al-ghazali's 'mirror christology' and its possible east-syriac sources

8/20/2019 Al-Ghazali's 'Mirror Christology' and Its Possible East-Syriac Sources

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Al-Ghazalı ’s “Mirror Christology” and Its PossibleEast-Syriac Sourcesmuwo_1370 698..713

Alexander Treiger *Dalhousie University

Though the term Christology originates in the Christian tradition, it is notinappropriate to use it in Islamic Studies. The Qur’an, for instance, has its own

Christology, according to which “Christ Jesus son of Mary” (al-ması ¯h · ‘I sa ibn Maryam ) was a human being and a messenger, rasul (i.e. not God or son of God),miraculously born from Mary without a human father (Q. 19:19–22). He was “supported”by the “holy spirit” (Q. 2:87, 2:253, 5:110) and unique in that he was “God’s word whichHe cast upon Mary and a spirit from God” (Q. 4:171; cf. Q. 3:45). This last phrase ispossibly an allusion to the Judeo-Christian idea of the personified divine Wisdom, or“Word” (Heb. dabhar ; Gr. logos ; Jud.-Aram. me ¯ mra ; Syr. melltha ; Ar. kalima ), famously discussed in the prologue of the Gospel of John.1 Muslim exegetes, however, do notinterpret it to mean that the Word became incarnate, but that some special divine

message (risala ) and good tidings (bishara ) were conveyed to Mary, or alternatively thatlike other created beings, Jesus was brought into existence by the divine word “Be”(kun ).2 The Qur’an further argues — in a manner reminiscent of docetic teachings — thatit only appeared (shubbiha ) that Jesus was crucified; in reality, however, God raised himup to Himself (Q. 4:157–158).3

As is to be expected, the Christology of the famous Muslim scholar Abu H· amidal-Ghazal ı (d. 505/1111) largely follows this Qur’anic framework.4 However,

* I am grateful to Samuel Noble for numerous helpful discussions over the years, which have helpedshape my thinking on the issues discussed in this paper, and to Nikolai Seleznyov and Afifi al-Akiti forreading and criticizing earlier drafts of this article.1 It is a popular misconception that Logos theology is unique to Christianity and has no basis in the Jewish tradition. For a corrective see Daniel Boyarin, Border-Lines: The Partition of Judaeo-Christianity (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004).2 See, e.g., al-T· abarı’s commentary ad loc.3 For a revisionist reading of this verse see Gabriel S. Reynolds, “The Muslim Jesus: Dead or Alive?”Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 72/2 (2009): 237–258 and the wealth of Musliminterpretations of this verse surveyed and analyzed by Todd Lawson, The Crucifixion and the Qur ’an:A Study in the History of Muslim Thought (Oxford: Oneworld, 2009).4 Works by al-Ghazal ı are abbreviated as follows: Arba ‘ı n = Kitab al-Arba ‘ı n fı ¯ us

·ul al-dı n , ed. ‘ A.‘ A.

© 2011 Hartford Seminary.Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148USA.DOI: 10.1111/j.1478-1913.2011.01370.x

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al-Ghazalı ’s Christology has one unique, important, and hitherto insufficiently investi-gated feature, which has no basis in the Qur’an or, to the best of my knowledge, in theMuslim tradition of Qur’anic exegesis. Al-Ghazalı argues that divinity was reflected in

Christ’s heart as light is reflected in a polished mirror. Those who saw this reflectionerroneously thought that Christ was “united” with divinity (ittih · ad ) or that divinity “indwelled” him (h · ulul ), and hence called him God — this error thus became part of theChristian teaching. Al-Ghazal ı insists, by contrast, that no union or indwelling tookplace, but rather that this was a case of “reflection” of divinity in the mirror of Christ’sheart. I will call this unique theory “mirror Christology.” This paper will investigate theorigins of mirror Christology. I will argue that it is rooted in the East-Syriac (“Nestorian”)mysticism of the early Islamic period, particularly in the mysticism of the eighth-century charismatic monk John of Dalyatha.5

Al-Ghazal ı invokes mirror Christology in one very specific context: his criticism of the S· uf ıs al-H· usayn ibn Mans·ur al-H· allaj (executed 309/922) and Abu Yazıd (Bayaz ıd)al-Bist·amı (d. 234/848 or 261/875). Both mystics are famous for their controversial“ecstatic pronouncements” (shat ·ah · at ) which seem to identify them with God, such as “Iam the Real” (al-H· allaj) and “Glory be to Me” (al-Bist·amı).6 Al-Ghazal ı constantly accuses al-H· allaj and al-Bist·amı of claiming ittih · ad (union with God) or h · ulul (God’sindwelling them).7 In many of these passages, he compares their errors to those of the

‘Urwanı and M.B. al-Shaqfa (Damascus: Dar al-qalam, 1424/2003); Fad · a

’ih · = Fad · a

’ih · al-bat ·iniyya , ed.

‘ A. Badawı (Cairo, 1383/1964); Ih · ya ’ = Ih · ya ’ ‘ulum al-dı n (5 vols., Cairo: al-Maktaba al-Tawfıqiyya,n.d.); Jawahir = Jawahir al-Qur ’an , ed. Rashıd Rid· a al-Qabbanı (Beirut: Dar ih· ya’ al-‘ulum,1411/1990); Makatı b = Makatı b-e farsı -ye Ghazzalı be-nam-e Fad · a ’il al-anam min rasa ’il h · ujjat al-islam , ed. ‘ Abbas Eqbal (Tehran, 1333sh/1954); Maqs ·ad = al-Maqs ·ad al-asna fı sharh · ma ‘anı asma ’

Allah al-h · usna , ed. F.A. Shehadi (Beirut, 1971); Mi ‘raj = Mi ‘raj al-salikı n , in Majmu ‘at Rasa ’il al-Imam al-Ghazalı , ed. Ibrahım Amın Muh· ammad (Cairo: al-Maktaba al-Tawfıqı ya, n.d.), 50–99; Mishkat =al-Ghazalı, The Niche of Lights , ed. and tr. D. Buchman (Provo, UT: Brigham Young University Press,1998); Mı zan = Mı zan al- ‘amal , ed. S. Dunya (Cairo, 1964); Munqidh = al-Munqidh min al-d · alal , ed. J. S· alıba and K. ‘ Ayyad (Beirut, 71967) [the paragraph numbers follow R.J. McCarthy’s translation of thetext in his Freedom and Fulfillment: An Annotated Translation of al-Ghazalı ’s al-Munqidh min al-d· alal

and Other Relevant Works of al-Ghazalı (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1980)]. References to chaptersand subdivisions of each work are given where possible. All translations in this study are my own,unless otherwise indicated.5 On John of Dalyatha see Alexander Treiger, “Could Christ’s Humanity See His Divinity? AnEighth-Century Controversy between John of Dalyatha and Timothy I, Catholicos of the Church of theEast,” Journal of the Canadian Society for Syriac Studies 9 (2009): 3–21 with references to earlierpublications.6 Carl W. Ernst, Words of Ecstasy in Sufism (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985).7 Makatı b , 19:15–20 (German tr. Dorothea Krawulsky, Briefe und Reden des Abu H · amid Muh · ammad al-G ˙ azzalı (Freiburg im Breisgau: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1971), 91–92; English tr. Alexander Treiger,“Monism and Monotheism in al-Ghazal ı’s Mishkat al-anwar ,” Journal of Qur ’anic Studies 9/1 (2007):

1–27, here 6); Mishkat , Part 1, §§45–48 (English tr. Buchman, 17–18); Maqs ·ad , 139, 162–171; Fad · a ’ih · ,109–110; Munqidh , §96, 102:9–11 (al-H· allaj and al-Bist·amı are not explicitly mentioned); Jawahir , ch.

3, qism 2, 29 (al-H· allaj and al-Bist·amı are not explicitly mentioned); Mı zan , ch. 4, 207:7–14; Ih · ya ’, Book1, bab 3, bayan 2, lafz · 4, I:60:6–19; Ih · ya ’, Book 18, bab 2, maqam 2, II:411:13–25; Ih · ya ’, Book 30,

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Christians. Let us examine the passages where al-Ghazal ı compares al-H· allaj andal-Bist·amı to the Christians in more detail. There are at least six such passages. 8 Since, asfar as I know, they have never been presented together, I shall list and translate them all,

beginning with those that do not invoke mirror Christology and ending with those thatuse it.

[T1] There are many groups who believe in indwelling (h · ulul ), so the falsehood of theh · ululı approach (but ·lan madhhab al-h · ululı ya )isnotan a priori [intelligible] (d · arurı ).How can it be an a priori [intelligible] if there is a well known debate regarding thisquestion, which can hardly be hidden? Even a large group of the realizers of the truthamong the S· ufıs (t ·a ’ifa kabı ¯ra min muh · aqqiqı ¯ al-s ·ufı ya ) and some of the philoso-phers ( jama ‘a min al-falasifa ) inclined to it. It is to this that al-H· usayn ibn Mans·ural-H· allaj, crucified in Baghdad, alluded, when he said “I am the Real, I am the Real.”

bayan 2, III:556:6 ff.; Ih · ya , Book 36, bayan 3, IV:424:16–21; Mi ‘raj , mi ‘raj 4, 84–85. Some of thesepassages are translated below. Cf. Margaret Smith, al-Ghazalı the Mystic: A Study of the Life and Personality of Abu H · amid Muh · ammad al-T · usı al-Ghazalı , together with an account of his mystical teaching and an estimate of his place in the history of Islamic mysticism (London: Luzac & Co., 1944),115–116, 233–234; Hava Lazarus-Yafeh, Studies in al-Ghazzalı (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1975), 402–403n38;and for a general background L. Massignon and G.C. Anawati, art. “H · ulul ,” in EI 2, vol. 3, 570b–571b.8 A seventh passage occurs in Mi ‘raj , mi ‘raj 4, 85. The authenticity of this work is still open to doubt, yet it is undeniable that it contains much Ghazalian material. In addition, Afifi al-Akiti has kindly referred me to a somewhat similar passage in al-Radd al-jamı l li-ilahı yat ‘I sa bi-s ·arı h · al-injı l ,

attributed to al-Ghazal ı (ed. M.‘ A. al-Sharqawı, Cairo: Dar al-Hidaya, 1986, 140–141; English tr. Maha

El-Kaisy Friemuth, “Al-Radd al-Jamı ¯l : al-Ghazal ı’s or Pseudo-Ghazal ı ’s?” in The Bible in Arab Christianity , ed. David Thomas (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 275–294, here 291; the passage invokes al-H· allaj’sand al-Bist·amı’s shat ·ah · at ). The authenticity of al-Radd al-Jamı l is still open to question. The workevinces certain arguments and turns of phrase characteristic of al-Ghazal ı and, moreover, showsfamiliarity with both S· ufism and Avicennian philosophy in ways reminiscent of al-Ghazal ı’s authentic works. It also takes a substantially Ghazalian attitude to allegorical exegesis, insisting on the necessity of ta ’wı l where rational demonstration makes the literal sense of a scriptural term or passage untenable.However, the use of chapter divisions characteristic of thirteenth-century bilingual Copto-ArabicGospel manuscripts (Mark Beaumont, “Appropriating Christian Scriptures in a Muslim Refutation of Christianity: The Case of al-Radd al-jamı l attributed to al-Ghazal ı,” Islam and Christian-Muslim

Relations 22/1 (2011): 69–84, here 83n4) and the citation of the Coptic text of Jn. 1:14 make it extremely unlikely that the work was penned by al-Ghazal ı . (It is however to be noted that the version of theGospels used in both al-Radd al-jamı l and the bilingual Copto-Arabic manuscript Vat. copt. 9 — classified by Kachouh as belonging to “Family K” — is not translated from Coptic. It is a versionprobably translated from Syriac and corrected against the Greek Vorlage . See Hikmat Kachouh, The Arabic Versions of the Gospels: The Manuscripts and Their Families , PhD Dissertation (University of Birmingham, 2008), vol. 1, 35, 281–287.) In my view, the similarities between al-Radd al-jamı l andal-Ghazalı can easily be explained by the author’s familiarity with al-Ghazal ı ’s ideas. The work wasmost likely written by a Muslim Egyptian (possibly a convert from Christianity, as suggested by Lazarus-Yafeh, Studies , 475–476) who had some familiarity with Coptic and used a bilingualCopto-Arabic manuscript of the Gospels. His floruit must be placed in the twelfth century, as in the

thirteenth century al-Radd al-jamı l was already cited by the Copto-Arabic Christian polemicist Abul-Khayr ibn al-T· ayyib (who attributed the work to al-Ghazal ı). Incidentally, the twelfth century is alsothe time when the Arabic Gospel translation belonging to “Family K” first becomes popular among theChristians in Egypt (see Kachouh, The Arabic Versions of the Gospels , vol. 1, 286).

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During his crucifixion, he shouted “They neither killed him, nor crucified him, but itonly appeared to them” (Q. 4:157).9 Abu Yazı d al-Bist·amı also alluded to this when hesaid: “Glory be to Me! Glory be to Me! How great is My affair.” . . . How can it be denied

[without proof], when Christians take the same approach regarding the union of divinity with the humanity of Jesus, peace be upon him ( ittih · ad al-lahut bi-nasut ‘I ¯ sa ‘alay-hi l-salam ), so some of them called him “God,” others “Son of God,” and otherssaid he is “half-God” (nis · f al-ilah ). And they all agree that when he was killed, only hishumanity was killed, but not the divinity. How [can it be denied without proof], whensome of the Shı ‘ites ( jama ‘a min al-rawafid · ) imagined the same about ‘ Alı andbelieved that he was God.10

[T2] This is the felicity (sa ‘ada ) that occurs to man and draws him near to God, [near] notin space or distance, but in meaning and reality. Propriety requires that we hold fast thereins of explanation at this point, for this matter has caused a certain group of people

(t ·a ’ifa ) to go as far as to claim to have union [with God] which goes beyond nearness(ittih · ad wara ’ al-qurb ). One of them [i.e. al-Bist·amı] said: “Glory be to Me! How great

is My affair.” Another [i.e. al-H· allaj] said: “I am the Real.” Yet another expressed [this] by [God’s] indwelling [in him] (h · ulul ). Christians expressed [this] by union of divinity andhumanity (ittih · ad al-lahut wa-l-nasut ), so they believed concerning Jesus — God’sprayers be upon him — that he is “half-God” (nis · f Allah ). May God be greatly exaltedover and above what the transgressors claim.11

[T3] [The “correspondence,” munasaba , between God and man] is a point where one isrequired to hold fast the pen’s reins, for people are split over it into those who aredeficient (qas ·ir ), inclined to blatant anthropomorphism (tashbı ¯h z · ahir ), and those

who are extreme and go too far (ghalin musrif ), transgressing the limit of [what ismeant by] correspondence by [claiming actual] union and believing in indwelling. Oneof them [i.e. al-H· allaj] went as far as to say: “I am the Real.” Christians, too, erredregarding Jesus, peace be upon him, saying: “He is God.” Others among them said:“Humanity has put on divinity as a garment” (tadarra ‘a al-nasut bi-l-lahut ).12 Otherssaid: “[Humanity] became united with [divinity].” As for those to whom it has beendisclosed that anthropomorphism and similarity [between God and man] on the onehand, and union and indwelling on the other are equally impossible, and to whom inaddition the true meaning of this mystery has been revealed, they are exceedingly few.13

Though the above passages do not use mirror Christology, it seems likely that it lurks inthe background. This is evident from the fact that in [T2] and [T3] in particular, al-Ghazal ıstrikes an “esoteric” note, refraining from fully expounding the issue under discussion.One is justified in assuming that were he to expound the subject more fully, as he does

9 As we have seen above, in the Qur’an, this verse refers to Jesus. Al-H· allaj boldly applied it to himself.10 Fad · a ’ih · , 109:7–110:6.11 Mı zan , ch. 4, 207:5–14 (this passage is absent in the corresponding discussion in Ih · ya ’, Book 21,

bayan 4).12 Reading tadarra ‘a for tadharra ‘a . Cf. Jawahir , ch. 3, qism 2, 29:11: wa-qad tadarra ‘a bi-l-lahut nasutı .13 Ih · ya , Book 36, bayan 3, IV:424:16–21.





in the following three passages, he would likely invoke mirror Christology, as he doesthere. Let us now move to the passages in which the mirror image is explicitly mentionedand made use of.

[T4] [The heart] is analogous to a polished mirror (mir ’at majluwa ), for it has in itself nocolor, but receives the color of what is present in it.14 . . . This is one of the stations of the science of unveiling (maqam min maqamat ‘ulum al-mukashafa ), and it is fromhere that the false imagining sprang forth of him [i.e. al-H· allaj] who claimed [to have]indwelling and union (idda ‘a al-h · ulul wa-l-ittih · ad ), saying “I am the Real.” It is onthis point too that the Christian discourse hinges, when they claim that divinity “united” with humanity (ittih · ad al-lahut wa-l-nasut ), or “put it on” as a garment(tadarru ‘ bi-ha ), or “indwelled” it (h · ulul fı -ha ) — in all the various ways in which they expressed it. This is sheer error, similar to the error of a person who judges that a mirror

has the form of redness ( yah · kumu ‘

ala l-mir ’

at bi-s ·urat al-h · umra ), when the red colorof an object facing it appears in it.15

[T5] [When the form of the entire universe appears in the heart], the person whose heart itis might look at the heart and see its supreme beauty, and be astonished by it. In thisamazement (dahsha ) his tongue might hasten to say: “I am the Real.” If the [mystery]behind it does not get revealed to him, he becomes deceived by it (ightarra bi-hı ¯ ). . . . This is a point of confusion (mah · all iltibas ), because that which becomesmanifest (mutajallı ) may be easily confused with that in which it becomes manifest(mutajalla fı -hi ), as the color of what appears in a mirror may be confused with thatmirror, so that one might think it is the color of the mirror itself. 16 . . . It is in this way that Christians looked at Christ, saw that an illumination of God’s light had shone uponhim (ishraq nur Allah qad tala ’la ’a fı -hi ), and as a result erred concerning him[thinking that he is united with God], as a person who sees a star [reflected] in the mirroror in the water and stretches his hand out to take it, thinking that the star is actually in the mirror or in the water, but that person is deceived (maghrur ).17

[T6] When nothing but God’s sublimity and beauty ( jalal Allah wa-jamalu-hu ) indwells theheart, so it is immersed in Him [alone], it becomes as if (ka-anna ) it is He, not that itis He in reality. There is a difference between saying “as if it is He” and “it is He”[without “as if”]. . . . This is a stumbling block (mazallat qadam ).18 A person who is notfirmly grounded in intellectual matters may not distinguish between the two. So he may see the perfection of his own essence (kamal dhati-hı ), which is due to the plain truththat has shone therein (ma tala ’la ’a fı -hi min jalı yat 19 al-h · aqq ) adorning it, and may

14 Here al-Ghazalı quotes one of his favorite poems, by al-S· ah· ib ibn al-‘ Abbad (d. 385/995): raqqa l-zujaju wa-raqqati (or: raqati ) l-khamrû / fa-tashabaha fa-tashakala l-amrû // fa-ka-annama khamrun wa-la qadh · un / wa-ka-annama qadh · un wa-la khamrû . Cf. Ih · ya ’, Book 2, fas ·l 4, mas ’ala 2,I:187; Maqs ·ad , 167 (shortly after [T6]); Mishkat , Part 1, §§45–48, 17–18; Mi ‘raj , mi ‘raj 4, 85; and n. 16below.15 Ih · ya ’, Book 18, bab 2, maqam 2, II:411:16–25.16 Here again the same two verses by al-S· ah· ib ibn al-‘ Abbad are quoted.17

Ih · ya ’, Book 30, bayan 2, III:556:6–15.18 On this expression in al-Ghazal ı see Lazarus-Yafeh, Studies , 137–139.

19 Reading jalı ya instead of h · ilya . Cf. Ih · ya ’, Book 1, bab 2, bayan 2, I:38:9. For this expression cf. jalı yat al-H · aqq al-awwal in Avicenna, al-Isharat wa-l-tanbı hat , ed. S. Dunya, 4 vols. (Cairo, 1960–1968),

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think that it is He and say “I am the Real.” He makes the same mistake as the Christians, who saw this in the essence of Christ Jesus, peace be upon him, and said “He is God.”Indeed, he makes the same mistake as a person who, looking at a mirror in which a

colored form is impressed, is deceived by it and thinks that this form is the form of themirror and that the color is the color of the mirror. Nothing of the sort (hayhat )!20

As evidenced from these passages, the mirror image provides al-Ghazal ı with a powerfulconceptual tool to rebut the erroneous notions of h · ulul and ittih · ad , ascribed by him toboth the Christians and the ecstatic S· ufıs (as well as to certain other groups). Al-Ghazalıbelieves that both the correct Christology and the correct, for lack of a better term,“waliology” (from the Arabic term walı ¯ , a S· ufı saint)21 is the one based on the mirrorimage. There is, in al-Ghazal ı’s view, a complete isomorphism between the experiencesof Christ on the one hand and those of al-H· allaj and al-Bist·amı on the other, between

Christology and waliology. In both cases, divinity was reflected in the mirror of theirhearts (al-Ghazal ı calls this state “extinction in tawh · ı d ,” al-fana ’ fı al-tawh · ı d )22 and inboth cases, too, this reflection was misconstrued as a case of union or indwelling. Theonly difference is that in the case of Christ, this misconstrual is due to his followers, theChristians, while in the case of al-H· allaj and al-Bist·amı , it is their own mistake. Al-Ghazal ı argues that both the Christians and the ecstatic S· ufıs fail to understand thedifference between a mere “reflection” of divinity in the human heart on the one handand a “union” between the two on the other (the latter being impossible). It is thisconfusion (iltibas ) that leads, in the Christian case, to erroneous beliefs regarding Jesus,

and in the S· uf ı case, to heretical ecstatic pronouncements (shat ·ah · at ).Significantly, al-Ghazalı does not question al-H· allaj’s and al-Bist·amı’s mystical

experience — in his view, their experience was valid, and indeed identical to theexperience of Jesus. He takes issue only with their interpretation of this experience. Al-Ghazal ı ’s position is, thus, a partial defense of al-H· allaj and al-Bist·amı insofar as heconcedes that they did have a powerful and authentic experience which easily lendsitself — if one is not firmly grounded in intellectual matters — to being misinterpretedas union or indwelling.

It may now be recalled that the terms “union” and “indwelling” are derived from the

Christian tradition, more specifically from East-Syriac Christianity as mediated by Muslim-Christian polemic. “Union” (ittih · ad , Syr. h · dhayutha , Gr. henosis ) is one of the

namat · 8, fas ·l 9, IV:22:1–3: wa-kamal al-jawhar al- ‘aqil an tatamaththala fı -hi jalı ¯yat al-H · aqq al-awwal qadra ma yumkinu-hu an yanala min-hu ; also IV:25:3–4.20 Maqs ·ad , 166:4–15. On this Ghazalian hayhat see Lazarus-Yafeh, Studies , 124–129.21 The term walı (pl. awliya ’) is especially common among the S· uf ıs who often considered themselvesas awliya ’. On the development of this idea see the useful summary of B. Radtke, art. “Walı (1. generalsurvey),” in EI 2, vol. 11, 109b–112a, which however makes no reference to al-Ghazal ı’s views on thesubject.22

Ih · ya ’, Book 35, shat ·r 1, bayan 2, IV:342:10–11; IV:344:6 (in the latter occurrence, the expression“extinction in tawh · ı d ” is, significantly, put in the mouth of al-H· allaj, while al-Ghazalı gives it the sense

of the fourth level of tawh · ı d : seeing nothing but God in existence); Arba ‘ı n , Part 2, ch. 6, 70–71;Mishkat , Part 1, §48, 18; Makatı b , 18:21–22 (German tr. Krawulsky, Briefe und Reden , 90).





terms that signify Incarnation, for instance in the title of the seventh-century East-Syriacscholar Babai the Great’s Christological treatise Kthabha da-h · dhayutha , Liber de Unione . The ninth-century Muslim polemicist Abu ‘Isa al-Warraq — whose refutation of

Christianity will be discussed shortly — habitually employs the term ittih · ad to designatethe Christian notion of the Incarnation.23 This term is also used in Christian Arabicliterature (alongside ta ’annus , tajassud , and other terms).24 Likewise, “indwelling”(h · ulul ) reflects the Greek Christological term enoike ¯ sis , as used for instance by Theodore of Mopsuestia, one of the Greek Church Fathers most revered by theEast-Syriac tradition.25 When Muslim heresiographers apply the terms “union” and“indwelling” to such groups as the H· allaj ıya (the followers of al-H· allaj), they are surely drawing on earlier usages in Muslim-Christian polemic (and ultimately, though indi-rectly, on East-Syriac Christian usage). This has been recognized by Hellmut Ritter:

Perhaps one had become familiar with the term h · ulul = enoike ¯ sis from theChristians and then applied it to all people who advocated some form of doctrines,or had customs, which recalled the doctrine of Christ’s divine nature inhabiting ahuman nature or who, like H· allaj, actually adopted Christian terms (nasut -lahut ).26

It is thus quite likely that al-Ghazalı too derives the terms “union” and “indwelling” fromMuslim-Christian polemic and applies them to al-H· allaj and al-Bist·amı. This hypothesisfinds confirmation in arguably the most important early (ninth century) Muslimpolemical treatise against Christianity: Abu ‘Isa al-Warraq’s The Refutation of the Three

Christian Sects (al-Radd ‘ala l-thalath firaq min al-Nas ·ara ). There we find the followingsignificant passage that describes various Christian understandings of the “mechanism”

of the Incarnation.

[T7] All [Christians] agree that the union [of the divine and the human, i.e. the Incarnation]is an action that occurred in time ( fi ‘l h · adith ) by which the Christ became Christ. They disagree however on what this action was, on the way in which it occurred, and onhow the two became one. Some argue that the Word united ( ittah · ada ) with that manby way of mixing and mingling with him (‘ala t ·arı q al-imtizaj wa-l-ikhtilat · min-ha bi-hı ¯ ). Others say that [the Word] took him as a tabernacle and a dwelling

23 David Thomas, Early Muslim Polemic against Christianity: Abu ‘I sa al-Warraq’s “Against the Incarnation” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), §10, 86–89.24 For instance, in the title of the eleventh-century Melkite scholar ‘ Abdallah ibn al-Fad· l’s unpublished work Challenges and Responses on theTrinity and the Incarnation (Masa ’il wa-ajwiba h · awl al-Tathlı ¯th wa-l-Ittih · ad ). See Alexander Treiger, “ ‘ Abdallah ibn al-Fad· l al-Ant·akı,” in Christian-Muslim Relations:A Bibliographical History , eds. David Thomas et al., vol. 3 (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 89–113, here 109–111.25 On the equivalence h · ulul = enoike ¯ sis see Hellmut Ritter, The Ocean of the Soul: Man, the World and God in the Stories of Farı d al-Dı n ‘At ·t ·ar (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2003), 463–464. On the use of enoike ¯ sis by Theodore of Mopsuestia see J.N.D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines (San Francisco: Harper

& Row, 1978), 305; Till Jansen, Theodor von Mopsuestia, De Incarnatione: Überlieferung und Christologie der griechischen und lateinischen Fragmente einschliesslich Textausgabe (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2009), 180–186.26 Ritter, Ocean , 470–471.

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(ittakhadhat-hu haykalan wa-mah · allan ). Others say that [the Word] put on [a human]body as a garment (iddara ‘a al-jasad iddira ‘an ).27

Several rival theories are put forward in this passage: union of divinity and humanity (ittih · ad ), indwelling (h · ulul , literally: taking humanity “as a tabernacle and a dwelling”),and putting on a garment (iddira ‘). The latter expression surely underlies al-Ghazal ı’sterm tadarru ‘ in [T3] and [T4] — a clear sign that al-Ghazal ı was familiar either with thispassage itself or at the very least with the Muslim polemical tradition dependent on it. 28

Ultimately, the term iddira ‘/tadarru ‘ also goes back to East-Syriac Christology: it is used,for instance, by the ninth-century Arabic-writing East-Syriac theologian ‘ Ammar al-Bas·rı,an older contemporary of al-Warraq, with whose works al-Warraq was surely familiar.29

Abu ‘Isa al-Warraq continues recounting the various Christian interpretations of theIncarnation as follows. (The italicized passage will form the basis of our discussion.)

[T8] Others say that [the Word] appeared in [the human body] the way an imprint of a sealappears in impressed clay, not in the sense that the seal’s imprint actually left [the seal]and came to dwell in clay, for the imprint does not mix with [clay], nor does it moveaway from its place. Others say that this did not happen in any of these ways. Rather it happened in the sense that the Word appeared in that body as a person’s image appears in a clean, polished mirror ( fı l-mir’at al-majluwa al-naq ıya ) and that person’s face becomes visible therein. It is in this way rather than in any other that they believe the union [i.e. the Incarnation] occurred.30

Here a rather unexpected surprise awaits us: al-Warraq explicitly mentions “mirrorChristology.” Even more importantly, unlike al-Ghazal ı, who employs it as a tool to rebutthe notions of h · ulul and ittih · ad , al-Warraq ascribes mirror Christology, instead, to a groupof Christians, who themselves, it seems, are somewhat critical of their coreligionists’understanding of the Incarnation as h · ulul and ittih · ad (this point will become importantlater on). Moreover, in a later section of his book, al-Warraq subjects mirror Christology tothe same scathing criticism with which he rejects all other Christian interpretations of theIncarnation.31 Later Muslim polemicists who were dependent on al-Warraq, such as theMu‘tazilite ‘ Abd al-Jabbar (d. 415/1025) in his Mughnı ¯ and the Ash‘arite al-Baqillanı(d. 403/1013) in his Tamhı ¯d , offered similar criticisms of mirror Christology.32 What is

27 Thomas, Early Muslim Polemic against Christianity , §11, 88 (my translation).28 As shown by David Thomas, both the Mu‘tazilite ‘ Abd al-Jabbar (d. 415/1025) in his Mughnı and the Ash‘arite al-Baqillanı (d. 403/1013) in his Tamhı d used al-Warraq’s passage. See Thomas, Early Muslim Polemic against Christianity , 77–82 and 295n5. On ‘ Abd al-Jabbar’s use of al-Warraq see also GabrielS. Reynolds, A Muslim Theologian in the Sectarian Milieu: ‘Abd al-Jabbar and the Critique of Christian Origins (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2004), 35–38.29

‘ Ammar al-Bas·rı , Kitab al-Burhan wa-Kitab al-masa ’il wa-l-ajwiba , ed. M. al-H· ayik (Beirut: Daral-Mashriq, 1977), Introduction, 41.30

Thomas, Early Muslim Polemic against Christianity , §11, 88 (my translation).31 Thomas, Early Muslim Polemic against Christianity , §165, 109 and §§ 220–229, 165–181.32 David Thomas, Christian Doctrines in Islamic Theology (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 133, 173, 175, 214, 235,327–331. The mirror image for the Incarnation is also used in a similar context by al-Maqdisı , al-Bad ’





truly striking is that rather than criticize mirror Christology, as al-Warraq and other Muslimpolemicists had done before him, al-Ghazal ı instead rehabilitated and wholeheartedly accepted it! As argued above, he adopted the “mirror model” of the relationship between

the divine and the human in Christ as the correct one: this is in fact his own Christology.Moreover, as we have seen, he adopted the same model in “waliology” as well, to partially exonerate the “ecstatic S· ufıs” al-H· allaj and al-Bist·amı.

Al-Warraq’s testimony thus reveals, rather surprisingly, that this mirror model,favored by al-Ghazal ı in both Christology and waliology, is ultimately of Christianprovenance. Though no doubt aware of its Christian origins, al-Ghazalı nevertheless didnot hesitate to adopt it.33 This is in line with his general approach that as an expertreligious scholar endowed with “insight” (bas ·ı ra ), he is entitled to borrow doctrines which he deems to be true, even if they occur in non-“orthodox” (e.g. philosophical) or

non-Muslim (e.g. Christian) sources.34 He did not take mirror Christology, however,directly from Christian sources, but from the Muslim polemical tradition: eitheral-Warraq’s Refutation or a later source dependent on the latter, such as ‘ Abd al-Jabbar’s

wa-l-tarı kh , ch. 12, ed. C. Huart (Paris, 1899–1919), IV:45:6 (French tr. IV:43) and by Abu Bakr al-Furakı(d. 1094, the grandson of the famous theologian Ibn Furak) in his hitherto unpublished al-Niz · amı (MS Ayasofya 2378; cited by Ritter, Ocean , 464, who mistakenly ascribes the text to Ibn Furak). For reasonsunknown to me, al-Furakı seems to attribute mirror Christology to the Melkites.33 I am certainly aware that the mirror image was also present in different contexts in other theological,

mystical, and philosophical works available to and used by al-Ghazal ı. Avicenna’s use of it in his Risala fı l-Kalam ‘ala l-nafs al-nat ·iqa in Ah · wal al-nafs , ed. A.F. al-Ahwanı (Cairo, 1371/1952), 196; English tr.Dimitri Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition: Introduction to Reading Avicenna’s Philosophi- cal Works (Leiden and New York: Brill, 1988), 74–75 is certainly another important model on whichal-Ghazalı drew. Avicenna’s influence would be perhaps sufficient to explain al-Ghazal ı ’s mirror“waliology.” Yet the fact that al-Ghazal ı also uses the mirror image as the backbone of his Christology (Christology not being mentioned by Avicenna in this context) and, moreover, the textual correspon-dences between al-Ghazal ı and al-Warraq make it virtually certain that al-Ghazal ı also drew onal-Warraq’s (or one of his followers’) analysis of the Incarnation, and was thus certainly aware of the factthat mirror Christology was employed by some Christians.34 In one of his Persian letters (Makatı b , 21–22; German tr. Krawulsky, Briefe und Reden , 95–96),

al-Ghazalı responds to the allegation that his idea that “human spirit (ruh · -e adamı ) is a stranger(gharı ¯b ) in this world” is the “teaching of the philosophers and the Christians (sokhan-e falasefe o nas ·ara ).” Al-Ghazalı begins his response by pointing out that the fact that Christians hold a certain ideadoes not, in and of itself, make the idea false. Al-Ghazal ı’s example is the Christian teaching that “thereis no god, but God, and Jesus is the spirit of God.” Al-Ghazalı counsels his addressee to follow the adviceof ‘ Alı : “Do not judge the truth by men; rather cognize the truth [first], and you will know its adherents.”Cf. also Munqidh , §§52–53, 81–82. For an analysis of the similarity between the Persian letter and theMunqidh see Kenneth Garden, al-Ghazalı ’s Contested Revival: “Ih · ya ’ ‘Ulum al-dı n” and Its Critics in Khorasan and the Maghrib , PhD Dissertation (University of Chicago, 2005), 105–106, esp. 106n69. Seealso al-Akiti’s remarks on the “ ‘ Alı maxim” as a uniquely Ghazalian topos, with a translation of anotherimportant passage from the Ih · ya ’ (Book 1, bab 5, bayan 1, waz · ı fa 7 of the student, I:83–84): Afifi

al-Akiti, “The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly of Falsafa : al-Ghazal ı’s Mad · nun , Tahafut ,and Maqas ·id ,withParticular Attention to their Falsafı ¯ Treatments of God’s Knowledge of Temporal Events,” in Avicenna and His Legacy: A Golden Age of Science and Philosophy , ed. Y.T. Langermann (Turnhout: Brepols,2009), 51–100, here 59–60 (I am grateful to Afifi al-Akiti for this reference).

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Mughnı ¯ or Baqillanı’s Tamhı ¯d . It is clearly from this tradition too that he borrowed hisexamples of “false” Christologies: union-Christology (ittih · ad ), indwelling-Christology (h

·

ulul ), and garment-Christology (iddira ‘ / tadarru ‘), all of which he rejects.

At this point in our inquiry, it should be noted that mirror Christology is surely not themost conventional Christian understanding of the Incarnation. In his rebuttal of al-Warraq’sRefutation , the tenth-century Jacobite scholar and philosopher Yah· ya ibn ‘ Adı (d. 363/974) — a Christian pupil of al-Farab ı — even flatly denies that Christians ever held such adoctrine.35 So who are these mysterious “mirror Christians” alluded to by al-Warraq? Inhis Refutation , al-Warraq gives us, unfortunately, no clue to their identity. Yet it is highly unlikely that he simply “invented” this group — his information about Christianity andChristian sectarian and ideological divisions is elsewhere extraordinarily precise.

To the best of my knowledge, this question has never been raised, let alone

answered. I would like to offer a suggestion which, though not entirely certain, seemsto me quite plausible in light of what we know about Middle Eastern Christianity in theearly Islamic period. I believe the “mirror Christians” alluded to by al-Warraq areEast-Syriac (“Nestorian”) Christian mystics, such as the charismatic monk John of Dalyatha (second half of the eighth century). John of Dalyatha himself does not actually espouse mirror Christology. As we shall see below, he has what we have dubbed “mirror waliology” — a theory of sainthood that is based on the mirror image. This “mirror waliology” could have developed into a mirror Christology among his followers in theninth century, who were in regular contacts and dialogue with Muslims (possibly even

with al-Warraq himself ). This is probably how mirror Christology came to be attested inal-Warraq’s survey of the Christian views on the Incarnation.

The case of John of Dalyatha, known in the Christian Arabic tradition as “the SpiritualElder” (al-shaykh al-ruh · anı ), is intriguing.36 He was anathematized, in the year170/786–87, by a council of the Church of the East, convened by the Catholicos Timothy I (catholicos 780–823).37 One of the main grounds for his condemnation was his belief

35 Abu ‘Isa al-Warraq, Yah· ya ibn ‘ Adı , De l’Incarnation , ed. and tr. E. Platti (CSCO , vol. 490–491/

Scriptores Arabici, vol. 46–47, Louvain: Peeters, 1987), §79, 93:9–14 [text], 80:23–33 [French translation].Ironically, in his own treatise On the Necessity of the Incarnation (Fı wujub al-ta ’annus ) Yah· ya ibn ‘ Adıhimself resorts to the mirror image in a sense somewhat similar to the one suggested by al-Warraq,possibly under the latter’s influence. See Samir Khalil Samir, “Le traité sur la nécessité de l’Incarnationde Yah· ya Ibn ‘ Adı , résumé et glosé par al-S· afı Ibn al-‘ Assal,” Studia Orientalia Christiana , Collectanea,18 ( Jerusalem, 1985), 1–29, here §§19–21, 14 (I am grateful to Father Samir and Father Nagi Edelby forkindly providing this reference). Is Yah· ya ibn ‘ Adı ’s denial that Christians ever used this image simply a polemical ploy or did he perhaps start using the mirror image more extensively after readingal-Warraq’s critique? This subject requires a separate investigation.36 Though John of Dalyatha wrote in Syriac, his works were subsequently (at an unknown date)translated into Arabic. For the following discussion see Treiger, “Could Christ’s Humanity See His

Divinity.”37 On Timothy I see now Vittorio Berti, Vita e studi di Timoteo I, 823, patriarca cristiano di Baghdad:ricerche sull ’epistolario e sulle fonti contigue (Paris: Association pour l’avancement des étudesiraniennes, 2009).





that “our Lord’s humanity could see His divinity” (h · azya ( ’ )nashuthe ¯ h d-maran l-alahuthe h ).38 It is significant that this accusation is formulated in terms of therelationship between Christ’s humanity and divinity (( ’ )nashutha and alahutha ) — the

Syriac words which correspond precisely to the Arabic terms nasut and lahut ,repeatedly used by al-Ghazal ı ([T1], [T2], [T3], and [T4]).

In the language of “Nestorian” Christology, “our Lord’s humanity” equals the humanindividual Jesus. The “Nestorian” Church of the East, to which John of Dalyathabelonged, was unique in that it understood Christ as a unified, yet complex “person”( pars ·opa ): an otherwise ordinary human individual Jesus, conjoined, from the momentof his conception, with God’s eternal Word. In this conjunction, neither the humanindividual Jesus had any divine qualities (as a human being, he was essentially nodifferent from any other human individual), nor God’s Word had gained any human

qualities: the former remained created and mortal, the latter, uncreated and immortal.The sharp distinction between the divine and the human was safeguarded in thisconjunction.

John of Dalyatha’s claim, for which he was condemned by the ecclesiasticalauthorities of the Church of the East, was thus that this human individual Jesus could seeGod.39 In the following passage, John of Dalyatha defends this position. He attacks hisopponents, who denied the possibility of such a vision, and calls them “immersed inblindness” and “misguided.” Among those misguided he, presumably, includes theCatholicos Timothy I himself.

[T9] Since, therefore, [Christ, including both His divinity and His humanity]40 is the Father’sintelligence (hawne ¯ h ) and knowledge (ı dha ‘the ¯ h ), and it is through His knowledgethat the Father is seen and known [both] to Him and to us all,41 what shall we say tothose immersed in blindness who rave and say that the human nature taken from us[i.e. Christ’s human nature, the human individual Jesus] does not see the nature of Him who took it and united it to Himself [i.e. the divine nature]. No, let us leave these

38 J.-B. Chabot, “Livre de la Chasteté, composé par Jésusdenah, Évêque de Baçrah,” Mélanges d ’archéologie et d ’histoire ecclesiastiques 16 (1896): 1–79, 225–291, here 67:4–7 (reading h · azya for

h · adhya ). The belief that “our Lord’s humanity could see His divinity” is a key “messalian” tenet, borneout also by other sources contemporary with John of Dalyatha. On the messalian background of Johnof Dalyatha’s views see below; and cf. Treiger, “Could Christ’s Humanity See His Divinity,” 10–11.39 The reasons why this seemed objectionable to the authorities of the Church of the East are wellexplained by the eleventh-century Nestorian theologian Ilıya bar Shennaya, metropolitan of Nisibis(d. 1046). See his Arabic work Book of the Sessions (Kitab al-Majalis ): Samir Khalil Samir, “Entretiend’Élie de Nisibe avec le vizir Ibn ‘ Alı al-Magribı, sur l’unité et la trinité,” Islamochristiana 5 (1979):31–117, here 114–115. For an English translation of the relevant passage see Treiger, “Could Christ’sHumanity See His Divinity,” 6–7. On Ilıya bar Shennaya see Samir Khalil Samir, Foi et culture en Irak au XI e siècle: Élie de Nisibe et l’Islam (London and Bookfield, VT: Variorum, 1996).40 This is explained in the immediately preceding section of the text (§5), not quoted here. For a French

translation of that section see Robert Beulay, L’enseignement spirituel de Jean de Dalyatha, mystique syro-oriental du VIIIe siècle (Paris: Beauchesne, 1990), 512.41 Reading h · ze ¯ w-ı dhı ¯ ‘ (“is seen and known”) for h · aze w-yadha ‘ (“sees and knows”), as suggested inTreiger, “Could Christ’s Humanity See His Divinity,” 8–9 and 19n50.

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misguided and stick to our subject, which is full of life. You have now understood thatthe Father’s knowledge is called Son.42

Even more importantly, John of Dalyatha argued that every human being could seeGod.43 Indeed, according to John of Dalyatha, it was the ultimate goal of human life toattain the vision of God. The locus of this human vision of God is, according to him, thehuman soul (or mind), described as a mirror . There are several passages in his works, where John of Dalyatha describes the vision of God by a human being (not specifically Jesus, but the visionary in general) in the mirror of the soul. Three of them can be citedhere.

[T10] Blessed is the soul that knows itself to be a mirror (mah · zı tha ), and gazing intently onit sees the brightness of the One who is hidden from all. He who said on Mount [Sinai]:

“No one may see Me and live” (Ex. 33:20), is seen in this place [i.e. in the mirror of thesoul]. And those who see Him live forever.44

[T11] By means of their diligence, He is revealed then to the few who gaze intently withinthemselves: those who make of themselves a mirror (mah · zı tha ) in which theInvisible [God] is seen. Because by Him they are drawn through ineffable rays of Hisamazing beauty which are offered to them within themselves, as God the Wordtestifies: “Blessed are the pure, for they shall see God” (Mt. 5:8) in their heart.45

[T12] The mind (hawna ) which seeks God in itself, its substance (qnome h ) becomes amirror (mah · zı tha ) in which God becomes visible to it. Glory be to Him Who revealsHis glory in the mind which is eager for the vision of Him, so that He becomes visible

to it for its great rejoicing! For He does not come to it from elsewhere to become visible, but He was [always] hidden and concealed in it. So when He sees that it toilsand is worn out searching for Him and that it is ever thinking of Him and athirst forthe vision of Him, He makes His glorious beauty to appear in it which was hidden in

42 John of Dalyatha, Homily 25 (“On Contemplation of the Holy Trinity”), Vat. syr. 124, fol. 332v–333r;cf. Beulay’s French translation, L’enseignement spirituel , 512–513.43 Since, on the “Nestorian” view, Jesus was, essentially, an ordinary human being (his conjunction withthe Word notwithstanding), Christology and “waliology” tended to be isomorphic: thus, if the vision of

God was accessible to Jesus, as John of Dalyatha insisted, it must also be accessible to other humanbeings, and the reverse. This isomorphism has been pointed out by Robert Beulay, “Jean de Dalyathaet sa Lettre XV,” Parole de l’Orient 2 (1971): 261–279, here 265–266n12: “La question théologique de la vision de la divinité par l’humanité de Notre Seigneur ou par l’esprit créé du contemplatif est, au fond,le même problème, et Jean de Dalyatha fait lui-même le rapprochement entre les deux cas dansl’Homélie que nous citons.”44 John of Dalyatha, The Letters of John of Dalyatha , tr. Mary T. Hansbury (Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias,2006), Letter 7 , §3, 40 (Hansbury’s translation with slight modifications).45 John of Dalyatha, Letters , Letter 14 , §2, 68 (Hansbury’s translation with slight modifications). SebastianBrock has noticed that here John of Dalyatha “subtly alters the wording” of the beatitude, whichoriginally reads: “Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God” (Mt. 5:8). In John of Dalyatha,

the text is rephrased to say: “Blessed are the pure, for they shall see God in their heart.” See S. Brock,“The Imagery of the Spiritual Mirror in Syriac Literature,” Journal of the Canadian Society for Syriac Studies 5 (2005): 3–17, here 14b; cf. 17b, n. 34, where Brock notes that in another letter ( Letter 39 , §1)“John does much the same, though there he adds, rather than substitutes, ‘in their hearts’.”





it, and comforts it. This is the one who has found the Kingdom which was concealed within him (cf. Lk. 17:21).46

To summarize, in John of Dalyatha we have, first, “mirror waliology,” the idea that saintssee God in the mirror of their hearts, and second, the emphatic affirmation that this same vision of God was also available to the human individual Jesus. It is a very small stepfrom here to a full-fledged “mirror Christology”: the belief that the “union” betweendivinity and humanity in Christ is nothing more than this very vision of God, granted tothe human individual Jesus in the mirror of his heart. Redefining the Incarnation as Jesus’ vision of God — available, in principle, to every human being — nullifies the uniquenessof Jesus and, therefore, provides a Christology fully acceptable to a Muslim theologiansuch as al-Ghazal ı.47

It is this “Muslim-friendly” Christology that is ascribed by the Mu‘tazilı authoral-Nashi’ al-Akbar (d. 293/906) to a group of Christians, called “messalians.” Messalian-ism (from the Syriac word ms ·allyane , “those who pray”) was, originally, an amorphousfourth and fifth-century charismatic tendency in Syriac asceticism that put emphasis onprayer and was accused of denying the Church hierarchy and the efficacy of thesacraments. However, in the eighth and ninth-century Church of the East, the tag“messalians” applied specifically to the wayward monastic thinkers who supported theidea of a human vision of God, i.e. to John of Dalyatha and his followers.48 It is obviously to this eighth and ninth-century “messalianism” that al-Nashi’ al-Akbar refers in thefollowing passage.

[T13] Another49 group of Mesallians (al-mus ·allyanı ya ) said: Christ’s humanity (nasut al-ması ¯h · ) contemplated [his] divinity and knew it ( yanz · uru ila l-lahut wa-ya ‘lamu-hu ). They refused to say: “Christ is God incarnate,” but rather claimed he was human and was not God, great and mighty.50

46 John of Dalyatha, Letters , Letter 50 , §19, 242 (Hansbury’s translation with slight modifications).47 As long as, of course, that Muslim theologian is willing to accept the possibility of a human vision of God, which was a controversial subject in Muslim theology. See A.K. Tuft, “The ru ’ ya [sic !] Controversy and the Interpretation of Qur’an Verse VII (al-A ‘raf ): 143,” Hamdard Islamicus 6 (1983): 3–41, based

on the same author’s unpublished PhD dissertation, The Origins and Development of the Controversy over “Ru ’ ya” in Medieval Islam and Its Relation to Contemporary Visual Theory (University of California, Los Angeles, 1979); D. Gimaret, art. “Ru ’ yat Allah ,” in EI 2, vol. 8, 649a–b with additionalbibliography.48 Treiger, “Could Christ’s Humanity See His Divinity,” 10–11.49 Before that al-Nashi’ al-Akbar seems to refer to the “original” fourth and fifth-century messalians.Hence the earlier part of his account is disregarded here.50 Al-Nashi’ al-Akbar, §13 in Thomas, Christian Doctrines in Islamic Theology , 46–47 (I owe thisimportant reference to Samuel Noble; the translation is my own). Thomas seems to be unaware that thispassage refers to the eighth-century messalians (i.e. the circle of John of Dalyatha) as opposed to the“original” (fourth and fifth-century) messalians. An interesting report about the messalians is also

preserved by al-Shahrastan ı (d. 548/1153): “There is a group among the Nestorians called Messalians(al-mus ·allı n ). Their beliefs regarding Christ are similar to those of Nestorius, except that they claim [thefollowing]: when man takes pains in worship, abstains from consuming meat and fat, rejects animaldesires and desires of the soul, his substance ( jawharu-hu ) becomes so purified that he reaches the

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Though it does not specifically mention the mirror image, this passage is an importanttestimony to the East-Syriac “messalian” tendency to redefine the Incarnation as Jesus’ vision of God and consequently to regard Christ as a mere human being and even to

emphatically deny his divinity , bringing Christology entirely in line with Muslimexpectations. Combined with the evidence we have from John of Dalyatha, al-Nashi’

al-Akbar’s testimony delineates the features of a “messalian” circle of precisely the typethat must have produced the “mirror Christology” encountered and reported by al-Warraq.

Let us now come back to al-Warraq’s analysis of the Christian views on theIncarnation. The controversy surrounding John of Dalyatha must have been surely alivein al-Warraq’s time. Though condemned by Timothy, John of Dalyatha was rehabilitatedby Timothy’s successor and vehement opponent I sho‘ bar Nun (catholicos 823–827).

This indicates that John of Dalyatha’s ideas had supporters in the highest echelons of church establishment in Iraq in the first half of the ninth century, at precisely the time andplace where al-Warraq was beginning to gather material for his Refutation of the Three Christian Sects .

As we have seen in [T8] above, al-Warraq argues that

other [Christians] say that [the Incarnation] did not happen in any of these ways.Rather it happened in the sense that the Word appeared in that body as a person’simage appears in a clean, polished mirror and his face becomes visible therein. Itis in this way rather than any other that they believe the union occurred.

Al-Warraq’s phrasing appears to suggest that “mirror Christians” attempted to present, asit were, a more “up-to-date” Christology, while being critical of the more conventionalmodels: union (ittih · ad ), indwelling (h · ulul ), and putting on humanity as a garment(iddira ’). It is, in my view, quite likely that these “mirror Christians” were John of Dalyatha’s followers — dubbed “messalians” by al-Nashi’ al-Akbar — who wereadopting John of Dalyatha’s ideas to the needs of the Muslim-Christian dialogue of theirday. Their criticism of the conventional christological models and their proposed newmodel — the mirror model — is part of their “accommodating” response to the Muslim

environment, a tendency evident in al-Nashi’ al-Akbar’s passage.

51

Indeed, mirror Christology (along with its variant, the seal-and-wax Christology outlined by al-Warraq in [T8]) is obviously a Christian attempt — and to judge from

Kingdom of Heavens (malakut al-samawat ) and openly sees God (wa-yara Allah jahratan ). All thingsin the hidden realm ( fı l-ghayb ) become disclosed to him, and no single thing remains concealed fromhim, both on earth and in heaven” — see al-Shahrastan ı, al-Milal wa-l-nih · al , ed. Amır ‘ Alı Mahna and‘ Alı H· asan Fa‘ur (Beirut: Dar al-ma‘rifa, 1414/1993), vol. 1, 270; French translation in Gérard Troupeau,“Les croyances des chrétiens présentées par un hérésiographe musulman du XIIe siècle,” in his Études sur le christianisme arabe au Moyen Âge (Aldershot: Variorum, 1995), Essay XVII, 684. It is perhaps

significant that al-Shahrastan ı mentions both human vision of God and the Kingdom — two motifsfeaturing prominently in John of Dalyatha’s [T12].51 Al-Nashi’ al-Akbar’s testimony shows that the tendency to “accommodate” Muslim expectations wasso strong as to lead some Christians — the “messalians” — to an explicit denial of Christ’s divinity.





al-Ghazal ı , a rather successful one at that — to propose a Christology that would bepalatable to Muslims. Mirror Christology and seal-and-wax Christology are both“palatable” because they emphasize that God could not suffer. Indeed, it is clearly the

raison d ’être of both Christologies that divinity (the Word) remains in itself unchangeableand immovable, and only its reflection or imprint comes to dwell in the body. Thoughthis anti-theopaschite trend had already become prominent in East-Syriac (“Nestorian”)thought before Islam — as part of the Christological polemic against the “Cyrillians”( Jacobites and Melkites)52 — one can see how it could easily get reinforced in an Islamiccontext, where repudiation of theopaschism was a sine qua non condition for a dialogue with Muslims.

Mirror Christology thus naturally developed, on the basis of John of Dalyatha’s ideas,in a milieu where interactions and dialogue with Muslims were frequent and where, as

a Christian, one felt the apologetic need to present Christian doctrines to Muslims in amore “favorable” light (even to the extent of denying Christ’s divinity). This milieu — described as “messalian” both by contemporary East-Syriac Christians and by Muslimobservers (al-Nashi’ al-Akbar) — is the most plausible source for al-Warraq’s mirrorChristology. Via al-Warraq (or a later Muslim author dependent on him), mirrorChristology eventually reached al-Ghazalı, who enthusiastically adopted it as his ownpreferred Christological view.53 The prominence of the mirror image in Islamic“waliology” as well — both in al-Ghazal ı ’s own writings and in the later Islamic

52 Cyrillians accept and even insist on theopaschite expressions, such as Mary the “Theotokos”(“birthgiver of God”), “God the Word died on the cross,” etc.53 A parallel case is offered by a Trinitarian theology where the hypostases of the Trinity are equated with divine attributes (s ·ifat ). Though arguably modalist, this theology nevertheless proved popular in Arab Christian circles, as it was more immune than hypostatic Trinitarian theology to Muslim criticismsof the Trinity as tritheism: once the hypostases have been redefined as attributes, Christian Arabtheologians could always appeal to the fact that Muslims themselves acknowledged the attributes of God. Apparently, this strategy worked: it is accepted by no other than al-Ghazal ı (again!) as the trueChristian view. See the following remarkable passage in one of al-Ghazal ı’s Persian letters: “Christians who say “Third of a Trinity” (thalith thalatha , Q. 5:73) do not mean that God is three, but they say that

He is one in essence and three in respect to attributes (be-e ‘tebar-e s ·efat ). They say, literally, “One insubstance and three in hypostasis-ness” (wah · id bi-l-jawhar wa-thalath bi-l-uqnumı ya ), and by

hypostasis (uqnum ) they mean attributes (s ·efat )” (Makatı b , 15:12–15; German tr. Krawulsky, Briefe und Reden , 84); al-Ghazal ı ’s formulae seem to be influenced by al-Warraq, see David Thomas,Anti-Christian Polemic in Early Islam: Abu ‘I sa al-Warraq’s “Against the Trinity” (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1992), §5, 66 and §8, 68. It is even more striking — and probably notaccidental — that both this kind of Trinitarian theology, where hypostases are redefined as attributes,and mirror Christology, where Incarnation is redefined as Jesus’ vision of God, are “adumbrated” by East-Syriac (“Nestorian”) mysticism of the early Islamic period, especially by John of Dalyatha. John of Dalyatha was accused of both a Trinitarian heresy (Sabellianism, i.e. modalism, because he argued thatthe Son and the Spirit are merely “powers” of God, i.e. His knowledge and His life) and a Christological

heresy (the idea that our Lord’s humanity could see His divinity). The former accusation foreshadowsthe s ·ifat -based Trinitarian theology, while the latter is connected to mirror Christology, discussed in thisarticle. In both cases, the Christian ideas represented by John of Dalyatha seem to have reachedal-Ghazalı, who reacted positively to them.

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(especially S· ufı) tradition — would also seem to owe a great deal, though indirectly, tothe (still insufficiently investigated) contacts between East-Syriac “messalian” circles andMuslim intellectuals, such as al-Warraq, in the early ‘ Abbasid period.54

54 On the mirror image in Syriac literature and in Islamic sources see Sebastian Brock, “The Imagery of the Spiritual Mirror in Syriac Literature,” Journal of the Canadian Society for Syriac Studies 5 (2005):3–17; Sebastian Brock, “Comment les cœurs purs verront Dieu: Saint Ephrem et quelques auteurssyriaques,” in Le Visage de Dieu dans le patrimoine oriental (Antélias, 2001), vol. 1, 133–143; RobertBeulay, La lumière sans forme: Introduction à l’étude de la mystique chrétienne syro-orientale

(Chevetogne: Éditions de Chevetogne, 1987), 155–157, 249n69, and index, s.v. “miroir,” 337; Beulay,L’enseignement , 443–447; D. De Smet, M. Sebti, and G. de Callataÿ (eds.), Miroir et Savoir: La transmission d ’un thème platonicien des Alexandrins à la philosophie arabo-musulmane (Leuven:Peeters, 2008).



al-ghazali's 'mirror christology' and its possible east-syriac sources

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