agricultural market access

9
Agricultural Market Access by David Laborde, Will Martin and Dominique van der Mensbrugghe In Unfinished Business? The WTO’s Doha Agenda Edited by Will Martin and Aaditya Mattoo

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Agricultural Market Access. by David Laborde , Will Martin and Dominique van der Mensbrugghe In Unfinished Business? The WTO’s Doha Agenda Edited by Will Martin and Aaditya Mattoo. Agricultural market access. Tiered formula to cut bound tariffs - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: Agricultural Market Access

Agricultural Market Access

byDavid Laborde, Will Martin and Dominique van der Mensbrugghe

In

Unfinished Business? The WTO’s Doha Agenda

Edited by Will Martin and Aaditya Mattoo

Page 2: Agricultural Market Access
Page 3: Agricultural Market Access

• Tiered formula to cut bound tariffs– Different coefficients for developed & developing

countries• Wider bands & smaller cuts in developing countries

• Flexibilities – Sensitive products for all countries• 4% of tariff lines in developed ctries; 5.3% in

developing– Assume cuts reduced by one third

– Special products for developing countries• 14% of lines; 40% no cut; average-cut of 11%

Agricultural market access

Page 4: Agricultural Market Access

Tiered Formula for Agriculture

Developed Developing

Band Range Cut Range Cut

A 0-20 50 0-30 33.3B 20-50 57 30-80 38C 50-75 64 80-130 42.7D >75 70 >130 46.7Average-cut Min 54% Max 36%

Page 5: Agricultural Market Access

Agric cuts & final tariffs, %

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 120%0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

45%

50%

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1

Post-Formula Tariff Rate

Initial Tariff

Fina

l Tar

iff

Tariff

Cut

equ

ival

ent

A

B

C

D

Page 6: Agricultural Market Access

Selection for product flexibilities• Highest-tariff rule frequently used

– No conceptual basis– Highest bound tariff includes many products with huge binding overhang and

no need to cut– Many of the highest applied tariffs are on minor products– Suggests adverse impacts of flexibilities on average tariffs are very small

• Largest trade share may overstate losses

• Use Grossman-Helpman political preference function– Assume original tariffs reflect political-economy equilibrium– Countries select sensitive prods to minimize political costs– Get more plausible product lists; large impacts on efficiency; not so large on

market access– Intuition– countries choose products with large imports, and where large ,

politically-costly reductions in applied rates are required

2p

Page 7: Agricultural Market Access

Changing # of sensitive products

6%

7%

8%

9%

10%

11%

12%

13%

14%

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50%

App

lied

tarif

fs -T

rade

wei

ghte

d av

erag

e

Share of sensitive products

Developed countries, constraint in % of lines

Developed countries, constraint in % of trade

Developing countries, constraint in % of trade

Developing countries, constraint in % of lines

Page 8: Agricultural Market Access

Cuts in agricultural tariffs, %

Developed Developing0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Formula Flex

Page 9: Agricultural Market Access

Cuts in agricultural tariffs faced, %

Developed Developing0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Formula Flex