alfred schutz on social reality and social science

7/27/2019 Alfred Schutz on Social Reality and Social Science

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ALFRED SCHUTZ ON SOCIAL REALITY AND SOCIAL SCIENCEAuthor(s): MAURICE NATANSONReviewed work(s):Source: Social Research, Vol. 35, No. 2 (SUMMER 1968), pp. 217-244Published by: The New SchoolStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40969905 .

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ALFRED SCHUTZ ON SOCIALREALITY AND SOCIAL SCIENCEBY MAURICE NATANSON"Familiar hings appen, nd man-kind oesnotbotherbout hem. Itrequires very nusualmind oun-dertake he nalysisftheobvious."- Alfred orthWhitehead

It hastakenAmericanhilosophersndsocialscientistshirty-five earsocatch pwith heearlywork f Alfredchutz.HisDer sinnhafteufbau er sozialenWelt:eineEinleitungn dieverstehendeoziologiewasfirstublishedn 1932. An Englishversion asrecentlyppeared nder he itle, hePhenomenologyoftheSocialWorld.1 t is clear that heGerman ditionwascloselytudied ysomeoftheablestminds fthe thirtiesnd'forties howere oncerned ith roblemsf thephilosophyndmethodologyfthe ocial ciences. Referenceso Schutz's ookappear n thewritingsf suchthinkerss JosOrtegayGasset,LudwigvonMises,Raymond ron, nd FelixKaufmann.Al-thought snotunlikelyhat heEnglishditionwillbe studiedwith qual carebyAmericancholars,he fundamentalssump-tions f heEuropeaneaderbout he elevancefphilosophyor

i Translated by George Walsh and FrederickLehnert with an IntroductionbyGeorge Walsh (Evanston, Illinois: NorthwesternUniversityPress, 1967). A glossaryof German-English ermshas been provided along with a selected bibliographyofwritingsby Schutz and titles to which he frequently efers. Although the qualityof Schutz's German does not come througheasily in English, the translatorshavedone conscientiousjob. I happened upon one howler, more amusing thandamaging: In the original, Schutz, referring o Rudolph Stammler,writes: "Inseinem Stammleraufsatzeigt Max Weber ..." Translated (footnote,p. 200): "Inhis essay on stammering,Max Weber demonstrated . ." The book is carefullyproofread. I came across only one typographicalerror: On p. 70, Je-Meinigheitshould read Je-Meinigkeit.


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218 SOCIAL RESEARCHsocial sciencehaveheretoforeeen rather ifferentrom hose ofhiscounterpartn the UnitedStates. Thus, for xample,Ludwigvon Mises,unlikemostAmericaneconomists, eginshis treatiseon economics, uman Action,with substantialection n "TheEpistemologicalroblem fa GeneralTheoryof Human Action/'The fundamentalssumptions that obe concernedwithman inthesocialworld s necessarilyo exploretherealitywhich under-liesand characterizesMan," the "Social" and "World." Philoso-phyis inescapableforthe social scientistwho seeksclarity ndrigor nhiswork,whotakes he term discipline" eriously. Noris itsolely questionof nterestn the ogicofscientificnquiry,matter f paying ttention o the statusof propositions,modelsand laws. Philosophysrather oncernedwiththephenomena fthesocialworld:menacting n the context f an intersubjectivereality,haredand sustainedby temporalbeingsawareof them-selvesno lessthanof one another.Oddly enough,today's eaderof The Phenomenologyfthe Social Worldmaybe closerto hisEuropean counterparthanwouldhavebeen the case even fifteenyears go,for herecent nterestnphenomenology,xistentialism,and existential sychologynd psychiatryas broughtmany ndi-vidualsto therealization hatthevery anguageof social sciencebearsthephilosophicalnflectionsnherentn itspresuppositions,presuppositions hich cannot be examinedwithina methodo-logicalorientationwithout angerofentering circlevicious notonlyfor ts ogicaldistressutalso for tsconceptualnsularity.Agood measureof responsibilityorcreating he audience forhisbook belongsto Schutzhimself. Through his teaching n theUnited Statesand the publicationof the three volumesof hisCollectedPapers,phenomenology as founditsway into socialscience. Ifwe havehad to wait thirty-fiveearsfor The Pheno-menologyftheSocial World, t shouldbe rememberedhatdur-ingthoseyears newphilosophical orcehas risentoshapesignifi-cantly heaudienceappropriate o thebook,a forcewhichowesmuchof tsquality ndmomentumo the career f Alfred chutz.


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SCHUTZ ON SOCIAL REALITY 219I

In itshistoricalocus, hePhenomenologyfthe ocial Worldis an attempto vindicate nd deepenMax Weber's heoryfsocial ction yprovidingorta philosophicalrounding hichderives romomeofthecentral deas ofEdmundHusserl ndHenriBergson. n itssystematicspect, hePhenomenologysan efforto establish heoutlines f a conceptionfmeaningwhose onstitutiveharacters groundedn therealityfinner-timeconsciousness.n its programmaticimension,hePhe-nomenologys an adumbrationfa philosophyfsocialreality,not implymethodologyut nanatomyfman's xistence ithhisfellow-mennthemidst feverydayife,withinwhatHusserlcalledthe "naturalttitude."The axisonwhich his hreefoldmovementurnssphenomenologytself,aken oth s a methodand as a modeofphilosophicalomprehension.he bestwaytoapproach chutz's henomenologys to see it at work n hischaracterizationfthesocialworld.The socialworldsprimarilyheworld feverydayife s livedandappreciatednd interpretedycommon-senseencarryingon thecognitivend emotive rafficf daily ife. "Common-sensemen"includes ll of us insofars we act in theworldratherhan bservetformallys disinterestedcientists. hus,although hilosophersnd sociologistsre also common-sensemen, hilosophyndsociologyrenotpart f thefabric fdailylife. Philosophys, n fact, reversalftheunderlyingttitudeofcommon-senseife, primordiallance twhat hemundaneeyehassimplycceptedwithout venthe ntimationfseriousquestion.Within he "natural ttitude"fdaily ifeepistemol-ogy ndmetaphysicsaveno status,heir undamentalroblemsareunadmittedecause hey reunrecognized,nd theirmpli-cationsfor a philosophyf humanexistencere simply ndingeniouslyxcluded.To beginwith, hen,man n the naturalattitude akesforgranted is being n a world,his having


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220 SOCIAL RESEARCHworld, heexistence fOthers ikehimself,heon-going eality fcommunicatingwith thosefellow-men, nd, just as important,theassumption hateverythingust said holdsequallywell fromthe standpoint f the "otherguy," the alter ego. Daily lifemundanereality is "ours" from heoutset, .e., all elements ftheworld of everyday xistence re taken as "real" foryou aswell as formeand for nyonewhoenters he human scene. The"taking s real"which s involvedhere snota matter f nferenceor formalpredication ut an initial seeingand grasping, per-ceptualseizingof theobjector eventas real and as real forallofus. Later we will turnto thephenomenologicalrounding orthe "taken-as-real,"ut for the moment it is the naive, the"prepredicative"raspof theexperiencedworldas "ours" whichneedsconsideration.To saythatthe world s experienced s "ours" from heoutsetis to hold thatmyfellow-mans initially ecognized s a "some-one" (not a "something") nd, further, "someone like me."2In myface-to-facencounterwith the Other, t is he as personwho is graspedratherthana creaturewith the anatomicalfea-tures which permitthe human observer to classifyhim as amember of the same species. It is in what Schutz termsthe"Thou-orientation" hat the Other is experienced s a person:"I am alreadyThou-oriented rom hemoment hat recognizean entitywhich directlyxperience s a fellow-manas a Thou),attributingife and consciousnesso him. However,we mustbequite clear that we are not here dealingwitha conscious udg-ment. This is a prepredicativexperience n which I becomeawareofa fellowhumanbeingas a person."The social world is an intersubjectivene in severalsenses:first,t is the locus of myencounterwith the "Thou"; second,

2A fewcautions re necessary:from heoutset" nd "initially" re not to betaken s chronologicalerms, eferringo eventsn theearly ivesof individuals.It is thephenomenologicalenesis nd not the causalorigin f experiencewhichis at issuehere.s The Phenomenologyf the Social World,pp. 163-164 hereaftereferredoonlybypagenumber).


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SCHUTZ ON SOCIAL REALITY 221it is the scene of myown action which is directed towardmyfellow-men.My actionrevealstheworld as "ours" no less thandoesmyencounterwithyouas my"Thou." And,ofcourse, hesocialworlddoes not springmagicallyntobeingwithmybirthoryours; t ishistoricallyrounded nd bearsthemarks nd signsoftheactivityfourancestors,mostremarkable fall thetypify-ingmediumof language. Finally,the intersubjective orldhasan open horizon; it is in movement owarda futurewhich ispartly ours"and in largepart"theirs," hepossession f futuregenerations. In sum,the intersubjective orld is the epistemiccontextfor humanaction,the significativeorizon n termsofwhich ndividuals, vents, nd even things re understood. It isnow possible to turn to the phenomenologicalgroundingforsomeoftheseclaims.The intersubjective orld of daily life,our social world, isthedomainofaction, nd theanalysis f action s a central hemeof Schutz's henomenology. n manyways, heproblemofsocialaction traversesnd connects ll of his work. In thePhenome-nologythe starting oint is Weber's conceptionof action. Al-thoughSchutz accepts and followsWeber's postulate of thesubjective nterpretationf meaning (the meaningwhich theactorbestows n his own act and forwhich he is responsible sdistinguishedrom heinterpretationhichtheobservermakes),he presentsomesalientqualifications.First, nd mostgenerally,Weberexplored hephilosophical oundationsf histheories nlyas deeplyas thedemandsofhis empirical esearch nd theappli-cation of relatedtheoreticalnvestigationequired; the vast in-sightand powerof his methodologywere not accompaniedbyequivalent philosophical nalysis. Second,and morespecifically,hisconception f social actiontookforgranted heveryproblemofintersubjectivityhich ies at the basis ofall theory faction.Concretely,he charges re thatWeber does not recognizethecomplextime-structuref action,failingto distinguish etweenon-goingction nd thecompleted ct; thathisanalysis f motiva-tion sfaulty ecause he doesnotallow for hedifferenceetween


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222 SOCIAL RESEARCHthatmotivationwhoseexplanatory rinciple ies in thepastandthatwhichdemands the consideration f the future;that theentire tatus fmeaning n social actionhas notbeen fully lari-fiedbecause the structuref intentionhas been leftphilosophi-cally unexamined. Schutz'sposition is perfectlylear at thispoint: convincedof the fundamental orrectnesslet alone bril-liance)of Weber's entire pproach o thephenomena fthesocialworld,he conceiveshis taskto be thatofa digger ffoundations,to provide a philosophical underpinningfor the sociologyofVerstehenyclarifyingtsphenomenological resuppositions. tis in thisperspectivehatSchutz's wnformulationfthenatureof actionis to be understood.There is a seriousambiguityn the term"action,"for t canreferto the on-going ourse of an action'sdevelopmentor tothecompleted, inished roduct. Moreover, ctionmaybe pre-sented o theegoinone of three emporal imensions: Myactionas it takesplace presentstself o me as a seriesof existing ndpresent xperiences,xperienceshat recoming obe and passingaway. My intended . . action presentstself o me as a seriesoffuture xperiences. My terminated,ompleted ct (whichismyexpired ction)presentstself o me as a seriesof terminatedexperienceswhich I contemplaten memory/' The meaningofan action s boundup withthese emporal istinctions;urtherrefinementsnecessary.Schutzdistinguishedetween ctionandact. The on-goingonstitutions termed action";thecompletedunit is the "act." Action is subject-bound,t builds up in atemporaldevelopment,nd its fullsignificances alwayson thefar ideof theactor'sntention.The act is a unitary henomenonwhich s object-orientednd whosemeaning s graspable. Since"meaning" s introduced ere na particularway, t isnecessaryoinclude some explanationof the phenomenological ositioninwhich t is embedded. Action(including ct) and meaningareintegral n theirepistemicfunction. Meaning is not "added"

4p. 39.


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SCHUTZ ON SOCIAL REALITY 223or "attached'' o actionbywayofsome sortof predicationrinterpretiveddendum. nstead,meanings bound to theveryconceptionf ctionndmust eunderstoodsvital o tsforma-tion. Meaning nd action re bothgroundedn temporality:". . . meaningsa certainwayofdirectingne'sgazeat an itemofone'sownexperience.This item s thus selected ut' andrenderediscreteya reflexivect. Meaningndicates,here-fore, peculiar ttituden thepart ftheEgo toward heflowofitsownduration." These distinctions ake t possible oseethedialecticalelationshipetween action" nd "act."In theprocessf tsformation,ocial ction s oriented owardcertain oals; t is project-directed,e might ay. The way nwhich goal is entertainedy theego involves hefollowingprocedure:he ndividual rojects isdesired oalas having l-readybeenfulfillednd fanciest as completed,s though tnowwere,n Schutz's ormulation,n the future erfectense.The goal thus magineds theprojectedct; it is themeaningofthe orrespondingctionmeant orealize t. The projecting,ofcourse, akes lace n a present.The goalprojecteds time-transcendent,orunliketheactionwithinwhich ts formationoccurs, hemeaning f thegoal,theprojected ct, is merelyintendedytheconsciousnessfthe magininggoandnot anactualpartof his stream f awareness. n phenomenologicalterms,heintentionalnitymeant theprojectedct, in thisinstance)s independentfthe ntendingn thepart ftheego.A mathematicalropositions trueor false ndependentf thefervencyithwhich hestudentssertststruth r falsityndregardlessfthe diosyncraticechniquese mayuse in his cal-culations.What smeant,hen,nsocial ctionsmeaningfulnthepresentothe xtentandfor chutz nly otheextent)hata fancyingrphantasyingonsciousnessrojects correspondingact. Thus, "themeaning f anyaction s its corresponding

5P. 42. Note the distinctionetween act" (Handlung)and "Act" (Akt),thelatterreferringo the spontaneous ather han the passiveaspectof the ego'sexperience.


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224 SOCIAL RESEARCHprojected ct."6 Apart from uch projection,however, ction,strictlypeaking,has no meaning.7 We have been discussingaction n thepresent. Clearly,past action is takenup anew inthe present nd considered n its completedcharacter s act.Insteadof fancyingn eventas alreadyhavingtakenplace, wehave theeventas actuallyhavingtakenplace. In an ''irreal' orfictiveway,or in a real way,the future s essential o the com-prehension f action in the present, nd withinthe present hehistoryfacts srelived. One is tempted ospeakwithAugustineofa present factionpresenttheprojected ct),a present factspast (the act remembered),nd a presentof action future theanticipated ct).8 The structural roundingof the distinctionbetween action and act in temporalconsiderations as decisiveimportanceor hetheoryfmeaning hat merges. Not onlytheongoing ction but the entirerangeof awareness equiresa re-flexivemomentn consciousness, looking-upon,fthere s to bemeaningful xperience. That reflexivenesss made possiblebyinnertimeordurewhichgeneratesnd sustains hemultivalentorderofhumanreality. It is preciselyhere thatHusserl'sandBergson's nalyses fhumantemporalityrovideSchutzwiththefoundation ora phenomenologicalccount of the constitutionofmeaning.The projected ct, t hasbeensuggested,equires phantasyngego who imaginesan event planned for the futureas alreadyhavingtakenplace. Phantasyings a complexactivityn whichthe imaginedobjectsare granted peculiarontologicalstatus:theyare takenas "irreal" or fictive eings. Husserl speaksofthem s "neutral" asdistinguishedrom positional")projections.What is thusphantasied s "real" in the mode of being enter-tainedbyconsciousness ut not real in the senseof being taken

6P. 61.7Thoughit maystillbe considereds partof "behavior"n thegeneric enseof thatterm.8Perhaps hetemptationughtto be avoided, or t is not altogetherlearonthisaccountwhat the relationships between he futurityf the projected ctand thatoftheanticipatedct.


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SCHUTZ ON SOCIAL REALITY 225as actuallyexistent r havingin facttranspired s a mundaneevent. The activityfphantasyings similar o Husserl'snotionofa "neutralitymodification"hroughwhichthe esthetic bjectemergess "rear*n theexperience ftheartwork.9Phantasying,then,meanspresentingo oneself possiblestateof affairsndtaking hatstateof affairs s consequent. One phantasieswhathis alterego will do in responseto a possible courseof actionwhoseprojected ct is now envisaged s finishednd done with.If thatcourseofaction is indeedfollowed nd theprojected ctbecomes reality,fwhatwas phantasieddoes in actuality akeplace,thenthemodeofattention ivento theact by theego inreflectivettitude hanges nto the "positional"attitudeof con-sciousness. It is essential o consciousnesshatphantasying avethe crucialreflective omentn itsprocedurefortheexperiencein question to be meaningful. Reflectionmarks the differencebetweenife ndthought.10 hantasying,tmustbe added,coversa variegated angeofattention,xtending rom ichand dramaticenvisagemento highly bstract nd unlikelypossibilitiesnd re-sultants. The question of which possibilities re selected orchosen n thephantasyingfprojected ctsleads to whatSchutz

". . . (L)et us supposethatwe are observing iirer's ngraving,The Knight,Death, ndtheDevil.' We distinguishere n thefirst lacethenormal erceptionofwhich hecorrelates the engraved rint*s a thing,hisprintn theportfolio.We distinguishn thesecondplace theperceptiveonsciousnessithinwhich ntheblack inesofthepicture here ppearto us thesmall olourlessigures,knighton horseback,'death/ nd 'devil.' In aesthetic bservation e do not considerthese s theobjectsObjekten);we haveour attentionixed n what s portrayed'in thepicture/moreprecisely,n the depicted*ealities,heknight f flesh ndblood,and so forth.That whichmakes thedepicting ossible nd mediatest,namely, he consciousnessf the picture' of the smallgreyfigurettesn whichthrough he derivednoesessomethingther, hrough imilarity,presents tselfas depicted*),s now an examplefortheneutrality-modificationf theperception.This depicting icture-objecttandsbefore s neither s beingnoras non-being,norin anyotherpositionalmodality;r rather,we are aware of it as having tsbeing, houghnly quasi-being,n theneutrality-modificationfBeing." EdmundHusserl,deas: General ntroductiono PurePhenomenology,ranslatedyW. R.BoyceGibson, ondon and New York:GeorgeAllen and Unwin Ltd. and TheMacmillan o.,1931, . 311).ioSee p. 70.


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226 SOCIAL RESEARCHcalls theproblemof "relevance," topicI will turnto later. Itis importantt thispointtorecognize hat hetheoryfphantasy-inghasseriousmplications or ocial actionat all levelsofhumanexperience ecause theprojection facts underlies hemeaning-fulstructuref thesocial worldfrom hedomainof face-to-faceexperience f theThou totypificationsfquiteremote nddistantfellow-mennd their ulturalrealities.

Social actiontakesplace in a context; t is situationallyimitedanddefined. Even thefictivespects fphantasyingre qualifiedand restrictedy thecontextwithinwhichthe act is projected.What is deemedto be "likely," possible,"or "out of theques-tion"depends, n part,on the situation t hand and the actor'sassessment f it. To understand ction,then, t is necessary oturntowhat motivates heactor n a situation. One of Schutz'scriticismsfWeber, tmaybe recalled, oncernedhis accountofmotivation.WhatSchutzobjectsto in Weber'streatments thatboththeactor's ubjectivefeeling bout thecontext fmeaningwhich s thegroundof his behavior nd what the observer up-posesthatgroundto be are indiscriminatelyut togethern theconceptof motive.11Since it was Weber who introducedthepostulate f thesubjective nterpretationf meaning,whichin-sistson attention eing paid to themeaningan act has for theactor who performshatact, it is curiousthat he failedto keepseparate he ubjective ndobjective spectswhendiscussingmoti-vation. The reasonforthe confusion s the failure to explorethetemporal oundation faction. Thus, f


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SCHUTZ ON SOCIAL REALITY 227directedaction is qualitativelydifferentrom that of its past-relatedcorollary. Schutzmarksthe differencey naming theformer he "in-order-to"motiveof action and the latter the"because" motive. The Phenomenologyncludesa detaileddis-cussionofthemeaningof theseterms.The central nsight fthesubjective nterpretationfmeaninghingeson thequestionofhowwe are to understand hemotiveof theactor. In response o thequestion,"Whyare you doingX?" twoanswers re bothcommon nd appropriate: I am doingX in order to accomplishY," or "I am doingX because of Y."In many ases t is possibleto translate ne form nto theother:"I am entering hediplomatic orps n order to servemycoun-try" ranslatesnto "I am entering hediplomatic orpsbecauseI wantto servemy country"and vice versa). When translationof thissort s possible,we are dealingwithwhat Schutzcalls a"pseudo-becausetatement." In thecase of a "genuinebecausestatement" ranslations impossible: I leftthediplomatic orpsbecause I was fired" annotbe translatednto an "in-order-to"equivalent. The motive fthegenuinebecausestatementies ina completed xperiencen thepast. Accessto it temporallymustbe bywayofthepluperfectense. The in-order-to otive s notonly directedtoward the futurebut presupposesthe projectwhichcharacterizeshe courseof actionphantasiedby the ego.In the in-order-toelation,the projectdoes the motivating;nthe genuine because relation,the project itself s motivated.18The largerconsideration nvolved here is that social action isinitiallydefinedby the project,not the causal antecedents ftheproject. This in turnmeansthat social actionis fundamen-tallymotivated y n-order-toelationswhich re,as theydevelopin theactuality f life,basically akenforgrantedby the actor.It is precisely ere that we locate the root of Schutz's entiretheoryf "theworld s takenforgranted." The situationwithinwhich heprojection f actionby wayof in-order-to otives akes

See p. 92.


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228 SOCIAL RESEARCHplace presupposes hepastacts of the ego and thehistory f hisantecedentprojections. The practicalefficacyf past perform-ances in a variety f situations ssuresa base fromwhicheachnew presentprojecting s oriented. Pragmatic ustification fthatbase in turnrenders ewprojects factiontypicallyssured.In the momentof reflection he ego looksback on his fund ofknowledge ainedfrompastactsand makes theassumption hatwhathas typicallyworkedreasonablywell in the pastwill alsowork quivalentlywell in thefuture. Of course, here s nothingautomatic bout the decisionas towhetherwhatwas appropriatein thepast s appropriate orthefuturebecausethe"Here" and"Now" statusof the individualis neverquite the same as hisearlierplacementn life Withinthespan of theprojectof thein-order-toelation, heproblematicspectofexperiences placedin abeyance. Thus, thetaken-for-grantedis always hatparticu-lar level of experiencewhichpresents tself s not in need offurthernalysis. Whether level ofexperience s thustakenforgranted ependson thepragmaticnterest fthe reflectivelancewhich s directedupon it and thereby pon theparticularHereand Now fromwhichthatglance is operating." 4If actionis always ituated, t is a worldof fellow-men hichguaranteeshesociality fman'sexistence. The human situationis essentiallyntersubjective.At the sametime, herangeof theintersubjective orldis far argerthan is ordinarily ecognized,for n additiontomycontemporariesand the narrower ut over-whelminglymportantlass of those ontemporaries ithwhomshare face-to-faceelationship Schutz alls them"consociates")there remypredecessors,hosewholivedbefore wasborn, ndmy uccessors,hosewhowill be born after die. It is a mistaketo limit theanalysis f social actionto the sphereof contempo-raries, hough t is indeed truethatwhat knowofmy predeces-sorsand successorss dependenton themodel ofmyexperienceof contemporaries.The beginningpointforan analysisof the

i*P. 74.


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SCHUTZ ON SOCIAL REALITY 229intersubjectiveorld s theWe-relationshipsharewiththosefellow-men ithwhom participaten direct patial-temporalencountermyconsociates.The experiencef theWe is pri-mordial.It isgainedbythepresencefmen n theworld, otbyinductionr a theoreticalroof. We comehere to an ex-perientialedrock fthesocial: the We ofdirect,hared, ace-to-facencounters,fromhe tandpointfthe go'sparticipationin the ocialworld,n experienceuigeneris.The problemfintersubjectivitys a problem ecauseof thefactof the We-relationship.n this ense, heWe is experientiallyrior othephilosophicalroblemtgeneratesor hosewho seektounder-stand ow socialworld spossible.Noris theWe-relationshiptobeexplainednthebasis fa logical onstructionfthe ocialmadebytheego. Rather,theworld ftheWe is notprivatetoeitherfus,but s ourworld,heonecommonntersubjectiveworldwhich s right heren front f us. It is onlyfrom heface-to-faceelationship,rom hecommonivedexperienceftheworldn theWe,that he ntersubjectiveorld an be con-stituted.This alone is the pointfromwhich t can be de-duced." 5 Within hesocialworldthusunderstood,owever,there tillremains hequestion f howknowledgef Others spossible.Atonelevel this s a distinctivelyhilosophicalrob-lem;atanotherevel, t isa systematicssuefor hemethodologyofthesocial sciences.Even in theface-to-faceelationship itha fellow-man,heindividual nows nlyan aspectof theOther. AlthoughheThou is given s a person,hemodeofgivennesss essentiallyadumbrated. ome spectsfthe Other remanifest,thersrepresentedn shadowyorm r are completelypaque. To saythat haveknowledgeftheOther s then o saythat knowhimdirectlyn very imitedmeasurebut indirectlyn vastdegree,hroughypifiedonstructs hich form fhimand ofhuman ehaviorenerally.Ofcourse,heparadigmhou inthe

is P. 171.


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230 SOCIAL RESEARCHrelationship f love or friendship resentshimselfvividlyandthoroughly,nd in all face-to-facencounters he realityof theOtheris more or lessvibrantly resented. But whenwe movefromonsociates ocontemporaries,radicalchange s introduced:theegoknowshiscontemporary y wayof typificationsnd con-structions, odelsof how "someone"traditionallyehavesor isexpected o behave n certain ituations. In short, heego knowshiscontemporarieshieflyhrough complex, oncatenatedystemofideal types. Schutzdistinguishesetween womeanings ftheconcept f deal type f humanbehavior:"It can mean firstfallthe deal type f anotherpersonwho is expressing imself r hasexpressed imselfn a certainway. Or itmaymean, second, heideal type ftheexpressive rocess tself, r even of theoutwardresultswhich we interprets the signsof the expressive rocess.Let us call the firsthe personal deal type'and the second the'material'or 'course-of-actionype'."

6Whathappensthen to thetheory f thesubjective nterpreta-tion ofmeaning s that the social worldis constituted,n largemeasure,by personal deal types nd by course-of-actionypes,varying rommoreor lessspecific cquaintancewitha fellow-manto almostcompleteanonymityn relationships.The meansbywhich uchtypes re constitutednvolves hepostulation f a per-sonand the attributionohimofthosetypical ttitudes,motives,interests,kills, nd techniqueswhichwould be sufficiento ac-countfor hekindofactin questionwe seek tounderstand.Theanalysismaybegineitherwiththeperson nd endwiththe actorstartwiththeact and from tstypical tructure orkback to theconstructionf thekindofperson apableofbehavingn thatway.What decidestheperspectiveromwhich theconstruction ill bemade is the nterpreter'sointof view. The personal deal type"is a function fthevery uestion tseekstoanswer"17 Finally,thepersonal deal type s intimatelyelated o thecourse-of-action

type nd indeedmustutilize tsmodel f t wishes ocreate tsown.ieP. 187.itP. 190.


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SCHUTZ ON SOCIAL REALITY 231Bymeansofbothforms fideal types, heego is able to advancefrom heexperience ftheThou in theWe-relationshipo the n-creasingstagesof anonymizationwhich mark its genesis anddestiny s a contemporary ithothercontemporaries,s a suc-cessor opredecessors,nd as a predecessoro successors,

II"Whoever . . wishes o analyze hebasicconcepts fthesocialsciences," chutzwrites,mustbewilling oembark n a laboriousphilosophical ourney,for the meaning-structuref the socialworldcan onlybe deduced from hemostprimitive nd generalcharacteristicsfconsciousness."8 This turnto the"subjective"mustbe understoodn phenomenologicalerms; therwisewe arein dangerofrepeatingwhat s bynow theclassicalerror finter-preting consciousness"n individual, interiorized"erms. It is

not the privatecontents f an introspectivewarenessbut thestructure f intentionality hich is meant in the phenomeno-logicalconception fconsciousness. The perceptualmodel, then,is not thatof a containerwith an "inside" and an "outside,"hookedup bywires oreceivemessages rom he "real"world,noris it theconsequenceof a separationbetweenmindand body,acasestillpendingbefore hephilosophic omestic elations ourt.Rather,forphenomenologyonsciousness s conceivedof as aunity n whichthe "subjective" s already n directconnectionwiththeobjectsofits ntentional oncernbecausethose"objects"areparts fthe unified tructurefthestreamsfconsciousnessnot"things"but meantcorrelates ftheacts which ntendthem.To turn oconsciousness,hen, s to locatetheessential eaturesfmeaning-structureshoseuniversalitys guaranteed,n part, bythe fact that no predicationof existence, ntologicalstatus,orpsychologicalpecificitys eitherbeingmade or is at issue in thephenomenologicalttitude.Schutz's nalysisof the time-structuref social action is con-

is p. 12.


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232 SOCIAL RESEARCHcernedwith what is necessarily resupposedforany ego whichphantasies projected ct,notwith theconcrete, istoricalndi-vidual and his particular nd specialcharacteristics.t is irrele-vanttotheanalysis o suggest,hen, hat thecapacity o phantasyvariesfrom ndividualto individual. It is becausewe can under-standphantasyings suchthat t is possibleto speakhereof indi-vidual differences.Certainly,here re considerable nd impor-tant variances n individualpsychological apacitiesand opera-tions, utthey remeasures ftheways nwhich ssential esponseismade. There aremoreor lessgifted hantasiers ut notmoreor lessgifted hantasying.Subjectivity,or hephenomenologist,s thento be understoodas a domainwhich s readily ccessibleto the inspection f anyinvestigatorho cares to make theeffort,rovided hathe equiphimselfproperly. More important han special knowledgeofmethodologicalechniquess thebroadrecognitionhat onscious-ness snot an idiosyncraticellspringo be tappedbya haphazardor esoteric methodof intuition but intentionalitytself,thatwhichby tsverynature s as "public" and as "intersubjective"sits ntimates,mathematicsnd language. Nor is subjectivityobeapproached hroughmoresophisticatedheories fpersonal ntui-tionand empathy.Schutz xplicitly epudiates hetranslationfverstehendeoziologie ntoeither n irrationalism hich tries oseizethevital spectof ife n somenon-reductiveayor a herme-neuticsof fellow-feelinghich triesto enterdirectly nto theactuality fthe Other's ivedexperience:"All true ciences emandthemaximum fclaritynd distinct-ness for all theirpropositions. There is no such thingas anirrationalscience. We must never cease reiterating hat themethod fWeber's ociologysa rational ne and that hepositionof nterpretiveociologyhould n nowaybe confusedwiththat fDilthey,whoopposesto rational cience nother, o-calledinter-pretive' ciencebasedon metaphysicalresuppositionsnd incor-rigibleintuition/"It is true thatthe postulateof such an interpretivecience


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SCHUTZ ON SOCIAL REALITY 233arose istoricallyromhenecessityfbreakinghroughhebarri-ers hatwere rected etweenherationalpecial ciencesndtheunderstandingf iving uman xperience.But twasforgottenbythose roposinghisnewapproachhat ifeand thoughtretwodifferenthingsndthat cience emains matter fthoughtevenwhents ubjectmatterslife. It cannot,herefore,ase t-self nsome ague ndconfusedmpathyron valuepresupposi-tions r ondescriptionsackingn ntellectualigor."9There re a varietyfreasons hy he gocannot eize he iv-ing actualityf the Other's xperience: is Here and Now isunique,his stock fknowledges builtup and utilized rom isperspectivendbyhischoice,ndhe aloneknowswhenhisproj-ectbeginsndends. Asfellow-man,owever,can share greatdealwith heOther: cangaindirect ccess ohim s a Thou intheWe-relationshipndI canshare certain imensionf timethroughhe act hatmy lter go nd grow lder ogether. uteven nthesemmediacies,donot 'become'theOther ordo Ientermysteriouslyntohis ived xperience. haringsnot nvad-ing. Thematteroesnot ndthere,f ourse,ecausemyknowl-edge f heOthern tsgreatestomplexityomeswithhe ypifica-tions ndidealtypeswhich orm hematrixf social ife. Thedescription,nalysis,ndclarificationf hatmatrixsnothingessthan he ubjectmatterf phenomenologyf the ocial ciences.The distinctionetweenife ndthought hich chutznsistson demandsrigorousciencef he ubjective. t is notpossible,inprinciple,or he cientisto enter irectlynto he ifehe ob-servesnd tobuild hisscience romhematerials fdirect n-counter.At best hese repoints fdepartureorwhatmayaterdevelopnto cientificork. Without oubt, hesociologistranthropologistayivewith is subjects,"hare heir aily ives,enterympatheticallyndgenuinelynto heironcernsnd activi-ties. It is from he tandpointfan observer,owever,hat hescientificeportsf uchparticipationremade ndare methodo-

i9 P. 240.


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234 SOCIAL RESEARCHlogicallywarranted.The experience fthe ubject s a Thou in aWe-relationshipenuinely stablishedby the scientist itherre-mainspartofdaily ifeor is made an explicitobjectof reflectiveanalysis. If it remainswithin ife, t is no morea partof sciencethan the correspondingxperienceof the subject. If it is ex-amined and reflectedpon,theexperience s taken n itstypifiedform ndinterpretedythemeans fconstructionsnd idealtypes.

For Schutz,adequate scientificnalysismust begin with theformation f objective typesbased on the knowledgegained ofindividuals hrough ersonal deal types. The sociological scent,then, s fromivedexperience o typificationsfmundane ife topersonal deal typeswhich ccountfor ndividualsn actiontoob-jective deal typeswhichreplaceall priorconstructs.With thefinal tage, hesocialscientist eacheshisgoal ofestablishingob-jectivemeaning-contextsfsubjectivemeaning-contexts.1*0 Andtherewithe achieves heformalizationnd anonymization hichrigorous ciencerequires. In one sense,the scientist ltimatelyfinds n thesocial worldhe describes he modelshe has placedthere. Concretehumanbeingshave been replacedby artificialcreatures esignedbythemethodologist.Yet it is extremelym-portant o remember hatthegenesis f constructnd type-build-ing goesbackin naiveform o thenaturalattitudewithinwhichmen in daily life interactwith one another. To paraphaseKroneckers aphorism,wemight aythat henatural ttitude ivesus theprimaryonstructs,herest s theworkofthesocial scien-tist. In a strangend tortuousway, t is throughhoughthat ifeis able toreturn o itssource.The OdysseyfSchutz's henomenologyrom hesolitarygototheachievementf science s notwithout ts nternal iscomfortsand challenges. From withintheorientationnd outlineof hiswork, here re three arge ssueswhich nvite riticaldiscussion:phenomenologicalmethod, henature f ntersubjectivity,nd theproblem frelevance.20p. 241.


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SCHUTZ ON SOCIAL REALITY 2351. Phenomenologicalethod. In an AppendedNoteto thefirsthapter f thePhenomenology,chutzmakes systematicstatementf thestatus f hisinvestigations phenomenologicalwork.Theanalysisf nner ime-consciousnesssdonewithinhephenomenologicaleduction.The rest fhisbook,however,saphenomenologyfthenatural ttitudewhich oesnot,forthemost art,nternto heproceduresrproblemsftranscendental

phenomenology.t is thephenomena ithin henaturalttitudewhich orrespondo thecorrelativeonstitutinghenomenafthephenomenologicallyeduced phere hat re consideredheproperbject f nquiry.The analysisftime ssaid to holdformundaneroblems: . . . since llanalysesarriedutwithinhephenomenologicaleductionoldtrue ssentiallylsoin psycho-logical ntrospection,nd thuswithin hesphere fthenaturalattitude, e shallhave to makeno revisions hatsoevern ourconclusionsoncerninghe nternal ime-consciousnesshenwecome oapply hem o therealm fordinaryocial ife/' 1 Phe-nomenologicalethod,f ourse,s not specialnstrumenthichthephenomenologistses sa jeweler is oupe. Useisbound toneendtoa philosophyfperceptualxperiencendatthe thertopragmaticonsiderationsfwhat sbeing ought, hat prob-lemcallsfor,nd what evelof clarificationsappropriateo thegoals f the nquiry.Understoodn thisway, heproceduresftranscendentalhenomenologyay eunnecessaryor he llumi-21P. 44. Compare the following formulations: "... a true psychologyofintentionality s, according to HusserFs words, nothing other than a constitutivephenomenologyof the natural attitude. In this eidetic mundane science (thus inthe psychological apperception of the natural attitude), which stands at thebeginning of all methodological and theoretical scientificproblems of all thecultural and social sciences,all analyses carried through in phenomenological re-duction essentiallyretain their validation. It is preciselyhere that the tremendoussignificance f the results achieved by Husserl for all the cultural sciences lies."(Alfred chutz,Collected apers,Vol. I: The Problemof Social Reality, ditedand introducedy Maurice Natansonwitha preface y H. L. Van Breda,TheHague: MartinusNijhoff, 962,p. 132) and: ". . . Husserl himselfhas estab-lishedonce and for all theprinciple hatanalysesmade in the reduced pherearevalidalso forthe realmofthe natural ttitude.'* Ibid.,p. 149.)


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236 SOCIAL RESEARCHnationof certainaspectsof mundane existence. However,thevariousstrata f phenomenologicalnvestigationmirror ne an-other, nd are, n structuralmplication,somorphicwithone an-other. It follows hatdescriptivework done at one level has itsdirect mplications nd analoguesfor other evels. It is not al-together lear whySchutzrestricts is transcendentallance toinner-time onsciousness. Granted that time is the cardinalthemeunderlyingocialaction, s it is ofall social structure,t isstillthecasethat hesocial tself,hecurrent fmundanity,s notonly quallydeservingf transcendentalnvestigationut in needof uch nquiryfa varietyfquestions elated osocialactionareto be analyzed utto their oots. The We-relationship,or xam-ple, s inmany espects primordial ivenfor chutz,.e.,hisstart-ingpoint naccounting or tsformndfunctions its ndubitableand immediatepresentation.Fromthestandpoint f the trans-cendental ttitude,t is necessaryo ask,How is it possiblethatthere s sucha structure?Within thenatural ttitude heWe-re-lationships a fact f ife,but in thephenomenologicalttitude tisdeeplyproblematic.It isdifficultoseehowthequestionofthevery ossibilityftheWe-relationshipan be given tsfullweightwithin herestrictionschutz mposes. Obviously,t is theauth-or'sright ocircumscribeheprovince f his investigation.Whatis at issuehere s somethinglse: how theanalogueof thetrans-cendentalproblemof sociality tself an be encounteredwithinthe imits f phenomenologyfthenatural ttitude. Perhaps nevendeepermethodologicalifficultyppearswhenweseektoputinto practicethe Husserlianpostulateof the correspondenceflevelsofphenomenologicalnquiry. Schutz ccepts t as absolutethat the correspondence olds. But that nsight an be gainedonlyfrom hevantage ointoftranscendentaleduction. Itwouldhavebeenofenormous elptohavehadan account fwhat havetermed he isomorphismf levels insteadof its being takenforgranted s a principle fphenomenology.uchan accountmightshowthattheunity fphenomenologicalonception nd practicepermits he phenomenologisto limithimself o the mundane


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SCHUTZ ON SOCIAL REALITY 237only by payingthe priceof excludingsome of the constitutivequestionsultimately ecessaryo thefull llumination fthenat-ural attitude.

2. The Natureof ntersubjectivity. etting side transcenden-talquestions ndmethod lsohasserious mplications orSchutz'sconception fintersubjectivitynd hisapproachto an accountoftheego'sknowledge fhis fellow-man.The acceptance f theWe-relationshipmeansthat heepistemologicalssueof ntersubjectiv-ity s,in certainrespects,etoutsidetheprovince f a phenome-nology fthe natural ttitude.There is a senseofalternation femphasis n the accountof thesemattersn thePhenomenology,for houghweareclearly oldthatwithin he common-senseorldofdaily ife ntersubjectivitysa primordial act f that ifeand sois taken forgranted ycommon-sense en,still theproblematicstatus f ntersubjectivitynd itsprime mportances a philosophi-cal theme or ocial science ntrudes bliquely nto thediscussion,a recognized, onored,but stillunadmitted uest.22Once again,itis notsimply matter fcircumscribinghe imits f the nvesti-gation. Inevitablyn philosophical nalysis f socialreality hereis a kindofcircularity hichhasnothing odo withdeductionorthe ogicof nquirybut is instead seeminglynescapable orrela-tion:thereality obe interpreteds alreadyunderstoodn a naiveorhiddenway. Intersubjectivity,hen, s notonly fact f ife, tis immanentlyomprehendeds a fundamentalccomplishmentof the enterprise f social existence. When the social scientistturns othe ntersubjectiveorld nd beginshisdescriptionfit,thedatahe locates realreadymarked nd chargedwith ntersub-jective ntent. Whenthephilosopherurns o intersubjectivitysan epistemological roblem,he is taking n odd stancewithre-spect oa familiar henomenon,amiliarn the enseof mmanentpre-acquaintanceship.Not to presuppose intersubjectivitynphilosophicalnquiry shardly oerase tormakebelieve t neverwas; rather,t is to turnto theconditionswhichaccountforthe

22Cf. pp. 33 and 98.


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238 SOCIAL RESEARCHstructuretself s a possiblefeature f humanreality. The circleis comprised f a "pre-existent"elationship fman and fellow-man beinginterrogated ya philosopherwho is already n rela-tionshipwithhis fellow-ment the moment e askshowthatrela-tionship s possible. Distinguishingetweenthelogicaland thechronological eginning finquiryhelpsto showthattheresultsof analysis re not vitiatedby the circlebut does not alter thedouble pull of thequestioner owardwhathe knows, n theonehand,and toward rootunfamiliarity,n the other. It is in thiswaythat playdevelops n thePhenomenologyetweenmundan-ity s typicallynown nd available tocommon-sense enand thestructure fmundanitys phenomenologicallyiewedbythephi-losopher-socialcientist. The uneasiness senseheremayhavesomethingo do withSchutz'spositionon Husserl'sapproachtothe problemof intersubjectivityn Formal and TranscendentalLogic and the CartesianMeditations. Like Husserl himself,Schutz was not completely atisfiedwith the attempt o accountfor ntersubjectivityn terms f the doctrine fthetranscendentalego. It mayofcoursebe thehindsight rovidedbyhis essayof1957 on "The Problemof Transcendental ntersubjectivitynHusserl" which eadsme to offer his uggestion,ut I think haton thebasisof thePhenomenologylone itwould be possibletosaythatpartof thereasonfor Schutz's urtailmentf his use oftranscendentalhenomenology as the ncreasing ealization hatitcouldnotprovide solution apartfrom he clarificationftheconstitutive rocess)to the philosophicalproblemof intersub-jectivitynd that, n principle,ntersubjectivitys an irreduciblegivenwithinwhich ndoveragainstwhichphilosophytruggles.233. The ProblemofRelevance. .Both social actionby men indaily ifeand the observationnd analysis f that ctionbysocial

23For the intersubjectivityssay see Schutz's Collected Papers, Vol. Ill: Studiesin PhenomenologicalPhilosophy,edited by I. Schutzwith an introductionby AronGurwitsch The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,1966). Elsewhere Schutz writes: ". . .we may say that the empirical social scienceswill find their true foundation notin transcendentalphenomenology,but in the constitutivephenomenologyof thenatural attitude." (Collected Papers, Vol. I, p. 149.)


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SCHUTZ ON SOCIAL REALITY 239scientistsresuppose fundamental nterestn goals takento bedesirableor necessaryorcarryingut the affairs f lifeand thework f science. Projects f action ituatedn complex ystemsfpreferencesnd needsreflecthebasicenergy fmanas a choice*makingcreature. The entire discussionof motivation, ecauseand in-order-totatements,hantasying,nd the constructionftypes urns n a conceptofvastproportionswhichSchutz termsthegeneralproblem frelevance. It does notfeature s a chapterorsection fthePhenomenology,etthere s hardly page of thebook whichdoesnotimply r refer o aspects ftheproblem. Itis only n theConclusionthat direct tatementfthenatureofrelevance ccurs, nd then t isonly ndicated n fleetingorm s asubjectwhichrequiresfuturedevelopment. Most simply, heproblem frelevance s posed by" . . . thequestionofwhythesefacts nd preciselyhese re selectedbythought rom hetotalityof lived experience nd regarded s relevant."

4 The questionstrikesll levelsofman's nvolvementn thesocialworldas wellas his nvolvementn science, rt, ndreligionbecause tpoints othe source of his agency n life,the vital principleunderlyingwhat wouldcall themotilityfconsciousness.Since theproblemofrelevancerequires"an over-allphenomenologicalnalysis," 5it is hardly urprisinghatSchutzwas unable to includea treat-ment f tin thePhenomenology.A separate reatisewould havebeen necessary.Nevertheless, e do have hints n laterpublica-tions brought ogethern his CollectedPapers) of how he pro-posedtoapproach heproblem. I amnot interested ere n sum-marizing routlining hedetailsofhisviewson relevance; ather,I amconcernedwithdisplayinghetaproot f theproblem. Whatisprofoundly resupposedn andnecessaryotheargument fthePhenomenologys an account fthemotile mpulse fsubjectivity,thevalenceofaction. In all motivation,hoice,projection, han-tasying,nd decisionthere s the forcewhichdrivesthe actionand expressesthe vitalityof the actor. I suggest that the

24P. 250.ss P. 249.


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240 SOCIAL RESEARCHidentificationnd comprehensionf thatnisus of consciousnesswould be the solutionto the sourceof relevance. The Pheno-menology ivesus somereason othink hatrelevance sgroundedin thephenomenologyfinner-timeonsciousness,nd a remark-able passage n a lateressay, On MultipleRealities,"maylendsupport othat laim:". . . thewholesystemf relevanceswhichgoverns swithin henatural ttitude s foundedupon thebasic experience f each ofus: I know that shall die and I fearto die. This basicexperi-encewe suggest allingthefundamentalnxiety. It is the pri-mordialanticipation romwhich all theothers riginate. Fromthefundamentalnxiety pring hemany nterrelatedystemsfhopesand fears, fwantsand satisfactions,f chancesand riskswhich ncitemanwithin henatural ttitude o attempt hemas-tery f theworld, o overcome bstacles, o draftprojects, nd torealize them." 6The fundamentalnxiety s necessarilyound to themeaningof nner-timeonsciousness otonlybecausedeath s thenegationof temporalityut because intentionalitys sustainedand ex-pressedn thetemporalityhich hefear f deathmenaces. Whatstrikesmeas certainn thisveryhypotheticalracing fthe sourceofrelevancesthathowever arnestlynd persuasivelyheanalysisof theproblems carried ut within henatural ttitude,t is onlythroughranscendentalhenomenologyhat tsfoundationan beexposedand reconstructed.Perhapsparadoxically,t is throughthehorizonof relevance hat thecritical ssuesof transcendentalphenomenology aketheir ppearance na phenomenologyfthenatural ttitude.

Turningfrom hePhenomenologyo themorethantwenty-fiveyears f workwhichfollowed, ne is struck ytheconsistencyfSchutz's hought s well as therichness nd clarity f the initialstatement f his position n 1932. It is not only the cardinalvisionofa philosophical econstructionf the essential tructure

26Collected Papers, Vol. I, p. 228. Cf. Aron Gurwitsch,The Field of Conscious-ness (Pittsburgh:Duquesne UniversityPress,1964), pp. 342-343 and 394 ff.


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SCHUTZ ON SOCIAL REALITY 241ofthe taken orgrantedworld fdaily ife which s sustainedandamplifiedn his Collected apers, utthedetailed nalysesof fundamentaleatures f socialrealitywhichare deepenedand extendedn being ppliedto a varietyfproblems hichwereforeseenn thePhenomenologyut leftforfuture reat-ment. Althoughts authorwas in his early hirties hen thePhenomenologyas published,t is evident hatthiswas thework fa mature hilosophical ind, hatthecontentsouldeasily avebeen xpandednto volumewice he izebutfor hefact hat he author hosetowaitforthetimewhenthemostrigorousndmeticuloustatementfhisfindingsouldbe pre-sented n themes ewasstill n theprocessfexamining.Theearlywork s anaccurateredictionfwhatwastofollow,espitethe fact hat heCollected aperscontain ssays n manynewtopicsnd deasnot ncluded nthePhenomenology. nd nad-dition o thefreshnessf essaysike "On MultipleRealities,"Schutznlargedis ociologiendphilosophicorizony tudyingtheworks fsuchthinkersn theAmericancene s GeorgeH.Mead,W. I. Thomas,ndCharles . Cooley,swell sSantayana,Whitehead,ndDewey. Althoughhere rerepetitionsn theformulationf ertain otionsntheCollectedapers,heresnosense f onceptualedundancy.he career fSchutzwas unitydevoted o an explorationfthetruephilosophicalrounds fsocial ealityn the ntentionaltructuref human onsciousness.Within hat areer,hePhenomenologyarks major vent nthehistoryfthephilosophyndmethodologyf the socialsci-ences. To besure,t sperfectlyeasonableo take hebook s asympatheticorrectiveor ertain hilosophicalnadequaciesnWeber'sociology;t sequally ermissibleoclassifyhework sanapplicationfHusserl'sdeas o thefield fthe ocial ciences.Yet uch ccounts ouldmiss henerve fwhat strulyriginalnSchutz's ffortocome o terms ith philosophyfman n thenatural ttitude.The rootoriginalitys the illumination fmundanitys typifiedythe ntentionaltructuref inner-timeconsciousness.verythingomes ack o that action, rojection,


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242 SOCIAL RESEARCHphantasyingand ultimately ven relevance,n myopinion) areall thematerials fa typifyingonsciousnessorwhich emporalityisthe ecret fthe ocialworld. The choiceofa phenomenologicalapproachto suchproblems s hardly asual,forthevery onceptof thenaturalattitudedemandsa wrenching ransformationfthatattitude, reflexive rocedurewhichHusserl calls ''reduc-tion1 and which tself an be understood nly n phenomenolog-ical terms. In phenomenology,hen,Schutz foundthemeaningoftemporality,nd withthattheclue to social reality.27The Phenomenologys remarkable,hough, or tssociologicalinsightno lessthanfor tsphilosophical rilliance. It is, in fact,the union of philosophy nd social sciencein Schutz'sthoughtwhich accountsfor ts powerand establishests importance orpresent-dayocial science. There are, of course,manywaysinwhich n alliancebetweenphilosophynd social sciencecan takeplace. Lookingat the matter rom he standpoint f sociology,onemight aythatforthesociologist hilosophymayoffer gen-eral perspectiven terms fwhichcertainmethodological rob-lemsand theoretical uestionscan be approached. But there salso a deeperdimensionof the relationship, ne in which thesociologist bsorbsthefullweightof a philosophicpositionandseesbasicaspects fhissociologie roblems hroughheconceptualeyesofthatposition. A sociologistwho is a convincedDeweyan,forexample,mayfindthatthe verysyntaxof his thought ndexpression s molded or fundamentallyffected y naturalisticcategoriesndconcepts. Schutz'sndebtedness oHusserlwaspro-foundbut it was notof thesortthat have ustmentioned. Tounderstandchutz's ociologytis imperativeo realizethathewasnotinfluencedyphilosophy; e wasa philosopher! He wasnotinfluencedyphenomenology;ewasa phenomenologist!Before

27Interestinglynough, t was theproblem f temporalityhichpresentedhephilosophicalmeeting lace betweenHusserl nd Schutz. The firstwork Schutzread by Husserlwas the Logical Investigations,hichat the timehe foundimpressivend importantut,he once toldme,"not reallyforhim." Laterheturned o theLectures n thePhenomenologyf Inner-TimeConsciousnessndwas catapultedntophenomenology.


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SCHUTZ ON SOCIAL REALITY 243askinghe uestion,Washethen lsoa sociologist?t isnecessaryto ookmore arefullynto he laim hat ewas philosophernda phenomenologist.he matter ftrainingsnotat issuehere.There are other scholarswho, like Schutz,were thoroughlytrainednbothphilosophynd social cience utforwhom heproperharacterizationouldbe,"He isa sociologisthoknowsa great ealaboutphilosophy/5chutzwas neither philosopherwhoknew great ealabout ociologyor sociologistntimatelyacquaintedwithphilosophy. till less was he an historianfideas. As philosopherndphenomenologist,chutz ook s thecontentnd focus fhi$work reciselyhat ield factionwhosesociologietatussdefinedythe ystemfconstructsndemic othenaturalttitudendthe dealtypesfthe ocial cientist,swell s that roundf ntentionalonsciousnesshe nvestigationofwhichs theprivilegedesponsibilityfthephenomenologist.In this ocust is impossibleoeffectdivision f abor ndsaythat he ociologistoncernsimself ith dealtypes hereas hephilosopheroncerns imself ith ntentionality.t shouldbeclearbynowthat n Schutz'sociology,xaminingdealtypessexploringhe ntentionalityonstitutivefall typification.on-versely,nSchutz'shenomenology,urningo thenature f nner-time onsciousnesss investigatingheexemplificationsfinten-tionalifenthenaturalttitude.At their heoreticalundament,sociologyndphilosophyreone.I suggestedtthe utsethat oday'seader fthePhenomenol-ogyhas differentelationshipothebook hanwouldhavebeenthe ase omeyearsgo. Itis nterestingospeculatenthe areerof thebook had itsEnglish ersion ppeared wenty-fiveearsearlier. Whetherrnot thetimewasrightn America or hereceptionf such volume sdebatable, ut t is certain t thistime hat hepublicationfthePhenomenologyomes t last tapointnthedevelopmentfphilosophynd social ciencewhen tisnecessaryomakenewdemandsn thebook's udience. Theperiodwhen henomenologyasconsideredGermanicmysteryis over.Accordingly,t is timeforbothphilosophersnd social


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244 SOCIAL RESEARCHscientistso declarea moratoriumn, if not a finalhalt to, thepseudo-questionsnd academic clichswhichhave clung aboutthe corpusof phenomenology,ot as gadfliesbut as fruitflies,buzzing nd pesteringwithoutknowledge r purpose. The timehas come to leave behindsuch by now wearyqueries as "Howdoes one phenomenologistheckup on thereportof another?","What if phenomenologists isagree?", nd "How can privateintuition verbe expected oyield ntersubjectivelyerifiable e-sults?", r,"Whatdoesphenomenologyook ikein practice,whenit's done}" With the publicationof Schutz'sbook, phenomen-ologyhasfinallyomeofage in America. And with thatcomingofagearise erious nd inescapablepedagogic uestionsfor newgeneration f philosophers nd social scientists:What kind oftrainings appropriate orwork n thephilosophynd methodol-ogyof the social sciences? Are graduatefaculties quipped toguide students in the exploration of phenomenologicalre-search? How are studentswhosephilosophical rientationn thesocial sciences s genuinelyndebtedto phenomenologyo be en-couragedto pursuetheirwork? Squabbles about labels and slo-ganshaveno place in thisdiscussion;whatmatterss therealitydenoted. There, in the systematicndeavourof scholarsandaspiring cholars, s to be foundthe urgency f our questions.Toward theresolution f thosequestionsthePhenomenologyfthe Social World offers oth a promiseand a warning. Phe-nomenology s a way into the common source which unitesphilosophy nd social science; its fulfillment ould mean theillumination f ifebythought. The refusal fphilosophy, ow-ever,will faultthe ultimate ffortf social scienceto understandman as a mundanebeing,for"whencommon-sensessumptionsareuncriticallydmittedntotheapparatus fa science, heyhavea wayoftaking heir evenge." 8

28P. 9.

alfred schutz on social reality and social science

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