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Alex Callinicos's Marxism: Dialectics

and Materialism in Althusser and

Frankfurt SchoolVasilis Grollios

Published online: 31 May 2013.

To cite this article:Vasilis Grollios (2013) Alex Callinicos's Marxism: Dialectics and Materialism

in Althusser and Frankfurt School, Critique: Journal of Socialist Theory, 41:1, 55-75, DOI:

10.1080/03017605.2013.776231

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Alex Callinicoss Marxism: Dialectics

and Materialism in Althusser and

Frankfurt School

Vasilis Grollios

This paper will be of interest to all those who have a general interest in Western Marxism

since two traditions within this framework are opposed in this paper and their opposition

is explained: the Althusserian tradition, which is followed by Callinicos, and the

Frankfurt School, which is followed by me. The main purpose of the paper is not to

analyse Callinicoss theory per se but, through a focus on Callinicoss theory, to bring the

Frankfurt School/Open Marxist tradition into contrast with the Althusserian tradition

for the first time. My hope is to show how someone like Callinicos, who appears to be a

Marxist thinker, is really not, and thus to contribute to the discussion about what it

means to be a Marxist in political philosophy. I argue that the integration of a vague

notion of totality and dialectics into Callinicoss theory, as well his references to the role of

class struggle, which remain problematic, give a false impression that he has moved far

from the Althusserian path. Callinicoss political philosophy, like that of Althusser, has

difficulty in connecting both dialectics to materialism and also totality to difference and

contradiction, and thus in disentangling itself from liberal thinking.

Keywords: Dialectics; Materialism; State Theory; Althusser; Identity Thinking; Open

Marxism

Introduction

One of the best-known contemporary Marxist thinkers is Alex Callinicos. In this

paper, I will investigate the philosophical background of his understanding of

Marxism, focusing on his interpretation of materialism and dialectics. I choose to

write about his work not simply because he happens to be more widely known than

many other Marxist scholars, but because through the richness of his work it is

possible to raise and then elaborate on some key issues in Marxist thought. I am

aware of the fact that Callinicoss work does not exhaust all the Althusserian

interpretations that have been given. However, I think that he stays closer to

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Althussers works than other Althusserians. For obvious reasons, the article does not

have the goal of fully analysing all the wings1 of the Althusserian tradition, but to

discuss a number of key aspects of Callinicoss work in order to further promote

debate on how the two traditions in Western Marxism, the Althusserian and the

Frankfurt Schools, collide over their interpretation of the philosophical backgroundof Marxs philosophy (that is, his treatment of materialism and dialectics).

Callinicoss work is multidimensional and impressive in its scope. It has the

ambition to analyse in-depth issues not only of political philosophy but also of

political economy and political science. I must stress that it is not the goal of my

article to make an overall assessment of Callinicoss thinking. Considering the

interdisciplinary character of his theory, it is beyond the scope of this paper to refer

to all the subjects that are included in his thinking. I will turn my attention primarily

to those issues that could be considered more philosophical, using the term in its

strict definition. I will then focus my analysis on his understanding of the state inorder to clearly explain my disagreement with how dialectics and materialism work in

his political philosophy. Although issues related to dialectics and materialism are

encountered in all his writings, when compared with his overall number of

publications, his philosophical texts are few and derive mainly from his research in

the 1980s. The biggest problem not only in his interpretation of Marxs philosophy

but also in the whole Althusserian path is the dismissal of dialectics and fetishism. We

shall see that this has significant repercussions for his social theory, especially

regarding the state question.

The paper will be of interest to all those who have a general interest in Western

Marxism since two traditions in this framework are opposed in this paper: theAlthusserian tradition, which is followed by Callinicos, and the critical theory

tradition, which is followed by me. I will attempt to show how Callinicos, a so-called

Marxist thinker, does not follow the Marxist way of thinking, but rather follows the

traditional theory analysed by Horkheimer. However, the goal of the paper is not to

analyse only Callinicoss ideas, but through this analysis to show the possibility that

someone who appears to be a Marxist thinker may really not be. Therefore, the main

purpose of the paper is not only to juxtapose the critical theory/Open Marxist

tradition with the Althusserian tradition,2 but primarily through this debate to

elaborate on what it means to be a Marxist in political philosophy. Since mostresearch in Marxist philosophy is being conducted by political scientists rather than

philosophers, in the strict sense of the term, the opportunity to debate these topics,

1 However, some references and comments about the postmodern materialism wing of the Althusserian path

need to be made.2 I know of only one paper (Simon Clarke, Althusserian Marxism, in Simon Clarke, Vicor Jeleniewski

Seidler, Kevin McDonnell, Kevin Robins and Terry Lovell (eds) One-Dimensional Marxism: Althusser and the

Politics of Culture (London: Allison & Busby, 1980), pp. 7102) that has focused on the philosophical

background of this debate so far, beside the articles in The State Debate, of course. Bearing in mind that Clarke

as well as the articles in The State Debatedid not elaborate directly on the philosophical background of the

debate, that is, on the meaning of dialectics and materialism, another attempt to expand on this debate might beinteresting even today.

56 V. Grollios


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especially in an era when liberal theory has come to almost completely dominate the

discipline of political philosophy, is to be welcomed.

The Dismissal of Dialectics

After completing a PhD on the logic of Marxs Capital at Oxford University in 1978,

over the next decade Callinicos published four books on Marxs thought and

contemporary Marxist political philosophy. In Is There a Future for Marxism?he is

quite clear that materialism is a thesis in which there exists a reality prior to and

independent of thought which the latter in some way merely reflects .3 Following the

same reasoning in his lecture on the Althusserian legacy, he writes that historical

materialism uses procedures of theoretical inquiry fashioned by the physical sciences

to analyze processes of social transformation.4 He also stresses that materialism is

closely related to realism, the belief that reality is prior to thought.

5

It appears fromthese passages that he understands Marxian materialism as a theory severed from the

historical formation of the multiple social forms and values that reproduce the

capitalist mode of production.

InMaking History, however, he surprises the reader when he notes that he prefers a

passage (which he includes in the book) from the third volume of Capital as a

summary of historical materialism. Here Marx emphasizes that it is the direct

relationship between the owners of the means of production and the direct producers

that reveals the hidden basis of the social structure and with it the political form of

the corresponding form of the state. For Callinicos, Marx is claiming in this passage

that it is exploitation that explains this particular form of political domination.6

My first comment is that Callinicos does not demonstrate the connection between

this passage and his view that materialism is connected to realism. In this passage

Marx does not merely connect exploitation to the form of the state, as Callinicos

contends, but dialectically connects content/essence to form/appearance. In other

words, there is something much more important in this passage that has evaded

Callinicoss attention. This omission on his part has not occurred by chance; rather, it

is explained by the fact that Callinicos does not properly connect materialism to

dialectics. Materialism for Callinicos is not the ad hominem critique that Marx

stressed in his criticism of Hegels state.

7

What Marx actually states in this passage is in complete agreement with his eighth

thesis on Feuerbach, which I believe summarizes in the most explicit way the Marxian

view ofad hominem critique, meaning Marxs materialism: Social life is essentially

3 Alex Callinicos, Is There A Future for Marxism? (London: Macmillan Press, 1982), p. 115.4 Alex Callinicos, What Is Living and What Is Dead in the Philosophy of Althusser, in E. Ann Kaplan and

Michael Sprinker (eds) The Althusserian Legacy(London: Verso, 1993), p. 41.5 Callinicos,Is There A Future for Marxism?, op. cit., p. 115.6 Alex Callinicos, Making History: Agency, Structure and Change in Social Theory(Cambridge: Polity Press,

1987), p. 42.7

Karl Marx,Contribution to the Critique of Hegels Philosophy of Law, in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels,Collected Works, Vol. 3 (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1975), p. 182.

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practical. All mysteries which mislead theory into mysticism find their rational

solution in human practice and in the comprehension of this practice.8 Here, Marx

means that there is a hidden essence in every social form (such as the state) that is

identifiable in the way that people come into contact with each other in order to

satisfy their basic human needs.Thus, thehidden essence of the social structure9 that Marx was referring to in this

excerpt from the third volume ofCapital, which is met in Callinicoss book, becomes

apparent through the ad hominem critique, which enables us to see the unavoidable

contradiction of interests between the owners of the means of production and the

direct producers that lies behind every form and lies in the essence of the capitalist

mode of production. The dialectic between essence and form, which can be identified

in this excerpt, is ignored in Callinicoss Making History.

It must also be stressed that Callinicos contradicts himself when, on the one hand,

he criticizes Engels for projecting Hegelian categories onto the physical world10

but,on the other hand, he identifies materialism with the methodology of the physical

sciences.11 Furthermore, he maintains that there isa limited sense in which historical

materialism can be said to be dialectical.12 He believes that the contradictions

analysed by Marx have nothing to do with the Hegelian logical contradictions of form

because, in Marxs work, contradictions are intrinsic to a social structure. For

Callinicos, such a contradiction can take place only when a relationship exists

between social entities or when the entities are mutually interdependent. In order to

clarify his position, he employs the example of the interdependence of the relations of

production and productive forces.13 However, the mere existence of a relation

between two entities, even if it is admittedly an interdependent one, does not make

the relationship dialectical.

Most political thinkers within the liberal tradition would concur with the view that

we live in a world where things, entities, are strongly correlated to each other, to the

degree that there is an interdependence between them. For example, let us consider

how liberal texts perceive the relationship between the economic and the political.

When there exists the possibility that elections might be called, the Financial Times

and The Economist, for example, immediately analyse the possible impact that the

election will have upon the economy. Naturally, Callinicos would not regard this

interconnected analysis as dialectical in nature. Thus, the dialectical, at least as far asMarx is concerned, must mean something other than mere interdependence, and it is

the notion of mediation that properly lies at the core of dialectical thinking. Entities

are mediated to each other; they exist through each other; they are separate in unity,

8 Karl Marx, Theses on Feuerbach, in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 5 (London:

Lawrence & Wishart, 1976), p. 8.9 Karl Marx,Capital, Vol. 3, in Collected Works, Vol. 37 (New York: International Publishers, 1998), p. 778.10 Callinicos,Making History, op. cit., p. 53.11 Callinicos,What Is Living and What Is Dead in the Philosophy of Althusser, op. cit., p. 41.12

Callinicos,Making History, op. cit., p. 53.13 Callinicos,What Is Living and What Is Dead in the Philosophy of Althusser, op. cit., p. 41.

58 V. Grollios


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being forms of the same essence, of the most important relationship in society:

namely, the way people connect theirdoingin order to satisfy their most basic needs.

Another question that should be posed is the following: since Callinicos admits

that contradictions are intrinsic to reality, why is he so reluctant at the same time to

characterize Marxist thinking as dialectical? The answer lies with the fact thatCallinicoss understanding of dialectics is strongly connected to his aim of separating

himself from the Hegelian Marxist tradition, which in his opinion has bequeathed a

teleological structure to Marxist dialectics. He maintains that there is in Marx and

Engels a tendency to conceive of revolutionary consciousness as the inevitable result

of a linear process.14 For Callinicos, this teleology is also shown by Marxs supposed

belief that the forces of production generate changes in the relations of production.

Thus, he interprets Marx as a proponent of technological determinism, basing his

interpretation on the main text that orthodox Marxism uses to support this reading,

Marxs 1859 preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy.15 This

should come as no surprise to the reader of this article since, as we have seen,

Callinicos subscribes to the orthodox view of historical materialism as a physical

science methodology that can be applied to the social sciences. He may not admit

that he accepts determinism, but I cannot see how he can distance himself from it

since his understanding of Marx is underpinned by his belief in the relation between

the physical and social sciences.

The important point here is the fact that, although Callinicos has implicitly

accepted determinism, he makes a great effort to retain class struggle as an essential

element of the Marxian account of historical materialism. In The Revolutionary Ideas

of Karl Marx, he maintains that the outcome of Marxs dialectic is not predeterminedand that it is only through the consciousness of the working class that revolutionary

change can come about.16 Moreover, in Marxism and Philosophy, he maintains that

technological determinism occurs in the Marxian corpus only until Capital,

characterizing it as the first version of historical materialism. In Capital, however,

Callinicos believes that Marxs position has changed so that the forces of production

are subordinated to the relations of production, an element that sets class struggle at

the centre of the Marxian account of historical materialism.17 However, I cannot see

how Callinicoss two positions*his implicit determinism and the centrality of class

struggle to his understanding*

are compatible. How is it possible for someone tomaintain that historical materialism employs the same methodology as the physical

sciences and, at the same time, have at the core of his understanding of social

transformation the belief that the result of class struggle is uncertain?

For Callinicos, social reality is composed of two separate worlds: that of structure

and that of agency; that of actual reality, which is the capitalist mode of production,

and another world consisting of the underlying mechanisms that are liable to subvert

14 Callinicos,Is There A Future for Marxism?, op. cit., p.140.15 Alex Callinicos, Marxism and Philosophy(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), p.51.16

Alex Callinicos, The Revolutionary Ideas of Karl Marx (London: Bookmarks, 2004 [1983]), p. 80.17 Callinicos,Marxism and Philosophy, op. cit., p. 51.

Critique 59


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the actual reality. He himself admits that this is the case: It is only when structure

and agency are treated as ontologically distinct strata each*i.e., agents as well as

structures*having their own emergent powers that the interaction between the

two . . . can be properly understood.18 Furthermore, he supports the view that the

capitalist mode of production pertains to the real and that there are conditionsexternal to the capitalist mode.19 If bypertains to the real, he means that it belongs

to the real world, is there a non-real one? Where is this world? And if this other world

is indeed non-real or external to the capitalist mode, how can we philosophize about

it? The simplest question to be posed here is: how is it possible for a world to exist

that is external to the capitalist mode of production, and if it exists, how can we have

knowledge of it?

For Callinicos, then, there is the world of the mechanisms of the capitalist mode of

production and another world of conditions external to the capitalist mode. He is

convinced that the underlying mechanisms are separate from and lieaway from theactual reality.20 It becomes clear, therefore, that Callinicos sees the world as

composed of two realities: the actual one and another reality that is not actual. Yet

if it is not actual, what kind of reality is it? An imaginary one? And if so, how can it

possibly be analysed and understood? If this is the case, then Marx is a writer about

the non-real as much as he is about the real. In this interpretation, Marx is more akin

to a writer of literature than a philosopher.

The fact that, for Callinicos, the world is not dialectical in its essence becomes

evident by his comment that Capitalinvolves the construction of levels of analysis,

some of which posit the existence of real contradictions,21 and by his view that the

ordering of contradictions does not require us to conceive every determination as

involving a real contradiction.22

When the above is taken into consideration, it is surprising that Callinicos believes

that he can still conceptualize society as a contradictory totality.23 However, his

notion of totality is doomed to remain vague, with its relation to dialectics

undetermined. The last of the many unanswered questions that I believe derive from

Callinicoss argument concerns the role of class struggle in this contradictory

totality. Where does class struggle belong? Does it belong to the actual or to the non-

actual reality, to the world of mechanisms or to the world of conditions external to

the capitalist mode of production?For Callinicos, then, form and essence are not mediated through each other; they

are not parts of the same relation. Things, social forms, such as the state, money or

representative democracy, are not themselves contradictory in nature since contra-

diction is not inherent in the thing itself. In Callinicoss thinking, social relations are

18 Alex Callinicos, The Resources of Critique (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006), p. 185.19 Ibid., p. 203.20 Ibid.21 Ibid., p. 201.22

Ibid., p. 202.23 Ibid., p. 203.

60 V. Grollios


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not forms of an underlying essence that is contradictory in its nature, and social

forms are not perverted forms of our doing. Thus, Callinicos cannot uphold Marxs

understanding of our world as a topsy-turvy world. For Callinicos, contradiction lies

outside the social forms. Thus, his theory cannot give voice to the mystery of that

reality.24

According to his interpretation of the contradictory nature of reality, ForMarx the statement that reality is contradictory means that class struggle, social

conflict, and economic crises are endemic to every social formation divided into

classes.25 However, I do not believe that this is what Marx had in mind when he

underlined the contradictory nature of the capitalist mode of production. Social

conflict and class struggle also took place in other societies, even in ancient ones,

before the appearance of the capitalist mode of production. Class conflict and

struggle are not characteristics unique to the capitalist mode of production.

Callinicos misses the point here.

For the Critical Theory tradition, however,26

the capitalist system is contradictoryin its nature because contradiction lies in the essence of every form,27 since forms in

the capitalist mode of production are the appearance of our doing, that is to say, of

the perverted way in which we come into contact with each other and with nature in

order to satisfy our needs. Since the means of production in capitalism are owned by

individuals*by capitalists*the workers cannot control the most basic relation in

society: that is, the way in which they satisfy their elementary needs. The

transformation of our doing into abstract labour, into capital, and into money,

means that, rather than people dominating wealth and using it to fulfil their basic

human needs, wealth (capital) dominates them and transforms them into

personifications of economic categories. This is the gist of the argument on the

existence of contradiction, on the dialectical relation between form (capital) and

content (our doing), meaning on the dialectical nature of our world.

For Althusser it is not politics but economy that is determinant in the last

instance.28 Political struggle is a distinct and specific level . . . the real con-

densation, . . . in which is reflected the complex whole.29 It becomes clear from

Althussers writings that he cannot maintain the logic of the topsy-turvy worldand

the trinity formula is the distorted formthat the contradictory nature of the way we

come into contact with each other in order to satisfy our basic human needs takes in

the capitalist mode of production, since we are forced to accumulate wealth instead

24 Max Horkheimer, Traditional and Critical Theory, in Max Horkheimer, Critical Theory: Selected Essays

(New York: Herder & Herder, 1972), p. 217.25 Callinicos,Marxism and Philosophy, op. cit., p. 55.26 The Open Marxism tradition has been very successful in showing the dialectic relation between form

(appearance) and content (essence). It is my opinion that Holloway, especially in his most recent text Crack

Capitalism, has successfully shown the contradictory nature of totality.27 The opposite of Callinicoss conclusion, the fact that we should attempt to identify contradiction inside

the form, is something that Adorno repeats many times, especially in his Lectures on Negative Dialectics.28 Louis Althusser, For Marx (London: Verso, 2005), 215. See also Louis Althusser, Philosophy of the

Encounter: Later Writings, 1978

1987. (London: Verso, 2006), p. 59.29 Althusser, For Marx, op. cit., p. 215.

Critique 61


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of promoting human needs. What the third volume makes explicit is that fetishism is

not a phenomenon that exists alongside other phenomena in the capitalist mode of

production; rather, it forms the core element of the capitalist system. In capitalism,

we live under the dominance of mystified forms, such as the state, bourgeois

democracy30

or value as money, the essence of which must be identified. Thus, therole of the philosopher is to demystify, to defetishize social forms.

According to Horkheimer, this is precisely why traditional theorists, (one could

include Althusser among them) maintain the bourgeois-liberal notion of structure

becoming thus unable to succeed in bringing to the surface the hidden essence of the

reified forms and thus denaturalizing them. Rather than attempting to penetrate the

fact, inside the form, the traditional-liberal philosopher instead classifies it and

compares it with other similar forms.

This is exactly what Althusser does, since for him the many different contradictions

are not the many different forms of an underlying basic contradiction. AlthoughAlthusser sees the political and the economic as overdetermined by each other, he

understands them as distinct moments. I do not think that the liberal social theory

tradition would seriously object to this view. Both understandings are slightly

different versions of traditional/identity undialectical thinking. For Marxian

dialectics, on the other hand, class processes are not presupposed, separated and

then combined and overdetermined to non-class ones. Rather, all processes in society

are seen as expressions of the essence of the class struggle, or the misfitting of our

doing to the demands of abstract labour.

Clarke aptly stresses the fact that Althusser focuses not on the concept of

production, but on the question of the complexityof the whole which both is and

is not subject to determination by the economic.31 Thus, Althusser is making the

appearance the measure of all things, and so abandoning the law of value . . . to the

last instance which never comes.32

I will add that, instead of attempting a defetishizing of the different forms that the

irrationality of subordinating our doing to the logic of capital, the logic of time is

money, takes, Althusser and his follower Callinicos attempt a classification of these

forms in the framework of traditional theory.

Even newer attempts that elaborate Althussers notion of contradiction and

overdetermination are shackled in the framework of traditional theory. For the mostwell-known postmodern materialists, Wolff and Resnick, different theories shape

society differently just as society shapes them. The constant interplay is what we

think Marx meant by dialectics.33 They admit their preference for the word

30 For a reading of Marxs democracy, which is based in the Frankfurt School theory of the form-fetish, see

Vasilis Grollios, Marx and Engelss Critique of Democracy: The Materialist Character of Their Concept of

Autonomy, Critique: A Journal of Socialist Theory, 39:1 (2011).31 Clarke,Althusserian Marxism, op. cit., p. 32.32 Ibid., p. 33. For a more detailed analysis on this see especially pp. 1633 and 53.33

Stephen A. Resnick and Richard Wolff, New Departures in Marxian Theory(New York: Routledge, 2006),p. 6.

62 V. Grollios


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overdetermination over that of dialectics.34 They dismiss Althussers belief in

determination in the last instance and are of the opinion that even Althusser seems

to have shied away from the consequences of its logic of his own work.35 Thus, for

their theory of society, no process . . . could be conceived to exist as cause without

being itself caused.36

From that they have moved to a new kind of antiessentialist class analysis that

views class only as an entry point that is stressed because, as they admit, we view its

existence in society as an outrage. The strength of this feeling shapes in part our

commitment to class as an entry point.37 Their whole economic analysis is mainly

based in the fact that they are more sensitive to exploitation than are other social

theorists. Since the dialectic between content/essence and form has been rejected,

because for them it cannot be but determinist, facts, forms and objects have nothing

more to reveal than their present form of appearance. This is identity thinking,

the most important characteristic of traditional-liberal theory. Any effort to bring theview of the tospy-turvy, inverted world back to its feet again by defetishizing the

forms is being rejected. Their thinking attempts another kind of classification that

stays restricted on the plane of appearance. The existence of contradiction(s) for

them is not explained by the perverted way in which we are forced to fulfil our basic

needs living as personifications of economic categories, but is just presupposed.38

On the same wavelength, Callinicos writes in his review of Chris ArthursThe New

Dialectics and Marxs Capitalthat the persistence and relevance of a dialectical social

theory depends on whether it is scientifically acceptable to ascribe structural

contradictions to social reality.39 However, I contend that dialectics is not something

we attribute or ascribe to reality but something inherent in it. Contradiction is aninextricable characteristic of capital because capital is the form that our doingtakes in

the capitalist system. The identification, then, of men of critical mind with their

society is marked by tension, and the tension characterizes all the concepts of the

critical way of thinking.40 Doingin capitalism encompasses the fact that the workers

interests are unavoidably contrary to those of the capitalist.

In order to better investigate Callinicoss understanding of the dialectical nature of

Marxs political theory, we must also explore his critique of commodity fetishism. I

believe that one of the most important themes in his writings is the effort he makes to

34 Ibid., p. 7.35 Stephen A. Resnick and Richard Wolff,Althussers Liberation of Marxian Theory, in E. Ann Kaplan and

Michael Sprinker (eds) The Althusserian Legacy(London: Verso, 1993), p. 61.36 Ibid., p. 69.37 Resnick and Wolff, New Departures in Marxian Theory, op. cit., p. 302.38 I have already attempted to bring into discussion the Althusserian path (its postmodern materialist wing)

and the Frankfurt School theory in another article of mine in which I analyse the repercussions of the

aforementioned presupposition as far as the theorizing of democracy is concerned. See Vasilis Grollios,

Democracy and Commodity Fetishism in Marx: A Response to Antonio Callari and David Ruccio,Rethinking

Marxism (forthcoming in 2013, published in the iFirst section of the journal (2012); doi: 10.1080/

08935696.2012.711535).39

Alex Callinicos, Against the New Dialectic, Historical Materialism, 13:2 (2005), p. 56.40 Horkheimer, Traditional and Critical Theory, op. cit., p. 208.

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almost completely dismiss the theory of commodity fetishism from his version of

Marxism. I will attempt to demonstrate that this has tremendously important

consequences.

For Callinicos, the theory of commodity fetishism reduces Capital to an

understanding of being, a two-part structure of hidden essence and surfacephenomena, and thus reduces Capital to a theory of ideology, an explanation of

why the agents of production are deceived as to its working, rather than an analysis of

the laws of motion of capitalism. Marx is thus reduced into the theorist of the

unhappy consciousness of man under capitalism.41

He is quite sure that no great damage would be done to Capitalby expunging

commodity fetishism since it is an error to believe that the essence/appearance

contrast is the organizing principle of Marxs argument. Rather, Callinicos holds that

the gist of Marxs argument is the proposition that capitalism functions through the

competition of capitals and the circulation of their products.42

At this point it would be useful for the reader to be informed of an attempt, inside

the Althusserian path, to maintain the theory of commodity fetishism. For Amariglio

and Callari,

Marxs discussion of commodity fetishism allows . . . for a nondeterminist depictionof how the economy itself cannot be . . . understood except by reference to thesenoneconomic elements . . . Commodity fetishism is Marxs device to show justhow. . . economic relations are themselves articulated and overdetermined out-comes of the combined effects of these superstructural and other processes.43

I believe indeed that they comprehend fetishism as another attempt to classify the

forms as they appear, as a different attempt, compared with the economism ofthe orthodox interpretation, to classify forms, but their effort still remains inside the

traditional theory framework. Fetishism for them is not an effort to penetrate inside

the form itself and bring to the surface its hidden essence, that is, its human content,

and thus to explain the existence of the enchanted, topsy-turvy world, something

that the ad hominem critique of the Frankfurt school theory attempts.

The question that must be posed at this point is this: if we are able to comprehend

capital as a social relationship by sidestepping the essence/appearance relationship, as

Callinicos as well as Amariglio and Callari believe we can, what then is the nature of

social relations in the capitalist mode of production? Are not social relations the formthat the most basic relationship in society, that of capital, takes? What I wish to make

clear is that the way in which people come to terms with each other and with nature

in order to satisfy their most basic needs in the capitalist system takes many forms,

such as representative democracy, the state and money. In order to find out the true

nature of these forms, we must penetrate their appearance and identify their essence.

How is this achieved according to Marxist philosophy? By thinking materialistically

41 Callinicos,Is There A Future for Marxism?, op. cit., p. 122.42 Callinicos,Marxism and Philosophy, op. cit., p. 132.43

Jack Amariglio and Antonio Callari,Marxian Value Theory and the Problem of the Subject: The Role ofCommodity Fetishism, Rethinking Marxism, 2:3 (1989), pp. 3160, at p. 35.

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and using the ad hominem critique, materialism is basically the attempt to

understand society in terms of human doing, which means by focusing on the way

in which people come to terms with each other and with nature in order to satisfy

their most basic needs. Therefore, we should endeavour to find the essence of these

forms in their social constitution by focusing on the conditions of social lifeendangered by societys current form. This is the only way in which materialism can

be connected to Marxs social theory, a connection that Callinicos, as well as

postmodern materialists like Amariglio and Callari, do not make. I believe that the

question of how materialism can enable us to better understand social reality is

doomed to remain unanswered in Callinicoss theory and in the Althusserian path in

general because this theory does not, and cannot, connect materialism to dialectics.

If, by investigating the historical formation of social forms, materialism can enable

us to connect these forms to the dynamic character of social practice, then the

conclusion must be reached that essence is also part of the form. Essence alwaysappears in the form in an inverted, perverted and mystified manner. In order to

decipher a social relation, to defetishize the form and understand its essence, we must

clarify its historical dimension and identify its human content. Essence and

appearance, form and content are mediated to each other; they are separate in

unity. Social forms have a common origin since they are moments of the same social

relation, that of our doing,44 our effort to satisfy the conditions for societys

reproduction.

According to Callinicos, in the essence/phenomenon tradition, which he rightly

identifies as Hegelian Marxism or the capital-logic school of thought, non-economic

relations are treated as the passive effects of the economy.45 Callinicos accuses the

capital-logic school of analysing all aspects of social life as phenomenal expressions of

the contradiction between capital and labour.46 He becomes more specific in his

disagreement when he attributes to the capital-logic school the belief that the

relations of production are a mere deceptive surface appearance. He, by contrast,

believes that they assume a self-regulating autonomy47 to which explanatory primacy

must be given.48 InMaking History, he argues that social relations aresets of empty

places49 because their nature does not depend on the identity of the particular agents

involved in them.

Additionally, he stresses that social life involves processes that go on behind thebacks of human agents.50 I argue, on the contrary, that the existence of processes that

44 I initially used the wordlabourhere, but after reading HollowaysCrack Capitalism, I believe thatdoing

is more suitable.45 Callinicos,Is There A Future for Marxism?, op. cit, p. 193. Not only Callinicos but also most members of

the postmodern materialist wing of the Althusserian path follow this understanding of essence, including

Amariglio and Callari.46 Ibid., p. 165.47 Ibid.48 Ibid, p. 167.49

Callinicos,Making History, op. cit., p. 39.50 Ibid.

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go on behind the backs of human agents can only be explained by the phenomenon

of fetishism that Callinicos dismisses. This means that, by succumbing to the logic of

time is money, to the logic of capital, people themselves produce an enchanted,

perverted, topsy-turvy world51 in which processes appear in a fetishized, naturalized,

transhistorical form.I have attempted to show thus far that the economic and the political are moments

of the same social relationship: that of the form that our doing takes in the capitalist

system, which is to say, capital. Thus, they are mediated to each other; they exist

through each other. I also think that, because of the non-elaborated, and I would dare

to say distorted, view that Callinicos has on dialectics, the relationship between the

economic and the political remains undetermined in his version of Marxism. If they

are not mediated with each other, if they are not understood as moments of the same

relation, what possible dialectical connection could they have to each other? What

would make their interdependence any different from the perception of interdepen-dence noted by liberalism?

Considering the above, it can be concluded that Callinicos follows the orthodox

Marxist tradition52 in separating structure from agency. While he may believe that

they are interdependent in some unspecified way, he nevertheless still conceives them

as two separate entities.53 Indeed, in addition to his separation of agency and

structure, he goes on to write that the social exists independently of the discursive

and more broadly of the mental.54 If the mental (human agency) is independent of

the social (structure), then how can humans change history, and what is the role of

dialectics in our understanding of reality? In order to answer these questions, theAlthusserian roots of Callinicoss political philosophy should be investigated in more

detail.

Callinicoss Althusserianism

The need to even more closely investigate the link between Callinicoss theory and

Althussers Marxism should come as no surprise to the reader. Despite Callinicos

never having openly admitted to being an Althusserian, the affinities between his

thought and Althussers are readily apparent.Upon reading Callinicoss conviction that the social exists independently of the

mental, Althussers argument thathistory is a process without a subjectimmediately

sprang to my mind. Indeed, Callinicoss admits that he accepts this position:

51 Marx,Capital, Vol. 3, op. cit., 817.52 This comment is also made by Bonefeld about Callinicos in a footnote of a very stimulating article of his,

although he does not expand it, like I do. See Werner Bonefeld, Negative Dialectics in Miserable Times: Notes

on Adorno and Social Praxis, Journal of Classical Sociology, 12:1 (2012), p. 132.53

Callinicos,The Resources of Critique, op. cit., p. 183.54 Ibid.

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Althusser is completely justified in arguing that Marxism must criticise and rejectthe teleological structure of the Hegelian dialectic and replace it with that of aprocess without a subject.55

However, 11 years on from this assertion, Callinicos appears to have abandoned his

former position:Althussers rejection of Hegel leads him. . .

to the opposite extremeof conceiving history as a process without a subject, rendering individual or

collective agency mysterious.56 This self-contradiction can be explained in terms of

an unsuccessful attempt by Callinicos to hide the Althusserian roots of his thinking.

An interesting attempt to defend Althussers idea of a process without a subject

has been made by Amariglio and Ruccio. This idea is at the core of their

understanding of postmodern economics because it enables them to displace subjects

and agents from serving as [the] initial motive and structuring device of economic

discourse.57 Their alternative explanation is based on the decentred subject with a

dispersed, depthless corporeality (the postmodern body).58

For them, the idea ofthe postmodern body allows specificity in that it never forgets the particular

capacities and incapacities and the peculiar and innumerable palpable differences.59

They attribute this idea to Marx who, in their view, presents the human body as

overdetermined as a register of class and other capitalist processes.60 Thus, the

working class is being overdetermined by other aspects such as race and gender.

A possible criticism from those who hold to non-identity thinking could be that we

do not fight as working class in order not to be working class, separating ourselves

from other groups in society. If the major pressure upon us is to transform our

everyday activity into money, to accumulate, to live

as personifications of economiccategories, then I do think that the theory of the cracks analysed by Holloway can

include all the aforementioned differences.

The story of the cracks in capitalism is the story of our

assertion of the difference of our doings, an attempt to . . . emancipate our doingsfrom the abstraction imposed through money. Heterogeneity is . . . our struggleagainst the abstraction of labour.61

Holloway becomes very clear in the third section of the thesis 28 of Crack

Capitalismwhen he asks if the fact that many people revolt against gender and racism

means that we should understand capitalist society as structured by a range ofclass but also of non-class conflicts? For those who stay at the superficial level of the

55 Callinicos,Is There A Future for Marxism?, op. cit., p. 141.56 Callinicos,What Is Living and What Is Dead in the Philosophy of Althusser, op. cit., p. 44.57 David Ruccio and Jack Amariglio, Beyond the Highs and Lows: Economics as a Process without a

Subject, Review of Social Economy, 65:2 (2007), p. 224.58 Ibid., p. 225.59 Ibid., p. 229.60 Jack Amariglio and David F. Ruccio, Modern Economics: The Case of the Disappearing Body?,

Cambridge Journal of Economics, 26:1 (2002), p. 98.61 John Holloway, Crack Capitalism (London: Pluto Press, 2010), p. 220.

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form-fetish, of appearance, and thus retain the bourgeois notion of structure, like

Ruccio and Amariglio, the answer would be a positive one.

However, for a non-identity critical theorist like Holloway, who has defetishized

the forms, the different masks, There is, however, always the prior question of what

generates the character masks, what produces the different identities.62

Theformation of the different identities is the result of the tremendous pressure upon

us to live according to the logic of time is money and of Accumulation for

accumulations sake, production for productions sake.63 We should then start not

with a dialectic understood as interaction but rather as the negative restlessness of

misfitting, of insufficiency.64 Adorno also stresses that, when the concept of the role

is made into a social standard, the non-identity element of humanity is being

eliminated.65

However, let us return to Callinicos. He accuses Althusser of ascribing autonomy

to theory,66 of subsuming the base into the superstructure,67 and of understanding

social structures as self-reproducing systems that constitute individual agents.68 This

criticism does not mean that he considers Althusserian philosophy without merit. He

admits that The general consignment of Althusser to the dustbin of history is a

powerful temptation to emphasize his merits, a temptation to which I succumb.69

However, I believe that Callinicos does not succeed in properly analysing either the

relationship between structure and agency or that between the forces and relations of

production. The result is a failure to sever his ties with Althusserian Marxism.

In the effort he makes to expound his ideas, he contradicts himself. At the start of

Making History, he maintains that structure and agency are so closely interwoven

that to separate either and give it primacy over the other is a fundamental error.70

Afew pages later, however, he confesses that, while he has attempted to undermine the

orthodox idea that social structures undeniably have explanatory autonomy, he still

believes it to be true.71 Although on the one hand he believes that structures have

explanatory autonomy, at the same time, he thinks that agents powers are partly

dependent on their position in the relations of production. I cannot see how these

two ideas can coexist. However, in his much more recent book, The Resources of

Critique, he writes that structure and agency must be treated as ontologically distinct

strata, each having their own emergent powers.72 In his own distinctive words,

structures and individuals are irreducible components.73 Like Althusser, then, he

62 Ibid., p. 222.63 Karl Marx,Capital, Vol. 1, inCollected Works, Vol. 35 (New York: International Publishers, 1996), p. 591.64 Holloway, Crack Capitalism, op. cit., p. 85.65 Theodor Adorno and Hellmut Becker, Education for Autonomy, Telos, 56 (1983), p. 107.66 Callinicos,Is There A Future for Marxism?, op. cit., p. 59.67 Ibid., p. 76.68 Callinicos,The Resources of Critique, op. cit., p. 182.69 Alex Callinicos, What is Living and What is Dead in the Philosophy of Althusser, op.cit., p.39.70 Callinicos,Making History, op. cit., p. 67.71 Ibid., p. 36.72

Callinicos,The Resources of Critique, op. cit., p. 185.73 Callinicos,Making History, op. cit., p. 84.

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accepts the separation of structure and agency, the economy and the political, but

how they correlate to each other, I think, remains unspecified in his work. Is this

relation understood by him as a determination in the last instance maybe? The

sidestepping of dialectics, the role and importance of which remain undetermined, is

certainly a common characteristic of Callinicoss and Althussers theories. AlthoughCallinicos criticizes Althussers dialectics as defective,74 he does not manage to set out

his own version satisfactorily.

Nevertheless, he acknowledges a number of positive contributions in Althussers

work. He maintains that Althussers insistence on putting relations before subjects

seems to me basically right, even if he got subjects badly wrong.75 As I have

attempted to emphasize, however, it is not a matter of prioritizing relations or

subjects but rather one of mediation. Relations and subjects exist through each other,

being part of the same reality. Taking into consideration my analysis in the previous

section of the paper, I feel that I have to underline that relations and subjects are partsof the one and only reality.

In Callinicoss opinion, anotherlasting contributionof Althusserian philosophy is

the conceptual clarification of historical materialism.76 However, Callinicoss

explication of Althussers contribution in this area is surprisingly brief. The only

thing I understood him to be clear about is that Althusser stressed that we should

understand social formations simultaneously as concrete wholes and as multiplicities

of determinations. In this way, Callinicos believes it is possible to retain the concept

of totality within Marxian theory without being accused of eradicating differences.77

Although he distances himself from viewing social forms as expressions of the same

relationship, just like all Althusserians do, he retains the notion of totality in his

political philosophy. He maintains that there is a larger totality of capitalism that

integrates into itself the irreducible other determinations,78 a single, articulated,

social totality that is formed by distinctive determinations.79

However, the problem with a belief in the existence of many determinations and

contradictions is that there is no one centre in social reality, one relation, one

determination, one contradiction that gives capitalism its distinctive character. How

can exploitation and injustice be explained if the contradiction of interests between

the capitalist and the worker is not positioned at the centre of our political

philosophy? Callari and Ruccio are certainly right in having called AlthusserianMarxism postmodern materialism.80 The difference between them and Callinicos is

74 Callinicos,Is There A Future for Marxism?, op. cit., p. 141.75 Alex Callinicos, Imperialism and Global Political Economy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009), p. 14.76 Callinicos,What Is Living and What Is Dead in the Philosophy of Althusser, op. cit., p. 47.77 Ibid., p. 44.78 Alex Callinicos, How to Solve the Many-State Problem: A Reply to the Debate, Cambridge Review of

International Affairs, 22:1 (2009), p. 91.79 Ibid., p. 103.80

Antonio Callari and David Ruccio (eds), Postmodern Materialism and the Future of Marxist Theory: Essaysin the Althusserian Tradition(Hanover, NH: Wesleyan University Press, 1996).

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that they are aware81 of the fact that the notion of totality cannot be maintained if we

follow Althussers notion of contradiction and dialectic, a problem with which

Callinicos should be familiar. Moreover, he makes no attempt to develop or more

precisely elucidate the coexistence of totality and difference in his version of historical

materialism. Perhaps if, like Callari and Ruccio, he acknowledged the Althusserianunderpinnings of his theory, then he could avoid the undeveloped points in his

works, which ultimately confuse the reader.

In Callinicoss view, Althussers third valuable contribution isthe elaboration of a

realist philosophy of science.82 The defence of realism*the thesis that reality is prior

to but knowable by thought*is for Callinicos a worthwhile task.83 However, the

following question should be asked: do we really need to read Althusser to

understand that Marx posits himself in the tradition of materialist philosophy? In

The Holy Familyhe is clear on this, although, in my opinion, materialism in Marx

relates to thead hominem character of the critique, not only to realism. In this text,Marx says nothing about any priority of reality. Rather, he stresses the need for anti-

theological, anti-metaphysical doctrines84 and the fact that The primary forces of

matter are the living, individualising forces of being inherent in it .85 Furthermore, in

underlining the importance of Locke, he notes that there cannot be any philosophy

at variance with the healthy human senses and reason based on them.86 By so doing,

Marx wished to stress that philosophy should be based on the dynamic character of

our doing. Thus, I am unable to see why Althussers defence of realism is a

worthwhile task.

In contrast to Callinicoss line of reasoning and in keeping with critical theorys

understanding of dialectics, I believe that structure and agency have a dialectical

relationship. Structure and agency are mediated to each other. The mental is not

something separated from reality, existing in a world of its own in another reality, as

Callinicos clearly implies, but rather is an inextricable part of the one and only

reality.87 Reality, just like class relations, should be understood as consisting of

multidimensional power relations. The economic, political and ideological are

different forms of expression of the relations of class exploitation, the most essential

of them being the relation of capital, the essence of the one and only reality.

If, as Callinicos maintains, the cause of the partially obscured nature of appearance

(rather than the deceptive character of appearance) is not the existence of capital,

81 This awareness is more clearly evident in a recent article of theirs. See Antonio Callari and David Ruccio,

Rethinking Socialism: Community, Democracy, and Social Agency, Rethinking Marxism, 22:3, pp. 403419

(2010).82 Callinicos,What Is Living and What Is Dead in the Philosophy of Althusser, op. cit., p. 47.83 Ibid., p. 48.84 Karl Marx, The Holy Family, in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 4 (London:

Lawrence &Wishart, 1975), p. 126.85 Ibid., p. 128.86 Ibid., p. 129.87

Richard Gunns excellent 1987 article reveals the dialectical relationship between theory and practice inMarx. See Richard Gunn, Practical Reflexivity in Marx, Common Sense, 1, pp. 3951 (1987).

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then how can the non-transparent/opaque nature of society be explained? How can

he explain the fact that essence is not outwardly evident at first sight? To put it

another way, if the appearance/essence relation can be dismissed, as he and other

Althusserians think it can, what is the point of philosophizing? Why is such an

intellectual effort required in order to elaborate a normative democratic politicaltheory? Marx makes the philosophical importance of the appearance/essence relation

clear in the third volume ofCapital, where it is clearly stressed thatall science would

be superfluous if the outward appearance and the essence of things directly

coincided.88

The State in Callinicoss Theory

Callinicoss Althusserianism and non-dialectical materialism become even more

evident when our attention turns to his understanding of the state. He accuses JohnHolloway and the capital-logic school of applying the theory of fetishism to the

state.89 Additionally, he accuses Simon Clarke of reducing the social totality to

capital in general. All aspects of social life are treated as phenomenal expressions of

the contradiction between capital and labour.90 He attributes to them the idea that

the form that the mode of production takes is a mere deceptive surface appearance.91

In accordance with his dismissal of dialectics, Callinicos confesses that he dismisses

fetishism, as I have stressed before. He is clear that no great damage would be done

to Capitalby the excision of commodity fetishism and that the essence/appearance

distinction does not lie at the core of Marxs philosophy.92 Fetishism, in his view,

reveals the persistence of Hegelian categories in Capital.93

Remaining close to his Althusserian roots, he writes that the decisive characteristic

of the capitalist mode of production is that the relations of production assume the

form of an autonomous, self-regulating economy.94 In correlation to economy, the

state apparatus in this theory is an autonomous entity, a distinct instance. For

Callinicos, if one follows the logic of the essence/appearance distinction, the state

must be understood as an inessential form.95

I do not need to reiterate here the main points of Holloways and Clarkes

arguments. However, a number of points that originate from the Open Marxism

tradition, which expands on the Frankfurt School theory, should be emphasized.According to the essencecontent/appearanceform distinction, forms are neither

inessential nor deceptive. Formsprocesses are inextricable parts of reality, are 100

per cent real, just as the essence is. Forms are not separated from the essence in the

88 Marx,Capital, Vol. 3, op. cit., p. 804.89 Callinicos,Is There A Future for Marxism?, op. cit., p. 152.90 Ibid., p. 165.91 Ibid.92 Callinicos,Marxism and Philosophy, op. cit., p. 132.93 Ibid., p. 133.94

Callinicos,Is There A Future for Marxism?, op. cit., p. 165.95 Ibid., p. 166.

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way Callinicos believes, but are mediated to it and exist through it. Reality in

capitalism is constituted by a dialectical relation between form and content, essence

and appearance. Here, the dialectical relation means that they are separate in unity.

Appearance is part of the essence, just as essence is part of the appearance. The state,

then, is a form

process that our doing, our effort to satisfy our needs, takes. Thus,neither the state form nor the economy are autonomous but rather are mediated to

the other dimensions of reality. Reality is thus seen as the multidimensional power

relation that class struggle takes.

Thinking materialistically means following the ad hominem critique to penetrate

the different fetishes and social formsprocesses so as to reveal the human relations

from which they emerge: that is, the class struggle that lies in their essence. Thus,

Holloway astutely regards and analyses fetishes as forms of class struggle. If one s

analysis remains at the level of forms and does not reveal the essence of those forms,

then ones understanding of reality is partial, not deceptive. Fetishism is real. Rootedin traditional theory, which adopts identity thinking, Callinicos is unable to see

fetishism as a process, as a real phenomenon that must be analysed dialectically. A

dialectical analysis of fetishism would result in defetishizing and denaturalizing the

forms by revealing the human doing that made their existence possible.

According to such an (Open Marxist) analysis, the state is one of the forms that

our deformed doing takes. Since our doing in capitalism is transformed into abstract

labour, into money, into the relationship that is called capital,96 the state is a

perverted form of our doing; it is not an entity different from capital but a form of it.

State and capital are mediated to each other.

However, for Callinicos, the state system is a determination distinct from the

others that comprise the capitalist mode of production, where

a determination is best understood as a social phenomenon constituted by thecausal powers that it has different from those constitutive of other socialphenomena.97

Callinicos sees inCapitaldifferent levels that arenon-deductiveto each other. The

new determinations that are introduced are not contained in those that already exist

at the start of the book, since each possesses specific properties.98

The Althusserian origins of his theory come to the fore once more. Callinicos

himself makes reference to Althusser in order to support his interpretation of the way

new determinations are introduced.99 I fail to see how such a position can coexist

with the notion of totality. How can the many differences reveal the logic of capital?

96 John Holloway convincingly demonstrates this in Crack Capitalism.97 Alex Callinicos,Does Capitalism Need the State System?,Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 20:4

(2007), p. 542. I would like to thank Peter Thomas for bringing to my attention the debate on the state that took

place in the Cambridge Review of International Affairs, in which Callinicos participated.98 Ibid.99 Alex Callinicos, Periodizing Capitalism and Analyzing Imperialism: Classical Marxism and Capitalist

Evolution, in Robert Albritton, Makoto Itoh, Richard Westra and Alan Zuege (eds) Phases of CapitalistDevelopment(New York: Palgrave, 2001), p. 240.

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Unfortunately, Callinicos does not develop this argument or adequately present the

reasoning behind it. If a social theorist rejects the notion of essence, of the one centre

that provides capitalism with its main characteristics, as Callinicos and other

Althusserians do, then he will not be able to provide a coherent and clear view of the

logic of the capitalist mode of production that appears as many forms, as manydifferent determinations.

Another problem with the Althusserian conception of determinations is his

understanding of potential. Where does new content and where do new determina-

tions come from? If their existence is not implicit, if they do not exist in an

undeveloped manner in previous determinations as a potential, how can their

emergence be explained? The only point in Callinicoss texts where his clear

appreciation of dialectics is to be found is his support for the view that a dialectical

understanding of reality is able to detect within the existing state of affairs

possibilities of change.

100

A very simple question might be posed to Callinicoshere: what is the relationship between the potential and the essence of reality? Is the

potential part of the essence, or not? If it is not, where does it come from? If we are

able to safely ignore the appearance/essence differentiation of reality, and conse-

quently the dialectical relationship between these two levels of analysis, how then can

the dialectical understanding of reality take place? How can it enable us to precisely

identify the potential? What is the relationship between totality, differences (in their

Althusserian version, which Callinicos accepts) and potential in his theory? Callinicos

remains silent on this as well. The fact that Callinicos does not expand on these

crucial questions strikes a serious blow to the viability of his version of historical

materialism.

For Althussers aleatory materialism, the coming of the new is explained by the

pure effect of contingency. Philosophy is thus no longer a statement of the Reason

and Origin of things, but a theory of their contingency.101 Since Callinicos, along

with other Althusserians, supports Althusser in rejecting the idea of a common origin

of social forms, of things, I cannot see how he can maintain in his political

philosophy that class struggle is the crucial driver of historical change.

In concluding this section, I wish to underline that Callinicos regards the state and

capital as two different entities that are somehow connected to each other but in an

unspecified way. They are not contradictory in their essence since they are not formsof a perverted relationship, namely, that of our doing in capitalism. For Callinicos,

the contradiction lies outside the form, the thing, not inside of it as in the Frankfurt

School/Open Marxism theory.102 Similarly, the dialectic lies not inside the form, in

the fetish, in the essence, in the nature of this capitalist organized world. Dialectics, in

100 Callinicos,The Revolutionary Ideas of Karl Marx, op. cit., p. 77.101 Althusser, Philosophy of the Encounter: Later Writings, 19781987, op. cit., p. 169170.102 For a reading ofCrack Capitalismfrom the standpoint ofNegative Dialecticssee Vasilis Grollios,Review

of John Holloway,Crack Capitalism, Pluto Press, 2010,Critique: A Journal of Socialist Theory, 40:2, pp. 289288

(2012). A very stimulating article that I believe succeeds in showing the foundation of the Open Marxism in theFrankfurt School theory is Bonefeld, Negative Dialectics in Miserable Times, op. cit.

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Callinicoss philosophy, is not the method by which the genesis of the form can be

gleaned by revealing its human content. The state, in his social theory, is not a form

of capital relation; its nature does not consist in the inverted form that our doing

takes.

Callinicos proves again his Althusserian origins when he twice praises Poulant-zas,103 the most famous Althusserian state theorist, for understanding the state as the

specific condensation of a relationship of forces between classes and class fractions. It

should not be forgotten, however, that Poulantzas regards the political as having

relative autonomy from the economic; the state lies outside the structure, retaining its

relative autonomy from it and thus also from class struggle. The state is not a social

form taken by class struggle; it is not mediated to the economic; it is not

contradictory in its nature. The state for Poulantzas, as for Callinicos, is an

autonomous entity, a distinct instance, having a relative autonomy from other

entities, other determinations. The state is not a form-fetish that we create, not amode of appearance of the irrationality of time is money as non-identity critical

theory informs us.104

Conclusion

In contrast to Callinicos and the Althusserian path and in keeping with the Open

Marxist school, I maintain that appearance is not something deceptive but is part of

reality*it is 100 per cent real. Essence and appearance, content and form have a

dialectical relation with each other; they are mediated to each other; they are separate

in unity. Social forms such as the representative form of democracy, value as money,the capitalist state and all the forms that our doing takes in the capitalist mode of

production are all real, and people live under their dominance. For Callinicos, the

dialectical elaboration of a social form, such as those previously mentioned, does not

aim to go beyond its immediate manifestation in order to understand its essence. For

him and for the other Althusserians as well, contradiction does not lie in the thing,

the entity itself. The fact that he follows the main lines of the Althusserian

interpretation of dialectics and materialism traps his thought in the framework of

traditional theory and prevents him from successfully integrating class struggle in his

philosophy of history and from posing perhaps the most important question that acritical theorist could pose: why do relations between people take the alienated form

of relations between things? Or to put it another way, why does content take this

particular form? However, if we set this question at the centre of our analysis, as I

think we should, then commodity fetishism becomes perhaps the most valuable part

of Marxs political philosophy.

103 Callinicos, Is There A Future for Marxism?, op. cit., p. 214215. Callinicos, Imperialism and Global

Political Economy, op. cit., p. 244.104 The best article that shows how Poulantzas follows the traditional identity thinking is, in my opinion,

from Simon Clarke. See Simon Clarke, Marxism, Sociology and Poulantzass Theory of the State in The StateDebate(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1991).

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I am sure that much more could be said on the practical implications of my

criticism of the Althusserians and of Callinicoss social theory: namely, the impact

that my analysis could have on their understanding of imperialism, international

relationships and class-based movements worldwide today.105 Also, much more could

be said about the economic theory of the Althusserian wing of the postmodernmaterialist members of the Rethinking Marxism collective. However, for obvious

reasons, this was impossible to achieve within the scope of this article. In addition,

my research background lies in philosophy and not in politics or economics.

Nevertheless, I hope that by showing the differences between the Althusserian and the

Frankfurt School theory I have set a philosophical background that political scientists

and economists may consider helpful in promoting their research goals.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Professor Werner Bonefeld for his strong encouragement and

valuable comments.

105 For a criticism of Callinicosideas on the alternative to austerity from an Open Marxism standpoint see

Werner Bonefeld,From Humanity to Nationality to Bestiality: A Polemic on Alternatives without Conclusion,Ephemera, 12:4, pp. 445453 (2012).

Critique 75

alex callinicos's marxism dialectics althusser frankfurst school

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