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All Director’s Training 2010 Session 4: Critical Incidents Incident: Escape at Indiana State Prison July 12, 2009

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Page 1: All Director’s Training 2010 Session 4: Critical Incidents Incident: Escape at Indiana State Prison July 12, 2009

All Director’s Training2010

Session 4: Critical Incidents

Incident: Escape at Indiana State Prison

July 12, 2009

Page 2: All Director’s Training 2010 Session 4: Critical Incidents Incident: Escape at Indiana State Prison July 12, 2009

Background of Facility Good facility on surface

ACA Accreditation Low drug use and incidents of

trafficking Good overall metrics

Better culture Positive staff/offender relationships T.C. environments Many offender organizations

Page 3: All Director’s Training 2010 Session 4: Critical Incidents Incident: Escape at Indiana State Prison July 12, 2009

Description of Critical Incident

On July 12, 2009 at 1030 hours (CST) Shift Supervisor was notified that three (3) offenders were missing from I-Cell house.

An emergency count was conducted at 1100 hours. It was verified that three (3) offenders were missing at 1107.

Nationwide search commenced with multiple Federal, State, and local agencies.

Page 4: All Director’s Training 2010 Session 4: Critical Incidents Incident: Escape at Indiana State Prison July 12, 2009

Charles Smith#876055Murder

95 years

Lance Battreal #988084

Rape53 years

Mark Booher #996357Murder

85 years

Page 5: All Director’s Training 2010 Session 4: Critical Incidents Incident: Escape at Indiana State Prison July 12, 2009

An internal search of the prison grounds turned up a change of clothes in the I-

Cell house tunnel area.Offenders gained

access to the I-Cell house midway

utility area unsupervised.

Page 6: All Director’s Training 2010 Session 4: Critical Incidents Incident: Escape at Indiana State Prison July 12, 2009

Once in midway offenders were able

to access tunnel system beneath the

facility.

After entering I-tunnel they were able to breach two walls

which allowed access to D-Cell house tunnel

Page 7: All Director’s Training 2010 Session 4: Critical Incidents Incident: Escape at Indiana State Prison July 12, 2009

The offenders were able to cut a chain securing a security grate and breach

another wall allowing access to the Main

Street tunnel system

From D-cell house tunnel they climbed through an access door

separating the ventilation feed/return system into the

return side of the ventilation system and crawled to the New

Service Building (NSB) basement area.

Page 8: All Director’s Training 2010 Session 4: Critical Incidents Incident: Escape at Indiana State Prison July 12, 2009

Offenders maneuvered through the Main Street tunnel system over to

Back Street tunnel.

At the beginning of the Back Street tunnel they

cut through the tag shop gate to gain

access to Back StreetOffenders utilized

carbon tipped cutting blades to breach the

security grates (approximately 7

minutes cutting time)

Page 9: All Director’s Training 2010 Session 4: Critical Incidents Incident: Escape at Indiana State Prison July 12, 2009

Once through the Back Street gate they cut through the bars surrounding the storm drain enclosure

From there they climbed through the hole previously broken in the storm drain …

Page 10: All Director’s Training 2010 Session 4: Critical Incidents Incident: Escape at Indiana State Prison July 12, 2009

… where they gained access to the 10th street storm drain system managed by the city. They went through the city

system and came up through a manhole lid on 7th street and

Grant

Page 11: All Director’s Training 2010 Session 4: Critical Incidents Incident: Escape at Indiana State Prison July 12, 2009

7th Street & Grant Ave

Page 12: All Director’s Training 2010 Session 4: Critical Incidents Incident: Escape at Indiana State Prison July 12, 2009

FACTORS LEADING TO ESCAPE

Procedure breakdowns: Staff allowed offender workers

unauthorized and unsupervised access to Midway.

Supervisory staff were not conducting walk-through inspections of housing units.

I-Cell house (honor dorm) offenders were allowed out of cell time from 0345 hours until approximately 2100 hours with exception of counts.

Counselor was compromised and admitted to trafficking with offender.

Lack of effective security practices and comprehensive Security Plan of Inspection.

Page 13: All Director’s Training 2010 Session 4: Critical Incidents Incident: Escape at Indiana State Prison July 12, 2009

Tunnel officer post frequently closed due to staff shortages.

Tunnel officers failed to report a broken/cut hinge on security door in tunnel areas approximately two weeks prior to escape.

Maintenance staff complacent and over familiar with offender maintenance workers.

Tunnels poorly maintained (repair debris removal needed). Facility maintenance staff would not work tunnels.

Physical Plant shortfalls: Tunnels not properly alarmed with security

electronics. Tunnel gates not updated with current technology.

FACTORS LEADING TO ESCAPE

Page 14: All Director’s Training 2010 Session 4: Critical Incidents Incident: Escape at Indiana State Prison July 12, 2009

PLAN OF ACTION – IMPROVEMENTS

Tunnel system cleaned and additional lighting added.

Fiber optic motion sensors and stun fencing placed on security grate – all alarms routed to control.

Guard One installed in tunnel system to monitor security inspections.

Enhanced staff search procedures implemented at facility entrances to prevent introduction of prohibited property.

High strength aircraft grade stainless steel bars installed throughout storm/sewer drains.

All midway keys removed from the unit (must be a Lieutenant or above to draw)

Policy changes (no offenders allowed in tunnel system)

Status of I housing unit changed. No additional out of cell house time allowed.

Page 15: All Director’s Training 2010 Session 4: Critical Incidents Incident: Escape at Indiana State Prison July 12, 2009

FOLLOW-UP Comprehensive Security Plan of

Inspection implemented to include inspection of storm drain security systems.

Annual security audits to enforce compliance with inspection procedures.

Initiated complacency drills throughout agency to challenge staff and ensure we are thinking about basic security practice ALL OF THE TIME.

Page 16: All Director’s Training 2010 Session 4: Critical Incidents Incident: Escape at Indiana State Prison July 12, 2009

“Those who don’t know history are destined to repeat it.”

- Edmond Burke

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