Room 701, Hoseinee House69 Wyndham StreetCentral, Hong Kong

www.civic-exchange.org

AIR QUALITYReport Card of the Donald Tsang Administration (2005 -2012)

January 2012Mike Kilburn

Room 701, Hoseinee House69 Wyndham StreetCentral, Hong Kong

www.civic-exchange.org

Principles and Measures to Improve Air Quality:

Policy Recommendations for a New Administration

January 2012Mike Kilburn, Christine Loh

CONTENT 1. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................. 1 2. AIR AND HEALTH: ESTABLISHING THE FACTS .................................................................................... 2 3. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK ................................................................................................................... 4 4. APCO, AQOs, and EIAO ....................................................................................................................... 5

4.1 Delaying the introduction of new Air Quality Objectives ..................................................... 5

5. MAJOR DISCONNECTS ........................................................................................................................ 7

5.1 Disconnects in policy-making ................................................................................................ 7

5.1.1 The lack of joined-up policy-making ........................................................................... 7 5.1.2 Failure to use a key policy tool – Air Quality Objectives ............................................ 7 5.1.3 Combining “sticks & carrots” ...................................................................................... 8 5.1.4 Inspection and maintenance ...................................................................................... 8

5.2 Scientific disconnects ............................................................................................................ 8 5.2.1 No government data on public health impacts of air pollution ................................. 8 5.2.2 Controlling sources rather than concentrations of pollution ..................................... 9 5.2.3 Air Pollution Index – understating the health risks .................................................... 9 5.2.4 Smoke vs. specific pollutants ...................................................................................... 9

5.3 Administrative disconnects ................................................................................................... 9 5.3.1 Loss of oversight of pollution control by the Secretary for Health ............................ 9 5.3.2 De-professionalisation of Environmental Protection Department – impacts on the Environmental Impact Assessment process ................................ 10

5.4 Political disconnects ............................................................................................................ 10 5.4.1 Legislative and District Councils ............................................................................... 10

6. A REVIEW OF CONTROL MEASURES ................................................................................................ 11

6.1 Collaboration with Guangdong ........................................................................................... 11 6.2 Controlling SO2 emissions from power stations ................................................................. 11 6.3 Increasing the use of cleaner fuels in power stations ........................................................ 12 6.4 Roadside emissions ............................................................................................................. 12 6.5 Controlling emissions from idling engines .......................................................................... 12 6.6 Accelerated retirement of heavily polluting diesel commercial vehicles ........................... 12 6.7 New technology pilots ........................................................................................................ 13 6.8 Introducing controls on non-road mobile machinery ......................................................... 14 6.9 Catalytic converters and remote sensing ........................................................................... 14 6.10 Reducing emissions from ocean-going vessels and local craft ........................................... 14 6.11 Not yet working .................................................................................................................. 15

7. THE NEW THREAT TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ......................................................................... 15 8. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................................... 16 Civic Exchange is an independent public policy think tank that helps improve policy and decision-making through research and analysis. It is a company with limited liability and a registered charity in Hong Kong.

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1. INTRODUCTION On 12 October 2011, Chief Executive Donald Tsang delivered the final Policy Address of his term in office, which began on 12 March 2005. The most contentious environmental issue of his term has been the threat that persistently high levels of air pollution continue to pose to public health. The government has been aware of the threat for more than a decade, and the Environmental Protection Department (EPD) has taken a number of measures to improve air quality.

These measures include the establishment of the Pearl River Delta’s (PRD) regional air quality monitoring network in collaboration with Guangdong Province, and since December 2008, a series of cross-border studies on the environment including measures for reducing air pollution. Within Hong Kong, the fitting of flue gas desulphurisation (FGD) equipment has dramatically cut emissions from all coal-fired power stations, and a new focus on measuring and reducing roadside emissions proposed in the 2011-12 Policy Address marks an important paradigm shift towards tackling invisible toxic emissions from vehicles of all classes.

These measures have delivered some progress in controlling emissions from certain sources, but concentrations of the most dangerous pollutants, especially at street level, remain stubbornly and dangerously high. It is hardly surprising therefore that growing public awareness has led to more direct expressions of concern in the last two to three years.

Public opinion surveys show widespread awareness and concern about the health impacts of air pollution at all levels of society.1 They also show the public believes that the government knows what to do, yet they have little faith that the necessary actions to clean up will indeed be taken.2 The surveys also show that air pollution is driving those who form the base of Hong Kong’s knowledge- and finance-based economy – the wealthiest and best educated – to leave.3

In 2010, a judicial review challenged EPD’s approval of the environmental impact assessment (EIA) for the Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macau Bridge (HKZM Bridge) on air quality and public health grounds.

4 In September 2011, the Hong Kong Airport Authority’s (HKAA) consultation about a proposed third runway revealed that air quality was so poor that usage of the new runway would be limited to just 40% of capacity so as to conform to the proposed new air quality objectives (AQOs).5

In short, Hong Kong’s air quality is now so poor that it not only threatens public health and the city’s attractiveness as a place of business, but also the viability of key capital projects that will underpin Hong Kong’s future economic development.

Other factors merit closer examination. When it comes down to the hard choices the community remains divided about the cost of reducing pollution. Legislators, district councillors and many transport owners and operators fiercely resist mandatory measures to improve air quality on the grounds of rising costs (and the threat of rising fares) and diminished convenience.

This paper reviews how the Tsang administration has tackled air pollution since he took office in March 2005, to determine where progress has been made, and where it has not. Some of the difficulties to achieving substantial improvement come from long-entrenched systemic “disconnects” in the way that air pollution is addressed, but new and fundamental problems have also emerged.

This review does not include policy recommendations. A companion paper, Principles and Measures to Reduce Roadside Emissions - Policy Recommendations for a New Administration,6 published at the same time, sets out Civic Exchange’s recommendations to an incoming administration seeking to take swift action to reduce the pollutants with the greatest public health impacts – roadside emissions.

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2. AIR AND HEALTH: ESTABLISHING THE FACTS

The starting point is to review air pollution levels from March 2005, at the start of the Tsang administration, to the present.7 The results are mixed. Data collected by the EPD and displayed on the Hedley Environmental Index (HEI) website8

shows that concentrations of sulphur dioxide (SO2) have dropped, ambient levels of nitrogen dioxide (NO2) have dropped slightly and ozone has remained high. However street-level concentrations of have risen consistently, while last winter saw a reverse in the decline of particulate matter (PM10). New data from EPD shows a steady decline in PM2.5.

Figure 1: Concentrations of NO2, SO2, ozone and PM10 in Hong Kong (Mar 2003 - Oct 2011)

Historical Series - NO2 Historical Series - SO2

Historical Series - O3 Historical Series - PM10

Source: Hedley Environmental Index

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To put these trends in context, each of these five pollutants exceed the World Health Organisation’s Air Quality Guidelines (WHOAQG), sometimes by a factor of four to six times. For example, Figure 1 shows the WHOAQG for NO2 (blue horizontal line) at 40 micrograms per cubic metre, while roadside emissions (illustrated in green) exceeding 250 micrograms with increasing frequency in recent years. The WHOAQG is the most current global standard for protecting human health based on the latest evidence in health and medical science. The public health impacts attributable to the concentrations noted above reflect the seriousness of the threat posed by Hong Kong’s air quality. The HEI, which uses a peer-reviewed methodology to indicate the public health impacts of air pollution shows that between 1 January 2005 and 31 December 2011 these pollution levels have given rise to some 7,240 premature deaths, 528,388 avoidable hospital bed days and 49.26 million avoidable doctor visits.9

Figure 2: Avoidable public health impacts of air pollution (Jan 2005 - Dec 2011)

Year Deaths Hospital bed days Doctor visits Tangible costs (HK$)

2005 1,269 89,562 8.07 million 2.57 billion

2006 1,159 82,973 7.59 million 2.40 billion

2007 1,137 82,345 7.59 million 2.39 billion

2008 1,155 81,023 7.25 million 2.32 billion

2009 822 63,491 6.16 million 1.89 billion

2010 792 60,327 5.92 million 1.81 billion

2011 906 68,667 6.68 million 2.05 billion

Total 7,240 528,388 49.26 million 15.43 billion

Source: Hedley Environmental Index Version 1.0 Taking a year-on-year view, the number of deaths attributable to air pollution has fallen from a high of 1,269 in 2005 to 792 in 2010.10

This 40% drop appeared to be encouraging, but in 2011 the trend was reversed, and the number of deaths has climbed again – to 906 in the last 12 months. The figures for other health impacts depict a similar trend.

To better understand these figures, it is necessary to look at the measures taken by the Tsang administration to address air pollution and to study any changes that have been made to the legislative framework under which air quality is administered. It should also be noted that the global financial crisis of 2008-09 resulted in a dramatic drop in emissions from the manufacturing sector and its associated supply chains (most notably container shipping, river trade and trucking) in the PRD, and the resulting cleaner air resulted in fewer deaths and illnesses.

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3. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK Air quality is managed under the Air Pollution Control Ordinance11, 12 (APCO) and the Environmental Impact Assessment Ordinance (EIAO). The APCO, which is based on the United Kingdom’s Clean Air Act, was drafted principally to address nuisance from unpleasant smells and smoke. It is also used to impose controls on emissions of volatile organic compounds (VOCs),13 and to impose caps on emissions from power stations.14

The result of APCO’s focus on controlling smoke is that EPD’s pollution controls for vehicles have focused on preventing smoky emissions rather than reducing specific harmful pollutants, in particular NO2 and particulate matter. Figure 3 shows that control strategies introduced between 1999 and 2002 successfully reduced annual incidences of smoky vehicle reports from around 35,000 to 10,000. But in the decade since, roadside concentrations of NO2 have continued to rise (see Figure 1).

Figure 3: measures and effectiveness in reducing number of smoked vehicles spotted

Source: Environmental Protection Department (EPD)15

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4. APCO, AQOs, and EIAO The APCO also requires the Director of Environmental Protection (DEP) to set AQOs – targets for the maximum acceptable levels of specific pollutants across the whole territory. The AQOs are not standards, which must be met. Rather, they are targets to be aimed for. The difference is that failure to meet a standard is a breach of the law, while failure to meet an objective carries no legal penalty. The only place that the AQOs do serve as legally enforceable standards is under the EIAO. If a project’s emissions are likely to breach the AQOs, then the proponent must mitigate those impacts, until they fall within the AQOs. The tighter the AQOs, the greater the reductions that must be achieved in order to keep the impacts of the project within acceptable limits – with obvious benefits for Hong Kong’s air quality. Hong Kong’s AQOs were established in 1987 and despite several updates to the WHOAQG, on which they were originally based, they remain unchanged. This is why environmental groups, 16 , 17

business chambers and a growing proportion of the public are increasingly frustrated. The AQOs were reviewed from 2006 to 2008 and new AQOs were proposed for public consultation in 2009 (see Figure 4). Some two years later they have still not been updated.

Figure 4: Current and proposed new AQOs (micrograms per cubic metre)

Pollutant Averaging time

Existing AQOs

Proposed new AQOs vs WHO AQGs & Interim Targets

IT-1 IT-2 IT-3 AQGs

SO2 10 min - 500

24 hr 350 125 50 20

RSP 24 hr 180 150 100 75 50

Annual 55 70 50 30 20

FSP 24 hr - 75 50 37.5 25

Annual - 35 25 15 10

NO2 1 hr 300 - 200

Annual 80 - 40

O3 8 hr 240 (1hr) 160 100

Source: EPD’s Air Quality Objectives Review Public Consultation18

4.1 Delaying the introduction of new Air Quality Objectives

On 19 May 2011 Mr Tsang told the Legislative Council (LegCo) that a plan for introducing the new AQOs would be announced by the end of 2011.

19 May

2011 …we are determined to put forward the AQOs for Members' discussions within this year.19

Dissatisfied with further delays, legislators suggested that the real reason why the new AQOs had not been released was the fear that major infrastructure projects may indeed fail to meet the new standard.20

In the same LegCo session, the Chief Executive appeared to confirm this view:

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… We must carefully assess the economic and social impacts of any new AQOs on Hong Kong. It is only by doing so that we can put forward any long-term and firmly established AQOs that are appropriate to all works projects and economic development.21

In a radio interview following his final Policy Address on 11 October 2011, Mr Tsang again insisted that his administration must have a plan for meeting the new AQOs before it can release them.

11 October

2011 … our work is not only to set targets but we have to set the targets that can be met.22

This appears sensible on first sight, but two years have been lost while the administration has tried to work out how it can meet the targets. During this period concentrations of several key pollutants, including PM10, PM2.5 and roadside levels of NO2 have begun to increase again. Another result is further delay, and in the same interview Mr Tsang again extended the timeline for introducing the new AQOs.

… As far as the air quality statutory requirement’s concern I can give you my word that we are doing it within my term of office.23

This is not to say that the government has been idle – it has continued to create and implement policies to reduce emissions during this period. The AQO consultation document also outlined 19 control measures to reduce emissions. These can be divided into four major groups – emissions savings from energy efficiency (5 measures), infrastructure development (more railways and cycle paths), traffic control (including pedestrianisation, bus rationalisation and low emission zones), and direct controls on emissions from sources ranging from power stations to road vehicles, vessels, non-road mobile sources and VOCs in consumer products. These and other specific measures will be discussed below. One positive aspect of the AQO consultation is that in 2009, the Chief Executive recognised that the Secretary for the Environment lacked the power to implement those control measures that fell under the remit of other policy bureaux, and gave responsibility to the Chief Secretary to co-ordinate policies across the bureaucracy.24

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5. MAJOR DISCONNECTS For air pollution to have remained so serious a problem for so long in a society that is as prosperous and institutionally mature as Hong Kong suggests that there must be underlying causes that make tackling air pollution so difficult. The Chief Executive inherited some of these when he took office in March 2005, but others have emerged or been reinforced on his watch. These can be broadly divided into policy, scientific, administrative and political “disconnects”.

5.1 Disconnects in policy-making

5.1.1 The lack of joined-up policy-making One of the principal reasons for the government’s limited effectiveness at controlling air pollution is the absence of a properly articulated policy with objectives, specific targets, and timelines for achieving them, a suite of complimentary measures that focus on reducing the most severe impacts, and an adequately resourced plan for enforcement. Instead, the current and past administrations have devised and implemented a number of loosely connected measures with no obvious broad policy objective. Even when stand-alone measures are successful, the lack of supporting or follow-up measures has resulted in many of the gains being lost. The closest the government has come was the Pearl River Delta Regional Air Quality Management Plan, which established “best-effort” targets, a timeline for meeting them and a regular reporting structure. It is interesting that this collaboration with mainland officials is the best example of a cohesive attempt to address air pollution, and suggests that future cross-border collaborations offer the best hope for cohesive strategic planning to reduce emissions.

5.1.2 Failure to use a key policy tool – Air Quality Objectives Hong Kong’s AQOs were established in 1987 according to the best available science at the time, creating a reasonably tight standard for air quality. Since then, as further research has provided better information on the threat air pollution poses to health, the World Health Organisation (WHO) has twice put forward new guidelines, most recently in 2006. Despite this, Hong Kong’s standards have remained unchanged. Thus, the majority of health impacts caused by air pollution occur at levels lower than the current AQOs.25

Recognising that the AQOs were indeed outdated, EPD began a review of the AQOs after the WHOAQG were published, which culminated in a public consultation in 2009. Although the levels of pollution remain very high, the government remains reluctant to tighten the AQOs. As a result, EPD lacks the key tool to deal with polluters and must instead find ways to persuade and incentivise polluters to pollute less.

Without tight standards, polluting businesses in Hong Kong, especially vehicle and vessel owners and operators, have been permitted to remain unregulated for the last two decades. In many other jurisdictions, standards have been progressively tightened and polluters are accustomed to incorporating

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requirements to operate more cleanly into their maintenance cycles, business models, and capital expenditure plans.

5.1.3 Combining “sticks & carrots” One solution is to combine the introduction of incentives and control measures so that polluters are presented with a choice – receive support to clean up or be penalised for not doing so. This can be especially effective at driving a swifter rate of change when measures are time-bound, particularly when they are constructed so that the rewards for those seeking to clean up decline at the same time as costs on the non-compliant begin to increase.26

5.1.4 Inspection and maintenance It is a long-established truism that policy without the backing of meaningful enforcement is much less effective. It is perhaps the lack of an effective inspection and maintenance regime for vehicles more than anything that has seen Hong Kong’s roadside pollution increase to, and remain at, dangerously high levels. 27

This is demonstrated by the effectiveness of controls on emissions from power stations, where the requirement to provide a regular supply of data and the threat of heavy penalties for breaching emissions caps has led to dramatic and sustained drop in SO2 emissions.

That is not to suggest that there has been no inspection of roadside emissions. EPD successfully reduced the number of reports of smoky vehicles between 2000 and 2002. In the decade since, there has been no effective monitoring and no specific maintenance requirements to control invisible pollutants emitted by motor vehicles, non-road sources, and vessels. Overseas experience, especially from California, shows that it is essential to monitor specific pollutants, and to set standards which must be met by properly structured maintenance regimes. On a more positive note the proposed introduction of remote sensing for Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) and petrol-powered vehicles in the 2011-12 Policy Address suggests that an important corner may have been turned.28

5.2 Scientific disconnects

5.2.1 No government data on public health impacts of air pollution Currently, there is no competent government body or official responsible for measuring or preventing the public health impacts of air pollution. While EPD is responsible for controlling emissions, it has no expertise in making health impact assessments. This duty should fall to the Department of Health (DH), but since 1989, the DH has had no responsibility in this regard. The government says health officials advise environmental officials but this does not make EPD an authority on health. Nor does it enable its officials to make professional judgments on health. EPD is conducting studies on emissions inventories and emissions control strategies. However, it is not supporting research on the public health impacts, which would help to address this key information gap and better inform its own decision-making.

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5.2.2 Controlling sources rather than concentrations of pollution

Typical of an engineering-based rather than a health-based agency, EPD has focused on reducing emissions from sources that produce the greatest tonnage of pollutants. The cost-benefit analysis for the 19 measures proposed in the 2009 AQO consultation provides a good example.29

It is not so much large quantities of emissions that cause the most harm to public health but high concentrations of pollutants in congested and poorly ventilated places. In Hong Kong, ageing diesel commercial vehicles (DCVs), poorly maintained LPG-powered taxis and minibuses, ships and off-road sources are the principal culprits. The “street canyons” of overbuilt urban districts (Mong Kok, Tsim Sha Tsui, Wan Chai, Causeway Bay and Central) prevent dispersion of roadside emissions, causing concentrations to build up and stay dangerously high in places where large numbers of people are directly exposed. But, since EPD’s control measures have addressed sources rather than concentrations and public exposure, action to address these high concentrations has been correspondingly slow.

5.2.3 Air Pollution Index – understating the health risks One of the key influencers of public opinion on air pollution is the government’s Air Pollution Index (API) but it is not a useful tool.30

While the API is intended to communicate the risk that air quality poses to public health, the methodology used for calculating it is based on the outdated AQOs. Thus, the API projects an artificially high level of acceptability onto day-to-day air quality.

5.2.4 Smoke vs. specific pollutants Another important disconnect is the focus the APCO and EPD have placed on reducing smoky emissions rather than specific toxic pollutants. There is no question that smoky vehicles are highly polluting, and measures to address smoke emissions are entirely reasonable. Unfortunately, EPD’s success in reducing the numbers of smoky vehicle reports by some 75% has done nothing to stop the steady rise in concentrations of NO2 – the pollutant that most seriously threatens Hog Kong’s future economic development. It was not until the 2011-12 Policy Address that EPD proposed any measures to monitor or control any individual pollutants from road vehicles.

5.3 Administrative disconnects

5.3.1 Loss of oversight of pollution control by the Secretary for Health As noted above, a fundamental disconnect occurred in 1989 when the Secretary of Health and Welfare lost the oversight of the APCO and the setting of the AQOs. During a reshuffle of policy portfolios, responsibility for air pollution was passed to the Secretary for Planning, Environment, and Lands,31 and has remained with the environment portfolio ever since. As a result the underlying purpose for managing air quality, for the protection of public health, has been lost,32, 33 and Environmental Bureau (ENB) and EPD have not

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updated the AQOs despite the fact that the WHO has twice since tightened the AQG.

5.3.2 De-professionalisation of Environmental Protection Department –

impacts on the Environmental Impact Assessment process While the transfer of oversight on the setting of the AQOs predated the Tsang administration, a key change to the EIA process took place during Tsang’s term. This was the merger of the roles of the Director of Environmental Protection (DEP), who acts as Hong Kong’s environmental regulator, and the Permanent Secretary of the Environment (PSE), whose role is to formulate and oversee the implementation of government policy. This creates an obvious conflict of interest when the government’s development plans (for example major infrastructure projects such as the HKZM Bridge or a third runway for the airport) are expected to have a negative impact on the environment.34

The justification given for the merger of the posts provided by the then PSE was:

The merger will achieve synergy between policy formulation and implementation, and is in line with the Government's commitment to streamlining and delayering the decision-making process.35

The EIA process is highly technical. It was designed to be managed and overseen by highly experienced environmental professionals. But the official appointed as DEP is an Administrative Officer, who lacks the appropriate professional expertise. This creates a danger that the decisions of the regulator are made on a political, rather than a scientific basis.

5.4 Political disconnects

5.4.1 Legislative and District Councils While EPD bears the brunt of public frustration at the lack of progress in addressing pollution, in truth they receive little meaningful support from either the Legislative or District Councils. Both of these bodies are highly protective of the livelihoods of small businesses and the public’s high expectations for convenience. As a result, EPD persistently fails to win political support for pollution control measures that would increase costs to polluters. The strong opposition to introducing higher licensing fees for older and more polluting DCVs is one example. The District Councils persistently block attempts to rationalise bus routes in over-served communities, and actively lobby to increase bus services to show constituents that they are working to support their interests. This opposition begs deeper questions about the willingness of the public to accept higher costs and diminished convenience in return for cleaner air that are beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that a large proportion of the public is highly sensitive to rather modest rises in costs, which creates difficulties when trying to implement the “polluter pays” principle.

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6. A REVIEW OF CONTROL MEASURES

6.1 Collaboration with Guangdong

Cross-border collaboration to reduce air pollution began in 2002. The most significant aspects of this collaboration were the establishment of best-effort targets for emissions reductions that were to be met by 2010 (see Figure 5),36 the establishment of a collaborative Regional Air Quality Monitoring Network covering the whole of the PRD,37 and the commitment to report on measures to be taken where the targets could not be met. These reports show that EPD adopted the tonnage-based approach to emissions reductions (although they latterly included reductions in concentrations).38

Figure 5: Progress of emission reduction in the Pearl River Delta 1997-2008

Emission Level

in 1997 (Tonnes)

Change in emission level

during 1997-2008

2010 Emission Reduction Target*

SO2 66,200 +13% -40%

NOx 124,000 -29% -20%

RSP 11,500 -54% -55%

VOC 68,800 -50% -55%

*Note: column 3 data is preliminary Source: EPD

While it is difficult to assess if this collaboration has accelerated the rate at which control measures are implemented, genuine attempts were made to achieve the targets and regular reports were made available through EPD’s website up to August 2010. It is regrettable that these reports have now ceased and that the next five-year collaborative plan is yet to be released.

6.2 Controlling SO2 emissions from power stations The most successful measure to reduce pollution has been the requirement that the power companies install FGD equipment, which can reduce SO2 emissions from power stations by 98% or more. While there are proposals to increase the proportion of natural gas, nuclear and wind power in the fuel mix, coal (which currently accounts for some 54%) is likely to remain as a strategic reserve fuel, so minimising emissions from coal will play a significant role in improving ambient air quality in Hong Kong. It is encouraging to note that EPD proposes to review the emissions caps on the power companies in 2012 with a view to tightening them from 2015.39

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6.3 Increasing the use of cleaner fuels in power stations Consistent with its policy of targeting the major sources, the Tsang administration has explored the replacement of coal with cleaner fuels – particularly natural gas and nuclear power. The jury is still out on the public acceptability of a switch from 23% to 50% nuclear, but there is an obvious benefit in CO2 emissions reductions if coal burned in Hong Kong were to be replaced by increased nuclear power from Guangdong. There has been concrete success in securing natural gas for Hong Kong to replace the supply from the rapidly depleting fields in the South China Sea. The aim is for natural gas to provide some 40% of the total fuel mix. A protracted consultation on the development of an LNG terminal in Hong Kong was turned on its head when a deal was struck in 2008 for Hong Kong to receive gas via pipeline from Turkmenistan, which is expected to commence in 2015.40

6.4 Roadside emissions Introducing control measures to reduce emissions from road vehicles has proven more difficult. A great deal of political capital was expended in passing the Idling Engine Ordinance, but by the time it was passed, it was much watered down with exclusions. Other initiatives have met with variable success.

6.5 Controlling emissions from idling engines During 2010 and the early part of 2011, ENB and EPD invested substantial political capital in securing the passage of the Motor Vehicle Idling (Fixed Penalty) Ordinance,41 which requires stationary vehicles to switch off their engines. This met strong opposition from taxi and minibus drivers, who complained that their vehicles become unbearably hot during the summer months (as turning off the engine would also shut off the air-conditioning). The bill was finally passed in March 2011 and comes into effect in December 2011 with numerous exemptions, especially for taxis and minibuses, which are likely to seriously impact its effectiveness in reducing roadside emissions. An informal survey by the South China Morning Post showed that where minibus drivers did comply, levels of carbon monoxide dropped by up to 30% in a street where many buses were parked. 42

6.6 Accelerated retirement of heavily polluting diesel commercial vehicles DCVs, which comprise some 20% of the total road vehicle fleet, account for 76% of NOx and 88% of PM emissions from all road vehicles, making them an obvious target for control measures.43

An attempt to accelerate the retirement of the oldest and most polluting DCVs with pre-Euro and Euro I standard engines by offering a grant of up to 20% of the cost of a new vehicle achieved limited success, with only 30% of vehicle owners applying to join the scheme.44 Many single-vehicle owners, with limited access to capital, struggled to secure loans for the outstanding 80% of the purchase price in the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008. A new scheme targeting vehicles with Euro II engines is due to conclude early in 2013.45

It is disappointing that there are no further plans for addressing the older vehicles that remain on the road, which continue to pollute with impunity.

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Figure 6: Vehicular NOx and RSP emissions of diesel commercial vehicles46

Source: Civic Exchange

6.7 New technology pilots

Other schemes have included a Pilot Green Public Transport Fund47 and a one-off purchase of electric buses for trial.48

While the combined funding committed to these schemes is close to HK$480 million and will give Hong Kong a much cleaner franchised fleet in time, it does not address the core problem that the legacy fleet remains highly polluting – and under the current franchise agreements, some buses could remain so for as much as 15 more years.

Figures 7 and 8: Comparative emissions of road vehicles and non-road mobile machinery (kg/source)

NOx Emissions RSP Emissions

Source: EPD49

24%

Other Vehicles

(80%)

12%

76%

Diesel Commercial Vehicles (20%)

88%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Total Vehicular NOx Emissions

No. of Vehicles Total Vehicular RSP Emissions

32

121

500

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

All Road Vehicles Diesel CommercialVehicles

Non-road MobileMachinery

2.6

11.3

44

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

All Road Vehicles Diesel CommercialVehicles

Non-road MobileMachinery

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6.8 Introducing controls on non-road mobile machinery

Plans to reduce emissions from non-road mobile sources (NRMMs) such as cranes, tracked vehicles and mobile generators, have been similarly limited. They focus on controlling the imports of new machines for replacement of old machines and creating a register of machines, rather than requiring emissions standards to be met or machinery to be maintained.50

The lack of any requirement on owners to maintain their machinery is troubling in a fleet of just 13,500 machines that is responsible for 7% and 11% respectively of Hong Kong’s total emissions of NOx and particulates, where such controls could make a substantial impact.

6.9 Catalytic converters and remote sensing

The second proposed measure to control vehicle emissions is more immediate, and provides a good example of more integrated policy development. EPD is offering to provide new catalytic converters to all minibuses, taxis and franchised buses with Euro II and Euro III engines.51 Trials with taxis have shown that replacing the catalytic converter and retuning the engine can reduce emissions of NO2 by an average of 90%. This also delivers significant improvements in fuel efficiency and vehicle performance, which would more than cover the cost of future replacements of the catalytic converter and regular maintenance.52

The trials have also played an important role in building acceptance of the scheme among the vehicle operators.

But perhaps the most significant measure is the plan to introduce on-road testing of the toxic emissions of petrol and LPG-powered vehicles.53

Until now, vehicles were only regulated to limit the amount of smoke they produced – the legacy of the smoke-based foundations of the APCO. This has been largely successful in terms of its original goals, but it has failed to reduce the level of invisible pollutants such as fine particles and NO2, which have remained consistently high.

By monitoring the levels of NO2, hydrocarbons (unburned fuel) and carbon monoxide emitted by road vehicles, EPD will be directly targeting the highest concentrations of the pollutants that are causing the greatest harm to public health. A recent EPD trial showed that emissions from franchised buses, minibuses and taxis were responsible for 90% of emissions in Mong Kok. While the proof of this scheme’s effectiveness will only come once it begins operation, the very fact that the right pollutants are being measured offers a reason for optimism.

6.10 Reducing emissions from ocean-going vessels and local craft

Emissions from marine sources have risen steadily due to the increasing numbers of vessels calling at Hong Kong and PRD ports and the lack of any meaningful control on marine emissions or the highly polluting marine fuels.54 However, important steps forward include the development of a marine emissions inventory 55 and the commitment in the 2011-12 Policy Address56 and the consultation on the Quality Living Area in the Pearl River Delta57

to explore a number of ways to reduce emissions from marine sources in Hong Kong and PRD waters. These include measures for ocean-going vessels (container ships and cruise liners are the most prevalent in Hong Kong) and local craft, for both of which trials are either ongoing or recently completed.

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6.11 Not yet working

Certain measures have not been implemented or have struggled to gain traction. These include the introduction of low emission and pedestrianised zones, and the rationalisation of franchised bus routes. However, now that the public transport fleet is being cleaned up, the door is open for introducing low emission zones, which had previously been held up because there were insufficient numbers of buses that met the Euro IV standard that is being proposed for the zones.

7. THE NEW THREAT TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Two major capital works projects – the HKZM Bridge and the proposed third runway for Hong Kong International Airport – have focused public attention on the impacts that air pollution could have on public health and economic development. With respect to the bridge, EPD’s air quality data shows that pollutant concentrations in Tung Chung are in regular breach of our current AQOs. Controversy was sparked when the DEP approved an EIA for the bridge that claimed that there would be no impacts on air quality or public health despite the large number of additional vehicles. A judicial review (JR) challenged these claims, which were based on outputs from PATH – a highly complex air quality model. The JR was upheld in April 2011,58 but overturned on appeal in September 2011.59

Also in September 2011, the HKAA launched a public consultation on the need for a third runway for Chek Lap Kok airport.60 HKAA was quick to identify the necessity and economic benefits of a third runway, but slower to provide information on the environmental and social impacts, sparking a vigorous debate on the nature of sustainable development. Air quality became a key issue when a report issued by the HKAA expressed concern that emissions from the additional flights using the third runway may not comply with the proposed new AQOs, thereby jeopardising the viability of the whole scheme.61

These two projects highlighted the link between air quality and future development. The HKZM Bridge JR has left unresolved many questions about the EIA process. Concerns remain about the following issues:

(a) Does the EIA process adequately protect public health?

(b) What can be done to improve transparency in the EIA process?

(c) Is there a conflict of interest caused by the regulator also having a duty to facilitate the delivery of government projects?

The public remains deeply concerned about the threat that air quality poses to public health and whether the threat is being adequately addressed by the regulator. Neither proponents of future projects nor EPD should be surprised if their projects and decisions are subject to more intense scrutiny, more challenges and more delays. This brings Hong Kong into new territory, where it is not only public health, but also economic development that is directly threatened by poor air quality.

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8. CONCLUSION The Tsang administration has made a variety of efforts to reduce air pollution. Certain initiatives (most notably, fitting FGD on coal-fired power stations) have led to measurable reductions in public health impacts, but the prevailing pollutant levels remain unacceptably high. In 2011, concentrations of some pollutants and public health impacts began to rise again, bringing into question the administration’s ability and commitment to deliver substantial and lasting improvements in air quality. Much of this is attributable to the fundamental disconnects that bedevil the government’s efforts to reduce pollution. The most important problem is the lack of a co-ordinated, evidence-based policy designed to achieve meaningful targets within a specified timeframe. As a result the gains from successful initiatives have been lost for lack of supporting measures, or the failure to simultaneously control emissions from other sources. The limited involvement of medical and public health experts in policy-making has resulted in an approach that fails to recognise the most acute threat to health comes from concentrations of pollutants where they are breathed (not the quantities that are emitted). Thus the successful schemes to cut emissions from power stations are far from enough. Many of the measures intended to reduce roadside emissions appear to lack urgency, focusing on standards for new vehicles (when they are replaced), rather than directly addressing the problems associated with the existing fleet. The lack of support for mandatory control measures from legislators has certainly contributed to the difficulties of the Tsang administration, but a strong case can be made for arguing that it has not chosen its battles carefully enough. The more co-ordinated and targeted policy-making that lies behind the simultaneous introduction of remote sensing for LPG and petrol-powered vehicles, along with the subsidised replacement of catalytic converters for buses and taxis is, hopefully, a sign that some hard lessons have been learned, and will be applied in the future. Perhaps the most significant shift is the threat that Hong Kong’s poor air quality now poses to economic development. The reluctance to announce new AQOs more than two years after the completion of the public consultation has deepened public mistrust of Mr Tsang’s commitment to controlling air pollution. The challenges to the HKZM Bridge and the third runway represent a dramatic escalation in the scale of the problem. The business community is beginning to appreciate the seriousness of this threat. It will be interesting to see how they, and the next administration, respond.

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ENDNOTES 1 Civic Exchange (January 2009), Hong Kong’s Silent Epidemic – Public Opinion Survey on Air Pollution, Environment and Public Health

2008, http://www.civic-exchange.org/wp/hong-kongs-silent-epidemic-public-opinion-survey-on-air-pollution-environment-and-public-health-2008-report-summary/. Accessed 8 November 2011.

2 Civic Exchange (December 2010), Summary Of Key Findings LESS TALK, MORE ACTION: Public Opinion Survey on Air Pollution in Hong Kong 2010, page 7, http://www.civic-exchange.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/101201-Less-Talk-Summary-EN.pdf. Accessed 8 November 2011.

3 Ibid., page 3. 4 Civic Exchange (May 2011), The HK Zhuhai Macau Bridge Judicial Review: Summary of the case, http://www.civic-

exchange.org/wp/110513zhmb_en/. Accessed 8 November 2011. 5 Arup (September 2011), Air Quality Review for Hong Kong International Airport, page 65,

http://vps.hongkongairport.com/mp2030/consultancy_report/ARUP.pdf. Accessed 8 November 2011. 6 Civic Exchange (January 2012), Principles and Measures to Reduce Air Quality: Policy Recommendations for a New Administration.

http://www.civic-exchange.org/wp/120112policyrecommendations_en. Accessed 12 January 2012. 7 Limiting the review to the present day, rather than the future, allows Civic Exchange to present empirical information, rather than

estimating air quality and the likely public health impacts. 8 Hedley Environmental Index (January 2009), http://hedleyindex.sph.hku.hk/. Accessed 30 December 2011. 9 These data are calculated from 1 January 2005 in order to allow complete years to be included in the table. The total impacts for Mr

Tsang’s time in office will be slightly greater as his term will conclude in June 2012. Hence, the two extra months before Mr Tsang’s term began in March 2005 are more than offset by the five or six months not included up to the end of his term in 2012.

10 The University of Hong Kong’s School of Public Health will release a new version of the HEI that includes mortality figures attributable to air pollution that are substantially higher than the current estimates. The new figures will be available from 17 January 2012 at http://hedleyindex.sph.hku.hk/. It should be emphasized that these estimates remain conservative, as they are based only on short-term exposure risks. Studies from other jurisdictions strongly suggest that the impacts will be larger still when cohort studies assessing the long-term impacts of air pollution are incorporated.

11 Civic Exchange (February 2009), APCO-101: A Review of the Air Pollution Control Ordinance. http://civic-exchange.org/en/live/upload/files/200902APCOs.pdf. Accessed 23 November 2011.

12 Civic Exchange (February 2009), A Review of the Air Pollution Control Ordinance for Legal Professionals. http://civic-exchange.org/en/live/upload/files/200902APCO.pdf. Accessed 23 November 2011.

13 Environment Bureau/Environmental Protection Department (October 2011), 2011-12 Policy Address and Policy Agenda Policy Initiatives of Environment Bureau, paragraph 2.4, http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr11-12/english/panels/ea/papers/ea1020cb1-41-1-e.pdf. Accessed 24 November 2011.

14 Ibid., paragraph 3.11. 15 Environmental Protection Department website (July 2011), Cleaning the Air at Street Level,

http://www.epd.gov.hk/epd/english/environmentinhk/air/prob_solutions/cleaning_air_atroad.html. Accessed 28 November 2011. 16 In December 2010 the Ombudsman upheld a complaint by Friends of the Earth, regarding the delay in introducing new AQOs. 17 Moy, P. (9 May 2011), “Ombudsman sides with green group” South China Morning Post,

http://www.hongkongcan.org/eng/2011/05/watchdog-upholds-air-quality-complaint/. Accessed 30 November 2011. 18 Environment Bureau (July 2009), Air Quality Objectives Review Public Consultation.

http://www.epd.gov.hk/epd/english/environmentinhk/air/pub_consult/files/book_en.pdf. Accessed 8 December 2011. 19 Legislative Council (19 May 2011), Hong Kong Hansard, page 10764, paragraph 2. http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr10-

11/english/counmtg/hansard/cm0519-translate-e.pdf. Accessed 7 December 2011. 20 Ibid., page 10763, paragraph 4. 21 Ibid., page 10764, paragraph 2. 22 RTHK-3 Backchat programme (19 October 2011), Chief Executive Phone-in.

http://programme.rthk.org.hk/channel/radio/programme.php?name=radio3/policy_phonein&d=2011-10-19&p=1971&e=&m=episode. Accessed 8 December 2011.

23 Ibid. 24 Hong Kong SAR Government (October 2009), Policy Address 2009-10 Breaking New Ground Together, paragraph 68.

http://www.policyaddress.gov.hk/09-10/eng/p67.html. Accessed 17 November 2010. 25 Lai, H. K., C. M. Wong, S. McGhee, and A. Hedley (January 2011), “Assessment of the Health Impacts and Economic Burden Arising from

Proposed New Air Quality Objectives in a High Pollution Environment”, The Open Epidemiology Journal No. 4, pages 106-122, http://bentham.org/open/toepij/articles/V004/SI0001TOEPIJ/106TOEPIJ.pdf. Accessed 1 December 2011.

26 Civic Exchange (May 2010), Carrots and Sticks: Accelerating the Replacement of Diesel Vehicles, http://www.civic-exchange.org/en/live/upload/files/201005CarrotStick.pdf. Accessed 1 December 2011.

27 Civic Exchange (June 2011), Roadside Air Pollution in Hong Kong: Why is it Still So Bad?, http://www.civic-exchange.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/110706RoadsideAir_en1.pdf. Accessed 1 December 2011.

28 Environmental Protection Department (November 2011), A Proposal to Strengthen the Control of Emissions of Petrol and Liquefied Petroleum Gas Vehicles, http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr11-12/english/panels/ea/papers/ea1128cb1-353-1-e.pdf. Accessed 18 November 2011.

29 Environment Bureau (July 2009), Air Quality Objectives Review Public Consultation. Annex E, http://www.epd.gov.hk/epd/english/environmentinhk/air/pub_consult/files/book_en.pdf. Accessed 8 December 2011.

30 Environmental Protection Department website (December 2004), API and Air Monitoring Background, http://www.epd-asg.gov.hk/english/backgd/backgd.html. Accessed 8 December 2011.

31 Legislative Council, Legal Notice 244 of 1989 to Secretary for Planning, Environment and Lands. 32 Civic Exchange (August 2011), Submission on the 2011-12 Policy Address, http://www.civic-exchange.org/wp/wp-

content/uploads/2011/08/110830PolicyAddressEnvt_en.pdf. Accessed 28 November 2011.

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33 Civic Exchange (August 2010), Submission on the 2010-11 Policy Address, http://www.civic-exchange.org/wp/wp-

content/uploads/2010/09/20100909_Policy-address-2010-consultation.pdf. Accessed 28 November 2011. 34 Kilburn, M. (27 July 2011), “Professional Needed as Top Environmental Regulator”, CleanBiz Asia, http://www.cleanbiz.asia/node/1136.

Accessed 1 December 2011. 35 Hong Kong SAR Government News Release (23 September 2004), http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200409/23/0923149.htm.

Accessed 8 December 2010. 36 Environmental Protection Department (August 2011), Progress of Measures under Pearl River Delta Regional Air Quality Management

Plan to Achieve 2010 Emission Reduction Targets, http://www.epd.gov.hk/epd/english/news_events/legco/files/Eng-cleared-0810.pdf. Accessed 30 November 2011.

37 Environmental Protection Department website (2005), Pearl River Delta Regional Air Quality Monitoring Report, http://www.epd.gov.hk/epd/english/resources_pub/publications/m_report.html. Accessed 30 November 2011.

38 Ibid., pages 2-3. 39 Environment Bureau/Environmental Protection Department (October 2011), 2011-12 Policy Address and Policy Agenda Policy

Initiatives of Environment Bureau, paragraph 3.11, http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr11-12/english/panels/ea/papers/ea1020cb1-41-1-e.pdf. Accessed 24 November 2011.

40 Information Services Department, Hong Kong SAR Government (September 2011), Hong Kong: The Facts – Water, Power and Gas Supplies, www.gov.hk/en/about/abouthk/factsheets/docs/wp&g_supplies.pdf. Accessed 1 December 2011.

41 Under the Motor Vehicle Idling (Fixed Penalty) Ordinance (the Ordinance) (Cap. 611), the driver of a motor vehicle is prohibited from causing or permitting any internal combustion engine ("ICE") which forms part of a motor vehicle to operate for more than three minutes in aggregate within any continuous sixty-minute period while the vehicle is stationary (“idling prohibition”), unless an exemption applies. A driver who contravenes the idling prohibition may be issued with a penalty notice requiring him or her to pay a fixed penalty of HK$320. Traffic Wardens and Environmental Protection Inspectors are empowered to enforce the law.

42 Cheung, C-f. (23 December 2011) “Idling ban makes a difference”, South China Morning Post, http://www.hongkongcan.org/eng/2011/12/idling-ban-makes-a- difference/. Accessed 4 January 2011.

43 Civic Exchange (June 2010), Carrots and Sticks: Accelerating the Replacement of Diesel Vehicles, http://civic-exchange.org/en/live/upload/files/201005CarrotStick.pdf. Accessed 24 November 2011.

44 Environment Bureau/ Environmental Protection Department (August 2010), CB(1) 2690/09-10(01) Progress of Measures Under Pearl River Delta Regional Air Quality Management Plan to Achieve 2010 Emission Reduction Targets, p. 3, paragraph 8(a), http://www.epd.gov.hk/epd/english/news_events/legco/files/Eng-cleared-0810.pdf. Accessed 23 November 2011.

45 Environment Bureau/Environmental Protection Department (October 2011), 2011-12 Policy Address and Policy Agenda Policy Initiatives of Environment Bureau, paragraph 3.17, http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr11-12/english/panels/ea/papers/ea1020cb1-41-1-e.pdf. Accessed 23 November 2011.

46 Environmental Protection Department (10 March 2010), Early Replacement of Old Diesel Commercial Vehicles (LC Paper No: CB(1) 1250/09-10(01)), http://legco.gov.hk/yr09-10/english/panels/ea/ea_iaq/papers/ea_iaq0310cb1-1250-1-e.pdf. Accessed 6 May 2010.

47 Ibid., paragraph 3.20. 48 Ibid., paragraph 2.6. 49 Ibid., page 3. 50 Civic Exchange (July 2010), Response to Environment Bureau/Environmental Protection Department Proposal Document: “A Proposal to

Control Emissions of Non-road Mobile Sources, http://www.civic-exchange.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/Non-road-mobile-sources-CE-Submission.pdf. Accessed 23 November 2011.

51 Environmental Protection Department (November 2011), A Proposal to Strengthen the Control of Excessive Exhaust Emissions from Petrol and Liquefied Petroleum Gas Vehicles and Introduce an Emission Reduction Supporting Measure, http://www.epd.gov.hk/epd/english/environmentinhk/air/pub_consult/files/Consultantion_Paper_eng.pdf. Accessed 23 November 2011.

52 Ibid. 53 Ibid. 54 Civic Exchange (September 2010), Legislative Council Panel on Environmental Affairs – Framework Agreement on Hong

Kong/Guangdong Co-operation: Environmental Protection and Ecology Conservation, page 3, paragraph 3, http://www.civic-exchange.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/100804 HK-GZ-Framework-agreement.pdf. Accessed 23 November 2011.

55 Environmental Protection Department (in prep.), Study on Marine Vessels Emission Inventory. 56 Hong Kong SAR Government (October 2011), 2011-12 Policy Address: From Strength to Strength, paragraph 128,

http://www.policyaddress.gov.hk/11-12/eng/p127.html. Accessed 30 November 2011. 57 Guangdong Province Housing and Urban-Rural Development Department, Hong Kong SAR Government Environment Bureau, and

Macao SAR Government Secretariat for Transport and Public Works (September 2011), Regional Cooperation Plan on Building a Quality Living Area Consultation Document, http://www.gprd-qla.com/en/show_plan.asp?id=265&left04=hlink. Accessed 23 November 2011.

58 Civic Exchange (May 2010), The Hong Kong Zhuhai Macau Bridge Judicial Review: Summary of the Case, http://www.civic-exchange.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/110513HZMB_en.pdf. Accessed 23 November 2011.

59 Civic Exchange (Forthcoming - expected February 2012) The Legal Implications of the Appeal of the Hong Kong Zhuhai Macau Bridge Judicial Review.

60 Hong Kong Airport Authority, Our Airport Our Future: Hong Kong International Airport Masterplan 2030, http://www.hkairport2030.com/en/. Accessed 23 November 2011.

61 Arup (September 2010), Air Quality Review for Hong Kong International Airport: Final Report, http://www.hkairport2030.com/en/information/publications/consultancy_reports.html. Accessed 23 November 2011.

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