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THE GENERAL Paaenalon Hill Philoosnphg Part 4

A COMPLETE GAME IN THE GENERALWell, n o t qu ite b ut it's as close as we've evercome to having one. We are still def initely againstthe printin g of games in a gaming magazine simplybecause there is no way such games can beplaytested suff iciently pr ior t o publication toinsure that they are good games. Therefore, ourefforts in this f ield w il l be l imited to games of thevariant class such as is fou nd i n this issue.LEYTE GULF IS more than the standardvariant however. I t requires alterations t o theMIDWAY mapboard, many more counters, andconsiderable shuffling of the rules. The basic gamesvstem is st i l l that of MIDWAY however and the

MIDWAY game is needed to play it. W hat will you rreaction be to this ty pe o f lead article? Quitehonestly, we don't know. That's why we tried-tofind out. Your response in the next ReadersResponse should dictate what course we follow inthis regard in the future.

We thin k Leyte G ulf is an interesting lit tlevariant, and a welcome change of pace from whatmight be becoming your stereotyped MIDWAYgame. Due to the limite d naval titles in our line atpresent and the fact that MIDWAY was publishedbefore the era of scenarios we decided to goahead and give it a trial run. The game can be verydeceiving at first glance. Just as many peoplethought MIDWAY was an easy Jap win, so willmany of you think that Leyte Gulf is a hopelessJapanese defeat. The odds may well be with theAmerican player but by adroit use of his advan-tages, the Jap can occasionally sneak out a win-despite the hordes of American aircraft. This isdefinitely not the type of game we would comeout with under the AH label, but as a magazinevariant i t proves most interesting.

Largely because of the inclusion of the game inthis issue, several regular features are conspicuousby their absence. To make room fo r the Leyte Gu lfcounters we had to drop the Readers Response andthe Contest reply cards in this issue. Both willreturn in the November issue and, for this issueonly, we will accept facsimiles of the contest. TheSeries Replay also departs from its regular formatthis t ime to experiment with a new concept inpresentation. We'll be asking you f or y our opinion son the relative merits of presentation in the nextReader's Response. Mean time, we'll be proceedingwith the re turn to the M IDWAY-sty le formatexhib ited i n the last issue which seemed to drawraves from almost everybody. And we do havesome really top-n otch matches in progress betweenname players . The pr oblem is, as we've said before,the lead time required to get these pbm games int oprint.Moving on now to the Reader's Response wefind a number of interesting statistics resultingform the August survey. The feature article againcopped t op honors in the voting fo r best art iclealthough it was actually topped i n first placeballots by the Series Replay. The results of ourrandom sample of 200 showed the following:

LUFTWAFFE ANALYSIS 362. . . . . . . . . . . . . .ERIES REPLAY MIDWAY 338CAMPAIGN AT WA T E R L OO Part V . . . . . . . 264ESIGN ANALYSIS ,154

ADVANCED KRIEGSPIEL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .H PHILOSOPHY 17The issue as a whole garnered a 3 41 ratincompared t o the June issue rating of 3 81 72% you indicated th at the last issue was better tha n ipredecessor, while only 40% indicated they wetaking advantage of the 2 for 1 deal whereby they get a new subscriber their subscription extended free. It's too bad because the offer wno t be made again after Apr il.

Which brings up the argument we often hear conventions that the GE NER AL shows a bprofit . Ease in point: take a $2.50 (2 for deasubscription, subtract $1.50 f or the discoucoupons, cross out another .96C for mailingthird class during the course of a year. Thleaves 4 . Out of that we must pay printingcollating, addressing, paper and envelope costno t t o men tion graphics, salaries and the dozeof free games given away as prizes. t takes me ntal giant t o see that even at the regular $5.0price Avalon Hi l l goes in the hole on each anevery issue a sacrifice wil ling ly made promote the art. So much for digression.Another one of the gripes people have hawith AH is the way in which game questions aranswered. I n the past, this nut mail as i t called around here was farmed ou t t o a numbe

of different wargamers to answer. The result waobvious, conflicting answers on the same quetions. This situation was remedied over a year agwhen the R&D staff was expanded and provisionmade for answering questions as part of thStaff's daily duties, and the situation is mucbetter now, albeit st ill far fr om per fect. Becaudiffere nt members of the staff specialize odiffere nt games and also due t o the resultininterruption it causes, we ask that you do nphone us on questions. The nut mail is sorteaccording t o game, and delivered to th e propeauthority every Friday for answering. This meanthat most questions are answered in the space 2 weeks barring an unusually heavy wo rschedule for a certain authority at that t ime. Foexample, Bulge questions may be slow in beinanswered when Randy Reed is approaching thdeadline for his next game. Stalingrad questionhave a tendency to be slowed down when thGENERAL is behind schedule. Only Tom Olesoour resident Anzio authority seems immune frothis type of priority commitments, and even hgoes on vacation once in a while. Bu t one thing sure, wi tho ut a stamped, self-addressed envelopand proper diagrams your chances of getting reply are greatly reduced.

Going on with the Reader Reponse we founthat 90% of you actually do read that microscopH Philosophy ont inued c n page

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Paae 3 THE GENERALEYTE GULF

by Rober t D. HarmonF o r four days in October of 1944 thereoccurred what may be said to be the greatestnaval battle in history. Hundreds of ships wereengaged over an area stretching 1000 miles.Theoretically, the US naval forces, with theirarray of mass-produced might, shou ld have hadan easy time of it. But it didn't quite work o u ttha t way.

THE PRELIMINARIES

Although the Chief of Naval Operations, Adm.King, argued strenuously for bypassing the Phil-ippines in favor of landings o n Formosa andmainland China, it was Obvious that, aside f romthe dubious na ture of operating against the Asianmainland, t h e US was commit ted t o liberating thePhilippines. I t was US territory; its inhabitantsh a d l o y a l l y resisted Japanese occupation.MacArthur wanted t o return t o them as he hadpromised, so long ago. There was n o choice.Meanwhile, the new Japanese government had

America had spent 1942 and 1943 replacher early losses with a large second generationflattops spearheaded by the Essex class. Thwere formidible 27 ,100 tons displacemewell-armed, capable of holding over 1 0 0 aircraWith them were the Independence-class licarriers, eight of which were available t o Halalong with t h e eight fleet carriers of t h e Esand pre-war classes. Conversions of light cruisethese CVLs were better in every respect ththeir Japanese counte rpar ts fast, capablecarrying 3 5 planes, displacing some 11,000 toT h e strategic situation at Leyte Gulf was built drawn up four S t l o ( victory ) contingencyupon an operations plan , a confcrencc , a n d t w o plans, to deal with possible US landings on I the

battles. The first incident. o f collrse, was the Philippines, 2) Formosa or the Ryukyu Islands,Battle o the Phillipine Sea (19-21 June. 1')44), 3 ) the Japanese home islands, o r 4 ) Hokkaidomore commonly known as .'The Great Marian39 and or the Kurilc Islands. Of the four, the first l f .Turkey Shoot. possibility secmcd likely. SHO-I called for the . adBACKGROUND: Afte r the great naval battles concentration of all available land-bascd aircraft T3m=o f 1942 t h o protagonivts found tI emuelvosbadly in the Philippinez. mainly from Formosa: this wasThe problenl was a lack o carriers; or to be followed by the cntirc Imperial fleet. Thethe entire prewar US carrier fleet, only the objective: destroy the US landing Ibrcrs at anyG i t e r l ~ r i t ewas left Suru/~ gr~ as laid up with cost. . - a .Ltorpedo damage; Horrlet. Lexington, York to~r~i r . The Pall of Morotai (a potential bomber babe) ;.f = 4and Wasp were gone. Five Japanese carriers weregone, o thers were o u t with battle damage, and ,more seriously, Japan's decimated air groups hadrun short of b o t h planes and experienced avia-tors.Both sides spent 1 9 4 3 rebuilding their forces.T h e Americans, with Guadalcanal o u t of the way,made limited advances in Japan's outer dominionsthe Gilberts, t h e Solomons, New Guinea, theAleutians.Then , Adm. Nimitz' forces in the centralPacific struck deep into Japanese territory, land-ing o n Saipan, Guam, and Tinian in the MarianasIslands. T h e long wait was over.T h e Turkey Shoot was just that. TheJapanese fleet hurled itself upon a new generationof US ships and the result was utter ruination.Over 4 0 0 Japanese aircraft were shot downat tempt ing t o get a t the US fleet. And theJ a p a n e s e fleet suffered terribly carriersShokaku and Taiho were sunk by US submarines,and the light carrier Hiyo was sunk by US planesduring the retreat. The US fleet was virtuallyunscathed.I t would be the last time tha t Japanese carriersoffered battle as an effective striking force.Gen. Tojo's government collapsed as a result ofthe Turkey Shoot.In a series of behind-the-scenes talks among theAmerican high command, culminating a t t h eOctagon Conference a t Quebec (Sept. '44), thefollowing decisions were reached:1) Gen. MacArthur's forces would land onMorotai that m o n t h , while2 Adm. Nimitz' forces would land o n Ulithiand Peleliu, bypassing Yap, and then3 ) the t w o forces would converge, bypassingMindanao t o land o n the island of Leyte in thePhilippines

and the superb anchorage a t Ulithi posed a directthreat t o the Philippines. Japanese Army com-manders began t o call for activation of SHO-1.Tokyo stalled, for t h e Americans had n o t ye tappeared. Then, on 10 Octobgr, Adm. Halsey's3rd Fleet announced itself off Formosa.The week of 10-17 October saw strikes o nJapanese aerodromes o n Okinawa, Formosa, andLuzon. But the main fighting t o o k place aroundFormosa, where Halsey's airmen t o o k o n Vice-Adm. Fukudome's 2nd Air Fleet. A furious airbattle t o o k place, and Adm. Toyoda, NavyCommander-in-Chief, decided t o gamble for aquick victory by rushing the carrier fleet's half-trained squadrons t o Formosa. The results: closet o 6 0 0 Japanese aircraft downed, as opposed t othe Americans' 79. Two damaged US cruiserslimped back t o Ulithi b u t the Japanese somehowgot the no t ion tha t 11 US carriers had been sunk.Certainly, 1 0 0 0 land-based aircraft had at-tacked Halsey; f rom the way the Japanese reactedthey must have believed tha t an invasion wascoming and was stopped by quick action on theirpart. In actuality, Halsey had more than accom-plished his mission: Fukudome was able t o offeronly feeble support t o the Philippines and thecarrier forces were toothless. But Halsey's retire-ment enabled t h e Japanese t o convince them-selves tha t they had driven him off. Then , o n 17October, came the bitter awakening.M N AND MACHINES

T h e reason for t h e stunning American victorieshe Turkey Shoot and Formosa was due t othe late Adm. Yamamoto's dire predictions ofAmerican industrial resurgence. Long past werethe desperate days of 1942 , when a few carriersand green pilots were all tha t held back theinvincible Imperial Navy

The ssex class carrler alone outnumbered all Japanese attemat carrler product~onF~rstaunched In July 1942, the ssex proto be superlor to anyth~nghe Japanese could produce Dlrplac39,800 tons wtth a complement of 3,460, these vessels malntathe~r lace In the fleet wtth a speed of 33 knots Each vesselprotected by e~ght lnch guns, and 28 50mm guns, and carr~ea~rcraftT h e n there were the highly numerous esc

carriers conversions of merchant vessels,later on, ready-made ships, capable of holdi15-20 aircraft. These were slow and weak b u t htheir uses landing suppor t and CAP, convduty , and , in their most effective role, as U-bokillers. They displaced about 7,000 tons.There were o ther vessels brand-new battlships of t h e Iowa and Massachusetts classes. Faspowerful, bristling wi th radar and AA guns, theoffered a formidible challenge t o any Japaneunits, ashore, afloat, o r airborne. Beside thbattlewagons were myriads of new cruisers, dstroyers, and transports.

The Iowa and her 5 sister ships were more than a matchanything the Japanese had to offer. save the Yamato. Mimportantly, with her 20 5-inch guns. sixty 40mm and sixty 20 mAA guns, these vessels presented a tremendous obstacle to Japanaircraft as evidenced by the Turkey Shoot. Capable of 33 knotkoy displaced 57,450 tons and carried a crew of 2,753.

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THE GENERhLIn the air, the US Navy was no longer inferior,in either numbers or quality. The Navy hadacquired good torpedoes at last , and an excellentto rpedo bomber to ca r ry them he TBF (andTBM) Avenger. The divebombers had also beenreplaced the SBD Dauntless had been replacedby t he SB2C Helldiver; not much of an improve-ment, but the Avengers could carry the ball ifnecessary. And, best of all, the Navy now had theGrumman F6 F Hellcat the first American

fighter able to beat the Z ero on its ow n terms.

The CVE.73 Gambier Bay sunk by com bined cruiser gunfire offSamar in the battle of Leyte Gulf, was just one of fiftyCasablanca class escort carriers buil t by the U nite d States duringthe war. The most remarkable statistic about these craft was theproduction rate; towards the end they were being built in less than 4months; a rate of production that turned even the Japanesekamikaze tactics into a futile effort. Displacing barely 10,000 tonsloaded and capable of only 19 knots, these vessels were far removedfrom their superior sisters in the Essex class. Each vessel could carry28 aircraft and was armed with a single inch gun, 16 40mm and24 2Omm A. A. guns. The wartime crew was 860.

All through the first two years of the war, theZero had terrorized the Pacific he Navy's F4 Fand F4U fighters, and the Army's P-38 Lightning,eventually were able to offer the enemy an evenmatch. Now the Hellcat, fast, maneuverable,well-armed, outmatched the Zero in every way,and made Am erican CAPS virtually impenetrable.Thus the Tutkey Shoot. Thus the orgy ofplane-smashing over Fo rmosa.

The Japanese still had a number of carriers,despite the losses of '42 and the Turkey Shoo t.But the Zuikaku, last survivor of the Pearl Harborcarriers, was the only big flattop available. Notthat i t mattered. One thousand planes had gonedown since June, and now there were virtually noplanes'for the carriers to launch.Japan did not have America's su periority inmachines; the Imperial fleet could no longer beatthe US in even battle. But Japan, its home islandsthreatened, faced with defeat for the first time intwo millenia, fell back on its ancient customson the Bushido code of the nation, on thesamurai spirit shrouded in antiquity. The Navycould not destroy the enemy. Very well . Then itwould, in one vast act of self-immolation, hurlitself upon the enemy and wreck the invasion atall costs. The Japanese armed forces might die,but perhaps their sacrifice would save theirhomeland. The Navy girded for self-sacrifice,especially a new squadron in the Philippines,known as the Kamikaze.

The idea had originated with Vice-Adm.Ohnishi, com mander of the 1st Air Fleet at ClarkAFB in the Philippines. What more effective wayof utilizing what few aircraft were left thanplunging them, bombload and all, into the enemyships? Twenty-three men volunteered for this firstsuicide unit , named Kamikaze in honor of theDivine Wind that had broken the Mongolinvasion in 1281.

THE LANDINGS, AND FIRS T ENGAGEMENTS:PALAWAN PASSAGE, SIBUYAN SEAWhile Halsey's 3rd Fleet moved down fromFormosa in support, Gen. MacArthur's forceslaunched the assault on Leyte, center island inthe Philippines. Appearing on 17 October, 7thFleet units under Vice-Adm. Kinkaid bombardedthe island and fought off some feeble strikes byJapanese Army air units . On the 20th, units ofLt.-Gen. Kreuger's 6t h Army landed at Dulag and

Tacloban. Over 100,000 troops were to land inthe next three days.SHO-1 went into effect.From the home islands, the Carrier Force, ledby Vice-Adm. Ozawa, headed south in to the openPacific. Ozawa, whose defeat at the Turkey Shoothad been through no fault of his own, washeaded with virtually no air units nto afamiliar predicament. Th is time, he was to lureHalsey away from Leyte, whatever it cost. Heand his carriers were bait.From Lingga Roads, near Singapore, the mainJapanese battle fleet steamed north to Brunei torefuel. On the morning of 22 Oct., they set sail,and divided. Force C, under Vice-Adm. Nishi-mura, was t o sail across the Sulu Sea andapproach the invasion area from the south, byway of the Surigao Strait . Force A (the CenterForce), under Vice-Adm. Kurita, was to sail alongthe west edge of Palawan, then swing belowMindoro, cross the Sibuyan Sea, and approachthe beaches from the north, by way of SanBernardino Strait.From the Pescadores came Vice-Adm. Shima's2nd Striking Force, consisting of two cruisers;Shima was to support Nishimura.The objective: Leyte Gulf, choked with trans-ports, LSTs, landing craft; the beaches piled highwith supplies and ammunition. Destroy all this,and MacArthur would find his troops on anotherBataan. Before dawn o n 23 Oct., the Japanesewere sighted. Two US submarines, Darter and

Dace, reported a large formation off Palawan,moving north. T he submarines promptly attacked.Darter s first shots sank Atago, the enemy flag-ship; Kurita and his staff wound u p in the drink.In the resulting melee, the cruiser Maya was sunkby Dace; Maya s sister ship Takao was sentlimping back to Brunei with two hits; Dace ranaground and was abandoned after Darter evacu-ated the crew. Kurita eventually continued north,his flag on the Yamato.More important than the loss of three cruisers,the Americans were alerted. Halsey moved histhree available task groups into the waters off theeastern Philippines; a fourth task group bound forUlithi was recalled. But before Halsey could get

Vice Adm. Kurlta's force underway on October 23rd. None ofthe pictu red vessels would survive the week.

off his strike, land-based J apanes e aircraft strucat TG 3 just after dawn on the 24th. CAHellcats knocked down or drove off all Ohnishi's and Fukudome's planes all bu t onJust as the CAP was being recovered, a lo.Judy divebomber dropped out of a cloud banand scored a direct hit on the light carriPrinceton. For a while, i t looked like the carricould be saved, and the cruiser Birmingham, hdecks and fantail crowded with rescue adamage-control parties, moved in t o help. ThePrinceton s after torp edo storage exploded, fatalinjuring the carrier and mowing down 800 of tBirmingham s crew.

Vengeance was quickly exacted. By 09 00 tfirst strikes took off against Kurita, now headeeast through the Sibuyan Sea. Although tJapanese had heavily reinforced their AA, tbarrage had little effect. The Americans concetrated on the tw o monsters towering over tfleet Yamato and Musashi. Yurnato escapwith superficial damage; Musashi went down thafternoon with 19 torpedoes and 1 7 bombs her a quick end to a short career. Myoko wbadly damaged and was sent home. Kurita cotinued on, delayed but not daunted. The Amercans, believing tha t K urita wo uld have the gosense to retire, shifted their attention to Nishmura, sighted late on th e 24th , headed fSurigao Strait.

THE BATTLE OF SURIGAO STRAITNishimura was close at hand, and steamiwith singleminded resolve for the invasion flejust beyon d Surigao Strait , between Leyte aMindanao. A brief air strike from Enterprise hproven ineffective. Adm. Kinkaid had gotten much air s upport as Halsey could give him; nownight surface battle was pending. Close at hawere the 7th Fleet f ire-support units , fo ur Allicruisers and six battleships under Rear-AdOldendorf. The battleships were tubby old reliof Pearl Harbor, but weren't much old er thForce C's two battleships. Besides, the Americvessels had been fitted with radar fire-contrsystems. Oldendorf arrayed his force across tend of the Strait and waited.First contact was made at midnight, whNishimura encou ntered Old end orf s PT-boaNishimura brushed them aside (later, PT-1torpedoed light cruiser Abukuma, of Shima's 2Striking Force, coming up-channel some timafter Nishimura).At 0 300 Oldendorf 's destroyer screen attackForce C, sinking 3 destroyers and fatally torpeding the battleship Fuso. At one stroke, Nishmura's force was reduced to three ships: battlship Yamashiro (damaged in th e atta ck), cruis

Mogami, and the destroyer Shigure. The Amecans retired unhur t.Finally, at 0350, Nishimura reached the Amecan battle line, lying at a right angle t o approach. As at Tsushima and Jutland, a 'crossiof the T had been achieved. Th e result wterrible. Yamashiro, battered to scrap by gunfiand harried by destroyers, went down at 041Mogami, seriously damaged, fought her way oand retired with Shigure. The Americans sufferonly comparatively minor losses severe damato the des t royer Albert W Grunt, caught in tcrossfire and riddled by both fleets. Oldendorf sout in pursuit of the enemy.

Mogami, heading south away from the battran int o Shima. Quite literally, tha t is ust

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Paae THE GENERMshe had done at Midway. Shima's flagship, thecruiser Nacki had made the mistake of assumingthe Mogami to be halted. S he wasn't, andrammed the Nacki. This was the climax of a badnight for Shima first, Nishimura had notbothered to rendezvous with him; then theA bukuma was hit. Now this.Shima chose to retire. Aircraft from Kinkaid'sescorts caught Mogami on the morning of the25th and finished her off.

Kinkaid's southern flank had been successfullycovered that night, but now Oldendorf had beenpulled out of position. The San Bernardino Strait,some distance to the north on the other side ofSamar, was unguarded. But perhaps Halsey wouldcoverWhere was Halsey?T H E B A T T L E O F C A P E E N G A N O

The one catch in the vic tory a t the TurkeyShoot had been that the Navy's air units hadbagged only one Japanese light carrier. Adm.Spruan ce, mindful of his original mission tosupp ort invasion had not pursued Ozawa.Despite the massive Japanese aircraft losses, thishad rankled. Halsey, among others, had beencritical of what seemed a lost chance. TheJapanese carrier force was still at large, andHalsey was ever-mindful of this; his air patrols tothe north had been maintained even during theair battles of the 24th. Late that afternoon,Ozawa was sighted heading south, and Halsey,assuming Kurita to be crippled, went northseeking a showdown. What he had no way ofknowing was that: 1) Kurita was far fromineffective 2) Kinkaid, thinking that Halseywould leave his Battle Line off San BernardinoStrait, did not send picket vessels or aerial patrolsthere: and 3) Ozawa's decks were virtuallyempty.By 0710 the enemy had been spotted; the firststrike brushed aside Ozawa's CAP and closed in,sinking Ckitose. Subsequent strikes that morningdisabled Ckiyoda and lightcruiser Tama whileHalsey, ignoring frantic pleas from Kinkaid,closed in with his surface fleet for the kill.Finally, Halsey got this message from Nimitz,after several requests from Kinkaid for the BattleLine (Task Force 34), at 1 0 a.m.: Where is T F34? The world wonders. T F 34 was promptlydetached, along with a carrier task group.Later air strikes sank Zuikaku and Zuiko.Ckiyoda was abandoned by Ozawa and was sunkby Halsey's cruisers. Hyuga and Ise defendedthemselves successfully, retiring with both lightcruisers despite heavy US air attacks. Ozawa,having pulled Halsey out of position, could leave;he broke contact after dark.And TF 34 reached San Bernardino Straits at0100, 26 October three hours after Kurita'sforce had escaped through it, after engagingKinkaid's carriers.THE BATTLE OFF SAMAR

While Halsey raced north scenting blood, andOldendorf was becoming the last admiral in navalhistory to use Battle Line surface tactics, Kuritasteamed undetected through San BernardinoStrait on the night of 24/25 Oct., turning southalong the coast of Samar. By dawn he was inKinkaid's rear.The first ships Kurita encountered were CarrierGroup 77.4.3 (known by its radio callsign asTaffy 3 ), consisting of escort carriers and adestroyer screen. Sighting Kurita at dawn, Rear-Adm. Clifton Sprague, commander of Taffy 3,

ordered out every plane he had, turned awayfrom the enemy, and threw out smoke screens.Th e Japanese were faster. Taffy dodged int o arain squall at 0715, and Sprague, to save hiscarriers, ordered his destroyers to attack.A two-hour melee followed, during which theJapanese formation broke up in confusion.Y amato and Nagato turned abruptly and left thesc en e, a void ing the destroyers' torpedoes;Kumano was damaged; Suzuya was mortallydamaged by the attack. The rest of the forma-tion, grappling with destroyers and harried byplanes from Taffy 2 and 3, fell behind thecarriers.

The destroyer screen paid for its braverytwo destroyers and a destroyer escort were sunkby massed gunfire. But most of the attack wasturned aside. Not all of it, though.Despite a pounding from aircraft, ToneHaguro Ckokai and Ckikuma managed to closein on the carriers and add their fire to theoccasional shots from the distant battleships. Thecarrier Kalinin Bay was damaged; then, at 0900Gambier Bay went down under fire from Chi-kuma. The carriers were quickly avenged; Ck-ikuma and Ckokai were sunk by Avengers andgunfire from the carriers.

Then, inexplicably, Tone and Haguro broke offthe attack; Kurita had decided to retire. On theother side of the horizon, Kurita had, by hismuddled communications, been convinced thatthe enemy was outrunning his ships (theyweren't). Unhap py tidings had just come in fromAdm. S hima; no dou bt Oldendorf now waited atLeyte with open arms. It had been a difficultcruise, starting with Palawan Passage; Kurita,lacking the single-mindedness of Nishimura, chosethe better part of valor.The Japanese ships were in retirement, but thebattle was not over. While Taffy 3 had beenoccupied with Kurita, Taffy 1 had been the

recipient of the first Kamikaze attack of thePacific war. Striking at dawn, the Kamikazes haddamaged carriers Santee and Suwannee. Taffy 3had been less fortunate: half an ho ur after Kuritadisappeared over the horizon the Kamikazes hadclosed in, damaging Kitkun Bay and sinking theSt. Lo.

Most of the early Kamikaze craft were obsolete multi enginedbombers such as this Frances shown burning just prior to its rnid airexplosion.

At a small cost, the Kamikazes had sunk acarrier and damaged three others. T he firstKamikaze unit had proven the w orth .of thisdesperate measure many othe rs would followthem in the remaining 10 months of war.

AFTERMATHThe US Fleet stayed in the area for the nefew weeks, giving Krueger support, and followiup on the victory. Light cruiser Noskiro wedown during a strike on Kurita on 26 OctobeKumano received several attacks over the neseveral weeks, but got as far as Lingayen before was sunk 25 Nov. by planes from Ticonderoga.Of Shima's forces, A bukuma was caught b5th and 13th Air Force B-24s from Morotai ansunk 26 October; the Nacki damaged by tMogami limped to Manila and was sunk there November.Ozawa made i t back to Japan, but not befolosing the crippled Tama to a US submarine route.

The light cruiser ~o sh ir o ever stood much of a chance agaAllied air superiorit y. I t is shown here under attack on Octob26th. Moments later the attacking Helldivers found the mark asent her to her grave.Japan was now left with three operationcarriers, Hyuga Ise and Hosko. There wealso four battleships left Yamato Nagat

Kongo and Haruna and a h andful of undamagecruisers. Except for the futile, doom ed sally the Y amato in April of '45, the Japanese navnever again offered open battle. Losing tMarianas had meant that 20th Air Force B-2could ravage the por ts and ship yards; losing tPhilippines had meant that there was no oavailable from the Indies, no ships t o burn it, nplanes for them to launch.

MacArthur would go on to secure all tPhilippines (which took until August) and cotemplate a landing on Honshu; Nimitz woumove against Iwo Jima and Okinawa. As far Leyte was concerned, it was all over but tshouting.Recriminations flew on both sides. Kurita wrelieved of command and given a desk job. Hals

was accused of stranding Kinkaid without suport; Kinkaid was accused of negligence in failito cover San Bernardino Strait. On the othhand, there is no denying the bravery shown bthe sailors and airmen on both sides. But for oside, it was an exercise in futility; on the othethe price of miscalculation.Airc raft Carrier: The Majestic Weapon Donald Macin tyreLeyte Gulf: Armada in the Pacific Donald MacintyreThe Barrle of Leyte Gulf Samuel Eliot MorisoThe Liberation of the Philippines Samuel Eliot MorisoThe TwoOcean War Samuel Eliot Moriso

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THE GENERAL Paee

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THE GENERALThe game of Midway offers many fine featuresand is an enjoyable game on its own merits. Butsome players may wish for a little change from anervous slugfest between a vulnerable fleet and anoutnumbered one, or variations on that theme.I offer such a change a Leyt e variantrecreating the 1944 battle on the Midway board.The basic rules are the same, but the situationand course of play are tadically different.So, here are the blueprints for a naval Armaged-

don, playable on your own Midway game andbloody enough to warm any wargamer's heart.RULES:

All Avalon Hill rules are in force, except asfollows:The Japanese fleet may e nter anywhere on thewest o r north edge of the search board, on orafter 050 0 23 Oct. Th e Japanese can also start upto 5 ships in Manila Bay (square C2H).The U.S. 5t h Fleet and accompa nying CVEunits start within squares of Leyte Gulf(squares E5I and E6C), from where they maymove freely. The U.S. 3rd Fleet may startanywhere in or east of row D, but may not setup w ithin 3 squares of land. Once entered, nounits may leave the board.JAPANESE AIR OPERATIONS:

Japanese air units cannot return to carriersafter a strike (due to pilots being inexperiencedat navigation and deck landing). They mayshuttle from carriers to Clark Air Force Base(square C2E) and vice versa, or may operate outof Clark exclusively. As such, th e Japanese donot have to reveal the location of their carriersafter launching a strike. When spotted, theJapanese player need not repo rt exact informa-tion. He may underestimate and /or exaggerate thenumbe rs of his force by 50 . However, he mustreport if any carriers are present.Only T, F, and D squadrons may operate fromCV's. B (land based aircraft) squad rons arestrictly limited to operating from Clark AFB witha range of 10 squares each way. K (Kamikaze;each factor = 1 aircraft) units have a total rangeof 14 squares, as do CV-based aircraft. Kamikazeunits are land-based. The American player isprohibited t o b omb Clark AFB or fly one-way(suicide) missions.B squadrons are counted as dive-bombers onthe Battle Board. T, F , and D squadrons may bedivided up in any manner between Clark AFBand the ships, subject to capacity restrictions.This applies to setup and play, except whereprohibited by range considerations.KAMIKAZES:

Kamikaze attac ks may be launched during airoperations on any turn. The attack is launched inthe same m anner as any air operation, and maybe launched in conjunction with any other airstrikes, except that once launched no Kamikazemay land. On the battle-board, Kamikazes mayattack from front, side, rear, or overhead even ifother aircraft are in the same square or attackingthe same ship. Just as an anvil attack is 2 (ormore) separate attacks, Kamikaze factors attackin separate attacks and may not combine withother units.AA against Kamikaze factors is 1 AA factorper ship, irregardless of amount. If two ships fireat one Kamikaze, the battle is 1-2. If one shipfires, or if no ship fires at all, the battle is 1-1with 1 Kamikaze. U.S. CAP functions in thenormal manner i.e., if 1 Kamikaze attac ks 1

ship and 3 fighters, it goes in the drink auto-matically.. Kamikaze at tack is resolved on th esame table as normal air attacks.AI R SEARCH:

Th e U.S. player may make 3 air searches perdaylight turn and 1 air search per night turn (aslong as the USS Independence is still afloat). TheU.S. m ay searc h only' with in 4 areas (12 squares)of his units. The Japanese may rtiake 3 airsearches per day turn, anywhere on the boardin or east of row G only. The Japanese playermust be automatically informed of all unitswithin one square of any land. If the Japaneseplayer searches west of row G he must have avessel within 12 squares of the area searched.STRATEGIC FACTORS:

Each Japanese ship has a Strategic Factor (SF)which it can emplo y against Leyte Gulf or CVE's

when in the same square. The SF, used only the search board, is as follows: CVL, CL =factor; CV, CA = 1 S F f actor; XCV/BB = 1 factors; BB = 2 SF factors; Yamato and Musas= SF factors each. Every 10 factors of T, D,B aircraft equals 2 S F factors.

L E Y T E GULF R E D U C TION :Each square of Leyte Gulf contains (althougthere are no counters there) American transport

supply vessels, and beaches piled with materiaEach square has a total reduction factor of 1The Reduction Factor (RF) goes down 1 for eacSF in that square at the end of the turn. ThJapanese get 3 victory points for each Rdestroyed; if both squares of Leyte Gulf acompletely reduced they automatically win. ThAmerican player may assign a CAP over LeyGulf squares. For each 10 factors of CA

HIT RECORDJAPANESE HI T RECORD

Zuikaku 10 Yamato 10 1 Tone 3Zuiho 6Chitose 6 mNagato 8 Takao 3Kongo 6m Maya 3Haruna 6hiyOda p Atago - Nachi 3 -rmHyuga 7 Ashigara 3 mIse 7 uIinlul Chokai 3 Abukuma 2aMusashi 10 Myo ko 3 lsuzu 2 EnFuso7 m l a gur o3 Oy oda 2Yamashira 7 m hikuma 3 m\ Tama C?AIRCRA FT CAPACITIES

Zuikaku: 21 Chitose: 10 Chiyoda: 10 Zuiho : 8 Hyuga: 3 Ise: 3CLARK AFB: UnlimitedTOTA L A IR C R A FT A V A ILA B LE

Distributed in any manner subject to AIRC RA FT CA PACITY limits: T I 0 F22 D l 5 K2 0 B10TIM RECORD

3i;O O o ~ ~ ~ Z Z O O O ~

3RD FLEET: U N ITE D S TA TE S H IT R E C ORDEnterprise 10 Washington 9 abot 7Essex 12 ccu l Alabama 9 owpens 7Wasp 12 lzE IEc Wichita 4 lr[[71 Langley 7Hornet 12 New Orleans Birmingham 3Lexington 12 Pensacola 3 M ia m i3 m lHancock12 Chester cEm Vincennes 3 III]Intrepid 12 Salt Lake City 4 Biloxi 3Franklin 12 1 / 1 Independence 7 Santa Fe 3 mlIowa 10 I m elleau Wood 7 Mobile 3 r lNew Jersey 10 m l an Jacinto 7 ml Oakland 3 73Massachusetts 9 I Princeton 7 m\ R e n o 3South Dakota 9 onterey 7 San Diego 3 m l

5TH FLEET:Taffy 18 7 ennessee 8 Portland 3Ta ffy 2 18 Mississippi 8 Shropshire 4Ta ffy 3 18 ennsylvania 71 enver 3 mlWest Virginia 8 1 Louisville r? r?l Boise 3 m]Maryland 8 [mashville 4 Phoenix 3California 8 1 1 1 inneapolis 4 Columbia 3

Sub Attacks

m

AIRCRAFT D ISPOSITIONSEnterprise: T 8 F 9 D 8 All Essex-Class CV s: T I 1 F12 D l 1 eachAll Cabot-Class CVL s: T 4 F4 D4 each All CVE s: T2 F2 each4

wQ e3 8 8 5 s ~ E ~ 5 8 Z 8 s ~ ~ ~ g p g ~ ~ ~

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2;2

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THE GENERAL Paaeassigned over a particular square, the S F forJapanese raids is cut in half. Example: T h eJapanese player raids E5I with 20 bomber fac-tors. U.S. CAP over E5I is 2 0 factors netresult: Japanese raid results in the elimination of1 RF. If Japanese fighters accompany the raid,the American CAP must engage the fighters firstusing the regular FTR vs FTR CRT. Let's assumethat the Japanese player had sent 11 fighterfactors along with his raid described in the earlierexample. The American must now use his CAP toengage the Japanese fighters a t odds of a t least1-1, leaving only 9 fighter factors free t o inter-cept the bombers. This has no effect o n theattackers, meaning that the Japanese player nowdestroys 4 S F during his raid. The Japaneseplayer must lose 1 bomber factor per raid everytime he attacks Leyte Gulf by air.U.S. units may move through Leyte Gulf, butonly CVE units and the USS ashville may bethere at the end of a turn. If the ashville orCVE's are in Leyte Gulf the Japanese musteliminate them before starting reduction.ESCORT CARRIER GROUPS:

Each CVE group has a R F of 12. They arereduced in the same manner as Leyte Gulf.The loss of every two R F means tha t a carrier issunk and the Japanese gain 3 points; the Ameri-can naturally losing the appropriate aircraft com-plement for tha t vessel. T h e Japanese player isassessed one hit against any of his (Jap) ships hewishes and is rewarded with one victory point fo reach battle tu rn in which he engages CVE's. Thislatter ruling simulates destroyer action. Shipswhich have been sunk by air attack in the sameturn in which they are engaged in surface combatare no t removed from play until the completionof the third battle turn.CVE's do not stack with each other o r anyother U.S. ships; CVE's d o not appear o n thebattle board and d o not need battle boardcounters. Individual escort-carriers (there are 18do n o t have any counters of their own in thegame.SUBMARINE ATTACK:

The U.S. may roll for the effect of submarineactivity in the area. This is executed immediatelyafter the search phase of the turn, and is doneonce a turn for a maximum of any seven turnsduring the game. The effects are:DIE R O L L R t S U L T S

Submarine ~ u n k :apane~e et 1 vlctory point? 3 4 N o effect

Onc group spotted; h ~ tn any vessel thereinOiic group spotted; 3 hits on any vessel there~n

A group is any stack in a single square. TheJapanese need reveal only one group; no mat te rhow many they may have. T h e group spottedcan be one already under U.S. surveillance. Whenspotted by a submarine the Japanese player is notallowed t o underestimate or exaggerate hisstrength; i.e. he must report the group's actualcomposition. However, he does no t have t oreport the actual square which the group is inonly the area.U.S. FLEETS:

Units of the U.S. 3rd and 5 t h Fleets may notstack together with units of the o ther fleet. TheUSS ashville carries the U.S. commander-in-chief, Gen. MacArthur. If it is sunk the Japaneseautomatically win.

VICTORY CONDITIONS:If the Japanese have not achieved an au tomat icvictory by the end of the 1700 Oct. 26 turn,victory will be decided by adding up the pointsf rom: a) ship sinkings as in Midway; b) damageto ships ( the Japanese get point for each hit on.surviving U.S. ships; and c) the total of pointswon by the Japanese for reducing Leyte Gulf andthe CVE's. The side with the highest total wins.

AIR ATTACKS ON CVE's:Normal air attacks against the CVE's areconducted in the same manner as air attacksversus Leyte Gulf with the following exceptions:1. The RF for a full strength CVE group is 12. I t thus takesanattacking wave of 12 factors to equal two SF.2. The RF for a CVE group is adjusted downward in accordancewith Its strength. Thus, a CVE group which had lost one carrierand had another damaged would defend with an RF factor of 9.I t would now take 9 attacking bomber factors t o equal 2 SF.3. The Japanese player loses 1 bomber factor for each carrier inthe CVE group i t attacks.4. CAP functions in the same manner as described under LeyteGulf Reduction with the exception (as noted in 2 above) of thevariable RF factor.5. When Kamikazes attack CVE's, the fighter escort (if any)must be met at 1-1 or better odds. Rema~ning AP fighters maystrip off against Kamikazes. For every two available fighters oneKamikaze is destroyed prior to attacking. Exactly of theremaining Kamikazes (fractions rounded upwards) may beassumed t o have found their targets. Each Kamikaze which findsits target is equivalent t o two SF.6. Example. Japanese attack Taffy 3 with 5 Kamikazes escortedby 8 fighters The American CAP consists of 12 factors. 8 ofwhlch immediately engage the Japanese fighters at 1-1. Theremain~ng flghters destroy two Kamikazes. O f the 3 Kamikazeswhich get through the fighter screen, only two find their targets.Result: 2 U.S. CVE's sunk and the RF for Taffy 3 reduced t o 8On the following turn the Japanese again attack Taffy 3 wlth 16bombers and 6 fighters, The U.S. player has a CAP of 15 factors,of w h~ c h e commbts 7 agalnst the Japanese fighters - orclngthem to attack at 1-2. The remaining 8 are appl~ed gainst theRF of Taffy 3, cutting the Japanese SF'S or the r a ~ dn half. Netresult: 2 SF applied agalnrt TAFFY 3 and 4 Japanese bombersdowned in addition t o fighter losses.

MISCELLANEOUS:CVE groups only require 3 search-board count-ers, marked Taffy 1 or whatever. No battle-board counters are needed (and since there are 18

carriers in the 3 groups, it's a good idea notmake any). Since they d o carry planes, and cbe sunk, it might be worthwhile to keep trackthe CVE ships f only o n paper. They are:Taffy ( T F 77.4.1) Sangamon, SuwannSantee, Chenango, Saginaw Bay, Petrof Bay.Taffy 2 ( T F 77.4.2) Catona Bay, ManBay, Marcus Island, Savo Island, Kadashan BOmnaney Bay.Taffy 3 ( T F 77.4.3) Fanshaw Bay, St. LWhite Plains, Kalinin Bay, Kitkun BGambier Bay.

One special note: when computing oddsU.S. aircraft vs. Japanese ship battles, remembto add 2 factors to each BB, and 1 factor t o eaof the o ther ships, f rom the Midway game (Yamato now has an AA factor of 12). TJapanese fleet, from bitter experience, addmany 25 mm MGs t o each ship's AA battery jprior t o sailing.

U4 t tD5 ?BDEGI E5The u duyer h o u l d mark a 3 or 5 43 III search b

,unleis ro s h c a whtch fl t they b l o n y 10 he us of f>agnrelr tn a u n d wav na ierw

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THE GENER Lt

PART VI2 aby Harley Anton

exceed 30-40 factors and should always be Once the PAA player has retreated fromA f t e r having given us his broad strategic w i n - cognizant of the impending arrival of the IVth Quatre Bras in good order he can make himseland a detailed uni t b y uni t analysis o f the Corps in its rear. almost impregnable against frontal assault in thforces Harley comple tes his treatise The second area is the Quatre Bras Gap: this is Genappe River line. This line is 1 continuouthe CAMPAIGN A T W A T E R L O O series wi th the one major area where a break is present in doubled position of rivers and hills from N18 todetailed look a t the board; first through the the natural barriers of the PAA front. Y-BB, W47. There is a 1 square break a t T34 , b u t tho f the French player and again f rom the 20-24 should be the major area wherein the PAA can and will o f ten counterattack heavily t oviewpoint. French player tries to force a battle of attri t ion hold t h a t break or any other a t tempt a t crossin

FRENCH EYES: the river line. T h e major difficulty the PAAplayer faces is that he must keep most of hiWhen the French player observes the map he early in the game. Close to 100 factors should be army within squares of the primary road forceallow its natural configurations to shape in this area achieving 3-1 or better attacks a t all so that when the river is breached a fallback cancampaign i n t o 4 basic steps. Deployment, times. Infiltration of the woods should have as be achieved in an orderly fashion with minimathe Quatre Bras-Nivelles Line, breaking it's goal BB23 or AA23 in an a t tempt t o flank losses Thus the Genappe River line is easiest toGenappe River line, and the drive on Water- AA25. Y25 should be the limited objective of break if f lanked , The most devastating break oshould be a t tempted in tha t order. this force with its major objective t o crush any this line is a breakthrough nto th e plains beSince t h e French strength remains constant PAA forces between it and X27, forcing the tween Nivelles and 047 If the French army canthe PAA constantly becomes stronger it abandonment of the Quatre Bras Heights. break into this area o n the first day o r early onto the French player's advantage t o deploy and the CC the French keep 45 t h e second day the game is 95 won. This forcefor battle as quickly as possible. I make factors if possible. This can often be done by a premature fallback on Mont , St Jean thefew dogmatic statements bu t with regard to minimal defensive units a t CC24 and CC26 and a only alternate to which is a b a t t l e of attritionthere is one basic maxim which 2-6 a t CC27 or BB28. A swing force situated a t stacked in the French favor..be overlooked. No French player can win DD22 and CC21 of 3 0 factors can be a part o fa competen t PAA player if he lacks a this force and the Quatre Bras Gap force as well.drive. This can be seen for 2 reasons. Naturally, this force should take a 3-1 on AA25, WHICH WAY TO NIVELLESand foremost, a drive down the Nivelles- 26 or 27 whenever such rare good for tuneSt. Jean road is farthest away from the presents itself. Make the woods between AA29Corps of the Prussian army. Secondly, and AA33 a no-man's land. If a 3-1 is unavailablethe French begin the game with a 2-1 factor on the heights, play a waiting game. Once the falla Nivelles drive cannot harm the o f the heights is eminent the forces a tand will always force the PAA t o divide CC21-DD22 can join the Gap forces and themeager force to meet it . ? 'he board can CC24-26 forces can reinforce Nivelles o r marchbe divided in to 5 major assault areas on i n t o Quatre Bras a t the French player's option.Quatre Bras-Nivelles line (which runs just The four th segment of the map is the Nivellesof the fold in the board). These areas are corridors o n rows 35 and 38. The French playerTilly corridor, the Qualre ras Gap the should have 55-60 factors a t Nivellcs consisting ofBras Heights, the Nivelles Corridors, and cavalry and the I1 Corps. Although a quiteBraine LeComte River. T h e more corridors common move among novices, the 1st CorpsFrench player assaults, the better chance he should never be sent to Nivelles as it takes t o ot o win the game. long to get there. Infantry situated a t RR15 andThe Tilly Corridor has 3 basic approaches. T h e SS15 can reach Nivelles faster than the Firstgap, the St. Gery Woods, and the corridor Corps, although cavalry starting here and going t oBoth the gap and the woods should be Nivelles is preferable. T h e I Corps is a naturalimmediately as even an unopposed for Nivelles and J J 2 5 and KK25 should bewould take t o o long in these areas. Count i t reached on turn 1. Note that HH30 is a closerUnopposed infantry would take 13 turns t o rou te for infantry than I131 and at least 1 stackt o A39 from Fleurus by way o f the gap and should go that way. I1 Corps cavalry can alsolonger by way of the forest. T h e corridor move from EE27 to CC33 and threaten Nivellesis a different story. Although this is ideal in only 2 turns. The major objectives of theterritory for the PAA, the French Nivelles force should be W36 and X, Y42.should slug away down row 19 in hopes o f Caution: This is an area wherein PAA counter-2 objectives. attacks are common so be cautious of infiltrationThe first of these is infiltration along the Thil maneuvers through 2 3 6 , 37.along row 23 in hopes of flanking the T h e Fifth Group is an outgrowth of theBras line. The second is the gain o f N24 Nivelles factor. Once they attain Y42 and X42order t o feint a t t h e La Lasne and , more they can threaten the Braine Le Comte River andt o flank the Genappe River line still remain a threat t o the W36 area by strad-the rear. The corridor drive should never dling the river.

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TH GENER LTo win the PAA need to hold the Genappeline most of the second day with minimal losses.A second flanking maneuver of the Genappe ispossible by force on the French right, taking theGenappe from the rear. A pincher aimed at 42 6from b oth North and Sou th is the objective here.Once again, caution mu st be advised as theextended force in the plains SW of the DyleRiver must always be conscience of the impend-ing arrival of the IV Corps to their rear if they

wish to survive.Once the Genappe is breached the campaignmust enter its final stages. If the French playerhas gained a 40 or more factor advantage in thecasualty box he should try to extend the PAA asmuch as possible to his left. In the final drive theGrand Army should constantly be wheeling to itsown left in an at temp t to keep pressuring thePAA and at the same time delay the impact ofthe arriving IV Corps as long as possible. Oncethe IV Corps has arrived and is making itself feltthe French player should attempt to swing backto his right so as to gain maximum extension ofPAA forces. If the French player beats the IVCorps to Mont. St. Jean by several (3-5) turns, heshould try for an immediate battle of attr i t ionbased on as many 3-1 attacks as is possible.Similarly, if the French player is late to Mont. St.Jean and faces a superior foe, he should also trya battle of attr i t ion with low odds attacksfurnishing the key. This is naturally a last ditcheffort and should be used only when the gameseems inevitably lost anyway.The mapboard determines French tactics to alarge degree. Until he can breach row S theFrench player must fight a maneuvering game.Once row S is breached he fights a battle ofattrition unless the forces are equal. If they are,he must once again maneuver making full use ofll the available approaches to Brussels. Remem-ber, once the PAA player is forced into theForest De Soignes he must split his forces tocover both victory roads and he must stand in no

retreat positions. Thus, the last leg of themapboard is much in the French player's favor.THROUGH PAA EYES

When the PAA player looks at the mapboardhe must immediately realize that i ts proper use ishis ultimate key to victory. Obviously, he mustalways keep the bulk of his army between theFrench player and the roads to Brussels. Con-versely, since he is outnumbered for the first 40of the game he must expose as few units to theFrench player as possible. The easiest method f orsatisfying these two conflicting criterion is byusing terrain to its maximum blocking advantage.With this factor in mind, there are certain areasof the mapboard in which the PAA should neverstand and fight. The most important of theseareas is the plain in the Ligny-Gosselies-QuatreBras triangle. To meet the French in this areaearly in the game is suicidal. Neither should thePAA rush blindly toward Trazegnies with hisNivelles forces. The re are good defensive positionsbehind each of these areas; make the Frenchmancome to you .PAA defense should be divided into 3 basicsegments. The first of these is the defense ofTilly, Quatre Bras Heights, and Nivelles. Thesecond of these is the Genappe River line. Thethird segment of the game should be the Battlefor Mont. St. Jean. If the Fren ch player has notbeen decimated by the end of the third segmenta fourth, the battle for the Forest De Soignesmay become necessary. If this happens the PAA

player will probably lose the game, thus everyeffort should be made to stem the French tideprior to this action.The French attack on Tilly in Phase I can bedefensed in 3 basic ways. The first two methodsare preferable as they attempt to entice theFrench player into an overcommitment in Tilly.Since Tilly is the easiest area for the PAA todefend such an overcommitment can often par-allel Marshall Grouchy's historical disaster atWavre. The third method involves eliminatingFrench desires to enter the Tilly corridor and willbe dealt with shortly.In Method No. 1, all PAA 1-6's and 2-4's aremoved in to the corridor. From 21 8 to R20 theFrenchman may be stopped at the cost of only 1unit per turn . An aggressive PAA opening (dis-cussed later) can prevent French units fromreaching 218 for 4 turns. The eleven unitsallotted to the corridor can be sacrificed 1 perturn and the IV Corps will come busting on whenthe unit at S19 is hit . The major strength of thisdefense is tha t a 12 factor sacrifice can hold theFrench player for 11 turns and large numbers ofFrench units can be trapped in the corridor bythe arriving IV Corps. Weaknesses of this defenseinclude the possibility of raids at 212 which aredifficult to stop, and the fact that the Bors DeMetz can be infiltrated by 1 AM/17. Most severeof all is the lack of any cavalry on other fronts,making screening and soak-offs hard t o come by.Because of these weaknesses, most expert PAAplayers prefer method No. 2; the hyper-decoy.The forces committed to Tilly in method No.2 are six 1-6's, one 2-4, three 4-4's and one 5-4,or two 4-4's and a 6-4 as optional in place of thethree 4-4's a nd on e 5-4 variation. Thi s defenseallows for 10 turns of delay (counting the 3 turnsit takes the Frenchman to reach Tilly) and leavesa counterattack force of 14-17 reserve factors.These factors can hold the Dyle River andprevent penetration of the Bors De Metz at S24and U24.

The major weakness of this defense is that ifthe French do not push a corridor drive, then th e14-17 infantry factors are wasted when theymight be sorely needed o n othe r fronts. This canoccasionally be turned to advantage late in thegame by a well timed counterattack towardQuatre Bras.Method No. 3 involves stacking 15 factors atV21 and U21. The se stacks should consist ofvaried unit strengths. If the French player decideson a large corridor drive, the 1-6's in these stacksshould provide delays while the infantry return tothe Quatre Bras front by way of the Bors DeMetz. If the French drive is light, the Infantry ofthese 2 stacks can be committed in sufficientstrength to halt i t or drive it back. If the Frenchplayer decides on no Tilly drive at all, then allthe PAA units go to Quatre Bras by way of theBors De Metz. The advantages of this defense instrength conserved are obvious. At the same time,it suffers from 2 basic weaknesses. The first isthat transfer back and forth between the 2 frontstakes 3 turns at the least. Further, one must havea delicate sense of commitment and timing toavoid wrong commitment due to French feints.More importantly, this defense can be disasterousif the French player smashes the Quatre Brasfront while the Tilly forces are caught in the BorsDe Metz. The road to Brussels and victory wouldthen be ope n. Still the defense is very temptingand the expert should give it consideration atleast as an enjoyable variation t o experimentwith.

The Phase 1 defense of Quatre Bras and heights can be divided int o two parts. The firstthese is the psychology of aggressive placemand the second is the actual defense itself.A unit on EE23 (preferably a 1-6) is a muSteinmetz and a 6-4 should be in a position move to AA27 and AA25 respectively on turnIt is good psychology to m ake your opponethink you will stand and meet him on the plaof Ligny by your set-up. Thus a good openset-up resembles this one: two 6-4's at EE1EE16 and EE17 and one 6-4, one 7-4 at DD2This should at the very least retard an eaFrench cavalry rush on Tilly. At the same time,the French player has 3 0 factors of cavalry JJ13 and KK13, this defense may lose a 6-4 turn one. This loss is acceptable as i t costs tFrench a 2-6 soak-off, possible exchange ofmore cavalry factors, exposure of his cavalearly in the game, and more importantly, severeretards the French Nivelles drive. On turn 2, Prussians should fall back toward Quatre Bleaving delay units at FF16 and FF19. Suddenthe French player sees his chance of quivictory melt away into defensive terrain rigbefore his eyes. On turn 3, one delay unit CC19 should suffice as th e defense enters second stage. Phase I1 involves the defense of tY22-BB22 corridor. Here the PAA player stanand fights or backs slowly toward Quatre Brbehind delay screens. If o ne decides to stand afight, the French should be made to soak-off much as possible. In addition, here as in eveother engagement, the French should never allowed to attack a large stack of units fromore tha n 2 squares. On a ny on e turn, a delunit can be placed and all the remaining corridunits shifted to Y/29 and Y/30 to prevent wooinfiltration or to counterattack in the Heigharea. The real key t o an excellent PAA defenseto get Opstal or a 1-6 to 227 immediately. A 6can be placed there to the PAA advantage, bonly as an addition, never as a replacement Opstal. This seemingly worthless maneuver makthe Heights almost 2-1 proof.If the French player makes an attack on AAat 2-1 and wins, he is forced t o advance (if does not the PAA can simply counterattack anresume their doubled position). When he doadvance, Opstal (and optionally the 6-4 allottto 2 27) move to AA26. O ther s tacks f rom tQuatre Bras corridor move to AA24, 2 25 a22 6 and an instant surrounded counterattaoccurs with Opstal furnishing the soak-off.There are several variations or counterattacwhich can be very effective, depending on homuch of a risk the PAA, player wishes to ruThe most effective of these occurs when tFrench Nivelles force does, not exceed 50 factoand is composed mostly of cavalry. In 2 turns tbulk of the PAA army is shifted from the QuatBras Gap toward Nivelles while only 1 or factors are left to jam the gap against Frenadvances. The trick to this attack is speed, forlate return to Quatre Bras will be disastrous.Other defenses of the Heights which have sommerit to aggressive players include allowing tFrench t o achieve BB26 on turn 1 and counteattacking viciously and stacking 4-4's at AAand AA 26 on to p of 6-4's to precipitate Frenattacks. I do not recommend the first of themethods as it virtually surrenders both Tilly anNivelles to French drives and at the same timexposes the PAA army to a decisive battle attrition early in the game. Its only advantage that i t forces the French player to attack in

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THE GENERAconfined area where his soak-off losses are liableto be heavy. The second of these variations keepsall the advantages of the first and adds one more.The French are always attacking doubled unitswhereas the PAA are not. T h e disadvantage t omethod 2 is that the French may break the PAAarmy t o o early in the game for the PAA casualtygain to be of decisive advantage.Once the Heights are breached or outflankedthe X and W rows may be held with one delayfactor per tu rn as a time gaining prelude t o a fallback t o the Genappe River. Once again, the keyis t o deny the French player a 3 square a t tackand 2 squares as often as possible. A delay unitat V27 and stacks a t V31 and S31 can be thefinal defense before falling back. Even if thefallback t o Genappe is more precipitious, block-ing the road a t X26 or X27 is essential t o allowat least 1 tu rn for deployment along the R row.T o summarize: 1) A soak-off unit positioned a t2 2 7 is essential.'2) Good use should be made ofthe excellent interior lines between Quatre Brasand Nivelles. 3 ) Try to achieve local superioritycounterattacks only when even if t h e attackachieves an exchange, one will still be in arelatively sound position a t the start o f theFrench move. 4 ) When outnumbered in factorstry t o deny your opponent squares t o attackfrom. 5) Kill as much French cavalry as possiblein early attacks. Leave the infantry for later wheneveryone has arrived o n the board.Phase I defense of Nivelles can be either t h eeasiest o r hardest PAA task depending on Frenchcommitments. I have found that Perponcher is avaluable asset when committed here. On thesecond turn he should be a t V41. This guaranteesthe road to Braine Le Comte, which otherwisecould be cut a t V44 by French cavalry thrustsbefore the 11 AM reinforcements could arrive toguard i t . If your opponent sends a large cavalryforce t o threaten Braine Le Comte , Cooke shouldstay a t V47 and Alten a t V44. If the Braine LeComte River is broken early, the French couldforce the PAA t o fight them in another area,which the PAA must avoid; the plains runningfrom Nivelles t o 0 4 7 .

.. .When ooke A l t e n a r r l v e at th lr designated pasetsonsPerponcher m a y be withdrawn to back u p rip n t h e 35 corr~dor fn o cavalry threatens Bra lne Le omte there IS of course o need l agu rd 11

Once the Braine Le Comte line is secured,Perponcher or Chasse should hold 2 3 9 untilflanked. Delay down the DD and CC rows ispossible a t a loss of one factorlturn. T h e PAAhas 2 basic problems at Nivelles: when t ocounte ra t tack and how t o s top infiltration a tCC-AA33. Perponcher and any 7-4's o r 6-4's areexcellent for stopping infilatration and for delay-ing down the 2 3 5 corridor as 1 stack of 15

factors cannot 3-1 them. Cavalry should be toppriority for counter-attack a t Nivelles. In addi-tion, units which can be surrounded by thecomplicated terrain features also present a choicetarget fo r counterattacks. W36 is a great positionand it is admirable t o launch a t least onecounterattack to prevent i t being outflanked. Theretreat to the river behind Nivelles should besynchronized with the Quatre Bras fall-back tothe Genappe if at all possible.T h e Phase I1 PAA defense of Genappe mustlast a t least until the IV Corps enters the board ifthe PAA player is to win the game. The GenappeRiver line is most easily broken a t R27 , T34 andT39. If broken a t R27 , the PAA can delay alongthe R row and actually shorten his defensiveperimeter. If broken a t T 3 4 (delay units canusually hold for o r 2 turns here) or T39immediate counterattacks should be staged. Re-member, tha t any French units that breach ariver defense have their backs against it on thesucceeding turn, and cannot retreat when coun-terattacked. Mobile forces should hold the LaLasne flank and immediate fallback should bemade if the Braine Le Comte River falls. Duringthe retreat t o Mont. St. Jean the primary roadsshould each be blocked with a delay unit. If theFrench aggressively pursue with part of theirarmy (no tab ly cavalry with light infantry sup-port) the PAA should turn on this part and crushi t before the remaining French heavy units comeup. This would be the last PAA chance in thegame for an advantageous counterattack.An often successful bu t risky PAA strategy canbe used if the Genappe River line is still intactwhen t h e IV Corps arrives. If this is the case thenthe IV Corps can be brought on behind theFrench at DDI 0.Combining with any remaining units in theTilly area (remember the 14-17 useless factors)it can be a formidable rear arm of a PAA pincherdesigned t o crush the French army. This strategycan backfire if the French breakthrough towardBrussels because he can then delay behind himand defect to victory. If played correctly, t h emore probable result is the encirclement of theFrench army and a PAA victory.Once the PAA player has fallen back t o the LaLasne-Braine Le Leude line he must make hisstand. The Forest De Soignes must by avoided atall costs. T h e basic maxims of defense and delaystill apply in this region. Try t o prevent theFrench extension of your lines by counterattack-ing. Avoid allowing the French player any 3square attacks. Don't expose stacks of smallunits. Be sure that you attack French cavalrywhenever possible. Finally don't allow the Frencht o interpose their army between your army andeither of the victory condition roads. (The areabetween the roads is so thickly forested that itbecomes of little practical value for victorycondition purposes.)SUMMARY:

Foremost fo r the French player t o remember isthat his cavalry are the eyes of his army. Heshould never fritter it away or tie it down t oa s s a u l t s on Infantry. Secondly, Napoleon'sg r e a t e s t successes involved smashing flankassaults. The 2-1 luck rou te to quick victory is afrontal assault maneuver. One mistake manyFrench players are guilty of is n o t realizing thatWaterloo is 5 days long not just 2%. The delayunits offered by the PAA in the first 2 daysoften allow the French t o inflict 40-50 factors

damage a t a loss of only 8-10. Once this situaticomes about the French player s tands an exclent chance of winning because the two armies anow of approximately equal strength.Further, the natural defensive advantage of tPAA is cancelled t o some exten t because they aforced to stand and fight in clear terrain aoften with forest a t their backs by the victoconditions. When this situation occurs the Frenshould continue their attacks down the Waterlroad in an arc from a b o u t N36 t o H45 sweepiforward with a defensive line of minimal foralong the center of this arc ready to springeither direction. T h e PAA cannot afford t o a t tathe weak French center because t o d o so exposhim to envelopment and exposes the victoroads. Once Mont. St. Jean is captured the PAarmy must be split t o defend b o t h roads. A t thpoint the French can use Napoleon's tacticconcentrating on 1 flank while containing tother and sweep to victory. Finally, if all elfails the chancy frontal assaults can be tried juas easily at this point as a t the beginning of tgame. T h e French (and t o a lesser ex ten t tPAA) should remember the Napoleonic advantaof always keeping a reserve force ready t o swaybattle. Particularly in the latter stages of tgame, the rules barring withdrawal and reentin to a zone of con tro l of the same unit o n oturn make strategic reserves a necessity. Naturaly, tactics of flanking (achieving 3 or more squarfrom which to attack) and development should nbe ignored.The PAA player must remember tha t tcavalry screen was the primary innovation of tNapoleonic era with respect to cavalry tacticThis is easily translated in the delay tacticsAvalon Hill's aterloo which is the basic partPAA strategy.

SERIES REPLAY ontinued from PageIn the center, a large battle develops for thplain west of Rethel. T h e French soon occuppositions o n t h e ridges west of Laon and LaferHeavy losses are sustained by the French forcdefending the gap (W17). T h e French also cotinue t o occupy the Argonne and none of thinfantry corps are attacked (except fo r the 6-6units). Instead, the main German attacks adirected against t h e gap in CC31 and against thcavalry divisions in BB3 1 and BB32. T h e Frenc6-6-2 corps are a t tacked a t 2-1 odds and aforced t o retreat with casualties. Soon BB3BB31, BB32, and AA32 are in German hands anthe ridge nor th of Langres has been turned.T h e French player conceded when the d tut ion reached that shown on Map No. 6. ThGame was declared t o be a Decisive GermaVictory.This game certainly illustrates the fact tha tshould not b e necessary for the German player tmake a costly series of frontal assaults againstrong French positions. I t is much be t te r attack the key positions of the French line, thospositions whose loss would compromise thwhole line. If t h e French can be bled at thespositions, their eventual defeat is assured for thFrench cannot win a battle of attri t ion and thiseven more t rue when the attri t ion rate is n o ttheir favor.

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THE GENERALI N N ITH THE FRENCH by Tom Oleson

To m Oleson is know n far and wide for his skilland devotion to one wargame. When not playingthe stock exchange, T om can usually be found inhis study dreaming up new ways to play ANZ IO.Fortunately for us, Mr. Oleson took time offfrom the aforeme ntioned pursuits to give us hisanswer to the French quandary in FRA NCE1940. Like many others lately, To m advocatesthe 'YtS better t o l ive to f ight another dayphilosophy which is rapidly becom ing the ac-cepted norm o f play for the game.

France, 1940 represents a significant departurefrom Avalon Hill's previous WWII land games. Bythat I do not refer primarily to the novel CRT,nor t o the use of air power, nor even to themechanized movement phase, but to the heavyreliance on "What If" scenarios.Imagine this same procedure had it beenapplied to the earlier games:1. Anzio what if the Afrika Korps hadwithdrawn in good order from Tunisia?2. D-Day what if the Salerno invasion hadbeen crushed, thu s freeing more troops for theFrench front?3. Stalingrad what if the Germa n infantryhad been mechanized?4. Afrika Korps what if Malta had fallen?Obviously, this list is merely a crude hint ofwhat can be done with this approach. It 's l ikeMIRVing a nuclear missile warhead s can go offin all directions. It also presupplies the variantswhich are always so popular. It's interesting, butas developed in France, 1940, it's quite a de-parture from the old idea of "Now y o u commandthe forces, and see if you can do better thanRommel.", etc.; it gives a presumably historicalwargame a strong flavor of t he ab strac t, likeTactics I or Blitzkrieg. Although I don't want tobelabor the point, one could even argue thatFrance, 1940 properly belongs in this lattercategory of wargame, since the main emphasis ison the non-historical situations.Of course, it's diverting to probe the possibili-ties if different strategies had been followed,and/or different events transpired. Be that as i tmay, I for one hate to see this take precedenceover attempting to simulate the historical version.This is surely the case in France, 1940, since it isstated that "quite frankly, between two equalplayers of good ability the Allies don't stand achance in the historical situation."

If so, why bother with it? In effect, doesn'tthis make the game purely a study of certainevents that could possibly have happened thirty-odd years ago in Eur ope? D oubtless a suitabletopic for a wargame, but perhaps a bit disap-pointing to those who would prefer a morethorough exploration of what was, rather thanwhat might have been.Of course, there is a formu la for determinin gvictory even if you are playing the scenario wherethe Germans start in Paris because Charlemagne'sson Pippin died at the age of two. but beingrather old fashioned, I am one of those backwardpeople who prefers to win or lose because Icaptured Stalingrad or crossed the Meuse, ratherthan having to check it out with a slide-ruleGet to the po in t : the po in t i s tha t I do no tagree that the historical situation should becategorically dismissed as the game's designer haschosen to do. To win as the Allies using thehistorical OOB is obviously difficult, but at thesame time an interesting challenge, and notimpossible, in my opinion. Here is how I proposetha t i t be a t tempted :First, I do concede that the historical set-up,the "Dyle Plan," is hopeless for the Allies.Therefore they must be permitted a free set-up,as in so many other games. That being the case,how do things stand?

As the table shows, the German ground forcesenjoy a superiority of only about six or seven tofive. German artillery is not included, it beingconsidered balanced by the Maginot Line. The 3air landing regiments are included.Obviously, this table ignores the 411 Axis airsuperiority, since there is no direct strengthcomparison possible with ground forces. Nonethe-less, the point is that the disparity between thetwo forces is not enormous, provided the Alliesfollow a careful strategy.

Point one in this strategy is the realization tterritory is relatively unim porta nt in France,It is only useful insofar as i t protects withdrawiAllied units . No matter if at the end of turn German artillery shells the Eiffel Tower. So loas Paris is not actually occupied, the Allies arewell off having lost everything north of the Seiand the Marne as if they still held Liege.Parenthetically, I f ind this one o f t he unreistic features of the game. The Allied playmight well prevent all German units from enting France and vet lose decisivelv. Of course.could always b e argued that des truction of tenemy is the point of the whole exercise, awinning territory must inevitably follow. Tvictory conditions of Stalingrad, Bulge, AK, etcould conceivably all be done over as a ratio units destroyed, and this is an increasingly poplar procedure in wargames. In my opinion, it cpermit perverse resu lts in certain circumstancOf course, this could be corrected, and no dousomeone will come up with a point system fcities captured, etc.Until then, the Allied player must fix firmly mind that he can only win by retreating n tplace, and at th e right pace.I t i s abou t 26 hexes from the closest points the German frontier to Paris. This means thatwould take German infantry 5 turns to reaParis unopposed. Presuming that the Allies cforce the Germans to pivot about the Ardennewhich is the crux of this suggested strategy, ththe distance increases to more than 30 hexes, 6 turns.

Therefore, this is the problem:1. Delay t h e German infantry for 4 extturns.2 Prevent the German armor f rom acting asspearhead.3 . Keep Allied casualties under a 3 ratio.Germans.I suggest this be a t tempted as follows:A. Initial Set-Up1 Dutch/BelgianAs th e diagram shows, of th e 13 unit s avaable, 7 are more than four hexes from tGerman border, and therefore immune to attaby infantry. Five of these units, because they adeep in the woods, can not be reached by armeither.

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Paae 3 TH GENERA

Four units can only be attacked from one hex,and therefore at relatively low odds. Moreover,these units are either behind a river or in woods.Only one unit can be attacked in strength, andshould it be destroyed, the zocs of surviving unitswill probably prevent significant penetration.2. AlliesFortress units should be in the more exposedMaginot hexes. There should also be a fewFrench infantry corps in the Maginot Line, aswell as 2 or 3 smaller mechanized units in close

B. Second TurnSince French infantry will need t w o turns t oreach the positions the Dutch and Belgians holda t the start , except fo r t h e central/southern

Ardennes, these units should fall back rather thanexpose themselves t o destruction. Not knowingthe pa th of strongest German advance, it's impos-sible to say exactly where t h e Dutch and Belgiansshould risk holding forward positions o n t u r ntwo. Here, as th roughout the game, the Alliedcommander will have t o carefully weigh the riskof casualties vs. the delay gained by territory held

reserve t o plug up any holes. A significantpenetration in this area is probably the greatestdanger the Allies face, as there are n o gooddefensive positions f rom which t o prevent theGermans from exiting t o the south.

The remaining Allied units should deploy inthe area Maubeuge/Givet/Montmedy, being care-ful no t t o be t rapped in the Givet salient byGerman paratroops, should the Germans initiallyattack Holland, Luxemburg, and France, b u t notBelgium.I strongly suggest concentration of the Britishunits, and Allied armor, as this is probably theonly way the Allies can counter-attack Germanarmored salients.Be sure t o keep air units o u t of German range.If it appears they will be exposed t o heavyattack, it is better to evacuate them by sea ( 5points lost), than risk destruction ( 1 0 points).

a tu rn or t w o longer. The Allies will have t o talosses, o r withdraw t o o rapidly. Their abilityjudge where and when t o withdraw, together wtheir success in forcing the Germans t o pivabout the Ardennes, will decide whether they wo r lose.C. German Alternate Strategy

What if the Germans, o n the first tu rn , puin to Holland and Luxemburg, perhaps eventacking France, b u t ignoring Belgium? Althouthey lose a turn in coming t o grips with the mabody ' o f the enemy, they d o better their strategposture. Their position in Luxemburg forces tBelgians t o withdraw t o the western Ardennes,be exposed t o heavy attack, unsupported by tAllies. F rom Holland, they can outflank the Liebottleneck, and make untenable the defensidisposition outlined in diagram I.So a different plan is needed for the Dutand Belgian forces t o fall back t o should tGermans a t tack this way (see diagramm 11 .course, in this case it is probable that tGermans will concen t ra te their forces more t o tnor th than if they push i n t o Belgium o n the fiturn, and some Allied adjustments may be callfor.

D. I t is presumed tha t t h e following rules willused:

1. German paratroops (so tha t the Belgiamay benefit f rom Eben-Emael).2. No mild winter (since the whole purposet o stick as close as possible t o history).3. Sea evacuation.I don't mean t o imply tha t the strategoutlined above guarantees Allied victory, o r eva 50150 chance: far f rom it I do th ink it givthem a ighting chance, for those who would li

t o explore t h e historical OoB of France 1940One last point: since the emphasis of Franc

1940 is so heavily o n "What if?" situationhere's ano ther , using the historical OoB Britaand France have an alliance with the Benelucountries, and can deploy therein a t start. Surethis is n o more improbable than some of thother alternatives, and should give the Germanqui te a struggle.

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THE GENER L

Ever since its inception ORIGINS O F WWIIhas been praised for its ease of play simple rulesand limited playing time. Howe ver the samemechanics and l imited num ber o f turns whichmake the game so delightfully easy t o play alsotend to stereot ype play onc e familiarization setsin. The variant objective charts included with theg a me d o mu ch to o f f s e t th i s b u t th e c reat io n o fvariant m etho ds o f play for ORIGINS is in-evitable If the insatiable appet ite o f the hardcoreis to be appeased. Thu s we present an overviewo f variants as designed by three separate enthu-siasts.

ORIGINS: AVOIDINGA WORLD WAR

The recent dispute between Dunnigan and J.E.Pourelle has served at least one purpose, if notmore, in suggesting to me an ORIGINS variantthat goes beyond a mere reordering of NationalObjectives and could prove very exciting indeed.The present game assumes that if Germany winsby 15 points or more, there is war butGermany still wins, and there is no real motiva-tion on the part of any player to prevent theoutbreak of war so long as he can still win.But in point of historical fact, the GermanGeneral Staff appears to have been rather con-vinced that another world war would be catastro-phic for Germany. Moreover, there is evidencethat Hitler shared their view, however reluctantly;he seems to have wanted an understanding withEngland and a l imited war with Russia sometimearound 1943. And, in any case, most people seemto agree in retrospect that Germany had li t t lechance of ultimately winning the war when itfinally came, however impressive her initial show-ing.Thus, I propose an ORIGINS variant in which,if a war breaks ou t, Germany loses and thecountry with th e nex t highest point score wins.Thus, the German player is in a real dilemmahe needs enough points to win, but not sodecisively as to cause a general war and loseeverything Obviously, this approac h is going torequire a little play testing to achieve pointbalance perhaps the point definition of warwill have to be raised to, say, eighteen but itcould be done, and the result may well be a farmore challenging game.Also not to be overlooked is the possibility ofa decisive victory for Germ any; this would consist(as Hitler hop ed) of understan dings with Englandand F rance, and a limited war with Russia. Warwith Russia would consist of exclusive Germa ncontrol of t he Baltics, Poland, and Romania. Ofcourse, it would be in the interests of Englandand France to help Russia prevent this, as theywant to win too.Thus, in short, this simple variation provides awhole new outlook on the game and its strategiesthat could be very exciting indeed. It might evenbe worth looking into. Playtest, anyone?

TRILOGYby Lew Pulsipher, Mark Saha, andLawrence Valencourt

ITALIAN ORIGINS

lames Dunnigan notwithstanding, I think mostpeople agree that ORIGIN S OF WW I1 is not a n"historical simulatio n" in any meaningful sense,but some believe that ORIGINS is basically agood game or "game-system." Unfortu nately, tw ofactors act to destroy the quality of play in theversions of ORIGINS included in the game. Theseare 1) the very large luck factor, and 2) theextreme imbalance. Far too often a clearlysuperior player can be th warted by a single dieroll. Many players prefer a game whose outcomeis determined by skill. Anyone who has playedthe historical game, which is standard in postalplay, knows that the United States has no chanceto win, and France wins very seldom (I have notyet heard of a French win). The other threecountries have a fair chance, but that is onlythree ou t of five The comments on play in theDesigners Notes included with the game aredifficult to explain in light of playing experience.The following two variants are designed re-spectively to eliminate the luck factor and tobalance the game by addition of a sixth player,Italy. This addition shou ld, inc identally create aless inaccurate simulation, but that is n o t theprimary intent. Play-balance is the objective inthe second variant.Proportional combat variant:1. All rules for historical ORIGIN S applyexcept as follows.2. The Diplomatic Conflict Table is not used.Combat is resolved using the formula: winner'sloss equals loser's strength squared, divided bywinner's strength; the winner is always thestronger force, and all losers are eliminated (seeexception below). For example. in a 5-3, winner'sloss is 32 /5 915 or 2 (round fractions tonearest whole number , with rounded up).3. On the f irs t tw o turns only one half of aforce can be eliminated in a conflict. Bothwinner's and loser's losses are halved. If there arean odd number of PF's in the loser's force, onemore will be eliminated than will survive. If thereis only one defending PF, it cannot be destroyed.For example, on turn 2, five PF's attack three.Two defenders are lost, and 915 times or 1attacker is eliminated.4. Add 2 PF's per tur n to United Statesallocations, and 1 PF per turn to French alloca-tions.Six player variant:1. All rules of historical ORIGINS apply ex-cept as follows.2. Add an Italian playe r, playing just be foreFrance on even numbered turns and just afterFrance on odd numbered turns. I talian allocationsare: 8 10, 12, 12, 12, 12. Italian objectives are:NC Austria-4 U Britain-5 NC Czecho slo-vakia-2 U France-4 U Germa ny-3 URhineland-2 NC Romania-1 No Germa n U inFrance-2 No Russian U in Germa ny-2.3. Add 1 PF per turn to allocations for theUnited States and France.Of course, these variants may be combined aswell as played separately.

SOLITARY ORIGINS?Impossible you say; on the contrary it 's veasy.First you decide on which of the five vations you want to play. Then take a deckcards and let each denomination represencountry.* Then you decide upon some methoddetermining which fraction of each countallocated PF's you put where.** My met

follows.In case of fractions of PF being put intcountry always make it the next largest whnumber. (For example 314's of 2 PF's worequire all (or both) to be placed in the saspot, 314 of 14 11 PF's, etc). The odifference in the way you play the game, afrom the fact that you play each country in tis in this first part; the placement of the PAfter the first round placement proceednormal giving understanding and/or control the eliminating of opponents PF, etc. On second round, if you flip a card designaplacement of your PF's in a country alrecontrolled by another power simply flip anocard over.Perhaps the idea is best illustrated by sample turn below:

*ExampleAce Alsace-Lorraine Queen RussiaTwo Austria King United Sta* *Clubs ?4of remaining PFsDiamon ds of remaining PFsHearts %'s of remaining PFsSpades all of remaining PFs

Sample Move:Turn 1USA turnFrenchFrenchBritainBritainBritainRussiaRussiaRussiaGermany

2 heartsQ heartsheartsK clubsK hearts

7 spades10 clubs5 hearts5 clubs8 spades

Both PF's go to Aus3 PF's to go to Russia1 PF to Rumania2 PF's to US5 PF's to US1 PF to Germany2 PF's to Rhineland3 PF's to Czechoslova1 PF to CzechoslovakAll 12 PF's t o Italy

Now in the "diplomacy" portion of th e m(th e "aggressive" portion is skipped no topponents have counters in the same counthe British can gain an understanding with the as can the Germans with Italy.As the game continues you'll find that in mcases each country will end up with a represative sample of each of the five belligerent PFHowever unrealistic it might b e for German yhave 32 factors in France Still, 1 feel version of solitary is a good way to practice to develop a feel for the "tactics" of the gaand variation played.The game I just finished was one of aggressive French Policy (and it had all of the turn Germans in France, 6 of spades ) and final score was surprisingly U S-15; F-11; B-2; RG-8.Remarks: Leave the PF's placed in your hocountry there as they will be your only meanseliminating undesirable "understandings" gaiby your "opponent."

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Page 5 TH GENERASERIES REPLAY

Roy Easton has long had a penchant fordifficult wargames. It seems to have manifesteditself in this, his latest literary effort. Roy notonly proposes a bold new strategy for theGermans in 1914, he amends the rules to cover afew existing ambiguities, and then proceeds tosubstantiate his hypothesis by relating a demon-stration game. We think you ll agree with us thatRoy has touched all bases in his approach to1914.THE GERM N LTERN TIVES

1914 T h e very words conjure up thoughts o fthe mighty German juggernaut as it s tormedacross France t o its appointment with destiny o nth e Marne. Having played the Avalon Hill game1914 more times than 1 would care to mention, Ican attest t o the fact th a t the strategies used t owin the game fo r th e Germans closely parallelthose actually used, b u t in the game th e elementof surprise is lacking fo r th e French player nowexpects an attack through Belgium although thereis surprisingly little that he can d o about it. Inthis article I shall examine some alternativestrategies fo r b o th sides and suggest some neces-sary rule changes.In 1871, the Prussian army won th e Franco-Prussian War and Chancellor Bismarck formed th eGerman Empire under the first Kaiser, Wilhelm I.Both Bismarck and von Moltke, th e PrussianChief of Staff, believed in the need t o avoid waro n t w o fronts. Their plan, should this occasionarise, was to fight a delaying action o n bothfronts, a t tempting to defeat th e weaker enemyfirst. It was n o t until 1 8 9 1 with a new Kaiser,Wilhelm 11 and a new Chief of Staff, Co u n tAlfred von Schlieffen, th a t th e General Staffbegan to make plans fo r assuming th e offensive ina future war.These early plans mainly concerned a com-bined Austro-German invasion of Russia. Al-though this drive would be under German direc-t ion , these plans never had Schlieffen's completesupport . He seems t o have taken the lesson ofNapoleon's 1 8 12 campaign t o heart for he didn o t believe th a t even t h e combined Austro-German armies could destroy the Russian army ina single campaign. If th e Russians fought delayingactions, they could tie u p the bulk of theGerman armies o n the vast Russian steppes, farf ro m th e German supply railheads and unable tocome t o the aid of the small forces covering theFranco-German border should the Fren ch succeedin mo u n t in g a successful offensive.Thinking along these lines convinced Schlieffenthat the Western Fro n t would be decisive andsoon the German General Staff began formulatingplans th a t called fo r a German invasion of Francewhile holding off the slowly mobilizing Russianarmies with delaying forces in East Prussia. By1897, Schlieffen was considering outflanking th epowerful French defenses o n the Franco-Germanborder by violating Belgian neutrality. By 1905,

LITTLE REVISION ND LOT OF REPL Y

the now-famous Schlieffen Plan had been devel- the decade proceding the war, i t was th e Germanoped and, although modified by von Moltke in mobilization plan in 1914.

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THE GENER L

MAP NO. 2. After turn 3 both sides have lost heavily but the Frenchcannot recoup their losses as can the Germans and are pushedsteadily back.

Were there any other opt ions available t o theGerman planners? Had the Germans stuck totheir earlier plans and made their main effortagainst Russia, there is little doubt tha t theywould have been successful. Russia was torn byinternal problems and was in n o position torecover as rapidly as she did in World War 11. Thequestion is, of course, how long would it havetaken for the German and Austrian armies t ocompletely defeat the Russians. Unfortunately,this question is outside the scope of this article.If we confine o u r at tent ion only to plansinvolving