aim through safety case idec – mumbai - may 2013
TRANSCRIPT
AIM Through Safety Case
IDEC – MUMBAI - MAY 2013IDEC – MUMBAI - MAY 2013
Introduction to Bureau Veritas
3IDEC - MUMBAI – MAY 2013
Bureau Veritas 2012 revenue: € 3,9bn
8 Global Businesses
Broad Geographical Presence
Asia Pacific
Europe, Middle East & Africa
Americas
Marine & Offshore
IVSCertification
Industry
Consumer Products
Construction
Well Balanced Portfolio
Commodities
20%
12%12%
9%
18%
11%
7% 12%
28% 23%
49%
GSIT
4IDEC - MUMBAI – MAY 2013
Offshore Units & Equipment Certification
► Design review, survey of construction, inspection of equipment, supervision of installation to assess compliance with specified standards and international regulations.
► BV recognized by 130 Flag States for the implementation of international conventions (statutory)
► Certification can be combined with classification
Consulting & Outsourcing
► Project management► FEED review► Technical assistance services: risk analysis,
hydrodynamics, mooring, structural strength and fatigue, vibrations and noise
► Services to operators: Asset Integrity Management, Expertise
Offshore Floating Units & Equipment Classification
► Design review, survey of construction, inspection of equipment, supervision of installation to assess compliance with classification rules.
► Maintenance of class in service through periodical inspections
► Cover hull, mooring and topsides (PROC).
BV Offshore services
Offshore Units Independent Verification
► Risk based safety assessment scheme required by a national authority.
► IVB can be combined with classification and certification
5IDEC - MUMBAI – MAY 2013
BV Involvement
Concept
Concept Design
FEED
Detailed Design
ConstructionInstallation
In-Service
Concept Approval
- Basic approval- Concept Design
approval- Final concept approval- Qualification of
unproven technology
ClassificationCertification
In service survey
Concept / FEED Approval
Certificate(s)
Class Certificate
Maintenance of Certificates
Project phases Approval type BV Certificates
6IDEC - MUMBAI – MAY 2013
Marine & Offshore Division : the global network
2000 marine technical staff: naval architects, marine engineers and surveyors180 survey stations in more than 90 countries
16 Local Technical Centres & Plan Approval
Offices
12 regional Marine Centres and Customer
Support Centres
4 Regional Training Centres
Local plan approval offices Marine operations centre Regional training centreSurvey stations
4 MARINE ZONES
•North Asia Zone
•South Asia Zone
•Europe, Africa and North Zone
•Hellenic, Black Sea & Middle East Zone
7IDEC - MUMBAI – MAY 2013
FSO & FPSO: Class & Technical Assistance studies
SKARV FPSOfor BP / STATOIL in Norway
More than 120 FSOs & FPSOs studied by BV
Present in all MODU types
AIM Through Safety Case
9IDEC - MUMBAI – MAY 2013
Asset Integrity Management
► I.M. is responsible of safety and availability of the asset.
Needs Risk Ranking and Decision Making (Priorities)
► It includes the follow-up and fullfilment of Class and Verification
► Must keep track of all inspection/maintenance schedules
Integrity Management
(Duty Holder)
Class & FlagRequirements
Verification Requirements
(SCEs) InspectionServices
e.g. NDT, VisualCompany
Requirements(BCEs)
10IDEC - MUMBAI – MAY 2013
Asset Integrity Management means…
►Accountability, roles and responsabilities
►Consistency
►Competence
►Management of Change
►Data Management
Document Center: Categories (ex: hull, mooring, stability, topsides, SURF, stability, integrity management)
What should be considered as « Must Have »?Expert reports, processed inspection reports as opposed to raw data (nice-to-have)
11IDEC - MUMBAI – MAY 2013
Asset Integrity Management means…
► Risk Management
Extract from the IADC HSE Case Guidelines and based on ISO IEC Guide 73:2002
12IDEC - MUMBAI – MAY 2013
AIM & SAFETY CASE
NOPSEMA Safety Case Content and Level of Detail - N-04300-GN0106 - Revison 4, December 2011NOPSEMA Safety Case Content and Level of Detail - N-04300-GN0106 - Revison 4, December 2011
FACILITY DESCRIPTIONFACILITY DESCRIPTION
FORMAL SAFETY ASSESSMENTFORMAL SAFETY ASSESSMENT
SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMSAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
SAFETY MEASURESSAFETY MEASURES
EMERGENCIESEMERGENCIES
RECORDSRECORDS
5 YR REVISION5 YR REVISION
14IDEC - MUMBAI – MAY 2013
3P’s: Plant, People and Processes
Any operation requires equipment to execute an activity, people to operate and maintain the equipment and a business process to guide the operations and maintenance.
CONTENT OF HSE CASE:
Part Content
1 Introduction, Summary of all parts
2 Operations HSE Management System
3 Catalogue of Critical Activities
4 Description of Facility, Process, Safety Systems, Manning Philosophy
5 HER, MAH, SCE, Summary of PS, MOPO, Summary of FSA (QRA, EERA, ESSA, TRIA)
6 Proposed Remedial Actions
7 Conclusion, Statement of Fitness
15IDEC - MUMBAI – MAY 2013
DOCUMENT HIERARCHY
Level 1: Overall Guidance
Level 2: Specific Guidance
Level 3: Generic Examples
Level 4: Asset Specific
Guidance Document for MAHGuidance Document for MAH
Guidance Document for SCE 1Guidance Document for SCE 1
Guidance Document for PS and Assurance Tasks
•
Guidance Document for PS and Assurance Tasks
•Guidance Document for Verification
•Guidance Document for Verification
•
Asset Specific Performance StandardsAsset Specific Performance Standards
Level 1
Level 3
Level 2
Level 4
Generic Document for MAH
Generic Document for MAH
Generic Document for PS and Assurance
Tasks
Generic Document for PS and Assurance
Tasks
Generic Document for
SCE 1
Generic Document for
SCE 1
Specific Equipment Reliability Plan (SERPs)Specific Equipment Reliability Plan (SERPs)
Asset Specific HSE Case
•
Asset Specific HSE Case
•
•Engineering Data
•
•Engineering Data
•
• Technical Data
•
• Design Data
•
• Assessment Data
•
• Historical Data
•
Asset Specific Safety Critical Elements
•
Asset Specific Safety Critical Elements
•
Guidance Document for MAHGuidance Document for MAH
Guidance Document for SCE 1Guidance Document for SCE 1
Guidance Document for PS and Assurance Tasks
•
Guidance Document for PS and Assurance Tasks
•Guidance Document for Verification
•Guidance Document for Verification
•
Asset Specific Performance StandardsAsset Specific Performance Standards
Level 1
Level 3
Level 2
Level 4
Generic Document for MAH
Generic Document for MAH
Generic Document for PS and Assurance
Tasks
Generic Document for PS and Assurance
Tasks
Generic Document for
SCE 1
Generic Document for
SCE 1
Specific Equipment Reliability Plan (SERPs)Specific Equipment Reliability Plan (SERPs)
Asset Specific HSE Case
•
Asset Specific HSE Case
•
•Engineering Data
•
•Engineering Data
•
• Technical Data
•
• Design Data
•
• Assessment Data
•
• Historical Data
•
Asset Specific Safety Critical Elements
•
Asset Specific Safety Critical Elements
•
16IDEC - MUMBAI – MAY 2013
3P’s: Plant, People and Processes
Plant;
►Know the equipment – Asset Register in Hierarchical fashion.
►Classify equipment according to criticality to HSE, Production etc.
►Select appropriate tools to determine task requirements (task, frequency, man-power, spares and specialist tools etc.).
►Have a management system in place to generate the work orders, record work history, provide management reports etc.
►Keep the correct critical spares in the correct location(s).
►Establish performance indicators, aligned with the equipment functionality to measure performance. Establish target values and have a Continuous Improvement process in place.
17IDEC - MUMBAI – MAY 2013
PhysicalChemical
Biological
Ergonomic
Psychological
Types of HazardsHealth Hazards
Individual Safety Hazards
A hazard is defined as a situation with the potential for causing harm to human health or safety (NOPSEMA Control Measures and Performance Standards N-04300-GN0271 Dec.2011)
A hazard is a situation that poses a level of threat to life, health, property, or environment. (Wikipedia)
A source or a situation with a potential for harm in terms of human or ill-health, damage to property, damage to the environment, or a combination of these (AS / NZS 4804:1997).
18IDEC - MUMBAI – MAY 2013
MAJOR ACCIDENT HAZARDS & MAJOR ACCIDENTS
19IDEC - MUMBAI – MAY 2013
MAJOR ACCIDENT EVENTS
NOPSEMA Hazard Identification - N-04300-GN0107 - Revision 4, December 2011NOPSEMA Hazard Identification - N-04300-GN0107 - Revision 4, December 2011
As per the definition given in OPGGS(S) regulation 1.5, a major accident event is an event connected with a facility, including a natural event, having the potential to cause multiple fatalities of persons at or near the facility. Thus MAEs by definition are consequence based.
As per the definition given in OPGGS(S) regulation 1.5, a major accident event is an event connected with a facility, including a natural event, having the potential to cause multiple fatalities of persons at or near the facility. Thus MAEs by definition are consequence based.
Major accident events usually occur as a result of a combination of factors. Care needs to be taken during the formal safety assessment that combinations of events that could lead to high consequence incidents are not dismissed as ‘double contingency’ or ‘double jeopardy’ events.
Major accident events usually occur as a result of a combination of factors. Care needs to be taken during the formal safety assessment that combinations of events that could lead to high consequence incidents are not dismissed as ‘double contingency’ or ‘double jeopardy’ events.
20IDEC - MUMBAI – MAY 2013
Major Accident Hazards (MAH)
THE FIVE STAGES OF THE MAJOR ACCIDENT HAZARD AND SAFETY CRITICAL ELEMENT MANAGEMENT PROCESS
1.Identify Major Accident Hazards (MAH)
2.Identify Safety Critical Elements (SCEs) from these MAHs,
3.Identify Performance Standards (PS) for each SCE
4.Identify assurance processes that maintain or ensure continued suitability of the SCEs (i.e. that they meet PS requirements)
5.Verify all steps have been undertaken, and thus that MAHs are being controlled.
21IDEC - MUMBAI – MAY 2013
SCE Identification
SCE IDENTIFICATION PROCESS FLOW
YES
NO
Is equipment designed to protect process equipment in order to avoid
catastrophic failure / injury?
Is the element design to provide control, shutdown, alarm or
mitigation during an emergency?
NO
Does the element contain flammable hydrocarbons or other hazardous
chemicals?
Could the release from the element cause serious injury to multiple
people or an environmental event?
Could failure cause an event resulting in catastrophic release from upstream or
downstream process?
Could failure of the element cause Major Accident or does the element prevent, control or mitigate a Major Accident?
Does the element prevent harm to people in the event of a Major Accident?
Safety Critical
•Not
Safety Critical
•
Not Safety Critical
•
Not Safety Critical
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
YES
NO
Is equipment designed to protect process equipment in order to avoid
catastrophic failure / injury?
Is the element design to provide control, shutdown, alarm or
mitigation during an emergency?
NO
Does the element contain flammable hydrocarbons or other hazardous
chemicals?
Could the release from the element cause serious injury to multiple
people or an environmental event?
Could failure cause an event resulting in catastrophic release from upstream or
downstream process?
Could failure of the element cause Major Accident or does the element prevent, control or mitigate a Major Accident?
Does the element prevent harm to people in the event of a Major Accident?
Safety Critical
•Not
Safety Critical
•
Not Safety Critical
•
Not Safety Critical
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
YES
NO
Is equipment designed to protect process equipment in order to avoid
catastrophic failure / injury?
Is the element design to provide control, shutdown, alarm or
mitigation during an emergency?
NO
Does the element contain flammable hydrocarbons or other hazardous
chemicals?
Could the release from the element cause serious injury to multiple
people or an environmental event?
Could failure cause an event resulting in catastrophic release from upstream or
downstream process?
Could failure of the element cause Major Accident or does the element prevent, control or mitigate a Major Accident?
Does the element prevent harm to people in the event of a Major Accident?
Safety Critical
•Not
Safety Critical
•
Not Safety Critical
•
Not Safety Critical
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
YES
NO
Is equipment designed to protect process equipment in order to avoid
catastrophic failure / injury?
Is the element design to provide control, shutdown, alarm or
mitigation during an emergency?
NO
Does the element contain flammable hydrocarbons or other hazardous
chemicals?
Could the release from the element cause serious injury to multiple
people or an environmental event?
Could failure cause an event resulting in catastrophic release from upstream or
downstream process?
Could failure of the element cause Major Accident or does the element prevent, control or mitigate a Major Accident?
Does the element prevent harm to people in the event of a Major Accident?
Safety Critical
•Not
Safety Critical
•
Not Safety Critical
•
Not Safety Critical
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
Is equipment designed to protect process equipment in order to avoid
catastrophic failure / injury?
Is the element design to provide control, shutdown, alarm or
mitigation during an emergency?
NO
Does the element contain flammable hydrocarbons or other hazardous
chemicals?
Could the release from the element cause serious injury to multiple
people or an environmental event?
Could failure cause an event resulting in catastrophic release from upstream or
downstream process?
Could failure of the element cause Major Accident or does the element prevent, control or mitigate a Major Accident?
Does the element prevent harm to people in the event of a Major Accident?
Safety Critical
•Not
Safety Critical
•
Not Safety Critical
•
Not Safety Critical
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
Is equipment designed to protect process equipment in order to avoid
catastrophic failure / injury?
Is the element design to provide control, shutdown, alarm or
mitigation during an emergency?
NO
Does the element contain flammable hydrocarbons or other hazardous
chemicals?
Could the release from the element cause serious injury to multiple
people or an environmental event?
Could failure cause an event resulting in catastrophic release from upstream or
downstream process?
Could failure of the element cause Major Accident or does the element prevent, control or mitigate a Major Accident?
Does the element prevent harm to people in the event of a Major Accident?
Safety Critical
•Not
Safety Critical
•
Not Safety Critical
•
Not Safety Critical
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
22IDEC - MUMBAI – MAY 2013
Safety Cases
BOW TIE DIAGRAMA Bow Tie diagram displays the relationships between the major accident events, the associated causes and consequences, Safety Critical Elements and Activities and factors affecting SCE integrity
23IDEC - MUMBAI – MAY 2013
Scope Of Work: Validation
What Is Validation ? Scope Of Validation
Hazard Identification & Risk AssessmentHazard Identification & Risk Assessment
Identification Of Major Accident Events (MAES)Identification Of Major Accident Events (MAES)
Identification Of Barriers To Those MAESIdentification Of Barriers To Those MAES
Safety Critical ElementsSafety Critical Elements
FORMAL SAFETY ASSESSMENT (FSA)FORMAL SAFETY
ASSESSMENT (FSA)
Forms the basis of
=EQUALS
24IDEC - MUMBAI – MAY 2013
25IDEC - MUMBAI – MAY 2013
Control Measures & Performance Standards
►Control measures include the physical features of a facility, and elements of the operator’s management system employed at the facility, that eliminate, prevent, reduce or mitigate the risk of major accident events and other hazardous events. They can take many forms including physical equipment, process control systems, management processes, operating or maintenance procedures, the emergency plan, key personnel and their actions
► Preferential order should be considered when selecting controls. The hierarchy of control measures typically includes, in order of priority, elimination, prevention, reduction and mitigation.
► The operator’s safety management system for a facility must specify the performance standards that apply. The performance standards are the parameters against which control measures for MAEs are assessed to ensure they reduce the risks to ALARP on an ongoing basis
NOPSEMA Control Measures and Performance Standards Rev 3, December 2011- N-04300-GN0271NOPSEMA Control Measures and Performance Standards Rev 3, December 2011- N-04300-GN0271
26IDEC - MUMBAI – MAY 2013
Examples of Control Barriers
28IDEC - MUMBAI – MAY 2013
SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
the SMS itself must meet the requirements of items (a) to (i), not necessarily the detailed description.
the SMS itself must meet the requirements of items (a) to (i), not necessarily the detailed description.
NOPSEMA Safety Case Content and Level of Detail - N-04300-GN0106 - Revison 4, December 2011NOPSEMA Safety Case Content and Level of Detail - N-04300-GN0106 - Revison 4, December 2011
29IDEC - MUMBAI – MAY 2013
Safety Case Cycle
STAGE 1IDENTIFY MAJOR ACCIDENT HAZARDS
TestInspectMaintain
FORMAL SAFETY ASSESSMENT
QRA, EERA , ESSA, NFHA, Dropped Object, Ship Collision, TRISIA, F&G
Mapping, HAC, etc.
STAGE 2IDENTIFY SAFETY CRITICAL ELEMENTS
DEMONSTRATION OF MAH & SCE MANAGEMENT
LikelihoodConsequenceRisk
AvoidPreventControl / MitigateEmergency Response
STAGE 3DEFINE PERFORMANCE STANDARDS
FACILITY HSE CASE
FunctionalityAvailabilityReliabilitySurvivabilityInteractions / Dependencies
STAGE 4DEVELOP / REVIEW AND IMPLEMENT
ASSURANCE PROCESSES
STAGE 5MANAGE NON-CONFORMING SCEs
HER AND HEMP
SAFETY CASE IMPLEMENTATION
STAGE 5INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES
MAH SUITABILTY ASSESSMENT
SCE SUITABILTY ASSESSMENT
INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION OF SUITABILTIY AND EXECUTION
INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION OF SUITABILTIY AND EXECUTION
INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION OF SUITABILTIY AND EXECUTION
IdentifyManage Interim Risk Until ResolutionRepair / Replace / Redesign / Rectify
30IDEC - MUMBAI – MAY 2013
TestInspectMaintain
FORMAL SAFETY ASSESSMENT
QRA, EERA , ESSA, NFHA, Dropped Object, Ship Collision, TRISIA, F&G
Mapping, HAC, etc.
STAGE 2IDENTIFY SAFETY CRITICAL ELEMENTS
DEMONSTRATION OF MAH & SCE MANAGEMENT
AvoidPreventControl / MitigateEmergency Response
STAGE 3DEFINE PERFORMANCE STANDARDS
FACILITY HSE CASE
FunctionalityAvailabilityReliabilitySurvivabilityInteractions / Dependencies
STAGE 4DEVELOP / REVIEW AND IMPLEMENT
ASSURANCE PROCESSES
STAGE 5MANAGE NON-CONFORMING SCEs
HER AND HEMP
SAFETY CASE IMPLEMENTATION
STAGE 5INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES
MAH SUITABILTY ASSESSMENT
SCE SUITABILTY ASSESSMENT
INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION OF SUITABILTIY AND EXECUTION
INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION OF SUITABILTIY AND EXECUTION
INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION OF SUITABILTIY AND EXECUTION
IdentifyManage Interim Risk Until ResolutionRepair / Replace / Redesign / Rectify
STAGE 1IDENTIFY MAJOR ACCIDENT HAZARDS
LikelihoodConsequenceRisk
Safety Case Cycle
31IDEC - MUMBAI – MAY 2013
STAGE 1IDENTIFY MAJOR ACCIDENT HAZARDS
TestInspectMaintain
FORMAL SAFETY ASSESSMENT
QRA, EERA , ESSA, NFHA, Dropped Object, Ship Collision, TRISIA, F&G
Mapping, HAC, etc.
DEMONSTRATION OF MAH & SCE MANAGEMENT
LikelihoodConsequenceRisk
STAGE 3DEFINE PERFORMANCE STANDARDS
FACILITY HSE CASE
FunctionalityAvailabilityReliabilitySurvivabilityInteractions / Dependencies
STAGE 4DEVELOP / REVIEW AND IMPLEMENT
ASSURANCE PROCESSES
STAGE 5MANAGE NON-CONFORMING SCEs
HER AND HEMP
SAFETY CASE IMPLEMENTATION
STAGE 5INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES
MAH SUITABILTY ASSESSMENT
SCE SUITABILTY ASSESSMENT
INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION OF SUITABILTIY AND EXECUTION
INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION OF SUITABILTIY AND EXECUTION
INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION OF SUITABILTIY AND EXECUTION
IdentifyManage Interim Risk Until ResolutionRepair / Replace / Redesign / Rectify
STAGE 2IDENTIFY SAFETY CRITICAL ELEMENTS
AvoidPreventControl / MitigateEmergency Response
Safety Case Cycle
32IDEC - MUMBAI – MAY 2013
STAGE 1IDENTIFY MAJOR ACCIDENT HAZARDS
TestInspectMaintain
FORMAL SAFETY ASSESSMENT
QRA, EERA , ESSA, NFHA, Dropped Object, Ship Collision, TRISIA, F&G
Mapping, HAC, etc.
STAGE 2IDENTIFY SAFETY CRITICAL ELEMENTS
DEMONSTRATION OF MAH & SCE MANAGEMENT
LikelihoodConsequenceRisk
AvoidPreventControl / MitigateEmergency Response
FACILITY HSE CASE
STAGE 4DEVELOP / REVIEW AND IMPLEMENT
ASSURANCE PROCESSES
STAGE 5MANAGE NON-CONFORMING SCEs
HER AND HEMP
SAFETY CASE IMPLEMENTATION
STAGE 5INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES
MAH SUITABILTY ASSESSMENT
SCE SUITABILTY ASSESSMENT
INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION OF SUITABILTIY AND EXECUTION
INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION OF SUITABILTIY AND EXECUTION
INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION OF SUITABILTIY AND EXECUTION
IdentifyManage Interim Risk Until ResolutionRepair / Replace / Redesign / Rectify
STAGE 3DEFINE PERFORMANCE STANDARDS
FunctionalityAvailabilityReliabilitySurvivabilityInteractions / Dependencies
Safety Case Cycle
33IDEC - MUMBAI – MAY 2013
STAGE 1IDENTIFY MAJOR ACCIDENT HAZARDS
FORMAL SAFETY ASSESSMENT
QRA, EERA , ESSA, NFHA, Dropped Object, Ship Collision, TRISIA, F&G
Mapping, HAC, etc.
STAGE 2IDENTIFY SAFETY CRITICAL ELEMENTS
DEMONSTRATION OF MAH & SCE MANAGEMENT
LikelihoodConsequenceRisk
AvoidPreventControl / MitigateEmergency Response
STAGE 3DEFINE PERFORMANCE STANDARDS
FACILITY HSE CASE
FunctionalityAvailabilityReliabilitySurvivabilityInteractions / Dependencies
STAGE 5MANAGE NON-CONFORMING SCEs
HER AND HEMP
SAFETY CASE IMPLEMENTATION
STAGE 5INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES
MAH SUITABILTY ASSESSMENT
SCE SUITABILTY ASSESSMENT
INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION OF SUITABILTIY AND EXECUTION
INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION OF SUITABILTIY AND EXECUTION
INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION OF SUITABILTIY AND EXECUTION
IdentifyManage Interim Risk Until ResolutionRepair / Replace / Redesign / Rectify
TestInspectMaintain
STAGE 4DEVELOP / REVIEW AND IMPLEMENT
ASSURANCE PROCESSES
Safety Case Cycle
34IDEC - MUMBAI – MAY 2013
STAGE 1IDENTIFY MAJOR ACCIDENT HAZARDS
TestInspectMaintain
FORMAL SAFETY ASSESSMENT
QRA, EERA , ESSA, NFHA, Dropped Object, Ship Collision, TRISIA, F&G
Mapping, HAC, etc.
STAGE 2IDENTIFY SAFETY CRITICAL ELEMENTS
DEMONSTRATION OF MAH & SCE MANAGEMENT
LikelihoodConsequenceRisk
AvoidPreventControl / MitigateEmergency Response
STAGE 3DEFINE PERFORMANCE STANDARDS
FACILITY HSE CASE
FunctionalityAvailabilityReliabilitySurvivabilityInteractions / Dependencies
STAGE 4DEVELOP / REVIEW AND IMPLEMENT
ASSURANCE PROCESSES
HER AND HEMP
SAFETY CASE IMPLEMENTATION
STAGE 5INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES
MAH SUITABILTY ASSESSMENT
SCE SUITABILTY ASSESSMENT
INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION OF SUITABILTIY AND EXECUTION
INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION OF SUITABILTIY AND EXECUTION
INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION OF SUITABILTIY AND EXECUTION
STAGE 5MANAGE NON-CONFORMING SCEs
IdentifyManage Interim Risk Until ResolutionRepair / Replace / Redesign / Rectify
Safety Case Cycle
35IDEC - MUMBAI – MAY 2013
TestInspectMaintain
FORMAL SAFETY ASSESSMENT
QRA, EERA , ESSA, NFHA, Dropped Object, Ship Collision, TRISIA, F&G
Mapping, HAC, etc.
STAGE 2IDENTIFY SAFETY CRITICAL ELEMENTS
DEMONSTRATION OF MAH & SCE MANAGEMENT
AvoidPreventControl / MitigateEmergency Response
STAGE 3DEFINE PERFORMANCE STANDARDS
FACILITY HSE CASE
FunctionalityAvailabilityReliabilitySurvivabilityInteractions / Dependencies
STAGE 4DEVELOP / REVIEW AND IMPLEMENT
ASSURANCE PROCESSES
STAGE 5MANAGE NON-CONFORMING SCEs
HER AND HEMP
SAFETY CASE IMPLEMENTATION
STAGE 5INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES
MAH SUITABILTY ASSESSMENT
SCE SUITABILTY ASSESSMENT
INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION OF SUITABILTIY AND EXECUTION
INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION OF SUITABILTIY AND EXECUTION
INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION OF SUITABILTIY AND EXECUTION
IdentifyManage Interim Risk Until ResolutionRepair / Replace / Redesign / Rectify
STAGE 1IDENTIFY MAJOR ACCIDENT HAZARDS
LikelihoodConsequenceRisk
Safety Case Cycle
36IDEC - MUMBAI – MAY 2013
Asset Integrity Management & Safety Case
► Objective
Life-Cycle oriented
Operating facilities safely
Minimizing down-time. Avoidance of non-expected shutdowns
Implementation of a Learning process
Avoidance of swiss-cheese effects. Avoidance of orphan items/systems
Event Consequence
