al qada in iraq report

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MIDDLE EAST SECURITY REPORT 14

Jessica D. Lewis

September 2013

AL-QAEDA IN IRAQ RESURGENTTHE BREAKING THE WALLS CAMPAIGN, PART I


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Cover Art by Maggie Obriwin.

All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part ofthis publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by anymeans, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or anyinformation storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing fromthe publisher.

2013 by the Institute for the Study of War.

Published in 2013 in the United States of America by the Institute for theStudy of War.

1400 16th Street NW, Suite 515 Washington, DC 20036.

http://www.understandingwar.org


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Jessica D. Lewis

AL-QAEDA IN IRAQ RESURGENT

THE BREAKING THE WALLS CAMPAIGN, PART I


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ABOUT OUR TECHNOLOGY PARTNERS

ISW believes superior strategic insight derives from a fusion of traditional social science research and innovative technologica

methods. ISW recognizes that the analyst of the future must be able to process a wide variety of information, ranging from

personal interviews and historical artifacts to high volume structured data. ISW thanks its technology partners, Palantir

Technologies and Praescient Analytics, for their support in this innovative endeavor. In particular, their technology and

implementation assistance has supported creating many of the maps and graphics in this product.

Praescient Analytics is a Veteran Owned Small Business based in Alexandria, Virginia.

Our aim is to revolutionize how the world understands information by empowering

our customers with the latest analytic tools and methodologies. Currently, Praescien

provides several critical services to our government and commercial clients: training,

embedded analysis, platform integration, and product customization.

Palantir Technologies is working to radically change how groups analyze information

We curretly oer a suite of software applicatios for itegratig, visualizig ad

analyzing the worlds information. We support many kinds of data including structured

unstructured, relational, temporal and geospatial.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Jessica D. Lewis is the Research Director at ISW. Jessica joined ISW in the summer of 2012 following eight years of service on Active Dutyas a itelligece ocer i the U.S. Army. Her military career icludes 34 moths deployed to Iraq ad Afghaista, where she providedintelligence support to tactical, operational, and theater commands. She has twice been awarded the Bronze Star Medal for her impactupo operatios. Jessica additioally served o tours i Germay ad the Uited States as a compay commader, sta ocer, adcounter-terrorism analyst.

Jessica directs the research program. She is also the lead architect for ISWs technology and data strategy as well as the lead analyst for ISW

al Qaeda i Iraq portfolio. Jessica specializes i data visualizatio, etwork aalysis, ad itelligece support to operatioal desig. She ischarting a course to advance ISWs signature analytical methodologies and to revolutionize the conduct of intelligence from open sourcesIn particular, she seeks to incorporate the function of early warning into ISWs regional work.

She has also authored several of ISWs Iraq Updates icludig Al Qaeda i Iraqs Breakig the Walls Campaig Achieves Its Objectivesat Abu Ghraib, From Protest Movemet to Armed Resistace, ad Iraqs sectaria crisis reigites as Shia militias execute civilias adremobilize.

Jessica holds a B.S. i Strategic & Iteratioal History ad Iteratioal Relatios from West Poit ad a M.A. i Strategic Itelligece

from American Military University.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Abudat thaks to Drs. Kimberly ad Frederick Kaga for their metorship ad thought leadership these may years. Special thaks awell to the ISW Iraq team, past ad preset, for buildig the most isightful cotemporary history o post-war Iraq. I would particularlylike to thak Marisa Sulliva, Ahmed Ali, Stephe Wicke, Sam Wyer, ad Omar Abdullah. Thak you as well to the Iraq summer itersKelly Edwards ad Michael Tehrai, for their creative eergies ad devotio, ad also to Harlee Gambhir, who will chage the gameLastly, my sicere thaks to Aaro Reese ad Maggie Obriwi, extraordiary craftsme, who cotributed immeasurably to this ishedreport.

ABOUT THE INSTITUTE

The Istitute for the Study of War (ISW) is a o-partisa, o-prot, public policy research orgaizatio. ISW advacesa iformed uderstadig of military aairs through reliable research,trusted aalysis, ad iovative educatio. ISW is

committed to improving the nations ability to execute military operations and respond to emerging threats in order to achieveU.S. strategic objectives.


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TABLE OF COnTEnTS

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................ 07

BACKGROUND .............................................................................................. 09

METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................ 11

THE FIRST CAMPAIGN: BREAKING THE WALLS ... . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. 13

THE NEXT CAMPAIGN: SOLDIERS HARVEST ... . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . 20

AQ IS MILI TAR Y OR GAN IZ AT ION .. .. .. . .. .. . .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. . .. .. . .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. . .. .. 21

WHAT WE KNOW ................ ................ ............... ................ ................ ............ 30

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 32

NOTES .......................................................................................................... 34

MAPS & CHARTS

MAP OF IRAQ ............................................................................................... 06

IRAQ CIVILIAN CASUALTIES ......................................................................... 08

VB IE D AT TAC KS OV ER TIM E ... .. . .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. . .. .. . .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. . .. .. 13

PHASE I: PROOF OF CONCEPT ..................................................................... 14

PHASE II: THE GREEN LINE .......................................................................... 15

PHASE III: THE PUSH TO BAGH DAD ................ ................ ............... ............... 17

PHASE IV: THE AQI SURGE ........................................................................... 18

AQ I STAT E VIS ION MA P .. .. . .. . .. .. . .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. . .. .. . .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. . .. .. 19

IRAQ VBIED CAMPAIGN IN SYRIAN CONTEXT .............................................. 22

VB IE DS VS . SVB IEDS JULY 20 13-JUL Y 2013 .. . .. .. . .. . .. .. . .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. . .. .. 24

AR EAS OF INTE REST FOR AQI VB IED OP ERATI ON S ... . .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. . .. .. 25

TOTAL VBIEDS PER MONTH VS. TOTAL VBIED VS. VBIEDS IN WAVES ... . . . . . .. 27

PHASES I-IV BAGHDAD ................................................................................ 28

AQ I ATTA CK & SU PPOR T ZO NES . ... .. . .. .. . .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. . .. .. . .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. . .. .. 32

MIDDLE EAST SECURITY REPORT 14 | AL-QAEDA IN IRAQ RESURGENT | JESSICA D. LEWIS | SEPTEMBER 2013


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MAP 1 | IRAQ


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AL-QAEDA IN IRAQ RESURGENTTHE BREAKING THE WALLS CAMPAIGN, PART I

By Jessica D. Lewis


Al-Qaeda i Iraq is resurget. Al-Qaeda i Iraq (AQI) reached its apex of territorial cotrol addestructive capability in late 2006 and early 2007, before the Surge and the Awakening removed theorganization from its safe havens in and around Baghdad.1Subsequet operatios pursued AQI orthwardthrough Diyala, Salah ad-Din, and Mosul, degrading the organization over the course of 2007-2008such that only a fraction of its leaders, functional cells, and terroristic capabilities remained and wereconcentrated in Mosul.2As of August 2013, AQI has regrouped, regained capabilities, and expanded intoareas from which it was expelled during the Surge.

AQI in 2013 is an extremely vigorous, resilient, andcapable organization that can operate from Basra to

coastal Syria. This paper traces AQIs revival i Iraq siceJuly 2012, when the organization launched a year-longoperatio they amed the Breakig the Walls campaig.This campaign consisted of a series of 24 major vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) attacksand eight prison breaks that demonstrate the evolutionof AQIs military capability over that time (See Part 2of this report, which describes these attacks in detail).

VBIEDs had been the signature attack type of AQI from2006-2008.3 Since May 2013, AQI has consistentlyexceeded the number of VBIED attacks per month thatit conducted in June 2007, while sustaining operations

in Syria as well.

The Breakig the Walls campaig eded o July 21,2013, whe al-Qaeda i Iraq successfully breached theprison at Abu Ghraib, leading to the escape of 500 ormore prisoners,4 the majority of whom were detaineddurig the Iraq War for terrorist activities.5The UnitedStates has reacted by rearmig the $10 millio boutyplaced on Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of AQI,

whom ocials said was based i Syria i August 2013.6Targetig AQIs leader, however, will ot be eective ihalting the organizations growth. AQI is no longer asmall cadre based around a single leader, but rather aneective recostituted military orgaizatio operatigi Iraq ad Syria.

The United States has also agreed to provide counter-terrorism support to the govermet of Iraq. As a seiorState Departmet ocial said, the Uited States watsIraq to have the iformatio to be able to map theetwork, to get at its acig, ad to be very precise i

its targetig, because Iraqi forces are uder threat adtheyre liable to make mistakes such as going at the threat

in a symmetrical way, rounding up too many people,targeting the wrong person, which makes the wholeproblem worse.7Yet the AQI network has grown robusover the past fourteen months, and mapping the networkad its aces may ot suce to halt its expasio.

A seior U.S. admiistratio ocial oted theunexpected growth of AQIs suicide bombing campaignBrieg o August 15, 2013, he stated that Over the lasttwo years, weve had an average of about 5 to 10 suicidebombers a month, in 2011 and 2012.... Weve seen overthe last 90 days the suicide bomber numbers approach

about 30 a month, and we still suspect most of those arecomig i from Syria.8

AQIs path to war was not abrupt, however. Violencebegan to escalate in June 2012 just before the start ofthe Breakig the Walls campaig. Casualty levels iIraq have rise sigicatly over 2012-2013, causedprimarily by AQIs VBIED attacks. The overall violencelevel i Iraq i July 2013 was commesurate with wartimelevels last observed i Iraq i April 2008. Total mothlyfatalities at the end of July 2013 exceeded 1,000 forthe rst time sice that date, accordig to the Uited

natios Assistace Missio Iraq (UnAMI).9

AQI has been able to grow not only because of its safe-havens and recruiting grounds in Syria, but also becauseit has replenished its veteran manpower throughpriso breaks iside of Iraq. The Breakig the Wallscampaign involved a total of eight complex attacksupo Iraqi prisos, two of which successfully freedhard-core veterans who had likely participated in AQIs


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i 2014 ad shatter popular codece i the ISF, upowhich Maliki has relied for his strong-man image sincethe Basra campaign in 2008.

Geeral Ray Odiero, commader of U.S. Forces-Iraqdescribed AQIs goals in June 2010, when its capabilities

were miimal. He oted, al-Qaeda i Iraq hastchanged. They want complete failure of the governmenti Iraq. They wat to establish a caliphate i Iraq.15He cotiued, now, thats a tall task for them ow,as compared to maybe it was i 2005 or 06. But theystill sustain that thought process. And it has nothing todo with the United States. You know, they continue tolook around the world for safe havens and sanctuaries.

And what they look for is ungoverned territories. Andso what they wat is to form a ugovered territoryor at least pieces of ugovered territory, iside of Iraq,that they ca take advatage of.16

Cotrol of territory i Iraq remais oe of AQIs goalsin 2013, but AQI also seeks to govern in Syria as well.17

AQI declared itself the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham(ISIS)in April 2013, an expansion of its historical politicalidentity now to include Syria. At a teaching tent in

Aleppo, Syria during its Ramadan fair, ISIS displayed amap of its emirate with o border betwee Iraq ad Syriaas part of a wider al-Qaeda caliphate stretching fromNorth Africa to the eastern frontier adjoining Iran.18

AQI has bee istrumetal i the Syria coict. By

studying known instances of SVBIED attacks in Syria,one sees AQI has operated there alongside the Syrian al-Qaeda aliate Jabhat al-nusra sice at least December2011.19AQI had initially supported Jabhat al-Nusra byreversig the ow of ghters ad resources that ocestreamed ito Iraq from Syria.20

The growth of the two franchises created competition.AQI declared in April 2013 that Jabhat al-Nusra wassubordinate to theIslamic State of Iraq and Sham. Jabhat al-Nusra rejected AQIs leadership, declaring fealty toal-Qaeda core directly.21 Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-

Zawahiri directed that the two aliates operate i theirseparate geographic zones and put both organizationson probation as franchises.22Al-Baghdadi at rst atlyrejected this instruction and reinforced his single-organization vision. Since June 2013,23 the twoorgaizatios have apparetly overcome their dierecesand often choose to cooperate tactically inside Syria.

AQIs military, governance, and social investment inSyria has increased since this time, most recently through

a combined arms attack upon Minnakh airbase north ofAleppo,24 through a oesive i orther Latakia,2

and the sponsorship of a Ramadan social outreachprogram in Aleppo in August 2013.26

AQI also drastically icreased VBIED attacks i Iraq

in 2013. As of August 2013, AQIs new operationthe Soldiers Harvest, has icreased the frequecyand volume of VBIED waves and also incorporatedspectacular attacks upon critical infrastructure, suchas the Um Qasr port at Basra.27 AQI will also likelycotiue to target hardeed ISF facilities with complexattacks involving VBIEDs now that it has tested itsgreatest complex operational ability. AQIs success inIraq at the expese of the ISF will add relative stregthto the organization in Syria. AQI would then prosperin a deteriorating security environment that transcendsstate boundaries.28

BACKGROUND

Characterizig the evolutio of al-Qaeda i Iraqsmilitary capabilities requires a uderstadig ofthe state of play i Iraq after the withdrawal of U.S.forces i December 2011. Al-Qaeda i Iraq (AQI)soperational capability had been degraded three yearsprior by Coalitio Forces, Iraqi Security Forces, adlocal security elemets kow as Sahwa who took uparms to drive out al-Qaeda and prevent their return.29I the sprig of 2010, U.S. ad Iraqi forces eitherpicked up or killed 34 out of the top 42 al-Qaeda inIraq leaders, ad by Jue of 2010 the orgaizatio hadlost coectio with [al-Qaeda Seior Leadership] iPakista ad Afghaista.30

By 2011, AQI was still able to conduct attacks, but theorganization was isolated, disrupted, and did not posea existetial threat to the state. From September 2010to December 2011, mothly fatalities i Iraq stabilizedi the 300-400 rage, accordig to Iraq Body Coutdatabase, which provides historical data covering this time

period.31

This rage establishes a baselie for ormalviolence levels as reported from open sources, againstwhich to compare observations of security conditions inpost-war Iraq.

The resurgece of AQI followed two treds: rst, the riseof iteral, Iraqi Sui political disefrachisemetafter the departure of U.S. forces, and second, theescalatio ad radicalizatio of the Syria coict.Immediately after the withdrawal of U.S. Forces i


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December 2011, Iraqi Prime Miister nouri al-Malikiarrested and tortured the bodyguards of Sunni VicePresidet Tariq al-Hashemi o the grouds that hehad supported terrorism.32 Hashemi ultimately edthe country and was sentenced to death in absentia.33

Violent activities rose following the departure of U.S.

Forces-Iraq (USF-I) ad the Hashemi arrest, althoughone cannot establish the causal relationships betweenthese contemporary events.

Fatalities rose above 500 for the moth of Jauary2012, with two attacks on January 5 and January 14most likely responsible for the overall increase.34Theseattacks involved multiple strikes, including manysuicide attacks, upo Shia civilia targets i holy citiesincluding Karbala, Nasiriya, and Kadhimiyah, andalso Sadr City ad Basra durig the Shia religiousobservace of Arbaee. Other attacks documeted

in early 2012 include a large wave of explosions onFebruary 23 that struck Baghdad, Basra, ad Salah ad-Din.35 This wave primarily targeted Iraqi Police adgovernment institutions, and it appeared to involve

vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs).AQI evidently had an enduring ability to coordinatespectacular attacks, including the use of VBIEDs, in thepost-USF-I period.36

The rise i attacks i Iraq paralleled attacks i Syria iways that show the overall involvement of al-Qaeda (AQ)senior leadership with the reconstitution of AQI and itsSyria oshoot, Jabhat al-nusra. VBIEDs detoated i

Aleppo ad Damascus i Syria o February 10 ad 13,2013.37 A ewly aouced al-Qaeda aliate, Jabhatal-Nusra, claimed credit for these attacks in a formallyproduced video.38 This coincided with a landmarkstatement by al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri callingfor Muslims i the regio, specically Iraq, Jorda,Turkey, and Lebanon, to support the Syrian opposition.39

AQI also lauched a media campaig o February 24,2012, just after its VBIED attacks iside Iraq. AQIaouced a campaig to strike military headquarters

o behalf of Sui prisoers i Iraq durig a 33-miutespeech demoizig Shia Islam ad the govermet ofIraq.40 This distictly sectaria speech typies AQIsstrategic voice ad dispositio i post-war Iraq beforethe campaign of attacks detailed in this report.

AQI also executed sigicat operatios targetigIraqi Security Forces (ISF) i early 2012. Most otably,

AQI lauched a sophisticated raid o ISF uits iHaditha, Abar o March 4, 2012. AQI assassiated

two police commanders in their homes and seized apolice checkpoit, killig 27 ISF persoel i total.4

AQI claimed credit for the Haditha attack ad describedthe operation in detail in a message posted to jihadistforums shortly thereafter.42AQI recorded the incidentin a video illustrating how multiple AQI units surprised

ISF by masqueradig as Iraqi atioal police.43 AQIalso launched a wave of 26 attacks across the countryo March 20, likely to disrupt ad discredit the Iraqgovernment before the Arab League Summit on March27-29, 2012.44 AQI claimed credit for this wave ofattacks as well.45

Overall violence began to increase sharply in June2012, at which poit Agece Frace Press (AFP) begato track daily casualties i Iraq i detail. AFP casualtyrecords idetied Jue 13 ad Jue 16 as high-casualtydays coinciding with multiple bombings.46The dataset

of violent events that the author curated for this studydocuments an additional SVBIED on June 4, 2012,

which targeted the oces of the Shia Edowmet iBab al-Muadham, Baghdad. AQI claimed credit for theattacks on June 4 and June 13.47The June 4, 2012 eventproduced a massive number of casualties for a singleattack, an estimated 215 (26 killed/190 wounded).48

This attack further demonstrates the capability andintent of AQI to deliver large-scale VBIEDs. Multiple

VBIEDs incurring fewer casualties preceded this attackand similar attacks continued into early July 2012.

AQI emir Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi announced on July21, 2012 the start of what he called the Breakig the

Walls campaig. Breakig the Walls bega just afterRamadan, and three days after a failed assassinationattempt against Bashar al-Assad that killed importantmembers of his inner security circle.* In a recordedspeech, Baghdadi described his itet to target thepressure poits of the Safavid project.49This messagemay be understood to target Malikis government, but

AQIs message at the start of the 2012-2013 campaignalso reected its broader itet to establish goverace

i Iraq ad Syria.

*Open source reporting has not resolved the method of the attackwith Syrian state media asserting it was a suicide bomber and com

peting sources suggesting a remotely detonated IED or VBIED. Liwa

al-Islam (LI) claimed the attack, ad from subsequet evets is a more

likely perpetrator tha the Free Syria Army, which also claimed it

This paper does not presume to establish a correlation or causation

between these events, but rather temporal proximity.


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The simultaneous detonation of many VBIEDs againstcivilia targets i Iraq became a immediate hallmark of

AQIs Breakig the Walls campaig. This VBIED wavephenomenon had been typical for AQI during the heightof the Iraq war, ad it appears that AQI recostitutedthis core competency well before July 2012. Based on the

sheer volume of attacks at the start of the campaign, italso appears that the early VBIED waves were scheduledand planned well in advance. AQI likely capitalized upon

vetera expertise achieved while ghtig U.S. Forcesdurig the Iraq War ad Assads forces i the Syria

War to amplify lethal eects i 2012-2013, particularlythrough the utilization of VBIEDs.

U.S. ocials described how, by August 2012, al-Qaedaiside of Syria had evolved from disparate, discoecteduits ad was buildig a etwork of well-orgaizedcells that are ow commuicatig ad sometimes

cooperating on missions, with a command-and-control structure evolving to match more sophisticatedoperatios i places like Iraq ad Afghaista.50 Theocials stated that The uits are spreadig from cityto city, with veteras of the Iraq isurgecy employigtheir expertise in bomb-building to carry out more thantwo doze attacks so far.51They estimated the numberof ghters i Syria at a couple hudred.52The level oforganizational capacity indicated by this assessmentsets the foundation for this study. AQI has re-emergedas a military force i Iraq ad Syria, ad it is critical

to understand what capabilities the organization hasregeerated i Iraq i order to assess the threat that AQInow presents to the region.

METHODOLOGY

Detecting AQIs Signature

Estimating the combat power and organizational cultureof secret orgaizatios such as al-Qaeda i Iraq (AQI)

may be approached through detailed analysis of the attacksthey perpetrate. This study considers the violent eventsi Iraq that are documeted i uclassied sources for

what they indicate about AQIs renewed organizationalcapacity. Closely examining the public record of violentevets, particularly the use of spectacular attacks iIraq i 2012-2013, eables us to draw coclusios about

AQIs broader operations.

AQI executed a wide array of attack types from July 2012to July 2013 durig the Breakig the Walls campaigThese attack types iclude small arms re, idirectre (IDF) via mortars ad rocket-propelled greades(RPG), improvised explosive devices (IED), suicidebombers (SVEST), vehicle-borne improvised explosive

devices (VBIED), and a subset, suicide vehicle-borneimprovised explosive devices (SVBIED). VBIEDs are themost complex attack type within this set, characterized bythe rewiring of a vehicle into a traveling high-yield bombrather than the placement of an explosive parcel withinor outside of a vehicle.53All of these attack types wereused for combied arms eects durig the July 2013 AbuGhraib and Taji prison attacks, and all of them appearedi dispersed fashio across Iraq throughout the courseof the previous year.

A blaket study of attacks i Iraq is dicult because

violent events are habitually underreported. Attributionis another challenge, as AQI was not the only groupcoductig attacks i Iraq durig this time periodOther groups operatig i Iraq today iclude Asaral-Islam, Shia militias, ad very likely Jaysh Rijal al-Tariqah al-naqshabadia (JRTn), a Baathist militatorganization.54 All of these organizations are knownto use small arms, IDF, ad IEDs, ad i some casesthey are also suspected of suicide attacks and car-borneexplosions.

Violent events in certain locales, furthermore, might beattributed to popular uprising rather than AQI.55Thisbecomes a legitimate consideration in light of the anti-government protest movement, which began in December2012 after Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki attempted toarrest Raa al-Issawi, a leadig Sui atioal politicalgure. The protest movemet cotiued at least throughSeptember 2013, when this report was published. Asmore violet actors take up arms i Iraq, attack pattersof established groups become obfuscated, as the groupsbegin to overlap and react to one another. Neverthelessit is possible to isolate coherent attack signatures for

AQI within the available data. This study will focusspecically upo oe of AQIs classic sigatures, wavesof vehicle-borne explosive improvised devices (VBIED)The VBIED waves of the Breakig the Walls campaigare idetied ad characterized i Part II of this reportOnce attributed, these attacks may be used to evaluate

AQIs operational capacity, depth, and targetingstrategy.


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Spotting VBIED Waves

VBIEDs costitute the most useful AQI gerprit forseveral reasos. First, VBIEDs are geerally the mostlethal attack type, and therefore the most consistentlyreported publically.* Second, VBIEDs are the most

complex attack type, which best illustrates the full capacityof AQIs supply chain. Third, VBIEDs have historicallybeen assessed as AQIs signature attack type.56

Although it is likely that AQI bears sole responsibility forall VBIEDs i Iraq, it is worthwhile to challege ad re-prove this assessment, particularly given that Ansar al-Islam, aother Salast group, claimed credit for SVBIEDattacks i Iraq over the course of 2012.57Although VBIEDattacks are a core competency for AQI, other groups canadopt this techique, ad therefore each VBIED attack byitself is only a moderate signal that AQI is responsible.

A stronger signal emerges in the detection of multiplecoordinated VBIED attacks. AQIs signature massingof VBIEDs over the course of the Breakig the Wallscampaig will be referred to here as a VBIED wave, addeed for the purposes of this study as the detoatioof sixor more VBIEDs o a give day i Iraq.AQI hasclaimed credit for several such VBIED waves since thelaunch of the campaign, beginning with a wave of 30

VBIEDs that detonated on July 23, 2012, just two daysafter the aoucemet of the Breakig the Wallscampaign.58

*VBIED ideticatio from public sources ivolves a qualitative as-sessment of each incident and the context in which it occurred. Not

all attacks that are reported i ews media as car bombs are techi-

cally VBIEDs. For example, a Adhesive Explosive Device (AED), or

sticky bomb, is ot a VBIED, but a assassiatio techique desiged

to target the occupants of a vehicle. A genuine car bomb, likewise, is

a bomb that is placed in a vehicle in order to target the occupants. By

contrast, even though they are often reported as car bombs, VBIEDs

direct explosive power exterally, usually to iict mass casualties or

sigicat structural damage. This requires thoughtful desig, whichis why VBIEDs are characterized as a highly technical operation.

The threshold of six VBIED attacks was chosen through holistic as-sessment to be the minimum volume of a VBIED cluster that other-

wise bore characteristics suggestive of orchestration by a central VBIED

commad. Clusters of ve or less VBIEDs, by cotrast, appeared to be

feasibly organized by a single VBIED cell assigned to a particular geo-

graphic area, or alternately a co-occurrence of singleton VBIEDs that

were not necessarily synchronized.

This study will examie the Breakig the Wallscampaign in detail, particularly the VBIED waves thatcharacterize this campaign. These waves can be brokendow for the purposes of aalysis ito four Phases ofthe campaign. These phases were not announced, butrather assessed by observig qualitative ad quatitative

diereces i attack patters over time. The waves ofVBIED attacks across these phases will be evaluated fortheir geographic spread, target selection, overall volumeand lethality. The VBIED waves will be considered inthe context of individual VBIEDs that occurred outsideof the 24 VBIED waves as well as other explosive events,such as IEDs ad SVESTS, i order to ree a overallcharacterization of their complementary use by AQI.Part I of this report will address these waves in aggregateto describe phase changes that illustrate organizationagrowth within AQI, and a detailed examination of theindividual waves is available in Part II.

In order to estimate lethality, the volume of the VBIEDwaves will be compared to daily casualty recordsmaitaied by Agece Frace-Presse (AFP).59 AFPdata provides a coservative ad specic estimate forcasualties, and as compared to other casualty data sets,represets a cautious miimum boud. The AFP datasetbegins to provide daily casualty records from violentevents in August 2012. Casualty insights prior to thisdate will be draw from Iraq Body Cout database, whoserecords begin in 2003.60The principal data set for the

violent events considered in this study is proprietary andderives solely from open sources, including National IraqNews Agency, al Sumaria News, al Mada Press, All Iraq News Agencyand the online Iraq Body Count(IBC) database.

THE FIRST CAMPAIGN: BREAKING THE WALLS

The Architects of Breaking the Walls

Al-Qaeda i Iraqs Breakig the Walls campaig begaon July 21, 2012 and ended on July 23, 2013. During

that time, AQI executed 24 VBIED waves that showcasedthe technical, logistical, and training capacity underlying

AQIs VBIED program. The enlistment of these functionsto deliver sychroized VBIED waves across Iraq revealsthe presence of a robust and specialized VBIED planningcapability within AQIs military organization. The styleof execution of the VBIED waves demonstrates thegrowth of the VBIED organization in terms of its skilledleadership, its support to combined arms attacks, and its


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ability over time to trai small eective teams.

The following section will identify four phases of theBreakig the Walls campaig based upo the pattersand characteristics of the VBIED waves and prisonattacks perpetrated by AQI between July 21, 2012 and

July 23, 2013. The four phases demonstrate centralizedplanning and direction of VBIED waves; the growth of

AQIs VBIED capability; and the presence of multiplehigh-fuctioig VBIED cells i Iraq by the ed of the

campaign. The four phases constitute an assessment ofAQIs battle pla ad adaptatio durig the Breakigthe Walls campaig.

PHASE I: Proof of Concept and Capability

The rst phase of Breakig the Walls bega i July 2012and ended in September 2012. This phase constituted

AQIs proof of concept and capability to execute repeatedlarge-scale VBIED waves across Iraq. The VBIED waves

on July 23, 2012 and September 9, 2012, involving 30and 21 VBIEDs spread over a wide geographic area, werethe largest and farthest spread among the waves across allfour phases. They served, therefore, to demonstrate thedepth and breadth of AQIs ability to operate. They alsoindicate the presence of a VBIED construction facility andtechnical experts with the available materiel to generatemay VBIEDs. Furthermore, they idicate the level ofcommand and control already in place within AQIs VBIEDapparatus, as the orchestration of so many VBIEDs on oneday required eective commuicatio to a very large teamIt also required a pla. I this case, the pla arrayed attackdeliberately by provice so that the whole of orther Iraqad Baghdad would feel the eects.

The two large VBIED waves, as well as several smallerwaves and clusters of attacks between them, generallyoriented on the northeastern front with a heavy densityin Kirkuk City. Because the targeting strategy varied

VBIED ATTACKS OVER TIME


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between civilian, military, and government targets, thisgeographic orientation does not necessarily evidence aclear operational intent. Rather, it may serve to illustratethe physical point of origin of the early VBIED campaign,assessed to have been more centralized then than it isnow, particularly in terms of VBIED construction.Phase I constituted an impressive show of force, but not

yet exceptionally focused operational planning. Thiscontrasts with patterns observed in later phases.

The early waves of the Breakig the Walls campaigivolved a large ghtig force i additio to the

explosive attacks. Very few of the early VBIEDs weredocumented as suicide attacks, which suggests that thedrivers of the attack vehicles required a exit strategy.Drivers were likely deployed as part of teams to spottargets and aid in recovery. A wave of 30 VBIEDs,like that witnessed on September 9, 2012, thereforeivolved potetially may times more ghters, iaddition to a vast VBIED construction apparatus andorganizational leadership. This observation pointsimmediately to a critical requiremet for commad ad

cotrol that was successfully fullled at the begiigof the Breakig the Walls campaig. It also poits tosophisticated campaign planning, which deliberatelyshifted operational objectives from the beginning to theed of the Breakig the Walls campaig.

The geography of the early attacks was also widespreadstretching from Basra in the south to Mosul in the north(see Part II for further details). This raises the questio of

whether the origial ghtig force was gathered togetherand then dispersed for attacks; or engaged remotely at

various locations with guidance to synchronize attacks on

a given day. The initial wide spread of attacks may lend tothe impression that localized teams were established earlyon in the campaign, but rigor must be applied to this ideaThe requiremet to geerate 30 VBIEDs ad to preparea deployable force for a specic missio with targetigguidance, training, and ready-made VBIEDs would takemuch time, but these early waves involved long periodsof time i betwee attacks toreset, commesurate withthese constraints. It is instead plausible that the greatest


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initial constraint for the VBIED organization wastechnical expertise, and this expertise, if limited to fewpersons, would suggest centralized VBIED planning,construction, and training.

In addition to VBIED waves, Phase I alsoincorporated four prison attacks against the BaghdadCouterterrorism Directorate; a police headquartersdetaiig 10 AQI persoel i Hibhib, Diyala; the TajiTasrat priso, which was subsequetly struck severaltimes; ad the Tikrit Tasrat priso. The attack agaistthe Tikrit Tasrat priso o September 27, 2012 iparticular involved VBIEDs among other capabilities,including mortars, SVESTS, and small arms. Thishighly successful complex attack, which would have beenplanned from an echelon above the smaller VBIED cellorganizations, secured the escape of 100 prisoners, 47of whom were reportedly AQI aliates o death row.

Apparent from a break in attacks is that AQI engagedi a strategic pause after this priso break i order toabsorb new human networks into its organization.

PHASE II: The Green Line

Phase II bega i november 2012 ad eded i February2013. It began with an operational pause in VBIEDand prison activity. This may be explained by severalcoditios: rst ad foremost, AQI received ito itsraks the fugitives of the Tikrit Tasrat priso, whichlikely required reorgaizatio ad restructurig withi

AQI. The marked increase in VBIED activity observedin later waves depended upon a rise in human capacitysuggesting that this event triggered new organizationalgrowth within AQIs military. It may also have produced

a shift in the leadership of AQIs VBIED operationwhich assumed a distictly dieret character i thelater Phase III. The pause in VBIED activity may alsoidicate a defesive requiremet to protect agaist ISFcouter-terrorism eorts i the wake of the prisobreak. Nevertheless, as the month of October 2012coincided with Eid al-Adha, AQI still managed tocoduct sigicat attacks, icludig small, clustered

VBIED activity on October 15, 2012 and October 272012. Sadr City was struck more than any other location


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in these two clusters in conjunction with the religiousholiday (see Part II for more detail).

Phase II focused many attacks upon civilian andgovernment targets along the Green Line separatingIraqi Kurdista from the rest of Iraq, coicidig with

an escalation in tension between the Governmentof Iraq ad Iraqi Kurds. This tesio igited overthe establishment on October 31, 2012 of the TigrisOperations Command, encompassing Salah ad-Din,Kirkuk, ad Diyala provices ad placig ISF i closeproximity to Kurdish territories.61Kurdish response wasucompromisig. Awar Haji, the Udersecretary ofthe Kurdistan Peshmerga Ministry, stated on November6 that the Iraqi Army would ot be allowed to eterKurdish territories.62Shortly afterwards, on November8, the Kurdistan parliament rejected Malikis decisionto create the Tigris Operations Command.63 Phase II

of AQIs Breakig the Walls was accordigly orietedo Kirkuk, reectig a deliberate targetig strategy toexploit a critical vulerability of the Iraqi govermet.

This targeting strategy was not manifest to the sameextent as in those attacks observed in Phase I. The wavesi Phase II were sigicatly smaller, closer together itime, and in many cases involved well-chosen individualtargets such as Kurdish political facilities. Phase IItherefore demonstrated tighter operational focus, butalso more importantly a temporary reduction in theoverall scale of the VBIED activity. It is possible thatthis decrease was the result of a fundamental resourcelimitation; however, there are also indicators that AQIs

VBIED activity was reorganized during this period.Namely, Phase II demonstrates a pattern of smaller wavesof VBIED attacks that begins to suggest the presenceof independent VBIED cells that had not been clearly

visible during Phase I.

Examining closely the clusters of VBIED attacks thatoccurred durig this period, sigicat groupigs ofattacks below the wave threshold occurred o Jauary

16 and 17, 2013. On January 16, three VBIEDs clusteredin Kirkuk and Tuz Khurmatu struck facilities associatedwith the KDP and PUK, yielding very high casualties.These attacks may reasonably be attributed to one celloperating with the intent to exploit ethnic tension. On

Jauary 17, four VBIEDs struck i Karbala ad Hilla isouther Iraq, targetig Shia civilias. These attacksmay also be attributed to a single cell, and very likely adieret oe, itet o this missio to exploit sectariatension. The signatures of these two attack clusters point

to two dieret cells o accout of the ear simultaeitygeographic disparity, and divergent target selection ofthe two VBIED clusters. These cells appear capable ofconducting multiple simultaneous VBIED attacks inclose proximity without guidance to coordinate attacks

with adjacent cells.

The tight control evidenced by these small attack clusterspoints to the self-contained capability of a VBIED cellby January 2013. Based on the presence of VBIED wavesindicative of coordination across multiple teams inaddition to individual VBIED clusters after this date,it appears that a VBIED cell may at times determine itsow missio ad acquire VBIEDs without assigmet

which would suggest that the VBIED construction sitesare also forward deployed by this time. This represents akey growth step i AQIs evolutio durig the Breakigthe Walls campaig. The combied occurrece of

independent VBIED cell activity and synchronizedattacks across many cells would come to typify laterphases. It does not follow that VBIED construction teamsare necessarily part of VBIED cells, but constructionsites ad their logistics require some form of protectiothat VBIED cell personnel may assist with providing. Ifinstead VBIED cells have no role in this site protectionmission, protection must instead be assigned to other

AQI elements, such as local security battalions, becauseprotectio of these sites is a operatioal requiremet.

Moreover, the leadership that had been in place toplan elaborate VBIED waves during Phase I apparentlypaused, particularly in January 2013, when no VBIED

waves occurred that exceeded ve VBIEDs o oe dayThe leaderships planning re-emerged profoundlyduring Phase III, which underscores the assessment thatPhase II sigies a trasformatio period of the VBIEDforce at the leader level. This transformation might alsohave involved the manning, training, and deploymentof additional VBIED cells, given that the overall volumead frequecy of coordiated VBIED waves subsequetlyincreased.

VBIED attack waves occurred on November 14November 27, November 29, and December 17, 2012These waves occurred i quicker successio, wererelatively few i umber, ad cosequetly icurredfewer overall casualties than the attacks in Phase I. Infact, the four VBIED waves in Phase II cumulativelyamounted to roughly the same number of VBIEDs

witnessed within one wave on July 23 or September 9The ability to synchronize attacks in more rapid fashion,


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and in particular to reset for repeatable attacks upon

Kirkuk, appeared to be the focus of continued Phase IIVBIED wave activity while the rest of the VBIED forcereorganized. Phase II also concluded with a pair ofprison attacks, including a second attempt at Taji base.

PHASE III: The Baghdad Campaign

Phase III bega i February 2013 ad eded i May2013. Phase III shifted the nation-wide VBIED campaignto Baghdad with large VBIED waves striking at a steadytempo of 30 day intervals. This geographical changeand stabilized rate of attacks demonstrate the return of

the VBIED planning cell, not only to coordinate highlysophisticated VBIED waves, but also now to directaction elements to mass upon a particular objective.Furthermore, some of the Baghdad waves i Phase IIIinclude as many as 20 VBIEDs in Baghdad on a givenday, suggestig the requiremet for three cells to deliverthe observed attack volume, and perhaps more in a surgecapacity. This high concentration of localized attacks overseveral months also suggests the presence of multiple

VBIED construction sites on the outskirts of Baghdad.

A preceding mini-wave on January 22, which consistedof three VBIEDs in Taji, Mahmudiyah, and Shulamay support placing two such cells in the belts aroundBaghdad. If so, the rst projected force from Taji orTarmiyah in the northern Baghdad belts, and the secondprojected from Mahmudiyah in the southern beltsThe likely location of the third cell does not, however,emerge from the data. Historical support zoes for AQI

would suggest that Jisr Diyala and Arab Jabour southeasof Baghdad are possible candidates.64

The attack patterns in Phase III also point tocomplementary geographic clusters within the attackdata. Strike patterns within the main VBIED wavesoutline three distinct attack zones within Baghdad: one tothe north, one to the southeast, and one to the southwest

within the city. This pattern validates the assessment ofthree separate VBIED cells operating in the Baghdad

vicinity at this time. To strike similar targets at regularintervals four months in a row suggests that AQI enjoyed


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incredible freedom of maneuver at this time, which

points to the Baghdad belts as the optimal environmentfrom which to launch attacks upon Baghdad.

There was no operational pause after Phase II, likelybecause Phase II functioned in many ways as a strategicpause in VBIED planning. Phase III appeared tocapitalize upon the launch of the anti-governmentprotest movemet o December 26, 2012 ad the rst

violet clash betwee ISF ad protesters ear Fallujah oJanuary 23, 2013. Phase III applied maximum pressureto ISF i Baghdad by targetig Shia commuities ia apparet eort to demostrate ISFs icapacity, ad

thereby to stoke the resurgece of Shia militias. Such aenvironment of uncontrolled violence has the potentialto threate the itegrity of state security i Iraq, whichtranslates directly to strategic gains for AQI in its declaredpursuit of a caliphate. The VBIED wave o February 17,2013 demonstrated the full shift of the national VBIEDcampaign to Baghdad, a trend that lasted until the end ofMay 2013. By the ed of May 2013, Shia militias wereonce again actively engaged in violence in Baghdad.65

PHASE IV: The AQI Surge

After May 15, 2013, the VBIED campaig quadrupled ifrequecy ad remaied focused upo Shia targets iBaghdad. Nearly half of the VBIED waves documentedi this study occurred durig this last quarter of thecampaig. Four additioal observatios serve to explai

AQIs acceleration.

Declaring the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham

The Syria provicial capital of al-Raqqa fell to theopposition on March 4, 2013.66 AQI had likely been

operating in Syria alongside Jabhat al-Nusra well beforethis, but their role may have itesied as al-Raqqaloomed as a ear victory. Soo after, al-Raqqa became athrone for Jabhat al-Nusra and AQI alongside the secularopposition, and it is likely that AQI shifted military assetsin Syria to secure this seat of governance, to recruit, andto advance further into Syrias military battlefronts.67

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared the Islamic State of Iraq andal Shamon April 8, 2013 following this military victory.6


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The U.S. State Department assessed as of July 2013 thatal-Baghdadi is personally in Syria, which is reasonablegiven this governance disposition.69This does not implythat the military command of AQI has shifted to Syria,however. A strog military operatig base ear the Iraqicapital, which has long been a principal attack zone,

would be a optimal coguratio for AQIs militarycommand.

Al-Baghdadi also declared that the Syrian al-Qaedaaliate Jabhat al-nusra was subordiate to the Islamic

State of Iraq ad al Sham. This aoucemet didnot gain ready acceptance by Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria.The Syria al-Qaeda aliate rejected al-Baghdadisleadership, declarig its idepedet aliatio toal-Qaeda core.70 Al-Qaeda emir Ayman al-Zawahiriresolved the dispute with guidance on June 9, 2013 tothe two groups to remain separate and operating in theirrespective geographic zoes, amely Iraq ad Syria.71Al-Baghdadi rejected this guidace o Jue 14, armighis itet to pursue a Islamic state i Iraq ad Syria.72

AQI may have sought to increase attacks during thisperiod in order to demonstrate capability and legitimacy

to the al-Qaeda core grouping.

ISF Fires on Protesters in Hawija

A major iectio occurred i Iraq o April 23, 2013,however, that may have caused AQIs military presenceto shift back to Iraq as a mai eort. O April 23, ISFsurrounded an anti-government protest sit-in camp inHawija ad coducted a search ad raid.73Armed meniside the camp red back, ad a clash esued which

claimed the lives of over 20 civilians in the camp andwounded over 100 others.74The response across the anti-government protest community was explosive. Clashesesued betwee ISF ad armed gume reportedly partof the eo-Baathist orgaizatio Jaysh Rijal al-Tariqahal-naqshabadia (JRTn). JRTn seized temporary

control of Suleiman Beg until tribal leaders brokered adeal with local ocials to ed the ghtig.75The armedme i the protest camp at Hawija were likely ot AQI

While Hawija falls alog a likely axis of support for AQIit is more likely that the camp housed militant elementsof the nationalist JRTN, whose platform more directlycoincides with the character and grievances of the Sunniprotest movement. It is unlikely that AQIs fortuneshad shifted to the degree that the organization would be

welcome i a Sui Arab camp i Iraq by that time.

Additioal clashes followig the oe i Hawija occurred

i Mosul ad Fallujah, ad several tribes i Abarannounced the formation of a tribal army to repelattackers, icludig the Iraqi Army.76 The iectioalso piqued ethic tesios i Kirkuk, as Kurdishocials aouced that Peshmerga forces would deployto ll the [security] vacuums... especially aroud thecity of Kirkuk.77 This iectio occurred immediatelyfollowing the April 20 Provincial elections, from which

Anbar and Ninewa were excluded ostensibly for securityreasons.78This created another opportunity for AQI toamplify operatioal eects to exploit the gap betwee

Iraqs Sui Arabs ad the state. It is likely that so mayredundant opportunities caused AQI to double down onits eorts i Iraq. Maximizig force to target the Shiain Baghdad indicates AQIs principal strategy remainedfocused upon igniting a civil war that would mobilize thesegments of the Sunni Arab community already teeteringon the edge of an uprising.

The Extremist Regional Sectarian Face-O

Shia militat activity i the regio also coicided withthis phase change in AQIs VBIED operation. On April

30, 2013, Hezbollah leader Hasa nasrallah overtlyannounced the organizations role in the Syrian civiwar, statig that Hezbollah will ot let Syria fall.7

Jabhat al-nusra, Syrias al-Qaeda aliate, respoded bydeclarig Hezbollah militats i Syria its top priority.80

These events demonstrate that extremist groups on bothsides of the sectaria divide had faced o i Syria. Theyalso iueced the mobilizatio of Shia militias i Iraqto the beet of AQI.

AQI STATE VISION MAP (SOURCE: MEMRI, 2006)


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O May 4, the Iraia-sposored Shia militat groupi Iraq, Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) held a massive rallyi Baghdad. AAH had also recetly made its presecekow i Syria as part of the Abu al-Fadl al-AbbasBrigade (AFAB).81AAH leader Qais al-Khazali called omembers at the Baghdad rally to maintain readiness.82This evet costituted a sigicat measure of AQIsability to provoke a response, and AQI may also haveincreased operational tempo in order to mass on thisobjective.

Other Considerations

Yet aother factor may have iueced AQIs battleplan in May 2013. Abd al-Malik al-Saadi, a seniorSunni cleric active within the anti-government protestmovement, announced on May 13 that he would forma Commissio of Goodwill to begi egotiatios withthe Maliki government on behalf of protesters fromall six provinces.83 The protests had become dividedbetwee recociliatio ad isurgecy iueces sicethe beginning of May 2013, and protesters in Salah ad-Din and Anbar demonstrated favor toward al-Saadis

initiative.84

The cessation of protests would have directlyundercut AQIs political strategy; it is possible that AQIicreased attacks i order to mobilize ISF to block thiseort.

But contemporaneous events alone do not explain thisphase chage. AQI greatly icreased the frequecy adsophistication of its VBIED operations at this time,indicating that added resources and organizationalgrowth were installed months earlier. In most cases,

attacks occurred weekly, indicating an increased abilityto sustain attacks in repeatable fashion. This escalationdemostrates AQIs reemet of its ability to recoverand reset after attacks and the establishment of multiplexed sites for preparig ad stagig VBIEDs.

Furthermore, the waves occurrig durig the last quarterof the Breakig the Walls campaig (May 2013 - July2013) often achieved casualty levels in excess of 300,most with fewer than 12 VBIEDs per wave. This indicatesthat the lethality of individual VBIEDs increased overtime, and emphasizes improved construction, improvedexecution, and reorientation primarily on civilian targetsThe organizational growth may also be a direct resultof the Tikrit Tasrat priso break, which repleished

AQI with new veteran manpower, potentially for use inIraq ad Syria. The source of AQIs amplied materialresources are as of yet unexplained. Phase IV of the

Breakig the Walls campaig cocluded with the altwo prison attacks on July 21, 2013. The Abu Ghraibprison attack resulted in the escape of 500 prisoners andthe death of 68 ISF troops. The attack upo Taji priso

was the third unsuccessful attempt over the course ofthe campaign. AQI then declared the conclusion ofBreakig the Walls.

Eects of the attack on Abu Ghraib

The effects of the Abu Ghraib prison attack uponIraq have bee profoud. First, it permitted a huge

manpower infusion to AQI, five times greater thanthat produced by the Tikrit Tasfirat prison breakin September 2012, assessed in this report to havesignificantly enhanced AQIs operational capability in2013. This manpower infusion may now be directedtoward Syria as well, for safe haven as well as operationadeploymet. Though ISF has coducted operatios tothe north and west of Baghdad to interdict AQI,85it islikely that most of the prisoners are still at large and

will become a part of the fighting force by 2014.

Additioally, this priso break demostrated to the Iraqpopulatio that AQI ca break hardeed ISF defesesEven though Abu Ghraib may be considered the leastdefensible prison facility for a number of reasons, this

was still a shocking victory for AQI, which was also ableto match ISF i a sustaied reght for a umber ofhours. This success gave sigicat advatage to AQIby demonstrating its capacity to the rest of the al-Qaedanetwork. It also supports the legitimacy of AQI as apolitical entity in Syria by showcasing its military might

AQI RAMADAN 2013, ALEPPO (SOURCE: HALAB)


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ad operatioal iitiative o the Iraq Frot. This successhas likely contributed to AQIs operations inside Syria,

where their operational initiative as well as governancestrategy may now be observed north of Aleppo.86

AQIs operatios at the ed of Breakig the Walls,

especially the attack upon the Abu Ghraib prison,demad a aggressive ISF respose, though the Iraqigovermet must be equally careful ot to trigger Suipopular backlash. If the ISF is able to mout eectivecounterterrorism operations to reestablish securityin Baghdad, to clear the Baghdad belts, and to regainmometum to project force ito the provices, the Iraqigovernment may be able to regain enough legitimacy toconsolidate gains. Targeting the AQI cells producingthese VBIED attacks should be a top priority becausesuch attacks are iictig more civilia casualties thaany other AQI operation, and constitute a principal

threat to Iraqi stability at preset.

If the ISF istead coducts blid search ad raidoperations into Sunni neighborhoods and communitiesthat result in mass arrests, the government mayprecipitate a Sui isurgecy. JRTn, defected ISFunits, and departed Sahwa could amplify this revolt,ad eectively egate the advace of the ISF. Aside fromcraftig a more eective couterterrorism strategy, itis imperative that the Iraqi govermet recocile ati-government protestors to the state. There must be ahealthy perspective of Sunni participation in governanceamog the Arab populatio if Iraq is to emerge from thethreat of al-Qaeda.

THE NEXT CAMPAIGN: SOLDIERS HARVEST

AQI announced the start of a new campaign on July30, 2013, claiming the VBIED wave on July 29 as theiaugural attack of the Soldiers Harvest campaig.87Asof September 1, 2013, there have bee ve large VBIED

waves followig the coclusio of the Breakig the Walls

campaign, on July 29, August 6, August 15, and August20, and August 28, 2013. These waves focused uponBaghdad ad souther Iraq. Durig this rst moth,

AQI has also struck critical ifrastructure, specicallythe port of Um Qasr near Basra.88This suggests that AQImay escalate to strike more heavily protected facilitiesover the course of the next campaign.

Forecastig how else AQI will prosecute the 2013-

2014 campaig requires a study of the other elemetsof AQIs military organization, how they relate to

AQIs governance strategy, and how this relationshiptraslates to ew operatioal objectives. It also requiresa parallel study of Iraqi Security Forces, Malikisscheme of maneuver, and how AQI will plan to disrupt

national elections in 2014. The new campaign will likelycapitalize upo AQIs amplied VBIED capability adcontinue its integration into attacks targeting hardenedgovernment facilities. Prison attacks and spectacularattacks targetig Shia civilias will likewise cotiuePolitical assassiatios of Sui as well as Shia gures

will likely escalate as Baghdad becomes more permissivefor AQI at the expese of ISF.

Outside of Baghdad, AQI will likely begin to operatewith impunity in villages where its control becomespalpable. In northern Diyala, southern Baghdad

northern Anbar, and Samarra, AQI may begin to projectsecurity battalions into urban areas, causing populationsto displace. Population displacement will serve as theprincipal indicator that AQI has reestablished conditionsthat reect the state of play i Iraq before the Surge.

AQIS MILITARY ORGANIZATION

This study seeks to interpret VBIED wave patterns overtime for what they indicate of AQIs organizational

evolution into a professional military force. Maintaininga high volume of attacks at short and regular intervalsdemonstrates measurable growth in capacity to planoperate, and sustain multiple VBIED cycles, revealing abroader array of technical expertise as well as increasinglysophisticated operational design. VBIEDs and prisonbreaks do ot ecompass the whole of the Breakig the

Walls campaig. AQIs 2012-2013 campaig likely alsoinvolved dedicated operations to establish and secure safehavens. Nevertheless, the VBIED campaign demonstrateshow well AQI recostituted as a ghtig force i the wakeof U.S. withdrawal. It dispels the possibility that AQIremaied a small etwork of disparate ghters loosely ledby a central political personage, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi

As such, it reduces the expectation that removing onekey leader will defeat al-Qaeda i Iraq.

Instead, AQIs campaign showcases the depth of a multi-echelon military organization with well-establishedcommand and control that can design and implementcoordiated attacks across the whole of Iraq. This


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directed.

Indicative of this operational art, AQI maintained itsinitiative while reacting to events in Syria; to the actionsof political gures i Iraq; ad to the operatios ofIraqi Security Forces. The orgaizatio exploited thecreation of the anti-government protest movementthe clash betwee protesters ad ISF at Hawija, adother unpredicted opportunities to their gain. And

yet it appears that these evets merely solidied AQIscampaig pla for Breakig the Walls. The assessed fourphases of the Breakig the Walls campaig described ithis report align with a shockingly symmetrical planningcalendar that may very well have progressed with minimaldisturbance for the entire year, at least where VBIED

waves ad priso attacks were cocered (For more othis, see Part II of this report).

The pricipal actio arm leveraged by AQI to iict

organization enjoys unconstrained communicationamong teams as well as unconstrained access to humancapacity and materiel. This negates the assumption thatthe Syria civil war caused AQI to eglect the Iraq frot.Istead, AQI seized the iitiative i Iraq as it gaiedground in Syria. Al-Baghdadi is now capitalizing upon aposition of military strength in order to assert initiativeon both fronts.

The most impressive and visible aspect of AQIs new

military organization is its reconstituted operationalart. AQI maitaied the iitiative i Iraq throughoutthe Breakig the Walls campaig, particularly fromFebruary 2013 July 2013. This iitiative bears adistinctive operational design signature at the force-levelas well as the VBIED organizational level. The force-levelplanning element is assessed to have designed the prisonattacks, while the VBIED planning team designed VBIED

waves and provided support to force-level operations as


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additional information on the waves discussed in thissection in Part II of this report). These elements of controlrequire both cetralized support ad decetralizedexecutio, which frames a core questio cocerig

which organizational model best describes the institutionresponsible. A highly centralized organization thatprepares VBIEDs ad deploys ghters may be regarded

as less organized, less capable, and less resilient than onethat is merely centrally guided, comprised of multipleself-contained cells that are capable of independentoperations with minimal support. As of August 2013,

AQIs VBIED wave pattern suggests AQI has developeda VBIED organization involving two echelons one toplan, support, and communicate; and one to constructand deploy VBIEDs.

The VBIED waves at the ed of the Breakig the Wallscampaign were highly controlled, of a consistent interval,and high yield, indicative of continued thoughtful

planning, but also the presence of high-performingforward-deployed teams capable of executing the plani repeatable fashio. For example, the VBIED wavesthat focused attacks upon Baghdad on May 15, May 20,May 27, and May 30, 2013 were not likely dependentupon a central command for all manner of support inexecution; this interval does not allow time for teamsto gather and disperse, for central leadership to providetraiig ad specic guidace, or for ew ghters to

err. The more likely scenario involves multiple teamsalready reed i their executio receivig istructioto attack on a given day and executing with little furthermanagement or interference.

In order to maintain this volume of attacks at close intervalthese teams were also likely able to access VBIEDs frommultiple construction sites. This hypothesis is supportedby the improbability that one VBIED facility was able tomaitai the throughput required for the waves see ithe later stages of the campaign. Whereas the July 2012ad September 2012 VBIED waves required a high oe-time volume, such that the VBIEDs might have beenmanufactured centrally over time and then staged; thepattern of attacks towards the end of the campaign suggestsa system more akin to multiple assembly lines for massproduction. The pace of attacks is determined in part bythe pace of VBIED construction, and the pace of attacksdrastically increased. Decentralized VBIED construction

is also easier to mask and harder to interdict, and it isan observable indicator of the expanded organizationaldepth of AQIs VBIED activity.

Expanding this idea further, the apparent shift in theVBIED construction system is one possible explanationfor the overall shift in VBIED waveform observed overthe course of the Breakig the Walls campaig. Thepattern began in Phase I as few high amplitude wavesspanning a wide geographic footprint, and it shifted


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by the al phase to may successive smaller waves thatwere focused geographically. This waveform may dependupon many factors, to include planning guidance toaccomplish phased operational objectives, resourcelimitations, and available combat power, but the rate-determining step for the VBIED capability is foremost

VBIED construction. Increased VBIED constructionmay have been the principal reason for the shift over thecourse of the Breakig the Walls campaig to eable

AQI to mass attacks upon Baghdad in 2013.

In addition to ready access to VBIED construction sites,forward deployed VBIED cells of the variety estimatedi the summer of 2013 required a degree of iteralorganization to perform minimum key functions: tocommuicate with a higher headquarters; to receivead deploy ghters; to receive ad deploy VBIEDs; adto spot ad desigate specic targets. The footprit of

individual VBIED cells may be traced in the attack databased upon evident geographic clusters, though it doesnot follow that these high performing teams are tetheredto local geography in every case. What a team lacks inlocal familiarity it must recover in preparation, and thecharacteristic VBIED cells observed in this study arecapable of surging to new attack zones rather than beingrestricted to a maximum radius of attack.

The idea that VBIED cells may not be geographicallydelimited emerges with the campaign swing to Baghdadi February 2013. This atiowide cosolidatio of

VBIED combat power indicates a surge role for VBIEDcells that had been operating far from Baghdad priorto February 2013. Almost o VBIEDs are documetedi this study betwee February 17 ad April 14, 2013 iKirkuk, Ninewa, and Salah ad-Din provinces, withinor outside of VBIED waves. Attacks in Kirkuk resumedon April 15, 2013 in a wave that synchronized attacks

with eects i Baghdad. The hiatus i orther VBIEDactivity, like the January 2013 break in VBIED waves, isnot yet fully understood. These cells may have shifted toBaghdad, shifted to Syria, or bee disrupted by the ISF

or iteral costraits. However, because they precededa drastic rise in VBIED wave activity in Baghdad in May2013, they may reasonably be considered as indicatorsof a growth step in the AQI VBIED organization andevidece that cells ca lift ad shift re.

Rather than identifying VBIED cells exclusively basedon geography, VBIED cells may instead be bounded

by feasible attack volume.*It is clear from the data thatsmaller clusters of VBIEDs with common geographyoccur frequetly betwee VBIED waves. The occurreceof small clustered VBIED activity is a key insight into thepresece of VBIED cells. For example, as the graph abovedepicts, the high overall level of VBIED activity continued

in January 2013 despite the temporary break in VBIEDwave activity. This suggests that VBIED cells were capableof mounting independent groupings of attacks withoutguidance to synchronize with other teams. It is also clearevidence of the presence of a centralized VBIED waveplanning element that was absent only during this timebefore resumig operatios i February 2013.

VBIED construction sites are a critical vulnerability ofthe VBIED organization because they are not mobilelike VBIED cells, and because they are laden withhigh visibility material resources, such as many cars

components, and explosives. It is not yet clear whatexplosive material comprises most VBIEDs, though thehigh volume of attacks suggests a steady supply chain.Oe report from Iraqi Police i najaf i December 2012indicated that a VBIED was seized containing two menand a large amount of TNT and C4.92Another reportfrom the Tigris Operations Command on August 20,2013 indicated that a raid on a VBIED factory includedammonium and C4.93 Still another police raid inSalah ad-Din on August 20, 2013 reported seizure ofan explosives factory in Suleiman Beg that involved 37

containers of DDT, TNT, and 20 motorcycles.94

Theseare isolated reports at this time, though the nature of theexplosives is a critical lie of iquiry for further study.It is important to establish how AQI procures explosivematerial i order for the ISF to disrupt logistics

* To re-egage the deitio of a VBIED wave as six or more VBIEDattacks, which theoretically represents coordination across multiple

cells, one VBIED cell is therefore not estimated to deploy more than 5

VBIEDs on one day. This threshold is reasonable because the detonation

of 5 VBIEDs likely requires a team of 5-10 ghters i additio to sup-

port sta ad leadership. Eective orgaizatios larger tha this requirefurther subdivision because of the dictates of span of control. A func-

tioal team this size is therefore a eective uit of measure for a basic

VBIED cell. For the purposes of framig the data, it is useful to idetify

smaller VBIED clusters as having structure and meaning even when they

do ot ivolve the high orgaizatio of a VBIED wave. Orgaizig a

VBIED wave of more tha 5 VBIEDs is therefore cosidered to require

coordiatio across cells. Recet reports from the Iraqi Couter-Ter-

rorism Task Force also idicated o August 21, 2013 that they coducted

a raid on a 16-man VBIED cell operating IVO Baghdad.


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supporting spectacular explosive attacks.

The fact that these cells are also responsive to centralizedguidance to synchronize attacks further indicates theprofessionalization of the VBIED organization. It isuclear how they commuicate, though ISF has reportedcoscatig motorcycles with forged documets uposite exploitation;95 and security battalions at leastreportedly receive instruction by courier.96AQI has alsolately warned Syrian jihadist organizations to exercise

communications security as a principal lesson learnedfrom ghtig Americas i Iraq.97Nevertheless, becausethe early waves of the Breakig the Walls campaigbear a top-dow quality as compared to later waves, itbecomes apparent both that the AQI VBIED commandhas developed new organizational depth over the last

year; and that a distinct planning vision is still drivingVBIED waves as of August 2013.

The enumeration of VBIED cells is critical to theestimatio of AQIs combat power. Furthermore, it isecessary to uderstad how to match ISF operatioaldesig to eradicate AQIs VBIED capability. For examplethe ISF search ad raid operatio ito orther Baghdadon August 4, 2013 may have had the potential to disrupt a

VBIED cell in the vicinity of the northern Baghdad beltshowever, VBIED waves continued without interruptionin August 2013. This is likely due to the presence ofadditional VBIED cells projecting attacks in Baghdad

from the southern belts. The total volume of VBIEDsoccurig withi waves from February 2013 to August2013 also clearly indicates the presence of multipleoperational cells that cannot each produce a full waveof VBIEDs in isolation. A wave involving 10 or more

VBIEDs may be estimated to involve a minimum of twoand likely three VBIED cells. The attacks mentionedbelow are discussed in further detail in Part II of thisreport.


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Baghdad

The dense geographic clustering into three distinctzones of Baghdad and the overall high volume of attacks,

usually in excess of 12 VBIEDs per wave, suggest theremay be three cells conducting attacks in the city as of

August 2013. There appears to be a northern Baghdadattack zone extending from Shula in the northwest toSadr City in the northeast; along with a southeasternzone and a southwestern zone. Considering the relativepermissibility of the Baghdad belts, these cells may beoperating on the periphery of Baghdad, to the north,south, and southwest, where AQI had enjoyed sanctuaryhistorically.98One or both of the southern belt cells mayalso be responsible for attacks in downtown Baghdad, in

Karrada and Sadoun, particularly.Perhaps the best illustration of the presence of multiplecells operating in Baghdad, and in particular from thesouthern belts, is the spread of the Baghdad attacks on

July 20, 2013, the day before the prison attacks uponAbu Ghraib and Taji base. These attacks largely avoidedthe traditional northern zone. This spread indicatesthat the northern cell was not in play that day, likelybecause it had been re-tasked to support one or both

prison attacks on July 21, 2013.

AQI had an operational presence in Baghdad from thebegiig of the Breakig the Walls campaig. The day

before the very large July 23, 2012 wave, a smaller waveof seven VBIEDs struck a number of locations. Threeof those VBIEDs detonated in Mahmoudiyah, south ofBaghdad, which is a possible area of interest for furtherstudy to detect one of the southern belt VBIED cellsNorthern Baghdad neighborhoods such as Sadr City,Husseiiya, ad Ur were struck as part of the rst large

July 23, 2012 wave the following day, which may indicatethat multiple staging areas had emerged in the vicinity ofBaghdad from the early days of the campaign.

It is important to consider the full spectrum of possiblelocations for VBIED cells, and VBIED construction sitesparticularly, in order to focus collection of intelligenceto corm or dey. It is especially importat at this timeto understand the depth of AQI in the southern beltsbecause ISF couter-AQI operatios i the ortherzone will fail if not synchronized with operations in thesouthern zones. They will also fail if they target the locaSunni population and not the high-performing VBIEDteams perpetratig attacks i Baghdad. Istead, if the ISF


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is able to disrupt the logistics of the VBIED apparatus,and to block their avenues of approach to Baghdad, theoperatios may be able to dampe the societal eectsof VBIEDs long enough to generate domestic policychanges.

NorthernIraq

Next to Baghdad, Kirkuk city and its environs wereslammed with VBIED attacks at intense periods at thebegiig of the Breakig the Walls campaig. nie

VBIEDs detonated in Kirkuk on July 23, 2013, alongwith two VBIEDs in Tuz Khurmatu to the south of thecity. Three additioal VBIEDs detoated i Muqdadiyah,south of Tuz Khurmatu, with further attacks i Baquba,Diyala. Again based upon estimated volume of attacksin each location, this VBIED wave appeared to involvea large umber of ghters operatig i the ortheast of

Iraq. This orther group of VBIEDs withi the July 23,2012 wave compared to four VBIEDs that detonated inBaghdad that day, and the three aforementioned VBIEDssouth of Baghdad in Mahmoudiyah the day before.The relative density of attacks in the North dissipatedby September 9, 2012. Attacks in the North generallymatched Baghdad attacks util February 2013, whenorthern activity generally ceased for two months.

Northern attacks resumed in April 2013 to a lesserdegree. As of August 2013, it appears that there is still acell conducting attacks in Kirkuk city and Tuz Khurmatu.

Because the volume is low and the rate inconsistent, itis possible that the same cell is responsible for attacksin Kirkuk, northern Salah ad-Din, possibly southernSalah ad-Din, and even Mosul. The assignment of a

wide geographic assignment to one cell may be feasible,particularly if the VBIED cell and the construction siteare based along the road that connects Kirkuk city toBaiji, or Tuz Khurmatu to Tikrit, Furthermore, thenorthernmost east-west route between Baiji and Kirkukforms the southern boundary of the Zaab triangle whichstretches northwest to Mosul. This region had also been

another historic support zone for AQI.99

By contrast, it does not appear that there is a VBIEDcell operating in Diyala at this time. The last VBIEDdocumeted i Diyala provice was defused by ISFon June 13, 2013.100 Given that VBIED attacks hadconcentrated at various points in the early campaignin the Diyala river valley, it now appears that AQI hasregained control of this support zone. A report fromthe Tigris Operations Command on August 20, 2013

idicated that operatios i the Hamri Moutais areabeginning in northern Diyala had resulted in the arrestof 48 personnel, six vehicles, 23 motorcycles, a VBIEDfactory, a traiig camp, ad 21 ries.101 It is possiblethat this had been a command and control node within

AQIs support zone, and potentially that which had

played a pricipal role at the begiig of the Breakigthe Walls campaig, whe VBIED operatios werelikely more cetralized. It is ot yet clear how this ISFoperatio will aect AQIs combat power, but VBIED

waves continued in Baghdad on August 20 and 282013.102

Mosul

Single VBIEDs detonated intermittently in Mosulthroughout the campaign until June 10, 2013, ahead ofprovincial elections on June 20, 2013.103On June 10

three VBIEDs detonated in Mosul, synchronized withattacks in Tuz Khurmatu, Kirkuk, and Baghdad. Twodays later, ISF defused two VBIEDs i East Mosul.104

This might suggest that a cell might have formed in closeproximity to Mosul, but attacks do not cluster again inMosul as of the time of this report. This suggests rstthat the northern VBIED cell that likely covers Kirkukand northern Salah ad Din also covers Mosul and Tel

Afar as needed. It may also suggest that Mosul began asa permissive support zone for AQI, and thus that theorganization, as in the Diyala River Valley, did not needor want VBIED attacks within their support zone.

Anbar

A VBIED cell in Anbar also appears among the originalcostellatio of actors at the begiig of Breakigthe Walls, although the cell participated miimallyin synchronized waves. Only one VBIED detonatedin Anbar on July 23, 2012, and none detonated onSeptember 9, 2012. However, a cluster of three VBIEDsi Ramadi ad Fallujah occurred o September 13, 2012Clusters of local VBIEDs occurred again on September24, 2012 ad May 1, 2013, agai oset i timig fromthe main wave.. The apparent trend of independentcell activity and minimal participation in synchronized

waves continued through August 2013. As of the timeof this report, the Anbar VBIED cell never participatedin a coordinated VBIED wave with more than one

VBIED. This may idicate that the cell has dicultycommunicating with the rest of the VBIED organizationor that it suers from some other costrait. It may alsobe unresponsive to tasking.


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Southern Iraq

AQI has deliberately targeted Shia populatio ceters isouther Iraq sice the begiig of the Breakig the

Walls campaig. This is a particularly impressive feat,given the great distance between the support zone needed

to construct a VBIED and the attack zones observed.From September 9, 2012 oward, AQI struck Basra,Amara, Imam al-Sharqi, nasiriyah, Diwaiya, najaf,Karbala, ad Shia commuities south of Baghdad.

VBIEDs began to cluster there in late December 2012,ad clusters occurred several times before the February2013 push to Baghdad began. The southern cell appearedto participate in this push to Baghdad.

On June 16, 2013, a wave of nine VBIEDs struckmost of these locatios i souther Iraq. A similar

wave happened again on July 14, 2013. Because this

concentration does not usually occur, it is reasonableto assess that the southern VBIED cell and the southernBaghdad belt cells interoperate, such that the southernBaghdad belt cells assist in waves directed at cities insouther Iraq; ad that the souther Iraq cell assistsin attacks upon Baghdad from the southern belts. Thishypothesis accounts for the volume of attacks in southernIraq o Jue 16, 2013 ad July 14, 2013, which exceedthe estimated capability of a single cell. It is possible butunlikely that the southern belt cells are solely responsiblefor the attacks i souther Iraq. Istead, there is likelyan additional cell, possibly located in Iskandriyah orMussayib in northern Babel, or Arab Jabour north of

Wasit, that covers the southern zone.

Southern Salah ad-Din

Like Mosul, only single VBIEDs occurred in southernSalah ad-Di provice throughout the Breakig the

Walls campaig. Sigle VBIEDs occurred i the citiesof Samarra, Balad, Taji, or Tarmiyah in conjunction

with most of the Phase I waves, and several independentVBIEDs detonated in isolation during Phase II. Thisearly pattern does not indicate the presence of a self-contained VBIED cell capable of conducting multipleidepedet attacks. Furthermore, the largest observedcluster of four VBIEDs in Taji occurred as part of theSeptember 9, 2012 wave, and VBIEDs never clusteredin this region again as of August 2013. In fact, the last

VBIED documented in southern Salah ad Din occurredon June 9, 2013 in Taji.105Given that this region is keyterrain for the northern approach to Baghdad, it is morelikely that AQI has decided not to strike this area with

VBIEDs tha that AQI is limited from doig so. For thesame reaso, this regio is critically importat for ISFto clear and protect in order to re-establish security inBaghdad.

WHAT WE KNOW

This study has raised many possibilities and manyquestios about the dispositio of al-Qaeda i Iraqtoday. It is therefore necessary to take inventory of thefacts, assessments, and remaining unknowns at thistime.

Facts

It is a fact that AQI announced the beginning of theBreakig the Walls campaig o July 21, 2012 adits end on July 23, 2013. It is further known that AQIhas claimed credit for umerous attacks i Iraq overthe course of the same period, including many of the

VBIED waves ad priso breaks idetied i this studyattributed them to an overarching campaign plan, andeven published a statistical report to credit themselves

with measures of their performance.*

It is a fact that violece levels i Iraq i 2013 by variousmeasures, including documented casualty totals and the

volume of VBIEDs documented in this study, compareto wartime levels when the U.S. military was thoroughly

egaged i the ght. It is a fact that VBIEDs were chieyresponsible for the rise in casualties from December2011 to August 2013. It is a fact that they were oftensynchronized to strike on the same day at locationsthat were sometimes geographically concentrated andsometimes widespread.

It is a fact that AQIs military organization is capableof other attacks besides VBIEDs, including IEDs

* On August 13, 2013, AQI published a campaign update in itsmilitary periodical, al-naba. Accordig to SITE Itelligece

Group, AQI took inventory of its attacks from November 26, 2011 toNovember 15, 2012, documenting 4,500 operations broken down

by region and type. The statistics in AQIs periodical have not been

fully compared to those documented in this study, but the number

of VBIED attacks claimed by AQI during this period greatly exceed

those documented from open sources.

ISIL Claims 4,500 Operatios i Oe-Year Period i Iraq, Gives

Statistics, traslated ad published by SITE Itelligece Group,

August 13, 2013.


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Advising Iraqi Security Forces

It is ecessary for ISF to reduce the VBIED threat iIraq i order to preserve the state agaist the threatof al-Qaeda. VBIEDs are the single highest source ofcasualties i Iraq. Reducig VBIEDs requires targetighigh codece locatios ad disruptig operatioalows. Reducig VBIEDs will ot reduce AQIs force-level military command or planning capacity. In fact,one can expect that reducing VBIEDs will translate to

The locations of the forward VBIED cells, forward VBIEDconstruction sites, and central VBIED leadership are yetunknown, but the adjacent map depicts named areas ofinterest for these locations that may focus collection forfurther reemet of the assessmets delivered i thisstudy. The hypothesis of many VBIED factories has latelybee corroborated by ISF reportig o site exploitatiodurig the Revege of the Martyrs security operatioin Northern Baghdad.108


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the battlefrots of Iraq ad Syria merge.

CONCLUSION

It is critical to the development of U.S. policy options toaddress the security situatio created by AQI i Iraq ad

Syria to understand that it is both necessary and possibleto iterdict this threat. Iterdictio depeds rst adforemost upon expert intelligence and operationadesign, both of which the U.S. can provide in mentorshipas the vetera force which lately assisted ISF i the eardefeat of AQI. It is foremost ecessary that ISF mouteective operatios to disrupt AQIs attacks upo thepopulation if the legitimacy of the state is to endure

VBIEDs are AQIs most lethal and specialized attackvector, ad it should be targeted ad defeated rst.

Second, defeating AQI depends upon the active

participatio of Iraqs Arab Sui populatio inational defense, which ultimately drove AQI from itsstrogholds i wester ad orther Iraq i 2007-2008. This population is instead teetering on the edge ofan uprising as of Au

al qada in iraq report

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