allaire 1963 bare particulars
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Bare ParticularsAuthor(s): Edwin B. AllaireSource: Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the AnalyticTradition, Vol. 14, No. 1/2 (Jan. - Feb., 1963), pp. 1-8Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4318430.
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PHLOSOP
STU IES
Edited by
WILFRID
SELLARS and
HERBERT FEIGL
with the advice and
assistance
f
PAUL
MEEHL, JOHN
HOSPERS,
MAY
BRODBECK
VOLUME XIV
Contents
January-February963
NUMBERS 1-2
Bare
Particulars
yEdwin
B.
Allaire,
STATE UNIVERSITY OF IOWA
Does Modal
Logic Rest upon
a
Mistake?by
R.
M.
Martin,UNIVERSITY OF BONN
andUNIVERSITY
OF TEXAS
IndirectSpeech Again
by A.
N.
Prior,MANCHESTER
UNIVERSITY
Indirect
Speech:
A
Rejoinder o Prof.A. N.
Prior
by
L.
Jonathan
Cohen,
QUEEN'S
COLLEGE, OXFORD
Baier's
Test
for
Practical
Rules Re-Examined
byDavid Barry
Lyons,
HARVARD UNIVERSITY
A
Note on
Commitment
by
LennartAqvist,UNIVERSITY
OF
UPPSALA, SWEDEN
Lewis'
Imperatives
of Right by
William K.
Frankena,UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN
A
Note on
Austin's
PerformativeTheory
of
Knowledgeby
Bernard
Mayo,
UNIVERSITY OF
BIRMINGHANM
Bare
Particulars
by
EDWIN
B.
ALLAIRE
STATE
UNIVERSITY
OF
IOWA
CONSIDER
'this
is
red,'
asserted
rulyof a
colored disc.
Some
philosophers
claim
that the
sentence
refers o
a
fact
consistingof
two
(kinds
of)
entities,
an individual(bareparticular)and a character universal),referred o
by
'this'and
'red,'
respectively.
They claim
further
hat
the two
entities
stand
in
the
exemplification
elation,
represented
by
'is.'
Currently,
hat
claimis
1
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2 PHILOSOPHICALTUDIES
widely rejected.Underlying he many arguments upporting hat rejection
is a rathersimple idea which Russell
once
expressed: One is tempted to
regard This is red' as a subject-predicate roposition;but if one does so,
one finds that 'this' becomes a substance,an unknowablesomething in
which
predicates nhere
. .
Though awkwardly xpressed,Russell's point is clear: The individual-
characteranalysis s at odds with the empirical radition. That is,
if
one
claims
that 'this
is
red'
is a
subject-predicate roposition
n
the
sense
that
'this'
and 'red'refer to
unanalyzable
ntities of differentontologicalkinds,
then one has violated the Principleof Acquaintance
PA),2
a basic tenet
of
empiricism.One is not acquaintedwith a something which could be
construedas an entity of a kind different rom red, except in the sense that
this is a
collection
f
the same
kind of
things
as
red,e.g., square
and
bright.
The heart of Russell'spoint is thus that the individualsof the individual-
character nalysisare unknowable
n
the sense
that
one
is not
directlyac-
quaintedwith them.
I
proposeto explorewhether or not one can propound he individual-
character nalysiswithout abandoning he
PA.
In
particular,
want
to
dis-
cuss
Bergmann's
ssertion3 hat
beingacquainted
with
a red
spot,
and noth-
ing else, one is presentednot with justone thing but two, a particular . .
and a character . . If I understandBergmann, e is maintainingprecisely
what
Russell
denies, namely,
hat
one is on such occasions
acquainted
with
an
individualor,
as he
prefers
o
call
it,
a
particular.
His
motivation s clear.
He attemptsto reconcile he individual-characternalysis
with
the PA.
Before discussinghis attempt
it
will be
helpful
to
examinethe dialectics
which
give
rise
to
the
problem.
will do that
by commentingbriefly
on
two
other
analyses
f the disc:
(I)
The disc is a collectionof
what hassometimes
been called perfectparticulars.
This
is red,'
asserted
ruly of our disc, is
analyzedas follows: 'this'refers
o
a collectionof entities,one of which is
referred
o
by
'red.'
This
latter
entity
is such that
if
there were two
red discs,
there
would
be two
such
entities
(perfect particulars),
ach
unanalyzable
and
numerically
different
rom
the
other.
(II)
The disc is a collection of
characters
universals).
This
is red'
is
analyzed
as
in
(I), except
that
the
entities
are
such
that if
there were
two red
discs,
the
two
collectionswould
have one
member n
common,
.e.,
one
member
which
is
literally
he same.
Each of
these analyses
encounters
an immediate
and,
I
believe,
insur-
mountable
objection.
Consider
wo
discs
of
the same
(shadeof) color, size,
shapeand so on.The objection o (I) is that it cannotaccountforthe same-
ness
of
the discs
since
the members
of
the two
collectionsare
all
unanalyz-
able
and different
rom
each other.
In
other
words, hough
both
collections
contain a
member referred
o
by 'red,' (I) providesnothing they
have in
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BARE
PARTICULARS
3
common
since the membersare
unanalyzable
s well as different.
The
ob-
jection to
(II) is
that it cannot
accountfor
the
difference,
ince
each
collec-
tion has
literally
he same
members.4
The individual-characternalysisencountersneither objection.That is
its strength.
The difference
of the
discs is
accounted
or
by
each
containing
a
different
ndividual;
he
sameness,by
each
containing iterally
the
same
characters
as
in
(II)). The
individual-character
nalysis
hus
allows
one
to
solve the
problemsof
samenessand
difference,
at
least as
they
arise
in
connection
with things.
Speakingmore
traditionally,
t
provides
a
solu-
tion
to the
nominalism-realismssue.
Notice
that a proponent
of the
individual-character
nalysis,or,
as
I
shall
henceforth
call
him, a realist,
explicitlygrounds
(by
means
of
entities)
the
samenessas
well as
the differenceof
the
two discs.
There must be
entities
to
accountfor the
discs
beingcalled the same
or,
less
accurately,
heremust
be a
shared
omething n
order
to
account for
the same
word ('red')
being
truly
predicatedof
'this'
and 'that.'The
objection
to (I) is
in
fact
some-
times
expressed s follows.
Since the
two red
entities
of
the
two
collections
are
different
and
unanalyzable,here
is no
way
of
accounting
or
their
being
referred o by the
same
word ('red'). So
expressed he objection s
mislead-
ing.
Moreover, t tempts a
defender
of (I) to
appeal
mistakenly
o
a
variant
of the meaning-is-use octrine.
The demandfor
grounding
ameness s
at present
suspect.
The suspicion
makes (I)
seemattractive.
Consider wo discs of
different hades
of
red.
In
ordinaryanguage, red'
may
be
correctlyused
to
refer to
either.
It
appears
that
a realist,
o be
consistent,
must
also ground
he sameness
f the
different
shades.For,
if
he
objects
to
(I) because t
does
not
explain
why the
same
word is used to refer o two
perfect
particulars,
e must
take
seriously
he
same
objection
in
the
case
of
'red'
when
applied
to differentshades.More-
over,since each
shade
s
simple
and
unanalyzable
he
ground
(i.e.,
the
shared
entity) mustbe of a differentkind.Thus,a third kindmakes ts appearance.
For
those of
a Platonic
stripe, his
third is
a
transcendent niversal r
con-
cept.
5
Each
shade
s red
by
virtue
of
participating
n
the same
transcendent
universal,
which
is the
proper
eferentof
'red.'
Hence,either
the
PA
cannot
be
maintained
or
we must
be
acquainted
with ( intuit )
concepts.The sec-
ond
alternativehas
been
unacceptable o
those
who embrace
he PA.
The
realist hus seems
doomed
to Platonism.
The proponent
of (I)
who
denies the
need
for
grounding
ameness
does not. This
seemingadvantage
hashad its effects.Recently, it hasbeen argued hat the root of Platonism
is
the
mistaken
way
in which
we
sometimes ookat
language. n
particular,
the
very
attempt
to
ground
samenessreveals he
mistaken
belief that
there
must
be
a
referent
o
justify
the
use
of a word.
Not even
the referring
se
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4 PHILOSOPHICALTUDIES
of a wordrequires referent,or so it is argued.What holds in generalholds
for 'red.'Hence, its use in referringo different hadesneed not be grounded.
Thus, we are told, the samenessof the shades merelymeans that they are
referred o by the same word. Moreover, t is claimed, even in the case of
things of
the
same shade each exemplification
f
it
is
really
different
and
unanalyzable.
n other
words,
their
samenessalso
consists
merely
in
their
being referred
o
by
the
same word.6
A
defenderof (I) may thus attempt to dispose of the objection
that
he
cannot
account
for
the
sameness
of
things by arguing
hat
the
very
at-
temptto accountfor it is mistaken.The attempt,he holds, inevitably
eads
to Platonismwith all its horrorsof transcendent
ntities.
That
shows
why
the
use doctrinemay
be
attractive
o a
defender
of
(I).
Consideragain
two discs
of
the same
(shadeof) color, size, shape,
and so
on. Supposethey are shownto you, one to
the
left
of
the
other.
If
aftera
while you are shown
them
again,you will not be able to tell which is which.
In fact, you will not be able to tell whether he two you now see are the two
you saw earlier.You can only tell that the two you now see have all the
properties hat the two you saw earlierhad.
In
other words, taken as such
and
in
themselves,
wo
perfectparticulars
f the same shade cannot be
told
apart.That means that
in
this case at least the sameness s grounded.We
know how the realistgrounds t. It remains o be shown that he need not
therefore
ground
he sameness
of
different hades n
order o justify
he use
of
'red'
for
any
of
them.
My realist akesadvantage f what the use doctrinehas taughtus, namely,
(a)
that from the fact that
the
same
word
is used
to
refer to two
things
it
does
not always
ollow that the
two
share
an entity. (Indeed,
we could de-
cide to use
just
one word to
refer
to
green
and
red.)
On the
other
hand,
it
does not
follow
(b)
that
they
never
do. The
proponents
of
(I) rashly
nfer
(b)
from
(a).
Their
rashness,
have
argued,may
be due
to
their mistaken
belief that even
(b)
commits
one
to
Platonism.Some things, our two discs
for
example,are
the
same shade
of
color. This is not a linguistic fact; i.e.,
not
merely he fact thatthey
are
referred o by the sameword.They are the
same
in
that theyareindistinguishable
s
such, or, more precisely,one can-
not
differentiate hem by their
color
alone.
Let us take stock. The problemof analyzing uch things as colored discs
arises
n the context of the
realism-nominalism
ssue. That issue, we saw,
cannotreallybe handledby accounting
or
the samenessn the discs n terms
of the samenessof words.At some point samenessmust be grounded n
entities.
To
believe
otherwise
s to
put upon
the
meaning-is-use octrinea
burdengreater han
it
can bear. Thus,
in
our case, it remains he first task
of
analysis
o
single
out the
unanalyzable
ntities which
account
for
the dif-
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BARE
PARTICULARS
5
ference
and
the
samenessof the
two discs.
The
second
task
or
step,
as in
all
cases,
s to
employ
the result
obtained in
the
firststep
to
explicate
certain
philosophical
sesof
words,
hereby
dissolving
he traditional ialectics.
The
realisticanalysisprovidesthe requiredgrounding.Yet it is tainted. Like
Russell,
many
philosophers
claim
that
they are not
acquainted
with indi-
viduals.The
heart
of
the matter
is whether or not
Bergmann's
laim
that
one
is in
fact
acquaintedwith
individuals
bare
particulars)
s
defensible
or,
even,
whether
t
can
be
made
intelligible.
An
obviousobjection
s that the claim
merelysprings
rom
the
dialectical
needs it
satisfiesand
is not
borne out
by a careful
inspection
of
what
is
in
fact
presented.
Indeed,
Bergmann
himself invites this
objection.
I,
of
course,
have
convinced
myself
that
I
am
actuallypresented
with
two
things.
Yet
I
am
loathe
to restthe
case
on this
conviction; or I
am
also
convinced
that a very
major
partof it
is
dialectical.
One
cannot
but
wonderhow
one
does
convince
oneselfof
suchmatters.
In
the
lightof
what he
himself
says,one is
indeed
tempted to
conclude
that
his
conviction is
dialectical
rather
than
phenomenological, f
I
may so ex-
press
myself.
If
so, then he
has
abandoned
he
PA.
Whether or
not under
the
pressureof
the
dialectic he has
actuallydone
that is
not my
concern.
The
point is
rather
whether or
not the
description
e
proposescan
be
defended ndependentlyof the dialectics.
Phenomenological
escription
s
prompted
by
philosophical
puzzles.One
turnsto
the
formeras
a
prelude o the
dissolutionof
the latter.The
dangers
are
obvious.
One
may
think
that one
still
describeswhen
in
fact one
already
argues.
That
makesall
alleged
descriptions
uspect.The
best one can do is
elaborate
hem
in
severalways,
always
n guard
against
hevarious
biases hat
mightcreep
in.
Once a
descriptionhas
been
accepted, he
puzzles
must
be
solved
by
speaking
commonsensically
bout it.
In
the course
of
thus speak-
ing
about it, one
maywell
be led
to
reconsider
t. After
all, it
was
prompted
by
the
puzzles.
Nevertheless,
one must
not and
cannot
give
awaythe
game
by
maintaining
hat
the
description s
forced
upon one
by
the
dialectics.
Bergmann
n the
quoted
passage
omes
dangerously
lose
to doing
just
that.
The
most one
could
say is that
the
dialectics
directs our
attention
toward
what is
presented.
But it
does not
and cannot
tell
us what
actually s pre-
sented.
A
comparison
may
help to
make
the point
clear.
The later
Wittgenstein,
believing that the
philosophical
puzzles
arise from
the
misuse of
words,
undertook o describe heircorrectuse.The misusesareengendered y what
he
calls
misleading
grammatical
nalogies.
Once these
latter
are
recognized
as
such,
the
philosophical
puzzles
disappear.
This is his
basic
idea.To
speak
as
before,
Wittgenstein's
description
of
correct
(and
incorrect)use is
the
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6 PHILOSOPHICALTUDIES
preludeto his solution of the philosophicalpuzzles. Are then his
descrip-
tions unbiased?There is no guarantee.Nor is it reasonable o demand
one
beforehand.Wittgenstein'sdescriptionproceedsdirectly
rom what
he con-
sidersa puzzleand thus indirectly romwhathe considers nillicit use.Thus,
the dialecticsmay have influenced he description.But once more,
the best
one can do is guardagainstthe biases that may have been introduced.
So,
too, with phenomenological escription. n this regardall philosophers
re
in the sameboat. They all start romwhat they considerunproblematical r,
as
it
is sometimesput, fromwhat they hold to be commonsensical.With re-
spect
to
their startingpoint they must always
be
vigilant. One cannot do
more;one must not do less.
I
return o the issue: Can the realisticanalysisbe defendedon phenome-
nologicalgrounds? t will be well to distinguishbetween two uses of 'know.'
First, there is the use of 'know' n which to know something means to be
acquainted
with
it. Second, there is the use
in
which
to know
something
means
to be
able to recognize t.
In
the second sense individuals
as such
or in
themselvesare unknowable.Consideragain he two discsand
the
situa-
tion
in
which you are shown them twice. Since you can only
tell that the
two you now see have all the properties hat the two you saw
earlier
had,
it
followsthat
if
each consistsof an individualand the severalcharacters
t
exemplifies, he individuals s suchor in themselvesarenot recognizable r,
as
I
prefer
o
say,
not
reidentifiable.
he
characters
re.
To
express
he
point
differently,
wo individualsare
merely numerically
different
whereas
two
characters re
intrinsically ifferentas well.
Russell held that individuals re unknowable.
A
defender
of
the
realistic
analysismay
take him to
have
held
merely that they are
not
recognizable,
i.e.,
that
they
cannot
be
known
n
the
second sense
of 'know.'
This, though,
is
not
at
all
what Russell meant. Rather, n sayingthat individualsare
un-
knowable,he
used
'know'
n
the
firstsense.
In
turn,
I
hold with Bergmann
that
while
they
are
indeed
unknowable n
the
second sense they are known
in
the first.
Accordingly, cannot get awaywith just maintaining hat they
are
merelynumerically
ifferent. must
show
n
what senseone is acquainted
with
them.
Not
to
recognize
his
obligation
would be to
confuse again the
two uses
of
'know.'
Nevertheless,
n
pointing out that individualsare not
recognizable, .e., are merely numericallydifferent,one has arrivedat the
heart
of
the matter.Individuals
are
just
those
entities which
do
groundthe
numericaldifferenceof
two things which are the same in all (nonrelational)
respects.
Consider once
more the
two discs. When
presentedtogether, they are
presented
as
numericallydifferent.That difference s presentedas is their
sameness
with
respect
o
shape, (shadeof) color,and so on. What accounts
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BARE
PARTICULARS
7
for that
difference s the
numerically
ifferent
ndividuals.
No
character, r
group
of characters
an do that.
Thus,
to
say
that
there
are individuals s
to
say
that
things
may
be
merely
numerically
different.No matter
what
de-
scriptionone proposes, he numericaldifferenceof two things which are
alike in
all
(nonrelational)respects
must
be
accountedfor. Consider
(IL).
To claim
that both
discs are but
collections
of
literally
he same
universals
does
not account for the thisness
and thatness
which are
implicitly
referred
to in speakingof
them as two
collections.That is,
the two collections
of
characters-if one
persists n speaking hat
way-are, as
presented,
numeri-
cally
different.Clearly,
therefore,
something
other than
a character
must
also be
presented.That
something
s what
proponents
f
the
realistic
nalysis
call a
bare
particular.Or,
perhapsbetter,
that
is their
explication
of
'bare
particular.'
One
difficultyremains.
Bergmannclaims
that
in
being presented
with
one redspot one is
presented
with two things.That
maybe misleading.
The
most
prevalentuse
of 'two'carries spatial
connotation.
That
is,
if there
are
twothings then
they are
spatially elated.Yet
exemplification,he
relation
obtainingbetween a character
nd an
individual, s obviously
not
spatial.
Thus,
the sense in which
there are two things is
merelythe sense
in which
there
are two
characters redand square)
n the
presentation f a red square.
For redand squareare not spatiallyrelated.Nor arean individualand the
character r
characterst
exemplifies. f
one shouldinsist that the
two char-
actersare in fact
spatially elated,arguing
hat they
are at the same place,I
merelyask him
what he
means by 'place.'There is
only one
answerI can
think of
which
would help.
A
placeas
such is itself an
entity. But, then, this
answer
makes
places
into
bare
particulars.This
piece of dialectics s well
known.
Consideragain
'this is red,'
asserted rulyof a
coloreddisc. To
what does
'this' refer?That
it does referto
something is
obvious. It does not always
refer
o
the entity
referred o by 'red.'
That is, 'is' in this
utterancedoes not
alwaysstand
for
identity.
Hence, 'this' can
only referto one of
two things:
an
individualor
a collection of
characters, ne of
which is red.8
We know
already
hat
the latter
alternative ails, for in the case
of two collectionsof
charactershe
membersof
which are the
same, the numerical
differencebe-
tween the
two collections s
left
unaccounted or. The realistic
analysisdoes
accountfor
it.
Moreover, wo individuals
re
presented n the sense that the
two
collectionsare
presented
as numericallydifferent.
That is
not to deny,
though, that individualsare merelynumericallydifferentfrom each other
and thus not
reidentifiable
s
such. That they are
explainswhy
they have
been
overlooked o often.
I
have argued
hat one can
propounda realistic
analysiswithoutabandon-
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8/10/2019 Allaire 1963 Bare Particulars
9/9
8
PHILOSOPHICAL
STUDIES
ing the
PA.Moreover,
one
can single out the bare particulars ithout
using
'exist'philosophically,
hus
avoiding he dialecticsof the
nominalism-realism
issue.
In trying
o do this, I
described,
r triedto describe,
he sortof entity
an individual s. Positively, ndividualsarethe carriers f numericaldiffer-
ence
as directly
presented o
us. Negatively,
ndividuals
re
not rudimentary
Aristotelian
ubstances.
Thus, they
are not
the sortof things Russell
prob-
ably
had
in
mind when he
denied
that they can be known.
To
the
sort
of
thing he had
in mind Locke's
phrase
a something
I know
not what
does
indeedapply.
To what
I meanby an
individual,
t does not.
To one who
ac-
cepts
the
PA,
Locke's phraseprovides
sufficient
ground
for
rejecting
the
entities
he
speaks
of.
The individuals want
to keep
from
being
overlooked
are
not such
entities.
That
is why one need
not abandon
he
PA in order
o
maintain hat
we are
presentedwith
bare particulars.
ReceivedFebruary
0, 1961
NOTES
'Bertrand Russell,
An
Inquiry
nto Meaning and Truth (London: Allen
and Unwin,
1948),
p.
97.
2
The
PA
states
that the
indefinable ermsof any ontological description
must
refer
to entities with which one
is
directly
acquainted.Furthermore, an unanalyzable
ntity
is explicated o
mean an entity represented y an indefinable
erm.
'Gustav
Bergmann,
Strawson'sOntology,
Journalof
Philosophy, 57:616
(Septem-
ber 1960).
'
Cf. Gustav Bergmann, Russell
on
Particulars,
Philosophical Review, 56:59-72
(1947). Reprinted
n The Metaphysics
of
Logical
Positivism (London: Longmans,
Green,
1954), pp. 197-214.
6
For a
discussion
of concepts,see
Reinhardt
Grossman,
Conceptualism,
Review of
Metaphysics,
14:243-54 (December 1960).
'This
explication
of sameness
may
well
explicate the
Hatus-vocis
doctrine
of
some
medievals.
'
Bergmann,
Strawson'sOntology, p.
616.
8
As
I
have
shown,
the
perfect-particular
nalysis(i.e., (I) )
is
unacceptablebecause
it does
not
account
for sameness.
Does Modal
Logic
Rest
upon
a
Mistake?
by
R.
M.
MARTIN
UNIVERSITY OF
BONN
AND
UNIVERSITY OF
TEXAS
PHILOSOPHERS
differ
enormously s to just
what
they wish to include
under
formal
ogic. Some wish to include
the whole of
mathematics,as
devel-
oped, say,within the
simplified heory
of
types
or within
an
axiomaticset