shattered with blinding flashes as the three rifle compa-nies, the mortars and machine guns of Company D, and all available artillery, adjusted with deadly accuracy by the FOs and infantry, raised a curtain of steel in the face of the attackers. It was a fanatical assault, and time and time again the


waves rushed to within fifteen yards of the defender's positions, only to be anni-hilated and hurled back.

There were frantic moments for Company D in Tettingen during this attack. Mortar and machine gun positions were spread out, and it was not long before the pounding of German artillery had completely disrupted communications between them. But S.Sgt. Estle E. Templeton was equal to the occasion and dur-ing the heaviest German firing continued to move from one gun position to another, coordinating their fire, while at the same time adjusting both mortar and artillery fire. His inspiration and leadership kept many machine gunners cool and at their weapons while the Germans repeatedly attacked to within a few yards of them.

After more than two hours of such desperate fighting, ammunition began to run low. A hasty check showed that only 1,000 rounds remained for the heavy machine guns; considering the fact that nearly 32,000 rounds had been used since the attack began, these rounds were not going to last long. Someone had to get back to the ammunition dump at Wochern and bring up more. Hand carrying the ammunition forward would take too long—it would have to be brought up by truck.

So far no vehicle had dared use the road from Wochern to Tettingen. Even without an attack in progress it was considered suicidal to risk it. But if Tettingen was to be held there was no alternative. Cpl. Donald W. Kreger, Company D trans-portation corporal, volunteered for the job. With fortune on his side, he returned without mishap carrying 64,000 rounds of ammunition. But by that time one house in the Third Platoon, Company C, area had been taken by the Germans. Kreger's next job was to contact the tank destroyers attached to the battalion, so that they could bring the 90mm guns of their GMC (Gun Motor Carriage) M36s to bear on the house. After this had been accomplished, Kreger moved from one gun position to another, cheering the gunners on, and picking off Germans with his Ml .

The battle raged for three hours. When the smoke at last drifted away and all was quiet again, the First Bn., grim and exhausted, still held Tettingen and Butz-dorf. Hundreds of twisted corpses were scattered on the shell-blackened snow of the surrounding slopes, bearing mute testimony to the attackers' resolve and fate. Of some 400 who had taken part in the counterattack, scarcely more than a hun-dred escaped; some dying from minor wounds after prolonged exposure in the sub-freezing weather.

Intermittent artillery and mortar fire continued, forcing the defenders of Tet-tingen and Butzdorf to take cover in cellars. The houses themselves, by this time crumbled and tottering, offered scant protection, and walking the streets by day-light was an invitation to disaster.

There were two small counterattacks—actually, these were more fighting patrols than counterattacks—on the evening of 15 January. Company B in Tet-tingen bore the brunt of the first of these. But there were only fifty Germans in the attacking force this time, and the survivors were soon driven off. Not long after this, four Mark V Panther tanks accompanied by infantry rumbled down the slopes


toward the flank of Company C, but the defenders in their dug-in positions around the town were ready. Bazookas added to the volume of small arms, machine gun and mortar fire. Two of the armored vehicles retired, trailing smoke behind them. The remaining two, with GIs of Company C closing in with bazookas and satchel charges, soon beat a hasty retreat. Most of the infantrymen who had accompanied the tanks were either killed or wounded.

This same night a reconnaissance patrol was sent to investigate the area to the east of the platoon's position. The patrol reported locating a pillbox whose field of fire was in the direction of Butzdorf. In the vicinity of this box there were also several concrete bunkers. The members of the patrol had heard voices coming from inside both the bunkers and the pillbox.

In Wochern, Lt. William P. Springer decided to change the position of his Company D 81mm mortars as they were drawing too much fire. Scarcely had the mortar tubes been moved when an artillery shell scored a direct hit on the evac-uated position. One man who had remained in the vicinity was wounded.

Wochern itself resembled a kind of boom town; the streets of the village hummed with activity. Tank destroyers, deuce-and-a-halves, weapons carriers, and jeeps passed through, milled around, or jockeyed for position. Signalmen deco-rated the fronts of the buildings with phone wires while staff and supply person-nel went about their duties. The streets swarmed with men and machines until the first whine of incoming artillery fire was heard; then, in fractions of a second, they became deserted except for the vehicles. In the rifleman's sense of the term, Wochern was a rear area, but nine men were killed and twenty-four wounded in the town during the days immediately following the attack of the First Bn. On several occasions there were direct hits on the Battalion Aid Station. Not once, however, were medical supply and communications operations seriously inter-rupted. S.Sgt. Joseph R. Mendrick of Company D rescued three comrades from the upper floor of a house in Wochern that had been set on fire by mortar rounds. It was full of small arms ammunition and grenades that exploded as the building burned.

On the next two days, 16 and 17 January, there were no further counterat-tacks, but the shelling continued. The paralyzing cold and the lack of sleep gave the frostbitten and isolated survivors of companies A and B a hollow look of weari-ness.

As General Malony had hoped, the 376th's assault on the villages had prompted German counterattacks with attendant German losses. What he had not counted on was that the Germans were moving in a much more powerful force for a determined counterattack into the Orscholz Switch. On its way to the sec-tor was the veteran Eleventh Panzer Division.

For Lt. Col. Miner's men 16 January proved a comparatively quiet day. Inter-mittent artillery, mortar, and machine gun fire fell on the towns but there was no attempt on the part of the Germans to recoup their losses. To the west the sol-diers could hear the noise of the Second Bn. attacking in the woods.

During the night, Lt. James W. Cornelius, accompanied by Sgt. Jesse R. Tower of the 319th Engineers, led a patrol with orders to blow up the pillbox and


bunkers located the previous night. The pillbox was found to be unoccupied, and a thousand pounds of nitro-starch were hauled forward and placed for detonation. When set off the charge blew the structure's dome clear and collapsed the walls. Of the bunkers, only one was found to be occupied. Against its steel door, two of Sgt. Tower's men laid 150 pounds of explosive. When detonated, this charge completely demolished the door, but the patrols' activity brought down a mortar barrage, and so it was decided to wait until morning to check the damage done.

With the coming of daylight, the doorless bunker was clearly visible from the American lines. A German medic, accompanied by another soldier, entered the town shortly after dawn, under a white flag, and requested permission to remove the wounded from the bunker. This was granted, but the soldier accompanying the aid man was detained. A short time later, a German half-track approached from over the hill; seven wounded were carried out of the bunker and loaded into the vehicle.

About noon Company B was withdrawn from Tettingen and took up a posi-tion in the woods west of the town to relieve Company F, which had helped clear the area the previous day. Captain Henry C. Bowden, CO of Company B, placed his three rifle platoons on line along a 1,000 yard front. Fifteen hundred yards off the left flank of the company were five German pillboxes. To the northwest, in Nennig, was the Third Bn. with Lt. Fox's platoon of Company I holding its right flank in an orchard, approximately 500 yards northwest of Company B's left.

German radio broadcasts on the night of 16 to 17 January told of heavy fight-ing in the vicinity of the town of Remich, west of Butzdorf, and intimated that there was more to come. This was both a threat and a promise, for the II Bn. of the 714th Grenadier Regiment, 4l6th Division, commanded by a Lieutenant Reudi-ger, had crossed the Saar and assumed a defensive position along the ridge south of the town of Sinz. In addition, General Wend von Wietersheim's Eleventh Panzer Division was moving into position. The Eleventh had been out of contact with American forces since the middle of December while it was being refitted in the vicinity of Bitburg. The Eleventh Division's Fifteenth Panzer Regt. had received a considerable number of new Panthers and Mark IV panzers, which brought the unit's total strength to almost 100 tanks and assault guns. A great number of replacements had been integrated into the division's 110th Panzergrenadier Regt., which had suffered heavily during the battle for Metz. Having sustained consid-erably fewer casualties, the 111th Panzergrenadier Regt. was considered more bat-tle experienced. The division's antitank battalion had been equipped with sixteen assault guns, while the I Bn. of the 110th and the engineer companies of both reg-iments were mounted in half-tracks. Scheduled to participate in the the Ardennes offensive, but not having been committed, the division was shifted early in Janu-ary from Army Group B south to Army Group G.

The commander of Army Group G, General Johannes Blaskowitz, planned a variety of exercises in which to use the panzer division in concert with other units to complement a faltering Operation Nordwind in Alsace, but due to the lack of these additional units, none of the plans materialized. In the end, Blaskowitz assigned the panzer division to the LXXXII Korps (General Walther Hahm), one


of three corps operating directly under the army group. The LXXXII Korps was responsible for a long stretch of the Saar, including the Orscholz Switch. In order to relieve pressure on the embattled Seventh Army in the Ardennes, the Eleventh Panzer Division was to make a strong armored raid out of the Orscholz Switch, three and a half miles to the southwest to heights on the east bank of the Moselle overlooking the meeting point of the German and Luxembourg frontiers. Target date for the raid was mid-January. The axis of attack was to run directly through Butzdorf and Tettingen.

For want of fuel and because the weight capacity of bridges over the Saar was limited, some fifty Mark V (Panther) tanks of the division had to remain east of the Saar. The raid would be entrusted to thirty Mark IV tanks of the Second and Sev-enth Panzer companies of the Fifteenth Panzer Regt., a battalion of twenty to thirty assault guns and self-propelled antitank guns, and the I and II Bns. of the 110th Panz-ergrenadier Regt., including a company of engineers, and an ersatz battalion.

American reconnaissance planes had picked up traces of the Eleventh Panzer's crossing the Saar north of Saarburg on 16 January: G-2 alerting the Ninety-fourth Division. On 17 January, overcast skies prevented continued aerial reconnaissance; the exact whereabouts of the German "Ghost Division" was unknown to Ameri-can intelligence.

At Butzdorf, Tettingen, Nennig, and the other villages, the GIs worked through 17 January to lay antitank mines and bring up tank destroyers and addi-tional bazookas. The engineers laid mines along the road leading into Butzdorf and strung a belt of mines along the east side of Tettingen. Daisy chains, pole and satchel charges were prepared and placed in readiness. The Ninety-fourth Divi-sion, unlike other U.S. infantry divisions, had no attached tank battalion, only a tank destroyer battalion, the 607th. Throughout the night the sound of tracked vehicles came from the woods and villages to the north and northeast.

At 0300 on the morning of 18 January a patrol sent out from Company A returned with two prisoners from the Eleventh Panzer Division. This was the first hard evidence that the division was in the vicinity. Immediately preparations were made to reinforce the antitank defenses. At daybreak the First Platoon of the reg-iment's Anti-Tank Company under 1st Lt. George W. Peters moved up from Wochern and began to dig in its guns around Tettingen.

The Breaking Storm

At 0710 on 18 January the storm broke. For twenty-five minutes 81mm and 120mm mortars, 88mm guns, 105mm, and 150mm howitzer shells deluged Butz-dorf, Tettingen, and Wochern. Geysers of dirt flew up from the streets as snow, mud, and jagged steel fragments ripped through the air. The shelling rose to a deaf-ening crescendo and seemed to remain there. The already shattered towns were well worked over. Roofs fell and walls crumbled. Crouching in their emplace-ments, the defenders knew that in spite of all they had been through the worst was yet to come, and this was just the beginning of it.


Then, at 0740 hours, the German firing subsided, replaced by the sound of tank motors. Overhead could be heard the rustling whir followed by the "crumph" that was the Division Artillery's response to the German barrage.

From the north and east came a long line of men, tanks, half-tracks, and assault guns, advancing on the Wochern-Sinz road. General von Wietersheim was sending his panzergrenadiers to seize and hold Tettingen and Butzdorf at all cost. Led by the Tenth (Engineer) Kompanie, mounted on their half-tracks, elements of the 110th Panzer Grenadier and 714th Infantry Regiments swarmed down the slopes toward Butzdorf. The grenadiers were supported by four self-propelled 75mm guns of the Sixty-first Antitank Bn., and several Mark IV panzers from the Seventh Kom-panie. Despite the defensive artillery fire, which hurled tons of steel at the Ger-mans, the grenadiers rolled forward in a giant arc. As the right wing of the attack hit Butzdorf, the left flank swung to the west and jabbed at Tettingen.

Company A in Butzdorf received the first blow. An assault gun, attempting to enter town, struck a mine while crossing the engineers' minefield and was dis-abled. Two half-tracks loaded with grenadiers tried to maneuver around the gun and were knocked out by bazooka fire. One of the men on the east side of town disposed of a self-propelled gun whose muzzle was thrust into the window of the house he was occupying. Despite the efforts of Company A, the grenadiers occu-pied two lightly defended houses on the northern side of Butzdorf.

Meanwhile, the left flank of the attack hit Tettingen. The men of Company C on the east of town had been watching the Germans roll toward them and were ready for the grenadiers when they came. Four half-tracks, two tanks, and a self-propelled gun swung into position about one hundred yards from the town.

11th PzD Counterattack at Butzdorf-Tettingen

I S January I M S


When one of the half-tracks hit a mine, its crew and mounted infantrymen leaped to the ground for cover. Private Thomas H. Goggins greeted one of the tanks with a bazooka round into the bogie wheels. This halted the panzer, but Goggins was unable to silence its gun. Behind the town's church the remaining tank maneu-vered into position and secured a field of fire by blasting a hole through the wall of the structure. Time after time, bazooka rounds were fired at the half-tracks but for some reason they failed to detonate. The half-tracks pulled up, in front of Lt. Chalkley's positions and the infantry began to dismount. Privates James C. Hobbs and Charles F. Croan each seized a machine gun and went to work on the grenadiers, most of whom were cut down not far from their vehicles.

When the tank Pvt. Goggins had disabled directed its fire into and through Lt. Chalkley's platoon CP, the lieutenant decided it was time to move out. Across the street was a barn that seemed a bit more habitable, and at 0900 hours the pla-toon leader and his runner withdrew to this position, bringing their telephone with them. The second panzer then began firing into the battalion CP. This tank also scored a hit on one of the prime movers of Lt. Peters' 57mm AT guns. Immedi-ately afterward both Lt. Peters and his platoon sergeant, Joseph J. Quentz, were wounded and had to be evacuated. Sgt. Charles Foxgrover became convinced that if he put his 57 into position to the south of town, he might be able to knock out the tank that was hammering away at the battalion's command post. A TD man standing nearby asked the sergeant, "What can you do with a 57? Why it's sui-cide!" Nevertheless, Foxgrover decided to make the attempt. His gun squad ran their weapon into position and opened fire at 300 yards. The tank was knocked out before it could turn its turret and bring its gun into firing position. As the crew of the 57 struggled to pull their gun back out of action, a German mortar round landed among them. Most of the crew was wounded, and the trails of the piece were jammed, taking it out of action.

The attacking grenadiers succeeded in taking three or four buildings in the northeastern part of Tettingen. They also secured Lt. Chalkley's old command post and soon had machine guns laying down fire on the main street. The withering firepower of the entire battalion was turned against the attackers: small arms, machine guns, artillery, and mortars slashing at the infantry while bazookas and 57mm ATs pounded the oncoming tanks. But by 0755 the Germans, by the sheer weight of numbers, had forced their way to the center of Butzdorf, and their main guns were firing point-blank into the houses still held by the desperate fighters of Company A. Tanks that had entered the town were singled out and buttoned up with small arms fire, then attacked by bazooka teams. Those that were stopped were finished off with satchel charges, and before long the streets of the town and the nearby fields were marked by the hulks of burning and smoking tanks and assault guns.

For more than an hour confusion reigned in both villages as German tanks and assault guns shot up the landscape and infantrymen of both sides fought at close quarters among the rubble and damaged buildings. Mines disabled some of the German vehicles, and the intrepid GIs stalked them with bazookas.

Pfc. Richard J. Kamins of the Second Platoon, Company A, reports:


I stood in the doorway and saw the first tank go by me. I fired at the second and yelled, "I got the sonuvabitch!" Lindsay reloaded. The next tank came down the street toward me. I hit him in the track. He saw me. I turned and ran down the hall. A spray of machine gun bullets chased me, ricocheting from where I'd been standing at the door. After that I fired from a window.

A fourth came and a fifth. It was too dark to use my sights but I couldn't miss. They were only 50 yards away. I hit them in the tracks, but still they kept coming. I hit one on the turret and the round bounced off like a tennis ball. I set one on fire and he withdrew in a sheet of flame.

Pop Huston crouched in a doorway. Some concrete dust blasted from the walls got in his eyes. Nevertheless, old Pop fired every rifle grenade he had. He hit tank after tank and watched the rounds glance off. His language was lovely to hear.

The First Squad was across the street. Jack Zebin and Wylie of the Third Platoon were attached to them as a bazooka team. Zabin had a tank graveyard in front of his position. He got credit for five. Dick Schweig and Whiz Wicentowski were to my left, and "The Reverend" Pillow and Howard Curler were down to my right. We had a nice box formation. One tank that I'd hit in the tread went down to be mouse-trapped by Pillow. Pillow scared him back to me. He was in reverse swing-ing his gun toward the First Squad's building. Simultaneously, Zebin and I hit him. My round tore a three-by-four hole in the rear armor. It was a long-range shot . . . all of five yards. The driver and gunner lay dead in the tank. A third was hanging out of the turret like a tablecloth. A fourth started to run. Cross fire from three buildings hit him. With every burst his body would jump, making us think he was still alive. Other bursts followed. Mclntyre came running up with a satchel charge and dropped it in the tank. The explosion was terrific. Later we examined the smok-ing hulk. There was no sign of any bodies.

Then there was a short lull. Faber, Odell and Bridgeman had been looking out the back window. They had seen no tanks, only artillery [rounds] landing. Bridge-man was leaning on a sink when a close one dropped. When the dust cleared, Faber asked where the sink was.

Bridgeman couldn't answer but the sink had disappeared.*

Meanwhile, the Regimental Cannon Company, back behind Wochern, was working its gun crews in two shifts as the missions kept coming back from Lt. Nielsen and anybody else who could make contact. It seemed as if everybody in the battalion knew the numbers for the artillery plot. By the end of the day the Cannon Company had conducted 70 missions, firing a total of 1,143 rounds. In addition, the 919th FA Bn. was having its biggest day since its arrival in combat— 72 missions of 3,132 rounds.

By 0835 on 18 January, the German infantry and panzergrenadiers support-ing the tanks had been cut to ribbons and were forced to withdraw; the remain-ing tanks retreated with them. There had been many moments when the outcome seemed in doubt, but Tettingen and Butzdorf were still in American hands.

The 110th Panzergrenadier Regt. had a great deal of trouble reorganizing to make another attack as the fire of several battalions of American artillery pounded and harassed them. At 1049 hours, elements of the II Bn., 110th, tried to attack, but were stopped dead in their tracks by the artillery fire. The Seventh Kompanie was so badly disorganized by the fire of 105s and 155s, it was not available for

*"History of the 94th Infantry Division in World War II. "


employment all day. From their positions in the woods the men of Company B could see the Germans some two hundred yards to the north, across the clearing, attempting to reform. The GIs directed a steady and telling volume of fire against them.

Once the first attack had been beaten back, Company A fought and regained the buildings it had lost earlier while Company C took sixteen prisoners.

At 1130 hours the next attack came when General von Wietersheim sent his Second Panzer Kompanie from the direction of Sinz against Tettingen and Butz-dorf. The company consisted of about ten Mark IVs moving in a huge arc and enveloping the two towns. Four of the tanks assumed a hull defilade position on the hill east of Tettingen, and the others moved about among the trees and haystacks north of Butzdorf. When the tankers had reached the desired positions, they began pounding the towns with both armor-piercing and high-explosive shells. As the projectiles came crashing through the walls and exploded within the buildings of Butzdorf, the GIs of Company A crawled into the cellars leaving one man in each building to wait and watch for German infantry that might attempt to advance under the protective fire of the tanks.

In Tettingen, Lt. Col. Miner and his staff worked to devise some method for relieving the pressure on the troops in Butzdorf. Division artillery continued its protective fires while Lt. Nielsen kept the Regimental Cannon Company well sup-plied with fire missions. Ignoring the artillery, mortar, and sniper fire that swept the streets of Tettingen, Lt. Col. Miner personally pointed out positions for the tank destroyers at the northern edge of town, but sniper fire, the narrow streets, and the low silhouettes of the targets hindered the efficiency of the TDs.

At 1430 hours, the 110th launched its final attack of the day as the i, II and Ersatz Battalions charged into the defenses of Butzdorf, supported by the Second Panzer Kompanie. Widely deployed, some fifteen vehicles with supporting infantry and preceded by grenadiers on foot swept over the hill and down the road to Butz-dorf. When the Germans were about 200 yards from the town, the defenders opened their final protective fire. The advancing infantrymen wavered, paused, and then continued forward leaving many of their comrades dead, wounded, or dying in the snow behind them. In front of the attackers the ground erupted with black smoke and jagged steel splinters. Through this storm the grenadiers bravely, des-perately, continued to advance.

As the German armored force neared the town, the tanks paused to let the infantrymen riding on them dismount and take cover behind them. Time and again the grenadiers attempted to storm Butzdorf only to be driven back by mur-derous small arms fire. After each repulse, the attackers reformed behind their vehicles. The panzers that broke into the town roamed up and down the streets at will, firing through walls, windows, and doors in an attempt to pulverize the build-ings held by the defending GIs. Still the Americans hung on. While events in Butz-dorf were visible from Tettingen, the remainder of the battalion was helpless to assist Company A. Pfc. Kamins picks up the story again:


We were lucky. Zimny and Craig had blast[ed] holes in the walls of the building in our block. We could withdraw without going into the open. One Tiger [It is unlikely that the tank encountered was a Tiger' it was more likely a Mark IV since Tigers were usually employed in independent battalions and no such unit was identified among the German units involved in the action.] fired two rounds at us. The liv-ing room became unfit to live in, but no one was hurt. We ran across the street to the platoon CP. Joe DeLibero was the last man in. A piece of shrapnel tore his thigh. Two men dragged him inside.

Two machine gun squads set up in the barn. 'The Reverend' Pillow was giving the boys hell. Never have I seen more inspiring leadership. He talked like a movie hero, only he meant it. Pillow's loader, Howard Curler, was pretty comical. His glasses were broken and he was using binoculars in their stead. He'd squint in myopic glory through the field glass at tanks that were no more than 150 yards away. To everybody but Curler their 88s [probably a 75mm] looked like telephone poles.

Over in the First Platoon Tom Wilson was pretty comical, too. His squad leader pointed to a tank about fifteen yards [away] with its gun leveled at their building and asked, "What do you think of that?" Laconically, "Dirty bore." Wilson replied.

Then came an order for us to withdraw as best we could. Speaking as though he were talking about the weather, Joe DeLibero asked Smith, our acting platoon sergeant, if he was to be left behind. Smitty and Peck, the platoon runner, were the last men to leave the building. They had Joe with them. We all took off like birds.

At the company CP a machine gun was set up in each door. We counted noses. In the First Squad only one man was uninjured. Klein was gone, Walters gone, Der-ickson gone, Burdzy gone. Kovac was hit in the thigh, but continued to laugh and hobble around. Fite got a nasty piece of shrapnel through his hand. Joe DeLibero lay looking up at the ceiling. Some guys stepped on him; he didn't say anything.*

While this attack was in progress, Pfc. Virgil E. Hamilton, Company D dri-ver, was bringing Bernie H. Heck, transportation corporal, and Earl N. Vulgamore, Company D's mail clerk, forward in his jeep. The three men had volunteered to take supplies and ammunition into Butzdorf. Midway between the two towns, they spotted four German tanks headed toward them on the narrow road they were traveling. Hamilton adroitly swerved the jeep behind a farmhouse before they were discovered by the approaching panzers. In the jeep was a bazooka and the rocket ammunition for it, destined for Company A. Although none of the men had ever used the weapon, they decided to put it to use. The three entered the demolished farmhouse and hastily assembled the bazooka and unpacked some rockets. There were a few moments of puzzlement over the proper technique for loading, but by the time the first of the tanks had rattled within range everything was ready. Hamil-ton shouldered the tube, while Vulgamore and Heck stood by as loaders. When the leading tank had approached to within forty yards, from his concealed posi-tion behind the farmhouse, Hamilton took careful aim at the tank and pulled the trigger. There was a deafening roar and the panzer, hit squarely, burst into flames. Hamilton, spurred on by his success, let fly another round at the second panzer. The path of the rocket was a bit high. Just as it reached its mark the panzer's com-mander raised his hatch in an effort to try and discover the cause of the plight of the first panzer. Striking the inner surface of the partly opened hatch the bazooka

*History of the Ninety-fourth Infantry Division.


round ricocheted down into the tank's interior, accounting for tank number two. With an expenditure of five rounds, the third German tank was disposed of while its astonished crew attempted to locate their attackers. It was after this that the fourth tank turned tail and set out at full speed for a safer area. But there were two rockets left and the three impromptu bazookamen, overcome with the sense of their success, set out in hot pursuit. When the last rocket had been fired against tank number four at 150 yards, it shared the fate of the other three.

The three men then continued on to Butzdorf to deliver their supplies, apol-ogizing on arrival for being late and for delivering a somewhat used bazooka with-out ammunition.

Exhausted but Unbroken

Companies A and C were near total exhaustion, reduced to not much over half their strength after four days of continuous fighting and "sweating out" artillery barrages. The GIs continued to give their all and were determined to stand together until the end, an end that was beginning to seem both near and inevitable. A mes-sage received at the Battalion HQ from the commander of Company A that after-noon read: "No alternative, will fight it out to the finish."

In the face of point-blank fire from oncoming tanks, Pfc. W. T. Pillow and Jack Zebin of Company A had manned a bazooka and destroyed four enemy armored vehicles. Cpl. Duncan N. Leach, Jr., also of Company A, with a borrowed bazooka knocked out one tank, crippled another, and then calmly proceeded to pick off the occupants of the two tanks with his rifle as they emerged—all this while under intense machine gun fire.

In Butzdorf, the fighting continued throughout the afternoon. T.Sgt. William McQuade of Company D eliminated a tank with one of the remaining pole charges. When three armored vehicles converged on the section of heavy machine guns at the west end of town, Instrument Cpl. Earle F. Mousaw took charge of his machine gun section after the section leader was wounded though he was wounded too. Keeping the German tanks at bay with a bazooka, he inspired the men of the sec-tion by his own example to hold out through two more tank attacks during which the machine guns of one of the other sections were overrun.

At 1700 hours, when Lt. Stafford took stock of the situation, it looked far from good. He held some eight or nine buildings in the southern section of town while an unknown number of Germans occupied the northern tip of Butzdorf. The Ger-mans had set up a mortar in their part of town, and their panzers were roaming the streets. In fact, one of the panzers was parked just outside the window of the company's CP. Company A had run out of bazooka ammunition, and the supply of pole and satchel charges was exhausted. Of Lt. Baker's platoon there was only one heavy machine gun still in action. The sole method of communication with the town was Lt. Morrison's artillery radio and this set, while it seemed to be send-ing, did not receive—perhaps messages there getting through and perhaps not. In addition, there were thirty wounded in the CP, and several prisoners.


Three members of Company D, 376th Infantry, Ninety-fourth Division, grim and resolute, in the ruins of either Butzdorf or Tettingen. Two of the men pictured (exactly which is not determined) are Cpl. Bernie H. Heck of Danvers, Illinois, and Pfc. Virgil Hamilton of Joplin, Missouri, who used a bazooka to knock out four German tanks.

The American commanders back in Tettingen assumed that at least a por-tion of Company A was still holding out in Butzdorf. The town was strangely silent, but German tanks could be seen patrolling the streets, and there was still occasional firing.

At about this time, word came that the Second Bn., 376th, would relieve the First Bn. that night and Lt. Col. Martin, commander of Company F, appeared on the scene in Tettingen with his men right behind him. As final plans were made for the relief, Lt. Chalkley, assisted by men from Company F, was instructed to clear Tettingen of snipers. At about 1700 hours, two squads, one under Sgt. Soca and the other led by T.Sgt. Harold B. Price, assaulted the building previously used as a platoon command post while two squads of Company F attacked the building beside it. Sgt. Drury and several other men who had been wounded and captured while defending these buildings were freed and eighteen prisoners were taken.

Once the town was cleared of snipers, the tank destroyers, urged on by their company commander, scored several hits on German vehicles. A self-propelled gun parked just outside Butzdorf was set on fire and exploding ammunition made a noisy and dangerous display of fireworks. Hits were also scored on three panz-ers as they attempted to cross an antitank ditch east of town. Two tanks northeast of Butzdorf were set on fire and at least one of the supporting tanks on the ridge


was damaged. As darkness fell, the area was lit by the glare of burning armor. The constant artillery and mortar fire and the noise of exploding ammunition covered up the sound of German recovery vehicles that succeeded in towing off three of the damaged tanks before they could be burned.

But the situation was desperate in Butzdorf. Under constant shelling and counterattack the men of Company A and B's First Platoon fought moving from house to house as they shifted defenses by "mouse-holing" through the walls with blocks of TNT. They had beaten the best the Germans had to offer and held what they had taken, but they were reaching the limit of their endurance. Casualties had reduced the company to less than 100 men, and many of the survivors were nearly helpless from trench foot, frostbite, and fatigue. One way or another the end was nearing. That evening, after further tank attacks had again threatened to overrun the streets, orders finally came to pull out and fall back to Tettingen under cover of the heavy smoke that was to be laid down by artillery. The time was 1830.

The Division CG directed that Butzdorf be abandoned since it could not readily be resupplied or relieved and since it had served its purpose of bringing about considerable attrition among the German forces. Meanwhile, Lt. Stafford, the CO in Butzdorf, had already arrived at a similar conclusion. Lacking the strength or the ammunition to counterattack, and since the company's position was now considered indefensible, Lt. Stafford decided to withdraw before he was overrun by a German assault during the night.

On his one-way radio Lt. Morrison called for a covering artillery barrage. His request managed to get through, the 919th and 284th FA Bns. obliging. Men pulled doors off their hinges and loaded them with litter cases while the walking wounded moved up the hill to Tettingen. Sleet had started to fall, and the night was so black that visibility was reduced to a matter of inches. Platoon leaders counted their men by touch. Lt. Hodges, checking his platoon, suddenly felt an odd shaped pack and an overcoat of peculiar texture. Pulling the man out of line, he discovered that an armed German infantryman had innocently wandered in among his men. The intruder was quickly disarmed and informed of his POW status as the platoon pulled out.

When the survivors of the First Bn. reached Tettingen, they found the Sec-ond Bn., 376th Infantry, in position to defend that village. Although no one could have known it at the time, the high-water mark of the German raid through the Orscholz Switch had come and gone.

The valor of the First Bn., 376th Infantry, at Butzdorf and Tettingen stands as an impressive monument to the unit's history. Swiftly and skillfully the men had hammered the first crack in the Siegfried Switch Line and had stubbornly held their initial salient against incredible odds. During that time an estimated ten Germans were killed to every one American, with another 170 taken prisoner, and many tanks and half-tracks left silent, broken, and burning on the field as a testimony to the valor of the infantrymen and that of their artillery counterparts. Far outnumber-ing the Americans, one of the best divisions the Germans could put in the field at the time had more than met its match in the men of the First Battalion.

Bibliography

Location of Records

Record locations and identification numbers are indicated in brackets [] after the name and date of the record.

Archival Records

First Infantry Division G-3 Operations Report, November-December 1944, "Restoration and Defense of the Bütgenbach-Weywertz-Weimes Sector." [Suitland, 301-3.]

First Infantry Division Combat Interviews, 16-31 December 1944, "German Breakthrough." [Suitland, File 7 Box 24012.]

"I SS-PzK In the Ardennes, Part 1: Preparation and Strategic Concentration." [National Archives Manuscript #B-577.]

"The I SS-PzK During the Ardennes Offensive" [National Archives Manuscript #B-779.] "First SS-PzRegt (16-19 December 1944): An Interview with Oberst Joachim Peiper."

[National Archives Manuscript ETHINT 11.] "First SS-PzRegt (11-24 December 1944): An Interview with Oberst Joachim Peiper."

[National Archives Manuscript ETHINT 10.] Second Infantry Division G-4 After Action Report, December 1944. [Suitland, 302 -4 to

302-4.1.] Second Infantry Division News Items, Headquarters 2d ID, 17,19 December 1944. [Suit-

land, 302-0.15.]

LOCATION

The Pentagon Library, Washington, DC Office of the Center of Mil i tary History, Washington, DC Washington National Records Center, Suitland, MD National Archives and Record Service, Washington, DC The Armor School Library, Fort Knox, KY The Infantry School Library, Fort Benning, GA The Library of Congress, Washington, DC US Army Mil itary History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA Fort Belvoir Van Noy Library, Fort Belvoir, VA Bibliothek fur Zeitgeschichte, Stuttgart, Germany

ABBREVIATION

O C M H Suitland National Archives Ft. Knox, KY Ft. Benning, GA

Pentagon

LOC USAMHI Ft. Belvoir, VA Stuttgart

324 Bibliography

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[Suitland, File 20 Box 24017.] Second Infantry Division Combat Interviews "German Breakthrough," 14 December

1944-16 January 1945. [Suitland, File 20 and 21 Box 24017.] Second Infantry Division Krinkelt-Rocherath Map Overlays. [Suitland, 302.3.3.] "Second SS-Panzer Division 'Das Reich,' September 1944" (in German). [National Archives

Manuscript #P-159.] "Fifth Infantry Division in the ETO," 1945; The Fifth Division Historical Section [Suit-

land, 305-0.] Fifth Infantry Division, History (Diary), July 1944-May 1945. [Suitland, 305-0.] "Fifth Panzer Army: Special Questions (Ardennes). [National Archives Manuscript #A-961.] "Fifth Panzer Army, Ardennes Offensive: General Comments." [National Archives Manu-

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#B-235.] "Fifth Panzer Army (Ardennes Offensive)." [National Archives Manuscript #B-151.] "Fifth Panzer Army (Ardennes Offensive)." [National Archives Manuscript #B-151a.] "Fifth Panzer Army Artillery (Ardennes)." [National Archives Manuscript #B-393.] Seventh Tank Destroyer Group After Action Report, 19-31 December 1944. [Ft. Knox, KY,

Call Number 807 T 502.] VIII Corps, German Breakthrough, 16-25 December 1944. [Suitland, ML 299.] VIII Corps Combat Interviews: Ardennes Operation 17 December 1944-26 January 1945.

[Suitland, Folder 350.] Ninth Infantry Regiment (Second Infantry Division) Unit Journal, December 1944. [Suit-

land, 302-INF(9)-0.7.] Tenth Infantry Regiment, History (Draft), July 1944-January 1945. [Suitland, 305-INF(10)-

0.] Tenth Infantry Regiment, After Action Reports, August 1944-May 1945. [Suitland, 305-

INF(10)-0.3.] Eleventh Infantry Regiment, History, July 1945. [Suitland, 305-INF(l l ) -0 . ] Eleventh Infantry Regiment, After Action Reports, August 1944-May 1945. [Suitland, 305-

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July-December 1944. [Suitland, 302-INF(23)-0.3.] Twenty-third Infantry Regiment (Second Infantry Division) Unit Journal, December 1944.

[Suitland, 302-INF(23)-0.7.] Twenty-sixth Infantry Regiment (First Infantry Division) After Action Report, December

1944. [Suitland, 301-INF(26)-0.3.] Twenty-sixth Infantry Regiment (First Infantry Division) Unit Journal, December

1944-February 1945. [Suitland, 301-INF(26)-0.3.] Twenty-eighth Infantry Division, After Action Report, November 1944; Division Review

No. 2, 9 November 1944, of the German 89th Division. [Suitland, 328-0.3.] Twenty-eighth Infantry Division, AGF (Army Ground Forces) Fact Sheet. [Suitland, 328-

0.] Twenty-eighth Infantry Division, After Action Report, November 1944. [Suitland, 328-

0.3.] Twenty-eighth Infantry Division Combat Interviews, "German Winter Offensive, 16-24

December 1944," Company K, 110th Infantry Regiment. [Suitland, File 78.]

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Twenty-eighth Infantry Division, 103d Engineer Combat Battalion Casualty Report, December 1944. [Suitland, 328-ENG-1.16.]

Twenty-eighth Infantry Division, 109th Field Artillery Bn After Action Report, December 1944. [Suitland, 328-FA(109)-0.3.]

Twenty-eighth Infantry Division, 109th Field Artillery Bn Official Statement of Lineage and Battle Honors. [Suitland, 328-FA(109)-0.]

Twenty-eighth Infantry Division Press Releases and Newspaper Clippings, December 1944. [Suitland, 328-0.15.]

Twenty-eighth Infantry Division Miscellaneous Historical Information, 1902-1945. [Suit-land, 328-0 .20 . ]

Twenty-eighth Infantry Division HQ Company Operations Report: The German Break-through, 16-31 December 1944. [Suitland, 328-0.3 .0 . ]

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[Suitland, 328-FA(109)-0.16.] Twenty-eighth Infantry Division, 28th QM Company After Action Report, December

1944. [Suitland, 328-QM-0 .3 . ] Twenty-eighth Infantry Division, 28th QM Company History, December 1944. [Suitland,

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2.3.] Twenty-eighth Infantry Division G-3 Journal and File, 17-20 December 1944. [Suitland,

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December 1944. [Suitland 330-CAV(0.3).] Thirtieth Infantry Division G-3 Journal, 5 - 7 August 1944. [Suitland, 330-3.2.] Thirtieth Infantry Division G-4 Report, 8 - 9 August 1944. [Suitland, 330-3.2.] Thirtieth Infantry Division Combat Interviews, "Mortain Counterattack, 6-12 August

1944." [Suitland, File 96 Box 24038.] Thirtieth Infantry Division G- l Journal and File, August 1944. [Suitland, 330-1.2.] Thirtieth Infantry Division G-2 Periodic Report, August 1944. [Suitland, 330-2.1.] Thirtieth Infantry Division G-2 Message File and Journal, August 1944. [Suitland, 330-

2.2.] Thirtieth Infantry Division G-3 After Action Report, August 1944. [Suitland, 330-3.] Thirtieth Infantry Division Divarty Journal, December 1944. [Suitland, 330-ART-0.7.] Thirtieth Infantry Division G-3 Journal, 16-18 December 1944. [Suitland, 330-3.2.] Thirtieth Infantry Division G-3 Journal, 19-21 December 1944. [Suitland, 330-3.2.] Thirtieth Infantry Division Divarty Unit Reports, 16-24 December 1944. [Suitland, 330-

ART-0.9.] Thirtieth Infantry Division Recon Troop After Action Report, December 1944. [Suitland,

330-CAV-0.3.] Thirtieth Infantry Division Divarty After Action Report, December 1944. [Suitland, 330-

ART-0.3.] Thirtieth Infantry Division G-4 After Action Report, December 1944. [Suitland, 330-4.] Thirtieth Infantry Division Field Attack Orders, December 1944. [Suitland, 330-9.] Thirtieth Infantry Division G-2 Journal, 18-20 December 1944. [Suitland, 330-2.2.] Thirtieth Infantry Division G- l Journal, 16-24 December 1944. [Suitland, 330-1.2.] Thirtieth Infantry Division G-2 Periodic Reports, 16-24 December 1944. [Suitland, 330-

2.1.] Thirtieth Infantry Division G-3 After Battle Report, 14-24 December 1944. [Suitland,

330-3. ] Thirtieth Infantry Division, 120th Inf. Regt. Unit Journal, December 1944. [Suitland, 330-

INF(120)-0.7.] "XLVII Panzer Corps in the Ardennes, The Assignment of the, (1944-45)." [National

Archives Manuscript #A-939.] "XLVII Panzer Corps in the Battle of the Ardennes." [National Archives Manuscript #A-

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land, 328-0; mislabeled as 28th ID.] Eightieth, Story of the. [Suitland, 380-0. ] Eightieth Infantry Division History. [Suitland, 380-0.2.] Eightieth Infantry Division After Action Report, September 1944. [Suitland, 380-0.3.] Eightieth Infantry Division Military Intelligence Interrogation Reports. [Suitland, 380-

2.0.] Eightieth Infantry Division G-2 Periodic Reports. [Suitland, 380-2.1.] Eightieth Infantry Division G-2 Journal. [Suitland, 380-2.2.] Eightieth Infantry Division G-3 Period Reports. [Suitland, 380-3.1.] Eightieth Infantry Division G-4 Journal File. [Suitland, 380-4.3.]

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Col. Richard R. Fleisher, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 ; 6 October 1944. [Suitland, 380-2.]

Ninety-fourth Infantry Division G-3 After Action Report, January 1945. [Suitland, 394-3.]

Ninety-fourth Infantry Division AGF Fact Sheet; 15 September 1942-9 February 1946. [Suitland, 394-0 . ]

Ninety-fourth Division, Story of the, 15 September 1942-19 February 1945. [Suitland, 394-0.]

Ninety-fourth Division G-2 After Action Report; J anuary -9 May 1945. [Suitland, 394-2. ] Ninety-fourth Infantry Division History, 1921-1945. [Suitland, 394-INF(376)-0. ] Ninety-Fourth Infantry Division in World War II, History of the [Suitland, 394-0 . ] Ninety-ninth ID G-3 Journal and File, 18-22 December 1944. [Suitland, 399-3 .2 . ] Ninety-ninth Infantry Division After Action Report, December 1944. [Suitland, 399-0 .3 . ] Ninety-ninth Infantry Division G-3 Journal and File, December 1944. [Suitland, 399-3 .2 . ] Ninety-ninth Infantry Division Map Overlays. [Suitland, 399-3 .7 . ] Ninety-ninth Infantry Division Combat Interviews, "Ardennes 16-20 December 1944."

[Suitland, File 209 Box 24069. ] 101st Airborne Division Combat Interviews: "The Siege of Bastogne." [Suitland, Folder 227.] 103d Engineer Combat Battalion (28th Infantry Division) After Action Report, December

1944. [Suitland, 328-ENG-0.3. ] "104th Infantry Division: Timberwolves," 1944 [Suitland, 3104-0.] 104th Infantry Division, After Action Report, December 1944. [Suitland, 3104-0.3.] 104th Infantry Division, G-2 Journal & File, December 1944. [Suitland, 3104-2.2.] 104th Infantry Division, G-3 Periodic Report; 4 December 1944. [Suitland, 3104-3.1.] 104th Infantry Division, G-3 Journal and File, 3 December 1944. [Suitland, 3104-3.2.] 110th Infantry Regiment History (Twenty-eighth Infantry Division), 17 February 1941-25

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1944. [Suitland, ML 2159.] 112th Infantry Regiment, S-2 and S-3 Journal File, 1-10 November 1944. [Suitland, 328-

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by Randall B. Patterson (of Kentucky) 1st Lieutenant, Infantry, U.S. Army. [Suitland, 328-INF(112)9-0.3.0.]

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INF(112)7-0.3.0.] 113th Field Artillery Battalion After Action Report, June-December 1944. [Suitland, 330-

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O.3.] 118th Field Artillery Battalion After Action Report, December 1944. [Suitland, 330-FA(118)-

O.3.]

119th Infantry Regiment After/After Action Report, August 1944. [Suitland, 330-INF(119)-O.3.]

120th Infantry Regiment History, August 1944. [Suitland, 330-INF(120).] 120th Infantry Regiment "Mortain," August 1944. [Suitland, 330-INF(120).] 120th Infantry Regiment G-3 Supporting Document, August 1944. [Suitland, 330-

INF(120).] 143d Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion History, December 1944. [Suitland, CABN-143-0.2.] 197th Field Artillery Battalion After Battle Report, August 1944. [Suitland, 330-FA(197)-

0.3.] 230th Field Artillery Battalion "Battle of Mortain," August 1944. [Suitland, 330-FA(230)-

O.3.] 254th Engineer Combat Battalion Journal, June-December 1944. [Suitland, ENBN-254-

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[Suitland, ENBN-254-0.3.] 254th Engineer Combat Battalion History Year 1944. [Suitland, ENBN-254-0.1.] 254th Engineer Combat Battalion After Action Report, July-October, December 1944.

[Suitland, ENBN-254-0.3.] 415th Infantry Regiment After Action Report, November/December 1944. [Suitland, 3104-

INF(415)-0.3.] 415th Infantry Regiment; History, 26 August 1942-31 December 1945; Chapter IX, Battle

of Lucherberg, Germany, 2 to 6 December, 1944. [Suitland, 3104-INF(415)-0.1.] 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit Journal, March 1944. [Suitland, TDBN-601-0.7.] 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion Unit Journal, March 1945. [Suitland, TDBN-601-0.7.] 607th Tank Destroyer Battalion After Action Report, June 1944-April 1945. [Ft. Knox, KY,

Call No. 8607 TD 101 AAR #575 U 847.6.] 609th Tank Destroyer Battalion After Action Report, September-December 1944. [Suit-

land, TDBN-609-0.3.] 609th Tank Destroyer Battalion After Action Report, October 1944-January 1945. [Ft.

Knox, KY, Call No. 8609 TD 101 AAR 847.7.] 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion After Action Report, August-September 1944, December

1944. [Ft. Knox, KY, Call No. 8610 TD 101.] 612th Tank Destroyer Battalion After Action Report, December 1944. [Ft. Knox, KY, Call

No. 8612 TD 101 AAR #452 847.9; Suitland, TDBN-612-0.3.] 612th Tank Destroyer Battalion History, 25 June 1942-May 1945, pg. 12-15. [Suitland,

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820-0.3 . ] 820th Tank Destroyer Battalion HQ Company After Action Report, December 1944. [Suit-

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[Suitland, TDBN-820-PL( ls t Rcn)-0.3. ] 820th Tank Destroyer Battalion Second Recon. Pit. After Action Report, December 1944.

[Suitland, TDBN-820-PL(2nd Rcn)-0.3 . ] 821st Tank Destroyer Battalion After Action Report, January-December 1944, Febru-

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Index of Military Units Units are divided by nation, then arranged numerically. German units whose designations do not begin with a num-ber are arranged alphabetically before the numerical listing.

British units:

Second Tactical Air Force 35

German units: Army Group B 19, 103-104, 116, 147, 313 Army Group G 313 Division Number 462 51, 63 "Gross-Deutschland" Panzergrenadier

Division 50 OB WEST 147 Panzerbrigade 150 241 Panzerzerstörer Kp. 50 I SS Panzer Korps 216, 234, 274, 303 1st SS Panzer Division ("Leibstandarte

Adolf Hitler") 20, 21, 24, 26, 29, 38, 39, 44, 216, 219, 227, 231, 234, 236, 283

1st SS Panzer Regt. 22, 25, 27, 30 1st SS Panzerjäger Bn. 255 2d SS Panzer Division ("Das Reich") 20,

21, 38-41, 43, 44, 216 II SS Panzer Korps 216 2d SS Panzergrenadier Division 50 2d SS Panzergrenadier Regt. 25 2d (Viennese) Panzer Division 20-21,

25, 30, 36,194-195, 208-211 3rd Fallschirmjäger Division 149, 159,

185,187, 216, 228, 279, 285 3d Panzer Regt. 30 3d Panzergrenadier Division 50, 63, 72,

78, 80 4th SS Panzergrenadier Regt. ("Der

Führer") 21, 38 -42 5th Panzer Army 103-104, 189, 195- 196,

213, 216, 274 6th Panzer Army 189, 216, 235, 274 6th SS Panzer Army 189

7th Army 87,103-104,115,116,189, 274 8th Fallschirmjäger Regt. 149, 159,174,

185 8th Panzergrenadier Regt. 50, 63 9th Fallschirmjäger Regt. 149, 185 9th SS Panzer Division 216 11th GAF Fortress Bn. 97 11th Panzer Division 312-313, 314 12th Panzerjäger (Abteilung) Bn. 235 12th SS Artillery Regt. 236, 274, 283,

288 12th SS Flak Bn. 283 12th SS Panzer Division ("Hitlerjugend"

or HJ) 153, 216, 217, 220-221, 226, 234-236 , 241, 252, 258, 269, 2 7 3 -275, 282-284 , 286, 288, 291, 293, 295, 302

12th SS Panzer Regt. 248, 258, 269, 273, 283, 286, 288, 294, 299

12th SS Panzerjäger Bn. 236, 239-240 , 245, 253, 274, 286, 294

12th SS Pionier Bn. 283 12th Volksgrenadier Division 87, 116,

216, 218-219, 222, 227, 234, 235, 241, 284

XIII SS Infantrie Korps 63 14th Machine Gun Ersatz Bn. 51 15th Panzer Regt. 313-314 15th Panzergrenadier Division 50, 78, 80 15th Volkswerfer Brigade 195 17th SS Panzergrenadier Division ("Gotz

von Berlichingen") 20, 50, 71-72, 78, 80, 85

25th SS Panzergrenadier Regt. 235-236 , 238-240 , 245, 248, 274, 283, 294

26th Replacement Training Bn. 207 26th SS Panzergrenadier Regt. 274, 283,

340 Index of Military Units

284, 286, 287-290, 294-295 , 2 9 9 -300

26th Volksgrenadier Division 190, 193-197, 201, 205-208, 211, 213-214

38th Panzerjäger Regt. 30 39th Fusilier Regt. 197, 202 XLVII Panzer Korps 20, 44, 63, 195-

196, 203, 214 48th Grenadier Regt. 223-224 , 232 49th SS Panzergrenadier Brigade 51 60th Panzergrenadier Regt. 104 66th Antitank Bn. 315 LXVII Army Korps 216 LXXIV Korps 87, 104, 116 77th Grenadier Regt. 197, 201-203, 205,

207, 209

78th Grenadier Regt. 206-208 , 213-214 LXXXI Korps 149, 187 LXXXII Korps 313-314 89th Infantry Division 87, 90-91, 102-

104,115-116,120,131,134,147 103d Panzer Bn. 50, 80 110th Panzergrenadier Regt. 313-315, 317 111th Panzergrenadier Regt. 313 115th Panzergrenadier Regt. 50, 71, 80 116th Panzer Bn. 104, 111, 115, 134 116th Panzer Reconnaissance Bn. 104, 134 116th (Windhund) Panzer Division 20,

104,115-116,120,126,131 130th Panzer Lehr Division 194-196,

206 -207 130th Panzer Regt. 195 130th Panzerjäger Bn. 195 146th Antitank Bn. 104 156th Panzergrenadier Regt. 104, 115 239th StuG Bn. 195 246th Volksgrenadier Division 149, 150,

187, 216 272d Volksgrenadier Division 87, 103,

115-116,120 275th Volksgrenadier Division 87, 91, 97,

103,115, 116 277th Panzerjäger Bn. 227 277th Volksgrenadier Division 216, 218,

221, 226-227, 234-235, 238, 258, 274 282d Ersatz & Ausbildungs (Infantry)

Bn. 51, 63, 80 326th Volksgrenadier Division 216 344th Volksgrenadier Division 87 347th Volksgrenadier Division 115, 116 353d Volksgrenadier Division 87 403d Volksartillery Brigade 149 404th Volksgrenadier Regt. 149, 164 405th Volksartillery Brigade 149

4l6th Infantry Division 310, 313 506th Heavy Panzer Bn. 186 559th Panzerjäger Bn. 195 560th Heavy Panzerjäger Bn. 258, 262,

273-274, 285, 288, 291, 293, 296 582d Volksgrenadier Division 193 600th Pionier Bn. 195, 206 689th Volksgrenadier Regt. 149 698th Replacement Bn. 85 714th Grenadier Regt. 313, 315 766th Volksartillerie Korps 195 901st Panzergrenadier Regt. 195 902d Panzergrenadier Regt. 195 983d Grenadier Regt. 103 984th Grenadier Regt. 97,103 985th Grenadier Regt. 103 989th Grenadier Regt. 226-227, 235,

258 990th Grenadier Regt. 226 1012th StuG Kp. 2 2 3 , 2 3 5 1026th StuG Kp. 194 1055th Regt. 103-104, 106,108, 111, 115,

131, 134 1056th Regt. 104, 115,120, 131,134,

138-139,143 1277th Sturmgeschütz Kp. 227

U.S. units: 1st Army 19, 87-88 , 90, 113, 142, 148-

149, 242, 251, 272, 278 1st Infantry Division 20-22 , 36, 153,

159, 168, 217, 221, 275, 278, 282, 284, 288, 290, 295, 303

2d Infantry Division 217, 219, 221-222, 226, 232, 236, 239, 242-243, 248, 252, 255, 258-259 , 276, 295, 303

2d Infantry Regt. 45, 49, 51, 53, 81, 84-85 , 275

3rd Armored Division 35, 44 3rd Army 19, 45, 52, 61, 73, 78, 87,149,

195, 214, 305 -306 3rd Cavalry Group 306 3rd Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron

81 4th Armored Division 67, 81 4th Infantry Division 35, 125 5th Armored Division 88, 138, 142 V Corps 88, 92, 103,125,142, 147- 148,

217, 242, 248, 274-275, 278, 281, 285 5th Field Artillery Bn. 285, 288 5th Field Artillery Group 49 5th Infantry Division 45-46 , 48, 51, 67,

73, 75, 81, 85 5th Medical Bn. 47

Index of Military Units 341

5th Reconnaissance Troop 84 7th Armored Division 45, 49, 51, 80,

84 -85 , 293 7th Army 149, 305, 314 VII Corps 19, 20, 87 -89 , 9 2 , 1 2 5 , 1 4 8 -

150, 153,188 7th Engineer Combat Bn. 47 -49 , 53, 77 7th Field Artillery Bn. 281 VIII Corps 19,193, 217 8th Infantry Division 199 9th Air Force 17,61 9th Armored Division 293 9th Army 87,148, 272 9th Infantry Division 88, 91 9th Infantry Regt. 219, 221, 242 -246 ,

248 -254 , 2 5 8 - 2 5 9 , 268, 275

IX Tactical Air Command 35 10th Armored Division 306 10th Infantry Regt. 45, 46, 49, 51, 53,

58, 62 -65 , 67, 69 -72 , 74, 76 -79 , 8 2 - 8 6

11th Infantry Regt. 45 -46 , 49-51, 53, 6 7 - 7 0 , 79 -80 , 8 4 - 8 6

12th Army Group 61, 215 XII Corps 61, 67, 306 15th Field Artillery Bn. 244, 246 18th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron

228, 231 18th Infantry Regt. 301, 303 XIX Corps 21 19th Field Artillery Bn. 48 XIX Tactical Air Command 61, 73,

82 XX Corps 45, 61, 67, 71, 73, 81, 85,

3 0 6 - 3 0 7 20th Engineer Combat Bn. 91, 100-101,

105,110, 113, 116,122,126-128, 131-134,137,139,143-144

21st Army Group 87 21st Field Artillery Bn. 48 23rd Armored Infantry Bn. 81, 84 -85 23rd Infantry Regt. 219-221, 232, 234,

236-241, 243 -245 , 253, 2 5 8 - 2 5 9 26th Infantry Division 306 26th Infantry Regt. 275, 278 -279 , 281,

284 -286 , 288-291, 301-303 28th Infantry Division 88 -92 , 94, 99,

103, 109, 115-116,120-121, 125, 128, 138 ,142 ,147-148 ,189-193 ,196-197 , 204, 213-214, 294

29th Engineer Combat Bn. 91 30th Infantry Division 20, 22 -24 , 30,

35 -36 , 44 , 153 31st Tank Bn. 81 ,84

32d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron 230

32d Field Artillery Bn. 281 33rd Field Artillery Bn. 281, 285, 288 35th Infantry Division 35, 67 37th Field Artillery Bn. 253 38th Infantry Regt. 219, 221, 242, 248,

250 -253 , 256-261, 267 -269 , 271 46th Field Artillery Bn. 47 -49 , 63 48th Fighter-Bomber Group 76 50th Field Artillery Bn. 49 78th Infantry Division 147 80th Infantry Division 67 84th Chemical Company (Smoke Gener-

ator) 45, 49, 51, 58, 74, 75 87th Armored Field Artillery Bn. 152 90th Infantry Division 84, 306 94th Infantry Division 306-307 , 314 95th Infantry Division 306 99th Infantry Division 216-217, 219,

221-222, 227 -228 , 230 -232 , 239, 242 -243 , 245, 252, 254 -255 , 2 7 6 -279, 295, 303

101st Cavalry Regt. 165 102d Cavalry Group 116 103rd Engineer Combat Bn. 192, 201,

213-214 103rd Medical Bn. 124 104th Infantry Division 149-150, 152-

153,177, 187-188 105th Engineer Combat Bn. 33 106th Infantry Division 193, 228, 293 108th Field Artillery Bn. 107, 111 109th Field Artillery Bn. 192, 203, 205 109th Infantry Regt. 89, 9 2 - 9 3 , 1 0 4 -

105 ,125-126 ,140-143 ,145-146 ,192 110th Infantry Regt. 89, 91, 93 -94 , 105,

111, 121,125, 128-129, 132- 134, 137, 141 ,143-145 ,148 ,189- 194 ,198-200, 202 -204 , 208, 213- 214

112th Infantry Regt. 90-91, 94, 9 9 - 101, 103-104,109-110,116-117,119-124, 126,129,134,136-137,141,143-148, 190

117th Infantry Regt. 20, 21-23, 25 -26 , 30, 33, 3 5 - 3 6

119th Infantry Regt. 43 120th Infantry Regt. 36 -38 , 43, 44 146th Engineer Combat Bn. 131, 140 160th Engineer Combat Bn. 48 -49 , 53,

69, 77, 81, 83 16lst Chemical (Smoke Generator) Com-

pany 75 177th Field Artillery Bn. 49

342 Index of Military Units

188th Field Artillery Bn. 152 203d Field Artillery Group 49 204th Engineer Combat Bn. 48 -49 , 5 2 -

53, 57, 74-76 , 77, 81 204th Field Artillery Group 49 229th Field Artillery Bn. 107, 111, 117,

118,120,138 254th Engineer Combat Bn. 276, 2 7 8 -

279 270th Field Artillery Bn. 49 277th Field Artillery Bn. 49 284th Field Artillery Bn. 48, 322 317th Infantry Regt. 67 318th Infantry Regt. 67 319th Engineer Combat Bn. 308, 312 319th Infantry Regt. 67 329th Engineer Combat Bn. 152, 170-171 365th Fighter-Bomber Group 120 371st Fighter-Bomber Group 82 376th Infantry Regt. 306-307, 310, 312,

321-322 376th Regimental Cannon Co. 309 393d Infantry Regt. 217-220, 226, 232,

235-240 , 244-245, 250, 259 394th Infantry Regt. 217-220, 222,

226-228, 232 395th Infantry Regt. 217-218 396th Fighter-Bomber Squadron 108 406th Fighter-Bomber Group 61 406th Squadron 82 413th Infantry Regt. 150,152-153,187 4l4th Antiaircraft Artillery Bn. 288 4l4th Infantry Regt. 150, 152, 187-188 415th Infantry Regt. 150, 152-153, 165,

182, 187-188 415th Regimental Cannon Co. 177-178 434th Armored Field Artillery Bn. 49 447th Antiaircraft Artillery Bn. 192 474th Fighter Group 120 492d Squadron 76 501st Engineer Light Pontoon Co. 170 512th Squadron 73 537th Light Pontoon Co. 48, 53, 74, 77,

81 551st Heavy Pontoon Bn. 48, 82 555th Antiaircraft Artillery (Automatic

Weapons) Bn. (Mobile) 152-153 558th Field Artillery Bn. 49

607th Tank Destroyer Bn. 308, 314 612th Tank Destroyer Bn. 230-231, 258,

278 613th Tank Destroyer Bn. 302 623d Light Equipment Co. 48 630th Tank Destroyer Bn. 190, 193 634th Tank Destroyer Bn. 289, 300 644th Tank Destroyer Bn. 244-245,

256, 258 687th Field Artillery Bn. 192, 198 692d Tank Destroyer Bn. 152, 170, 175,

178, 183 695th Field Artillery Bn. 49 707th Tank Bn 94-96 ,100 ,105 , 109,

112-114, 118-119,122,124-125, 132-133,135,141,143,146,148,190, 192, 204-205

735th Tank Bn. 47, 49, 75-76 , 81, 84 739th Field Artillery Bn. 49 741st Tank Bn. 217, 238, 251, 258,

269 750th Tank Bn. 152, 170-171, 175,

178-179 773d Field Artillery Bn. 49 801st Tank Destroyer Bn. 220, 229-231,

234, 245, 259 812th Chemical Bn. 308 814th Tank Destroyer Bn. 81, 84 818th Tank Destroyer Bn. 47, 49, 7 5 -

76, 80-81, 84 823d Tank Destroyer Bn. 22, 30, 35,

37 -38 , 41, 43 893d Tank Destroyer Bn. 116-119, 121,

124-125,127,129,141,143,148 919th Field Artillery Bn. 308, 317, 322 924th Field Artillery Bn. 244 929th Field Artillery Bn. 164,178,182 943d Field Artillery Bn. 49 955th Field Artillery Bn. 288, 303 987th Field Artillery Bn. 152 989th Treadway Bridge Co. 48, 53, 77,

81 1103d Engineer Combat Group 47, 51,

53, 58, 83 1171st Engineer Combat Group 89, 91,

116, 128, 139 1340th Engineer Combat Group 131-134,

138-139,144-145

General Index

Aachen 87, 88 , 149 ,153 ,186 , 217 l 'Abbaye-Blanche 3 6 - 4 4 Adams, 1st Lt. George 253-265 , 268 Allen, Lt. Col. Jack G. 235, 237 -239 ,

245, 250 Allen, Lt. Roy E. 246 Allen, Gen. Terry del la Mesa 150, 187 Allen, Sgt. Walton R. 109, 114 Alsace 313 Alsatians 226 Ames, Sgt. R. T. 181 Anderson, Capt. Harry 70, 80 Anderson, Capt. Lewis R. 71-72 Andrew, Lt. Tom 37 -38 , 40-41, 4 3 - 4 4 Andrews, Pfc. Walter A. 80 Antwerp 87, 215, 303 Appleton, Wisconsin 161 Ardennes 87, 88, 91, 147, 190-191,

193-194,196, 215, 217, 233, 273, 305 -306 , 314

Ardennes Offensive 186, 189, 195, 213, 274, 313

Army Special Training Program (ASTP) 182

Arnaville 4 5 - 8 6 Arras 194 Arry 47, 50, 56, 60, 62 -63 , 65 -66 , 7 2 -

73, 79, 82, 84 Ars-sur-Moselle 76 Aubel, Belgium 275, 278 Avranches 19-20, 35, 36

Baker, Lt. 320 Bane, Capt. Frank P. 139 Barcellona, Lt. Gaetano 251 Barnett, 2d Lt. Wayne E. 147 Barrias, Pvt. 27 Barsanti, Col. 271 Bartelt, Medic Milton 64, 71

Barton, Sgt. Jack L. 105, 110 Bassafranca 281 Bastogne 190, 192, 195-197, 203, 206,

208, 211, 213, 302 Battle of the Bulge 36, 272 Baughn, 2d Lt. Jack H. 131 Bayerlein, Lt. Gen. Fritz 195, 206 Bayon 67 Bayonville 4 9 - 5 0 Beckes, T.Sgt. Carl 120 Bell, Col. Robert P. 45 -47 , 49, 62, 65,

77 Berg 267 Berg, Sgt. 26 Berlin 120 Besch 306 Bickerstaff, Sgt. Ted 246 Bield 234 -235 Bills, S.Sgt. Cline 80 Birdsong, Maj. Wi l l iam H. 67 -70 , 79 Birks, Col . Hammond 38, 44 Blaskowitz, Gen. Johannes 313 Bockholtz 192, 198, 200, 205, 207, 211 Bois D'Arry 57 Bois des Anneaux 47, 56 Bois des Gaumont 57, 70-71, 7 8 - 7 9 Le Bois du Pare 23 -24 , 26, 35 Bone, Sgt. Otis 247 Bonn 149 Bookter, Lt. 24 Boos, Col . Francis 248, 250 -252 , 257,

267 Borders, 2d Lt. Ray M. 118 Borg 3 0 5 - 3 0 6 Botts, Capt. 300 Bowden, Capt. Henry C. 313 Bradford, Pennsylvania 94 Bradley, Gen. Omar 19, 92, 215 Brandenberger, Gen. Erich 104, 115 Breckinridge, Lt. Col . Wil l iam M. 49

344 General Index

Brest 19 Bretal, Sgt. Alexander 143 Brittany 19, 217, 306 -307 Brockenschmidt, SS Capt. 245 Brodeur, Pfc. Charles 182 Brugler, Cpl. Russell D. 61 Bruns, Maj. Gen. Walter 102, 115 Buchholz 219 Buchholz Farm 228 Buchholz Forst 234 Buchholz Station 217-218, 230 Buchmann, SS 2d Lt. 245 Buckley, Capt. W.H. 187

Büllingen 219, 227, 236, 252-253 , 271, 274-295 , 299-300 , 302

Burns, Bob 15 Burns, Sgt. George E. 183-185 Butgenbach 219, 221, 274-290 , 2 9 4 -

295, 300, 302-303 Bütgenbacher Heck 279, 281, 282, 284,

287, 294-295 , 298-299 , 303 Butzdorf 305 -322

Caen 194,273 Cafe Schincker 192 Caldwell, Maj. Samuel W. 310 Cally, Pfc. Joseph 127 Camp Elsenborn 232, 236, 278 Cance River 36, 41 Cannon, S.Sgt. Leo L. 123 Carr, 1st Lt. Francis L. 54 Case, Lt. Versel 187 Chafin, T.Sgt. Harry O. 69, 70 Chalkley, Lt. 316 Chambley 45, 47, 53, 65 Cheatham, Sgt. Thomas R. 161, 172 Chmura, Capt. W.M. 111 Christensen, Maj. R.C. 122, 137 Christianson, Cpl. Walter 27 Cipra, S.Sgt. Benjamin A.P., Jr. 138 Clarke, 2d Lt. John J. 109, 114,119 Clemson University 278 Clerf River 189-192,195,197-198,

201-202, 206, 208-209 , 211 Clervaux 191-192, 197, 201, 203,

213 Clise, Lt. 241 Clough, Maj. C. 187 Cochran, Col. John H. 150,153, 166,168 Cole, Hugh 258 Cole, Capt. Sidney C. 117 Collier, S.Sgt. Noah 295 -297 Collins, Lt. 175

Collins, Gen. J. Lawton 19, 125 Cologne (Köln) 87, 104 Congressional Medal of Honor 130, 298 Consthum 192, 213 Cornelius, Lt. James W. 312 Corny 47, 56, 63, 65, 67, 69-71, 73,

79 -80 Cota, Maj. Gen. Norman D. 90-91, 94,

103, 105, 114, 116, 118,122,124-125, 128, 131, 136, 140, 142, 147,190, 204

Cote de Faye 47, 49 -50 , 63, 70-71 Cottingham, Lt. Col. Levin B. 51, 75 Cox, Sgt. 73 Creegan, Capt. Thomas F. 138, 144 Creel, Sgt. George 230 Crete 12 Crévéchamps 67 Croan, Pvt. Charles F. 316 Cupelli, 1st Lt. Ralph R. 53, 62, 6 5 - 6 6 Cushman, Lt. 24 -26 , 35

D-Day 275, 280 Daley, Col. Edmund K. 116, 128, 131 Dana, Maj. Richard A. 121, 135 Dane, Lt. Sidney P. 269 Daniel, Lt. Col. Derrill M. 278-282,

290-291, 293-294 , 299, 301-303 D'Anillo, S.Sgt. Carmine F. 78 -79 Danowski, 1st Lt. Thomas 165-167, 172,

175,179,187 Dasburg 191, 193, 195,197 Davidson, Lt. 182 Davis, Pvt. Charles 167-168,173,175-

176,178-179,186 Davis, Brig. Gen. George A. 111-113, 122,

131,141-143,145-146 Davis, Capt. Wil l iam B. 53, 59-61 Detroit, Michigan 182 Devine, Brig. Gen. John M. 84 Devlin, Lt. 202 Dickens, Lt. Col. Randolph C. 46 Dietrich, SS Gen. Josef "Sepp" 216 Dieulouard 67 Dille, 1st Lt. Eugene N. 61-62, 6 5 - 6 6 Di Pietro, Cpl. 70 Do-17 24 Dodson, Pfc. Wilbur H. 57 Doff, Pfc. 158 Doherty, Capt. Henry R. 113 Dolenc, T.Sgt. Edward 224 Dom Butgenbach 189, 278, 281, 283 -

285, 288, 291, 294-295 , 298, 300, 303-304

General Index 345

Domane Bütgenbach 278-279 , 282, 284 -286 , 288 -290 , 294-295 , 297, 300, 302

Donnange 190, 192 Dornot 45 -47 , 50-51, 63, 67, 68, 80, 81,

85 Dorsey, 1st Lt. Dan 172,177 Douglas, Lt. Col . Robert H. 222 Drauffelt 192, 198, 201, 204, 211 Drosch, Johann 253 Drosch, Paul 253 Drosch house 259 -260 , 262, 265 Drury, Sgt. 321 Ducat, Sgt. Harry 161, 163-164,173 Dunkirk 216

Düren 87, 97, 149, 187 Durwiss 153 Dutko, 1st Lt. George 55-56 , 62, 72, 78

Echtz 150, 175 Edmund, 1st Lt. Curtis M. 117,121,135 Eichelsberg hill 222 Eichen, Lt. Sid 37, 42, 44 Eisenhower, Gen. 87 Eisler, 1st Lt. Walter E., Jr. 241 Elsenborn 267 -268 , 281 Elsenborn Ridge 217, 222, 252, 263,

275, 303 Emerich, Lt. Howard O. 269 Erickson, Capt. Reynold 37, 39 Ericsson, Pvt. Alfred 26, 2 8 - 2 9 Eschweiler 153, 170-171 Evans, Sgt. 173

Falaise 215 Fallingbostel 195 Le Fantay 21, 23, 26, 2 8 - 3 0 Farrell, Sgt. Grover 270 Feiker, Capt . Frederick 198, 200 -202 ,

204-214 Fleig, 1st Lt. Raymond E. 105, 109-110,

112-115, 118-119, 122, 130, 146 Flood, Lt. Col . Albert M. 94 ,102-103 ,

109, 111, 122 Flynn, 1st Lt. Thomas 199, 201, 210, 212 Focke-Wulf FW-190 43 Fort Benning, Georgia 165 Fort Driant 46 -47 , 51, 63, 70, 85 Fort Jeanne d'Arc 51 Fort Marival 51 Fort St. Blaise 47, 63, 82 Fort Sommy 47, 63, 82

La Foulelaye 26 Fox, Lt. 313 Foxgrover, Sgt. Charles 316 Frankland, Lt. Col. Robert 26, 2 9 - 3 0 Frear, Capt . Seth R. 135 French Riviera 148 Frenz 150,152-154, 159,165,170, 174 Froitscheidt 98 Fuller, Col. Hurley E. 190, 192, 204, 214 Fuller, 1st Lt. Jack W. 117-118, 124,

127-128,141

Gardner, Pfc. Lewis 137 Gary, Pfc. Charles 180 Geilenkirchen 186

Gemünd 195,197 George, 1st Lt. Wil l iam 109, 119, 123-

124 Georgia, University of 55 Germeter 90-91, 94, 98-99,101, 104, 111,

114-117, 122-123, 128, 140- 141 Gerow, Gen. Leonard 88, 125, 142, 148,

242 Goffigon, 1st Lt. Long H. 236-241 Goggins, Pvt. Thomas H. 316 Grand la Dainie 22 -23 , 26, 29, 36,

3 9 - 4 0 , 43 Granville, Lt. John C. 246-247 , 251 Greenberg, 2d Lt. Karl 54 Greene, Lt. George 22 -24 , 26, 28, 30,

3 2 - 3 4 , 36 Greentree, Pfc. John 61 Griffin, S.Sgt. Leslie W. 78 Grindhausen 190 Groenveld, Sgt. 208 ,212 Guy, 1st Lt. Robert B. 56

Hahm, Gen. Walther 313 Hallahan, Capt . Francis J. 165-167, 176,

178-179,187 Hallowell, 1st Lt. Wil l iam H. 62, 79 Hamilton, Pfc. Virgil E. 319 Hamlett , Cpl . Thomas W. 132 Hammelburg, Germany 214 Hancock, Maj . Wi l l i am F. 243, 247 -248 Hansen, 1st Lt. Carl E. 60, 62, 66 Hardy, Sgt. Sam 26, 28 -29 , 36 Harris, Capt . George A. 114 Harris, Joseph 298 Harris, 1st Lt. Leo E. 54, 56 Harvey, Capt. James 251 Hatzfeld, Lt. Col. Theodore S. 94

346 General Index

Haug, Lt. Odvar 73 Haughey, Maj. Wilfred H., Jr. 49 -50 ,

54, 57, 62 Hays, Maj. Stanley 86 Hazam, Lt. Mitchell J. 80 Hazlett, Maj. Robert T. 103, 110,122,

136

Heartbreak Crossroads 243 Heck, Cpl. Bernie H. 319 Heinerscheid 190, 192, 213 Hellendorf 306 Henbest, Lt. Col. Ross C. 192 Hess, Sgt. 178, 181 Hesse, Col. 102 Heydte, von der 303 Higgins, Sgt. 23, 25, 33 high velocity armor-piercing (HVAP)

143

Hightower, Lt. Col. John H. 233 Hils, Capt. 296 Hinski, Lt. Eugene 251 Hitler, Adolf 19, 190,193-194, 196-197,

215- 216, 304 Hitler Youth ("HJ") 273 Hobbs, Pvt. James C. 316 Hodges, Gen. Courtney 87-88 , 90, 92,

113,125,142, 242 Hodges, Lt. 322 Hohen Berg 276, 284 Hohes Venn 216 Hollerath 2 2 6 , 2 3 5 , 2 8 3 Holtz, Lt. Charles S. 54 Holzheim 228 Holzhum 192, 202-203 , 213 Honsfeld 219, 227-232, 234, 276, 278,

294, 298 Horn, 1st Lt. George E. 113, 116,139 Hoscheid 192, 205, 213 Hosingen 192, 197-198, 201-214 Hostrup, Capt. Bruce M. 99, 100, 105,

110,113-114,119,122, 146 Hotel Claravallis 192 Hoven 150 Howard, Maj. Thomas L. 77 Huertgen 91-92,104,125 Huertgen Forest 87, 147,149, 190, 199,

217, 275, 294 Hungary 194 Hünningen 219-220, 231-234, 279,

294 Hunter, Lt. 201 Huston, 2d Lt. Robert E. 100-101, 105,

113,116 Hutter, Lt. 212

Huyck, Capt. John B. Ill Inde River 149-151,155-157,166,170,

175,187-188 Inden 150,152-154, 165, 171-172,174,

187-188 International Highway 224, 226, 237 Irwin, Maj. Gen. LeRoy 45, 67, 78, 80,

82, 84 Isley, Lt. Col. Carl J. 131 Izzo, 2d Lt. Louis J. 127

Jabos see P-47 Jagdpanther 14, 269, 273-274, 280, 289,

292-293 , 296 jagdpanzer 30, 206, 241, 245-249, 255,

269, 285-292 , 294, 302 Jagdpanzer IV 195, 231, 262, 269, 2 7 3 -

275 Jagdpanzer IV/48 236, 238, 240, 274,

286, 288, 290, 293 Jagdpanzer 38(t) Hetzer 194, 227 Jans-Bach creek 235, 240 Jarrett, Capt. W.H. 201-204, 207-210,

212-214 Jenkins, Sgt. 29 Jenski, T.Sgt. Walter E. 60 Jentsch, Pvt. Arthur 26 Johns, 2d Lt. Benjamin 116, 126 Johnson, Lt. Col. James R. 49, 63, 77 Johnson, T.Sgt. Robert M. 66 Jones, Pfc. Robert H. 185 Joyce, S.Sgt. Martin J. 129 Ju-88 24

Juvigny 30, 32, 34

Kall River 90-91, 93-94 , 96, 99,101, 103,109, 112-113, 115-117,122-123, 125,128, 137-138,141-142,144

Kall Woods 98, 113, 119 Kaltenburgsknipp hill 233 Kamins, Pfc. Richard J. 316, 318 Kampfgruppe (KG) 17,103-104, 194, 236,

289 Kampfgruppe Schmitt 50 Kansas State University 54 Kasserine 281 Kelleher, Lt. Col. Gerald C. 165, 187 Kelley, Capt. Donald C. 122-123 Kennedy, Capt. John J. 278 Kettenkrads 23 KG Bremer 282-283 KG Cochenhausen 194

General Index 347

KG Gutman 194 KG Krause 283 KG Kuhlmann 283-284 , 288 KG Müller 236, 238, 245, 283, 286 KG 901 195 KG 902 195 KG Peiper 219, 227, 230-232 , 234, 252,

276, 293 KG von Bohm 194 KG von Fallois 195, 206-208 , 211 KG von Poschinger 195 KG Zeiner 245, 248, 255 Kimball, Lt. Frank 177 King Tiger 12, 176, 178-179, 182-

185 Knutsen, Lt. 250 Koechling, Gen. Friedrich 149, 187 Kokott, Gen. Heinz 206 -207 Kolar, Sgt. 297 -298 Kommerscheidt 90-91, 94, 9 6 - 9 9 , 1 0 2 -

103, 106, 108, 110-147 Korte, Col. Peter 149 Kraas, SS Col. Hugo 273, 283, 288, 291,

294-295 Kradenberg 102 Kraft, Sgt. Rudolph 265 Kreger, Cpl. Donald W. 311 Krieder, T4g. James A. 113, 127, 132 Kriegsmarine 193 Krinkelt 189, 221, 232, 236, 238, 241,

245, 248, 252-253 , 259-260 , 2 6 2 -263, 268, 274

Krinkelter Wald 232, 235-238 , 2 4 3 -245, 258, 271, 274

Kübelwagen 39, 41, 44, 282, 295 Kudiak, Sgt. Tony 111, 112 Kuhlmann, SS Maj. 283 Kursk 193,194

Lac de Butgenbach 279 Lamb, 1st Lt. George R. 58 Lamersdorf 150, 152-156, 165-166, 170,

174, 185, 187 Landesschützen 104 landsers 11, 97, 135, 153,158,165, 310 Langfitt, Lt. Col. Frank V., Jr. 49 Lanzerath 228, 230 Latham, Lt. Col. Robert H. 83 Lauer, Gen. 245 Lausdell (crossroads) 239, 242-246 , 248,

250-254 , 259, 262, 268, 271 Leach, Cpl. Duncan N„ Jr. 320 Lealsy, Pvt. Paul 112

Lemmon, Lt. Col. Kelly B., Jr. 45 Leonard, Lt. 118, 121, 127, 130 Liège 216, 275, 278, 302 Lind, Capt. Ralph E„ Jr. 132, 138 Linguiti, Capt. 124 Lipe, Sgt. Andrew J. 136 Lisy, 1st Lt. Stanley 114 Littlehales, S.Sgt. Roy 121 Lockett, Lt. Col. Landon J. Ill, 119 Lohn 153 Lorient 306 Lorraine 87 Lorry 65, 85 Losheim 222, 283 Losheim Gap 219, 228, 230, 252 Losheimergraben 218, 220, 222, 223,

224, 225, 227, 232, 235, 275, 283 Love, Capt. James W. 252, 254-268 Luchem 168

Lucherberg 149-154, 160, 164, 166-178, 183, 185-188

L u f t w a f f e 51, 273 Lutz, Capt. Edwin M. 100-101, 113 Lutzeber Chateau 153, 158 Luxembourg 189, 314

M3 Stuart light tank 229, 231 M4 Sherman medium tank 76, 81, 105,

112-115, 118,125,130, 137, 170, 175-177, 179, 205-211, 217, 238-239 , 242, 250, 251, 256, 260-261, 263, 268-269 , 271, 273, 280, 291, 294, 299-300, 303

M10 see Wolverine M29 see Weasel M36 302,311 McClune, Lt. Col. 307 MacDonald, Capt. Charles 239-241, 251 McElroy, Lt. 118, 121,125, 127 McGarity, Sgt. Vernon 238 -239 McKinley, Lt. Col. Will iam D. 243-246,

248, 250-254, 268 McMill in, T.Sgt. Robert 143 McQuade, T.Sgt. Will iam 320 Mahaley, Capt. Walter C. 116 Makousky, 1st Lt. Lumir T. 132, 139 Malmédy 227, 232, 277-278, 288, 298,

303 Malony, Maj. Gen. Harry J. 306-307,

312 Manin, 1st Lt. Kelsey C. 139 Mardigny 84 Mark III 50

348 General Index

Mark IV 12, 30, 40 -42 , 44, 50, 65, 111, 125,143,194-195, 207-208 , 210, 230-232 , 234-235, 248, 266-267, 269, 275, 277-278, 296, 298-301, 313

Mark IV Jagdpanzer see Jagdpanzer IV Mark V Jagdpanther see Jagdpanther Mark V Panther 27-31, 34, 41, 44, 56,

60, 111-112,118,125, 135,143, 181,183, 185,188,194-195, 206, 208-210, 228-230 , 232, 248, 260-261, 273, 275, 280, 286, 296, 311, 313-315, 318

Mark VI see Tiger Mark Via see King Tiger Markey, Sgt. James J. 105,109,113, 115,

132

Marnach 191,192,197, 205, 209, 210, 213

Marokus, Sgt. 162-164 Martin, Lt. Col. 321 Martin, Sgt. Charles 27-29 , 32 Martin, Capt. Ross 135 Mayer, S.Sgt. Ron 259 Mays, Lt. Col. 141 Meals, Pfc. Donald W. 309 Melesnick, Lt. John 247 Mendrick, S.Sgt. Joseph R. 312 Merken 150 Merode 275 Merritt, Pfc. Russell 309 Mestrenger Mühle 96, 102, 115, 119-120,

132, 134, 139 Metz 45, 51, 54, 74, 81, 84-85 , 305, 313 Meuse River 189,193,195-197, 216, 228,

235, 252, 271, 273, 275, 294, 304 MG-42 42 Mildren, (Lt.) Col. Frank T. 253, 2 6 8 -

269 Miller, Sgt. 160,162 Miller, Capt. Joseph W. 100-101 Miller, 1st Lt. Victor 238-242 Milliner, 1st Lt. James 155-156 Mills, Pfc. Henry 259 Milton, Maj. Harold F. 192, 199, 202,

204, 206, 208, 210, 212-213 Miner, Lt. Col. Russell M. 307-308 ,

312, 318 Mode, Lt. Roy E. 265 Model, Field Marshal Walther 104, 187 Moderscheid 219, 235, 278 Monschau 89-91, 93, 96,103-104, 115,

120,142, 216-217 Montgomery, Capt. Hunter M. Ill , 119,

123 Morrison, Lt. 320, 322

Morschheck 278-279 , 282-295, 2 9 8 -300, 302

Morse, Lt. 202 -203 Mortain 20, 22 -25 , 29, 36, 39-41, 4 3 -

44, 88 ,194 Moselle Canal 52-53 , 69, 83 Moselle River 45, 46, 52, 59, 64-65 , 67,

75, 77, 81-83, 85, 305-307, 310, 314 Mousaw, Cpl. Earle F. 320 Muglia, 2d Lt. Alfred J. 98 -99 ,109 Munshausen 192 Mürringen 220, 232-233

Namur 195 Nancy 61, 67, 80 Nebelwerfer 12, 15, 41, 242, 253, 274,

283, 288, 294 Neel, Lt. Lawson 30-35 Nelson, Col. Gustin M. 138,143-146 Nenning 305, 310, 313-314 Neuhof 227 Neumann, SS Maj. Günter 283 Nied 306 Nielsen, 1st Lt. Hjalmar W. 309, 317-

318 Noble, Pvt. G. Dean 26, 36 Normandy 46, 147,149, 194, 217, 273 -

274 Norris, Col. Jack 248 Novéant 67, 69 Nürnberg 214

Ober Eisenbach 192,197-198, 205-207, 213

Oberleuken 305 -306 O'Connell, S.Sgt. James 64 O'Connor, Sgt. 156 Olbricht, Capt. 102 Oldenski, Sgt. Stanley 292, 298 Olsen, 1st Lt. John J. 159-161, 163,165 Olson, Sgt. Marvin S. 136 O'Malley, Capt. Eugene W. 94, 97, 101 O'Neal, Sgt. Wil l iam 126 Operation Cobra 19 Operation Lüttich 19, 36 Operation Market-Garden 149 Operation Nordwind 313 Orscholz 305

Orscholz Switch Line 305-307, 310, 312, 314, 322

Ossola, 2d Lt. Reynold A. 116, 122, 126 Osterhold, Col. Wilhelm 223-226

General Index 349

Ostrowski, Sgt. John 135 Ott, SS Capt. Alfons 235 Our River 189-197, 201

P-38 (Lightning) 16, 120 P-47 (Thunderbolt) 16, 42, 61, 65, 76,

82,108,112,120, 234 Pagny-sur-Moselle 81 Panther see Mark V Panzer Anklopfgerät 224 Panzerfaust 15, 127, 256, 263, 290, 297

Panzerjäger 12 Panzerkampfwagen see Mark IV; Mark V;

Mark VI Panzerschreck 15, 165, 171,177 Panzerspähwagen (Sd Kfz) 39 -40 Patton, Gen. George S. 19 Paul, Sgt. Andrew 256 Paul, Lt. Col. Donald 190 Paul, Maj. Vivian 271 Paulishen, 1st Lt. Andrew H. 55, 57 Payne, 2d Lt. Richard (Dick) H. 119,

135-137

Payne, 1st Lt. Robert A. 205-211, 213 Peiper, SS Lt. Col. Joachim 219,

227-228, 231, 277-278 Pelfrey, Pfc. Shelby 180 Pellino, 1st Lt. Aurelio 113 Pennsylvania State University 53 Peril, Pvt. 147 Pershing, Gen. 190 Peters, 1st Lt. George W. 314, 316 Peterson, Lt. Col. Carl L. 94, 99, 103,

111-113,118, 122,129-130, 135-136, 139-140, 142

Le Petit Fieffe 38 Pflieger, Lt. Gen. Kurt 310 Phillips, Wesley E. 309 Pickering, Lt. 202 Pier 150, 166, 170, 172, 175, 178-181 Pierce, 2d Lt. Robert K. 101 Piercey, Capt. Guy T. 98, 111, 135,137 Pillow, Pfc. W.T. 320 Pitman, T.Sgt. Bruce 121-122 Point Marion, Pennsylvania 53 Poland 193

Polich, Capt. George S. 49 Pont de la Vacherie 38 Poznan 193 Pratt, 1st Lt. Robert W. 133 Price, T.Sgt. Harold B. 321 Priess, SS Lt. Gen. Hermann 63 Pritts, Sgt. Marshall F. 129

Pugh, Capt. 117, 121, 125, 127-128, 130 Putney, Pfc. Delmar C. 124 Putz, Cpl. 208,211 Pynchon, Capt. Will iam H. 114-116, 118,

122-123

Quentz, Sgt. Joseph J. 316 Quinton, Pfc. Nathanuel M. 137

Raffelsbrand 93-94 , 105, 111 Rauw, Johann 253 Rauw house 255, 257, 259-260, 262 Red Ball Express 46, 191, 201 Remich 313 Renshaw, Sgt. 24 Reppa, 1st Lt. Robert B. 230 Reudiger, Lt. 313 Reynolds, Maj. Robert C. 130, 133 Rhine River 87-88 , 149, 215 Rhoades, Sgt. Will iam E. 158 Rhyne, Sgt. 39 Richelskaul 90-91, 94, 99, 103-104,117,

121, 125,141, 143 Riechels-Busch 285 ,294 Riley, Col. Don 232 Ripperdam, S.Sgt. Frank 106, 110-111,

135 Ripple, Lt. Col. Richard W. 99, 100, 114,

124,130,135-137,143-144,146 Rivette, Capt. Donald 280, 298, 300,

303 Roberts, Cpl. Charles 247 Robertson, Gen. Walter M. 217, 219, 221,

236, 242-244, 248, 253 Rocherath 189, 217, 220-221, 226, 232,

238, 242-261, 265, 268, 271 Rocherather Baracken 243-244 , 251-

252, 268 Rodt, Maj. Gen. Eberhardt 50 Roer River 87, 90, 149-150, 153,164,

172,187-188, 215, 217, 219 Roetgen 117,149 Roett 142 Rogers, 1st Lt. Howard S. 114, 123, 124 Rokey, Capt. Raymond R. 106-108, 118 Rollbahns 216 Rollings, Capt. Edward C. 253, 256,

259, 262, 265 Rose, Pfc. Donald 296-297 La Rossaye 21, 26, 29 Rotgen 87 Ruhr 149

350 General Index

Rumbaugh, Capt. George H. 133-135, 144-146

Ruppenvenn 232, 236, 238, 240, 243, 245, 247, 253

Rupt de Mad 52-53 , 74, 75, 77, 82 -83 Russo, Pfc. Philip L. 308

Saar 195, 314 Saar-Moselle triangle 305 Saar River 305-306 , 310, 313 Saarburg 308, 314 Saarlautern 305 -306 La Sablonniere 23, 26 Saghbazarian, Pfc. Harry 79 St. Barthelmy 20-30 , 33 -36 , 38 -39 , 42 St. Hilaire 20 St. Lo 215, 217 St. Nazaire 306 St. Vith 278, 294 Salazar, Pvt. Isabel 260, 262 Saranac Lake, New York 183 Saul, S.Sgt. Jesse W. 168 Saunders, Lt. 182-183 Schelde Estuary 87 Schirr Busch 229 Schmeisser 11, 34 Schmidt 88-91, 93 -94 , 97 -99 , 101-104,

106, 108-111, 113, 117-120, 124-125, 128-131, 136,138,140, 142,147-148, 199

Schmidt, Lt. Gen. Hans 115 Schmidt, Lt. Ralph L. 259 Schnittenhelm, SS 1st Lt. 296 Schophoven 150 Schoppen 235 Schowalter, Lt. Marc M. 260 Schulze-Kossens, SS Lt. Col. 245 Schwammanuel Dam 87-88 , 90 Schwartz, Cpl. Irwin 296-297 ; (Pvt.)

187 Schwarzenbach 279 Schwarzenbach Creek 290 Schwarzenbruch Trail 234-236 , 2 3 8 -

240, 242, 245 -246 Schwarzenbüchel 281, 284-285 , 289,

291, 299 SCR-300 164 ,192 ,200 SCR-536 93 SCR-610 246 Sd Kfz 121 298 Sd Kfz 234 282 Sd Kfz 234/3 286 Sc6 River 20

Seiler, Pfc. Gus 139-140 Seine River 50 Seitz, Col. John F.R. 286, 290 Selune River 20 Setliffe, Col. 139, 145 Setterberg, 1st Lt. Carl B. 145 Shaw, 2d Lt. Warren G. 54, 62 Shedio, T3g. John M. 109 Sheridan, Lt. David 160-163,167,172-

173

Shetler, Capt. Carl J. 309 Shiler, Pvt. 27 Shinefelt, Sgt. Richard 260, 263 Shipley, Maj. Alden P. 65, 67 Shipley, Lt. John D. 161-162, 164,

166-167, 172 Shotts, S.Sgt. Charles F. 162, 172 Sicily 217 Siegfried Line 88, 96, 149,190 Siegfried Switch Line 305, 322 SIG 33 298 Simon, 1st Lt. Leon 111, 121-122 Simonskall 93-94 , 102,105, 115, 121,139,

143 Simpson, Maj. Will iam E. 50, 57 Simpson, Lt. Gen. Will iam H. 87 Sinz 313, 318 Skain, Pfc. Clarence J. 137 Skorzeny, Otto 229 Skyline Drive 192, 197-198, 201-211 Slobodzian, Cpl. 212 Smart, Sgt. Marion D. 173, 175 Smith, Pfc. Frank 211 Smith, Cpl. George R. 164 Smith, 2d Lt. Horace L. 128, 141 Smith, 1st Lt. Lee 241 Smoke generator, M2 51-52 Smoke pots, Ml and M4 51 Soape, Pfc. Claudie L. 157 Soca, Sgt. 321

Soderman, Pvt. Will iam K. 249-250 Sonnefield, Lt. Col. J.E. 116 Speggen, Sgt. Angelo 60 Sperber (Sparrowhawk) 195 Spitze 276, 278 Spooner, S.Sgt. Anthony (Tony) R. 105,

110 Springer, Lt. Will iam P. 312 Springfield, Lt. Tom 37-44 S P W 2 5 1 276 SS Signal School Metz 51 Stafford, 1st Lt. David F. 309, 320, 322 Steinmauer hill 202, 205, 207 Stepanian, Capt. 288

General Index 351

Sternebeck, SS Lt. Werner 276-278 Steward, Lt. 40 -42 Stewart, Lt. George W. 253 Stolzembourg 192 Stone, S.Sgt. Will iam J. 56, 72 Storey, 1st Lt. Isaac Howard 55, 60, 62,

66 Stoumont 189 Straube, Gen. 104 Strickler, Col. Daniel B. 203 StuG-III 40, 223 Sturmgeschütz 15, 223-225 Sunburg, Pfc. Lester 143 Suskind, Pvt. Mike 186 Sutton, Lt. Fred 271 Sweeney, Lt. Edward 258

Tait, Lt. Col. Will iam 129-130, 133 Task Force Davis 140-141 Task Force R 124-126,128-129 Taylor, Lt. Raleigh 175,178-181 Templeton, S.Sgt. Estle E. 311 Tessy 21 Tettingen 305 -322 Thionville 310 Thompson, Lt. 167, 172 Tiefenbach 293 Tiger 13, 59, 135, 186,188 Toner, Sgt. 146 Touart, Col. 150 Toul 67 Tower, Sgt. Jesse R. 312-313 Trier, Germany 193, 305 Trois Ponts 189 Tropp, 2d Lt. Edward W. 143 Troyes 52 Trumbley, Lt. Wil l iam 256 Truppner, Lt. Stephen A. 246, 250 Turtle, Col. 241, 253 Tyo, 2d Lt. Richard 108, 137,145 Typhoon fighter-bomber 38, 41

Udenbreth 226 Ulmer, Lt. Arthur A. 164,167, 182 University of Illinois 182 Urabl, SS Capt. Georg 283 Urmetz, Cpl. Walter W. 158 Urspelt 190

Vandelainville 49, 63 Vente 39

Verdun 82 Verelli, Lt. 161-163 Vezon 71, 79 Vick, Capt. Elias R., Jr. 53-55, 62 Viebig, Col. Wilhelm 226-227 Villecey-sur-Mad 49 -50 Villeneuve 37, 42 Vinson, Lt. Frank 58 Vire Canal 23 Voisage Farm 47, 50, 52, 54-56, 61, 63,

65-67 , 69, 80, 84 volksdeutsche 51, 226 volksgrenadier(s) 11, 63, 193 von Funck, Gen. Hans Freiherr 20 von Kluge, Field Marshal Günther 19, 21,

35 von Lauchert, Maj. Gen. Meinrad 194 von Lüttwitz, Gen. of Panzer Troops

Heinrich 195-196, 201, 206, 211, 214 von Manteuffel, Gen. of Panzer Troops

Hasso 196-197 von Schwerin, Lt. Gen. Gerhard Graf 20 von Waldenburg, Maj. Gen. Siegfried

104 von Wietersheim, Gen. Wend 313, 315,

318 Vossenack 90, 91, 94, 95, 96-102 ,104-

105, 109, 111, 113-115, 117-119,121-125, 127-129,131-133,138,140-141,143, 145-147

Vossenack Ridge 91, 94, 126 Vulgamore, Earl N. 319

Wacht Am Rhein 273-274, 302 Wadehn, Luftwaffe Lt. Gen. 149 Wahlerscheid 219, 236, 239, 242-245,

252-253 , 268 Wahlhausen 197 Waimes 276 Walker, S.Sgt. Curtis E. 123 Walker, Lt. Col. George E. 47, 77-78 , 81 Walker, Capt. Jack W. 98, 121, 122, 137,

144-145 Walker, Gen. Walton 45, 81, 306 -307 Wallace, T.Sgt. Fred 227 Warche River 230-231, 233, 276, 281 Ward, S.Sgt. John M. 119,123 Warner, Cpl. Henry "Red" 292-293 ,

298 Warsaw 193 Waville 50 Weasel 88, 98, 100-101, 109, 114-115,119,

121-124, 129, 133,139, 148

352 General Index

Webster, 1st Lt. John O. 101 Weh Creek 149, 159 Wehrmacht 273 Weiler 192, 213 Weisser Weh Creek 93 Weisserstein Trail 226, 234, 236, 242 Weisweiler 152-155, 159,166 Wenau 87 Weniger, 1st Lt. Charles S. 122 Westwall 102,190, 194-197, 235, 273,

305, 310 Weywertz 281 Wharton, Brig. Gen. James E. 90 White, Sgt. "Red" 176,180 Williams, Cpl. Hale 287 Williams, Capt. Robert H. 69 Williams, Pvt. Roy 179 Wiltz 213 Wilwerwiltz 192, 198, 204-205, 207 Wirtzfeld 219-220, 239, 258-259 , 265,

268, 271, 284 Witt , Capt. Eugene M. 55, 57, 76 Wittscheidt 92

Wochen 306-307, 309, 311-312, 314, 317 Wollenberg, Pfc. Richard 287 Wolverine (M10) 76, 80, 116, 119, 128-

129,135, 137,141, 148, 229, 280, 289, 291, 294, 300, 303

Wood, Sgt. Charles 269 Workman, T.Sgt. 30 World War 1 190

Yarman, Sgt. Kenneth E. 109, 113-115 Yezzi, Pfc. John 60 Young, 2d Lt. Frank W. 58 Yuill, Col. Charles W. 45

Zahora, Sgt. 177 Zaroslinski, S.Sgt. Anthony S. 109, 114,

115 Zebin, Pfc. Jack 320 Zeiner, SS 1st Lt. Helmut 245-246 Zubendchen 106 Zweifall 117

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