alexius meinong - th of obj)

8/20/2019 Alexius Meinong - Th of Obj)

1/21

The

Theory

of

Obiects

uv

ALEXIUS

MEINONG

(rneNsrerrD

By

IsAAc

LEvI,

D.

B.

TERRELL,

ND

RODERICK M. CHISHOLM

fne

fneort ol Obiects

"hesitatingly

concede

hat

we

are

happy

about something,

n

in something,and, at least in the majority

of cases,do

not

intend without wishing pr or intending

something.

To

put

it

no

one

fails

to recogniz-dhat

psychological vents

so

very

co

have

this distinctive

"character

of

being

directed

o

somethi

etwas Gerichtetsein)

as

to suggest ery

strongly

(at

least)

should

take

it to be

I

characteristicaspect

of

the

psychol

opposed

o the non-psychological.

The

purpose

of the following remarks

is, nevertheles

explain why I hold this way of looking at the matter to b

established,despite the many

difficulties

confronting

it. T

so

many cases n which reference,

ndeed

explicit directedn

richtetsein), to that

"something,"

or

(as

we

say

quite natu

an object,

unquestionably orces tself

upon

our attention

th

if

they

alone

were to

be

considered,

he

question

would

answered or

anyone

who investigated

hese matters

scie

The

partitioning

of whateverdeserves

nd needs

heore

sideration

nto difterent

scientific ealms,and

the

careful del

of

these realms,

may

often be of little

practical importanc

vancing

the researchconnected

with it. What

matters

in

analysis

s

the

work that

is

accomplished,

nd

not

the bann

which it is done. However, obscuritiesas to the boundari

diverse

areas of

science

can become significant

n

two co

ways:

either

the

areas

which

are actually

nvestigated

ncro

one

another, or they are separated rom

each other,

an

quently

leave

an

intermediate area

untouched./The

signif

such obscurities, within

the sphere

of our

theoretical in

exactly

the opposite of

their

significance

within the sphere

tical

affairs. n the latter, the

"ieutral

zone" is a

guarante

desired

but rarely capableof being reahzed)

of amicable

n

relations, while the overlapping

of territorial

claims

pre

typical case

of conflict of

interests.But

in the realm

of th

activity, where such conflicts, at least,

have no

justificatio

gain,

objectively considered, f

the frontier districts

coincid

a result

they are

investigated rom different

sides.A

sepa

the

other hand, is always a

disadvantage,

he seriousness

depends

on

the size

and

significanceof

the intermediate

The intent of the

problem

raised here

is to call attentio

such an area of knowledge,T hich

is sometimes verlooke

times not sufficiently appreciated

n its

distinctive chara

question

concerns he

proper place

for the scientific

nvest

l.

Tne

Pnosr.BM


2/21

[78]

ALEXIUS MEINONG

the

Object

(Gegenstand)

aken as such and

in

general-we

wish

to

know whether,

among the sciences

hat are accredited

by

scientific

tradition,

there

is

one

within

which

we

could attempt

a

theoretical

consideration

f the

Object

as such, or

from

which

we

could

at least

demand

his.

2. Tnu Pnr.ruprcp rN FAvoR oF THBAcruar,

It was

no

accident hat the foregoing account

ook cognition as

its

starting

point

in order o

arrive

at

the Object.

To be

sure,

cognition

is not unique

in

"having" an

Object.

It

has

it in

such a distinctive

manner,

however, that

whenever we

are

speaking of Objects,

we

are influenced

to think

first of all of the

Object

of

cognition. For,

to

be

precise,

he

psychological

event

we

call

cognition does not

con-

stitute the

cognitive

situation in and

of

itself:

knowledge

s,

so to

speak,

a double fact

(Doppehatsache)

n

which what is known

confronts

the

act of knowing as something elatively

independent.

The act of knowing

is

not merely

directed toward what is

known,

in the way

in which

a

false

judgment

may

be

directed

toward

its

Object. In knowing, on the

contrary, it is

as

though what

is

known

werg seized

or

grasped

by the

psychological

act, or however

else

one

might attempt o

describe,n

an

unavoidably

pictorial

way, some-

thing

which

is

indescribable.

f one concentrates xclusively

on the

Object

of knowledge, he

problem

about the science of

Objects

which

was

raised above

s initially

placed

in

a

rather

unfavorable

light. A

scienceof the

Objects of

cognition: does this

mean

any-

thing more than

the demand that what

is

already known

as

the

Object of cognition

be

now

made the Object of a science,and

thus

the

Object of cognition for

a second

ime?

In other words,

are we

not asking or a sciencewhich either is made up of the sum-totalof

the sciences

aken together,

or one which would

have

to accomplish

all over

again what the

recognizedsciences.

ointly

accomplish

any-

way?

We

should

guard

ourselves

against concluding rom these

con-

siderations

hat the idea of

a

universal

science, n addition to

the

special

sciences,

s abstrd. This understandingof the nature of

the

world

in its entirety and of

its ulrimate

foundations,which the best

The Theory ol Objects

discipline

which

goes

under

the

name

of metaphysics

ha

thought to be

exactly such a science.

No matter

how

many

pointments

have

been associatedwith

this

name,

and are

ass

with

it, the responsibility

or

them

lies with our intellectual

ties,

and not with the idea of such a science.

May one

go

therefore,

as

to take metaphysics o be

the

science

whose eg

function is to deal with

Objects

as such-or Objects n

their to

I If we rememberhow metaphysics as alwaysbeenconce

including n

its subject

matter the farthest and the nearest,

he

est and the smallest

alike,

we

may

be surprised

o be told tha

physics

cannot

take on such a task. It

may sound strange

that metaphysics

s not

universalenough

or

a

science

of

O

and hence cannot

take

on

the

task

just

formulated. For

the

tions

of metaphysics ave been universal

(a

fact which has s

been

disastrous

o its success).

Without

doubt,

metaphysics

do

with everything

hat exists.However,

the totality of what

including what has

existed

and

will

exist, is infinitely small

in

parison

with

the totality

of

the Objects

of knowledge. Th

easily

goes

unnoticed,

probably

because he lively interest n

which is part of our nature tends to favor that exaggeratio

finds the non-real

a mere

nothing--or, more

precisely,

whic

the non-real to be something or which science

has

no app

at all or at least

no application

of

any

worth.

How little truth there

is in

such a view

is most

easily sh

ideal Objectss hich

do

indeedsubSist

bestehen),

ut

which

by any means

exist

(existieren),

and consequently

cannot

sense e rcal

(wirklicft).

Similarity and

difference re

exam

objects

of

this

type:

perhaps,

under certain

circumstances,

he

sist between

ealities;

but

they are not

a

part

of replity them

That ideas, as well

as assumptions nd

judgments,

are neve

concerned with

such Objects

(and

often

have

reason

to b

intimately concerned with them) is, of course,beyond qu

Similarly,

number does

not

exist n

addition

o what is

num

supposing he

latter does

exist;

this we clearly

know from th

that

we can also count what does

not

exist. Again,

a connecti

not

exist in

addition\to what is connected, upposing he latte

exist: That their

existence s not

indispensable

s

proven

b

3.

Concerning

the sense

in

which I

intend

to\mploy the

expression


3/21

[80]

I

AIE)(IUS

MEINONG

connection

between

he equilaterality

and

equiangularity

of a

tri-

angle.

Moreover, where

existing

objects are concerned, such as

atmospheric

and thermometric

or barometric conditions, the con-

nectedness

oes

not unite these

realities themselves o much as it

does

heir being

or even

heir non-being.

n knowing such a connec-

tion, we

are

already dealing with

that special

ype

of Object

(mit

jenem

eigentumlichen

Gegenstandartigen),

hich,

as I

hope-

have

shown,a

s

related

to

judgment

and assumptions

Urteilen

und

An-

nahmen)

in the rvay

in

which

the Object,

in

a

strict

sense,

(der

eigentliche

Gegenstand)

s

related

o

presentations

Vorstellungen).

I

haye recommended

he

name

"Objective"

(Obietkiv)

for this

type of

Object, and

I

have

shown

that the

Objective itself

can

assume he functions

of

an

Object in

the

strict sense.

n particu-

lar,

it can become

he

Object

(Gegenstand)

of

a

new

judgment,

or

of some

other intellectual

operation, which is related to it as

to

an

ordinary

object

(Obiekt).

If

I

say,

"It

is true

that

the

antipodes

exist,"

truth

is

ascribed

not to the

antipodes,but

to the

Objective,

"that

the

antipodes

exist." But

this existenceof the antipodes

s a

fact

(Tatsache)

which,

as everyone

sees

mmediately,can

very

well

have

a subsistent

tatus, but cannot be still

another

existent entity

in its own tufn,

as it

were.*

This holds, likewise,

or all other ob-

jectives,

so that

every

cognitive

act

which

has

an Objective

as its

Object represents hereby a caseof knowing somethingwhich does

not

exist.

What

has been stated

here only

in

terms

of isolated examples

is supported

by

the testimony of

a very highly

developed

cience-

indeed the

most highly

developed one: mathematics.We would

surely

not want to speak

of mathematics as alien

to

reality,

as

though

t had

nothing to do

with what exists. ndeed,

we cannot

ail

to

recognize

hat

mathematics

s

assuredof

an

extensivesphere

of

application

n

practical

ife

no less than

in

the

theoretical

reatment

of reality.

However,

pure

mathematical

nowledge s

never

concerned

with anything

which must, in

the nature of the cage,be actual. The

form of

being

(^Seiru)

ith which

mathematicsas such

is occupied

is

never

existence

(Existenz).

In this respect, mathematicsnever

transcends ubsistenceBestand): a straight ine hasno more exist-

ence

than a right

anglg a regular

polygon,

no more

tlan

a

circle.

It

can be regarded

only

as

a

peculiarity

of the mathematical

use

4. Uber Annahmen,

chap.

vii.

*

ld,ass

ie

zwar

sehr

wohl bestehen, ber nicht ihrerseits

sozusagen och

einmal

existieren ann.'l

The Theory of Objects

[

8

of language hat

this usage

rnakes

quite

explicit

existence-cla

Even

though

the mathematician

may

use

the term "existence,"

cannot

but concede hat

what

we

would

otherwise

call "possibil

is,

in the final analysis, all

that he requires

of the

objects

of

theoretical consideration; t is

very

noteworthy,

however,

tha

positive

urn

is

being

given

o

this ordinarily merely

negative

conc

Together

with

the

prejudice

n

favor

of

our

knowledge

of rea

alluded

to

previously,

he

basic

independence

f nnathematics

r

existenceenables

us

to understand a fact

which

would

be

fa

-surprising f thesepoints were not considened. ttempts to syst

atizn the sciences s

parts

of a

whole usually

find

themselvesn

embarragsing

position

in

connection with

mathematics, and

t

must be

extricated,

with varying degrees

f success,

y

more

or l

artificial expedients.This is in striking

contrast

o the recognitio

one might

straightaway

say

popularity-which mathematics

acquired

or

itself even in

lay circles by

its achievements. ut

organization of

all knowledge

nto

the science of nature

and

science

of mind

(Natur-

und

Geisteswissenschaft),

ppearing

o

an exhaustivedisjunction,

realtry

akes

into

account only

the

s

of

knowledge

which has

to

do

with reality

(Wirklichkeit).

C

sequently,

when

we

look

at the rnatter more

closely,

we should

be

at all surprised to

find that

this organization

does not

do

justice to mathematics"

3. Sosew ANDNrcHTsErN

There is thus

not

the

slightestdoubt that what-is

supposed o

the

Object

of

knowledge

need

not exist at all.

But our accoun

to now

may seem o leave

room

for the conjecture

hat where

existence s

absent, t not only can be

but

must be replaced

subsistence.

ut even his

restriction

s inadmissable, s may

bp s

by contrasting

he

characteristic

unctions

of

judging

and assum

a distinction

have attempted o

maintain

by contrasting

he

"th

and synthetic unction" of thought.€ n the former case, he ac

thought

grasps

a Sein, n the latter

a

"Sosein."

n

each

case,natnra

it is an

Objective

that

is

grasped;

t

is

reasonable o speak

o

5. Cf. K. Zindler:

"BeitrZige

zur

Theorie

der

mathematischen

Erkenntn

Sitangsberichte der l


4/21

[82]

{

ALEXIUS MEINONG

[83

house

or

the land

does

exist, has

existed,

or will

exist. However, he

light

might

be

shed

on domains

which

are especially

mportant

for us

to

know.

-

But

such

things

may

be

alien to

our

natural

way of thinking;

it

is even

more

instructive

to recall

this

trivial

fact,

which

does not

yjt go

beyond

the

realm

of the

Seinsobjektiv.'

ny

particular

thing

that isn't

real

(Nichtseiendes)

must at

least be

c-apiUte

f

serving

as the

Object

for

tlose

judgments

which

grasp

ts

Nichtsein

It does

not matter

whether

this

Nichtseln

is neces$ary

r

merely

factual;

--Jllil-ro*i.nate. translations

of the

German terms

in the

text

are the

following.

The sein

of

an object

is

its existing,

or its being

real;

its Nichtseln

is its

not exisr-

ing' or

its being

unreal;

its ,sosein

is its

having

characteristics.

A seinsobJektiv

is

an

objective

consisting

of

sopething

existing,

or of

something

being

reai; anaro-

gously

for Soseinsobjektiv

and Nichtseinsobiektiv.l

7, This

principlt

was

first enunciated

by E. Mally

in

his treatise which

was

honored

by the

Wartinger

prize

in 1903,

and

which

appears

in completely

revised

form as

No. III of

tlese

papers;

see chap. i,

$

3,

of

Mally's

paper.

[Meinbng

here

refers

to thc volume

in which

his own

essay originally

appeared.

Mally's

paper

is

entitled

"Untersuchungen

zur

Gegenstandstheorie

des Messens."l

nor

does t matter

in the

first

case

whether

the

necessity

tems

ro

the

essence

f

the object

or

whether

it

stems

rom

aspects

whi

are external

o

the

Obiect

in

question.

n order

to

know

that

the

is no round

square,

must

make

a

If

physics,physiology,and

psychol

ideal

character

of sense-qualities,

about

color as

well

as

about

soun

more

than

the other.

Those

who

l

sion

could very well say:

"There

i

there are no

such

objects."

The

fa

is meant

by this

statement

hrows

of objects

to reality,

or

their

relation

to

being,

genglaly:

that

somewhat

loser eximination

of

the matter,

which

is

of

fundamen

importance

n its

own right,

is entirely

n

place n

our

present

stu

4.

Tnr AussrnselN

oF

THE

Pune

Oslncr

A recourse

o

certain

psychological

experiences

uggests-

ls

as

p

natural

way

of resolving

tre

paradox

which seems

o lie

bet

us.I have attempted o preJent he most

essential

oints

pertain

to

this

problem

n another

work.8

But,

according

9 my-a:count

he

if

we

were

now

to maintain

the

aforementioned

ubjectivity

of

sen

qualities,we could speak

of the

object

of

a

Presentation

f

blue

o

in

ttre sense

of

something

which

is

a

capacity

of

that

presentat

from

which reality

withholds,

as

it

were,

the

opportunity.

for

realization.

considered

rom

the

standpoint

of

the

presentation,

still

seems

o me

to

touch

on

something

of

essential

significa

However,

I cannot

conceal

rom

myself

at

present

he

fact

that it

no more

necessary

o an

object

that

it

be

presented n

order

n

to exist

than

it is

in order

for

it to

exist.

Further,

even

if there

w

a

reference

o

it,

the

most

that

could

result

from

its

being

presen

would be

a

sori

of

existence-"s;d5fsngs

by

way

of

idea

(in

d

Vorstellung)"-21d 5s, more precisely, "pseudo-existence"'.

express

t more

exactly:

If

I

sayf

"Blue

doesnot

exist,"

I

am

thin

ing

just

of

blue,

and not

at

all

of a

pr,esentation

nd

the

capac

it

-may

have. It

is as

if

the

blue

musi

have

$ing_

in

.the

first

pla

before

we

can raise

the

question

of

its being

(sein)

or non-be

(Nichtsein).

But

in

ordef

not

to fall

into

new

paradoxes

or ac

The

Theory

ol Obiects

8.

t)ber Annahmen,

PP.

98 ff'

9.

See

"Uber

Gegensiinde

hijherer

Ordnung,"

loc. cit',

pp.

186 f'


5/21

[84]

ALEXIUS

MBINONO

The

Theory ol Objects

[8

absurdities,_perhaps

he

following

turn

of

expression

may

be ap_

propriate:

Blue,

or

any-

other

Oblect

whatsoevlr,

s

somehLw

given

prior

to

our

determination--of

ts

-being

or

non-biing,

io

; way"that

does

not

Trry

any

prejudice

to

its

ion-being.

we"'co-urd

uiJo a"-

scnoe

ne

srtuation

rom

its

psychological

ide

n

this

way:

if

I should

be

able

to

judge

that.a

certain

Otieit

is not,

then

I

upi.u,

to have

had.to

gra-sp

he

ObjecJ

n

some

way

befoieh*A,

i"'iiJ"r-to

,uy

anything

about

its

non-being,

or

morl

precisely,

i

orao

io

"mr-r to deny the ascriptionof non-being o^theObject

This

fact,

despite

ts commonplice

charactlr,

is seen

o

be

of

re

to

do

justice

oit

with

somewhat

rs of

the

following

considerations.

I

a certain

thing,

A, is

not-more

st

as

much

an

Objective

as

is the

tainty

with

which

I am

iustified

in

degree

of certainty

that

the Objective,

above,thatithassubsistencef

:,::itfffl#l",i3li;"ti"li#i',",ffi1

f

-i:

u

seinsobiektiv

or

Nichiseinsobiiictiv,

stands

n

relation

to

its

9Uj"."l

(Obiekt),

albe-it

um

grano

salis,

as the

*n.f"

t it, p".tr.

But if the whole has being,so must its parts.

This

seems

o

iean,

when

t is

extended

o

theiase

of

the

objective:

if the

objectivi

has

being

(rsl),

so,

in

some

sense

or

other,

must

the

object

*rri.n

u"-

longs

to

it,

even

whel

th9

Objective

is

an

objective

of

non_being

(Nichtseiwobiektiv).

Furthermore,

since

the

otjective

rtri"tly pr"-

vents

us

from

assuming

hat

A has

being,

(being,

as we

have

si"n,

can

sometimes

e

understood

s

existence;

ometimes

s

subsistence),

it

appears

hat

the

requirement

hat

the

object

have

beinj

r*rri"n

was

inferred

from

the

being

of

the

Nichtseinsobiektiv)

o,u[",

,ror"

only

insofar

as

the

being

in

question

s

neither

existence

nor

sub-

sistbnce-only

ihsofar

as a

third

order

of

t"in ,

it

oo"

t"1,

ip""t

this way, is adjoined o existence nd subsistence.his rort of ueing

must

belong,

herefore,

o

every

Object

as

such.

A

Nichtsein

of

the

same

ype

cannot

be

set

in opposition

o

it, for

a Nichtsein

even n

this

new-sense

rculd

have

g

immediately

produce

difrculties

analog-

ous

to those

which

arise

fibm

Nichtsein

in its

ordinary

sense,

and

which

the

new concept

was

o

have

eliminated.

The teri

"euasisein,

seemed

o

me for

a while

to be

a

completely

suitable

expression

or

this

rather

oddly

constituted

typey'f

being.

This

designation,

owever, ike

others

hat

were approved

ea

(for

instance,

"Pseudoexistenz"and

"Quasitranszendenz,"

r)

r

for

such

a

postulate.

Must we not

take

thought to avoid

it

in

case also wherever t is possible?The considerationwhich se

to force us to such a

postulate

s,

to be sure,

an experience

w

is easilyobserved.As

we have seen,

A must

be "given"

to me n

s

way

or other

if I

am

to

grasp

ts non-being.

This

produces,howe

as

f

have

already

shown elsewhere,l2

an assumption

(Annah

possessing

ffirmative

quality:

in

order

to deny

A,

I

must

first ass

the

being

of

A. What

I

refer

to, so

far as

the

being of

A is

cerned,

s

thus

something

which is

to a certain

extent

only a

claim

to

being

(ein gewissermassen

orgegebenes

ein

des 4

.

But it

tfte essence f assumption hat it

direct

itself

upon

a being

w

itself does not need

to

be.

Without

a doubt,

t would be

comforting

o be

able

o

say

ha

strange kind of being which belongs o that which does not h

being

(Sedn

des

Nichtseiendes)

s

just

as

absurd

as it

sounds'

S

a view could recommend

tself

to us were it

not

for

the fact

tha

Objective,which

has

being,

always

seems o

require

n turn an

O

which has being. For

the

present,

his requirement

s based

s

on the analogy o the

part-whole

relation:

an

Objective

s

the

treated as

a

complex

of some

kind and

the Object

belonging

as a kind

of

component.

n many:respects

his

may

be

in

accord

with our insight into

the nature

of an Objective,

which

is as

yet

exceedingly

defective.However,

no

one

will

deny

that this

ana

is only

an initial

expedient n our

embarrassment

nd

that

t

would be no

grounds

or following

this

analogy rigorously

eve

part

of

the

way. Thus, nsteadof

deriving

he

being

of an

Object

the being of an Objective,

even

on tle basis

of a

questionable

na

where

the

Objective

s

an

Objective

of non-being,

t would

be b

to conclude

rom

the

facts

with

which we are

concerned

hat

analogl does

not apply

to the Objective

of non-being-i.e.,

tha

being of

the

Objective

is

not by any

means universally

depe

upon the being

of its Object.


6/21

[86]

ALEXIUS MEINONG

This is a

position

which

speaks

or

itself

without

any

further ado.

If

the

oppositionof being

and non-being

s

primarily

a matter of

the

Objective

and not

of the

Object,

then

it is, after all, clearly under-

standable hat

neither being

nor non-being can belong essentially

to the

Object

in itself. This is not to

say,

of course, hat

an Object

can neither

be nor

not

be.

Nor is it to

say

that

the

question,

whether

or not the

Object has being, is

purely

accidental o

the

nature

of

every Object. An absurdObject such as a round squarecarries n

itself the

guarantee

of

its

own

non-being

n every sense;an ideal

Object, such

as

diversity,

carries in itset the

guarantee

of its own

non-existence.

nyone who seeks o

associate

himself

with

models

which have

become famous could

formulate

what has

been shown

above by

saying

that the

Object

as

such

(without

considering he

occasional

peculiarities

or

the' accompanyingObjectire-clause

which

is always

present)

stands

"beyond

being

and

non-being."

This

may

also be expressedn the following

less

engagingand also

less

pre-

tenticlusway,

which is

in my

opinion,

however, a more appropriate

one:

The

Object s by nature ndifferent to being

(aussersetend),

l-

though at least one of its two Objectives of being, the Object's

being or non-being, subsists.

What

one could thus

call with

propriety

the

principle

of the

in-

difference

of

pure

Objects

to

being

(den

Satz

vom Aussersein

des

reinen

Gegenstandes)

inally eliminates he

appearance

f a

paradox

which

was the

immediate

occasion or the assertionof this

principle.

As

soon

as t is

recognized hat, apart from

special

cases, oth being

and non-being

are

equally external to

an

Object, it is

then under-

standable

hat nothing

more, so to

speak,

s

involved n comprehend-

ing

the

non'being

of the

Object

than there

is

in

comprehending

ts

being.

The

above-mentioned

rinciple

of the hdependence

of

Sosein

from

Sein now

presents

a

welcome

supplement o this view.

It tells

us that that which is not in any way external to the Object, but

.constitutes

ts

proper

essence,subsists

n its Sosein-the Sosein

attaching

o

the Object whether

he object has being

or

not. We are

finally

in

a

position

to

see

with sufficient clarity

what confronted

us

above

as the

prejudice

n favor

of the existence,or at

least

the

being, of

afl

possible

Objects of knowledge.Being is not the

pre-

supposition

under

whi&

knowledge inds,

as it

were, its

point

of

attack; it is

itself such a

point

of

attack. Non-being

is

equally as

The Theory ol Objects

5.

TnB

Tnsonv

or Onrncrs ns Psvcnotocv

We now know

that

those

Objects

which exist, and

e

which

have being,

run

fan short of

the sum-total

of

Objects

edge,and

we

can

see

herefore

how inaccurate

t would

be

a scienceof the actual, or a scienceof being in general,n

how

comprehensive

ts scope,as a science

of

Objects

of

k

taken

simply

as such.

Moreover,

n the

prwious paragraph

considered

only the

Objects of

cognition. But the

quest

at the very

outset of this

exposition

had to take

into con

the

fact that

not only cognition

but

every case of

judg

presentation

as

ts

Object-not

to

mention

the

Objectivity

stiindlichkeir)*

of extra-intellectualexperiences.

his all-e

importance

of

Objectivity

for

the

psychical

side

of

life

indeed be

precisely

ts distinguishing haracteristic,

as I ha

mentioned

already-may

now

suggest

o us that

(owing

to

clusive

attention to

cognition)

we

permitted

ourselves

down a detour that might easilyhavebeen avoided.For tlr

which

most

naturally

would

have to do with Objects

as

su

be the

very

one whose business t

is

to deal

with this

O

This task,

in

view of what I

have

ust

touched

on once ag

to belong to

psychology.

In any event,

t must

be

conceded hat

the current di

psychology

s

not entirely opposed o such a

conception

o

There s,

for

example,

a

psychology

f sound as

well as a

p

of color, within which by no

rneans

he least important

taken to

be

the

ordering of the

diverse Objects belongi

sensory

domain

concerned,

and

the investigationof

their d

nature.13 t is also natural that the scienceof psycholo

draws into its

range of

investigation

he distinctive activit

psychological

sphere-in

particular,

intellectual

activities

be

an odd

psychology

of

judgrnent

hat took

no notice

of

acitf which

(under

sufficiently

avorable circumstances)

e

beyond itself to take

possession

f reality

in sorne way.

*

[By

"Objectivity"

is meant

here

merely

the

characteristic

of referrin


7/21

[88]

ALE)SUS

MEINONG

The

Theory

ol

Oblects

[8

something

besides eality which

can

be known,

and

it is

sometlfng

which wg are

n a

position

o know

with the

aid

of certain

ntellectual

operations.Psychology,

herefore,

certainly

cannot

refrain

from

con-

sidering

both

this capacity

o know and

also

that something

outside

of reality

(Ausserwirkliche)

toward

which

these

characteristic

ac-

tivities

are directed.

To this extent,

therefore,

he Objects

of

judging,

assuming,

and

presenting,as well as the Objectsof feeling and desiring,undoubt-

edly

gain

entry into

psychology.But everyone

will notice

at

once

that

this

science

does not

take these

Objects

nto

consideration

or

their own

sakes. n

practice,

both

inside and

outside

of scientific

pursuits,

it is, frequently enough,

quite

an incidenql

matter

as

to

what

result

s a

primary-

goal,

and

what is

just

accepted

as

an

acci-

dental by-product . For

example, t

is certainly

useful

to archaeology

that what

philologists

often

find necessary

merely

for

textual

inter-

pretation pbints

to

the

"real

things,"

yet

is no

proper

part

of

classical

philology,

Otherwise,

he latter science

could

easily

lay

claims

to

being the most

basic

discipline,

since

work on

4ncient

languages

has provided the starting point for all sorts of scientificactivity.

Similarly,

psychological

nquiry

can bear

fruit

for related

areas

as

long as

they belong o sciences

which are

either

less

developed

han

psychology

or

have not

yet

been

formally

recognized

as

sePar,ate

Cciences t all.

Nothing

more clearly

demonstrates

hat

this

has

happened n

the

caseof theoretical

consideration

f

Objects

han

the

eximple of colors mentioned above,

where

investigation

of

the

psychological

acts

first

led to the

investigation

of

facts

concerning

Objects;

an example s

the

investigation

of

the relationships

among

colors conceived n spatial terms

(der

Farbenkdrper

auf den

Far-

benraum).ra

The

reference

o linguistic

science,already

ntroduced,

shows n another respect how little psychologY an qualify as the

true

scienceof Objects.

n

dealing

with

the meaning

of

words

and

sentences,l6inguistic science

s necessarily

lso

concerned

with

Ob-

jects,

and

grammar

has done

the spadework

or a

theoretical

grasp

of Objects n a very

basic way. Thus,

in

point

of

fact, the

viewpoint

from

which

psychology

was

to have

been conceded

any

prerogative

in this matter is

not apparent; rather,

it is

clearty seen

hat

neither

of these ko

disciplings an be that

science

f

Objects

we

are seeking.


8/21

Ie0]

ALB)CUS MEINONO

which, strange o say,

has not

yet

entirely

been orgotten.

This argu-

ment states hat

if

"esse"

need

not be

precisely

percipii'

it must at

any rate

be

"cogitari";

for

no one

can think of an

"essd'

without-

thinking of

it. In any case, he

effect

of

such considerations

may

be

more opposed o, than

in accord with,

their intent.

If, for example,

the ultrawhite

mentionedabove s

brought into the

domain

of theo-

retical consideration

ust

by meansof a

conceptiondirected

owards

it, then the

novel

psychological

events

which

come to ltfe

could

engender ew work for psychology.To be sure, his is by no means

necessary.n

the case

of the

examplewe are

considering

here, such

work is scarcely o be expected,

ince an

abundance

f similar con-

ceptions s already

available. However,

the

possibilty

must

cer-

tainly

be kept

in mind, and if it is

once

actually

rcaliz.ed,

hen

how

little

the conception

of ultrawhite is a

part

of

psychologywill

be-

come

quite

clear.

By viitue

of

this conception,

he work

of the theory

of Objects is to

a

certain

extent

already completed,

btrt

that of

psychology

has

yet

to be done. It

would be odd

do

consider

the

accomplishedask

a

psychological

ne

just

because f

the

task that

is still to

be

done.

6. Tns TnBonv or OsrBcrs ls e Tneony or

tnB

Os.recrs

oF

KNowrepcn

What

psychology

cannot

provide

us might

better

be sought,

therefore, n those

areaswhere

the

very

nature of

what

we

investi-

gate

s constituted, n

part,

by

Objects.

On the basis

of our

previous

discussion,

t can hardly be doubted hat in cog3itionwe

have

before

us facts of this type. Cognition s not merely a

jirdgrnent

hat

happens

to be true; it is true by its own n4fiug-frus

from

within, as

t were.

A

judgment

is true, however, not insofar

as

it has an

Object

that

exists,

or even one that has being, but only

insofar as it

grasps

an

Objective

hat has

being.

That

there

are black swans,

but

that there

is no perpetuummobile, are both true judgments;but the first con-

cerns an exfuent object, he

second

a non-existent bject.

n

the one

case, he being

of

the

Object in

question

subsists;n

the other case,

its non-being

subsistsri

ruth is always

bound up

with the being

of

Objectives

and

is

therefore

partially

constituted

out of it.

The

judgment

would not be true if therp were

no

Objective

o which it

referred. Nor would

the

judgmerrte

true

if

it were constituted

dif-

ferently than it is and therefore

did not agree

with the facts. The

The Theory

of

Obiects

coincidence

f

the

one subjective

and the other objective

eq

can thus

be entirely

accidental:

as

when

one draws a true

sion from

false premises.

Now

such

an accidental

or external

character

s surely

to

the

relation

between

knowing

and

what

is known. In t

of

knowing,

it belongs

o

the nature of the

judgrnent

that

not

miss ts

aim

at

what is to be

known. This distinctive e

cognition

achieves place

n the forum

of

psychological

nve

throughwhat we know as evidence Evidenz). However, the

judgment

tself

does

not constitute

he fact of cognition. It

i

tial

to

grasp

the

Object with respect o the

Objective, and

the

being

of the

latter is

indispensable.

n this respect, he c

entirely

resembles

he

judgment

which

is true

per

accide

were. For

this

reason, t

was

possible

even

at the beginnin

present

essay

to

call knowledge

a

double fact

(Doppelta

Anyone

who wishes

a scientifically loser

view of this compo

must

not restrict

himself to

the

psychological

aspect of it;

also

ake

into consideration,

s

quite

expresslya

part

of the

p

set

before him,

the other

side, i.e.,

the Objective

which

ha

and

the

Object which

is implicated

n

the

Objective.

With regard

o

our

major

problem,

we have

n

some

mea

turned to a standpointwhich we abandoned n the previou

graphs,

for we have

appealed o the fact

that objects be

only to cognition,

but also to false

udgment,

o

presentatio

psychological

ctivities which are totally

non-intellectual.

rf

clude

hat

the theory

of Objects alls

most

naturally

within

th

tific treatment

of

cognition, we

are confronted with

this

q

By

restricting ourselves

o

cognition

and

thus

excluding oth

chological

events,do we not.cut ourselvesoff from

certain

and

give

up that

universality

which is

required in dealing w

jects

as such?

The doubt

is unfounded. rn

order

to

see

his,

one mus

all,

remember he

characteristicdifference

between

psychol

the scienceof knowledge. t is obvious hat psychologys co

only with real

psychological

vents

and not

with

the merely

p

A scienceof

knowledgecannot set similar limitations on its

cause

knowledge

as

such

has

value, and therefore

somethin

is not

but

could

be

may

draw

attention to itself

as a desi

for

knowledge.Accordingly, not

only

are

pseudo-objects

n

and hence all objects which

are actually

udged

or

presente

included

as

Objects of our scientiflcknowledge

(Wissens),

b


9/21

lez

1

ALE)CUS

MBINONG

all

Objects which are Objects of our

cognition only in

possibility.

However, here is

no Object

which

could not

at

least

in

possibility

be

an Object of cognition; at any rate, we may say

this if

we adopt

the instructive iction that the

capacity

or

knowledge

s not impaired

by limitations,

such as stimulus hresholdsand

thresholdsof discrim-

inations, which

are

laid down by the constitution

of the subject

and are never entirely

absent.

Assuming an intelligence

of

unlim-

ited capacities,

here is nothing unknowable;

and

what is know-

able, is. Ilowever, since the preferredusage s

generally

o apply

"it

is"

(es

gibt)

to things

which

have being, and

particularly

to

existing

hings,

t would

perhaps

be clearer o say: All

that

is

know-

able is

given-narnely, given

to cognition.

To this extent, all

objects

are knowable.Given-ness

s a most

generalproperty

can be ascribed

to

Objects without

exception,whether hey are

or are not.

The

consequence f these considerationsor

the relation

of the

Objects of cognition to the

Objects of

other

psycho{ogical

ctivities

scarcelyneeds o

be

drawn

more

explicitly. Regardless

f the other

types of

experience ne might have of Objects,

all

Objects

are,

with-

out exception,

Objects of knowledge. Consequently,

anyone

who

undertakesa

scientific

reatment

of Objects

rom

the standpoint of

cognition need not fear that he rnightthus excludeany area rom the

totality of

Objects.

,7.

T'JinTnronv

or Osrncrs As "PURE

Loclc"

It

is

in

accord with long-established

rad$on

to think of

logic

first,

when consideringa scientific

reatment of cognition.

Actually,

it is only

very recently that

problems

have been set

for one

of the

main

parts

of logic, the so-called

pure

or formal

logic,18

which

agree

unmistak4bly

with

what must

properly

be demanded

f

a

theoretical

treatmenC

f

Objects as such.lo

have

already

expressed

lsewhere

my basic agreementwith

E. Husserl'sattack

against

psychologism"

in

logic.2o

did this at a time when external

circumstances

revented

me

from

obtaining

r,nore han a

preliminary

and

very incomplete

acquaintancewith thb extensivework of

this

author. Today,

when

I

trust

that

through

penetrating

study I have done

justice

in some

18. S.. E"

Husserl,

LogischeUntrry*lr,ngrr,

tnro

volumes,

(Leipzig

and Halle,

1900and 1901),

Pure"

and

"Formal"

Eogic are

explicitly dentified n

Vol.

I,

p,

252.

19. In

particular,

Vol. I,

pp.

241 ff,; also Vol. II,

pp.

92 fr.,

The Theory ol

Objects

measure o

the

merits of the

publication

in

question,

I ca

pletely

support

my

previous

expression

of agreementand

it

still further to

many another

of

those

"problems." trt s, th

haps

a

dissent

of

relatively rninor

importance hat I wotrld n

these

problems

precisely

o

"pure

logic."

I

am influenced

above all by this fact:

it

is only with

gre

culty

that

the notion of

logic can be separated rom that of

nology devoted o

the

advancement f

our intellectual

powe

sequently, ogic alwaysremains a "practical discipline."zl W

say at

most

that

a transition can be

made from

the

work

practical

discipline to what

tr have

occasionally

chancteriz

"theoretico-practical

discipline."z

When

logic is

thus calle

Iogic,"28

would

prefer

to say

that the result is not logic

at a

I would

refer

tle

probiems

set

for

"pure

logic" to that

the

discipline,

or to one of

those theoretical disciplines, o

whic

like

all

other

practical

disciplines,must fina-llybe traced.

I am

in

complete agreement

with

the

author

of

the

L

Untersuchungen,

s

I

have

ust

mentioned, n insisting hat r

is

not

to be

made exclusively o

psychology.

ndeed, when

sider

the

guiding

idea to

which

our author returns

again an

in his polemic against"psychologism" n order to characte

extra-psychological

omain of

knowledge, t is difficult

for

avoid the

impression hat

he was not entirely able to

free

from

what he

had

opposed

with

as much zeal as truth. "Pur

has to

do with

"concepts,"

"propositions,"

"arguments,"

a

like.*

But are

not concepts,

after

all,

presentations

which

used for

theoretical purposes,

but which

are nevertheless

tions?

If one

disregards

he. obtrusive

grammatical

meaning

word

"proposition"

(Satz),

bs is explicitly demanded, .8., b

zano,

will

one then

be able to disregard he psychologica

(assumption

or

judgment)

expressed

by the

grammatical p

,1.

I

h"*

tried to

present

this in

greater

detail

in

my

work, tlber

phische llissenschaJt und ihre Proprideutik (Vienna,

1885).

See

particul

96 t.

22. Loc.

cit.,

p.

98.

23.

I find the equivalent term,

"formal

logic,"

objectionable

in that

it

mind what used to be taught under tlis

name and

what

has

properly

been

and

apparently overcome.

Is

this objection based

merely on a

personal

idios

We must also

give

some weight

to the

fact

that

the

term

"form"

cannot

p

clear

picture

of

what it

is

supposed to

mean.

*

[It

is

impossible to

reproduce

in English

the

full significance of M

remarks here

and

below. There is no

English

word or expression which d


10/21

le4l

ALEXIUS MBINONO

tion? More

precisely:

If

we do this,

what will

be retained

hat can

in some measure

ay claim

to

the

name

"proposition"?

Still,

there

is an

extralogical

sense

here in

which

one

can talk

of

a

"law

(Satz)

of contradiction,"

or the

"Carnot law

(Satz)"

and

so on,% although,

to be

sure, his has the

feel of a rather

extended

usageof

words.

As

far

as I can

see, such an extralogical sense s completely

lacking

in the

case of the word

"inference"

(Schluss).

Even

il one

speaks

quite

naturally

of

"the"

syllogism n modus Darapti, of "the"

hypo-

thetical syllogism,and the like, one means an intellectual event or

the

possible

results

of

such

an

event,

ust

as one means a

physio-

logical event

when one

speaksof

"the'

circulation of

the blood.

To contrast

"objective"

inferences

and

proofs

with thory

that

are subjective26

ight thus seem o obscure rather

than to

clarify

the facts

of

the matter.

But

the

entire

tenor of the Logische

Unter-

suchungen,

s well

as many

of

the

particular

statements

hat are con-

tained

in it,

convincesone

that,

despitecertain differences n detail

(at

present

navoidable),

he author's

goal

s

thesame as

our own.

It

is a

goal

o which

he

has

been orced by

mathematico-philosophical

studies20

nd by

certain

distinctions

which are in

part genuinely,

and

in part only supposedly,psychological; refer to the distinction

between content

(Inhalt)

and

Objectu and, what

is

even

more

to

the

point,

to that

between

Object and

Objective.2sUnder such

cir-

cumstances,

he common

causewill be better served f

I cease

dwell-

ing

on

these considerations

which

may be

largely terminological

anyway) and, instead,

ry to show briefly how,

in

my opinion, we

may

deal more

adequately

with

the danger

of

"psychologism"-2

danger which,

in spite of

the attention

devoted o it, may

not

yet

have been

entirely

avoided.

\

8. TUB Tnronv

or

Os.recrs

es Eprstsnolocy

Before

we-do

this, however,

we

may draw an

obvious

practical

consequence

rom the

criticisms we

have directed

against

he ex-

pression

"pure logic."

There is no need

to

invent a

name for

a

theory of scientifickq5rwledge

Wissen)

which

sets tself

no

practical

The Theory

ol

Objects

goals

and

accordingly

represents

a

theoretical

science.

One

not wish for a more

natural name

than the

designation,

T

remote.

"Psychologism,"as the name of a natural or considere

ency

to

solve

problerns with

predorninantly

psychological

involves

no blame in itself.2g

However,

within a

certain

sp

who

neglects

he secondside of this fact and so proceed

theory

of

knowledge

as if

there

were only a

psychological

cognition, or

one

who would foist

the viewpoint

of

psych

events on this second side,

is

not

to be spared

the repro

psychologism.

Can we make clear

to ourselves

why there

is

this da

falling

into such

a

psychologism,

a

danger from which

s

anyonewho has concerned

himself

with epistemological

mat

withheld

his tribute? The

double aspect

(Doppelseitigkeit)

nition is so

striking

that

hardly

anyone

could overlook

it

only existing

hings were to

be

known.

However,

as

we hav

all of mathematics,and particulad geometry,deals with th

real. Thus, the

prejudice

in

favor of reality

that I

have

rep

called

o attention eads

here to a dilemma

which seems

o b

illuminating

and which is, nevertheless,

asically

very

singu

be

sure,

we may

not

become explicitly

conscious

of it

eas

29. The

proven

objectivity

of

Uberweg-Heinze's

presentation

of facts

me

of this

in my

own case.

They

place

my

own scientific activity under

th

24,

What

is involved

here

is, of course,

the Objective;

see Uber Annahmen,

p.197.

'

Jntersuchungez,


11/21

Ie6]

ALE)CUS

MBINONO

The Theory ol Obiects

that has being.

And surely, whoever wishes

to

free

him

this misconception

need not make it

his task

to keep

p

at a distance

rom the theory of

knowledge.

The

psyc

cognition

must

always

constitute an integral

part

of

the

knowledge.The only thing

against

which

he rnust

guard

taking for

psychology

hat

part

of the

theory of knowle

is

and

must

remain

the theory

of

Objects.

If the theory of the Objects of knowledgeor, more b

theory of Objects, s

presented

o us as an

integral

part

of

of knowledge,so

he answer

o the

initial

questionof our

p

cussion

an easily be

found.

The

proper

place

for investi

jects

as such,

we

could then say, s the

theory

of knowle

in fact,

this result could be left standing

without rnuch

d

the theory of

Objects.

The

more

clearly

the theory

of k

becomes

ware

of

its

tasks, the more certainly

it will

be

remain,by virtue

of

one of

its

fundamental

parts,

a

theo

which

s to be known, of the

"given"

in

the sense

n

which

was employedabove, and

consequently

f the

sum-total

o

generally.

Often

enough,

epistemological

nterests

will

quite

prepare he way for an interest n the theory of Objects.

less, f

I

see ightly,

we

must

go

one step further

if we ar

do

justice

to the claims

which

a

theory of

Objects

is com

make in

virtue

of its

distinctive

nature.

9. TUB Tusonv or Osrrcrs

.4,s SppaRAre

ScrcNc

The

position

of

psychology,

which along

with

the

Objects

must be

given

a fundamental

share

n the theory

edge, oints

o this

fact. We

havealreadyseen

t to be

self-e

there can be no theory of knowledgewhich does not con

with

the

act of knowing and

which is not to this

extent a

chology

of

cognition.

However,

no one would

consider

cance

of

psychology

or

the theory

of knowledge

o be an

characterization

f

the

position

of

psychology

n the

syst

ences.No

one would wish

to regard

psychology

as noth

than

a

piece

of episternology.Shall we

be satisfied

with

analogous

charccteization of

the

theory

of

Objects?

Is it

it

may be

formulated

approximately

n

the following manner:

either

the

Object

to

which

cognition

s directed

exists n

reality or it exists

solely

"in

my

idea"

(more

briefly,

it

"pseudo-exists',).

erhaps

nothing

bears

more

eloquent

estimony

o

the naturalness

f

this

dis-

junction

than

the use

of

the

word

itdeal.',

According

to

modern

usage,

without

regard

for

its historical

meaning,

he

word

.,ideal,'

means

the

same as

"thought of"

or

',merely

presented";

hence

t

pertains,

apparently,

to

all

of those

objects which do not exist

or which could not

exist.

What does

not exist

outside

of us,

so one

automatically

thinks,

must

at least exist

in us. Such an

Qbject,

it

is

supposed,

elongs

before the forum

of

psychology;

one

then

makes

room

for

the thought

that

the knowledge

of eiisting

things

(and

along

with

this

knowledge

eality itself) cin

perhaps

be

treated

"psychologically."

And perhap5

his

prejudice

in

favor

of

what

is actqal can be

traced

one

step

farther

back

by exhibiting

the truth

from which it

could

have

originated.

t

would

certainly

be mi$taken

o believe hat

every

instance

of hnowledge

must concern

existence

or

something

existent.

But

is it

not

correct to

say that

all cognition

as such ul-

timately has to do with something which has

-being

(mit einem

Seienden)2

That

which

has

being, he

"fact,', without

which

no cog-

nition

could

count

as cognition,

s the

Objective. t

is the

Objective

which

is

grasped

by

the

relevant

cognitive

act and to which

being

(Sein)

or,

more

precisely,

subsistence

Bestand)

belongs,

whether

it is

positive

or negative,

whether

t

is

an

Objective of being

(Sein)

or of.

Sosein

Would it be

too

risky to suppgse

hat the faciuality of

its

Objective,

which

is unfailingty

associatedwith

any

instance of

cognition,

has

undergone

a sort

of transferenceo

the

Object

(which

is

almost

the only

thing

considered

by theory)

and

that

it is then

exaggerated

nto

the

tacit

demand

that everything

that

confronts

knowing

be

real?

-

The question

may

remain

undecided

here.

Our

problem

is

not

the

psychology

of

psychologism.

This

much, however,

stands be-

yond

all

doubt: psychologism

n the theory

of knowledge

s invari-

ably

based

on

the

neglect

or

misunderstanding

f the

Object side

\

of-

-the

cognitive

state,u

the

word

"Object,' being

here taken

in its

widest

sense,

n which

it includes

the

Objective).

One

falls

into

psychologism

f one

fails to

grasp

he

significance

nd

the

distinctive


12/21

Ie8]

ALE)CUS

MEINONG

for our

interest n the

theory

of

Objects o

proceed,

as it were,

by

way

of our

interest n cognition?

It

seems hat

anyonewho

has

involved himself

closely with the

problems

of the

theory of

Objects has

plenty

of

direct experience

to

the effect that

this is

not

the case.

We may acknowledge

hat

epistemology

may

utilize every detail which competent

nquiry in

the theory

of

Objects

has

produced

and will

produce,

o afford

some

further

information, perhaps

ess directly, but no

less clearly. We

can fully appreciate the basic significance of what the theory of

Objects

has to

show us

concerning

psychologism

n

epistemology,

s

we have

just

done,

and at the same

ime

admit

that

the theory of

Objects

raises

problems

whose solutions are interesting for

their

own

sakes.

This becomes

particularly

clear when

qe

make an

,assumption

which

may still involve

much that is

obscure,

but concerning

whose

essentials

have no fear

of making any

mistake.

I have

referred

before

to

the fact that

a suitable

place

for mathematics

ould never

be found in

the

systemof sciences.f

I am

not mistaken,

he

anoma-

lous

position

of mathematics

had

its basis n the

fact

that

the

con-

cept of a theory of Objectshad not yet been formed. Mathematics

is, in

its essential

eatures,

a

part

of

the theory of Objects. say

"in

its

essential eatures"

n

order to explicitly

leave

open

the

possibility

of

a

specific

differentiation

of

mathematical

nterests

which

I

believe

is

one of

the unexplained

matters mentionedabove).81

Apart

from

that, it

seems

quite

obvious to

me

that both

internal

and external

factors

have

secured or mathematicsan advantagewithin its

own

domain,

while the theory of

Objects

must

set

the entire

domain

of objects

before

itself as its task or hold this domain

before its

eyes

as an unattainable

deal. If.this consideration s

justified,

then,

as

soon

as some account s taken

of

the more

specific

aspects

of

the theory

of

Objects

we cannot fail

to see how little our interests

in it are epistemologicalnterests.

From

what has been said,

I

draw

the conclusion hat

the theory

of Objectshas

a claim to the

statusof

a discipline

ndependent

ven

^\

of the theory

of

knowledge,

and, accordingly,

to that

of

an

inde-

pendent

science.

Thh

claim

cannot

be

elevated o the level of an

accomplished

act, but, on the contrary, is scarcely beginning

to

be fulfilled, for

the theory as

a

whqle

is something

o

be developed,

and not something

eady

to'be exhibited.

The

high

stageof

devel-

The

Theory

ol Obiects

recognition

of its claims,

which can hardly

be

overestim

mathematician

might

well be disturbed by the

suggestion

is

"really"

a

theorist

of

Objects

(Gegerutandstheoretike

ever,

no one will

demand hat

a

physicist

or

chernist

consid

self to be

a metaphysician.

This is so becausea sciencewh

ready exists

cannot be either charactenzed

r even named n

of a science

which is still

merely an object of

aspiration

over, a relatively

general

science as such can

and

must se

goalswhich are foreign to the relatively specializedscienc

second

point

is

somewhatobscured, n

the

case

of

the

rela

mathematics

o

the theory of

Objects,

by

the

fact that

in t

main

of

the

theory of Objects

mathematics represents n

(of

several)

but, at least

for

the time

being, the

only spec

ence

of its type which

is known and

recognized.A twofol

perhaps

quite

dissimilar

in its two aspecls, s, accordingly

ascribed o

the theory of

Objects. On

the

one hand, the the

Objects

has

the

problems

of a scienceof the

highest degree

erality and comprehensiveness.

n

the

other, it

has,

as if

ing in

the

place

of

a whole

group

of specializedscience

problems

which

so far have not receivedany specialconsid

Because

of the

necessity

or descending nto relatively spe

domains which

arises from this situation, its

nature

as a

science s unavoidably again obscured.Consequently, he su

tion of

mathematicsunder

the

theory

of

Objects

can easily

to threaten he

distinctive characterand

specialclaim of the f

However, such external

and accidental matters ought

hamper

insight into the essentialconnection

between math

and the

theory

of

Objects

tg the extent that that connectio

This

not entirely simple situation

can,

perhaps,

best

be

gi

due by saying: Mathematics s certainly not the theory of O

but

is now

as before a science n its own

right.

However, ts O

are ncluded n the domain which the Theory of Objects,also

its own

justification,

must

deal with

as

a

whole.

10.

TnB

TnBonv oF OBJEcrs

,c,I.ro

rHen ScrsNrcrs;

GeNeRAr, NDSpncrArrzeo TueoRy

oF

Osrncrs

The theory of

science

can

adopt

two approaches

o its


13/21

[1oo]

ALEXIUS

MEINONG

then

the theory.

The several

sciences

nust

first be

given.

T'hen

he

necessity

or

examining more closely

their

nature

and

mutual

rela-

tionship

may

become

ustified.

However,

science

s

also, at

least

partially,

the

result

of premeditated

activity.

In

employing

such

ore-

sightedness,

he

theory of science

an also

deal

with

sciences

which

do

not

yet

exist but should exist. It

can

find

itself

directed

toward

rendering

he idea and the

tasks of

such sciences

s

precise

as

pos-

sible in anticipation of them.

In

the

preceding

discussionwe

found ourselves

compelled

by

our interest n

Objects

o. considerationswhich

belong

to

the

theory

of science.

n this connettion, it is

incumben?

upon

the theory

of

science

o function

in

the

second

of the two ways

mentioned

above.

The

theory of Objects, which

we

must

claim

to

be

a

proper

sci-

ence, s, in the main, a sciencehat for

the time'being

hardly

exists

at

altr-especially as a

separate

diibipline explicitly

recognized

n its

own right. But,

although

no

investigations

ave been

carried out

in

the name

of

the

theory of Objects, we must

not suPpose

hat

this

sciencehas been

wholly

neglected.

trf

we were to trace out in detail the numerous

and

intimate

rela-

tions which the sciencewe have just proposed bears to ways of

thinking that have

been followed in

the

past,

we would

see hat

it

justifies

tself by

what it

has

to offer. This is

not the

proper

time to

trace these

connections;

evertheless,

n introducing

his new science

it

is

appropriate

o make some mention of

them, Thus, some notice

can be

taken

of

necessitieswhich have

been

felt

for a long

time

and which have

already

ound

expression n

the r,nostdiverse

ways,

necessitieswhich

have arisen

in

consciouslyworking

out

interests

that

are

very widespread,

but which

have often been unconscious

of their

real

goal.

In

fact,

I believe

hht no specialhistorical

nvestigation

s

actually

required to establish hat, althoughthe theory of Objects may not

have been

pursued

"explicitly"

heretofore, t has all

the rnore

fre-

quently

been

pqrsued

"implicitly." To this I

must

add

that,

at

least

in

practice,

the implicit

status has degreeswhich smooth,fransition

to the

explicit status. Anyone

who

wishes

o

pay

attention

to such

transitions

and

their orsets should bear in mind that we

have

met

with

interests

of two different types

pertaining

to the theory o\

Objects: those

questiofis

certain specialdomains

The

Theory

of

Obiects

We have

referred above to the

faat

that speciatrized

in

tain

sense

he most specialized) ttreory of

Objec'r.s

as fo

mathematics

he

most

splendid

epresentation

hat could be

This

luster

has

long led to

efforts to make the

procedu

mathematico,

accessible

o

other

sciences-I might say,

ot

mains

of Objects.

We shall

scarcely

be tripped

unr by

any

cant

error

if

we

add: wheneversuch

atternpts

have been und

then to that extent an effort has been naadealso to do the

specialized

heory

of Objects

in areas

outside

of rnathern

course,

not every

application of

mat"hernatical

roceduresne

be

taken nto

considera{.ion.

hen

the merchant

or the

engi

culates,

he has

as little to do

with the theory of Objects as w

other

theory.

Flowever,

certain

presuppositions

having

to

Objects

ie naturally

at the base of

such

practican

applica

is not otherwise

when

the application results

n

a theoretic

est. In

contrast

with the

technique of calculation which

d

complete

attention,

the nature of these

presuppositions

an

fully

in the background"

This

is ilinrstrated

most clearly by th

of probability and the theory of probableerror, which even

still

not recognizedby everyone

as naturatrly

elonging o L

psychology.

The

nature

of these

assulroptions

an

possibly

calculations

n

question

at

the service

of

the

theory of Obj

we

can see n

the case of

the

theory of combinations). Me

geometry

seerns

better

prepared

than arithrnetic to extend

beyond ts

narrow borders

to discoveries

n

the

theory of

trf one

observes

hat the domain

of spatiatr

quantities

be

arithmetic,

then what is

offered as the translation

(so

fam

everyone)

of

the

geornetrical

view from

space to tirne is

extramathematical

nd,

moreover,

pertains

o

the theory

of

It pertains o the theory of Objects becauset is in no way

with

the

so-called

eality,

or more

precisely,

eal existence

It

is obvious

that the analogy s valid for

phoronorrny

o

greater

neasure;

f-what seems

o

me

to

need no

proof-,A.

is correct

in

contending that tension is the

"third

fund

phenomenon

of rnechanics"

along with space

and time,82

additional

direction s

indicated n which this

science,

withou


14/21

theory of

Objects

hrough the most thoroughgoing

priori

treatment

chology to

order the "perceptual

Objects"

("Empfindungsgegens'

tiinde')ts belonging o t}te difterent senses nd, where possible, o

understand heir multifarious

aspects n tep.s

of

spatial

representa-

tion are

particular$

instructive. Even

if, in regard

to

visual sensa-

tion, where these

effortl

have brought

forth

the most

tangible

results,sa

he

name

"color-geometry"

mplies

far more

praise than

is actually deserved,

t

still

becomes

undeniably

aPparent

hat

the

character of the

pertinent

investi$tions

belongs

much

more

to

the

theory of Objects han to

psychology. trust that

it is not

excessively

personal

for

me to report

at this time

that

much

of

the essential

nature

of

the

way in

which the

theory

of

Objects

rames

ts

ques-

tions originally occurred o me

while I was

engaged

n

supposedly

exclusively

psychological

abors

toward

clarification

of

thesematters.

What I have called the encroachmentof the mathematicalap-

proach

beyond

ts strictest

imits has

an instinctive

and

unconscious

iharacter in comparison with the

completely

explicit

attempts

to

expand that domain

and

to

generalize

o

the fullest

extent

possible

that

way

of framing a

problem.

These

have

probably

already

achieved

some

mportanceunder the

name of the

general

heory

of functions;

one

cannot

fail

to see

this in such

designations

s

"the

theory

of

extension" and "the theory

of manifolds,"

and

even under

the

fre-

quently

misunderstood

catchword,

"meta-mathematics."

From

the

point

of view we

have

addpted

here,

hesestrikingly

significant

nves-

iigations

represent

he transition

from

the specialized

o the

general

theory of objects.A similar

status

may

be ascribed

o the

endeavors

and results customarilygroupedunder the generalnameof "mathe-

matical

logic," even though

those endeavors

are in

many respects

intended or an'entirely

different

purpose.

On

the

o$er hand,

it

is

likely that

the

treasure

of

valuable

assertions

nd suglestions,

which

(non-mathematical)

ogi,q,

epistemology,

nd metaphysics

rom Aris-

totle to the

present

have

contributed o

the area with

which

we

are

33. A t** introduced

by

Witasek,

o,h?"h

,""-. to me

very

usefu

alexius meinong - th of obj)

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