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Fall 2005 Volume XIX, No. 3 AFRP 10-1

Senior Leader PerspectivesThe Portuguese Air Force: A Look Ahead. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5Lt Gen Lus Evangelista Esteves de Arajo, Portuguese Air ForceOrigins of the Royal Bahraini Air Force. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7Col Hamad Abdulla Al-Khalifa, Commander, Royal Bahraini Air Force

Focus AreaCoalition Perspectives on Airpower and Space Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12Lt Col Paul D. Berg, USAF, Editor

Features

Effects-Based Operations and Counterterrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22Mr. David B. Lazarus

Effects-Based Operations: A Military Application of Pragmatical Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29Dr. Alexandre Sergio da Rocha

Tomorrows Air Warfare: A German Perspective on the Way Ahead. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39Lt Col Frank M. Graefe, German Air ForceUnmanned Aerial Vehicles/Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles:Likely Missions and Challenges for the Policy-Relevant Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45Manjeet Singh Pardesi

Air Superiority: A Sine Qua Non? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55Col Jos C. DOdorico, Argentine Air Force, RetiredCountering a Strategic Gambit: Keeping US Airpower Employable in aChina-Taiwan Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64Col Lawrence M. Martin Jr., USAFThe Future of US Airpower on the Korean Peninsula . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75Dr. Bruce E. Bechtol Jr.Toward Information Superiority: The Contribution of OperationalNet Assessment . 85Dr. Peter W. WielhouwerPublic Affairs and Informaton Operations: A Strategy for Success . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97Maj Tadd Sholtis, USAF

DepartmentsPrelaunch Notes

Honoring a Fallen Airman and Introducing the Latest Chronicles Online JournalArticles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Ricochets and Replies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11


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Ira C. Eaker Award Winners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14Vortices

Centralized Execution in the Air Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15Maj John Schaefer III, USAF

Quick-Look

The Combat Aviation Advisory Mission in Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107Maj Ioannis Koskinas, USAF

Book ReviewsJai t fellagha, officier franais, et dserteur: Du FLN LOAS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109Rmy MadouiReviewer: Lt Col Paul D. Berg, USAFPictorial History of the Philippine Air Force: 50th Anniversary, 19471997 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110

Alberto A. Anido and Brian Austria-TomkinsReviewer: LCDR Mark R. Condeno, PCGA

Ju 87 Stuka. . . . 110Robert JacksonReviewer: Lt Col Robert Tate, USAFRThe United States Air Force and the Culture of Innovation: 19451965. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111Stephen B. JohnsonReviewer: Dr. Frank P. DonniniThe Future of the Australian-U.S. Security Relationship. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112Rod Lyon and William T. TowReviewer: Capt Gilles Van Nederveen, USAF, RetiredIn Command of History: Churchill Fighting and Writing the SecondWorld War. . . . 112David ReynoldsReviewer: Dr. Nicholas Evan Sarantakes

A Question of Loyalty: Gen. Billy Mitchell and the Court-Martial ThatGripped the Nation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113Douglas C. WallerReviewer: CSM James H. Clifford, USAResearching National Security and Intelligence Policy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114Bert ChapmanReviewer: Lt Col Dave Howard, USAF, Retired

At Hitlers Side: The Memoirs of Hitlers Luftwaffe Adjutant, 19371945. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114Nicolaus von BelowReviewer: Maj Paul G. Niesen, USAFDevelopment of the B-52: The Wright Field Story. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115Lori S. TaggReviewer: Dr. Kenneth P. WerrellU-Boat War Patrol: The Hidden Photographic Diary of U564. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116Lawrence PatersonReviewer: Lt Col W. M. Klumper, PhD, RNLAF


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Reconsidering a Century of Flight. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117Roger D. Launius and Janet R. Daly Bednarek, eds.Reviewer: Maj Gen I. B. Holley Jr., USAFR, Retired

Air War over Russia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118Andrew Brookes

Reviewer: Dr. Matthew R. SchwonekThrough Eyes of Blue: Personal Memories of the RAF from 1918. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119

A. E. Ross, DFC, ed.Reviewer: Dr. James A. MowbrayGerman Air-Dropped Weapons to 1945. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119

Wolfgang FleischerReviewer: Capt Gilles Van Nederveen, USAF, Retired

Air Power: The Men, Machines, and Ideas That Revolutionized War,from Kitty Hawk to Gulf War II. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120Stephen BudianskyReviewer: Lt Col Matthew C. Stafford, USAFTaming Liquid Hydrogen: The Centaur Upper Stage Rocket, 19582002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121

Virginia P. Dawson and Mark D. BowlesReviewer: Maj Kendall K. Brown, PhD, USAFRDresden: Tuesday, February 13, 1945. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122Frederick TaylorReviewer: Maj Paul G. Niesen, USAFSurvival Kit for Leaders. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124

John C. Kunich and Richard LesterReviewer: Col Gail Arnott, USAF, RetiredLuftwaffe X-Planes: German Experimental Aircraft of World War II. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124Manfred GriehlReviewer: Capt Gilles Van Nederveen, USAF, Retired

Mission Debrief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125


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Air and Space Power JournalBoard of ReviewersProf. Tami Davis BiddleUS Army War CollegeLt Col Price T. Bingham, USAF, RetiredMelbourne, FloridaDr. Kendall K. BrownNASA Marshall Space Flight CenterBrig Gen Phillip D. Caine, USAF, RetiredMonument, ColoradoDr. Clayton K. S. ChunUS Army War CollegeDr. Mark ClodfelterNational War CollegeDr. James CorumUSAF School of Advanced Air and Space StudiesDr. Conrad Crane

Director, US Army Military Studies InstituteDr. Dik A. DasoNational Air and Space MuseumSmithsonian InstitutionDr. William L. Dowdy

Alabama State UniversityCol Dennis M. Drew, USAF, RetiredUSAF School of Advanced Air and Space StudiesDr. Stephen FoughtUSAF Air War CollegeCol Thomas E. Griffith Jr., USAFUSAF School of Advanced Air and Space StudiesDr. John F. Guilmartin Jr.Ohio State UniversityDr. Grant T. HammondCenter for Strategy and Technology

Air UniversityProf. Daniel HughesUSAF Air War CollegeDr. Thomas HughesUSAF School of Advanced Air and Space StudiesLt Col J. P. Hunerwadel, USAF, RetiredUSAF Doctrine CenterCol Mark P. Jelonek, USAFCommander, 614th Space Operations GroupDirector of Operations, Fourteenth Air ForceMr. Charles Tustin KampsUSAF Air Command and Staff CollegeDr. Tom KeaneySchool of Advanced International Studies

Johns Hopkins UniversityCol Merrick E. KrauseDirector, NDU PressEditor,Joint Force Quarterly

Dr. Charles KrupnickUS Army War CollegeDr. Benjamin S. LambethRANDLt Col David MacIsaac, USAF, RetiredMontgomery, AlabamaDr. Karl P. MagyarMontgomery, AlabamaCol Edward Mann, USAF, RetiredColorado Springs, ColoradoDr. Jerome V. MartinCommand HistorianHeadquarters US Strategic CommandCol Phillip Meilinger, USAF, RetiredNorthrop Grumman CorporationDr. Daniel MortensenUSAF College of Aerospace Doctrine, Researchand EducationProf. James MowbrayUSAF Air War CollegeDr. Karl MuellerRANDDr. Richard R. MullerUSAF School of Advanced Air and Space StudiesCol Robert Owen, USAF, RetiredEmbry-Riddle Aeronautical UniversityDr. Reina J. PenningtonNorwich UniversityCol Bob Potter, USAFUSAF Public Affairs Center of ExcellenceLt Col Thomas R. SearleHeadquarters US Special Operations CommandDr. James SmithUSAF Institute for National Security StudiesCol James Spencer, USAF, RetiredUSAF AcademyCol Michael A. StanleyUSAF Air War CollegeCol Richard Szafranski, USAF, RetiredToffler Associates

Dr. James TitusUSAF AcademyCol Mark Wells, USAFUSAF AcademyDr. Kenneth P. WerrellChristiansburg, VirginiaDr. Harold R. WintonUSAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies

4


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APJ

The Portuguese Air ForceA Look AheadLTGENLUSEVANGELISTAESTEVESDEARAJO,PORTUGUESEAIRFORCE

DEVELOPINGAVISIONofthefuturein a time marked by asymmetriesand discontinuities calls for circum-spection, especially to properly per-

ceivetheconstantchangestakingplacearoundus and the speed with which they unfold. De-spite the current environment of acceleratedchange and our heavy reliance on emergingtechnologies and practical doctrines for usingavailable assets, the enduring characteristics,capabilities,andprinciplesofairpoweremploy-ment provide a needed intellectual anchor foranticipating action. However, we can rest as-sured that the air force of the future will cer-tainly be an heir to the one that exists today,which, in turn, remembers what it has learnedfromitspredecessor.Thisrelationshipbecomesapparent,forexample,whenoneseesthatourpast national objectives dictated the employ-ment of air assets in vast and remote theatersof operations. Those objectives became a defacto precursor to the development of capa-bilities that we call expeditionary during thepresent time, when mission accomplishmentdepends on a mind-set of excellence, reflectedin the motto serve well by performing well.Thus, one can see the future of the air force

only from a logic of seamless values and goalsindelibly infused with a specific institutionalculture.

The air force of the future will mirror thenations wishes, since its political leadershipmust define strategic objectives, assign mis-sions, and ensure the availability of assets andresources required to achieve them. Further-more, one of the main premises of building a

vision for the future entails understandingthat the cycle governing the acquisition and

development strategy (indispensable for de-finingandbuildingfuturecapabilities)ismuchmore sweeping than that of technological anddoctrinal changes. As a result, one should con-sider investingfundsbeyondacquisitioncostsin resources needed to support, sustain, andupgradeavailableassetsortoacquirenewones.Doingsowillassuretheviabilityofacredibleforceinanever-changingworldenvironment.

In examining the broad outlines of nationalstrategy, one notes the relevance of the coop-erative security concept and the concomitant

requirementforPortugaltocontributemilitaryassets and capabilities aimed at ensuring secu-rity and defense in current areas of interest,preferably through a collective construct. Theconceptofforwarddefensemeans,aboveall,participatingactivelyanddeliberatelyonbehalfof universal values, expressing solidarity, andaffirming legitimate interests in accordancewith foreign-policy imperatives defined in amultilateral framework. In the last decade,therefore, the armed forces have undertakenmissions that have expanded their dominance

in theapplicationprocessanddramaticallyincreasedthefrequencyoftheirtaskingstoconfront situations that only the armed forcescould meet, despite their unresolvability bymilitary meansthat is, those missions in sup-port of our foreign policy. That necessarilyimplies qualitative changes in the acquisi-tional,developmental,structural,andopera-tionalareasofourmilitaryforce.

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6 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2005Insofar as the air force is concerned, the

characteristics of its current or future weaponsystemssuch as speed, mobility, range, andflexibility of employment, in independent,

joint, or combined operationsallow thosesystems to contribute decisively to foreseeableemployment scenarios. Specifically, the airforce should continue to develop capabilitiesthatallowittoconductsurveillanceanddefenseof both Portuguese airspace and the area be-tweenPortugal,Madeira,andtheAzoresalsoknown as the Portuguese Strategic Triangle.These capabilities would contribute to free-dom of action by surface forces and facilitateother air operations such as strategic and tac-tical airlift, combat air patrols, surveillance,

search and rescue, and personnel recovery.

A force so organized, thanks to its joint,combined,andexpeditionarypotential,shouldhave the ability to integrate modularly withother forcesnamely as part of a NATO re-sponse force or a European Union battlegroupto fulfill international obligations.One assumes that such a force would receivedirection from an adequate command-and-control system and have plug and play capa-bilities for conducting operations in conjunc-tion with other allied assets. Additionally, this

force structure could carry out independentoperations, such as rescuing and recoveringcitizens, as well as aiding in natural disasters.One could justify the acquisition, sustainment,and development of the capabilities requiredto perform such missions on the grounds of

the nations need to have at its disposal a ca-pable and credible air forceone with an in-ternationally recognized capability judged bythe dedication and tenacity with which it con-

ducts operations. As is the case today, the suc-cess of the future air force will derive from theindividual and collective value of its people.Thus, their recruitment and retention, initialtraining and professional military education,and motivation and professional values willcontinue to constitute fundamental pillars ofthe military forces effectiveness.

In conclusion, we foresee an eminently ex-peditionary air force, which implies a high de-gree of interoperability with other nationalandmultinationalforces;anabilitytofunctionmodularly, including a deployable command-and-control system suited to a specific opera-tional environment; agile logistical support; ahigh capacity to explore the potential inher-ent in joint and combined operations; a struc-ture that facilitates rapid response; and theuse of weapon systems and equipment com-patible with new technologies. In sum, suchan air force could act effectively yet affordablyin independent, joint, and combined opera-tions.Withitspersonnelnotonlysolidlyrootedin sound principles, values, and ethics, butalso adequately educated and trained as wellas professionally fulfilled, the air force of thefuture will continue to participate actively inPortugals security and defenseand in itspresence and affirmation in the world. q


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Origins of the Royal Bahraini Air ForceCOLHAMADABDULLAAL-KHALIFA, COMMANDER, ROYALBAHRAINIAIRFORCE

ALTHOUGHTHEKINGDOMofBah-rainisasmallcountrygeographically,several characteristics have allowedit to become one of the more pro-

gressive nations in the Middle East and Asia.Due to its unique location and industrial sta-tus, many banks and international corpora-tions decided to make Bahrain the center oftheir Middle East operations. In addition thecountry also processes natural resources suchas oil and natural gas and hosts industrial op-erations, which include a petrochemical plant,an aluminum factory, a dry-dock site for shipmaintenance, and oil refineries. Furthermore,Bahraini citizensthe countrys human re-sourceare well versed in all of the profes-sions associated with these activities and arecapable of protecting the countrys resourcesand preserving its freedom. A dedicated andcapable military force composed of Bahrainsown citizens ensures the safeguarding of thoseassets and the defense of the country.

The Bahraini Defense Force, established in1968, includes modern air force, infantry, andnaval forces. Taking a first step toward devel-oping itself, the Royal Bahraini Air Force sentmany of its personnel to friendly countries in1974 to receive training in aviation and air-craft maintenance. At the same time it pro-cured jets, the Air Force purchased supportequipment and other necessary materiel.

When this materiel began arriving in Bahrain,the air and maintenance crews were complet-ing their training courses abroad. These events

successfully concluded the first stage in estab-lishing the Air Force, and many other devel-opments soon followed.

In 1976 the Air Force established an AirWing at Rifaa Air Base (see fig.) with a mod-est flight of four German-made Bo-105 heli-copters.1Operations soon began, and becauseof Bahrains location, these aircraft becamecritical to many successful search-and-rescue

Muharraq Air Base

BAHRAIN

Rifaa

Air Base

Bahrain International Airport

Shaikh Isa

Air Base

Figure. Location of Royal Bahraini Air Forcebases

missions. In 1978, 12 Agusta Bell AB-212 TwinHuey helicopters became part of the Air Wing.Since the pilots and technicians were alreadyqualified and prepared to operate these air-craft, operations commenced as soon as thecrewsjoinedthewing.Thesehelicoptersjoined

withplatformsfromneighboringcountriesandother friendly forces in several local and re-gional search-and-rescue operations as well astrainingexercises,includingtherescueofanumber of US Navy personnel after a missileattackontheUSSStarkduringtheIraq-IranWar.

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Royal Bahraini Air Force F-16 aircraft

8 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2005

Fighter JetsDuring the development of the Defense

Forceandtheintroductionofseveralmodernweaponssystems,Bahrainiofficialsrecognizedthe importance of possessing fighter jets ca-pableofdefendingthecountrysairspace.Con-sequently, in 1985 Bahrain acquired the F-5,thebestexportfighter jetavailable,andformedthe6thFighterSquadronatMuharraqAirBase(seefig.).Bahrainipilotsandtechniciancrewsunderwenttrainingconcurrentlyandpreparedto conduct operationswhen thejets arrived.Thisyoung force, initially called the Bahrain

AmiriAirForce,conductedoperationsinheli-coptersandfighterjetsandbeganconstructionofShaikhIsaAirBase(seefig.),whichwouldbecomeoneoftheregionslargestbases.2AfterpilotsandtechnicianshadmasteredF-5opera-tions, training commenced on the F-16, anevenmoremodernfighteraircraft.In1990theF-16sarrived,andShaikhIsaAirBaseopenedinsouthernBahrain.Duringthefollowingyear,these new Bahraini F-16s, alongside the F-5s,

joinedinthewartoliberateKuwait.Training and Joint Exercises

Because of the fundamental role of train-ing in the preparation of Royal Bahraini AirForce members to operate the modern sys-tems they employ, the Royal Bahraini AirForce Technical Institute was created to offerinstruction at all levelsfrom basic subjects tohighly technical courses needed for special-ized skills. The institute also offers courses toprepare officers and other members for edu-

cational opportunities abroad. For example,to further develop and prepare its future se-nior leadership, the Royal Bahraini Air Forceselects several officers each year to attend spe-

cialized and advanced courses in the UnitedStates as part of the annual training plan.Some of those courses are offered by Air Uni-

versitys Squadron Officer School, Air Com-mand and Staff College, and Air War College,located at Maxwell AFB, Alabama. Moreover,under the guidance and with the blessings ofthe Supreme Commander, His Majesty, the

Air Force founded the Training Wing, whichcurrently usesFireflyaircraft toprovide in-struction in basic aviation.3Advanced training

will soon include the more sophisticated BAe

Hawk trainer.4

Because exercises lend a spirit of realism,reinforce integration throughout the variouscommand levels, and play an important rolein preparing for successful operations, Bah-rain has emphasized participation in all train-ing exercises with its neighbors and otherfriendly nations. Exercises such as PeninsulaHawk and Gulf Spears, conducted annually,involve forces belonging to members of theGulf Cooperation Council (GCC), who sharea sense of cooperation and common interests.

Initial Link, another exercise in which Bah-rain participates, helps organize and managethe air forces of the GCC, the United States,and other friendly nations. Additionally, Bah-rain joins the US Air Force in Blue Flag, acommand and control exercise held in theUnited States.

Attack HelicoptersSinceBahrainfieldsgroundforcesequipped

with the most modern weapons and armored

vehicles, it formed squadrons of AH-1 Cobrahelicopters to provide direct and close air sup-port for those forces.5 Specifically, the year1994markedtheestablishmentofthe8thHeli-copterSquadron,followedin1997bycreationof the 9th Helicopter Squadron, both unitsflying this important weapons system. Along-side the ground forces, the Cobras create asignificant deterrent force.


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9ORIGINS OF THE ROYAL BAHRAINI AIR FORCE

Air Defense Systems andthe Air Operations and

Air Defense CenterIn 1999, due to the need for coordination

betweentheAirForceandAirDefenseSystems,the Air Defense Wingconsisting of HAWKPhase III missilesfell under the umbrella oftheAirForce.6Thewingworksincoordination

with the various other Air Force wings to ablyand efficiently secure the Kingdoms domain.

Additionally, the availability of early-warningradars led to formation of the Air Operationsand Air Defense Center, which connects the

various Air Force sectors during air operations

and maintains continuous coordination withoperations centers belonging to neighboringand friendly forces.

Air MobilityDue to the importance of air mobility, the

BAe146-RJ85 aircraft became the foundation

Notes1. The Bo-105 is a twin-engine helicopter manufac-

tured at the time by Messerchmitt-Bolkow-Blohm in WestGermany.Forcesallovertheworldstillutilizeitinmedicalevacuation, mainly because of its reliability, main rotorclearance of over nine feet, and tail rotor clearance ofover seven feet. Its rear clamshell doors allow for easyloading and unloading.

2. The Royal Bahraini Air Force was formerly knownas the Bahrain Amiri Air Force, but when Bahrain becamea monarchy in the elections of 14 February 2002, thearmed forces were renamed accordingly.

3. The US Air Forces Air Education and TrainingCommand also uses the T-3A Firefly, a propeller-drivenaircraft that replaced the T-41, to screen pilot candidatesby exposing them to military-style traffic patterns, aero-batics, and spins.

4. In early 2003, Bahrain signed a deal for six BAeHawk 127 two-seat jet trainers, manufactured by BAe Sys-tems. The British Royal Air Forces Red Arrows AerobaticTeam has flown the Hawk family of aircraft since it en-tered service in 1976. Since then BAe Systems has builtover 800 Hawk trainer and operational aircraft and hasexported some of them to 15 countries.

5. The AH-1 Cobra evolved from the UH-1 Huey,originallydevelopedfortheUSArmyinthemid-sixties.The original Cobra retained the Hueys engine, trans-

of the Mobility Wing of the Royal Bahraini AirForce.7 Other mobility aircraft will join the

wings inventory in the near future.

ConclusionVia these modest phases of development

since the mid-1970s, the Royal Bahraini AirForce has become an effective force in the re-gion. The loyal men of the Air Force exhibitthe spirit of perseverance and determinationto perform their national duty to protect Bah-rains cultural assets, which have accumulatedthrough many years of nurture. Throughoutthis time, Bahrain has diligently worked onproviding everything that would help its citi-

zens realize their dreams of a free and abun-dant life and contribute to our Kingdomshonor and glory, while following the exampleof our highest role model, His Majesty KingHamad bin Isa Al-Khalifa, the King of Bahrainand Supreme Commander of the DefenseForce. God save and protect him; he ignitedthe initial flame that formed this force. q

mission, and other major parts but replaced theHueys bulky fuselage with a thin profile fuselage withtandem seating. . . . Primary missions of the Cobra arehelicopter Close Air Support (CAS), escort of trans-port helicopters and ground convoys, armed recon-naissance, helicopter air-to-air attack, anti-shippingoperations, and coordination and terminal control offixed wing CAS, artillery, mortars, and naval gunfire. Itis the only western attack helicopter with a proven air-to-air and anti-radar missile capability.

AH-1Cobra,GlobalSecurity.org,http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/ah-1.htm.

6. The Homing All the Way Killer (HAWK) surface-to-air missile system provides medium-range, low to me-

dium altitude air defense against a variety of targets, in-cluding jet and rotary wing aircraft, unmanned aerial

vehicles, and cruise missiles. Its Phase III configurationalso includes a defensive capability against tactical mis-siles. It is a highly lethal, mobile, all-weather, day-or-nightsystem that is reliable and effective against electroniccountermeasures.HAWK,GlobalSecurity.org,http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/hawk.htm.

7. The BAe146-RJ85 is normally used as a regional air-liner, carrying 7082 passengers.


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APJLTCOLP ERGAULD. B , USAF, EDITOR

Honoring a Fallen Airman andIntroducing the Latest ChroniclesOnline JournalArticles

W

E BEGIN THIS issue on a sombernote. The editors of Air and SpacePower Journal(ASPJ)were profoundlysaddened to hear that Maj William

Brian Downs, the author of a recent ASPJarticle,has died. He, along with three other Americans

and the Iraqi pilot he was instructing, perished inan aircraft crash 80 miles northeast of Baghdad,Iraq, on 30 May 2005. His article, Unconventional

Airpower, appeared in the spring 2005 issue ofASPJ. As a member of the 6th Special OperationsSquadron, Major Downs was an expert at trainingother air forces to employ airpower to defend theircountries against terrorists, insurgents, and otherthreats. His article offers keen insights into the doc-trine,forcestructure,andtacticsneededtocounterthe foes we face today. His personal experience and

obvious dedication to duty bolstered the points hemade in that article. America has lost an Airman,but his values and ideas live on. We are proud tonote that his ASPJ article reflects one modest ex-pression of those ideas. We hope that other Airmengain inspiration from his life and wisdom from his

writings. The ASPJstaff wishes to express our deep-est sympathies to Major Downss family.

A man of action, Major Downs noted in his ar-ticle that the war on terror and our efforts againstinsurgents will take a long time. The US Air Forcemust adapt itself for the fight (p. 25). Airmen canhelp in this adaptation process by intellectually

engaging in the discussion of airpower and spacepower ideas and issues that confront our servicetoday, as well as those that will concern us in thefuture. ASPJ promotes that professional dialogueamong Airmen worldwide. In that spirit, we com-mend his article to you and introduce the latestChronicles Online Journal(COJ) articles.

COJcomplements the printed editions ofASPJbut appears only in electronic form. Not subject toanyfixedpublicationschedule,itcanpublishtimelyarticles anytime. Furthermore, while ASPJ focusesnarrowly on airpower and space power topics ofconcern to todays Air Force, COJcovers a broaderrange, including historical, political, or technicalmatters. It also includes articles too lengthy for in-clusion in the printed journals.

Articles appearing inCOJ are frequently repub-lishedelsewhere.TheSpanish,Portuguese,andAra-bic editions ofASPJ, for example, routinely trans-late and print them. Book editors from around the

world select them as book chapters, and collegeprofessors use them in the classroom. Recent arti-clesavailableathttp://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/ airchronicles/cc.html include

Capt Craig S. Millers A New Perspective forthe Military: Looking at Maps within Central-ized Command and Control Systems and

Maj Tadd Sholtiss Planning for Legitimacy:A Joint Operational Approach to Public Af-fairs.

The ASPJeditorial staff is always seeking insight-ful articles and book reviews. We offer publicationopportunities in English, Spanish, Portuguese, and

Arabic. We will add a French version of ASPJin thenear future. To submit an article for publication inany of these languages, please refer to the submis-

sion guidelines at http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/howto1.html. Wepublishbookreviews to inform Airmen about the latest bookspublished on military topics. To submit a book re-

view, please refer to the guidelines at http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/bookrev/ bkrevguide.html. q

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APJ

We encourage you to send us your comments, preferably via e-mail to [email protected]. You may also sendletters to The Editor,Air and Space Power Journal, 401 Chennault Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6428.We reserve the right to edit the material for overall length.

ARABICASPJWe thank the editor and staff [of the new Ara-bic ASPJ], with special thanks to 1st Lt Basma

Abdul-Hamid for this great effort. All the top-ics are meaningful and constructive. I enjoyedthe article about the strategic perspective on

fighting terrorism (What Kind of War? Strate-gic Perspectives on the War on Terror) by ColJohn D. Jogerst. My regards to your efforts,and God bless you.

Brig Gen Qaid Al-KhuzaaiDirector of Operations, Iraqi Air Force

Baghdad, IraqEditors Note: See the inside back cover of this is-sue for a photograph of General Al-Khuzaai re-ceiving a copy of the inaugural ASPJ-Arabic inBaghdad in February 2005. The Arabic version of

Colonel Jogersts article first appeared in the spring2005 issue of ASPJ-Arabic, available at http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/apjinternational/aspjarabic/2005/spr05/jogerst.pdf. We subsequentlyrepublished that article in the spring 2005 issue of

ASPJ-English, available at http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj05/spr05/jogerst.html.Congratulations on standing up the ArabicASPJ. Thats a great accomplishment. Hope-fully it will help cement our valuable relation-

ship with that part of the world.Maj Matt Knocker Isler, USAF

Nellis AFB, Nevada

LEADERSHIPCongratulations on your leading articleLorenzonLeadershipbyMajGenStephenR.Lorenz (summer 2005, available at http://

www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj05/sum05/lorenz.html). It is a truly

insightful and inspirational document. I can-not remember reading a better written ormore useful article on that topic. I have for-

warded it to junior Air Force officers who willneed those words of wisdom throughout theircareers, and I have recommended that theykeep a copy handy for frequent reference.Thank you for your exceptional publications.They help me keep my brain active.

Col Robert E. Frank, USAF, RetiredHenderson, Nevada

RESCUE OPERATIONSI was a member of Task Force Gabriel, one ofthe aviation units mentioned in Col Darrel

Whitcombs article Rescue Operations in theSecond Gulf War (spring 2005, available athttp://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj05/spr05/whitcomb.html). I authored one of the documents hecites in his sources (AWOAC Historical CaseStudy: Personnel Recovery Operations dur-ing OIF). I just wanted to say well done! The

article is very well put together.CWO3 Gordon Cimoli, USA

Giebelstadt, Germany

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LTCOLPAULD. BERG, USAF, EDITOR

ASPJ

Coalition Perspectives on Airpower and Space Power

ALLIANCE AND COALITION mili-tary operations figure prominentlyinbothwarandpeace.Alliancessuchas the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-

zation (NATO) are formal, usually long-termstrategic partnerships codified in written ac-

cords. Alliance agreements normally obligatesignatories to render substantial military, po-litical, and economic support to one another.Coalitions are less formal than alliances, typi-cally consisting of countries or other politicalgroups acting in concert to pursue selectedcommon goals on an ad hoc basis. Coalitionmembersmaycontributetoonlyasingleaspectof an operation, remain in the coalition tem-porarily, and feel free to limit the extent oftheirobligationtoothermembers.Forexample,the coalition formed to conduct Operation

Enduring Freedom featured members whoprovided varying forms of political, logistical,or military support. A different coalition par-ticipates in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Yet an-other took part in Operation Unified Assis-tancethe tsunami-relief effort of early 2005.Terms like coalition of the willinghave enteredour vocabulary to describe countries joiningtogetherforspecificpurposesbutnotformingbroad, enduring political relationships. Somepunditsquestionthefutureoftraditionalmili-tary alliances such as NATO, but few of them

doubt the ongoing importance of coalitions.From an Airmans perspective, airpowerand space power operations conducted by alli-ances and coalitions present somewhat differ-ent challenges. Alliance members usually havetime to train together to refine doctrine and

optimize interoperability. They may even stan-dardizeequipmenttosomedegree.Conversely,coalitions bring together air forces that mayhave minimal prior experience working to-gether. The event that triggers coalition for-mation may be a war or natural disaster, so Air-men from participating nations need to reachagreementonkeyoperatingproceduresassoonas possible. The success of Unified Assistanceshowed that preparation and planning beforean emergency can pay dividends. The Multi-nationalPlanningAugmentationTeam(MPAT),a cadre of military planners from nations

with Asia-Pacific interests capable of rapidlyaugmentingamultinationalforceheadquartersestablished to plan and execute coalition op-erations in response to military operationsother than war/small scale contingencies, of-fers a good example.*Disaster-response agree-ments that MPAT members had reached longbefore the tsunami struck in December 2004helped coalition members work together todeliver relief to stricken people more quicklythan might otherwise have been possible.

Each unique coalition member deservesunderstanding and respect. Some bring im-pressivemilitarycapabilities.Otherscontributemore modest resources, such as logistical sup-port or basing rights. However, all participants

significantly bolster the efforts political legiti-macy, as seen by the world community. Airmenfrom different countries need to understandthe ever-changing constraints faced by theircoalition partners and value the contributionsthey make.

*Briefing, subject: Multinational Planning Augmentation Team, 1 June 2005, PowerPoint slide 3, http://www2.apan-info.net/mpat/ main-files/What%20is%20MPAT_files/frame.htm (accessed 11 June 2005).12


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FOCUS AREA 13Because we cannot predict the next crisis in

todays uncertain world, Airmen should edu-cate themselves about the perspectives of po-tential coalition partners. In some cases, such

as the British-American relationship, Airmenfrom different countries have long trainedand served together, but other air forces areless acquainted with one another. Each ofthe worlds air forces faces unique challengesand operates different equipment, but Air-men everywhere can profit from exchanging

views about how best to apply airpower andspace power in pursuit of common goals. Tofoster such an exchange, this issue of Air andSpace Power Journalcontains articles written byauthors

from

Argentina,

Australia,

Bahrain,

Brazil, Germany, Portugal, Singapore, andthe United States. In hope of supporting fu-ture coalition operations, we dedicate this is-sue to advancing professional dialogue andmutual understanding among all the worlds

Airmen. q


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First Place Second Place

Ira C. Eaker Award Winners

for the topAir & Space Power Journalarticles of the 20042005 academic year

Lt Col William B. Danskine Maj Alexander Berger Third PlaceLt Col Arnel B. EnriquezAggressive ISR in the War Beyond Blue Four: The Past The US National Security

on Terrorism: Breaking and Future Transformation Strategy of 2002: A Newthe Cold War Paradigm of Red Flag Use-of-Force Doctrine?

(Summer 2005) (Summer 2005) (Fall 2004)Congratulations to this years winners! The award honors airpower pioneer Gen Ira C. Eakerand is made possible through the generous support of the Air University Foundation. If you

would like to compete for the Ira C. Eaker Award, submit a feature-length article to the Editor,

Air and Space Power Journal,401 Chennault Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6428 or via e-mail [email protected]. All military personnel below the rank of colonel (O-6) or governmentcivilian employees below GS-15 or equivalent are eligible. If ASPJ publishes your article, you

will automatically be entered in the competition.14


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APJ

We are committed to expanding international cooperation in the re-construction and security of Iraq, just as we are in Afghanistan.

Pres. George W. Bush

Centralized Execution

in the Air ForceMAJJOHNSCHAEFERIII, USAF*

Two weeks into the war, you are on your way north into Iraq leading a two-ship ofF-15Es, each loaded with eight GBU-12s and a GBU-10. Its a clear, blue day, andyour onboard sensors give you a good fix on a convoy of Iraqi trucks stalled on theroad with heavy loads. But then the Airborne Warning and Control System aircraftinterrupts your perfect sortie:Tipsy 07, this is Darkstar.Darkstar, this is Tipsy 07. Go ahead.Tipsy 07, Kmart directs you to proceed to X and destroy Y.Since the rules of engagement (ROE) specifically prohibit destroying Y, you makesure the tape is on before authenticating Darkstar and making him repeat the order.He confirms the order, emphasizing that it comes directly from Kmartthe joint

force air and space component commander (JFACC)and that it is time sensitive.You inform Darkstar that this mission will require you to divert and dutifully lead

your two-ship to X and turn Y into piles of flaming wreckage. After hot-pit refuelingat your divert base, you and your weapon systems officer fly home wondering ifmaintenancewillbeabletodeliverenoughjetsfortonightssorties,consideringyourlate return; you also discuss the merits of centralized execution of airpower. Mean-whileKmartcelebratesthecripplingblowyoursortiedeliveredtotheIraqileadership.

The Master TenetAlthough advances in command-and-control technology have made cen-tralized execution both feasible and appropriate in certain limited circum-

stances, one should carefully follow the guidelines laid out in Air ForceDoctrine Document (AFDD) 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, which defines cen-tralized control as the planning, direction, prioritization, synchronization,integration, and deconfliction of air and space capabilities to achieve theobjectives of the joint force commander. That document also describes de-

*Major Schaefer is a student at the School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.15


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centralizedexecutionasthedele-gation of execution authority to re-sponsible and capable lower-levelcommanders to achieve effectivespanofcontrolandtofoster disci-plined initiative, situational respon-siveness,andtacticalflexibility.1Theairpower tenet of centralized con-trolanddecentralizedexecutionarose when available technologydid not allow commanders to see

what their airpower assets were do-ing in real time. Specifically, thelack of reliable communicationslimited the direct control of those

assets. The Air Force embraced de-centralized execution partially inreaction to heavy losses sufferedduring the Vietnam War, when in-dividuals outside the theater con-trolled planning and execution.

Aircrews had to use tactics ill suitedto the threat, resulting in reducedeffectiveness and unnecessary

losses. Information flowed slowly to and from the theater, and the means ofcommunication dictated transmission of only the most important data.

Technology available at the time did not provide the fidelity required forsuccessful centralized execution.Current technology, however, provides commanders with real-time infor-

mationaboutalltheirassetsandhigh-qualityintelligenceabouttheenemysassets. Our ability to collect and disseminate data continues to grow expo-nentially. As the introductory scenario illustrates, this growth has led to in-stances of commanders easily reaching forward and successfully employingcentralized execution. Since this phenomenon has already occurred andthe temptation to utilize it will only grow as our assets and weapons connectto the global information grid, an examination of centralized executionseems appropriate.

Centralized or Decentralized Execution?AccordingtoLtColWoodyParramore,USAF,retired,Centralizedexecu-

tionhappensifasortiecarriesoutitsmissionunderdirectcontrolofanairandspaceoperationscenter(AOC)(whetheratheaterAOC,thetankerair-liftcontrolcenter,orthespaceAOC),withnootherecheloninthechainofcommandissuingorders.2Armedwiththisdefinition,wecanexamine16


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AFDD1sreasonsforemployingdecentralizedexecution,situationsthatmaycallforcentralizedexecution,andguidelinesforusingcentralizedexecution.

AFDD1addressesdecentralizedexecutionsabilitytoachieveeffectivespanofcontrolbypointingoutthatmoderntechnologybringsthecommanderafloodofdatafargreaterthanheorshecanabsorbandtranslateintositua-tionalawareness.Nocommandercanknoweverythingabouteveryassetinacomplextheaterwithhundredsofplayers.Thisargumentsetsaboundaryfortheextenttowhichoneshouldusecentralizedexecutionbutdoesnotpre-cludeit.Commandersshouldremainfocusedonhigher-levelissuesandavoiddelvingintotacticaldetails.Smalloperationsmakecentralizedexecu-tionevenmoretempting,butcommanderscanassuretheroutineachieve-mentofgreatereffectsbylettinghighlyskilledAirmenexecutetheirassigneddutieswhileairborne.

In both small and large air campaigns, the challenge lies in identifyingsorties that lend themselves to centralized execution. The JFACC should

have a system or staff, such as a time-sensitive targeting cell, in place thatrecognizes those rare instances as they occur and knows their limitations inusingcentralizedexecutiontomeetthecommandersintent.Whenper-sonnel or equipment issues cause centralized execution to tie up assets thatcouldproducebettereffectsbyallowingthetheateraircontrolsystem(TACS) to run its course, one should avoid centralized execution.3If an in-put into the TACS can produce a desired effect, then one doesnt need cen-tralized execution. For instance, if the ground commander decides to makekilling a particular enemy armored division the priority for the next week,then the JFACC should make appropriate inputs into the TACS to generateair tasking orders that will accomplish this goal. Attempting to reach for-

ward and individually redirect the number of sorties required to achievethis effect is not the preferred option.AFDD1alsonotesthatdecentralizedexecutionservestofosterdisciplined

initiative.Whenproperlyused,centralizedexecutionredirectsasortieseffortbut should not take all initiative away from the aircrew. Our entire system oftraining seeks to develop aircrews that can take stock of the existing tacticalsituation and execute their mission. Centralized execution that removes theabilitytoadjusttoreal-worldconditionsamountstomicromanagementandiscounterproductive. For instance, transmitting exact attack parameters for anewtargetinsteadofassigningthetargetwitharun-inrestrictiontoavoidover-flightofaparticularareamayresultintheaircrewsnothavingtheflexibilityto

employ due to such real-world conditions as bad weather in the targetarea. When employed properly, centralized execution does not restrict air-

crew initiative any more than publishing a change to the ROE would.CurrentandemergingtechnologiesrequirereevaluationofAFDD1s

statementthatdecentralizedexecutionimprovessituationalresponsiveness.Inpreviousconflicts,oftentimesonlyaircrewssawthetacticalsituationandthetruelayoftheaerialbattlefield.Commandersreliedonafter-actionre-portsandreconnaissanceassets,usuallywithlongdelays,toshapetheirpic-tureofthebattlespace.Modernsurveillanceandcommunicationsassetshave

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significantlyimprovedbattlespaceawareness.Thesituationnowdictateswhohasabetterviewofeventsonthebattlefield.Insomecases,controlelementslocatedwithorabovefriendlysurfaceforces,suchasgroundorairbornefor-

wardaircontrollers,mayhaveamuchmoreaccuratepictureofactiononthegroundthantheAOCdoes.Ontheotherhand,weather,threats,andlight-ingconditionsmaydegradethecontrolelementssituationalawarenesssoseverelythatonefindsmuchbetterreal-timesituationalawarenessonthe

AOCfloor.Inaperfectworld,thecontrolelementwouldpullthesameinfor-mationofftheglobalinformationgridthattheAOCsees,butcurrentavionicslimitationsandthedemandsofflyingandsurvivinginahostileenvironmentsometimesinhibitthisprocess.Becauseoflongersortiedurationsandlimiteddatapipelinestothecockpit,theinformationthataircrewshaveontakeoffcanlosecurrencybythetimetheyreachtheirtargetareas.Thus,centralizedexecutionmightoffertheonlywayofcapitalizingonemerginginformationandquicklyrespondingtothechangingsituationonthebattlefield.

Finally, although AFDD 1 declares that decentralized execution fosterstactical flexibility, it does concede that in some situations, there may be

valid reasons for execution of specific operations at higher levels, most no-tably when the JFC [joint force commander] (or perhaps even higher au-thorities)maywishtocontrolstrategiceffects,evenatthesacrificeoftacticalefficiency.4One can justify losing some incremental tactical progress to-

ward the commanders intent provided by decentralized execution whencentralized execution will spur significant movement toward strategic objec-tives. Additionally, political constraints may force a commander to employcentralized execution. For example, during the Cuban missile crisis, Presi-dent Kennedy exercised strong personal control of low-level activities to

avoid blundering into a nuclear war.5

The Road AheadIn his article Centralized Control/Decentralized Execution in the Era of

Forward Reach, Maj Mark Davis argues for modifying the decentralized-execution portion of the master airpower tenet in order to align Air Forceand joint doctrine.6Since World War II, however, this master tenet has re-peatedly proven itself as the best way to employ airpower. Ignoring it canleadtocompromisingtheremainingtenetsofairpowerandtolosingeffects.Overuse of centralized execution shackles the flexibility that allows trained

Airmen to achieve airpowers maximum effects. Nonetheless, recent eventshave shown that centralized execution will occur. However, the unique char-acteristicsofairpowerandspacepowerdictatethatdecentralizedexecutionremain the norm. Although Air Force doctrine acknowledges that com-mandersmayusecentralizedexecution,itdoesnotprovidein-depthanalysisoftheinherenttrade-offs.AnexaminationoftheAirForcesreasonsforem-ploying decentralized execution reveals some practical guidelines for usingcentralized execution.18


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The EffectsOnemustfirstconsiderwhetheranybenefitswouldaccruetotactical,opera-tional,orstrategiceffectsfromemployingcentralizedratherthandecentral-izedexecution.Onecanjustifysomelossofeffectivenessorefficiencyatalowerlevelinexchangeforgainsatahigherlevel.Forexample,centralizedexecutionmightproveappropriateforredirectingsortiestodeliverafatalblowtoenemycommand-and-controlsystems,preventingthespreadofaconflictoverpoliticalborders,attackingtime-sensitivetargets,orcomplying

withpoliticalconstraintsatthedirectionofcivilianleadership.Oneshouldnotusecentralizedexecutionsimplytoexchangeonetacticaleffectforanothersomethingbestaccomplishedbychangingguidancetothedecen-tralizedsystem.TheAOCstaffmustrecognizethatbecausewecandoesnotqualifyasjustificationforswitchingtoacentralized-executionmode.Similarly,theJFACCshouldnothabituallyusecentralizedexecutionsimplybecausethecapabilityexistsbutshoulddosoonlywhenitsincreasedeffectsjustifydeviat-ingfromthemastertenet.Whos in Charge?Given the employment of centralized execution, the JFACC must remainthe single air commander, responsible for ensuring that such executiondoes not degrade effectiveness by leading to the de facto establishment ofprivate air forces at the disposal of supported ground commanders. AFDD 1clearly states that the JFACC should mediate the competing demands fortactical support against the strategic and operational requirements of theconflict.7This responsibility remains the JFACCs even if that commander

chooses, based on his or her expertise as an Airman, to employ centralizedexecutiontosupportthegroundcommander.Inordertomaximizeitseffects,airpower should remain under the command of an Airman, regardless ofthe method of execution selected by the JFACC.The Right People at the AOCBecausecentralizedexecutionaddstotheresponsibilityoftheAOC,itmustbe staffed with experienced war fighters. Sending the squadrons youngestfour-ship flight lead or a field grader fresh off the staff but not yet back onhis or her game to the AOC will not work with centralized execution. Therecent effort to treat AOCs as weapon systems has paid great dividends in

standardizing and upgrading their equipment. Since this new equipmenthas made limited centralized execution a reality, AOCs must put it in thehands of current, tactically proficient Airmen who can recognize when suchexecution represents the best way of fulfilling the commanders intent.Making Up for Pipeline ShortfallsOne can use centralized execution to overcome shortfalls in existing infor-mation pipelines. Because AOCs often have access to more information

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than do aircrews in the cockpit,they can use the additional data toreach forward and centrally exe-cute sorties when pipeline short-

falls prevent crews from obtaininginformation in a timely fashion.The long-term fix would entail in-creasing the size of the pipelines tothe cockpit and enhancing thequality of the information so thataircrews can subscribe to the typesof data they need. In the mean-time, an accurate picture of thetheater-information architecture

will help identify situations in

which physical or network limita-tions prevent maximum effective-ness when assets operate under de-centralized execution. The JFACCand his or her staff need to knowabout such limitations so they canuse centralized execution to pushforward information that can radi-cally alter a sorties effectiveness. Giulio DouhetTraining for Decentralized ExecutionOur current system of training produces Airmen who can gather informa-tion from multiple sources and make the right decisions in the air duringthe heat of battlea great source of strength for the Air Force. Our service

will always need individuals capable of flexibly employing their weapon sys-tems. Thus, the Air Force needs to ensure that the incorporation of limitedcentralizedexecutiondoesnoteventuallyproduceaforceofAirmenunableto act on their own.

Deviate with CautionCentral execution of a sortie should not create an airborne puppet. The

AOC must still honor the remaining tenets and principles of airpower, leav-ing the aircrew enough flexibility to achieve the desired effect. AFDD 1 ad-dresses this issue: Centralized control maximizes the flexibility and effec-tiveness of air and space power; however, it must not become a recipe formicromanagement, stifling the initiative subordinates need to deal withcombats inevitable uncertainties.8This statement also applies to properlyemployed centralized execution. Similarly, the AOC should keep the overallsituation in mind to avoid losing the effects of numerous sorties when the

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centralized execution of a few sorties results in failure to achieve sufficientmass.LimiteduseofcentralizedexecutionwillallowtheJFACCtocapitalizeon technology yet still realize maximum effects by adhering to the remain-ing tenets of airpower. Indeed, according to AFDD 1, Commanders must

applytheirprofessionaljudgmentandexperiencetotheprinciplesandtenetsas they employ air and space power in a given situation.9This balancing actcurrently includes the use of centralized execution, whose employmentshould become easier as technology advances.

TheAirForceshouldtaketoheartGiulioDouhetsobservationthatvictorysmilesuponthosewhoanticipatethechangesinthecharacterofwar,notuponthosewhowaittoadaptthemselvesafterthechangesoccur.10Becausetechno-logicalprogressincreasesthelikelihoodofutilizinglimitedcentralizedexecu-tion,theAirForceneedstoanticipatetheattendantchangesandincorporatethemintoitsdoctrine,training,andoperations. q

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Notes1. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 17 November 2003, 28, https://

www.doctrine.af.mil/Main.asp?.2. Lt Col Woody W. Parramore, USAF, retired, Defining Decentralized Execution in Order to Recog-

nize Centralized Execution, Air and Space Power Journal18, no. 3 (Fall 2004): 25, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj04/fal04/fal04.pdf.

3.AccordingtoAirForceInstruction(AFI)13-1AOCV3,OperationalProceduresAerospaceOperationsCenter,1July2002,http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/13/afi13-1aocv3/afi13-1aocv3.pdf, theTACScon-sistsofmobilefacilities,equipmentandtrainedpersonneltopermittailoredC2foraerospaceoperationsthroughoutthespectrumofconflict(7).Seechap.2ofthisAFIforadetailedoverviewoftheTACS.

4. AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 30.5. Lt Col Phillip K. Heacock, The Viability of Centralized Command and Control (C2), Air University

Review30, no. 2 (JanuaryFebruary 1979), http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1979/jan-feb/heacock.html.

6. Maj Mark G. Davis, Centralized Control/Decentralized Execution in the Era of Forward Reach,Joint Force Quarterly, Summer 2003, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/1835.pdf.

7. AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 28.8. Ibid.9. Ibid., 27.10. Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air, trans. Dino Ferrari (1942; new imprint, Washington, DC:

Office of Air Force History, 1983), 30.

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APJ

Effects-Based Operations andCounterterrorismMR. DAVIDB. LAZARUS

EditorialAbstract:Mr.LazarusoffersanAustralianviewoftheconcepts,philosophies,andrelevanceofeffects-basedoperations(EBO)inthefightagainstterrorism.Hecontendsthatal-QaedasactionscanbeunderstoodthroughanEBOlensandconcludesthattheonlyeffectiveresponseistoemployahigher-leveleffects-basedstrategy(EBS).Tobesuccessful,EBSwillhavetoovercomethechallengesofMuslimdistrustand

the

changing

strategies

associated

with

short-lived

Western

democratic

political

administrations.

DEVELOPMENTSANDCRISESacrossthe globe over the last decade havedemonstrated the significant secu-rity challenges that many nations

have been experiencing during a transitionfrom ColdWar to postColdWar securitystructuresandapproaches.Arguablythesinglegreatest challenge posed within this new inter-nationalsystemisthethreatofmodernterrorism.The danger of this threat was demonstratedmost clearly by the terrorist attacks of 11September 2001 (9/11) in New York and

Washington. The United States and its coa-

lition partners are currently experiencing themagnitude of this challenge in their globalcampaign against international terrorism.

Thisarticlewillattempttoexaminetherele-vance of the new concepts and capabilities ofeffects-based operations (EBO) in the fightagainst international terrorism. To do so, onemust explore the philosophy of the effects-based approach with specific reference to thecurrentphenomenonofradicalIslamicterror-ism and its leadership network, al-Qaeda.Furthermore, the article asserts that al-Qaedaitself is employing EBO in its terror campaign

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EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONS AND COUNTERTERRORISM 23and that the only effective response mustinherently involvea largerandhigher-leveleffects-basedstrategy(EBS)bytheUnitedStatesand its allies.

The degree to which air and space powercapabilitiesarerelevanttotheconceptsofEBOand EBS will not be examined to any greatdegree. This does not reflect any judgementas to their actual, undeniable centrality to theconcepts, but rather the fact that any suchexamination may be counterproductive toreaching a clear understanding of the morefundamental principle of the effects-basedphilosophyallthatmattersiswhatisachieved,not how it is achieved.

Effects-Based Operationsand Strategy

EBOis defined as a conceptual process forobtainingadesiredstrategicoutcomeoreffecton the enemy, through the synergistic, multi-plicative, and cumulative application of thefull range of military and nonmilitary capa-bilities.1This is an adaptive process that takesthe shape of a complex, interwoven patternthat spans the tactical, operational, andstrategic dimensions of engagement.2 Theenabling foundation of EBO is effects-basedtargeting,whichinvolvescreatingandmanipu-lating events using precision lethal andnonlethalcapabilitiesthatchangeanadversarysbehaviour and mind-set in a manner close tothatwhichwasoriginallyintended.3

The planning process undertaken occurspredominantly at an operational level.4It con-sists of an initial attempt to map forward intime the linkages of controllable actions andthe relationship between their likely effectsand the predefined objectives that drive the

process. While this process preferably beginslong before any EBO is launched, it is organic,evolutionary,andcontinuous,employingnear-simultaneous planning that is coordinatedacross all echelons of command.5 This is a re-sult of the necessity to account for secondary-,tertiary-, and greater-order effects that flow onfrom the original event like ripples across apond,hopefullyachievingtheultimatelydesired

effect.6While this is generally true of all com-bat, the exceptional sensitivity of EBO to thisdynamicisofafargreaterorderandmagnitude.

Whether this final effect in the end is really

what was wanted and satisfies the predefinedobjective can only be judged at a later point intime,andfromastrategicratherthanatacticalor an operational perspective. Hence, the es-sence of EBO is its focus upon the outcome ofany operation rather than how the operationis conducted. Furthermore, since the ulti-mate sourcing of EBO objectives is from thestrategic or political level, this leads directly tothe conceptual heart of strategythat war it-self is simply an extension of politics by othermeans.7

This implies the necessity for political guid-ance toward some sort of strategic frameworkwithin which effects-based planning must beundertaken. This inference leads to the con-cept of EBO, which can be defined as the co-herent application of all national resourceson all national levels, guided by ends ratherthan by means or ways, in order to achievegrand strategic objectives.8The significance ofEBO in this strategic context is that it providesthe imaginative leaders of advanced nationsthe capacity to truly target an adversary in amanner that can enable the achievement ofthe ultimate goal of skillful strategyto sub-due the enemy without fighting.

The Nature and Strategy ofInternational Terrorism

The profound implications of the effective-ness of EBO and EBS with respect to modernconventional warfare have been demonstratedthrough the astounding conventional coali-tion victory during the initial occupation stage

of the recent Iraq War in 2003.9 The war itselfwas described as an effects-based campaign bythe US military, termed shock and awe, andembodied the most meaningful attempt in re-centtimesatemployingarmedconflictinorderto achieve a strategic outcome through the ef-fects produced by military force.10

Only time will ultimately tell whether thiswas in fact a successful attempt. While military


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24 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2005victory was arguably inevitable, far less predict-able is the actual desired strategic outcome ofa safe and stable self-determined Iraqi govern-mentone that honours human dignity and

servesas

abeacon

for

democracy

in

the

Middle

East. Yet the global debate that raged in thelead-up to that war, which has continued evenmore so since its seemingly incorrectly toutedconclusion, concerns the relevance not onlyof the war in Iraq to the current global waragainst terrorism, but of war itself and anymilitary response to the threat of internationalterrorism.11

At issue seems to be the unwillingness orinability of many to conceive of warfare assomething beyond the purely physical, de-

structive, force-on-force exercise that has untilnow been the nature of warfare. The ability toout-manoeuvre an adversary and apply an ex-ceptional rate of battlefield attrition is indeedalmost entirely useless and irrelevant when itcomes to an ideologically driven global terrornetworksuchasal-Qaeda.However,theeffects-based concept is not reliant on such physicallylimited means.12At its fundamental core, EBOis about the mind perceptions and the cogni-tive dimensions of an adversarys reality, re-gardless of any physical or military inferiority

or superiority.13

Al-Qaeda is employing EBOin its campaign of terror and has in fact argu-ably undertaken one of the most visible, high-profile EBOs in history9/11. Axiomatically,the degree towhich 9/11 can bejudged asuccessor failure from al-Qaedas point of

viewcanonlybedeterminedwiththepass-ingoftime.

Shock and AweIn terms of shock and awe, no aspect of the

recent coalition campaign in Iraq can evenbegin to compare to the psychologically andcognitively devastating effects of the terroristattacks on New York and Washington in 2001,particularly of course for Americans.14 Theseattacksunquestionablysetapartal-Qaedafromall other terrorist groups through its demon-strated ability to comprehend and plan forthe dynamics of temporally grouped crisis

events whose constructed linkages producedan emotional terror which far exceeded thesum of the individual acts themselves.15 Thetiming of the attacks to coincide with a peak

window of the global media cycle is furtherevidence of the attention paid to the widercognitive and informational effects intendedtoresultfromtheattacks,ratherthananysimplephysical destruction.16

Withoutfurtherdissectingtheattacksof9/11,it should be sufficient to assert that al-Qaedaleader Osama bin Laden and his terroristplanners are not simply madmen but arehighly intelligent, imaginative, resourceful,and insightful individuals who clearly under-stand the fundamentally psychological and

emotional nature of their own battlespace.17

The events of 9/11 also clearly demonstratedtheir ability to conceptualise the second- andthird-order capacity of effects that could resultfrom their attacks.18While the exact goals andspecific motivations of bin Laden are now theintense focus of a great many analysts andcommentators, a clearly enunciated aim haslong been the elimination of Westerners andthe US military presence in SaudiArabia.

Worth noting is the fact that the US responseto the terror attacks has indeed been to with-

draw its military presence.

The Global War on TerrorAs mentioned previously, the mere asser-

tion that any effective response to the threatof international terrorism can take the formof something akin to a war employing militarymeans sparks intense debate.19 This articledoes not intend to examine in any great depththe conduct of the war against terrorism up tothis point, but some comment is perhaps nec-

essary and relevant to set the tone for the dis-cussion that will follow. It must be notedthatimmediatelyfollowing9/11theUnitedStates clearly and correctly acknowledged thatthe nature of the war to be undertaken wouldbe unlike anything previously seen or con-ceived and that beyond its physical effects,much would be unseen and unknown.20 Thishinted perhaps at recognition of the need for


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EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONS AND COUNTERTERRORISM 25a focus on the cognitive and informational di-mension of their enemy.

Furthermore,inresponsetotheneedforim-mediatemobilisation,theUScampaignsfirstin

Afghanistanand

then

in

Iraq

had

to

make

do

withthen-currentcapabilitiesthathadpreviouslybeendesignedforandsuitedtotraditional,con-

ventionalmilitaryadversaries.21 Newandrapidlyevolvingcapabilitieswereindeedemployedandguidedbyeffects-basedconcepts,butthesetoo

were based on mostly traditional military plat-forms,suchastheB-52bomber.

The point to be made is that the campaignswere always going to look very traditional inmuch of their physical conduct. However,there was a significant application and evolu-

tion of effects-based thinking even betweenthe wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.22 This indi-cates that judging the US-led war on terrorismas fundamentally flawed by an emphasis ontrying to defeat the enemy on a redundantbattlefield perhaps overlooks the profoundrevolution in strategic military thought that iscurrentlyunderway,basedbroadlyaroundthe effects-based philosophy.23

The Threat of Rogue NationsWhile the significance of the terrorist threat

posed by a traditional nation-state such as Iraqis obviously a contentious issue, the threatdoes indeed exist in the form of two specificscenarios: (1) the provision of safe havens toterrorist networks and (2) their possible ac-cess to weapons of mass destruction (WMD).24The first such scenario does not require muchelaboration since itwas clearly and easilyunderstood in the case of Afghanistan that de-nying al-Qaeda a territorial base of operationsfrom which it can devise and launch opera-

tions is a fundamental prerequisite to under-mining and eliminating the terrorist threatthat it poses.

InrelationtoIraq,however,thesecondsce-nario regarding possible terrorist access to

WMDisnowcondemnedasafallacythatun-derminesanypossiblelegitimacyforlaunchingthewarinthefirstplace.Butthesignificanceof EBO in thewar on Iraq that followedwas

profound, regardless ofwhether or not IraqdidinfactpresentasourceofWMDcapabilityto al-Qaeda.25 The IraqWar clearly demon-stratedthechangedparadigmfromoldwartonewfrom

former

military

objectives

of

ex-haustion and attrition to the more direct

achievementofregimechange,networktarget-ing,andterritorialcontrolutilisingafarsmallerscale of force and involving far less directground combat. EBO enabled the direct tar-geting of Iraqs centre of gravityits leader-ship. US commanders also demonstrated thepossibilityofusingtheirasymmetricallysuperiormilitarycapabilityinameasured,tailoredman-nerinordertoorganiseIraqioptionsinsucha

wayastocognitivelyherdthemtowardthein-evitable

achievement

of

coalition

objectives.

26

Targeting the InternationalTerrorist Network

The series of terror attacks that have oc-curred in the aftermath of the Iraq War, how-ever, have been a sobering reminder that thecentral focus of the current war against terror-ismmustremainontheal-Qaedanetwork.Themost notable of these attacks included thebombings of the UN headquarters in Iraq inlate 2003 and the Madrid train station in early2004. From an EBO perspective, the chal-lenges of targeting not a national leader but aglobally dispersed network that is religiouslyand ideologically driven are profound.27

Al-Qaeda truly represents the next genera-tion of networkcentric adversaries, leveragingits own asymmetric advantage in employingitsownobjective-driven EBO.28Al-Qaedaisanenemythathidesintheculturalandpoliticalshadows of the world and strikes suddenly atthe economic, political, and cultural centres

of power of its enemy before fading back intothe shadows and quietly assessing the resultsin terms of its overall strategy.29 The difficul-ties in targeting such a foe are numerous.

From a defensive standpoint, the most pow-erful weapon available in the struggle to pre-

vent terrorist attacks themselves and dismantlethe networks behind them is intelligence.30Collaboration between intelligence agencies,


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26 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 2005local police, and security services around the

world is certainly the most effective approachto locating, monitoring, disrupting, and de-stroying localised al-Qaeda cells and radical

Islamic groups.31

But the success of such aneffort will always be limited to the tactical andoperationallevels.Inordertoeffectivelycounterterrorism at the strategic level, it is necessaryto target and disrupt the strategic guidanceprovidedbythepoliticalleadershipofal-Qaedato its dispersed and otherwise independentlyoperatingcells.32Theplanningandconductofan EBO such as the terrorist attack in Madrid,

where the intended strategic effect certainlyhad nothing to do with Spain itself but withthe attempt to undermine the coalition effort

in Iraq, require planners to know the inten-tions of al-Qaeda leadership.33The ability of al-Qaeda to communicate its

intent to operational-level leaders of the net-work must be the target of the intelligence-gathering effort, whether focusing on conven-tional communications, use of the Internet,audio- andvideotapesreleasedtothemediabyal-Qaeda leaders,oreven throughmorecreative means. However, as demonstratedby Israels battle against Palestinian terror-ists,noamountofintelligencegatheringorsecuritymeasurescantotallyprotectagainstterroristattack.Whatiscriticaltosuccessinthewar against terrorism is the capacity tominimisethestrategicimpactofanyterror-ist operation that might inevitably be suc-cessfullycompleted.34

Dividing the IslamicModerates and Extremists

The futility of trying to fight terrorism atthe tactical and operational levels leads to the

searchforasolutionatthestrategicorpoliticallevel. This is in fact implied by the effects-based concept itself. Furthermore, the neces-sity to target the collective minds of a broadsociety rather than just a limited network ofminds or the single mind of a particular leaderdemands awide-scale, long-term EBS cam-paign.35More so than in any other form of en-gagement with an adversary, the truism that

prevails is that one must truly know himselfand his adversary.36 Unfortunately, much of

what is said and written by leaders and com-mentators in the West seems to suggest that

the motivations of al-Qaeda specifically andthe root causes of radical Islamic terrorism ingeneral are not properly understood at all.Simple explanations such as they are evil orthey hate us indicate that the West does notunderstand its enemy.37

Thewar against terrorism is in factverymuchabattleagainstaspecificbreedofradicalIslamic militancy that has adopted a grandstrategy of seeking to spark a so-called clash ofcivilisations between the Islamic and non-Islamic worlds.38 The desire for this civilisa-tional clash seems to stem from the nexus be-tween the fundamentalist beliefs of WahhabiIslam and the religious Muslim ideology ofSalafism, whose followers yearn for a return tothe early medieval times during which Islamexperienced its golden age.39 Furthermore,andsettingasideanytendencytowardpoliticalcorrectness and religious sensitivity, the fact isthat there is, to a degree, real identification bya majority of the Muslim world, includingmoderates, with the motivations and religiousideology of al-Qaeda.40 In fact, it is this identi-fication that is the true source of strength andsupport for al-Qaeda and its associated terror-ist networks. Therefore, this is perhaps thestrategic centre of gravity of the current phe-nomenon of international terrorism, and it ishere that any EBS campaign must focus.

This understanding lies at the heart of thereferences made by many to the need for acounterterrorismstrategythataimstodraintheswampof the Islamicworldor towin[the]hearts and minds of secular and moderateMuslims.41Any EBS campaign aiming to winIslamic hearts and minds would be profoundly

complexandcannotpossiblybesuggestedherein any great detail, though it might be helpfulto broadly identify a possible target set.42

The Islamic madrassa, or religious school,in which young Muslims are indoctrinated

with fundamentalist and anti-Western beliefsand values, could be countered with alterna-tive education aid programs. The Arab media,particularly the al-Jazeera television network,


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EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONS AND COUNTERTERRORISM 27might be utilised as a communication medium

with the Arab streets, in an attempt to balanceor even counter the use of this platform byal-Qaeda itself.43An ongoing and widespread

public relations campaign could be attemptedtodiscreditterroristactionsandpresentcounter-terrorism actions in the most favourable con-text possible.

The power of images such as that of thetoppling of Saddam Husseins statue in Iraq,

which received insignificant coverage in theArab world, might be leveraged.44Effective ad-vertising campaigns might be devised and em-ployed in an attempt to shape popular Islamicopinion. The Arab diaspora could be engaged

withinWestern nations to form a culturalbridgebetweentheWestandtheIslamicworld.Overallthough,whatwillbevitalforsuccessisforalltheseoperationstobedesigned,launched,andmanagedaspartofanoverarching,coher-ent,andcoordinatedEBScampaign.

ConclusionThe EBS required to combat international

terrorism would echo the nature of the ColdWarandtheUSstrategyofcontainmentagainstthe Soviet Union, since the current war against

terror can be won only by recognising that it isan ideological and geopolitical struggle.45Thisstruggle must be fought with ideas and under-taken not just by the political leadership andthe military but also by all levels of govern-ment, including diplomatic, informational,economic, social, and cultural means.46 How-ever, while the United States is perhaps the

Notes1. US Joint Forces Command, Joint Forces Command

Glossary, http://www.jfcom.mil/about/glossary.htm.2. Gen Tommy R. Franks, USCENTCOM, Briefing

on Military Operations in Iraq, release no. 03-03-44, 22March2003,http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iraq/2003/iraq-030322-centcom03.htm.

3. Brig Gen David A. Deptula, Firing for Effects, AirForce Magazine84, no. 4 (April 2001): 4653.

4. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2020(Washington, DC: GPO, June 2000).

5. Paddy Turner, Mark Round, and Andrew Preece,Effects-BasedPlanningAUKResearchPerspective(paper

only nationwith the capacity to assume aleadership role in this geopolitical battleagainst the radical Islamists, it cannot lead theideological battle because it currently lacks

legitimacy in the Muslim world. This is espe-cially so because of US handling of the Pales-tinian issue and the close relationship betweenthe United States and Israel. It is also true forother Western nations in general. WidespreadMuslim distrust of America and the West willlikely be a severely limiting factor of any EBS.

Another challenge to overcome in the em-ployment of EBS is the political and adminis-trative cycle of the leadership of Western anddemocratic nations. The relatively short timeframes of these cycles may undermine theability to properly plan and implement anyEBS that will inherently need to be bipartisanandlong-terminnature.Ausefultoolmightbea national department or centre that can over-see the coordination of the multidisciplinaryand cross-departmental efforts necessary at alllevels of the state.

Exceptionallystrongleadershipandpsycho-logical resilience throughout society will cer-tainly be required so that when inevitable ter-ror attacks do occur, focus is maintained onlong-term strategic goals rather than on any

short-term reaction. The first response to anyterrorist attack must be to ask what the intentof the attack is and what reaction the terroristis trying to provoke. Any response that followsmust then be undertaken as part of an effects-based campaign whose goal it should be not

just to win the war against terror, but also toultimately win the peace. q

presented at 2004 Command and Control Research andTechnologySymposium,SanDiego,CA,1517June2004).

6. NickCook,Effects-Based AirOperations:CauseandEffect,JanesDefenceWeekly39,no.24(18June2003):59.7. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, bk. 1, On the Nature of

War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 87.

8. AlanStephens(lecture,GraduateStudiesinStrategyandDefence,AustralianNationalUniversity,Canberra,4May 2004).

9. Anthony H. Cordesman, The Iraq War: Strategy, Tac-tics, and Military Lessons, Significant Issues Series 25, no. 5(Washington, DC: CSIS Press, September 2003), 14965.


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28 AIR & SPACE POWER JOURNAL FALL 200510. Paul Adams, Shock and AweAn Inevitable

Victory, in The Battle for Iraq, BBC News Correspondents onthe War against Saddam andaNewWorldAgenda,Sara Beckand Malcolm Downing, eds. (London: BBC WorldwideLimited, 12 June 2003), 1056.

11. S. M. Rahman, Iraq War: Triumph or Tragedy?DefenceJournal7,no.1(August2003),http://www.defencejournal.com/2003-08/opi-c.htm (accessed 13 October2004).

12. Price T. Bingham,TransformingWarfarewithEffects-BasedJointOperations,AerospacePowerJournal15, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 5866.

13. AlanLevine,KnowingYourEnemy,TheWorldandI19, no. 4 (April 2004): 214.

14. Wendy H. Burkett, Assessing the Results of EBO: TheRelationship between Effects-Based Operations and the Psycho-logical Dimension of Warfare (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army

War College,7 April 2003), 17.15. Chiang H. Ren, Understanding and Managing

the Dynamics of Linked Crisis Events,Disaster Prevention

and Management: An International Journal9, no. 1 (Febru-ary 2000): 12.

16. Boaz Ganor, Terror as a Strategy of PsychologicalWarfare, International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism,15July 2002, http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=443.

17. Colin Gray, Thinking Asymmetrically in Times ofTerror, Parameters, Spring 2002, 514.

18. Maj Gen Yeshwant Deva, Psychological Aspects ofCombating Terrorism, Asian Journal on International Ter-rorism and Conflicts7, no. 22 (January 2004), http://www.stratmag.com/Aakrosh/ac72205.htm (accessed 9 August2004).

19. Ivan Eland, Are We Fighting a Real War on Ter-ror at All? Independent Institute, 4 February 2004, http://

www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=1259(accessed 11 October 2004).

20. Pres. George W. Bush, address to Joint Session ofCongress,20September2001,http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html.

21. DonaldRumsfeld,SECDEF(address,HouseArmedServices Committee, Washington, DC, 5 February 2003),http://www.house.gov/hasc/openingstatementsandpressreleases/108thcongress/03-02-05rumsfeld.html.

22. Linda D. Kozaryn, Myers Submits Annual Reportto Congress, American Forces Press Service, 15 August 2002.

23. Iain McNicoll, Effects-Based Operations: AirCommand and Control and the Nature of the EmergingBattlespace, RUSI Journal 148, no. 3 (June 2003): 38.

24. Bush Declares Victory in Iraq, BBC News, 2 May2003.

25. Douglas Jehl and Judith Miller, Draft Report Saidto Cite No Success in Iraq Arms Hunt, New York Times, 25September 2003, A1.

26. Merrick E. Krause, Decision Dominance: Exploit-ing Transformational Asymmetries, Defence Horizons, no.23 (February 2003): 18.

27. William M. Arkin, A New Mindset for Warfare,Washington Post, 22 September 2001, http://www.

washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A8672-2001Sep22.

28. David Hughes, Net-Centric Wars Focus ShouldBe Counter-Terrorism, Aviation Week and Space Technology157, no. 25 (16 December 2002): 55.

29. Chuck Spinney, Is America inside Its Own OODALoop in Afghanistan and Iraq? Defense and the National

Interest,no.

499

(29

October

2003),

http://d-n-i.net/

fcs/comments/c499.htm.

30. Sara Dayl, Fight Terrorism with Intelligence, NotMight, Christian Science Monitor, 26 December 2003, com-mentary.

31. BruceBerkowitz,IntelligencefortheHomeland,SAIS Review 24, no. 1 (Winter 2004): 16.

32. Foramoreexpansiveexplorationofthischallenge,see Williamson Murray, ed. Transformation Concepts for Na-tional Security in the 21st Century (Carlisle Barracks, PA:

Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2002).33. Norman Friedman, Information Warfare Can

Defeat Terrorists, United States Naval Institute Proceed-ings129, no. 4 (April 2003): 4.

34. Amnon Barzilai, Getting the Aftermath Right,

Haaretz, 23 April 2004, article no. 1088435.35. Marc Lynch, Taking Arabs Seriously,Foreign Af-

fairs82, no. 5 (September/October 2003): 81.36. See the seminal strategic-philosophical writings of

Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Lionel Giles (New York:Dover Publications, 2002).

37. Nicholas D. Kristof, Why Do They Hate Us? NewYork Times, 15 January 2002, sec. A21.

38. For a deeper analysis on the exact nature of sucha clash, see Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizationsand the Remaking of World Order(New York: Simon & Schus-ter, 1996).

39. John Hooper and Brian Whitaker, Salafi ViewsUniteTerrorSuspects,TheGuardian,26October2001,6.

40. Amir Taheri, Al-Qaedas Agenda for Iraq, NewYorkPost,4September2003,http://denbeste.nu/external/ Taheri01.html.

41. Michael J. Waller, Losing a Battle for Hearts andMinds, Insight on the News 18, no. 14 (April 2002): 18,http://www.insightmag.com/news/225520.html.

42. CIA Concerned US War on Terror Is MissingRoot Causes, AFP[Agence France-Presse], 29 October 2002,http://www.globalpolicy.org/wtc/terrorism/2002/1031 cia.htm.

43. Miranda Green, Washington Focuses on Propa-ganda War: The White House Is Trying to Make Its PR asSlick as Its Military in the Battle to Win Hearts and Minds,

Writes Miranda Green,Financial Times, 13 March 2002,sec. The Americas, 8.

44. Roger Howard, The Dangers of Warfare in aMedia Age, In the National Interest 2, no. 16 (23 April2003), http://www.inthenationalinterest.com/Articles/

Vol2Issue16/vol2issue16howard.html.45. Mark Trevelyan, Rumsfeld Heralds Shift to War

of Ideas on Terror, Reuters, 24 October 2003, http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2003/031024-terror-war.htm.

46. Goh Chok Tong, Singaporean prime minister(speech, Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC,6 May 2004), http://app.sprinter.gov.sg/data/pr/2004050603.htm.


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Editorial Abstract: Dr. da Rocha presentsa Brazilian perspective of the relation-ship between pragmatical analysis andeffects-based operations (EBO), showinghow the former encompasses the latterstypical features and provides insightsinto some aspects of EBO. He notes thatany set of connected purposive actions isa collective work and must be consideredfrom multiple standpoints. A successfulplanner must be aware of these differentframeworks and their interrelationships.

THE CONCEPT OF effects-based op-erations (EBO) is key for the USmilitary. Arguably, one can trace itsroots back to World War II, perhaps

even earlier.1 In a sense, this should not sur-prise us because planned actions, in war andelsewhere, are supposed to be rational andpurposiveand every rational, purposive ac-tionpurports a foreseeable effect.2 This com-ment, however, is not trivial. Even though pur-posive action is connected to its effects, manyquestionsariseregardinganactionstrueeffectand awareness of undesirable side effects thatcould accompany the desired effect. Perhapsthekeyissueliesindetermininganactionstrueeffect becauseas Lt Col Antulio J. EchevarriaII points outactions always have first- and

Effects-Based

OperationsA Military Application of

Pragmatical AnalysisDR. ALEXANDRESERGIO DAROCHA

secon

air & space power 2005

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