all things considered. systematic cognitive processing and electoral decision-making

7/29/2019 All Things Considered. Systematic Cognitive Processing and Electoral Decision-Making

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Southern Political Science Association

All Things Considered: Systematic Cognitive Processing and Electoral Decision-MakingAuthor(s): David C. Barker and Susan B. HansenSource: The Journal of Politics, Vol. 67, No. 2 (May, 2005), pp. 319-344Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Southern Political ScienceAssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3449633

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All Things Considered:Systematic CognitiveProcessing and Electoral Decision-making

DavidC. BarkerUniversity f Pittsburgh

Susan B. HansenUniversity f Pittsburgh

This paper seeks to understandwhat difference it makes if voters systematicallyconsider a repre-sentative range of salient criteriabefore choosing a candidate, and whether the effects of suchsystematic processing are conditioned by political knowledge. To this end, we executed exper-iments during the 2000 electoral season that randomly exposed some subjects to an AnalyticHierarchyProcessing (AHP) tool, which encourages systematic processing of various orthogonaldecision criteria in complex choice environments.We predicted,and found, that the choices ofknowledgeablevotersexposedto AHP were weakerand less consistentthan controlgroup responses,suggesting that systematic processing induces integrative complexity and perhaps "analysisparalysis" among knowledgeable voters. However, we found that among less knowledgeablevoters, the opposite patterngenerally emerged-AHP exposure was associated with even greaterreliance on partyID and ideology cues, perhapseven bolstering predispositionsvia projectionandrationalization.

Classic democratictheory presupposes an informed,principled,active, anddeliberateelectorate.And to be sure,political scientistshavepondered n exhaus-tive detail the degree to which Americans are indeed informed (Bartels 1996;Delli CarpiniandKeeter1996;Lupia1994), principled Converse1964;Nie andAnderson 1974; Peffley and Hurwitz 1985; Smith 1989), and active (VerbaandNie 1972;Verba,Schlozman,andBrady 1995;WolfingerandRosenstone 1980).However,as Luskinhas pointedout (2002), political scientistshave been farlessinclined to examinethe deliberatenessof theAmericanelectorate-the degreetowhich Americanvoters systematicallyconsider a broadrangeof criteriabeforechoosing a candidate-and what difference such systematic considerationmakes.'

On the otherhand,social psychologists have spent a fair amountof ink (andsubject pools) seeking to determine he conditionsthatlead to "systematic" og-'However, for good examples of studies thatanalyze the effects of deliberation,variously opera-tionalized,see Zallerand Feldman1992,Tetlock 1993, and Fishkin 1995.

THEJOURNAL F POLITICS, ol.67, No. 2, May2005, Pp. 319-344? 2005 SouthernPoliticalScience Association


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320 David C. Barker and Susan B. Hansennitive processing versus "heuristic"processing2and how these differentroutesaffect various choice environments(Chaiken 1980; Chaiken and Trope 1999;Chaiken,Liberman,and Eagly 1989; Pettyand Cacioppo 1986). Followingthisintellectualtradition,we consider the impact that systematic (a.k.a. deliberate)cognitive processing may have on electoral decision making. In particular,wefocus here on (a) understandinghe circumstancesunder which such systematicprocessingis possible, (b) whetherit is conditionedby political knowledge,and(c) how it mayaffect voters'abilityto makeconfident,consistent,andpredictabledecisions.3

Heuristics nd DemocraticDecisionsHumandecision-makingprocessescan be placed intothreegeneralcategories:simplistic,heuristic, and systematic. Simplisticdecision making occurs withoutregard o rationalcalculation;decisions may be formed "onthe doorstep" Con-verse 1964;Zaller 1992) in responseto arbitrary timuli suchas symbols (Kinderand Sanders 1996), strategic framing (Barker2002; Riker 1986), or generalpalaver(Combsand Nimmo 1993).Second, heuristic decision making (Tversky and Kahneman 1974) involvesconsiderable rational thought, but limited systematic effort. Due to restrictedhumancapacityfor short-term nformationstorage(Fiske andTaylor1991; Lauand Sears 1986), or perhapsbecause of limits in eithermotivationor ability tocognitively elaborate4 Petty and Caccioppo 1981), heuristic decisions rely oncognitive shortcuts McKelveyandOrdeshook1986) to avoid the costs of infor-mation gathering (Downs 1957). Political scientists and psychologists havedetermined hat formostpeople most of the time, individualsmake choices usingeither simplistic or heuristic processes. Indeed, scholars have filled volumesdebatingwhethervoters'tendencytoward"cognitivestinginess"reflectsignorantincompetenceor rationalefficiency (Lau and Redlawsk2001; Nie, Verba,andPetrocik1976;PettyandCacioppo1986;Smith 1989). It is importanto note thatfor bothsimplisticand heuristicdecisionmaking,cues playa primaryrole-irra-tionally in the former,rationally n the latter.In both modes, the most powerfulcriteriondrivingdecisionmakingis notnecessarilythe one most important o theindividual,but often the one most accessible, or recently primedto the "topof2These two modes, while conceptuallydistinct,are not necessarilymutuallyexclusive (Chaiken,Liberman,and Eagly 1989).3 Of course, we are also intellectuallyinterestedin the association between systematiccognitiveprocessing and "correct"voting. But before voterscan vote correctly, hey have to be able to reach

a conclusion in the first place. If systematic cognitive processing dramatically eopardizes voters'ability to make decisions, then any ultimateimprovement n overall vote "quality"may be moot, orat least severelyoffset.4However,Lau and Redlawsk (2001) demonstrate hat although systematic processing may beimpossiblewithout some degreeof motivationandability,highly sophisticatedcitizens are oftenjustas likely to rely on heuristics as are the less sophisticated.


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All Things Considered 321thehead" Barker2002; Iyengarand Kinder1987;Jones 1994;Riker1986;Zaller1992).5Considerablepolitical science scholarshiphas arguedthat "gutlevel" heuris-tic processing (Popkin 1991) often producespoliticaloutcomesthat arevirtuallyindistinguishable romthose producedunderconditionsof completeinformation(Downs 1957; Lupia 1994; Nisbett and Ross 1980). However,as Tversky andKahnemanoriginallyobserved(1974), heuristics ntroducebias into the decision-making environment almost by definition. And indeed, although reliance onheuristics may be perfectly rational, several studies have now accumulatedtodemonstrate hat heuristic-basedvoting does not necessarily lead to "correct"decisions6 (Bartels 1996; Lau and Redlawsk 1997), particularlyfor politicalnovices orwhen candidatesdo not conformto stereotype CarminesandStimson1980; Cobb and Kuklinski1997; Lau and Redlawsk2001).A third process of decision making-one involving effortful, methodical,and even scientific processing of relevant criteria--may be in operation forsome individuals some of the time, when they are both motivatedand able to"cognitivelyelaborate"on the decision at hand.Indeed,when faced with impor-tant decisions involving multiple competing considerations, some peopledeliberatelybecome more reflective.They may even make long lists tallyingthepros and cons of each alternativeon various criteria, perhaps even makingallowances for differences in salience betweendifferentcriteria Franklin1956).Following Chaiken (1980), we term this kind of decision making systematic.This is the type of processing in which many candidates,political scientists,and democratic heoristswould like to see citizens engaged (Dahl 1989; Fishkin1995; Kelley 1983; Lau and Redlawsk2001), underthe assumptionthat votesgenerated throughsuch a careful and deliberateprocess are more likely to be"correct.'"7We have carefully delineated these distinctions in order to clarify how ourresearchdeparts rom earlieranalysesof politicaldecisionmaking.In sum,whileprevious research considering voter competence and democratic theory haslargely focused on distinguishingvotes on the basis of more or less knowledge,we distinguishvotes on the basis of more or less systematic processing. Fur-thermore,we seek to understand he degree to which the formermay influencethe latter.

5However,see Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997; Miller and Krosnick 2000.6 Correctdecisions maybe defined as thosemade with fullest attainableunderstanding f the expe-riences resultingfrom that choice and its most relevantalternatives-based on the interests,values,

andbeliefs of the individualdecision maker(Lau and Redlawsk 1997).7It is important o note that we do not see systematicprocessingas necessarily superior o heuris-tic processing.Indeed,as manyhavenoted,heuristicprocessingmayleadto correct votes in a major-ity of instances and is thus probably more "rational"than systematic processing under mostcircumstances,particularlywhen an electoral outcome is not perceivedby an individualvoter to beparticularly alient.


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322 David C. Barkerand Susan B. HansenATheoryof SystematicProcessing,CognitiveComplexity,ndPreference nstabilityOurtheoreticalperspectivebuilds most directlyon Linville's (1982) researchregardingbelief complexity.This work showed that the greaterthe number ofnonredundant ttributesa personuses in thinkingaboutan object,the less likelyit is thatthe object is perceivedas consistently good or consistentlybad in all its

aspects--thus generatingbelief complexity.As a result, the attitudetowardtheobjectmoderates.This reasoningfollows from the fact that locationon the eval-uatively positive side of a given attributedimension is not predictiveof locationon the positive side of a separateattributedimension,so long as the dimensionsareuncorrelatedandthe decision maker s genuinelymotivated o make the bestoverallchoice.We suggest that systematic cognitive processing about a presidentialvotechoice is likelyto follow a similarpattern,because the vote choice is by its naturea salient andcomplex one, with several relevant decision criteria hat are inher-ently orthogonal o one another e.g., desiredcandidate raits, ssue stands,valuepredispositions).Some of these considerationsmay even be inherentlyat odds,such as the desireto elect a candidatewho will be best able to enhance individ-ualism andhumanitarianismimultaneously see Tetlock(1986) for the inherenttension in dominantAmerican political values). Given that no single choiceoption (candidate) s likely to possess an advantageon every relevantdecisioncriterion(e.g., in 2000, many observersof the presidentialdebatesreported hatAl Gore appearedmore experiencedand knowledgeablethan GeorgeW. Bush,but less warm andtrustworthy),hen as a voterdeliberatelyconsiders more com-peting criteria, n relationto the summary udgment producedby either (a) therunning tally of online processing (Lodge, McGraw,and Stroh 1989) or (b) asimple heuristic such as partyidentification, he intensitywith which that voterholdshis or hervote intentionshould diminish.Indeed,as observersranging romJean PaulSartre Aronson 1980) to JosephGoebbels (Combsand Nimmo 1993)to Bob Woodward 1994) have suggested,the honest and thoughtfulconsidera-tion of an issue from severaldifferent sides often leads to perplexity,equivoca-tion, vacillation,and/orintellectualparalysis.8So while it may be possible that

8It may occur to some readers hat the operative nterveningvariablehere is ambivalence-an indi-vidual's endorsement of competing considerationsrelevantto evaluatingan object. Ambivalenceoccurs when (a) there exist a mix of both positive andnegativebeliefs aboutan object, (b) the pos-itive andnegativebeliefs are of similarmagnitude,and(c) the positiveandnegativebeliefs about theobject are of at least moderate ntensity (Hass et al.1991;Thompson,Zanna,and Griffin1995). Theliteraturehas demonstrated hatenhancedcognitiveactivity maygreatlyenhanceambivalence ZallerandFeldman1992) andthatambivalencesubstantiallydestabilizes electoral decisionmaking(Lavine2001). Althoughwe do not directlymeasure ambivalence n this study,we do suggest, based on theresearchcited, thatthe natureof systematicprocessingnaturallyand substantially ncreasesthe like-lihood that competingconsiderationswill be encounteredby the decision maker,almost by defini-tion. Thus, our framework s consistent with the ambivalence literature.However,given that (a)ambivalencehas been given a quite specific definitionin the literature,and (b) we do not explicitlymeasureambivalenceper se, we preferto follow Linville, Tetlock,and others in using the broader


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All Things Considered 323greatercomplexity of thoughtultimatelyleads to more thoughtfulvotes, it mayalso lead to fewer,weaker,and less consistent votes-at least amongvoterspos-sessing enoughinformationaboutthe various criteriaunder consideration o feelconflicted.This theoreticalperspectiveis also supportedby several otherstudies involv-ing thought inducement,which have been operationalized n various differentways. For example, Wilson and his colleagues (1989) found that when peoplethinkaboutreasons,decisions are often rendered ess predictable,an observationsupportedby theZallerand Feldman 1992) "stopandthink"experimentsas well.Similarly,Fishkin(1995) found that attitudesbecame much more nuanced andcomplex after citizens had engaged in considerable thought and discussionregardingvarious ssues. Inmuchthe sameway,Tetlock(1993) describes a seriesof studies that reveal how induced integrative complexity reveals attitudinalmoderation.

Importantly,none of these researchersattempted o induce systematic cogni-tive processingin the particularway we do here. Instead,most of the aforemen-tioned research sought to demonstratewhat can happen when citizens areencouraged o simplyintrospect,orotherwise"stopandthink."Still, these studiesprovidecompellingevidence of how,asTheodoreRoethkehasopined,"Self-con-templation s a curse/Thatmakes an old confusion worse"(Sullivan 1975, 249).In otherwords, these studiesprovidea solid theoretical foundationon which toexpect that induced systematic cognitive processing will be associated withchoice equivocation,at least undercertain conditions.

Considering mplification ypothesesTo reiterate, ystematicprocessingis not merely"thinkinghard"about a deci-sion-it is conscientiously expandingthe range of relevant criteriaconsideredin relation to the choice. This distinction is importantbecause several studieshaveshownhow,undersome circumstances,merethought nducementmayactu-

ally amplifythe attitude in question-the opposite of what we have suggestedwill be associatedwith inducedsystematic processing.Forexample,TesserandConlee (1975) foundthatattitudes oward egalized prostitution ended to polar-ize the longer subjectswere instructed o think about those attitudesafter indi-cating an initial preference. The key distinction between Tesser and Conlee'sresearch and thatof Linville discussed earlierhas to do with whether increasedthoughtgeneratesredundant ather hanorthogonalbeliefs aboutan object(Juddand Lusk 1984; Libermanand Chaiken1991). Simply,when people are encour-aged to thinkabout a choice in a relativelyunconstrainedway, they will tend tobe biased towardthoughtsthat supportpreexistingattitudes,and attitudepolar-ization tends to result. On the otherhand,when citizens are encouraged o con-siderquestionsfrommorethan one angle (as we are suggesting),the numberofconceptof beliefcomplexity--which reliesuponthepresenceof conflictingconsiderationsas thepsy-chological mechanismunderlying he resultingbelief moderationandunpredictability, ut has beendefined and operationalizedmorebroadlythanhas ambivalence.


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324 David C. Barker and SusanB. Hansenconsiderationsgeneratedwill often be orthogonal,generatingattitudinalcom-plexity, equivocation,and moderation(see Eagly and Chaiken, 1993, for a niceoverview).

The CrucialRole of PoliticalKnowledgeWhile some of the aforementionedresearch(Wilson et al. 1989; Zaller andFeldman 1992) found that the least sophisticatedof researchsubjectswere themost likely to display choice inconsistencyafterbeing promptedto introspect,we hypothesizethatpeople lacking in fundamentalpolitical knowledgewill notexperience the heightened choice instability and equivocationassociated withsystematicprocessing.In fact, we suggest that the oppositemay well occur.Fol-

lowing Chaikenand her colleagues (1980, 1989, 1999), we simply suggest thatgenuine systematicprocessing may be impossible when citizens do not possessthe requisitemotivationor tools to do so. It is unmistakable hat a good manycitizens do not see presidentialelections as particularly alientto theirlives. Thislack of motivationmanifests itself in the form of low levels of ambientpoliticalknowledge, leaving these citizens ill equippedto engage in systematicprocess-ing regarding he presidentialvote.However,exposureto a tool designed to induce systematicprocessing couldvery well increase such citizens' desire to make accuratedecisions. Moreover,and perhapsmore importantly, xposure to the systematicprocessing tool willlikely create some distance between a decision maker'sactual confidence thatthey have made the rightchoice and their desiredjudgmentalconfidence(a.k.a."sufficiency hresholds"-Chaiken, Liberman,andEagly 1989). Such an increasein decision makers'sufficiency thresholdswill likely cause significantconster-nationandperplexityamongall decision makers.FollowingChaiken,Liberman,and Eagly (1989), we suggest that uninformed decision makers,now realizingthattheycannotpossiblyachievedesired confidence n theirvote choices throughsystematic processing (given that such processing requiresa certaindegree ofinformation),will increasetheirrelianceupon reliable heuristic cues in order toachieve adequateconfidencein theirjudgments.This process may be furthermagnified by the fact that(in contrast o the sub-jects found in theexperimentsof Wilson et al. or ZallerandFeldman), heseunin-formed decision makersarebeing askedby the treatment o evaluate alternativecandidateson criterionafter criterion.As a result,the multipledimensionsnowbecome redundant ather hanorthogonal,because the cue reliance will suggestthe same candidatepreferenceon each criterion.Forexample,evaluationof VicePresidentGore(let'ssay) on the criteriaof intelligence,honesty,and crimepolicymayall be highlycorrelated n the minds of uninformedvoters,particularlyhosewith partisan dentities,9because of a "haloeffect" whereone positive (or nega-

9 This is not meantto be a blanketstatementcondemningthe political sophisticationof all parti-sans, but rathera descriptionof a particular ubset.


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All Things Considered 325tive) evaluation mplies othergood qualities(JuddandLusk 1984), leaving suchvoters little choice but to bolster their existing predispositionsor to projectpreferredattributesonto the preferredcandidate. And given that among low-informationvoters, the most readilyavailableand frequentlyrelieduponheuris-tic has been foundto be partyidentification Lau and Redlawsk2001), inducedexposureto various decision criteriaandprompting o evaluatecandidatesbasedon these criteriamay ultimatelyreinforceparty-basedcandidatepreferences(anoutcome consistent with Tesserand Conlee's (1975) work as describedearlier).In this way,we aresuggestingsomethingof a nonmutuallyexclusiverelationshipbetween systematic processing (at least efforts or inducementsto do so) andheuristicprocessing,underconditionsof low information.

SpecificHypothesesBased on the theorydelineated in the previoussection, we expect that knowl-edgeable voters inducedto systematicallyprocess a broadrange of relevantcri-teria will tend to exhibit (1) weaker candidatepreferences, (2) less consistencybetweenparty identificationand vote choice, and (3) less inclinationto vote atall, thus (4) increasing the error variance in our ability to predict vote choicefromparty identificationand otherdemographicvariables. Onthe otherhand,forlow-knowledgesubjects,we predictthe reverse:exposureto a systematic cogni-

tiveprocessing tool will be associated withgreaterconsistencybetweenpartyIDand vote choice, as well as greater overall votepredictability.What happens if the systematicprocessing tool is complementedwith free,salientinformation?Undersuchconditions,we predict hatthe increasedrelianceon cues andresultingrationalizationamong low-knowledge respondentswill bemitigated.In otherwords,we expect thatsome voters ill equippedto systemati-cally process a broadrange of criteria due to a lack of knowledge about thosecriteriawill make use of available informationwhen the costs of obtainingthatinformationarenil, and in the process will enhance the complexityof theircog-nitions.Therefore,we posit thatwhenprovidedwith useful information, he con-sistency and predictabilityof low-knowledge voters exposed to the systematicprocessingtool will still be greaterthanthose in the controlgroup,but less thanthose induced to systematicallyprocess without additional nformation.10But what about when informationcomplements he systematicprocessingtoolfor votersalreadypossessed of considerablepoliticalknowledge?Does availableinformation nhanceormitigatethe destabilizingeffects of systematicprocessingon knowledgeablevoters?Wepredict hat ust as too manyvoices around he tablecan paralyzeefficientdecisionmaking(Woodward1994), additional nformationgained when voters alreadyfeel that they "know the candidates" e.g., among

1 An alternatehypothesis (butone to which we do not subscribe) s thatlow-knowledgevotersaresimply intellectually azy, thus choosing to ignorerelevant nformationeven when it is made readilyavailable.If this propositionis true, however,then we would expect to see little difference in low-knowledgerespondents'voting behavioraccordingto the availabilityof free candidate nformation.


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326 David C. Barker and SusanB. Hansenknowledgeablevoters n avisiblepresidential ontest)maycontradict ome stereo-types, thus inducingeven more perplexity.Thus we expect those preferencestobe even less predictable han those made without available nformation.

MethodologyTheAnalyticHierarchyProcess of Decision Making(AHP)

Pioneeredby mathematicianThomasSaatyat the WhartonSchool of Business(Saaty 1980), the analytichierarchyprocess (AHP) and its primarycommercialvariant,ExpertChoice,were created to encourage and facilitate good decisionmaking when criteria are varied and complex and to overcome the restrictiveassumptionsof transitivityplacedon decisionmakingby traditional ame theory.Drawingits axioms in part from Simon's(1960) model of comprehensivedeci-sion making but with a conscientious eye towarddesigning a simple, realisticmethodology (Formanand Selly 1998), AHP is composed of severalpreviouslyexisting but unassociatedconcepts andtechniques,such as: (1) explicit recogni-tion of the importanceof the decision task, (2) hierarchical tructuringof com-p'exity, so as to make the considerationof a wide rangeof criteriamanageable;(3) pairwise comparisonsof criteria," n orderto best prioritize hatcriteria,and(4) an operationalization f inconsistency (to overcome restrictiveassumptionsandallow for qualitativeas well as quantitative onsiderations).Saaty'ssynthesisof these concepts/techniquesproducedan instrument hat has become the stan-darddecisionmakingtool on themarket oday.As of 1998,AHP was being taughtin business schools (Formanand Selly 1998), had been used in over70 countriesworldwide,and had been cited in over 2000 journalarticles,both scholarlyandpopular (Zahedi 1986; http://www.ExpertChoice.com). or example, AHP hasbeen used to model highly complex decision-making processes ranging fromhiringhundreds f people fora businessfirm,to decidingamong competingadver-tising approaches,o settling ong-termdisputes n the Middle East(Palmer1999).A small samplingof ExpertChoicepatrons ncludesthe United StatesArmy,theUnited StatesAir Force,the United States State and Defense Departments,Ford,Xerox, Boeing, GE, IBM, U.S. Steel, the governmentsof SouthAfrica, Canada,andIndonesia,andmanyotherusers.Conceptually, he AHP tool is quite simple: AHP first encourages decisionmakersto recognizethe importanceof the decision at hand(e.g., choose the bestcandidate)and to prepare hemselves to considerthe decision seriously.The toolthenhelpsdecisionmakers o recognizethecomplexityof suchanimportantdeci-sion, by consideringthe many (sometimes competing) objectives at hand(e.g.,electing the candidatewith the best personalqualifications,policy preferences,and value priorities). To structure this complexity, AHP then helps decisionmakers hierarchicallybreak down the objectives they must consider into sub-

" See Rahn (1995) for analysis of how the inherentcomplexity of an electoral context naturallyleads to evaluationaroundparticulardecision criteria,rather han around he candidates.This is justone of the ways that AHP is designed to reflect a naturalsystematicprocessing procedure.


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All Things Considered 327objectives (e.g., regardingcandidatetraits,decision makers could be promptedto considerintelligence, strength,experience, integrity, nspiration,andcompas-sion). Next, AHP helps decision makersprioritizethese objectives by guidingthemthrough uccessivepairedcomparisonsof eachobjective (a.k.a. "criterion").The preferencesgeneratedby these comparisonsare thenweighted accordingtothe intensityof eachpreference e.g., "IpreferoptionA to optionB by five times,optionA to optionC by threetimes, but optionA to optionD only slightly,"andso on). From hose statedpreferences, heprogramgeneratesan indicatorof pref-erence "consistency" or each matrix of weighted comparisons.'2At last, AHPusers evaluate the specific choice alternatives(e.g., candidates)based on eachidentified choice criterion and weight, before finally indicating an intendedchoice.13 A more thoroughdiscussion of AHP,its history,axioms, and applica-tions cannot be included within the constraintsof a single article.However,forfurther information, interested readers should consult Saaty (1980), Zahedi(1986), or http://www.ExpertChoice.com.In sum, due its careful construction,comprehensiveyet realistic design, andwidespreaduse, we considerAHP to be the best existing applicationof what weseek to model as systematiccognitiveprocessing,which not only involves "hardthought"but also includes: (1) recognitionof decision importance, 2) the con-siderationof awide rangeof sometimescompetingcriteria, 3) prioritization, nd(4) a point-by-pointcomparisonof alternativesbased on establishedcriteria.14

The ExperimentalDesign and SampleWe conducted our controlledexperimentsduringthe final month of the 2000electoral campaignseason. Participatingn the experimentswere 220 univetitystudents,most of whom we recruited from political science classes at a largepublic university."5ubjectswere given $10 for participating n the experimentandwere not informedof thepurposeof the studybeforehand,but weredebriefedafter the experimentalsessions (which typically lasted about 45 minutes) were

completed.12In otherwords,AHP provides an indication of the degree to which user preferencesregardingvariouspairedcomparisonsof criteriaarelogicallyconsistent. Forexample, f anexperimental ubjectconsiderseconomicpolicy moreimportanthan environmental olicy,and environmental olicy moreimportanthanabortionpolicy,theneconomicpolicy should be consideredmoreimportanthan abor-tion policy.1 In a typicalbusiness environmentwhen ExpertChoicehas been hired to assist in a decision, theAHP tool then processes the linear and nonlinear combinationsof priorities,preferences,and con-sistency to producea suggestedchoice and intensityof choice. However, his aspectof the tool wasnotprovided o ourrespondents,becauseunderrealisticcircumstances ndividualswho are motivatedto process systematicallydo not have a tool to suggest the most "analytic" hoice. They must try tosort through t all themselves. It is this attemptat sorting throughcomplexitythat we suggest leadsto perplexity,equivocation,andunpredictability.14Weshouldpointoutthatthisdefinition s consistentwith otherstandard reatments f the concept,such as those offeredby Simon (1960) and Chen and Chaiken(1999).15However,some subjectswere recruitedwith an advertisement rom the studentnewspaper,andmanyothers were fulfillingpsychology department equirementsas partof the "subjectpool."


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328 David C. Barker and SusanB. HansenTable 1 displayssome of themarginalstatisticsfor oursubjects.As canreadilybe seen, these subjectsare disproportionately oung, white, attentive,Democra-tic, and liberal,as compared o the U.S. populationat large.As such, we clearly

cannot make broadgeneralizations rom this sampleto any representative opu-lation-but thatis not our intentionat this stage. Ourgoal, as discussedin detailin the previous section, is to understandwhethersystematicprocessing can beinduced,whether t is associated with choice equivocation,and whether t inter-acts with voter knowledge in meaningful ways-goals best evaluated n a con-trolledsetting.Althoughsuch "college sophomores"may be more amenableto experimentalstimuli thanthe greaterpopulation(Sears 1986), we have reasonto believe thatthispossibilityis counterbalanced y other factorsin thisparticular ase. Specifi-cally,most experimental tudies of candidateevaluationexaminevote choices inhypotheticalelectoralenvironments.By contrast,by analyzingvote intentions na highly visible presidentialcontest in real time and in close proximityto the

TABLESummary Statistics of Sample Characteristics

Characteristic: Mean S.D. Minimum MaximumSex1 .45 .50 0 1Race2 .87 .34 0 1Year n College3 2.27 1.12 1 5PartyID4 2.20 .88 1 3Ideology5 2.22 .67 1 3Knowledge6 1.24 .80 0 5Debates' 1.76 1.28 0 5Interest8 1.38 .62 0 2How Likely to Vote?9 1.50 .80 0 2Registered?1o .84 .37Pres. Vote Choice" .64 .48 0 1Strengthof Pres. Vote Choice'2 1.47 .64 0 2

1 1 = FEMALE;0 = MALE.21 = AFRICANAMERICAN;0 = OTHER.31= FRESHMAN;5 = FIFTHYEAR SENIOR.

41 = REPUBLICAN;2 = INDEPENDENT;3 = DEMOCRAT.'1 = CONSERVATIVE; = MODERATE;3 = LIBERAL.60 = NONE OF THE PARTYCONGRUENCEQUESTIONSANSWERED CORRECTLY; =< 4 CORRECTANSWERS, 2 = ALL 5 CORRECTANSWERS.70= WATCHEDNO PRES. DEBATES;4 = WATCHEDALL PRES. DEBATES.80 = NOT INTERESTED IN CAMPAIGN; 1 = SOMEWHATINTERESTED;2 = VERY

INTERESTED.90 = NOT LIKELYTO VOTE; 1 = SOMEWHATLIKELYTO VOTE;2 = VERY LIKELYTOVOTE.1o1 = REGISTEREDTOVOTE;0 = NOT REGISTERED.110= BUSH; 1 = GORE.120 = NOT VERYSTRONG;1 = SOMEWHATSTRONG;2 = VERY STRONG.


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All Things Considered 329election date, we are providingan unusual and extremely challenging environ-ment in which to observe experimentaldifferences.It is highly likely thatmanyof our experimentalsubjectshad made up their minds before taking partin ourexperimentsandwere not going to be persuaded o change their vote intentionsregardlessof the power of the experimentalstimuli. Hence, even though thisanalysis was conducted on college students"in the lab,"we suspect that if realvote intentions differ across experimentalgroups in this short experimentalmanipulation,on subjects that may or may not be inclined to systematicallyprocess under normal conditions, then the impact of genuine systematic pro-cessing may be at least as pronounced n "the real world."

The ExperimentalGroupsBefore arrivingfor their scheduled experimentalsessions, participantswererandomly assigned to one of three experimentalgroups. Participants n two ofthe three groups were exposed to the AHP tool. The participants hen reportedtheirvote intentionsas well as otherattitudinalanddemographic nformationona short questionnaire.The remaining"control"group simply respondedto thesurvey questionswithoutany cognitive inducementwhatsoever.Hence, the firstexperimentalgroup (64 subjects)appliedAHP to the presidentialrace but wasnot providedwith information about the candidatesin that contest, while the

secondgroup(61 subjects)appliedAHPto thepresidentialcontest andwas givenfree,relevant nformationaboutthe majorpartycandidates candidate ssue posi-tions, voting records)to use. The controlgroup(95 subjects)was not exposedtothe AHP tool.16SpecificAHPProcedures

All subjects who were exposed to AHP were first offered successive pairedcomparisonsof severalconsiderations hatpeople contemplatewhen choosing acandidate.Theseconsiderationscan be categorizedunder hreegeneral headings:policy preferences (economic policy, health care policy, education policy,crime/guncontrolpolicy, abortionpolicy, and foreignpolicy); democraticvalue

16As noted above, subjects wererandomlyassigned to one of the groupsprior to the experimentalsessions. They were assigned by a weighting procedure hatgave all subjectsa 50% chance of beingassignedto one of the AHP treatments thus,a 25% chance of being assignedto the AHPonly treat-ment, and a 25% chance of being assigned to the AHP+Information reatment),and a 50% chanceof being assigned to the control group.The randomizationprocedurewas weighted in this way toensure that there would be enough control group respondentsto make valid comparisonsnot onlybetween the control group and each of the AHP groups individually,but also between the controlgroup and the AHP treatmentmore generally(with or without information).Diagnostic tests showthat the individual reatmentgroups (AHP only,AHP+Information, ontrol)do not differstatisticallyaccording o race,gender,partyidentification, deology,political knowledge,or generalmedia atten-tiveness. Still, to ward off any suspicionof confoundingeffects attributable o nonexperimental ari-ables, we included severalcontrol variablesin our models. These controls also serve to enrichthemodels by providingadditional nteresting nformation.


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330 David C. Barkerand SusanB. Hansenpreferences (liberty, equality of opportunity,self reliance, and tolerance), andcandidate characteristics(intelligence, strength, experience, inspiration, andhonesty). AppendixA reveals descriptionsof these criteria,as were thoroughlydescribed to each experimentalsubject (except those in the control group).Wecarefully chose each of these criteria based on: (1) the state of the behavioralliterature egarding he most important raits, ssues andvaluesrelevant o Amer-icanvoters,"72) the most salient issues in theeyes of voters,according o surveyssuch as the National Election Studies conducted by the Center for PoliticalStudies at the University of Michigan, (3) rough ideological balance, in termsof values thatcan be considered"liberal" equalityof opportunity,olerance)or"conservative" self-reliance, economic liberty), (4) scope, that is the effort toincludea relativelybroadrangeof traits, ssues, andvalues thatclearlymean dif-ferentthings and do not leave out any majorconsiderations,and (5) parsimony,in orderto keep the experimentmanageablein terms of time and information.We recognize that this is not a comprehensive ist of relevantdecision criteria.But we believe thatit includes most of the salient considerations hathave beenidentified by scholarshipand public opinion.1Within each considerationrealm (the general categories: policy preferences,valuepreferences,candidate raits),participantswere askednot only which of thetwo considerations hey consideredmore important e.g., freedomor equality?astrongeconomyor low crime? candidateexperienceor intelligence?),butalso byhow much that option was preferredover the other.Finally, participantswereasked to compareand choose between successivepairsof the three considerationareas(e.g., "Which do you prefer:a candidatewith the rightissue positions or acandidatewiththerightpersonalcharacteristics, ndby how much?").Underthisframework,with between four and six decision criteriawithin three realms ofconsideration, ubjectswereasked to makea totalof 34 pairedcomparisons {(Nx N - 1)/2 x K} + {(K x K - 1)/2}], where K equals the numberof considera-tion realms andN equalsthe numberof criteriawithin each considerationrealm.Appendix B displays the instrument used by voters to make these pairedcomparisons.After thinking about their preferences regarding the salience of variousdecision criteria, subjects were read a statement about each candidate andwere asked to indicate,in Likertfashion,the degreeto which they agreedor dis-agreed with that statement(stronglyagree, agree, disagree, stronglydisagree).Subjectswere not given the option to expressneutralityand were askedto con-sider one candidateon all the criteriafirst,before turningto the second candi-date. The order n which candidateswerepresented o subjectsfor evaluationwas

1'7Forexample,Fiorina 1981), Sullivan,Piereson,and Marcus 1982), McCloskyandZaller(1984),Verbaand Orren 1985), HurwitzandPeffley (1987), Aldrich,Sullivan,andBorgida(1989), Feldmanand Zaller(1992), Alvarez and Brehm(1995), and Funk(1999).18Wealso consideredother criteria e.g., humanitarianism,roupattachments),but the additionofmore elements made the numberof pairedcomparisonsuntenable.These elements might be incor-porated n futureapplicationsof AHP.


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All Things Considered 331randomized, o wardoff any systematicorder effects. Appendix C displays theinstrument on which experimentalsubjects recordedtheir Likert responses tothese questions regardingeach major party candidatein the 2000 presidentialcontests.19As mentioned earlier, at this point participantswho had been randomlyassignedto the firstexperimentalgroup(AHP only) completeda shortquestion-naire, collected their stipend,and went home (as groupthree, the controlgroup,had already done). However,participantswho had been assigned to group twowere providedwith pages of informationregarding he candidates'relative issuestands andpublic records.20Participantswere instructed o carefullyreview thisinformation,as well as the choices thatthey had made on the earlier sections ofthe AHP instrument,and were encouraged to make changes to their earlierresponses if they so chose. It is important o reiterate hat the informationwasprovidedafter exposureto AHP,and it was only providedto a randomsubsetofAHP subjects, so that we were enabled to distinguish the impact on subjectsattributableo AHP fromthe impactattributableo information-this distinctionbeing one of the centraltheoreticalfoci of this project.After all participantshadbeen given ampleopportunityo reviewthe informationand makechanges,theseparticipantswere providedwith survey questionnaires,on which the participantsprovided their voting preferences and demographic information in the samemanner hatparticipantsn the "no information" roupandthe controlgrouphadalreadydone.As we have already alluded to several times, the survey instrumentalsoassessed generalpolitical knowledgeaboutpartiesand issues, in orderto gaugenot only baseline knowledgelevels as such, but also subjects'abilityto appreci-ate the complexityof considerations elating o the vote choice. Thisvariablewasconstructedas a summed ndexof five questionspertaining o the "substance" fpolitics, or the informationmost relevantto voting decisions (Delli CarpiniandKeeter1996), askingwhich of theparties s morelikelyto be (1) in favorof largertax cuts, (2) pro-choice on abortion,(3) pro-guncontrol, (4) in favor of federalefforts to help the disadvantaged, nd (5) associatedwith business interests.Wechose theseparticular ssue items because (a) thereis an unambiguous"correct"answeron each of these, which should be apparent o most casual observersofU.S. politics, and (b) correctresponses to all of these items would necessitatesome recognitionof the value complexityand perhapscontradiction nherent nsome traditionalparty stances. For example, while the Democratic Partypro-

19The commercialversion of AHP is designed to be executed electronically,with considerablygreatersophistication.In futureresearch,we plan to use AHP interactivelywith computer-generatedfeedback o subjectsregarding hetransitivity f theirchoices, as well as the contemporaneous hoicesbeingmadeby otherparticipantsn the study, o see how self awarenessand social anxietymayinflu-ence the process.

20 This was objectiveand balancedinformationbased on the candidates'own speeches andvotingrecords,taken from candidateWeb sites and the League of Women Voters.For copies of the exactinformationprovided o participants n these experimentalcells, contact the authors.


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332 David C. Barker and SusanB. Hansenmotes freedomwhen it comes to the issue of abortion, t is the RepublicanPartyto whichthisvalueperspectivebelongs when it comes to the issue of guncontrol.Such recognitionof value complexity across partisan ssue stances is necessaryfor a systematicprocessor o experience heequivocationdescribedby ourtheory.Correct responses to these questions were coded as "one," while incorrectresponseswere coded as "zero."21We thendividedthe measure nto a trichotomy,where "two"indicatesa correctresponseon all five questions;"one" indicatescorrect responses to four of the questions, and "zero" indicates an incorrectresponse to at least two of the questions.22As shown in Table 1, the subjectsinthisexperimentwereroughlyequallyknowledgeableabouttheparties'basic issuestands as the Americanpublic at large (Delli Carpiniand Keeter 1996;NationalElection Studies2000).

Models and FindingsWedevelopedOrdinalLogisticandOrdinaryLeastSquaresregressionmodelsto evaluate the impact of our experimentalstimuli on several electoral inten-tions.23Specifically,we analyzed the variance in four dependentvariables:(1)howstronglysubjectsfelt abouttheirpresidentialcandidatepreferences 2 = very

21 Wewere also interested n seeing whether subjects who had been providedwith campaign nfor-mation would display higher levels of political knowledgethan AHP subjects in the no-informationtreatmentor than controlgroup subjects.But the data reveal that differences between experimentaltreatmentgroups on political knowledge were insignificant.In fact, subjectsrandomly assigned tothe AHP no-information reatmentdisplayedslightlyhighermean scores on politicalknowledgethandid subjects assignedto the AHP+information reatment.These observationsrevealnot only that theinformationprovidedto some subjects did not appearto contaminate he knowledge measure,butthatsubjectsdid not automaticallydrawconnectionsbetween informationregardingcandidate ssuestandsandgeneralizationsabout the parties.22 Weultimatelydecidedto trichotomize he measure or tworeasons:First, hismeasure s designedto capturea competent evel of political knowledge.We arenot interested n the full rangeof politi-

cal knowledgewithin our subjects-only whetherthey possessed the minimaldegree of knowledgenecessaryto engagein meaningfulsystematicprocessing.Inthatvein, we reasonthatfailureto under-stand the major partypositions on more than one of these basic issue areas revealsa level of igno-rance that wouldrenderboth an appreciationof consideration omplexityimpossibleanda "correct"voting decision subject to chance. Secondly, and more practically,there were simply not enoughresponsesin the zero, one, two, andthreecategories, ndividually, o conduct reliablestatisticalcom-parisons.23 Severalalternativemeasuresof the dependentvariableswere operationalized, ecessitatingbino-mial and multinomial ogit models. Furthermore,differentspecificationsof our models without somany controlvariableswere also analyzed.Ourfindingsundersuch alternativemeasurement trate-gies and specificationswere generally stronger hanthose we reporthere. We decided to reportthe

tables includingall controlsbecausethey providethe most conservative andtherefore he most con-vincing) estimates of the importantrelationships.The point is that the statisticalpatterns reportedin this section are quite robust to alternativemethodological choices. To better control for het-eroskedasticityand spatialautocorrelationn our models, traditionalstandarderrorswere replacedwith robust standard errors, using the Huber/White/sandwich method of calculating thevariance/covariancematrix.All statisticalanalyseswere performedusing Stata8.0.


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All Things Considered 333strongly;1 = somewhatstrongly;0 = not too strongly); (2) how consistent can-didate preferences were with voter party identification and ideology, that iswhethera liberalDemocratplannedto vote for Gore, and so on (1 = consistent;0 = unclear;-1 = inconsistent);24nd (3) how likely subjectswere to vote (2 =highly likely; 1 = not very likely; 0 = not at all likely). Finally,we also createdavariablemeasuringthe variance in the residuals aroundpredictedvalues in amultinomial ogit model of vote intention(0 = thirdparty;1 = Bush;2 = Gore),as predictedby partyidentification, deology, sex, race,knowledge,attentiveness(measuredby thenumberof debates a subjectreportedhavingwatched),andyearin college. This measureallowedus to observe the degree to which AHP expo-sure was associated with vote predictabilityby other cues besides merely partyidentificationand ideology (such as group identificationcues based on genderandrace).Therelevant ndependentvariables n ouranalysis simplyidentified he exper-imentalgroupto which subjectshad been randomlyassigned:AHP without addi-tional information,AHP with information,or the control group (which acts asthe referencecategory in these analyses). Our models also included interactionterms,whichmultipliedeachof ourexperimental xposurevariablesby thepolit-ical knowledge trichotomydescribedin the previous section. Control variablesinclude race (1 = black;0 = white),25 ex (1 = female, O= male), partyidentifi-cation (1 = Republican;2 = Independent;3 = Democrat),ideology (1 = conser-vative;2 = moderate;3 = liberal),year in college (1 = freshman;5 = fifth-yearsenior),how manypresidentialdebatesparticipantshad watched(0-4), and theaforementioned indicator of general political knowledge about parties andiS~S26ssues.26

ResultsSTRENGTHOF VOTEPREFERENCES.The first step in evaluating our hypothesesis to determinewhetherexposureto the AHP stimulus stimulatedequivocationand moderationregardingthe presidentialcontest. Recall our prediction thatexposureto AHP inducesuncertaintyamongskilled voters but assuranceamongignorant voters. The coefficient associated with "AHP Only" in the secondcolumn of Table2 (the firstdisplayingodds ratiocoefficients)shows thatamonguninformedsubjects,exposureto AHP increasedthe odds of expressinggreaterstrength of candidate preference, relative to any lower category, by 19%-although that relationship is statistically insignificant. However, as we hadhypothesizedandas the additionof the coefficientscorresponding o "AHPonly"

24For respondentswho indicatedmoderateideology or independentparty identification,or whovoted for third-party andidates, t was often unclear whethertheirvotes were consistent with theirpartyidentificationsor ideology. Such cased were coded as "zero."25Unfortunately,we hadno subjectsof Hispanic ethnicity;this outcome reflects thedemographicsof the region wherethis samplewas drawn.26 See Table 1 for marginalstatistics for all of the control variables,and others.


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334 David C. Barker and Susan B. Hansen(effectivelyzero) and the first interaction erm(1/.63) reveals,moderatelyknowl-edgeablesubjectsexposedto AHP were 1.58 times as likelyto reportweakercan-didatepreference,and the most knowledgeablesubjectswere2.16 times as likelyto expressweakerpreference(p < .001).What about informationprovidedafter exposure to the AHP stimulus?DidAHP subjectstake advantageof the opportunity o reconsidertheir choices andadjustthem in light of the available nformation?Thereappears o have been nodiscernible effect on low-knowledge subjects. However,as expected, the avail-ability of free information o subjects appears o have magnifiedthe AHP effectamong knowledgeablevoters. Indeed,moderately nformed AHP+Info subjects

TABLE2Statistical Models1 of Vote Intentions, As Predicted by AHP StimuliRegarding he PresidentialContest

Strengthof Preference Std. Errorof VotePreference Consistency Vote Prediction LikelihoodExp (b)2 Exp (b) OLS b Exp (b)Experimental StimuliAHP Only 1.19 1.90** -.14*** 1.03AHP + Information .95 2.37*** -.01 1.72"Interaction:AHP Only x .63*** .41*** .04* .63*Know.Interaction: AHP + Info) x .55*** .55*** .01 .37***Know.Controls:GeneralPoliticalKnowledge 1.66*** 1.75*** .08*** 2.09**Female 1.59 1.34 N/A 2.14"***Black 2.02* 1.02 N/A 1.13Year n College .86 .79 N/A .80*PartyID (GOP= 1; 1.19 2.13* N/A 1.16

Democrat= 3)Ideology (Liberalism) .77A .90 N/A .89PresidentialDebate 1.29^ 1.27^ N/A 1.56"***ViewershipModel ErrorReduction .06 .07 .06 .10N 214 211 214 2141 Statistical tests are based on robust standarderrorswith clusteringbased on the experimentalgroups.2Ordinal ogistic regressionmodel. Coefficientsrepresent he change in the odds of the value ofthe dependentvariablebeing observed in any higher category relative to all lower categories (con-

verted from the logit estimate)given a one-unitchange in x, relativeto all loweroutcomes. As such,coefficients less thanone indicate a negative relationship.p < .10 (two-tailed).*p < .05 (two-tailed).**p < .01 (two-tailed).***p < .001 (two-tailed).


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All Things Considered 335were 1.82 times as likely to reportweaker candidatepreferences,and the mostknowledgeable subjectswho were exposed to AHP and informationwere 2.64times as likely to reportweakercandidatepreferences as observedby addingtheAHP+Info variable {again, effectively zero} and the second interactionterm{ [1/.55]2} together),which is 48% greaterthan the AHP effect when informa-tion had not been provided(p < .001).VOTECONSISTENCY. he third column of Table 2 (the second column display-ing odds ratio coefficients) shows the results of an ordinal logistic regressionanalysis of the degree to which presidentialcandidatepreferenceswere consis-tent with subjectparty dentification Republican, ndependent,Democrat)and/orself identified ideology (conservative,moderate, liberal). Recall that we pre-dicted that exposure to AHP would correspond to less consistency amongknowledgeablevoters (H1),but greater consistency among less knowledgeablevoters (H2).The models provide strong supportfor these predictions. Amongthe least knowledgeable voters, those exposed to AHP without additionalinformationwere 1.9 times as likely to choose a candidate that reflectedtheirpartisanshipand/or ideology, relative to the control group. At the same time,exposure to AHP is associated with less consistency among knowledgeablerespondents; he most knowledgeable respondentswere less than half as likelyas the controlgroupto prefera candidate n keeping with their statedpartyIDand/or deology ({90 - [1/.41]}2). Theserelationshipsare all stronglystatisticallysignificant.Considering heconditional mpactof adding nformation o themix, it appearsthatproviding subjectswith informationwas associatedwith even higher levelsof consistency amongless knowledgeablesubjectsthan was the case when AHPwas providedwithoutinformation.As for knowledgeablesubjects,unexpectedly,informationdid not seem to furtherenhancethe inconsistencyeffects of AHP. Infact, the magnitudeof the AHP effect was significantlygreateramongthose whohad not been given the opportunity o review salient information.While ourpre-dictions regarding he mitigatingor enhancingeffects of informationhave notbeen borne out in this model, ourgeneral predictions-that knowledgeableAHPusers would be substantially ess inclined towardconsistency than the controlgroup, and that less knowledgeablevoters would be more inclined towardcon-sistency-have received strongsupport.27

27 Alternativemodels, with straightforward ote choice as the dependentvariable, ndicate that thistendencytowardconsistencyamong low-knowledgerespondents xposedtoAHPandawayfrom con-sistency among high-knowledge respondentsexposed to AHP disproportionately enefitedGore inthis sample. Such an outcome was not unexpected,given that the social context (urbanNortheasternuniversity),group endorsements, ncumbentadministrationperformance, he state of the economy,and othercues benefited the Democrat,so thatas the number of criteriaused by subjectsexpandedbeyondpartyidentification, here would have been a greater ikelihood of for subjectsin this partic-ular sampleto choose Gore over Bush.


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336 David C. Barker and Susan B. HansenVOTEPREDICTABILITY.he fourthcolumn of Table2 displays coefficients froma model predicting he variance n residualsarounda multinomial ogit equationof vote intention(0 = thirdparty, 1 = Bush, 2 = Gore). The multinomiallogitmodel hadpredictedvote intentionby the controlvariables ncludedin all of ourother equations (knowledge, party identification, ideology, sex, race, year incollege, and numberof debates viewed; pseudo-R2= .30). Recall that we rea-soned that if exposureto AHP enhances relianceon easy heuristicsamong low-knowledgevoters,thenthe amountof errorvariancearound he regression slopeshould be lowerfor low-knowledgesubjects exposedto AHP.However, his rela-tionshipshould reverseamongAHP subjectswithmoreknowledge.These resultssupportour predictions nicely. Low-knowledgeAHP subjects' vote intentionswere significantlymore predictablethan those of control group subjects. Fur-thermore,as the interactionterm and each of its components (knowledge andAHP only) show,the aforementionedpredictabilityvanishesamonghigh-knowl-edge subjects. Interestingly,however,when informationwas addedto the mix,AHP exposurewas not significantlyassociatedwith vote predictability, ither forhigh-knowledgeor low-knowledge subjects-although the signs of the coeffi-cients associated with each variable are in the predicteddirection. These non-findings were unexpectedand suggest that either (1) there is something aboutenablingAHP subjectswith information hat works to diluteAHP effects whenit comes to reliance on cues other thanparty identificationor ideology, or that(2) theparticularmix of individuals n theAHP+Infoconditions,foridiosyncraticreasons thatcannot be systematically explained,did not respondto the stimuli.Given the relationshipsrevealed in the previously discussed vote consistencymodel, in whichAHP+Infosubjectsdidappear o be moreor less relianton partyID and ideology cues (depending upon knowledge) than were control grouprespondents, he latterexplanationappears ess likely. But given that the natureof the experimentaldesign did not include an informationonly condition, it isimpossible with these data to pinpoint exactly what effect informationhas onrespondents.As such, all we can offer is pure speculation.One possible expla-nationmight be that when subjectsare armedwith free information, he abilityof priorpolitical knowledgeto explainvariance is dramaticallydiluted for low-knowledge subjects(becausesuch subjectsuse the informationandsubsequentlybehave morelike knowledgeablesubjects)andenhancedfor knowledgeablesub-jects (because such subjects can use the information more skillfully). Suchdecreasedpredictivecapacity for the knowledge variable(and perhapsfor thevariablesmeasuringsubjects'year in college andcampaign nterestas well) mayhave worked to counterthe changes associatedwith the partyidentificationandideology measures. Again, this explanation is purely speculative and is notentirely satisfying. Futureattemptsat modeling AHP effects should include anexperimentalcell that provides subjects with informationonly, so as to bettercapturethe differences between informationeffects and systematicprocessingeffects.


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All Things Considered 337VOTELIKELIHOOD.inally,we examinedthe relationshipbetweenAHP exposureand subjects' plans to vote. As the final column in Table2 shows, the datagen-erally supportourhypotheses.Knowledgeablevotersexposedto AHP were 1.16times less likely to reporta higher,rather han lower, inclinationto vote ({0 +[1/.63]2}). Moreover,when given free information,knowledgeablevoters were86% less likely to reportan inclinationto vote (1.72 - {[1/.37]2}). So again,while theadditionof informationdid not seem to exaggerate heAHPeffect, bothhigh knowledge AHP groups revealed substantiallyweaker turnoutintentions.Interestingly, monglow-knowledge subjects,whileAHP exposurewithout addi-tional informationwas not associatedwith turnout ntentions,those low-knowl-edge AHP subjectswho were also providedwith informationwere 72% morelikely to report a greaterrather than weaker turnout intention, relative to thecontrol group. One explanationof this finding is that low-knowledge subjectsselectivelyused the informationavailable o them to support heirheuristicdrivenchoices, thusincreasing heirstrengthof preference o matchtheirincreasedsuf-ficiency thresholds.

ConclusionIn this paperwe have examinedthe viability of democraticdecision makingfrom a differentangle thanhas been done previouslyin political science. Rather

thananalyzingvariance npolitical knowledge,attitudestability, deologicalcon-straint,or even "hardthought,"we have consideredpolitical sophisticationinterms of systematicprocessing--the degree to which "allthings are considered"before making a choice. Moreover,rather than trying to identify systematicprocessors in the electorate,we have sought to understandwhethersystematicprocessingcanbe inducedandwhether hatdependsonknowledgelevels. Finally,we have examined whetherthe availabilityof free information influences thisprocess. In sum, our findingssuggest that(a) systematic cognitive processingispossible and can be induced;and(b) knowledgematters.Ourexperiments oundthatinducedconsiderationof a wide rangeof choice criteriadidnot seem to mit-igate relianceupon "gutlevel reasoning"among low-knowledge ubjects.In fact,amongthe less skilled,exposureto theAHP tool was associatedwithgreateruseof the partyID cue. By contrast,among more knowledgeablesubjects,the rela-tionship completely reversed-AHP exposurewas associatedwith weaker votepreferences, turnoutintentions,partisan/ideologicalconsistency, and vote pre-dictability.These findingssupport he extantsocial psychology literature,whichshows that expandedconsiderationof orthogonaldecision criteria is associatedwith increased perplexity and equivocationwhen voters have the capacity toprocess those decision elements properly(Linville 1982; Tetlock 1993). On theotherhand,while citizens possessing fewer skills may experiencethe same per-plexity, they may also understand hat their best bet to make a "correct"choiceis defensivelyto fall back on reliableheuristics,thusprojecting raits andration-


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338 David C. Barker and SusanB. Hansenalizing choices throughthe well-known "halo effect" (Bargh 1994; Chaiken,Liberman,andEagly 1989;Tesser and Leone 1977).However,the degree to which such voters will take advantageof free infor-mationto help them overcome theirknowledgedeficienciesis less clear. In someof ourmodels, ourexpectationsregarding he effect of addinginformation o theAHP stimulus were borneout, but the relationshipswere inconsistentoverall.Itis possible that some people take advantageof free informationwhen provided,while othersdo not-leading to inconsistent effects.How generalizableare our findings?This is a valid concern, given that ourexperimentalsubjectswere traditionalcollege students,and thus may have lesscrystallizedattitudes and may thereforebe more amenableto change than theirparents.However,given that we measuredsystematic processingby attemptingto induce it in an experimentalenvironment, t is likely thatsome of the subjectsin our controlgrouphad alreadyengaged in systematicprocessing,withouttheAHP tool-particularly given that a large percentageof oursubjectswere highlyattentivepolitical science majors.This would serve to mitigate the differencesbetween our treatmentand control groups. Even more importantly,our experi-mentaldesign is quite unusualin that we analyzedreal vote intentionsduringaclose, highly visible presidentialcontest in its final weeks, when even manycollege students have surelymade up theirminds. Therefore, t is possible thatthe systematic differences we observed between treatmentand control groupsmay actuallyunderestimate he impact of genuine systematic processing overelectoral decisions duringthe entirecourse of a campaign.So what does all this mean for Americandemocracy?While real voters arealmost never going to be exposed to a decision-makingtool to help them sys-tematically process, many concerned voters likely engage in some degree ofopen-mindedconsiderationof various criteria,before making a judgment thatbest reflects their values and interests,on balance. Does such systematicpro-cessing improveelectoralchoices? Stateddifferently,does theacknowledged ackof systematicprocessingon the partof whatis surelymost of theAmericanelec-torate(Lau and Redlawsk2001) compromisethe representative apacityof therepublic?The answer is not clear cut and may depend in part on one's faith inheuristic cues. If party identification and general self-assessed ideology helpuninformedvoters to make choices more reflectiveof their intereststhan wouldoccurwithout the help of such cues (Lupia 1994;Nisbettand Ross 1980;Popkin1991), then our experimentssuggest that inducedsystematic processing shouldencouragegreater correspondencebetween low-informationvoter interests andvote choices (but see Lau and Redlawsk2001). At the same time, this relation-ship may be problematic f it cements bad choices in voters' minds.As for knowledgeablevoters, if systematic processing leads to greaterper-suadability, t mightmean thatvoters areworkingharder o make "correct"deci-sions. However, t might also lead to intellectualparalysisand withdrawal romthe process altogether.If such is the case, then any potentialgains in "correctvoting"affordedby enhancedsystematic processingmay be counterbalanced y


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All Things Considered 339losses in skilled voters' ability to act as opinion leaders or to participate n theprocessat all.Therefore,perhaps he angstfelt by some democratic heoristsoverthe lack of Americansystematicprocessingon the partof the electorate at largecan be assuagedsomewhatby these findings.

AppendixA:Definitionsf CriteriaRelatingo Presidential oteChoice,asProvided o ExperimentalubjectsA. Characteristics: Personal traits pertaining to candidate competence,

charisma,andcharacter.1. Intelligence:The abilityto thinkcreatively,understand omplexissues andmake sounddecisions.2. Strength: nnerconfidence to stand on principleunderpressureandnot beintimidated.3. Experience:"Know-how" btainedfromperformingduties relevant o theoffice sought.4. Inspiration:Ability to motivate,inspire, persuade,and charm.5. Honesty:Charactero tell the truthandnurture he public trust.

B. Policies: Candidate deas pertaining o official nationalgovernmentpositionsin variousissue domains.1. Economic Policy: Policy preferences regardingtaxes, spending, invest-ment, debtreduction,andtrade.2. Health Care Policy: Policy preferences regardingMedicare, Medicaid,HMOreform,andcoveragefor the uninsured.3. Education Policy: Policy preferences regarding public school funding,

college aid, andprivateschool vouchers.4. Crime/GunPolicy: Policy preferences regardinggun control and othercrimeprevention nitiatives.5. Abortion Policy: Policy preference regarding the pro-life/pro-choicedebate.6. Foreign Policy: Policy preferences regardingdefense spending and thepromotionof worldpeace, stability,and democracy.

C. Values: Candidatecommitmentto Americanprinciples of liberty,equality,self relianceandtolerance.1. Liberty:Freedomto make economic and lifestyle choices without gov-ernmental ntervention.2. Equality of Opportunity:Removingbarriersof discriminationand disad-vantageso everyonecan compete on a level playingfield.


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340 David C. Barker and Susan B. Hansen3. Self Reliance: Success achieved throughinitiative,hardwork, pride andpersonalresponsibility.4. Tolerance:Promotinga spiritof communityby championingdiversityof

thoughtandbackground.

AppendixBAHPTool orSuccessive PairedComparisonsf ChoiceCriteriaTraits TraitsIntelligence 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 = 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 StrengthIntelligence 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 = 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ExperienceIntelligence 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 = 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 InspirationIntelligence 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 = 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 HonestyStrength 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 = 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ExperienceStrength 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 = 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 InspirationStrength 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 = 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 HonestyExperience 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 = 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 InspirationExperience 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 = 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 HonestyInspiration 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 = 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 HonestyPolicies PoliciesEconomic 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 = 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 HealthCareEconomic 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 = 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 EducationEconomic 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 = 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Crime/GunEconomic 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 = 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 AbortionEconomic 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 = 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ForeignHealth Care 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 = 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 EducationHealth Care 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 = 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Crime/GunHealth Care 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 = 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 AbortionHealthCare 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 = 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ForeignEducation 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 = 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 CrimeEducation 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 = 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 AbortionEducation 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 = 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ForeignCrime/Gun 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 = 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 AbortionCrime/Gun 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 = 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ForeignAbortion 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 = 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ForeignValues ValuesLiberty 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 = 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 EqualityLiberty 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 = 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 SelfRelianceLiberty 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 = 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ToleranceEquality 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 = 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 SelfRelianceEquality 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 = 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ToleranceSelf 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 = 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ToleranceRelianceCriteria CriteriaTraits 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 = 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 PoliciesTraits 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 = 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ValuesPolicies 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 = 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Values


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All Things Considered 341AppendixCAHPTool o CompareCandidates n SeveralChoiceCriteria(Likertcale Responses:StronglyAgree,Agree,DisagreeStronglyDisagree)

Choice Criteria: CandidatesA. Traits: Bush Gore"Candidate s an exceptionally leader"I. Intelligent2. Strong3. Experienced4. Inspirational5. HonestB. Policies:"Candidate's olicies would be good forAmerican policy"1. Economic2. Health Care3. Education4. Crime/Gun5. Abortion6. ForeignC. Values:"Electingcandidatewould protectandpreserveAmerican "1. Liberty2. Equality3. Self Reliance4. Tolerance

AcknowledgmentThe authorswould like to thankthe following people for their helpful sugges-tions on earlier drafts: ChristopherJan Carman, Jon Hurwitz, ChristopherBonneau, Scott McClurg,Adam Lawrence,and MorganMarietta.We are alsoindebted to the editor and three anonymousreviewers for their conscientiousreadingof earlier drafts.This paperis much betterbecause of their efforts.Allremainingshortcomingsare, of course, ours alone.ManuscriptsubmittedJune 2, 2003Final manuscriptreceivedMarch26, 2004

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David C. Barker [email protected])s assistantprofessorof political science,University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260. Susan B. Hansen([email protected])s professor of political science, University of Pittsburgh,Pittsburgh,PA 15260.

all things considered. systematic cognitive processing and electoral decision-making

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