alejandro arrieta department of economics rutgers university
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A Structural Misclassification Model to Estimate the Impact of Non- Clinical Factors on Healthcare Utilization. Alejandro Arrieta Department of Economics Rutgers University. June 7 th , 2008. Health Care Utilization. Over-utilization: Back surgery, heartburn surgery, cesarean section - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
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A Structural Misclassification Model to Estimate the Impact of Non-Clinical Factors on Healthcare
Utilization
Alejandro ArrietaDepartment of EconomicsRutgers University
June 7th, 2008
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Alejandro Arrieta Slide 2/16
Health Care Utilization Over-utilization: Back surgery, heartburn surgery,
cesarean section Under-utilization: Cardiovascular surgery for minorities
Research Questions What is appropriate level of treatment? How health outcomes are affected by non-clinical
factors? What is the degree of over/under treatment? What drives over/under treatment?
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Alejandro Arrieta Slide 3/16
Health Care Utilization: Application
Cesarean Section Rates: New Jersey
18%
20%22%
24%
26%28%
30%
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Observed c-section rates: 1994-2002
OVERTREATMENT?
C-sections in New Jersey grew from 22.5% to 27.5% between 1999 and 2002.
WHO and Healthy People recommend a rate of 15%.
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Alejandro Arrieta Slide 4/16
Physician Agency
Physician is the agent with informational advantage
Monetary or non-monetary incentives to deviate from appropriate treatment
Health outcomes Clinical factors Non-clinical factors
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Alejandro Arrieta Slide 5/16
Physician Agency
Physician observes health status h: healthy (h<0) or sickly (h≥0)
A is the appropriate treatment for sickly patient
B is the appropriate treatment for healthy patient
Physician chooses a treatment conditional on patient health status
Nature Physician
h≥0
h<0
U(i<0|h≥0 )
U(i≥0|h≥0 )
U(i<0|h<0 )
U(i≥0|h<0 )
appropriate
inappropriate
appropriate
inappropriate
AB
BA
Nature Physician
h≥0
h<0
U(i<0|h≥0 )
U(i≥0|h≥0 )
U(i<0|h<0 )
U(i≥0|h<0 )
appropriate
inappropriate
appropriate
inappropriate
AB
BA
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Alejandro Arrieta Slide 6/16
Nature Physician
h≥0
h<0
U(i<0|h≥0 )
U(i≥0|h≥0 )
U(i<0|h<0 )
U(i≥0|h<0 )
appropriate
inappropriate
appropriate
inappropriate
AB
BA
Physician Agency Physician incentives (i)
depend on perceived cost-benefits for each treatment
Inappropriate treatment arises when physician incentives are big (i≥0)
Physician chooses the treatment associated to the highest utility (U)
Patient observed medical information
Nature Physician
h≥0
h<0
U(i<0|h≥0 )
U(i≥0|h≥0 )
U(i<0|h<0 )
U(i≥0|h<0 )
appropriate
inappropriate
appropriate
inappropriate
AB
BA
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Alejandro Arrieta Slide 7/16
Structural Misclassification Model Health status: Patient requires treatment A if h≥0
Econometrician cannot observe the appropriate treatment . She only observes the physician treatment choice y.
Without non-clinical factors , and binary models (probit/logit) will return efficient estimators
hxh
0 if 1~ hxhy
)0Pr()1~Pr()1Pr( hyy)0Pr()0~Pr()0Pr( hyy
y~
yy ~
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Alejandro Arrieta Slide 8/16
Structural Misclassification Model
However, with non-clinical factors Physician’s incentives: Physician chooses the inappropriate treatment when
The probability of observing the treatment
izi
)0|0Pr()1~|0Pr()0|0Pr()0~|1Pr(
1
0
hiyyhiyy
)0Pr()1( )0Pr()0|0Pr()0Pr()0|0Pr()1Pr(
100
hhhihhiy
yy ~
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Alejandro Arrieta Slide 9/16
Structural Misclassification Model Cesarean section deliveries
For the c-section case:
Estimation using Maximum Likelihood Bivariate probit (Amemiya, 1985) with Partial
observability (Poirier, 1980)
Conventional approach:
Monte Carlo study: Conventional approach reports inconsistent estimates
)0Pr()0|0Pr()0Pr()1Pr( hhihy
)0Pr()1Pr( ihy
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Alejandro Arrieta Slide 10/16
Application:C-section in New Jersey 1999-2002
C-sections in New Jersey grew from 22.5% to 27.5% between 1999 and 2002.
WHO and Healthy People recommend a c-section rate of 15%.
What drives the rapid growth in c-section rates?
DATA Dependent variable: Mode of Delivery
c-section (y=1) or vaginal delivery (y=0) Patient discharge hospital data (NJ Dept of Health) US Census (zip code matching)
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Alejandro Arrieta Slide 11/16
Application:C-section in New Jersey 99-02
Clinical variables: Most relevant according to medical literature (14 variables, ICD codes).
Non-clinical variables: Direct physician incentives drivers (insurance
condition, hospital size, physician specialty) Signaling of patient-obtained medical
information and preferences (ethnicity/race, zip code income, social support, full employed woman)
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Alejandro Arrieta Slide 12/16
C-section in New Jersey 99-02Results
DEGREE OF OVER-TREATMENT
3.2% of non at-risk women had a c-section due to non-clinical
Each year, around 2,500 women have c-sections for non-medical reasons
Each year, $17.5 million paid in excessBUT THIS PERCENTAGE IS GROWING
dhhidhhii )0,0Pr()0,0Pr()0Pr(
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Alejandro Arrieta Slide 13/16
C-section in New Jersey 99-02Results
OBSERVED C-SECTIONS AND C-SECTIONS WITHOUT NON-CLINICAL INFLUENCE
Figure 2: Cesarean Section Rates: New J ersey
18%
20%22%
24%26%
28%30%
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002Observed c-section rates: 1994-2002Estimated c-section rates (health related only): 1999-2002
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Alejandro Arrieta Slide 14/16
C-section in New Jersey 99-02Results
WHAT DRIVES PHYSICIAN INCENTIVES? Direct Physician Incentives drivers
Insurance matters: women without insurance less likely to have a c-section followed by Medicaid (prospective payment) and HMO (capitated fees).
Hospital size matters: probability of c-section is higher if delivery is in a big hospital.
Specialization: more specialized doctors (Ob/Gyn) more likely to do a c-section.
Signaling of patient’s information and preferences Physician’s perception of informed patients Income: Higher income implies a lower probability of c-section. Ethnicity: Latin and Black women have higher probability of c-
sections, and white women lower probability. Social support: Married women or with partners have a lower
probability of c-sections. Full-time employed women have a higher probability of c-
section
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Alejandro Arrieta Slide 15/16
Conclusions
Contribution: A new methodology to efficiently measure
over- or/and under- healthcare utilization Methodology allows us to neatly separate out
the impact of non-clinical factors on risk-adjusted utilization rates
Methodology allows us to estimate the degree of over-treatment or under-treatment
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Alejandro Arrieta Slide 16/16
Extensions
Is racial bias in cardiovascular surgery originated by under-use for African Americans or over-use for White patients?
Deeper analysis of physician incentives in c-section rates. Do unnecessary c-sections increase newborn mortality and length of stay? Comparing risk-adjusted c-section rates.
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Alejandro Arrieta
Thank you
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Alejandro Arrieta
Clinical Variables
MARGINAL EFFECTSStructural Misclassification
Model with dept errors
Age (years) 0.00% *Breech or transverse lie presentation 0.40% *Diabetes 0.20% *Hypertension 0.10% *Pre-eclampsia 0.00% *Oligohydramnios 0.00%Polyhydramnios 0.40% *Multiple gestation 0.30% *Previous cesarean delivery 0.50% *Abruptio placenta 0.10% **Full or partial placenta previa 0.50% *Elderly primigravida >=35 y.o. 0.40% *Long labor 0.20% *Admission by emergency -0.30% *
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Alejandro Arrieta
Woman is married -2.20% *Zip code mean household income (thousands) -0.10% *Yearly average of births in Hospital (thousands) 0.50% *Obs&Gyn Physician 3.30% *Woman is full time employed 8.60% *Patient payment (uninsured) -8.50% *Medicaid payment -3.50% *HMO payment -1.40% *White (non-Hispanic) -2.40% *Black (non-Hispanic) 2.70% *Hispanic 2.70% *Year 2000 3.00% *Year 2001 4.70% *Year 2002 8.30% *
Non-Clinical Variables
MARGINAL EFFECTSStructural Misclassification
Model with dept errors
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Alejandro Arrieta
EstimatesRESULTS
Structural Misclassification Model with dept errors
Correlation -0.422 *(0.018)
Inducement (Marginal probability) 0.032(0.006)
Log-Likelihood function -160307.28Pseudo-R2 0.522Number of Observations 403660
Estimation was done in GAUSS 5.0. Program code is available under request.Standard errors in parenthesis. * Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 10%
Dependent variable is mode of delivery. 1 if it was a cesarea section, 0 if it was a vaginal delivery.