allegretti participatory budgeting wellington 221112
DESCRIPTION
Giovanni Allegretti is an architect and senior researcher at the Centre for Social Studies at the University of Coimbra, Portugal. Presentation given on Thursday 22nd November 5.30 – 8pm Wellington Public Library – Mezzanine Floor Meeting Room – lift across from Clarks CafeTRANSCRIPT
DEEPENING DEMOCRACY VIA PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING
22nd November 2012Wellington
Attempts of a definition of
PB
1
When we talk about PB, we are referring to an IDEOSCAPE, i.e. a
model travelling around the world, which becomes real in the
different places where it happens, and whose name is note
necessarily that representative…participativo - Budżet Partycypacyjny - Bilancio Partecipativo - deltagend
Source: Learning from the South, 2010, GIZ- Bonn
But does a “minimum common denominator” exist? And does it
need continuity or discontinuity with the pre-existing
participatory practices?
What is this common “minimum denominator”:
• According to the PB-Unit (english think thank on PB):
• Participatory budgeting is a democratic process which ENTRUST CITIZENS (and no formal citizens, too) to decide how to allocate part of a municipal budget or another budget that affects them…
So, is not just a “device” or a “technique”, but a series of principles that can use different methods and techniques to be “translated” into concrete action, according to local possibilities.
!5
WHY PB? If we take one of the definitions given by the PB Unit,
PB is based on four hypothesis:
1)That opening decision on “money” is highly practical and symbolic
2)That is possible to RIBUILD social trust
3)That both citizens and politician are better than in the other’s perspective (social collective intelligence)
4) That, in the world of today, is better starting from the individuals and then invite them to meet and listen to each other is more effective
PATIENCE is NEEDED for implementing a good process and having strong results!
AN EXAMPLE:
PORTUGAL
EXPLOSION by
CONTAGION
Source: Nelson Dias,
2012
PB beyond parties? (Portugal, 2002 /2012)42
12 11
3 3 2
Series1
Fonte: Nelson Dias | 2012
9
It’s main differences with other pre-existing tools of CONSULTATION are that is
not an INDIVIDUAL DIALOGUE between a single citizen or a single group and
one politician that is fostered :
but
… but a LEARNING BY DOING
ENVIRONMENT.
That’s why it helps to build “mutual trust”, helping to deal
with COMPLEXITY WHILE CO-DECIDING
ADOPTING PBs as “a continuity” or a “discontinuity” in relation to past experiences? Could it become na
“engine” coordinating other spin-offs?
Participatory
Budgeting
Programa
BH -Cidadania
Social Inclusion
Municipal
Plan of Sanitation
Master Plan
of Urban Drainage
Global Specific
Plans of Slums
City Master Plan
and District Plans
Regionalised
Participatory
Planning (PPR)
Social Guidelines
PRogram of
priority roads
11
PB’s MAIN FEATURES ARE:
1) explicitly discussing financial issues (resources are not always guaranteed) 2) Having cycles (negotiating needs time)3) Coinciding with an institutional responsibility (is not a “devolved pot” as in the Community Driven Development, but implies a relation with political authorities)4) Having some degree of co-decision5) Giving feedbacks to citizens
(Source: Marc Bloch comparative research, 2005-2009, Berlin)
12
Sometimes TRANSFERS and emulation look strange and models are unaware of their weight in innovation elsewhere…
• It is the case of Christchurch, which beacame the inspirational source for many German PBs (based on a “consultation on public finance” procedure) after the Bertelsmann Award for “Democracy and Efficacy of the Administration” in 1993 (through the “Cities of Tomorrow Network”) because of its system of community boards and web-transparency (NPM approach).
• It is also the case of the Hungarian 1% Budget, which is today the base of japanese PBs.
13
WHEN PB WAS BORN IN LATIN AMERICA it was mainly a matter of “EQUAL DISTRIBUTION OF
RESOURCES”, if we consider the African Models, today, is a PIVOTAL TOOL to collect resources
Porto Alegre: l’epicentro
PB essence moved from
EXPENSES to the CREATION OF
INCOME and LOCAL FINANCIAL
AUTHONOMY (so
DEVELOPEMENT). See Rural
Senegal or Madagascar
(extractive industries)
Macromodels2
The Empowerment LinePB works in different ways, but should aim to be
meaningful and change how money is spent
Communicating Consulting InvolvingDecision
makingPartnership
Passive engagement (not PB) Empowerment through PB
Scope of PB activity
Progression
16
PHASE 1:
Mobilization of citizens
and employeesPHASE 2:
Structuring
and
Implementation
of public dialogue
PHASE 3:
Monitoring and
implementation of
Common decisions
Ciclo de discussão Ciclo de execução
PHASE 0:
Creation of
pre-conditions for
implementing PB
ONE PROCESS, TWO INTERLINKED CYCLES:
PROPOSING -> DECIDING -> IMPLEMENTING
THREE MAIN TYPOLOGIES OF PBs
TERRITORIA
LTEMATICACTORIAL
FACE-TO-FACE APPROACH
VIRTUAL/DIGITAL APPROACH
MIXED APPROACH (variable geoetry)
THEY CAN OVERLAP Source: Nelson Dias,
2012
LOGIPARC – Poitiers (France)
19
“ENCOURAGING DESIGNs” need to
be imagined, especially where
concentration of critical issues is high
(in Europe immigrants without voting
capacity, poor areas) in order to
guarantee PLURALITY and
DIVERSIFICATION OF PARTICIPANTS
Young People and
Schools PBs in Europe
20
TWO MAIN APPROACH TO DECISION-MAKING
CO_DECISIO
NALCONSULTATIVE
Source: Nelson Dias,
2012
22
“Branding matters”? Analyses show that “concretizing” decisions and mouth-to-mouth
works better...
It means that citizens have to be involved in both cycles (either if
they are overlapped or the process is biennial)
Virtual+
25
THE CYCLE OF CO-DECISION
APPROVAL OF PREVISIONAL
BUDGET
Winter
CITIZENS’ VOTE
PLAN OF FEED-BACKS
Feedback citizens’ Assemblies
Presentation of projects
and voting phase.
AUTUMN
PARTICIPATORY PLANNING
Thematic Assemblies
Feasibility evaluation.
Transformation of proposals to into
projects
SUMMER-AUTUMN
MAKING NEEDS AND
PROPOSALS EMERGE
Neighbourhood Assemblies
SPRING
…AND A CYCLE OF CO-IMPLEMENTATION…
HOW AN AVERAGE CYCLE LOOKS LIKE
THE PIVOTAL ROLE of the “MANAGEMENT OF EXPECTATIONS”
S ≥ R - E
Virtual
“SATISFACTION ≥ RESULTS – EXPECTATIONS”
THE CO-DECISIONAL PBs impliy “giving-up” a part of the decisional DISCRETIONALITY of PUBLIC
AUTHORITIES, but they make EXPECTATIONS MORE REALISTIC and CO-RESPONSBILIZE PEOPLE , so
produce higher results
And they are usually more SUSTAINABLE
and LONG-LASTING27
PERCEPTIONS of CITIZENS ARE VERY IMPORTANT and HAVE TO BE MONITORED CONSTANTLY.
‘If it feels like we have decided ---- it’s PB. If it feels like someone else has decided, it isn’t.’ Brazilian resident involved in PB
THE CASE of
ZEGUO, CHINA
29
INCREASING SATISFACTION: THE CASE OF OREBRO (SWEDEN)
30
The importance of Celebrations and Symbolic moments/places
(marae?)
Which goals?3
32
Fighting corruption
TRANSPARENCYGranting accountability
Reducing the debt
Bettering the machine Inve
rting
prio
ritio
es
Territorial redistribution
Social inclusion Socia
l jus
tice
Cutti
ng b
udge
tIn
crea
sing
finan
cial a
utho
nom
y
Dynamizing social fabricReconstructing social links
Com
mun
ity
Deve
lopm
ent
Democratize Democracy
Granting sustainability
Which effects to evaluate, and for which process?
THE COEHERENCE BETWEEN MEANS AND GOALS
Rebuilding mutual trust
33
Arezzo: Focus Group to test
the efficacy of informational
documents
A NEW VISION OF ACCOUNTABILITY
(TRANSPARENCY +
RESPONSIVENESS)
A BETTER INFORMATION
CAPACITY
34
Adapted to the place...to allow access to awareness and skills
35
TRACEABILITY IN EVERY
PHASE (Seville) and control
committees
36
Zanzara Tigre
Mobilità Sostenibile
>>Fine Presentazione
ALTRE INIZIATIVE
Piccioni
Raccolta Differenziata
Iniziative in Circoscrizione
Caro-affitti
Vivibilità Centro Storico
Pulizia strade
SOME EFFECTS CANNOT BE OBTAINED IF THEY ARE NOT
PURSUED…. (conclusions of INCLUIR project)
For example, social inclusion of
minorities and vulnerable groups
need to challenge structural
inequalities with specific tools.
Examples
from
Senegal
and
Ecuador
38
The same happens with the goal of redistributive justice
How to go
beyond the
“usual suspects”,
so the audience
which already is
prepared to
participate
(TRAINING)?
Geographic Area
Priority total
Need total
Population total
Total Score
% of total city score
Resource available (£41,200)
Area A 6 6 9 21 12. 9% £5,314 Area B 3 9 6 18 11% £4,544 Area C 12 12 6 30 18. 4% £7,581 Area D 3 2 2 7 4. 3% £1,772 Area E 12 2 2 16 9. 8% £4,038
etc ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Total for all areas of the city 163 100% £41,200
39
More simple ways exists for fostering solidarirty: i.e. CARAVANS seeks to create solidarity, and take into account the needs of ABSENT
people. INFORMALITY is also very important
40
Evolving and
correcting mistakes
THE CASE OF LISBON,
Portugal
Odemira Cascais Lisboa Portimão Aveiro
16.1
13.8
5.9
1.5 0.9
HOW TO CALCULATE COSTS/BENEFITS? The number of participants (in
Portugal)
3.469 23.198 29.911 694 616
Source: Nelson Dias,
2012
Cascais
Amador
a
Odemira
V. F. X
ira
Condeix
a
Lisboa
Portim
ão
Caldas
Rainha
Aveiro
Trofa
6.3
3.12.6 2.4 2.3
1.61 0.9
0.40.05
% of PB on Municipal Investments (Portugal) Source: Nelson Dias,
2012
Odemira Portimão Cascais V.F. Xira Lisboa Caldas Rainha
Amadora Aveiro
19.217.9
12.2
7.3
4.62.9 2.8
0.3
PB investments per capita (Euros) in Portugal Source: Nelson Dias,
2012
SOME LONG-TERM EFFECTS
4
Small interventions benefit PME local enterprises and generate a
new territorial redistribution of public resources (1 billion R$ untill
now)EMPREENDIMENTOS APROVADOS POR TEMÁTICA
1,3
9,7
3,7
1,1
40,0
1,9
11,0
3,1
28,2
0,0 5,0 10,0 15,0 20,0 25,0 30,0 35,0 40,0 45,0
Cultura
Educação
Esporte
Habitação
Infraestrutura
Meio Ambiente
Saúde
Social
Urbanização de Vila
Wealthy actors usually don’t appear…
The Grottammare example: “Stop new beach-housing in a touristic city; let’s improve the quality of water
and beach-facilities accordin to the
eco-system protection” (1994)
Winner of the EU blue-flag (1999/2005)
Reproducing the Porto Alegre model, where (in 10 years) 9
shores in the polluted lake were made safe for bathing
BP better addresses the goals of SUSTAINABILITY
It requires detailed deliberation on
the centarl and side.issues (through
SPIN-OGFFs)
The case of Borbona (Lazio): a strategy of sustainability which enriched the resources of PB through savings
Fragilities5
PB success depends on how
CENTRAL or MARGINAL it is,
within the local political strategy.
The case of Belo Horizonte
What are PB’s main structural LIMITS, i.e. its fragility/volatility? They are strictly linked to:1) Minimal prerequisites to be implemented (political will, a cohesion in the social fabric, a minimal financial autonomy, a good subdivision of the territory, an institutional structure which works and could be bettered, a good PB organizational ARCHITECTURE)2) The difficulty of reaching “diversity” in participants (let aside the “representativity” issue…rich sectors and the most poor are absent) 3) The growing scarcity of local financial resources within an incomplete decentralization framework
52
ARE PBs FRAGILE? Only when they create unrealistic expectations, and are not “RESILIENT”Analyzing fragilities to create “contention walls”
for the still ongoing processes…
Fonte: Alves/Allegretti (2012) baseado
em dados de Nelson Dias
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
1 36 6
1418
23
13
2531
28
-1 -3
-13
-4-8
-18
Ongoing PBs Interrupted PBs
Ongoing and interrupted (2002- 2012)
Fonte: Nelson Dias | 2012
Ruling party in Portuguese cities that have abandoned PBs, until 2010. The majority have
been interrupted by the same government that created them… Why?
55
The cycle of life and death…
DELIBERATION/
NEGOTIATION
INDIVIDUALISM
CONSULTATIVE DECISIONAL
CASES OF IN PORTUGAL BY MODEL
3
17
27
23
Interrupted PBs Ongoing PBs
Source: Nelson Dias,
2012
HOW DOES A “RESILIENT PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING*”
LOOK LIKE?
(RESILIENCE IS THE CAPACXITY OF ADAPTATION TO SURVIVE TO THE TRANSFORMATION OF
EXTERNAL ENVIROINMENT AND CONDITIONS…)
Fonte: Alves/Allegretti (2010)
Does a resilient capacity of transformation relay on clear principles? Yes, transformations along time could
be “oriented” by these ideas:
1) Maintaining people at the “centre” (for example in filtering)
2) Respecting authonomy between society and institution, being complementary to representative democracy
3) Being evolutionary (inctrementality – not repetition of a “ritual”)
Models of PB dissemination in Portugal, which can contribute to that…
Local design based on adaptation of International Models
Desenho local do processo baseado na adaptação de modelos nacionais e/ou internacionais
Implementation based on copy-paste from Internet
1ª Fase
2ª Fase
3ª Fase
Source: Nelson Dias,
2012
Che relazioni con il “Programma” elettorale?
A FAKE PROBLEM: the conflict with representative Democracy, and
electoral programs:
1) The PB is more realistic and concrete, acting as a “diacronic” filter of
what to do, in time…
2) Is representativeness so represenative? Could it catch diversity?
3) Upkeeping is easier, when there is major “onwership” of public works..
PB can compete com other process and must be rrclearly definined…
Parce que sens perception de l’innovation, n’a pas d’innovations et d’enracinement/durabilitè…
It needs that what is promised is done… (underlying its unicity)
Le BP est faite de deux cycles
From limits to challenges
6
64
RESETTING THE USE OF ICTs in an adequate and coherent manner?
65
Evaluating is always fundamental for saving energies and optimizing
investments (which in PB are also emotional, and not only material)…
BUT, OFTEN, both POLITICIANS and CITIZENS are scared of
evaluation, or they do not have RESOURCES
66
It helped to understand what are PB’s main structural LIMITS, i.e. its fragility/volatility strictly linked to:1) Minimal prerequisites to be implemented (political will, a cohesion in the social fabric, a minimal financial autonomy, a good subdivision of the territory, an institutional structure which works and could be bettered, a good PB organizational ARCHITECTURE)2) The difficulty of reaching “diversity” in participants (let aside the “representativity” issue…)3) The growing scarcity of local financial resources within an incomplete decentralization framework
Thinking in terms of RAISING DIVERSITY
The Dilemma of participation by ADVOCACY.
69
Scaling-up helps dissemination
The case of Solecki Funds in Poland (since 2009)
Fonte: SLLGO, 2012
71
A NEW OPPORTUNITY: the SCALING-UP (South Kivu in RDC, the case of Tuscany and Lazio I Italy, Malaga Province and Andalusia
Region in Spain) - HOW TO IMPROVE QUALITY OF DELIBERATION?
Numeric multiplication
Support for financial
weakness and trembling
coalitions
Fake examples?
Major procedural quality
Introducing PB principles
in other policies