allan p. rhodes, duke engr & services (de&s), ca [se] · randy p. edwards, fire control...

13
Report of the Committee on Electric Generating Plants Kenneth W. Dungan, Chair Risk Technologies, LLC, TN [SE] William D. Snell, Secretary TU Services Inc., TX [U] Donald C. Birchler, FP&C Consultants Inc., MO [SE] Bernhard G. Bischoff, Chemetron Fire Systems/Williams Plc, IL [M] Rep. Fire Suppression Systems Assn. John IL Bouchard, Sedgwick of New England, MA [I] Harold D. Brandes, Jr., Duke Power Co.,~NC [U] Stanley.[. Chingo, CornEd, IL [U] Rep. Edison Electric Inst. Thomas C. Clayton, Black & Veatch, MO [SE] Harry M. Corsoo, IV, Cerberus Pyrotronics, NJ [M] Rep. Nat'l Electrical Mfrs. Assn. PhilllpA. Davis, Kemper Nat'l Insurance Cos., IL[I] Paul H. Dobson, Factory Mutual Research Corp., MA [I] Don Drewry, Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Insurance Co., NJ [I] Ismail M. Gosla, Fluor Daniel, CA [SE] Richard M. Hansen, Richard M. Hansen & Assoc., Inc., IL [SE] Leonard R. Hathaway, J&H Marsh & McLennan, GA [I] Dwight S. Hull, II, Tennessee Valley Authority, TN [U] Everett C. Hume, HSB Industrial Risk Insurers, CT [I] Robert Malanga, Union Camp Corp., NJ [U] Amjad M. Mian, Manitoba Hydro, Canada [U] Yuvonue L. Moore, Stone Container Corp., IL [U] James F. Muivoy, Alison Control Inc., IL [M] Gregory W. Powell, Baltimore Gas & Electric Co., MD [U] John G. Puder, F. E. Moran Inc., IL [IM] Omer Semen, Raytheon Engr & Constructors, NY [SE] Stereo F. Vieira, Tyco Int'l., Ltd., RI [M] Rep. Nat'l Fire Sprinkler Assn. Alternates Michael L. Alford, Stone Container Corp., IL [U] (AlL to Y. L. Moore) Patrick T. Borns, McDaniel Fire Systems Inc., IN [M] (Mt. to B. G. BischofD Randy P. Edwards, Fire Control Instruments, Inc., MA[M] (Mt. to H. M. Corson) Rickey L. Johnson, Cigna Special Risk, CT [I] (Voting Ale to AISG Rep.) John W. Koester, J&H Marsh & McLennan, MD Ill (/kit. to L. 1L Hathaway) Charles R. Prasso, HSB Industrial Risk Insurers, CT [I] (Mt to E. C. Hume) Allan P. Rhodes, Duke Engr & Services (DE&S), CA [SE] (Alt. to H. D. Brandes) Samuel L. Rogers, Kemper Nat'l Insurance Cos., CO [I] (Alt. to P. A. Davis) Daniel J. Sheridan, Black & Veatch, MO [SE] (Alt. to T. C. Clayton) Richard Wickman, Baltimore Gas & Electric Co., MD [U] (Alt. to G. W. Powell) Staff Liaison: Richard P. Bielen Committee Scope: This Committee shall have primary responsibility for documents on fire protection for electric generating plants and high voltage direct current (HVDC) converter stations, except for electric generating plants using nuclear fuel. This list represents the membership at the time the Committee was balloted on the text of this edition. Since that time, changes in the membership may have occurred. A key to classifications is found at the front of this book. The Report of the Technical Committee on Electric Generating Plants is presented for adoption in 2.parts. Part I of this Report was prepared by the Technical Committee on Electric Generating Plants, and proposes for adoption amendments to NFPA 850-1996, Recommended Practice for Fire Protection for Electric Generating Plants and High Voltage Direct Current Converter Stations. NFPA 850-1996 is published in Volume 11 of the 1998 National Fire Codes and in separate pamphlet form. Part I of this Report has been submitted to letter ballot of the Technical Committee on Electric Generating Plants, which consists of 26 voting members. The results of the balloting, after circulation of any negative votes, can be found in the report. Part II of this Report was prepared by the Technical Committee Electric Generating Plants, and proposes for adoption amendments to NFPA 851-1996, Recommended Practice for Fire Protection for Hydroelectric Generating Plants. NFPA 851-1996 is published in Volume 11 of the 1998 National Fire Codes and in separate pamphlet form. Part II of this Report has been submitted to letter ballot of the Technical Committee on Electric Generating Plants, which consists of 26 voting members. The results of the balloting, after circulation of any negative votes, can be found in the report. 2O

Upload: tranthuy

Post on 06-Jul-2018

216 views

Category:

Documents


0 download

TRANSCRIPT

Report of the Committee on

Electric Generating Plants

Kenneth W. Dungan, Chair Risk Technologies, LLC, TN [SE]

William D. Snell, Secretary TU Services Inc., TX [U]

Donald C. Birchler, FP&C Consultants Inc., MO [SE] Bernhard G. Bischoff, Chemetron Fire Systems/Williams Plc,

IL [M] Rep. Fire Suppression Systems Assn.

John IL Bouchard, Sedgwick of New England, MA [I] Harold D. Brandes, Jr., Duke Power Co., ~ NC [U] Stanley.[. Chingo, CornEd, IL [U]

Rep. Edison Electric Inst. Thomas C. Clayton, Black & Veatch, MO [SE] Harry M. Corsoo, IV, Cerberus Pyrotronics, NJ [M]

Rep. Nat'l Electrical Mfrs. Assn. PhilllpA. Davis, Kemper Nat'l Insurance Cos., IL[I] Paul H. Dobson, Factory Mutual Research Corp., MA [I] Don Drewry, Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Insurance Co.,

NJ [I] Ismail M. Gosla, Fluor Daniel, CA [SE] Richard M. Hansen, Richard M. Hansen & Assoc., Inc., IL [SE] Leonard R. Hathaway, J&H Marsh & McLennan, GA [I] Dwight S. Hull, II, Tennessee Valley Authority, TN [U] Everett C. Hume, HSB Industrial Risk Insurers, CT [I] Robert Malanga, Union Camp Corp., NJ [U] Amjad M. Mian, Manitoba Hydro, Canada [U] Yuvonue L. Moore, Stone Container Corp., IL [U] James F. Muivoy, Alison Control Inc., IL [M] Gregory W. Powell, Baltimore Gas & Electric Co., MD [U] John G. Puder, F. E. Moran Inc., IL [IM] Omer Semen, Raytheon Engr & Constructors, NY [SE] Stereo F. Vieira, Tyco Int'l., Ltd., RI [M]

Rep. Nat'l Fire Sprinkler Assn.

Alternates

Michael L. Alford, Stone Container Corp., IL [U] (AlL to Y. L. Moore)

Patrick T. Borns, McDaniel Fire Systems Inc., IN [M] (Mt. to B. G. BischofD

Randy P. Edwards, Fire Control Instruments, Inc., MA[M] (Mt. to H. M. Corson)

Rickey L. Johnson, Cigna Special Risk, CT [I] (Voting Ale to AISG Rep.)

John W. Koester, J&H Marsh & McLennan, MD Ill (/kit. to L. 1L Hathaway)

Charles R. Prasso, HSB Industrial Risk Insurers, CT [I] (Mt to E. C. Hume)

Allan P. Rhodes, Duke Engr & Services (DE&S), CA [SE] (Alt. to H. D. Brandes)

Samuel L. Rogers, Kemper Nat'l Insurance Cos., CO [I] (Alt. to P. A. Davis)

Daniel J. Sheridan, Black & Veatch, MO [SE] (Alt. to T. C. Clayton)

Richard Wickman, Baltimore Gas & Electric Co., MD [U] (Alt. to G. W. Powell)

Staff Liaison: Richard P. Bielen

Committee Scope: This Committee shall have primary responsibility for documents on fire protection for electric generating plants and high voltage direct current (HVDC) converter stations, except for electric generating plants using nuclear fuel.

This list represents the membership at the time the Committee was balloted on the text of this edition. Since that time, changes in the membership may have occurred. A key to classifications is found at the front of this book.

The Report of the Technical Committee on Electric Generating Plants is presented for adoption in 2.parts.

Part I of this Report was prepared by the Technical Committee on Electric Generating Plants, and proposes for adoption amendments to NFPA 850-1996, Recommended Practice for Fire Protection for Electric Generating Plants and High Voltage Direct Current Converter Stations. NFPA 850-1996 is published in Volume 11 of the 1998 National Fire Codes and in separate pamphlet form.

Part I of this Report has been submitted to letter ballot of the Technical Committee on Electric Generating Plants, which consists of 26 voting members. The results of the balloting, after circulation of any negative votes, can be found in the report.

Part II of this Report was prepared by the Technical Committee Electric Generating Plants, and proposes for adoption amendments to NFPA 851-1996, Recommended Practice for Fire Protection for Hydroelectric Generating Plants. NFPA 851-1996 is published in Volume 11 of the 1998 National Fire Codes and in separate pamphlet form.

Part II of this Report has been submitted to letter ballot of the Technical Committee on Electric Generating Plants, which consists of 26 voting members. The results of the balloting, after circulation of any negative votes, can be found in the report.

2O

N F P A 8 5 0 ~ F 9 9 R O P

PART I

(Log #CPI 9) 850- 1 - (Entire Document): Accept SUBMrI'I'ER: Technical Committee on Electric Generating Plants RECOMMENDATION: Review SI unit conversions. Also, the staff should review individual conversions within NFPA 850 and NFPA 851 for errors. For exzsnple, NFPA 850 sections 5-4.6.5.1 and 5-6.5.2.2 convert 0.20 gpm/ft2 to different values. SUBSTANTIATION: The SI unit conversions used in NFPA 850 and NFPA 851 do not match NFPA 13. NFPA 13 uses L/min. NFPA 850 and NFPA 851 use L/s. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMIYrEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26 VOTE ON COMMITIEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 25 NOT RETURNED: 1 Clayton

(Log #1) 850- 2- (1-1.1): Reject

Note: This Proposal appeared as Comment 850-2 (Log #26) which was held from the Fall 95 ROC on Proposal 850-1. SUBMITTER: Richard Wickman, Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. RECOMMENDATION: 1. Add new sentence to Scope Section 1-1.1:

"Coal preparation equipment and processes used at the generating station are covered in this document rather than NFPA 120."

2. Add Sections of NFPA 120 to NFPA 850 changing the word "shall" to "should." Acid the following Sections: 4-3, 4-4, 4-5, 4-6, 4-7, 4-8, 4-9, 4-10, 4-11 A4-4, A-4-5, A-4-5.8, A-4-7.1, A-4-11 as follows:

1-1.1" This standard covers minimum requirements for reducing the potential for loss nf life and property from fire and explosion in coal preparation plants. Only plants designed to prepare coal for shipment are included in this standard. Other equipment and processes, such as coal pulverizers, used to condition coal for firing in boilers at power generating plants, gasification plants, or for utilization in certain special processes are not covered in this standard.

4-3 Dedusters. All dedusting equipment shall be connected directly to a suction syr;tem capable of movingenough air to prevent the leakage of dust from the system. The suction system shall discharge the dust-I:den air by the shortest possible route to collectors outside the building.

4-4* Pneumatic Cleaners. Adequate dust-collecting systems with suction hoods at the cleaners, suction ducting that maintains at least a 4000 ft per min,ate fpm (20 m/s) air velocity, and dust collectors having pressure release venting shall be installed. Belt conveyor-type transfers and loading points associated with the cleaners shall be hooded similarly and connected to dust collectors.

4-5* Driers. 4-5.1 Drier heating units that are fired by pulverized coal shall be

installed, operated, and maintained in accordance with NFPA 8503, Standard for Pulverized Fuel Systems.

4-5.1.1 Driers of the direct-fired type shall be designed and operated so that combustion is substantially complete within the furnace/air heater before the gases of combustion come in direct contact with the coal drying in the drying chamber.

4-5.1.2 Driers shall be designed and constructed to be dusttight, with smooth surfaces ta prevent the accumulation of coal.

4-5.1.3 Where coal c~n be exposed to excessive heat on normal or emergency shutdown, a bypass stack with an automatically controlled damper shall be installed to direct the products of combustion away from the coal.

4-5.1.4 Thermal drier systems that have a hot gas inlet or plenum chambers where fly ash or coal siftings might accumulate shall be equipped with drop-out doors or ports to facilitate removal of these solids. Where continuous means of removing drop-out solids are not provided, frequent checking and manual clean-out shall be provided as condition., warrant.

4-5.1.5 All internal areas of thermal coal driers where coal solids possibly could hang up or accumulate under any abnormal operating condition, such as in the drying chamber or dry cyclone collector, shall be equipped with explosion relief vents that open direcdy to the outside atmosphere. These vents shall be of sufficient number, size, and location to operate in excess of the design normal pressure. Explosion vents shall be checked or tested at least once each morth and records kept to verifythese checks.

NOTE: For further information, see NFPA 68, Guide for Venting of Deflagrations.

4-5.1.6 During system operation, frequent visual checks shall be made of all the mechanical components and equipment associated with the drying system.

4-5.2 Instrumentation and control panels on thermal driers shall be located in an area relatively free of moisture, vibration, dust, and noise. The panel shall be located within the range and view of the supervising operator. The operator control room shall be provided with windows or other means, such as video cameras, that give visual contact with the thermal drying system. The panel shall include recording-type control instruments, monitoring indicators, alarms, and temperature limits set to maintain proper operation. Audible and visual alarms shall be interlocked electrically to provide safe shutdown of the drier when unsafe temperatures or other emergency malfunctions occur. Control instruments shall be checked and serviced by a qualified technician at least every 3 months.

4-5.2.1 Where pneumatic controls are used, instrument quality air shall be provided.

4-5.3 DryinKchambers shall be protected by an automatic water spray system. The automatic spray system shall include a manual control. The source for the fire protection water shall be such that the required volume flow rate and pressure of clean (solid-free) water is available at all times and that the exposed piping is protected against freezing.

4-5.4 All main fans shall be inspected on a regular basis and shall have bearing temperature and vibration detectors.

4-5.5 Driers that have been shut down because of a fire or any other emergency condition during regular operation shall be checked to ensure that there is no burning material within the system before being placed back in service. Driers that have remained idle for a long period shall be inspected carefully before being placed back in operation.

4-5.6 Driers shall be designed and installed, if possible, with their explosion vents opening directly to the outside. This usually can be accomplished by installing the drier along an outside wall of the building, directly under the roof, or by having a portion of the drier extend through the roof. If such locations are not practicable, ducts to the outside of the building shall be as short as possible and designed to withstand explosion pressure.

NOTE: Guidance for design of vent ducts is provided in NFPA 68, Guide for Venting of Deflagrations.

4-5.7 Cyclone collectors used with driers shall be equipped with explosion vents equal in size to the cross-sectionai area of the exhaust sleeve to supplement the venting area provided at the exhaust opening.

4-5.8 Thermal Oil Heating Systems. Indirect heat exchange-type driers, such as thermal disk processors, shall be given special consideration when designing fire protection for the dryer and dryer building.

NOTE: Chapter 9 of NFPA 664 is the primary reference in NFPA standards for thermal oil systems used in industrial processes. While this standard addresses loss prevention in a specified occupancy (wood products), other standards might be applicable to any industrial process featuring thermal oil systems. Reference should be made to NFPA 664, Standard for the Prevention of Fires and Explosions in Wood Processing and Woodworking Facilities, Chapter 9.

4-6 Dust Collectors and Dust Removal Equipment. 4-6.1 Those areas in which combustible dust is or might be in

suspension in the air continuously, intermittently, or periodically under normal operating conditions shall be provided with a dust- collecting system or systems to collect such dust and prevent its discharge to the atmosphere.

4-6.1.1 All coal-handling equipment or machinery that produces dust shall be connected to a dust collector with ducts and hoods that have sufficient suction volume and velocity to collect and transport all the dust produced. Hoods, enclosures, and ducts shall be of noncombustible construction, designed and maintained in accordance with the Industrial Ventilation Manual of Recommended Practice by the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists, and NFPA 91, Standard for Exhaust Systems for Air Conveying of Materials.

4-6.1.2 All dust collectors, other than those that are an integral part of dust-producing equipment, shall be located outside the working areas, preferably outside the building or in separate rooms properly vented to the outside.

4-6.2 When a plant or handling facility is planned, special consideration shall be given to the location of the dust-producing equipment with respect to the location of the dust collection devices to ensure that the connecting ducts will be as straight and as short as possible.

21

N F P A 8 5 0 - - F 9 9 R O P

4-6.2.1 All dry dust collectors shall be of noncombustible construction, equipped with adequate explosion doors or vents.

NOTE: For further information, see NFPA 68, Guide for Venting of Deflagrations.

4-6.2.2 The entire dust-collecting system shall conform to NFPA 91, Standard for Exhaust Systems for Air Conveying of Materials.

4-6.3 In no case shall the design of the dust removal system be such that the dust is drawn through the fan before entering the collector. Fans shall be of noncombustible construction.

4-6.4 Ducts shall be designed to maintain a velocity of not less than 4500 fpm (22.9 m/s) to ensure the transport of both coarse and fine particles and to ensure reentrainment if for any reason the particles should fall out before delivery to the dust collector (e.g., in the event of a power failure).

4-6.4.1 Round ducts shall be used wherever possible. Rectangular ducts shall be used only where clearance prevents the use of round ducts. Rectangular ducts shall be made as nearly square as possible to minimize the deposit of combustible materials. All ducts shall have a minimum number of bends and irregularities that could interfere with free airflow.

4-6.4.2 In bag-type dust collectors, the bags shall be constructed of anti static, fire resistant material and shall be provided with a suitable electrical ground.

4-6.4.3 Dust collector hoppers shall be sloped at approximately 60 ° to ensure material flow. Zero speed switches and high level alarms shall be used to idendfy conditions that can lead to spontaneous combustion. Hopper discharge valves or screw conveyors shall be provided to discharge the dust continually. H~P4e~s shall not be used as storage bins.

Hood takeoffs shall have a minimum area of four times the area of the duct. Duct work also shall be supplied with blast gates and dampers for individual pickup volume adjustment.

4-7 Explosion Venting. 4-7.1" Explosion venting shall be provided in areas where coal

dust might be present in explosive or ignitable quantities, such as in coal preparation plant buildings, and sections of buildings housing screens, pneumatic coal-cleaning equipment, dryers, and other dust-producing machinery.

NOTE: Reference should be made to NFPA 68, Guide for Venting of Deflagrations, when sizing explosion vents.

4-7.2 Ventilating hoods and exhaust ducts shall not be acceptable as explosion venting devices unless they are designed properly for a dual purpose and function to provide direct release of excess pressure to the outside.

4-7.$ Equipment vents or ducts used to direct the energy of an explosion in equipment to the outside of the building or a safe location shall be as short as possible and shall be designed to withstand the explosion pressure. Vent closures, which may be necessary to permit proper functioning of equipment and to prevent the escape of dust during normal operation, shall be designed to open at the lowest possible increase in pressure or shall be of flexible or frangible materials that blow out or rupture readily to permit the release of explosion pressure.

4-8 Process Control Rooms. Positive pressure shall be maintained in process control rooms to prevent the entry of fugitive dust.

4-9 Electrical Equipment Rooms. Positive pressure shall be maintained in electrical equipment rooms such as switch gear, motor control centers, and cable spreading rooms to prevent the entry of fugitive dust.

4-10 Miscellaneous Equipment. Powder-actuated tools shall not be used in hazardous atmospheres.

4-11" Coal Storage. Coal storage piles shall meet the requirements of this section.

4-11.1 Spontaneous Ignition. The key concept in coal storage is to prevent spontaneous combustion. Preventing spontaneous combustion requires the following:

(a) Eliminating air entrainment in the coal, (b) Eliminating heat sources near the storage, and (c) Preventing moisture in the coal. 4-11.2 Coal Silos. 4-11.2.1 Avoid storing coal in silos and bunkers for lon~ periods.

If coal must be stored for a long period, prevent air entrmnment using the following methods:

(a) Covering the top of the stored coal with a binder material, and

(b) Inerting the stored coal with recommended inert gas. 4-11.2.2 Remove areas in the storage (hideouts) that can allow

pockets of coal to form, dry, and combust spontaneously. A-4-4 Pneumatic coal-cleaning systems employ low-pressure air,

usually pulsed, to effect a separation between relatively dry coal and the mechanically associated impurities. The coal is usually 3/4 in. (19 mm) and smaller with up to 4 percent surface moisture.

The pickup of fines from the feed coal in the process air stream creates a potentially explosive mixture. However, approximately 400 fpm (2.05 m / s ) air velocity dissipates methane from the coal and, in practice, has caused explosion and fire hazards of very low proportions inside the equipment. Nonetheless, in the area surrounding the equipment a potential fire hazard exists from unintentionally vented fine coal, and the potential for all hazards increases where the cleaners are preceded by thermal driers.

A-4-5 Thermal coal driers may be permitted to be of any type that conforms to the requirements of Section 4-5, including rotary driers, continuous carrier driers, vertical tray and cascade driers, multilouver driers, suspension or flash driers, and fluidized bed driers. These direct-fired convection-type driers constitute the majority of the current operational units. Almost all of these units utilize special direct-fired air heater-type furnaces, usually coal fired by stokers or by pulverized fuel systems.

A-4-5.8 Thermal oil systems are used in coal preparation plants to indirectly dry coal in thermal disk processors. Severe losses have occurred due to lack of inadequate sprinkler protection, poor sitting and confinement of expansion and storage tanks and heaters, improper piping arrangement, and inadequate interlocks and controls. NFPA 664, Standard for the Prevention of Fires and Explosions in Wood Processing and Woodworking Facilities, Appendix A, Section A-9, covers hazards and protection concepts for typical thermal oil systems. Even though the woodworking industry has unique equipment that needs hot oil applications, the hot oil heating and distribution systems are similar, and the concepts provided in this standard can be utilized for the coal preparation industry.

A-4-7.1 Provision of 1 ft 2 (0.1 m s) of building vent for each 80 ft a (2.3 m s ) of volume or space in which an explosion might occur generally is considered adequate for coal preparation plants, although the amount of venting needed to rmnlmize structural damage that might be caused by a dust explosion varies according to the strength of the building, extent of the hazard, location and distribution of vents, properties of the coal dust, and other factors.

A-4-11 Fortunately, evidence of heating is easy to detect. During the early stage of heating, the odor is unmistakable° When heating is more advanced, smoke and steam also might be apparent. If the hot coal is in an exposed storage pile, the hot materml can be dug out and wetted. If the hot material has to be loaded onto a conveyor belt, the loading areas should be hosed down and water should be applied to the hot material before or as it is loaded onto the belt.

Tunnels under silos or storage piles should be ventilated adequately and should be protected with a system of automatic sprinklers. Hoses for wash-down and for fire fighting should be provided. The main tunnel should have exit routes at opposite ends of the tunnel. SUBSTANTIATION: The Scope of NFPA 120, Standard for Coal Preparation Plants, 1994 edition specifically excludes power generating plants. Coal dryers and associated equipment and installations are used at some generating stations. COMMITrEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: NFPA 120 covers many of these concerns, therefore, extracting this data was not necessary. NUMBEROF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 25 NOT RETURNED: 1 Clayton

(Log #CP12) 850- 3 - (1-2): Accept SUBMII~I'ER: Technical Committee on Electric Generating Plants RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read:

1-2 Purpose. This document is prepared for the guidance of those

charged with the design, construction, operation, and protection of fossil fueled (i.e.. coal. ~ or oil) or ~ . alternative fueled (i.e., municipal solid waste, refuse derived fuel, biomass, rubber tires, and other combustibles) ~: c~2 5:c~ steam electric generating plants, combustion turbine and internal combustion engine electric generating plants, and high voltage direct current converter stations.

1-2.2 This document provides fire prevention and fire protection recommendations for the safety of construction and operating personnel, the physical integrity of plant components, and the continuity of plant operations.

1-2.$ Nothing in this document is intended to restrict new technologies or alternative arrangements. SUBSTANTIATION: Editorial.

92

NFPA 8 5 0 - - F 9 9 R O P

COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF CoMMrFFEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26 VOTE ON COMMITrEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 25 NOT RETURNED: 1 Clayton

(Log #CP13) 850. 4 - (1-$): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Electric Generating Plants RECOMMENDATION: Revise 1-3 to read:

1-3 Application. 1-3.1 This document is intended for use by persons

knowledgeable in the application of fire protection for electric generating plants and tagh voltage direct current converter stations.

1-3.2 The recommendations contained in this document are intended for new installations oR4y as the application to existing installations may not be practicable. However. the recommendations contained in this document renresent good industry Dractice and ~:c:'cf~.rc m'ght ~c :.F~!'c:~i.c t.~ should be considered for existing installations. SUBSTANTIATION: -The Committee feels that NFPA 850 is a good industry practice and existing plants may benefit from the recommendations. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMII'TEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26 VOTE ON COMMITIEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 24 NEGATIVE: 1 NOT RETURNED: 1 Clayton

EXPLANATION OF NEGATIVE: POWELL: The original members of the NFPA 850 Committee

went to great lengths in drafting this document to assure that it would apply only to new facilities. This is still an appropriate limitation to the apl~li~ation. The proposed wording "should be considered for exisung installations" utilizes the same %hould" wording as all the other sections of the document; thus, it would appear that if the proposal is accepted, existing facilities would fall within the applicability of the document. As noted in Section 1- 3.3, existing generation facilities are unique. The last sentence of that sections states, "Many of the specific recommendations herein may require modification after due consideration of all local factors". The committee would be providing inconsistent advice if the proposed change which says, in effect, that the document should he utilized for existing facilities is followed by a section that says such use would require modification of the recommendations. If the change is made as proposed, the entire document should be reevaluated and rewritten to make it applicable to existin~ facilities. The proposed change in wording expands the applicauon of the document to existing plants which has never been the intent of t l~ committee or the document; thus, I suggest there be no change to the wording of 1-3.2.

SUBSTANTIATION: Coal handling areas are not defined. Guidance is needed to assist in selection of electrical equipment

t ~ c a t i o n as stated in Section 5-4.5.6. ACTION: Reject.

COMMITIT~ STATEMENT: The proposed definition is too broad. See Committee Proposal 850-7 (Log #CP10). NUMBER OF COMM1TFEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 25 NOT RETURNED: 1 0 a y t o n

(Log #CP10) 850. 7 - (1-4 Coal Handling Area. (New)): Accept SUBMITrER: Technical Committee on Electric Generating Plants

I RECOMMENDATION: Add a new definition to read: Coal Handling Area. Areas in proximity to coal handling

equipment in which coal dust can accumulate due to normal operating conditions, or as a result of infrequent malfunctioning of handl ingorprocessing equipment. SUBSTANTIATION: The term is used in the document. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26 VOTE ON COMMIIq'EE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 25 NEGATIVE: 2 NOT RETURNED: 1 0 a y t o n

EXPLANATION OF NEGATIVE: CHINGO: The definition is indeterminate with respect to the

boundary of a coal handling area. This vagueness will not provide the user with a clearer understanding because of terms such as "proximity ~ and "infrequent". In addition fire protection requirements are not defined for "new areas" misconstrued by this definition. For example, if a conveyor passes over employee autos and the belt breaks dumping coal onto the cars, does the parking lot constitute a coal handling area by this definition? What are the protection requirements for the parking lot? Coal handling areas are already well understood and applied within the scope of the recommended practice. A new definition is not warranted.

POWELL: The Committee Rejected Proposal 850-6 because it was too broad, and then wrote their own definition of "Coal Handling Area" which is even broader. The implications of accepting this definition, potentially, roll over to determine which areas of the plant might need classified electrical equipment. Also, there is currently litigation regarding the jurisdiction of the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) in coal processing areas of power generation facilities. Depending on the outcome of that litigation, this definition could impact the areas judged to be under MSHAjurisdiction rather than that of other authorities having jurisdiction who might utilize NFPA 850. If a definition is needed, it should be developed with more thought than this one.

(Log #CP14) 850. 5 - (1-4 Alternatiw. ~ Fuels): Accept SUBMITrER: Technical Committee on Electric Generating Plants RECOMMENDATION: Revise the definition to read:

Alternative Fuels. Solid fuels such as municipal solid waste (MSW), refuse derived[ filel (RDF), biomass, rubber tires, and other combustibles th~x are used instead of fossil fuels ( gas, oil, or coal), in a boiler to produce steam for the generation of electrical energy. SUBSTANTIATION: Editorial. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITrEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 25 NOT RETURNED: ] Clayton

(Log #7) 850- 6- (1-4 Coal HandlingArea (New)): Reject SUBMITTER: Harold D. Brandes Jr., Duke Power Company RECOMMENDATION: Add the following definition:

Coal Handling Area. Areas in proximity to coal handling equipment in which coal dust may accumulate.

(Log #CP15) 850- 8 - (1-4 Fossil Fueled (New)): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Electric Generating Plants RECOMMENDATION: Add a new definition m read:

Fossil Fueled. Fuel containing chemical energy, which has been formed from animal and plan(matter over manv years (i.e.. oil. coal. and natural t, as) that are used in a boiler reproduce steam for the generation of electrical enert, v. SUBST~kNTIATION: The Committee defined the term as it is used in the document. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITrEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 24 NEGATIVE: 1 NOT RETURNED: 1 Clayton

EXPLANATION OF NEGATIVE: MALANGA: The definition would be better read as follows

(taken from Hawley's Condensed Chemical Dictionary). Fossil Fuel. Any material used as a source of chemical energy in

a combustion reaction, that results from an animal or vegetable source in past geologic ages and has been buried (compressed) in the earth, such as petroleum, natural gas, coal and lignite.

23

N F P A 8 5 0 - - F 9 9 R O P

(Log #CP20) 850- 9 - (Oaapter 2): Accept ;UBMITTER: Technical Committee on Electric Generating Plants

RECOMMENDATION: Revise Chapter 2 as follows: Chapter 2 Ad.~ . . . . . . . . : . . . . . . . . . . Fire Risk Control Protrram

2-1 General. 2-1.1 This chapter provides recommended criteria for the development of a Fire Risk control orogram which contains administrative procedures and controls necessary for the execution of the fire prevention and fire protection activities and practices for electric generating plants and high voltage direct current converter stations. 2-1.2 The Fire Risk control program -.~:-,,d~.~wa+d-:c cc..~'~-cl: recommended in this chapter should be reviewed and updated

eriodically. 1.3 The intent of this chapter can be met by incorporating the

features of this chapter in the plant's operating procedures or otherwise as determined by plant management. 2-2 Management Policy and Direction. 2-2.1 Corporate management should establish a policy and institute a comnrehensive Fire Risk control program to promote: the conservation of property; and- continuity of operations; and as

protection o f safety to life by adequate fire prevention and fire protection measures at each facility. 2-2.2 Proper preventative maintenance of operating equipment as well as adequate operator training are important aspects of a viable fire prevention program.

Delete 2-3 from Chapter 2 and move to the beginning of Chapter 3 and renumber accordingly.

~ . . , ~ + : . ' . - - ^ + . + . I . . . . + : . . . . . . . : . . . . . + . T k . . . . I . . ^ + : ~ . I . ~ ^ . . I ~ I . . . . . I +

. . . . I +. . . . . . I ' + " + ~ + ' ~ , " + " ' I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ ' +

. . . . . . . . 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2-3 Fire Risk Control Progra__m. 23 .1 -g4- Fire Prevention Program. A written plant fire prevention program should be established and as a minimum should include the following:

(a) Fire safety information for all employees and contractors. This information should include, as a minimum, familiarization with fire prevention procedures, plant emergency alarms and procedures, and how to report a fire.

(b) Documented regularly scheduled plant inspections including provisions for handling of remedial actions to correct conditions that increase fire hazards.

(c) A description of the general housekeeping practices and the control of transient combustibles. Fire experience has shown that transient combustibles can be a significant factor during a fire situation, especially during outages.

(d) Control of flammable and combustible liquids and gases in accordance with appropriate NFPA standards.

(e) Control of ignition sources to. ~::.c!u~c iIl_¢.l!ldi~smoking, grinding, welding, and cutting. (See NFPA 51B, Standard for Fire Prevention in Use of Cutting and Welding Processes.)

(f) Fire prevention surveillance. (See NFPA 601, Standard for Security Services in Fire Loss Prevention. )

(g) Fire report, including an investigation and a statement on the corrective action to be taken. (See Appendix B.)

Lh__)_ Fire Hazards of Materials located in the plant or storage areas identified in accordance with NFPA 704. Standard S~stera for the ldentifwation of the Fire Hazards of Materiale. 2-4 Fire-Protection Prom'am. 2-4.1 ~ Testing, Inspection, and Maintenance. 2-4.1.1 g t d - Upon installation, all fire protection systems should be preoperationally inspected and tested in accordance with applicable NFPA standards. Where appropriate standards do not exist, inspection and test procedures outlined in the purchase and design specifications should be followed.

~ All fire protection systems and equipment should be periodically inspected, tested, and maintained in accordance with applicable National Fire Codes®. (See Table 2-4.1.2 ~--5~ for

uidance. ) OTE: Inspection intervals for unat tended plants may be

~ermitted to be extended to normal plant inspections.

Table g462- Reference Guide" for F'Lre Equipment Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance

Item NFPA No. Supervisory and Fire Alarm 72

Circuits Fire Detectors 72 Manual Fire Alarms 72 Sprinkler Water Flow Alarms 25/72 Sprinkler and Water Spray Systems 15/25/13 Foam Systems 11A/11C/16/25 Haiogenated Agent, Chemical & 1~'12A/17/2001

Co. Systems Fire Pumps & Booster Pumps 20/72 Water Tanks & Alarms 25/22/72 P.I.V.s and O.S. & Y. Valves 25/72 Fire Hydrants and Associated 25/24

Valves Fire Hose and Standpipes & H o s e 14/1962/25

Nozzles Portable Fire Extinguishers g, 10/-to¢6g

Fire Brigade Equipment 1971/1972/1973/1974 Fire Doors g l ~ 80/90A Smoke Vents 204M Emergency Lighting 70 Radio Communication Equipment 1221 Audible and Visual Signals 72

2-4.1.3 ~ Testing, inspection, and maintenance should be documented with written procedures, results, and follow-up

actions recorded and tracked for closure. ~-g Impairments.

~ A written procedure should be established to address impairments to fire protection systems and other plant systems that impact the level of fire hazard (e.g., dust collection systems, HVAC systems, etc.). As a minimum this procedure should:

identify equipment not available for service; identify personnel to be notified (e.g., plant fire brigade

c-tfi~ieader, public fire department, plant fire protection coordinator, control room operator etc.); and-

increase fire surveillance as needed. [See 2-409.] and provide i~dditional protected measures as necessary (e.g..

tempgrarv water supplies, additional hose. etcA 24.2.2 ~ Impairment to fire protection systems should be as short in duration as practical. If the impairment is planned, all necessary parts and manpower should be assembled prior to removing the protection system(s) from service. When an impairment is not planned, or when a system has discharged, the repair work or system restoration should be expedited. 2-4.2.$ ~ Proper reinstallation after maintenance or repair should be performed to ensure proper systems operation. Once repairs are complete, tests that will ensure proper operation and restoration of full fire protection equipment capabilities should be made. Following restoration to service, the parties previously notified of the impairment should he advised. The latest revision of the design documents reflecti.'ng.as-built conditions should be available to ensure that the system ts properly reinstalled (e.g., drawings showing angles of nozzles). 24.3 Dc~'g'a Rc'Acw~ Mana tmment of Change. 2-4.$.1 A system should be imnlemented tffat would ensure that the appropriate individual(s1 with fire protection resnonsibilitv. ~ made aware of new constructions, modifications to existing structurs, changes to oDerating conditions, or other action that could impact tile fire prot4ction of the _ nlant. The Fire Risk Evaluation and the appropriate nrocedurs and rot, rams discussed in this canter might need to be revised to reflect tlae impact ofhtis action. 24.4 2-~ Fire Emergency Plan. 2-4.4.1 g-7-,4- A written fire emergency plan should be developed, and, as a minimum, this plan should include the following:

(a) response to fire alarms and fire systems supervisory alarms, (b) notification of personnel identified in the plan; (c) evacuation of employees not directly involved in fire-fighting

activities from the fire area; (d) coordination with security forces or other designated

personnel to admit public fire department and control traffic and personnel;

(e) fire nrenlanning which defines fire extinguishment activines;

24

N F P A 8 5 0 - - F 9 9 R O P

(f) periodic drills to verify viability of the plan; and (g) control room operator(s) and auxiliarv operat0r(s)

activities during fire emergencies. NOTE: Emergency c anditions may warrant that breathing apparatus be readily available in the control room. Self-contained breathing apparatus should be considered for activities outside the control room. 2-4.5 ~-8 Fire Brigade. 2-4.5.1 ggA- The size of the plant and its staff, the complexity of fire fighting problems, arid the availability of a public fire depar tment should de termine the requirements for a fire brigade.

: NFPA 600. Industrial ]~lre Brigade and OSHA Standal'~! ~t (~FP~ 1910.156 Fire Brigade.'; should-be consulted for determinin~

o n e r a t i o n limitations. 2~.5.2" ~ If a :?ire brigade is provided, its organization and training should be identified in written procedures. 2-4.6 Operator(s) Actions. 2-4.6.1 g-g.g Turbine Lubricating Oil Fires. A critical aspect of responding to turbine lubricating oil fires is minimizing the size and durat ion of the oil spill. The need for lubrication to protect the turbine-generator bearings and shaft should be balanced against the fire damage from allowing the oil leak to continue. Tire following steps may be useful in minimizing fire damage and should be considered during preplanning and training for emergency conditions:

(a) t r ipping the turbine; (b) breaking condenser vacuum; (c) emergency pur:ging of the generator; and (d) shut down oil pumps. Shutting down oil pumps ca4a .'!~..eze : c~ - "~ me)" cause

~.~-:~:~ . . . . . . . . . . . mechanical &unage to the turbine deoendin~ on rotafin~ soeed. However. it can be effective in mitigatin~r the overall damage due to .fi~. Thc m".-~'af=crarcr ;hc'a!~ ~c zc.nz'altc~

2-4.7 ~ Special Fire Fightm'-g Conditions. This section discusses special fire f ighting conditions unique to fossil fueled steam electric generat ing plants. This information might be useful in ffrc ~ - g ~ c "-^:~: . . . . . . . . . . . . . :~ ~ . ~ fire preplanning. It could also be utilized in the education and training of both on-site and off-site fire fi~htin~ oersonnel who would resnond in the event of a fire e m e r l ~ e n cv.

2-4.7.1 gt.g,g~ Regenerative Air Heaters. Since laboratory tests and repor ted incidents indicated a rapid increase in tempera ture to the 2800°F-3000°F (1537°C-1648°C) range in an air preheater fire, great care should be given to manual fire fighting. Large amounts of water will be needed to cool and extinguish a preheater fire. Fire prep lanning should be accomplished to ensure use of an adequate number of access doors and safe access to the doors. 2-4.7.2 g 4 h g ~ Electrostatic Precipitators. Once a fire is detected, the uni t should go into emergency shutdown immediately. It should be recognized that during operat ion the a tmosphere in the precipitator is ox~en-def ic ien t and opening doors or running system fans fo l lomng a fuel trip could cause conditions to worsen (increased potential for backdraft explosion). Once the flow of air and fuel to the fire has been s topped and the electrostatic precipitator has been shut down and deenergized, the precipitator doors may be permit ted to be opened and water hoses employed if necessary. 24.7.8 g-8,g,g Cable Trays. Cable tray fires should be handled like any fire involving energized electrical equipment. It may not be practical or desirable to deenergize the cables involved in the fire. Water is the most effective extinguishing agent for cable insulation fires but should be applied with an electrically safe nozzle. Some cables [polyvinyl chloride (PVC), Neoprene , or Hypalon] can produce dense smoke in a very short time. In addition, PVC liberates hydrogen chloride (HCI) gas. Self-coatained breathing apparatus should be used by personnel a t tempting to extinguish cable tray fires. 24.7.4 g & g , 4 Hydrogen System. Due to the wide explosive

i limits of hydrogen (4 percent to 75 percent volume of gas in air), under most conditions it is safer to allow a hydrogen fire to burn in a controlled manner until the gas can be shut off ra ther than to risk an explosion. It nray be necessary to extinguish the fire in order to gain access to the shutoff valves. 2-4.7.5 ~ Coal Storage and Handling. 24.7.5.1 ~ Once the location and extent of a fire in a coal storage pile has been de termined, the coal should be dug out and the heated coal removed. Since moisture accelerates

oxidation, water used for fire fighting can aggravate the situation if the seat of the fire is not reached. 24.7.5.2 g g g d i ~ Clearly marked access panels in equ ipment should be provided for manual fire fighting. Coal dust presents both a fire and explosion hazard. Combustible, finely divided material is easily ignited. However, there is a possibility that a deep seated hard-to-extinguish fire can occur. CAUTION: Application of an extinguishing agent that disturbs coal dust deposits could result in a dust explosion. 24.7.6 ~ Coal Pulverizers. (See NFPA 8502, Standard for the Prevention of Furnace Explosions~Implosions in Multiple Burner Boilers, and NFPA 8503, Standard for Pulverized Fuel Systems. )

Moved 2-9 to new 2-5.1. 2 9 !dee t ' .qc : t ' e= e f F:.re H==a.~-~ e f ~ .= ' .e -~: . .M.zte.~.~: !coated

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ' . . . . . . . . . . d . . . . . d . . . . . . . . . . . . y . . . . . . . . ~ d . . . . . . .

SUBSTANTIATION: The Chapter was reorganized and re t ided to be more specific. Fire Risk Evaluation was moved to Chapter 3 as it fits better there. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATWE: 25 NOT RETURNED: 1 Clayton

(Log #CP21 ) 850- 10- (4-2.2): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Commit tee on Electric Generat ing Plants RECOMMENDATION: Add a second sentence as follows:

"A single tank is no t considered a reliable water supply." SUBSTANTIATION: A water supply from a single tank can be impaired due to p u m p suction line failures, tank coating failures, tank sett lement, a n d p e r i o d i c tank maintenance and inspections. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMI'Iq'EE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 23 NEGATIVE: 2 NOT RETURNED: 1 Clayton

EXPLANATION OF NEGATIVE: MALANGA: There is no substantiation to establish that a single

water tank is not a reliable source of water supply. No data has been provided to substantiate this s ta tement nor compare the reliability of water tanks with o ther sources, which are also susceptible to main tenance downtown or unreliability. Examples of other sources include fire pumps (which require controllers and power sources), public or private water mains (which may be out of the control of the building owner), and rivers, lakes, ponds or reservoirs which can be subject to changing elevations, intake screen fouling, draining and evaporation. As written, this provision is contrary to o ther NFPA documents which establish water tanks as an acceptable source of supply, and if anywhere, this type of requi rement or s ta tement would be long in a building code or loss control r e c o m m e n d e d practice.

POWELL: The added wording regarding a "single tank..°" leaves no room for a Fire Risk Evaluation and good emergency preplanning. The multiple tank recommenda t ion may be appropriate for a large generat ing facility, but smaller facilities often have a single tank. Proper planning for tank cleaning and

.repair assures that rout ine work is normally done dur ing plant outages. Plant procedures for other routine and emergency impairments of the primary water storage tank are written to include utilizing portable pumps or normally closed connect ion to provide water to the fire systems f rom alternate sources (i.e., demineral ized water tanks or cooling tower basins). COMMENT ON AFFIRMATIVE:

GOSLA: I have voted in favor however we should say "A single tank may no t be (instead of "is not") considered a reliable water supply".

Substantiation: Tank can be des igned to provide reliable source of firewater by adding additional requirement . Most of the power plant has one dedicated tank for firewater service. Sometimes they also combine firewater with o ther services such as service water or potable water systems. In all cases most o f the new power plants have one tank.

25

N F P A 8 5 0 - - F 9 9 R O P

(Log #CP22) 850- 11 - (4-2.4): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Electric Generating Plants RECOMMENDATION: Add a new sentence to 4-2.4 as follows:

"Demineralized water and ash water should not be considered for use as a fire protection water source due to excessive corrosion and erosion characteristics." SUBSTANTIATION: Consideration of water quality will prevent long-term problems relating to fire protection water supply. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 24 NEGATIVE: 1 NOT RETURNED: 1 Clayton

EXPLANATION OF NEGATIVE: POWELL: I suggest adding a sentence: "When cross connections

to these supplies are provided for an emergency or back up water supply, these connections should be normally closed. If the emergency supply is used, the piping should be flushed following that usage." As stated in my comment to Proposal 850-10, nonconventional water supplies are often used to supplement normal systems during impairments. This is also possible in emergencies when the normal supply may have been depleted.

(Log #CP23) 850- 12- (4-3(c)): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Electric Generating Plants RECOMMENDATION: Insert the following at the end of the first sentence:

(c) Sealing valves open. This option should be followed only where valves are within fenced enclosures under the control of the property owners. SUBSTANTIATION: This clarifies the valves should be sealed in the "open" position. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26 VOTE ON COMMrI'rEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 24 NEGATIVE: 1 NOT RETURNED: 1 Clayton

EXPLANATION OF NEGATIVE: MALANGA: For completeness, the words "or other appropriate

means of security" should be appended to the proposedwording.

(Log #CP16) 850- 13 - (4-4.1.1): Accept SUBMITrER: Technical Committee on. Electric Generating Plants RECOMMENDATION: Add new text to 4-4.1.1 as follows:

"Hydrant spacing in main plant areas should be a maximum of 300 ft. Hydrant spacing in remote areas such as long-term coal storage should be a maximum of 500 ft. SUBSTANTIATION: NFPA 24 defers to the authority having jursdicdon for spacing. NFPA 850 should provide guidance. COMMITI'EE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 25 NOT RETURNED: 1 Clayton

(Log #CP17) 850- 14- (4-6.3.3): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Electric Generating Plants RECOMMENDATION: Revise text as follows:

4-6.3.5 When working in areas (e.g., combustion turbine compartments) where actuation of the fire protection system could effect personnel safety, the fire extinguishing system should be locked out to prevent discharge of the system. A trouble indication should be provided when the system is locked out. SUBSTANTIATION: The revised wording clarifies the use of "inhibit" mode. Lockout is a term used in the industry. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 25 NOT RETURNED: 1 Clayton

(Log #14) 850- 15 - (5-3.8): Accept SUBMITTER: Harold D. Brandes Jr., Duke Power Company RECOMMENDATION: Add the following text:

'`ventilation should be accomplished by mechanical or natural exhaust ventilation arranged in such a manner to include all floor areas or pits where flammable vapors may collect. Exhaust ventilation discharge should be to a safe location outside the building." SUBSTANTIATION: Clarification of current intent. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

Editorially change "may" to "can". Text will read: "Ventilation should be accomplished by mechanical or natural

exhaust ventilation arranged in such a manner to include all floor areas or pits where flammable vapors can collect. Exhaust ventilation discharge should be to a safe location outside the building." NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 25 NOT RETURNED: 1 Clayton

(Log #CP4) 850- 16- (5-3.8): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Electric Generating Plants RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read:

"To prevent hazardous accumulations of flammable vapors, ventilation for indoor pumping facilities for flammable hquids or combustible liouids at or above their flash point should provide at least I ft 3 of exhaust air per ft2 of floor area (0.30 m 3/m2), but not less than 150 f t3/min (0.071 m3/sec) . SUBSTANTIATION: Clarification. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMrrI'EE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26 VOTE ON COMMITI'EE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 25 NOT RETURNED: 1 Clayton

(Log #15) 850- 17 - (5-3.9.2): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Harold D. Brandes Jr., Duke Power Company RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows:

"The provisions of foam systems for tank protection should be considered in the Fire Risk Evaluation. The Fire Risk Evaluation should regard exposure to other storage tanks and important structures, product value, and resupply capability, as well as the anticipated response and capabilities of the local fire brigade." SUBSTANTIATION: Clarification of current intent. COMMITrF_,E ACTION: Accept in Principle.

I Revise text to read: "The provisions of foam systems for tank protection should be

considered in the Fire Risk Evaluation. The Fire Risk Evaluation should consider exposure to other storage tanks and important structures, product value, and resupply capability, as well as the anticipated response and capabilities of manual fire fighting." COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Editorial and the Committee wanted to include all fire fighting capabilities, including the local fire department. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 25 NOT RETURNED: 1 Clayton

(Log #8) 850- 18 - (5-4.4.5 (New)): Accept SUBMITrER: Harold D. Brandes Jr., Duke Power Company

I RECOMMENDATION: Add the following text: "Prior to extended idle periods, the conveyor system should be

cleared of coal." SUBSTANTIATION: Coal left on a belt for an extended period of time may be subject to spontaneous heating which may result in fire damage to a section of the belt. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 25 NOT RETURNED: 1 Clayton

26

N F P A 8 5 0 - F99 R O P

(Log #CP11) 850- 19 - (5-4.6.2.4): Accept SUBMYrTER: Technical Committee on Electric Generating Plants

I RECOMMENDATION: Add new 5-4.6.2.4 as follows and renumber existing 5-4.6.2.4 to read:

~l'he sprinkler or water spray system control valve should be located m an area or enclosure separate from the hazard." SUBSTANTIATION: The Committee feels the control valve should be located away from the hazard for safety reasons. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept." NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26 VOTE ON COMMITrEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 25 NOT RETURNED: 1 Clayton

(Log #6) 850- 20- (5-7.1.4): Accept SUBMITI'ER: Harold D. Brandes Jr., Duke Power Company RECOMMENDATION: Add the following text:

"Hydrogen cylinders and generator hydrogen fill and purge manifold shall be located remote from the turbine generator." SUBSTANTIATION: This will reduce the hazard associated with hydrogen cylinders around the turbine generators. Also, in case of fire, an operator should be able to safely access the purge manifold to purge hydrogen from the generator. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

Make this new 5-7.1.1.4, not 5-7.1.4. Change "shall" to "should". Text will read:

"Hydrogen cylinders and generator hydrogen fill and purge manifold should be located remote from the turbine generator." NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26 VOTE ON COMMITIT~ ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 25 NOT RETURNED: 1 Clayton

COMMENT ON AFFIRMATIVE: CHINGO The term "remote" is ambiguous and provides no

clearer understanding of where this would be or what would constitute as adequate separation.

(Log #CPS) 850- 21 - (5-7.$.1): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Electric Generating Plants

I RECOMMENDATION: Add a new 5-7.$.1 and renumber existing paragraphs:

5-7.$.1 Use of a listed fire resistant (i.e., less hazardous or less flammable) lubricating oil should be considered. SUBSTANTIATION: There is presently a product that is listed for this use and should be considered by this recommended practice. COMMITrEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 25 NOT RETURNED: 1 Clayton

(Log #12) 850- 22 - (5-7.3.5(e)): Accept in Principle SUBMITrER: Harold D. Brandes Jr., Duke Power Company RECOMMENDATION: Add the following text:

"All flanged connections should be provided with coverings (flange guards) around the flange to reduce the possibility of oil spraying onto a hot surface. The flange covering may be of metal or other noncombustible material." SUBSTANTIATION: This will reduce the possibility of oil leakage. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle.

Revise the submitted, text to read: "Non-combustible coverings (flange guards) around the flange to

reduce the possibility of oil spraying onto a hot surface." COMMITrEE STAT~hMENT: Editorial rewrite. NUMBER OF COMMITrEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 25 NOT RETURNED: 1 Clayton

(Log #11) 850- 23 - (5-7.3.8 (New)): Accept in Principle SUBM1TTER: Harold D. Brandes Jr., Duke Power Company RECOMMENDATION: Add the following text:

"An emergency "oil cutoff switch" should be provided in the control room. The switch should deenergize old AC and DC lube oil pumps when activated." SUBSTANTIATION: The proposed switch would permit

erators to stop iube oil pumps in an emergency. MMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle.

Modify 5-7.3.6 as follows: 5-7.$.6 It is desirable to provide for remote operation, preferably

from the control room, of the condenser vacuum break valve and lock out of the lubricating oil pumps. Breaking the condenser vacuum markedly reduces the rundown time for the machine and thus limits oil discharge in the event of a leak. See the discussion in 2-7.2 on fire emergency planning involving turbine lubricating oil fires. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The revised wording better fits in 5- 7.$.6. NUMBER OF COMMITIT_,E MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 25 NOT RETURNED: 1 Clayton

(Log #2) 850- 24- (5-7.4): Reject SUBMITTER: William J. Satterfield, Capital Asset Mgmt, LLC RECOMMENDATION: Add text to read as follows:

"Hydrogen use areas to include storage should have early alarm detection devices." SUBSTANTIATION: Hydrogen leakage at either the turbine- generator bearings or at the hydrogen seal oil unit or at piping connections is highly flammable and explosive (4 percent to 75 percent) in air. Early warning of leakage will reduce this hazard with personnel response. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITrEE STATEMENT: Experience has shown a hydrogen leak dispenses quickly or ignites, therefore, a detection system adds minimal benefit. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 25 NOT RETURNED: 1 Clayton

(Log #10) 850- 25 - (5-7.4.2.$): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER= Harold D. Brandes Jr., Duke Power Company RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows:

"If turbine~enerator bearings are protected with a manually operated sprinkler system, the following should be provided:

(a) Manual activation should be from the control room or a readily accessible location not exposing the operator to the fire condition. Staffing of plant should be sufficient to promptly handle this function as well as other responsibilities during an emergency of this nature.

(b) Documented procedures should be in place with authorized approval given to operators to activate the system if necessary in a fire condition.

(c) Periodic training should be given to operators regarding the operation of the system." SUBSTANTIATION: There have been several reported incidents where operators were reluctant to operate manual water spray systems. Instructions for operator training are needed to resolve this problem. With a properly designed and operated water suppression system, a supplemental gaseous system is not necessary. COMMITrEE ACTION: Accept in Principle.

I ake this proposal new 5-7A.~.4. Revise (c) to read: . (c) Periodic training should be given to operators regarding the

need for prompt operation of the system. COMMITrEE STATEMENT: The Committee wishes to maintain the requirement of supplemental automatic gaseous systems, therefore they made the proposal a new paragraph. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26

27

N F P A 8 5 0 - - F 9 9 R O P

VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 24 NEGATIVE: 1 NOT RETURNED: 1 Clayton

EXPLANATION OF NEGATIVE: MALANGA: Although carbon dioxide has been demonstrated as

acceptable for surface fires, there has been no test data provided nor field experience shown to substantiate the use of any gaseous system for a pressurized spray fire. The videotape shown at the last committee meeting showed the effectiveness of carbon dioxide on surface fires only. As such the recommendation to use a gaseous system where manual water spray systems are used should be either removed or replaced with the recommendation for a dry chemical

F e system (which has been proven to be effective in extinguishing res of the type expected on a pressure-lubricated turbine

bearing).

(Log #5) 850- 26 - (5-7.4.4.1 (New)): Reject SUBMITTER: WilliamJ. Satterfleld, Rode & Assoc. RECOMMENDATION: Add text to read as follows:

"Where there is a possibility for gaseous hydrogen to leak from the hydrogen-cooled generator system and accumulate in pockets or otherwise escape from safe containment, some means of detection using catalytic technology should be provided." SUBSTANTIATION: Hydrogen gas is odorless and has no color for visibility. Early detection of leakage below its LEL will permit implementation of action ]plan(s) to reduce the possibility of a serious fire and /or explosmn. State-of-the-Art detection equipment is available from many vendors. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The proposer is recommending a specific technology as other technologies are capable of detecting hydrogen. Also see Committee Statement on Proposal 850-24 (Log #2). NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 25 NOT RETURNED: 1 Clayton

(Log #CP6) 850- 29- (6-4.3): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Electric Generating Plants RECOMMENDATION: Revise 6-4.3 to read:

6-4.3 Automatic water mist suppression systems should be installed in accordance with their listing with respect to volume limitations, nozzle placement and discharge durations. The arrangement will depend on the type of systems and the hazard protected. Thermal detection is recommended. SUBSTANTIATION: Clarification and incorporates the reference to thermal detection to actuate the system. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 24 NEGATIVE: 1 NOT RETURNED: 1 Clayton

EXPLANATION OF NEGATIVE: MALANGA: Thermal sensors are only one means of reliable fire

detection; unfortunately, due to high airflows in certain turbine enclosures, fire detection by thermal means can be seriously delayed. Because the cleanup considerations for a false discharge of a water mist system are indeed minimal, more appropriate detection, such as flame sensing, should be permitted.

(Log #CP9) 850- 30 - (6-5.3.4): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Electric Generating Plants RECOMMENDATION: Modify 6-5.$.4 to read:

"Combustible gas detector(s) should be considered for the enclosure or gas turbines." SUBSTANTIATION: The paragraph was modified because diesel engines do not run on natural gas or other gaseous-type fuels. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 25 NOT RETURNED: 1 Clayton

850- 27 - (5-8.5): Reject (Log #9) SUBMITTER: Harold D. Brandes Jr., Duke Power Company RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows:

"Battery rooms should be provided with ventilation to limit the concentration of hydrogen to 2 percent by volume. Natural or mechanical ventilation can be used." SUBSTANTIATION: Revise this requirement to be consistent with IEEE 484. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reiect- COMMITTEE STATEMENT-: The Committee wishes to keep the requirement consistent with NFPA 69 and 25 percent of the LEL. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 25 NOT RETURNED: 1 Clayton

COMMENT ON AFFIRMATIVE: GOSLA: Committee Statement - consistent with NFPA 69 - does

not match with the proposal.

(Log #CP2) 850- 28- (6-3.~,): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Electric Generating Plants RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read:

6-3.3 Compressors and regulating stations installed on-site should be protected in accordance with the recommendations of Chapter 6. SUBSTANTIATION: The Committee feels gas compressors may be installed on-site with no detection, protection or explosion hazard consideration. This condition represents an exposure to the plant and associated equipment. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 25 NOT RETURNED: 1 Clayton

(Log #CP18) 850- 31 - (6-5.4.1.3): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Elecuic Generating Plants RECOMMENDATION: Add a second and third sentence as follows:

"Where this equipment is located in open areas within a building, the buildin~ should be sprinklered in accordance with 5-7.4.1.1. Where lubricating oil reservoirs and handling equipment are installed outside, individual coverage is appropriate." SUBSTANTIATION: For indoor installations, individual spot protection is inadequate protection for the building and surrounding equipment- The revised text clarifies the reference to 5-7.4.1.1 which was embedded in the reference to 5-7.4.1.3. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 24 NEGATIVE: 1 NOT RETURNED: 1 Clayton

EXPLANATION OF NEGATIVE: POWELL: I suggest rewording the proposed sentence to direct

the user of this document to the appropriate sections of 5-7.4.1 with the foilowin~ wording to replace the proposed wording:

"Where the eqmpment is located in open areas within a building, either the building should be sprinldered in accordance ~ith 5- 7.4.1.1 or a protected enclosure should be provided around the equipment. Water based or gaseous fire protection is appropriate for the enclosure. Concentric piping or piping enclosed to channel any leaks to a safe location should be provided for oil piping outside the enclosure."

I suggest that the Committee change the wording of this sentence so as to allow the use of a protected endosure rather than arbitrarily recommending the addition of sprinkler protection to what could be a very large building that otherwise would not need it~

28

N F P A 8 5 0 - - F 9 9 R O P

(Log #3) 850- 32 - (6-5.4.3): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Paul 14. Dobson, Factory Mutual Research Corp. RECOMMENDATION: Add text to read as follows:

6-5.4.3 Water Mist systems 6-5.4.3.1 Where water mist systems are used the system should be

listed for the application. The system should be installed in accordance with the manufacturer's installation procedures.

6-5.4.3.2 The turbirke ,enclosure should be arranged for reduced leakage by automatic closing of the doors, ventilation dampers, and automatic shutdown of fans and other openings. Fuel valves should be arranged to close automatically on system actuation.

6-5.4.3.3 The water (and air) supply should be sized to be capable of providing protection for as long as the hazards of hot metal surfaces above ,:he autoignition temperature and uncontrolled combustible liquid flow exist (consult manufacturer for cool down times) This has been shown to be 20 minutes for many areas, but can be .substantially longer. This requirement may be met by cycling the mist discharge provided this is included in the listing and has shown to be effective in fire tests.

Renumber existing ,5-5.4.3 - 6-5.4.4 to 6-5.4.4 - 6.5.4.5. SUBSTANTIATION: Water mist systems have been developed by several manufacturers specifically for protection of combustion turbines within enclosures. A test procedure has been developed by Factory Mutual Research Corporation specifically for combustion turbines. The test procedure involves oil spray and pool fires. These fires axe both shielded and in the open. In addition testing is conducted to verify that nozzle placement, if done in accordance with installer specifications, will not result in blade rubbing.

The test reports are available from the manufacturer (Securiplex. Marioff, and Fike). 5The test procedure used is rifled "Fine Water Spray Systems for the Protecuon of Combustion Turbines and Machinery Spaces and is available from FMRC. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle.

Add text to read as follows: 6-5.4.3 Total flooding water mist systems. 6-5.4.3.1 Where total flooding water mist systems are used the

system should be installed in accordance with NFPA 750 and should be listed for the application. The system should be installed in accordance with the manufacturer's installation procedures.

6-5.4.3.2 The turbine enclosure should be arranged for reduced leakage by automatic closing of the doors, ventilation dampers, and automatic shutdown of fans and other openings. Fuel valves should be arranged to close automatically on system actuation.

6-5.4.3.3 The water (and air) supply should be sized to be capable of providing protection for as long as the hazards of hot metal surfaces above the autoignition temperature and uncontrolled combustible liquid flow exist (consult manufacturer for cool down times). This has been shown to be 20 minutes for many areas, but can be substantially longer. This requirement can be met by cycling the mist discharge provided this is included in the listing and has shown to be effecuve in fire tests. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The Committee wanted to clarify that the water mist s)stem is a total flooding system. The reference to NFPA 750 was added for guidance. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 25 NOT RETURNED: 1 Clayton

(Log #CP3) 850- 33 - (6-5.5, 6-5.5.1 ): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Electric Generating Plants RECOMMENDATION: Revise 6-5.5 and 6-5.5.1 to read:

6-5.5 Inlet Air System. 6-5.5.1 Air filters and evaporative cooling media should be of a

F e that will- not bum freely when exposed to fire. UL900, tandard for Safety Test Performance of Air Filters can be used as

guidance. SUBSTANTIATION: Air filters are not presently being manufactured that meet the criteri~ COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 23 NEGATIVE: 2 NOT RETURNED: 1 Clayton

EXPLANATION OF NEGATIVE: BRANDES: This may be an acceptable change. However, the

Committee's substantiation is that there are no UL Listed air filters. Subsequently, I learned that there is at least one UL Class 1 filter available, so this issue merits fm-ther discussion.

POWELL: I am not aware of any manufacturer that supplies tile filters recommended in this proposal. The NFPA 850 Committee should not be recommending materials that are not commercially available. This section should be deleted.

(Log #CP7) 850- 34- (6-6.3): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Electric Generating Plants RECOMMENDATION: Revise 6-6.3 to read:

"A smoke detection system should be installed to provide early warning and alarm functions in the event of an electrical fire within the enclosure." SUBSTANTIATION: Clarification. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 25 NOT RETURNED: 1 Clayton

(Log #CP8) 850- 35 - (6-6.4): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Electric Generating Plants RECOMMENDATION: Revise 6-6.4 to read:

"An automatic suppression system should be considered for the enclosures." SUBSTANTIATION: This change allows other types of systems besides gaseous systems. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITrEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 25 NOT RETURNED: 1 Clayton

(Log #CP1) 850- 36- (7-4.2.4.2, 7-5.2.6): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Electric Generating Plants RECOMMENDATION: In the first sentence of 7-4.2.4.2 and 7- 5.2.6, the word "plug gauges" should be "plugages". SUBSTANTIATION: Editorial. COMMITI'EE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 25 NOT RETURNED: 1 Clayton

(Log #CP24) 850- $7 - (9-2.1): Accept SUBMITrER: Technical Committee on Electric Generating Plants RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read:

9-2.1 The responsibility for fire prevention and fire protection for the entire site during the construction period should be clearly defined. The administrative responsibilities should be to develop, implement, and periodically update file internal orogram as necessary ~ the measures outlined in this recommended sPractice.

UBSTANTIATION: Clarification. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26 VOTE ON COMMITrEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 25 NOT RETURNED: 1 Clayton

29

N F P A 8 5 0 - - F 9 9 R O P

(Log #CP25) 850- 38- (9-2.3): Accept SUBMITrER: Technical Committee on Electric Generating Plants RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read:

9-2.3 The fire prevention and fire protection program should include a Fire Risk Evaluation of the construction site and construction activities at any construction ~ site. (See Chapter

SUBSTANTIATION: Editorial. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26 VOTE ON COMMrrTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 25 NOT RETURNED: 1 Clayton

(Log #CP26) 850- 39- (9-2.8): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Electric Generating Plants RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read:

9-2.8 Construction and installation of fire barriers and nrotecfive ooenin~ devices (i.e.. fire doors, damners, etcA should be given priority in the construction schedule. SUBSTANTIATION: The change is more expansive. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 25 NOT RETURNED: 1 Clayton

(Log #CP27) 850- 40 - (9-$.1.3): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Electric Generating Plants RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read:

9-5.1.3 Fire tools and equipment should be used for fire emergencies only and should be distinctly marked

SUBSTANTIATION: Clarification. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26 VOTE ON COMMrITEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 25 NOT RETURNED: 1 Clayton

(Log #CP28) 850- 41 - (9-3.2): Accept SUBMITrER: Technical Committee on Electric Generating Plants RECOMMENDATION: Delete text as follows:

9 $.2 Cc.nz~---cticn Equ~mcz:.L Cc.nz~-~c'.Jc.n cqu'~:...cnt :hculd

Prc.tcct~c:=. NFPA 512 has been withdrawn. SUBSTANTIATION: Editorial. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 25 NOT RETURNED: 1 Clayton

(Log #CP29) 850- 42 - (9-4.4.2): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Electric Generating Plants RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read:

94.4.2 Automatic sprinkler systems should be designed and installed in accordance with the applicable NFPA standards.

! . l t . Waterflow alarms should be provided and . z : : . t ~ s~, ~ ,c, vc monitored at a constantly attended location as determined by the individual responsible for fire prevention and fire protection. SUBSTANTIATION: Editorial. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 25 NOT RETURNED: 1 Clayton

(Log #CP30) 850- 43 - (9-7.1.1): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Electric Generating Plants RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read:

9-7.1.1 Where practical, the permanent underground yard system, fire hydrants, and water supply (at least one water source), as indicated in Chapter 4, should be installed during the early stages of construction. Where provision of all or part of the permanent underground system and water supply is not practical, temporary systems should be provided. Temporary water supplies should be hydrostatically tested, flushed, and arranged to maintain a high degree of reliability, including protection from freezing and loss of power, ff there iS a possibility that the temporary system will be used for the life of the nlant, then the temoorarv system should meet the reauirements-indicated in Chanter 4. SUBSTANTIATIOI~I: Clarification. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 25 NOT RETURNED: 1 Clayton

COMMENT ON AFFIRMATIVE: MALANGA: Improved wording - Add "or otherwise approach

that of a permanent installation" after the words "...for the life of the plant...".

(Log #CP31 ) 850- 44 - (9-8.2(e)): Accept SUBMrlq'ER: Technical Committee on Electric Generating Plants RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read:

(e) Welding. ~rindin~ or open flames are in use. SUBSTANTIATION: -Clarification. COMMITrEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 25 NOT RETURNED: I Clayton

(Log #4) 850- 45 - (10-1.1): Accept SUBMITTER: Paul H. Dobson, Factory Mutual Research Corp.

I RECOMMENDATION: Add the following to Section 10-1.1. NFPA 750, Standard for the Installation of Water Mist Fire

Protection Systems, 1996 edition SUBSTANTIATION: Reference for information which would be needed to properly install a fine water spray system for protection of combustion turbines. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITrEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 25 NOT RETURNED: 1 Clayton

(Log #13) 850- 46 - (A-5-7.4.2.1): Accept in Principle SUBMITrER= Harold D. Brandes Jr., Duke Power Company RECOMMENDATION: Add the following text:

"Automatic actuation is preferable to manual actuation° Automatically actuated systems have proven to actuate properly under fire conditions and are not prone to spurious actuation." SUBSTANTIATION: This statement will provide owners, operators, and design engineers with the best advice and experience of the committee. COMMITI'EE ACTION: Accept in Principle.

Rewrite 5-7.4.2.1 as follows: 5-7.4.2.1 Turbine generator beatings should be protected with

closed-head sprinkler system utilizing directional nozzles. Automatic actuation is more reliable than manual actuation. Fire protection systems for turbine-generator bearings should be designed for a density of 0.25 gpm per sq ft (0.17 L/sec-m2) over the protected area.

Move the second sentence of the proposal into the appendix. COMMr[TEE STATEMENT: The Committee wished to move this recommendation to the body of the document for emphasis. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26

30

N F P A 8 5 0 / 8 5 1 - - F9 9 R O P

VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 25 NOT RETURNED: 1 Clayton

Editorial Correction

The Technical Committee on Electric Generating Plants proposes the following editorial change to NFPA 850, P~commende,l Practice for Fire Protection for Electric Generating Plants and High Voltage Direct Curreat Converter Stations, 1996 edition:

1. Section 4-2.1 (a)',!, last sentence should read: "...transformer not adequately separ~tted according to 3-1.4." (original text reads 3- 1.3).

PART II

(Log #CP1) 851- 1 - (Entire Document): Accept SUBMITrER: Tech~ficai Committee on Electric Generating Plants RECOMMENDATION: Review SI unit conversions. Also, the staff should review individual conversions within NFPA 850 and NFPA 851 for errors. For example, NFPA 850 sections 5-4.6.5.1 and 5- 6.5.2.2 convert 0.20 gpm/f t2 to different values. SUBSTANTIATION: The SI unit conversions used in NFPA 850 and NFPA 851 do not match NFPA 13. NFPA 13 uses L/min. NFPA 850 and NFPA 851 use L/s. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITI'EE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26 VOTE ON COMMrl?rEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 25 NOT RETURNED: 1 Clayton

(Log #CP2) 851- 2 - (Chapter 2): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Electric Generating Plants RECOMMENDATION: Revise Chapter 2 as follows:

Chapter 2 A~min:e'-"-r:'e Conic!= Fire Risk Control P ro~am 2-1 General. 2-1.1 This chapter provides recommended criteria for the development of a Fire Risk Control program which contains administrative procedures and controls necessary for the execution of the fire prevention and fire protection activities and practices for hydroelectric generating plants. 2-1.2 The Fire Risk control Program :-'~-./n:-'~'-':c z c ~ c L : recommended in this chapter should be reviewed and updated

eriodicall~'. 1.3 The intent of this chapter can be met by incorporating the

features of this chap,~er in the plant's operating procedures or otherwise as determined by plant management. 2-2 Management Policy and Direction. 2-2.1 Corporate ma,aagement should establish a policy and institute a comprehenmv¢ Fire risk Control program to: promote the conservation of property=awl- continuity of opera t ions :andes well--as protection of safety to life by adequate fire prevention and fire protection measures at each facility. 2-2.2 Proper preventative maintenance of operating equipment as well as adequate opcr~ttor training are important aspects of a viable fire prevenuon program. 2 ~ ~ r c P-zk E;'~2"-av.~.u. MOVE TO THE BEGINNING OF C H A P ~ R 3 A ~ rc Pdzk E;v2ua~dzn :hcu!~ ~c !n ' ta tc~ e:--! 7 ":

or . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , mad

Fire Risk Control Program -2-42-3.1 Fire Prevention Program. A written plant fire prevention program should be established and, as a minimum, should include the following:

(a) Fire safety information for all employees and contractors. This information should include, as a minimum, familiarization

with fire prevention procedures, plant emergency alarms and procedures, and how to report a fire.

(b) Documented re~_ularlv sch¢~uled plant inspections including provisions for remedial actions to correct conditions that increase fire hazards.

(c) A description of the general housekeeping practices and the control of transient combustibles.

(d) Control of flammable and combustible liquids and gases in accordance with appropriate NFPA standards.

(e) Control of ignition sources j ~ tc "nzlude smoking,

~ rindin~, welding, and cutting. (See NFPA 51B, Standard for Fire revenuon in Use of Cutting and Welding Processes.) (f) Fire prevention surveillance. (See NFPA 601, Standard for

Security Services in Fire Loss Prevention.) (g) Fire report, including an investigation and a statement on

the corrective action to be taken. (See Appendix B.) 2-4 Fire Protection Program -2-~-2.4.1 Testing, Inspection, and Maintenance. -2-ra~2-4.1.1 Upon installation, all fire protection systems should be preoperationally inspected and tested in accordance with applicable NFPA standards. Where appropriate standards do not exist, inspection and test procedures outlined in the purchase and design specifications should be followed. ~.~2r 2~.1.2 All fire protection systems and equipment should be periodically inspected, tested, and maintained in accordance with applicable National Fire Codes®. (See Table 2-4.2 for guidance.)

Table 2-4.2 Reference Guide for Fire Equipment Inspection, T e s t ~ , and Maintenance

NFPA No. Item Supervisory and Fire Alarm Circuits 72 Fire Detectors 72 Manual Fire Alarms 72 Sprinkler Water Flow Alarms 13/72 Sprinkler and Water Spray Systems 15/13/25 Foam Systems 11A/11C/16/25 Halogenated Agent, Chemical, & 12/12A/17/2001

CO ~ Systems Fire Pumps & Booster Pumps 20/72 Water Tanks & Alarms 13/22/72 P.I.V.s and O.S. & Y. Valves 13/72 Fire Hydrants and Associated 13/24

Valves Fire Hose and Standpipes &Hose 14/1962/25

Nozzles Portable Fire E x t i n g u i s h e r s ~ 10/-1-962-

Fire Brigade Equipment 1971/1972/1973/1974 Fire Doors & DamDers 80/90A Smoke Vents 204M Emergency Lighting 70 Radio Communication Equipment 1221 Fine Water Mist Snrav Systems 750/72

NOTE: Inspection intervals for unat tended plants may be permitted to be extended to normal plant inspections. -24~- 2-4.1.$ Testing, inspection, and maintenance should be documented with written procedures, results, and follow-up

actions recorded and tracked for closure. -2-62-4.2 Impairments. -2-£~- 2-4.2.1 A written procedure should be established to address impairments to fire protection systems, and as a minimum this procedure should include the following:

(a) Identification and tracking of impaired equipment. (b) Identification of personnel to be notified (e.g., plant fire

brigade chief, public fire department, etc.). (c) Determination of needed fire protection and fire prevention

measures. (d) identifv additional pro'tecfiv¢ measures as necessary (j,¢.,

temDorarv water SUDDIv. additional fire hose) -2-~.~ 2~.2.2 Impairments to fire protection systems should be as short in duration as practical. If the impairment is planned, all necessary parts and personnel should be assembled prior to remowng the protection system(s) from service. When an impairment is not planned, or when a system has discharged, the repair work or system restoration should be expedited. ,2A~-2~.2.3 Proper reinstallation after maintenance or repair should be performed to ensure proper systems operation. Once repairs are complete, tests that will ensure proper operation and

31

N F P A 8 5 1 - - F 9 9 R O P

restoration of full fire protection equipment capabilities should be made. Following restoration to service, the parties previously notified of the impairment should be advised. The latest revision of the design documents reflecting as-built conditions should be available to ensure that the system is properly reinstalled (e.g., drawings showing angles of nozzles). 2-4.3 Management of Change. 2-4.3.1 A system should be imnlemented that would ensure tha~ the appronriate indlvidual(sl with fire nrotection responsibility. ~r¢ made aw'dr¢ of new construction, modifications to existing structures, changes to onerating conditions, or other action that could imt)act the fire nrotection of the nlant. The Fire Risk Evaluation and the ant)ronriate nrocedures and prggrams discussed in this chanter might need to be revised to reflect the impact of flais action~ LL~ 2-4.4 Fire Emergency Plan. A written fire emergency plan should be developed, and, as a minimum, this plan should include the following:

(a) Response to fire alarms and fire systems supervisory alarms. (b) Notification of personnel identified in the plan. (c) Evacuation of personnel not directly involved in fire-fighting

activities from the fire area. (d) Coordination with security forces or other designated

personnel to admit public fire department and control traffic and personnel.

(e) fire nrenlanning which defines Fire extinguishment activities. (f) Periodic drills to verify viability of the plan. (g) Control room operator(s) and auxiliarv op¢i'~tor(sl activities

during fire emergencies. Approved breathing apparatus should be readily available in the control room area. ~g2-4.5 Fire Brigade. ~-~-I- 2~.5.1 The size of the plant and its staff, the complexity of fire-fighting problems, and the availability and response time of a public fire department should determine the requirements for a fire brigade. ~.-.-.-~2~.5.2" if a fire brigade is provided, its organization and training, induding special fire-fighting conditions unique to hydroelectric plants, should be outlined in written procedures. ~ .~2 -4 .5 .$ Cable tray fires, unique to hydroelectric generating plants, should he handled like any fire involving energized electrical equipment. It may not be practical or desirable to deenergize the cables involved in the fire. Water is the most effective extinguishing agent for cable insulation fires but should be applied with an electrically safe nozzle. Some cables [polyvinyl chloride (PVC), Neoprene, or H)~aalon] can p.roduce dense smoke in a very short time. In addition, PVC liberates hydrogen chloride (HCI) gas. Self-contained breathing apparatus should be used by personnel attempting to extinguish cable tray" fires. SUBSTANTIATION: This chapter was editorially revised to be consistent with NFPA 850. COMMITrEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 25 NOT RETURNED: 1 Glayton

(Log #t) 851- 3- (5-3): Accept SUBMITrEIR: A. M. Mian, Manitoba Hydro RECOMMENDATION: Revise Section 5-$ as shown:

5-3. Generator P i t ~ d Windings 5-3.1 Protection of generator windings consisting of

thermoplastic materials should be provided by automatically actuated gaseous extinguishing systems, waterspray rings, or both.

of Ukc : ; 'c .~ng "z-.zu!~.'Scn c..q~ tkc ~'Ang c.f th= g=ncr.~=or. 5-$.2 Protection of eenerator nits containine auxiliary circuits

such as protection current transformers (CT's). neutral ~ransformer. and mcounding resistors which are associatqd with generator Drotection should be provided hv an automatically ~¢l;~ated ~Zaseons extinguishing swstem or water spray system. 5 - 3 . 3 Gaseous suppression systems should be actuated by protective relays or fire detection systems or both.

9.p__e_r.B_t~ of waterspray rings should be manually actuated ~r aut~ma'Aca!!~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . a ~.I ~- interlocked ~)~tcm L~c.t rcqu'rc~ .t. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . : . . ^ k^ ~:_~ .̂svr~. so that the unit will trio before the system

PRECAUTION: Immediately after the generator has been snraved with a water based system it should be mechanically run (electrically isolated and without excitation1 for at least 24 hours to avoid creating stator ~ o u n d faults on both types of wi~lcting

SUBSTANTIATION: The present fire protection Section 5-3.1 on the generator windings recommends fire protection for windings regardless of their composition. Depending on the types of composition material, a fire protection system may not be necessary, especially for thermosetting wmdings, because of the self-extinguishin~ properties of the winding materials.

All hydroelectncgenerator windings use thermoplastic or thermosetting windings. Thermoplastic windings consist of asphalt/mica, paper tape, strand insulation with cotton or asbestos bonded and with a thermoplastic resin. Thermosetting windings consist of epoxy resin/mica and polyester/mica, Dacron-polyester film or Dallas-polyester glass fibres bonded, and with a thermosetung resin.

The task group conducted a world wide fire loss experience survey. The survey asked for reports on fires involving thermosetting and thermoplasuc windings. Based upon reported loss experience by electrical utilities and major suppliers o f generator windings it was concluded that fires in generator thermosetting windings are self-extinguishing.

Fire protection measures for GT's, neutral transformers, and grounding resistors have also been added in Section 5-3.2 because this eqmpment contains Thermoplastic material. A failure of any one of these can present a fire hazard around the generator and field cabling. These measures are proposed based on the reported fire loss experience in electrical utilities and the types of combustible insulation materials involved in the CT's, neutral transformers and grounding resistors. COMMITrEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 26 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 25 NOT RETURNED: 1 Clayton

32